{"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_count": 41, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00070837", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00070837.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nS2 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \nTHE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW \nIN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY \nOF DR. PARK DIETZ AND DR. ELIZABETH LOFTUS \nDAMIAN WILLIAMS \nUnited States Attorney for the \nSouthern District of New York \nOne St. Andrew's Plaza \nNew York, New York 10007 \nAssistant United States Attorneys \nOf Counsel \nEFTA00070837\n", "char_count": 475}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n1 \nI. \nTHE COURT SHOULD PRECLUDE CERTAIN OPINIONS FROM DR. DIETZ \n1 \nA. \nBackground \n1 \nB. \nLegal Standard \n5 \nC. \nDiscussion \n8 \nI. Response to the Opinions of Dr. Rocchio \n8 \n2. Opinions as to Hindsight Bias \n11 \n3. Opinions as to the \"Halo Effect\" \n14 \n4. Opinions as to \"Pathways to False Allegations of Sexual Assault\" \n17 \n5. Opinions Regarding the Credibility of Witnesses \n21 \n6. Opinions Regarding Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms \n22 \nII. \nCERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED EXPERT TESTIMONY OF DR. \nELIZABETH LOFTUS SHOULD BE PRECLUDED \n25 \nA. \nBackground \n25 \nB. \nApplicable Law \n26 \nC. \nDiscussion \n30 \nI. Unobjectionable Opinions by Dr. Loftus \n30 \n2. Commonsense Principles Within the Ken of the Jury \n30 \n3. Opinions Bearing on Witness Credibility and Demeanor \n31 \n4. Factual Narratives About the Case \n32 \n5. Opinions as to False Memory Formation \n33 \nIII. IF DEFENSE CHALLENGES TO DR. ROCCHIO ARE ACCEPTED, THE \nDEFENSE EXPERTS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED \n35 \nCONCLUSION \n37 \nEFTA00070838\n", "char_count": 1037}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "TABLE OF AUTHORITIES \nCases \nAdams v. Laboratory Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2014) \n12 \nAmorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Pass. Corp., 303 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002) \n7 \nBarnette v. United States, No. 12 Civ. 327, 2021 WL 949848 (W.D.N.C. March 12, 2021) \n17 \nBoucher v. US. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 1996) \n8, 23 \nBourjaior v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) \n6 \nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) \npassim \ndeWit v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., No. 16 Civ. 36, 2017 WL 5905575 (N.D. Fl. Jul. 25, 2017) \n \n14 \nDoe by and through Pike v. Pike, 405 F. Supp. 3d 243 (D. Mass. 2019) \n13 \nDoe by and through Pike v. Pike, No. 17 Civ. 40021 (D. Mass.) \n13 \nGen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) \n6 \nHighland Capital Mgmt. v. Schneider, 551 F. Supp. 2d 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) \n8 \nHygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1992) \n8, 12, 22, 32 \nIsland Intellectual Prop. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 09 Civ. 2675 (KBF), 2012 WL 526722 \n(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012) \n7, 17, 33 \nKumho Tire Co., Inc. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) \n6, 8 \nLam v. City of San Jose, No. 14 Civ. 877 (PSG), 2015 WL 6954967 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2015)28 \nLaSalle Bank Nat'l ASS)! v. CIBC Inc., No. 08 Civ. 8426 (WHP) (HBP), 2012 WL 466785 \n(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012) \n8 \nLVL XIII Brands, Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 209 F. Supp. 3d 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)8, 21, \n23 \nMarx & Co. v. Diners Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1977) \n8 \nNimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 2005) \n6, 19 \nP.S. ex rel. Nelson v. The Farm, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (D. Kan. 2009) \n24 \nR.D. v. Shohola, Inc., 16 Civ. 01056, 2019 WL 6053223 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2019) \n28, 29, 32 \nUnited States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973) \n27 \nUnited States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991) \n18 \nUnited States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2005) \n26 \nUnited States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1992) \n26, 27 \nUnited States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 1994) \n8 \nUnited States v. George, 97\n... [truncated, 2790 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/2 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=2]", "char_count": 2790}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "United States v. Shiraishi, No. 17 Cr. 582 (JMS) (RLP), 2019 WL 1386365 (D. Haw. Mar. 27, \n2019) \n27, 28, 29 \nUnited States v. Smith, 148 F. App'x 867 (11th Cir. 2005) \n26 \nUnited States v. Stroming, 838 F. App'x 624 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) \n15 \nUnited States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) \n15 \nUnited States v. Valle, No. 12 Cr. 847 (PGG), 2013 WL 440687 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2013) \n3 \nUnited States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) \n16 \nUnited States v. Welch, 368 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2004) \n30 \nUnited States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) \n6, 8 \nYates v. State, 171 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App. 2005) \n17 \nOther Authorities \nBennett & O'Donohue, \"The Construct of Grooming in Child Sexual Abuse, 23 J. Child Sexual \nAbuse 957 (2014) \n10 \nCraven et al., \"Sexual grooming of children,\" 12 J. Sexual Aggression 287 (2006) \n10 \nDiamond et al., \"The Truth is Out There: Accuracy in Recall of Verifiable Real-World Events,\" \n31 Psychological Science 1544 (2020) \n34 \nDworkin et al., \"PTSD in the Year Following Sexual Assault,\" Trauma, Violence & Abuse 1, 11 \n(2021) \n24 \nPark Dietz, \"Grooming and Seduction\", 33 J. Interpersonal Violence 28 (2018) \n24 \nR. Schmechel, T. O'Toole, C. Easterly, & E. Loftus, Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' \nUnderstanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 Jurimetrics J. 177-214 (2006) \n34 \nRuin \nFed R. Evid. 70 \npassim \nFed R. Evid. 704(a) \n7 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 26.2 \n25 \nFed. R. Evid. 401 \n7 \nFed. R. Evid. 403 \n7, 18, 29, 32 \nFed. R. Evid. 703 \n33 \nFed. R. Evid. 704 adv. comm. n.  \n8 \nEFTA00070840\n", "char_count": 1560}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "PRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nThe Government respectfully moves for the Court to preclude certain opinions from Dr. \nPark Dietz and Dr. Elizabeth Loftus. Rather than focus narrowly on reliable opinions that would \nbe relevant to issues in this case, the defendant proposes to have Dr. Dietz and Dr. Loftus testify \nbroadly about a wide variety of topics, from testimony about various psychological disorders to \ntestimony regarding the generation of false memories in laboratory settings, that are not relevant \nto the issues in this case. Many of those opinions are also unreliable, squarely within the ken of \nthe average juror, or would invade the province of the Court and the jury if offered. \nTo the extent Dr. Rocchio is permitted to testify on her opinions, the Court should admit \nreliable opinions on the same topics by defense experts. But the defense's expert notice for Dr. \nDietz and Dr. Loftus is far more expansive, and some of the defense's responsive opinions are not \nreliable. The Court should preclude many of their opinions. \nI. \nTHE COURT SHOULD PRECLUDE CERTAIN OPINIONS FROM DR. DIETZ \nA. Background \nAs described in the defense expert notice, attached as Exhibit A, the defense offers the \nopinions of Dr. Dietz, an expert psychiatrist, both in response to the Government's expert Dr. Lisa \nRocchio and on several other subjects. \nAs to Dr. Rocchio's opinions, Dr. Dietz offers the following responsive opinions: \n• \nThe word \"grooming\" \"imputes motive and intent without adequate evidence of \neither,\" including to the defendant. (Ex. A at 3). \n• \n\"[G]rooming has no consistent definition, and concerns have been raised that there is no \nvalid method to assess whether grooming has occurred or is occurring.\" (Id. at 4 \n(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). \n• \n\"In any particular population of alleged victims, patients, or plaintiffs—including those \nwhom Dr. Rocchio has treated or evaluated—the determination of whether grooming \nhas occurred is a subjective judgme\n... [truncated, 2068 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/4 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=4]", "char_count": 2068}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Such judgments have no known error rate and cannot be tested, verified, or \nreproduced.\" \n• \n\"There is no generally accepted theory of grooming by third parties,\" and it is not \naccepted in the relevant community. \"[I]t has not and cannot be tested; and there is no \nknown or potential rate of error.\" \n• \nThe notion that \"individuals with particular vulnerabilities are often targeted by \nperpetrators of sexual abuse\" is \"a commonly accepted bit of clinical lore\" that is \"not \nbased on empirical data.\" \nAs explained below, the Government agrees that Dr. Dietz may offer an opinion on the difficulty \nof accurately determining whether an act constitutes grooming, in response to Dr. Rocchio. \nAlthough his remaining opinions purport to respond to Dr. Rocchio, however, they are themselves \nunreliable or invade the province of the jury, and should be precluded. \nBeyond his response to Dr. Rocchio's opinions, Dr. Dietz offers several additional \nopinions, to which the Government objects as discussed herein. As to \"hindsight bias,\" Dr. Dietz \nopines: \n• \nHindsight bias, or \"the tendency to overestimate how predictable or foreseeable an \nevent is after being informed about the outcome of an event,\" exists and has been found \nin various experiments. (Ex. A at 4-5). \n• \nHindsight bias \"affects legal judgments.\" (Id. at 5). \n• \nAwareness of the impact of hindsight bias \"should temper any claims that so called \n`grooming' behaviors should have been noticed and either reported or avoided and that \nfailing to do so constitutes knowledge or intent.\" (Id.). \nAs set forth below, the Government objects that these opinions are within the ken of the jury and \ninvade the province of the jury and the Court. \nDr. Dietz also offers the following opinions as to the \"Halo effect\": \n• \nThe \"Halo effect\" is \"a cognitive bias in impression formation whereby the positive \nevaluation of one characteristic has a radiating effect on how other, non-related \ncharacteristics of the individual are evaluate\n... [truncated, 2028 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/5 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=5]", "char_count": 2028}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "• \n\"Like many people who achieve great power and wealth, JeffIre]y Epstein exploited the \nHalo effect to surround himself with people who would serve his needs.\" (Id. at 6). \n• \nEpstein's personality flaws \"allowed him to use his brilliance to manipulate people to \ndo his bidding and to compartmentalize people into isolated cells in which none had \ncomplete information about his activities.\" (Id. at 7).1\nAs set forth below, the Government objects that these opinions are an irrelevant invitation to July \nnullification and an improper vehicle for introducing a factual narrative. \nDr. Dietz offers a lengthy series of objectionable opinions as to \"Multiple Pathways to \nFalse Sex Assault Allegations.\" (Id. at 7). In relevant part, Dr. Dietz opines: \n• \n\"False allegations of sexual assault do occur, and there are multiple pathways to these \nfalse allegations of sexual assault.\" (Id. at 7). \nHe also lists these \"pathways,\" in terms at times \"drawn nearly verbatim\" from a 2012 article in a \nforensic psychology journal, along with conjectures of ways in which these mental conditions or \ncircumstances could hypothetically lead to false claims of sexual assault, including the following \nexamples: \n• \n\"Lying\": \"Often, humans lie because of what they perceive as the favorable \nconsequences for lying; for sexual assault these consequences could be . . . the severe \nnegative consequences that the alleged perpetrator experiences ... secondary gain from \nvictim status ... excusing behaviors or characteristics of the alleged victim (e.g., sexual \nactivity, pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases) [or] financial gain.\" (Ex. A at 7). \n• \n\"Implied Consent\": \"A false allegation can arise when it was reasonable to believe \nconsent was given but the alleged victim falsely believes that it was not.\" (Id. at 7-8). \n1 The disclosure also notes that \"Dr. Dietz is also prepared to address Jeffrey Epstein's sexual \nbehavior should it prove relevant,\" id. at 7, but as he has not disclosed what o\n... [truncated, 2504 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/6 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=6]", "char_count": 2504}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "• \n\"False Memory\": Dr. Dietz cites principally to the work of Dr. Loftus in describing the \nexistence of false memories. (Id. at 8). \n• \n\"Intoxication\": \"A person who does not accurately recall events that occurred while he \nor she was under the influence or while experiencing the side effects of withdrawal . . \n. may confabulate or fill in the memory lapses with events that seem probable or which \nfor some reason they come to believe `must have' taken place.\" (Id.). \n• \n\"Antisocial Personality Disorder\": \"If an individual with antisocial personality disorder \nis likely to lie to achieve power and pleasure, a false allegation of sexual assault might \nbe the means by which he or she attempts to achieve power over the falsely accused.\" \n(Id.). \n• \n\"Borderline Personality Disorder\": \"[A]n individual with BPD may use a sexual assault \nallegation as a way of impacting a third part for some desired outcome.\" (Id. at 8-9). \n• \n\"Histrionic Personality Disorder\": \"In times when attention is not being received to the \ndesired level, a false allegation of sexual assault may help to pull individuals with \nhistrionic personality disorder out of their depressed state.\" (Id. at 9). \n• \n\"Delirium\": \"Relevant to this pathway are the perceptual disturbances that may be \npresent, including misinterpretations, illusions, or even hallucinations.\" (Id.). \n• \n\"Psychotic Disorders\": \"[D]elusions may lead a person to claim adamantly that sexual \nrelations or events occurred that may be impossible or highly improbable.\" (Id. at 9). \n• \n\"Dissociation\": \"[I]t is possible that in the event of a sexual assault, dissociation may \ncause a person to fill in the parts of the experience that are not clearly remembered with \nevents that for them feasibly could have occurred.\" (Id. at 10). \n• \n\"Intellectual disability\": \"Intellectually disabled individuals, compared to individuals \nwithout ID, have vulnerabilities related to memory and communication that the legal \nsystem may not be equipped to handle \n... [truncated, 2368 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/7 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=7]", "char_count": 2368}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "• \n\"Changes in the core details of the allegation are often used by professionals as indices \nin determining the credibility of a victim's claims.\" (Ex. A at 10). \n• \n\"Additional research is needed, but at this point there is little empirical support to \nindicate that being emotionally upset, distressed, or crying while reporting an assault \nindicates that the report is more likely to be true.\" (Id. at 11). \n• \n\"Individuals who have been sexually assaulted have higher rates of mental disorders \nthan individuals who have not been sexually assaulted,\" and such disorders \"can affect \nmemory and recall, requiring assessment on a case-by-case basis.\" (Id. at 11). \nAs set forth below, the Government objects that these opinions invade the province of the jury and \nare prejudicial. \nFinally, Dr. Dietz offers the following opinions regarding post-traumatic stress disorder \n(\"PTSD\"): \n• \nSignificant portions of victims following sexual assault exhibit \"[v]arying degrees of post-\ntraumatic stress symptomatology.\" (Ex. A at 11). \n• \nPost-traumatic stress symptoms include (but are not limited to) \"distressing memories \nof the event; intense or prolonged psychological distress at exposure to cues that \nsymbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event; marked physiological reactions \nto cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event; avoidance or efforts \nto avoid distressing memories, thoughts, or feelings about or closely associated with \nthe traumatic event(s); and avoidance of or efforts to avoid external reminders (people, \nplaces, conversations, activities, objects, situations) that arouse distressing memories, \nthoughts, or feelings about or closely associated with the traumatic events(s).\" (Id.) \n• \nIndividuals with this subset of post-traumatic stress symptoms \"are particularly \nunlikely to engage in continued communication or friendly gestures with an alleged \nperpetrator, to wear clothing provided by an alleged perpetrator, or to unnecessarily \nr\n... [truncated, 2356 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/8 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=8]", "char_count": 2356}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will \nassist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to \ndetermine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by \nknowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may \ntestify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the \ntestimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the \ntestimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, \nand (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods \nreliably to the facts of the case. \nThe party that proffers the testimony bears the burden of showing that it is admissible by a \npreponderance of the evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 & \nn.I 0 (1993) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)). A district court's \nexclusion of expert testimony will be affirmed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. See \nGen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997). \nA threshold issue is, of course, whether the witness \"is qualified to be an `expert' in the \nsubject matter at issue. See Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 396 n.11 (2d Cir. 2005). \nTestimony from a qualified expert is admissible only if the trial court determines that it is both \nrelevant and reliable. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90; see Kumho Tire Co., Inc. v. Carmichael, 526 \nU.S. 137 (1999). Specifically, in Daubert, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of \nEvidence \"assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a \nreliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.\" 509 U.S. at 597. \"Daubert applies to both \ndefense and government experts.\" United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 148 (2d Cir. 2003). \nApplying Rule 702, the Court must determine whether the expert's reasoning and \nmethodology underlying his testimony is valid, and whether that reasoning or methodology was \napplied reliably to the facts, so as to be relevant and helpful to the jury. See Kumh\n... [truncated, 2137 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/9 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=9]", "char_count": 2137}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "150 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit has emphasized that \"it \nis critical that an expert's analysis be reliable at every step.\" Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Pass. Corp., \n303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002). \"In deciding whether a step in an expert's analysis is unreliable, \nthe district court should undertake a rigorous examination of the facts on which the expert relies, \nthe method by which the expert draws an opinion from those facts, and how the expert applies the \nfacts and methods to the case at hand.\" Id. Minor flaws with an otherwise reliable expert opinion \nwill not bar admission of that evidence; however, the Court should exclude the expert evidence \"if \nthe flaw is large enough that the expert lacks `good grounds' for his or her conclusions.\" Id. \n(quotation marks omitted). \nRules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence state that relevant evidence is \nadmissible when it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less \nprobable than it would be without the evidence, but it may be excluded if its probative value is \nsubstantially outweighed by, among other things, the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the \nissues, and misleading the jury. \"Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading \nbecause of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible \nprejudice against probative force under Rule 403 . \nexercises more control over experts than over \nlay witnesses.\" Daubed, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting authority omitted). \nAmong other things, the Court \"must consider whether an expert's proposed testimony \nwould usurp the province of the judge to instruct on the law, or of the jury to make factual \ndeterminations.\" Island Intellectual Prop. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 09 Civ. 2675 (ICBF), \n2012 WL 526722, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2012) (citations omitted). While Federal Rule of \nEvidence 704(a) provides that \"[ajn opinion is not objectionable just be\n... [truncated, 2038 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/10 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=10]", "char_count": 2038}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "ultimate issue of fact,\" the Second Circuit has admonished courts to take care \"lest [the expert] be \nallowed to usurp the function of the judge.\" Marx & Co. v. Diners Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 511 \n(2d Cir. 1977). Accordingly, courts must not admit \"opinions which would merely tell the jury \nwhat result to reach.\" Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363-64 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. \n704 advisory committee's note); see also United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994) \n(\"When an expert undertakes to tell the jury what result to reach, this does not aid the jury in \nmaking a decision, but rather attempts to substitute the expert's judgment for the jury's.\"). Nor \nmay an expert opine as to a party's state of mind, credibility, intent, or motive. See LaSalle Bank \nNat'l Ass 'n v. CIBC Inc., No. 08 Civ. 8426 (WHP) (HBP), 2012 WL 466785, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. \n14, 2012) (collecting cases); see, e.g., Highland Capital Mgmt. v. Schneider, 551 F. Supp. 2d 173, \n182-183, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). \nFinally, expert opinion should not be offered where it does not fit the facts of the case. \n\"Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-\nhelpful.\" Daubers, 509 U.S. at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki \nMotor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996) (\"expert testimony should be excluded if it is . . . [inter \nalia] in essence an 'apples and oranges comparison' (quoting Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas \nCorp., 727 F.2d 202, 208 (2d Cir. I 984))); see also LVL XIII Brands, Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier \nS.A., 209 F. Supp. 3d 612, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (expert opinion inadmissible where it is \"a \nmismatch for the facts\" of the case). \nC. Discussion \n1. Response to the Opinions of Dr. Rocchio \nAlthough some opinions by Dr. Dietz respond to Dr. Rocchio, each opinion must itself be \nreliable and relevant, as required by Rule 702. See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 148. The Government \n8 \nEFTA00070848\n", "char_count": 1989}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "agrees that at least one of these opinions can meet this test: it is \"within the range where experts \nmight reasonably differ,\"Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 153, and can be tested through \"[v]igorous \ncross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of \nproof.\" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595-96 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the \nGovernment agrees that Dr. Dietz can respond to Dr. Rocchio's testimony about grooming \nbehaviors by suggesting that it is difficult to assess whether grooming has occurred. See 2/25/20 \nTr. at 36:13-37:14, United States v. Randall, No. 19 Cr. 131 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y.) (explaining that, in \nsuch a case, \"the jury, not the trial court, should be the one to decide among conflicting experts\"). \nThat opinion is only one of those noticed by the defense, however. The defense expert \nnotice includes four other sets of opinions that supposedly respond to Dr. Rocchio but do not \nsatisfy the Daubert standard. First, the expert notice—which closely parallels the defense's \nDaubert motion—improperly discusses the facts of this particular case and comments on various \nlegal documents, even though it offers no basis whatsoever to conclude that Dr. Dietz has any legal \nexpertise or has reliably applied any expertise to the facts of this case. In particular, the notice \nstates that Dr. Dietz will opine that Dr. Rocchio's opinion on grooming \"carries the risk of \nimputing motive and intent to the Defendant,\" (Ex. A at 3), that \"Dr. Rocchio's proposed testimony \nis silent as to whether she is expected to impute a theory of `grooming-by-proxy' to the defendant,\" \nand that \"Ms. Maxwell is not accused of soliciting or enticing sexualized massages for herself,\" \nbut instead that she \"recruited and grooming minors to provide sexualized massages for Mr. \nEpstein,\" (id. at 4). These opinions, while potentially relevant to the Court's consideration of a \nDaubert motion, are not properly put before a jury. \n9 \nEFTA0007\n... [truncated, 2005 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/12 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=12]", "char_count": 2005}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Second, certain of Dr. Dietz's opinions about grooming are not themselves reliable or \ninvade the province of the jury. In particular, it is circular to say that \"grooming\" \"imputes motive \nand intent,\" because grooming is defined to be a strategic pattern of behavior used to develop \nrelationships of attachment and coercion between perpetrators and victims. (Ex. A at 3). That is, \nif the behaviors lack the requisite motive and intent, they are not grooming behaviors. If Dr. \nDietz's point is that determining motive and intent is for the factfinder (id.), the Government \nagrees—and Dr. Dietz should not be permitted to testify that grooming behaviors \"impute[] motive \nand intent without adequate evidence.\" (Id.) The adequacy of the evidence is a question for the \njury. Dr. Rocchio's testimony will inform the jury about the existence of grooming behaviors, but \nleave to the jury whether such behaviors occurred in this case. Dr. Dietz is free to tell the jury that, \nin his view, assessing whether grooming occurred is difficult and subjective. (Id. at 4). But it \ninvades the province of the jury to go a further step and tell the jury that it lacks evidence to impute \nmotive or intent. \nThird, Dr. Dietz proposes to opine that the notion that perpetrators target vulnerable victims \nis \"a commonly accepted bit of clinical lore\" unsupported by any empirical data and cannot be \nverified. (Ex. A at 4). This claim is itself unsupported by any evidence. It is also wrong. For \ninstance, an article cited by Dr. Dietz describes a literature review of sexual abuse involving \nteachers, which identified \"factors that make a child vulnerable to educator sexual abuse, such as \nproblems at home with parents, lack of confidence, and participation in other risky behavior.\" (See \nBennett & O'Donohue, \"The Construct of Grooming in Child Sexual Abuse, 23 J. Child Sexual \nAbuse 957, 964 (2014), Dkt. No. 397 Ex. A; Ex A at 4 (citing the same)). Other scholars have \nrecognized that \"[g]rooming \n... [truncated, 2090 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/13 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=13]", "char_count": 2090}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "with \"a poor relationship with their parents,\" who \"do not have many friends,\" or who \"have \nalready been victimized.\" (Craven et al., \"Sexual grooming of children,\" 12 J. Sexual Aggression \n287, 292 (2006), Dkt. No. 397 Ex. A (citations omitted)). Dr. Rocchio's clinical experience is \nsupported by the academic literature, in which perpetrators' targeting of vulnerable victims is well \nestablished. Dr. Dietz must do more to show the reliability of his view than simply call this \nliterature \"clinical lore\" and complain about the lack of data. \nFourth, Dr. Dietz states that \"no authority ... support[s] a theory of grooming-by-proxy.\" \n(Ex. A at 4). To the extent that Dr. Dietz is pointing to the fact that the term \"grooming-by-\nproxy\"—a term that Dr. Rocchio does not employ and that the defense has attempted to inject into \nthe case-is not supported by the literature, that terminological claim is of course irrelevant to any \nissue. To the extent that Dr. Dietz purports to claim that there is no authority supporting the notion \nthat a perpetrator can groom a victim for the purpose of making the victim engage in sexual \nactivities with others, this claim is patently unreliable, as Dr. Rocchio will explain at the Dauber! \nhearing; there is in fact ample literature on the pimp-prostitute relationship and other instances in \nwhich third parties groom an individual for the benefit of someone else. And if the Court excludes \nDr. Rocchio's opinion on this issue, Dr. Dietz's opinion is irrelevant. \nThe Government acknowledges that Dr. Dietz can offer reliable, relevant opinions in \nresponse to Dr. Rocchio. But Dr. Dietz's proposed opinions include legal argument, opinions that \ninvade the province of the jury, and opinions that are themselves unreliable. Those should be \nexcluded. \n2. Opinions as to Hindsight Bias \nDr. Dietz's opinions that hindsight bias exists and should \"temper\" conclusions about \nwhether to impute knowledge to an individual (Ex. A at 5) do not convey any r\n... [truncated, 2038 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/14 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=14]", "char_count": 2038}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "beyond the ken of the average juror and are not helpful to the jury. Instead, they are a virtually \nunprecedented attempt to psychoanalyze the jurors and to supplant both their role as judges of the \nfacts and the Court's role in instructing them. \nThe only possible relevance of hindsight bias in this case is the supposed bias of the jurors \nthemselves. This is not a case where it matters whether the opinion of a witness or a party at some \npoint suffered from hindsight bias. The primary purpose of the testimony is to convince the jurors \nto \"temper\" any conclusion that the defendant formed the requisite intent because the jurors might \nbe suffering from hindsight bias. (Ex. A at 5). Of course a factfinder should not confuse the \nbenefit of hindsight with what was known at the time. But this commonplace truth does not need \ntestimony from a psychiatric expert. \nThe concept of hindsight bias is well within the ken of the average juror. \"Hindsight bias \nis a common-sense concept—everyone knows that `hindsight is 20/20.\"' Adams v. Laboratory \nCorp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014). The prevalence of this common saying shows \nthat jurors plainly understand the ways in which hindsight can bias one's perspective. As such, \nexpert testimony on it is unnecessary and inappropriate. See id. (\"[C]ommon-sense concepts are \nespecially appropriate for consideration by a jury.\"); see also, e.g., United States v. Mulder, 273 \nF.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"[T]he district court should not admit testimony that is directed solely \nto lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help.\" \n(internal quotation marks omitted)). To whatever extent the Court believes further emphasis on \nthis point is helpful, it can give the jury appropriate and neutral instructions to guide its \ndeliberations. What the defense cannot do is skew the jury's deliberations by putting an expert \nimprimatur on testimony that states, in effect, that the jurors s\n... [truncated, 2055 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/15 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=15]", "char_count": 2055}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "of the evidence because they are subject to hindsight bias. This inversion of the courtroom roles—\nin which a party's witness sits in judgment of the jurors-is prejudicial and usurps the function \nboth of the jurors and of the Court in instructing the jury. See, e.g., Nye!, 961 F.2d at 364 \n(\"Whereas an expert may be uniquely qualified by experience to assist the trier of fact, he is not \nqualified to compete with the judge in the function of instructing the jury.\"). \nIf Dr. Dietz's testimony on hindsight bias is helpful to the jury in this case, testimony of \nthis sort would become central to the court system. Every single trial involves a retrospective \nadjudication. \nThe bulk of trials—civil and criminal—involve an assessment of a party's \nknowledge at some point in time before the trial. If a psychiatrist can testify as an expert that the \njurors should second-guess their assessments of what was known to a party because the jurors \nsuffer from hindsight bias, surely many litigants—at least those with the resources—would rush \nto offer such evidence. \nInstead of being routine, as it would be if accepted here, expert testimony regarding the \nhindsight bias of jurors is vanishingly rare. The Government has not been able to find a single \nreported decision in a federal criminal case in which it was admitted. Indeed, the only instance \nthe Government has located of such evidence being arguably admitted in any federal case was in \nDoe by and through Pike v. Pike, 405 F. Supp. 3d 243, 250 (D. Mass. 2019). In that civil case, \nhowever, the infringement of such evidence upon the role of the jury was not argued to the Court. \nIndeed, the initial motion did not even mention hindsight bias at all, and the movant mentioned the \nconcept in passing only in reply but devoted no substantive argument to it. See Doe by and through \nPike v. Pike, No. 17 Civ. 40021 (D. Mass.) (ECF Nos. 47 & 50) (memorandum of law and reply). \nAnd even in that case the Court did not actually admit th\n... [truncated, 2056 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/16 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=16]", "char_count": 2056}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "final ruling until trial,\" Pike, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 250, before which the case settled. There is thus \nscant authority countenancing the introduction of opinions such as this. \nIndeed, even in the somewhat less prejudicial context of evaluating a witness's hindsight \nbias (instead of the jurors'), expert testimony on hindsight bias has been rejected. In DeWit v. UPS \nGround Freight Inc., the court found that an expert opinion on hindsight bias \"merely takes a \ncommonsense concept and applies it to a specific field,\" and thus did not \"concern matters that are \nbeyond the understanding of the average lay person,\" and ultimately excluded it, reasoning that it \n\"therefore would not be helpful to the jury and offers nothing more than what lawyers for the \nparties can argue in closing arguments.\" deWit v. UPS Ground Freight Inc., No. 16 Civ. 36, 2017 \nWL 5905575, at *2 (N.D. Fl. Jul. 25, 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). So \ntoo here.2\nThe defense's offer of Dr. Dietz's opinions on hindsight bias to \"temper\" the jurors' \nassessment of the evidence is thus virtually unprecedented. If this Court allowed such testimony \nin this case, however, it would likely become much more common. This Court should decline to \nopen the door to the routine psychoanalysis of the jury in this way. \n3. Opinions as to the \"Halo Effect\" \nDr. Dietz's opinions concerning the \"Halo effect\"—i.e., that \"the positive evaluation of \none characteristic has a radiating effect on how other, non-related characteristics of the individual \nare evaluated\" (Ex. A at 5)—are irrelevant to any issue to be considered by the jury and appear to \n2 Accordingly, even if the defense somehow put at issue whether a witness's opinion on some \nmatter was affected by hindsight bias—and the Government cannot currently envision how this is \nlikely—the proper way of litigating an issue so squarely within the ken of the jury is through lay \nevidence and argument, not expert testimony. See deWit, 2017 WL 59\n... [truncated, 2032 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/17 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=17]", "char_count": 2032}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "be offered in an effort to encourage jury nullification by engendering sympathy for the defendant, \nas well as to offer a factual narrative based on no reliable evidence through a witness plainly \nincompetent to do so. \nNone of the charges in this case relate in any way to the defendant's appraisal of Jeffrey \nEpstein's character or whether the defendant did or did not view him in the manner suggested by \nthe Halo effect. Simply put, if every word that Dr. Dietz said regarding the \"Halo effect\" and \nEpstein's \"brilliance\" in exploiting it were taken as true, the defendant would be guilty if she met \nthe elements of the charged offenses—exactly as she would be if every word Dr. Dietz said on this \nsubject were disbelieved. Her knowledge and intent are no different if she participated in the \nconspiracy due to the Halo effect or for some other reason? Dr. Dietz's opinions on this topic \nsimply do not tend to negate any element or establish any defense. \nInstead of serving any proper purpose, the apparent intent behind offering Dr. Dietz's \nopinion on the \"Halo effect\" is to engender sympathy for the defendant. But juries are not \"to act \nbased on their . . . sympathy.\" United States v. Stroming, 838 F. App'x 624, 627 (2d Cir. 2021) \n(summary order); see, e.g., United States v. Mustaga, 753 F. App'x 22, 37 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary \norder) (\"The district court correctly recognized that evidence of solitary confinement could be used \nfor the improper purpose of provoking juror sympathy.\"). Any attempt to encourage such \nsympathy is therefore an attempt at nullification, which is itself plainly improper. See, e.g., United \nStates v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997) (Jury nullification is \"by no means a right or \n3 Evidence of the defendant's motive may be relevant evidence proving the offense, but evidence \nthat a \"Halo effect\" gave the defendant a motive to commit the crime has no relevance as defense \nevidence at trial. \n15 \nEFTA00070855\n", "char_count": 1975}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "something that a judge should encourage or permit if it is within his authority to prevent.\"); id. \nat 614 (\"We categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law, jury \nnullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to \nprevent.\"); see also United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) \n(\"A jury has no more `right' to find a `guilty' defendant `not guilty' than it has to find a `not guilty' \ndefendant `guilty,' and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can \nbe, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial \nof due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.\" (emphasis in original)). \nCompounding the improper nature of this testimony, the defense appears to seek to use Dr. \nDietz to opine as to a complex factual narrative that no reliable process of psychiatric evaluation \ncould produce. Dr. Dietz is not remotely competent to opine that Epstein would \"surround himself \nwith people who would serve his needs\" (Ex. A at 6), or that he was able to \"use his brilliance to \nmanipulate people to do his bidding\" or \"compartmentalize people into isolated cells in which \nnone had complete information about his activities\" (id. at 7-8). Dr. Dietz has absolutely no basis \nto make such broad and sweeping claims about Epstein or his relationships with anyone, much less \nanyone in this case. It appears that Dr. Dietz has reached his conclusions based solely on one \ninterview of Epstein with Steve Bannon in which Epstein \"acknowledge that he gravitated to \npeople of power\" (Ex. A at 6) and some case documents exchanged in discovery (Def. Expert \nNotice Ex. C, attached as Exhibit B). This \"evidence\" does not even support the point—it suggests \nthat Epstein looked to the halos of others, not that he generated one himself. And it is no basis, at \n16 \nEFTA00070856\n", "char_count": 1992}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "all, for Dr. Dietz to suggest to the jury that anyone involved in this case did anything because of \nEpstein's \"halo.\" \nThis factual narration of Epstein's life and apparently the lives of other people who \ninteracted with him, a defense summation based on a nullification defense masquerading as an \nexpert witness opinion, is not based on any competent evidence, and in any event is patently not \nthe product of reliable psychiatric methods reliably applied to this case. See, e.g., Island \nIntellectual Prop., 2012 WL 526722, at *2 (\"It is also inappropriate for experts to act as ... vehicles \nfor factual narrative\"). This \"opinion\" should be precluded. \n4. Opinions as to \"Pathways to False Allegations of Sexual Assault\" \nThe defense's offer of Dr. Dietz's opinions regarding the existence of false allegations of \nsexual assault and the \"multiple pathways to these false allegations of sexual assault\" (Ex. A at 7) \nis a remarkable departure from permissible practice in a criminal trial. The very form and nature \nof all of these opinions is highly prejudicial and seeks to invade the province of the jury and \ndisplace the Court; the offer of these opinions, which are largely lifted \"nearly verbatim\" from a \nsingle journal article (attached as Exhibit C), is not the product of reliable methods applied to the \ncase; the opinions are well within the ken of the jury; and there is no showing whatsoever of any \n\"fit\" between these opinions and the evidence to be presented at trial. \n4 This would not be the first unreliable factual claim made by Dr. Dietz, who testified in a previous \ncriminal case that a defendant got the idea of drowning her children in the bathtub from an episode \nof Law & Order in which a defendant did so and was acquitted on an insanity defense, when in \nfact no such episode existed. See generally e.g., Barnette v. United States, No. 12 Civ. 327, 2021 \nWL 949848, *9-10 (W.D.N.C. March 12, 2021). This led to the reversal of the trial conviction of \nthe defend\n... [truncated, 2094 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/20 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=20]", "char_count": 2094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "The form of Dr. Dietz's opinions-listing a number of disparate circumstances and \npersonality traits, with no showing of any connection to the evidence of this case, and conjecturing \nvarious ways in which they could lead to false allegations of sexual assault—is a breathtaking \ninversion of proper expert opinion. To appreciate the audacity of the defense approach, consider \nif the Government attempted to do something similar. If the defense put on witnesses at trial, and \nthe Government then called in rebuttal an expert psychiatrist to offer opinions on \"Pathways to \nFalse Exculpatory Testimony\" and opined that a variety of circumstances or mental conditions \ncould hypothetically lead individuals to testify in ways that falsely exculpated a defendant, it is \nsafe to assume that the defense would object. What the defense offers here is no less inappropriate. \nBeyond the obvious problems with the form of the opinions, the opinions themselves are \nplainly not admissible under Rule 702. Dr. Dietz's opinion that \"[£false allegations of sexual \nassault do occur\" (Ex. A at 7), is not helpful to the jury. There will be no dispute that allegations \ncan be either true or false, and offering an \"expert\" opinion that allegations can be false is simply \nprejudicial, not only inviting the jury to speculate about the frequency of false allegations but \ngiving the incorrect impression that they are common. Indeed, if Dr. Dietz seeks to offer such \ntestimony that false accusations \"do occur,\" it will open the door for the Government to elicit on \ncross-examination that Dr. Dietz's principal source, which he relies on \"nearly verbatim\" (Ex. A \nat 7), concludes that \"the most recent more methodologically adequate studies have indicated that \nfalse allegations are somewhat rare\" (Ex. B at 101 (citing study estimating the frequency of false \nrape allegations between 2% and 10%)).5 Of course, the Government's view is that this entire \n5 The Government typically cannot introduce evidence\n... [truncated, 2161 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/21 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=21]", "char_count": 2161}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "topic can serve only to distract the jury from their task of determining whether these specific \nallegations are in fact proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus Dr. Dietz should be precluded \nfrom offering this opinion. \nMany of the \"pathways\" Dr. Dietz describes are not just within the ken of the jury, they \nare at the core of the jury's role. It is not helpful to the jury or permissible under Rule 702 for an \nexpert to testify that \"lying,\" a mistake of \"implied consent,\" or \"intoxication\" could lead to a false \naccusation of a crime. Sorting out witness credibility, mistake, or other such circumstances is \nsquarely the function of the jury, which will be instructed by the Court and which does not need \nthe help of a psychiatrist to assess such possibilities. See, e.g., United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d \n91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"Mlle district court should not admit testimony that is directed solely to \nlay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help.\" \n(internal quotation marks omitted)). \nEven as to the opinions that involve psychological conditions, Dr. Dietz's opinions are not \nhelpful to the jury. While Dr. Dietz's descriptions of antisocial personality disorder, borderline \npersonality disorder, histrionic personality disorder, psychotic disorders, delirium, dissociation, \nand intellectual disability at least involve Dr. Dietz's psychiatric training in some way (unlike \npathways such as \"lying\"), it is hardly beyond the ken of juries to know that mental disorders or \naltered mental states may at times motivate people to dissemble or to believe things that are not \nfair to allow the Government to correct the record. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1296 \n(2d Cir. 1991) (\"The weighing of relevance under Rule 403 may be altered when a false impression \nis created by earlier testimony. That is, evidence whose probative value might not ordinarily \noutweigh its prejudicial effect if offered on direct examinat\n... [truncated, 2124 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/22 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=22]", "char_count": 2124}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "true. Attempting to put the imprimatur of an expert on a variety of ways in which mental disorders \ncan lead to unreliable testimony is simply an attempt to invade the province of the jury by putting \na thumb on the scale in their assessment of witness credibility.6 See, e.g., Nimely, 414 F.3d at 398 \n(\"[E]xpert opinions that constitute evaluations of witness credibility, even when such evaluations \nare rooted in scientific or technical expertise, are inadmissible under Rule 702\"); United States v. \nLwnpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (barring expert from testifying as to scientific principle \nrelated to the assessment of witness credibility as impinging on jury's role). \nTo the extent Dr. Dietz's opinions include something outside the ken of the average jury—\nspecifically, that these \"pathways\" occur frequently in sexual assault cases—they are not reliable. \nThe article that Dr. Dietz relies on—in fact \"nearly verbatim,\" (Ex. A at 7)—was intended as a \nresearch agenda to explain the (undoubted) instances of false accusations, not to provide a roadmap \nfor establishing the falsity of any allegation. (See Ex. B at 98 (\"Part of the focus of the present \npaper, then, is to bring attention to the dearth of psychological literature investigating correlates \nand causal mechanisms of false allegations of sexual assault and to propose a model specifying \nthe major causal pathways to false allegations. These pathways are intended as a model for further \nempirical investigation.\" (emphasis added))). Indeed, the authors were emphatic that their article \nnot be misused as a simplistic means of \"determining the accuracy of specific accusations.\" (Ex. \n6 Dr. Dietz should in any event not offer his opinions on false memory, which are apparently \nderivative of Dr. Loftus's. Given that the defense has noticed Dr. Loftus as a witness, if any false \nmemory testimony is appropriate, it should come from Dr. Loftus, whose research it is based on, \nnot from Dr. Dietz summarizing Dr.\n... [truncated, 2134 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/23 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=23]", "char_count": 2134}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "B at 98 (\"[A] legitimate concern about enumerating such pathways is the misuse of psychological \ndiagnoses in determining the accuracy of specific accusations.\")). \nFinally, even to the extent that Dr. Dietz's opinions on any of these \"pathways\" offers any \nexpertise that is truly beyond the ken of the jury, there is no justification for allowing him to offer \nthese opinions in the abstract without any fit to the facts of the case. At a minimum, unless and \nuntil there is any evidence creating a predicate for the relevance of any of these mental disorders, \nit is simply irrelevant—and highly prejudicial—for a psychiatric expert to enumerate a number of \nmental disorders and conjecture that they could cause unreliable testimony. See, e.g., LVL XIII \nBrands, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d at 642 (finding testimony fails Daubert's \"fit\" requirement where \nthere is a lack of \"record foundation\").7 Thus even if, contrary to the arguments above, the Court \nbelieved some of the opinions on these \"pathways\" could under some circumstances be helpful to \nthe jury, the Court should defer on the admissibility of such opinions until the evidence at trial \ncreates a predicate that a witness has a condition creating such a \"pathway.\" And even then, as \ndescribed above, it is likely that such an opinion, based on one article, would be unreliable, only \nmarginally helpful to a jury that can understand the relationship between mental illness and truth-\ntelling, and highly prejudicial by having an expert witness testify to the credibility of other \nwitnesses. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.. \n7 Of course, to the extent a witness's mental condition is relevant, it must be proven through \ncompetent evidence, not through—for example—eliciting on cross-examination of a lay witness a \nhearsay statement of a medical diagnosis. It should also not be simply the subject of lay diagnosis \nby the jury, as Dr. Dietz's notice seems to suggest. Rather, to lay an evidentiary predicate for the \nassessment of a witness\n... [truncated, 2107 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/24 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=24]", "char_count": 2107}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "5. Opinions Regarding the Credibility of Witnesses \nDr. Dietz also offers several different opinions regarding the assessment of the credibility \nof witnesses. These are also not helpful to the jury. \nDr. Dietz's opinion that emotional distress is not predictive of the truthfulness of an \nallegation invades the core of a jury's competency—the evaluation of a witness's demeanor. \nIndeed, in very similar circumstances, the Second Circuit has affirmed the exclusion of scientific \nexpert testimony instructing the jury in how to assess a witness's demeanor. See Lumpkin, 192 \nF.3d at 289 (barring expert from testifying that \"confidence bears little or no relationship to \naccuracy in identifications,\" reasoning that \"Fundamental to the role of juror as trier of fact is the \ntask of assessing witness credibility. And, a witness's demeanor on the stand, including his or her \nconfidence, impacts the assessment of credibility.\"). The same result should apply here. \nSimilarly, Dr. Dietz's opinion that \"professionals\" evaluate \"[c]hanges in the core details \nof the allegations\" to determine credibility, (Ex. A at 10), also invades the province of the jury. \nHow to reconcile inconsistencies in witness accounts, as part of assessing the credibility of \nwitnesses, is at the core of the jury's function. See, e.g., Lumpkin, 192 F.3d at 289. The \nGovernment expects that the Court will instruct the jury on how to assess the credibility of \nwitnesses, and having one party's witness lay down a set of expert-endorsed rules can only make \nit more difficult for the jurors to follow the Court's instructions. See, e.g., Hygh, 961 F.2d at 364. \nDr. Dietz's opinion that individuals who have been sexually assaulted have higher rates of \nmental disorders than individuals who have not been sexually assaulted, and that these disorders \ncan affect memory and recall, is prejudicial and unhelpful. Offering this opinion in this form can \nonly serve to prejudice the jury into making generalizations that\n... [truncated, 2148 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/25 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=25]", "char_count": 2148}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "acknowledges that witness credibility should be assessed on a \"case-by-case basis,\" (Ex. A at 11), \nthat case-by-case assessment is best made by precluding him from offering this prejudicial and \nstereotyping opinion before the jury. \n6. Opinions Regarding Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms \nFinally, Dr. Dietz opines that \"significant proportions\" of victims exhibit post-traumatic \nstress symptomology for \"varying durations\" and that victims with certain symptoms are \n\"particularly unlikely to engage in continued communication or friendly gestures with an alleged \nperpetrator, to wear clothing provided by an alleged perpetrator, or to unnecessarily recreate a \nsexual assault event.\" (Ex. A at 11). \nThis opinion is confusing and appears not to be relevant to the facts of the case. First, Dr. \nDietz's conclusion that victims with certain post-traumatic stress symptoms are unlikely to \n\"unnecessarily recreate a sexual assault event\" is illogical given that it appears to place the \nresponsibility on the victim for experiencing repeated assaults, and at a minimum he should be \nrequired to disclose comprehensibly exactly what behavior he is referring to as unlikely. \nSecond, a critical distinction in this case involves the difference between victims of sexual \nassaults who are involved an ongoing relationship of attachment and coercion with their abusers—\nincluding the power imbalance arising from the age differential between them and the abusers—\nand those who are not. To the extent Dr. Dietz's testimony primarily addresses the latter category, \nsuch an opinion is irrelevant and should be precluded for lack of fit with the facts of the case. See, \ne.g., LVL XIII Brands, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d at 642; Boucher, 73 F.3d at 21 (\"expert testimony \nshould be excluded if it is [inter alia] in essence an apples and oranges comparison\" (internal \nquotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). \n23 \nEFTA00070863\n", "char_count": 1918}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "To the extent Dr. Dietz intends instead to opine on the former category, that opinion is not \nreliable. Such an opinion—essentially that it is highly unlikely for abuse victims to continue \nrelationships with their abusers after the first act of sexual assault—is patently implausible and \ninconsistent with the extensive literature on grooming, the pimp-prostitute relationship, delayed \ndisclosure of sexual assaults, and delayed onset of PTSD, all of which recognize the relative \nfrequency with which victims of sexual assaults continue contact with their abusers. Indeed, such \nopinions would seem in great tension even with Dr. Dietz's own writings on grooming; if he truly \nbelieves that abused children are unlikely to continue contact with their abusers or wear clothing \nprovided by their abusers, it would be hard to see how he could express surprise that \"even today, \nfar too many people, including many who should know better, have difficulty grasping the \npossibility of nonforceful, nonthreatening, and nonviolent acquaintance molestation, as their \npreconceptions of childhood innocence and predatory molesters are too strong to allow them to \naccept that children can be so readily manipulated into doing or allowing things that others find \nabhorrent.\" (See Park Dietz, \"Grooming and Seduction\", 33 J. Interpersonal Violence 28, 29 \n(2018), Ex. D; see also Ex. A at 3 (citing id.)). The article on which Dr. Dietz relies for his opinion, \nmeanwhile, acknowledged that it found unusually high rates of PTSD and acknowledged selection \nbias issues, among other concerns: the studies included \"[I]argely consisted of help-seeking \nsamples,\" and \"[s]urvivors seeking help might be in more distress, might have more risk factors \nfor the development of PTSD \n. or may be subject to additional stressors related to engagement \nwith the criminal justice system.\" (Dworkin et al., \"PTSD in the Year Following Sexual Assault,\" \nTrauma, Violence & Abuse 1, 11 (2021)). \n24 \nEFTA00070864\n", "char_count": 1996}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "The defense has clearly not to date carried the burden of establishing that the methods that \nled Dr. Dietz to offer this uncited and implausible opinion in the context of the abuse that the \nevidence will show in this case are subject to peer review and publication, attained widespread or \ngeneral acceptance, or are otherwise reliable. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95, 592 & n.10. \nAccordingly, unless the defense meets its burden of affirmatively establishing that this opinion, as \napplied to the context of this case, meets the Daubert reliability standard, it should be precluded. \nSee, e.g., P.S. ex rel. Nelson v. The Farm, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288 (D. Kan. 2009) \n(excluding as unreliable an expert's opinion that children typically report abuse promptly without \nholding hearing). Should the defense come forward with some evidence of reliability in its \nresponse papers, the Government would respectfully request an opportunity to reply or, in the \nalternative, a Dauber! hearing to probe the issue. \nTo the extent Dr. Dietz seeks to apply his opinions to the context of this case, the defendant \nhas not established the reliability of these opinions, which should be precluded or, at a minimum, \nexplored at a hearing. And to the extent Dr. Dietz seeks to apply his opinions to other contexts, \nthey are irrelevant.8\n8 The Government understands that Dr. Dietz is not planning on attending the November 10, 2021 \nDauber! hearing of Dr. Rocchio, and the Government has not to date received any Rule 26.2 \ndisclosures from Dr. Dietz, or even a complete bibliography of the sources cited in his disclosure. \nThe Government respectfully requests that, should a hearing be scheduled on the reliability of Dr. \nDietz's opinions, that hearing be held after the defense's response to this motion and after all \nnecessary Rule 26.2 disclosures are made. \n25 \nEFTA00070865\n", "char_count": 1884}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "II. \nCERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED EXPERT TESTIMONY OF \nDR. ELIZABETH LOFTUS SHOULD BE PRECLUDED \nA. Background \nThe defense seeks to offer expert opinions of Dr. Loftus on \"the workings of human \nmemory.\" (Ex. A at 1). \nSpecifically, the defense seeks to offer testimony from Dr. Loftus \nregarding: \nI. \"[H]ow memory fades and weakens over time.\" \n2. \"[H]ow \nmemory \nbecomes \nmore \nvulnerable \nto \ncontamination.\" \n3. \"[T]he mechanism by which false and/or distorted memories can be created as a result \nof post-event information and occurrences, suggestion, influence or the like.\" \n4. \"[T]he effects of suggestion on memory,\" including how \"[s]uggestive activities can \nexplain how it is that a person might go from having no memory of sexual abuse, and even denying \nsexual abuse, to later having [memories] for numerous abusive acts, if the memories are false.\" \n5. \"[T] he characteristics of false and/or distorted memories\" . \"[fin particular,\" that: \na. \nSuch memories \"can be described with confidence, detail and emotion, \neven when they are false\"; and \nb. \n\"[P]eople come to believe in these experiences and are not deliberately \nlying.\" \n6. \"[Identification of] some of the suggestive activities that occurred in the current \ncase,\" including \"media coverage and other publications (including but not limited to newspaper \nand magazine articles, news reports, television shows, documentaries, books, podcasts, websites, \netc.) and discussions/conversations with others, can be sources of suggestion.\" \n7. \"[H]ow, in a case like this one, suggestion can lead individuals to the construction of \ndistorted memories.\" \n(Ex. A at 1-2 (emphasis added)). As set forth below, the Government objects that some of these \nopinions (paragraphs 1, 2, 5(b), and 6) are commonsense principles within the ken of the jury; \nsome (paragraphs 5(a) and 5(b)) invade the province of the jury in assessing witness credibility \n26 \nEFTA00070866\n", "char_count": 1938}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "and demeanor; some (paragraphs 6 and 7) are vehicles to insert factual narrative about the case; \nand some (paragraph 3) are unreliable and lack fit with the case. \nB. Applicable Law \nAs a general matter, memory, perception, and the fallibility of human recall—that is, how \npeople may remember, misremember, or forget past events—are within the ken of the jury. See \nUnited States v. Caner, 410 F.3d 942, 950 (7th Cir. 2005) (\"In general . . . jurors understand that \nmemory can be less than perfect.\"); United States v. Smith, 148 F. App'x 867, 872 (11th Cir. 2005) \n(affirming district court's exclusion of expert testimony on memory and perception, including the \nimpact of stress on memory, in context of eyewitness reliability because proposed testimony would \nnot assist the jury); United States v. Labansat, 94 F.3d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1996) (\"It is common \nknowledge that memory fades with time.\"); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1050-53 (7th \nCir. 1992) (\"[S]uch testimony may be properly excluded where the testimony addresses an issue \nof which the jury is generally aware.\"); United States v. Shiraishi, No. 17 Cr. 582 (JMS) (RLP), \n2019 WL 1386365, at *5 (D. Haw. Mar. 27, 2019) (where testimony \"falls within the common \nknowledge of the average layman, [it] is improper testimony under Rule 702\"); United States v. \nLibby, 461 F. Supp. 2d 3, 10 (D.D.C. 2006) (\"[J]urors inevitably encounter the frailties of memory \nas a commonplace matter of course.\"); United States v. Heine, No. 15 Cr. 238 (SI), 2017 WL \n5260784, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 13, 2017) (finding that memories are fallible and may deteriorate over \ntime to be \"within the ken of the ordinary juror\"); United States v. Redwood, 216 F. Supp. 3d 890, \n891 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (excluding memory expert under Rules 702 and 403, and noting that \"[w]hile \nin unique circumstances expert testimony regarding memory and perception may be warranted, \nthis is not one of those cases\"). \n27 \nEFTA00070867\n", "char_count": 1972}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Federal courts—typically in the context of proposed expert testimony regarding witness \nidentifications—have historically evinced skepticism to so-called memory expert testimony and \nhave routinely excluded such testimony as unhelpful and because it invades the province of the \njury. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 798 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (5th Cir. 1986) (\"Until recently, \ncourts were uniformly skeptical about admitting expert testimony concerning the reliability of \neyewitness identifications.\") (discussing United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973), \nwhich affirmed the district court's exclusion of expert testimony and finding that witness cross-\nexamination was adequate to \"reveal any faults in the identification\"). \nWith respect to Dr. Loftus specifically, several federal courts have excluded Dr. Loftus's \ntestimony on memory as either unhelpful to the jury or as irrelevant given the facts of the case. \nSee, e.g., Curry, 977 F.2d at 1050-53 (affirming district court's exclusion of Dr. Loftus's testimony \nabout memory in the context of witness identifications, including the fading of memories, witness \nconfidence in memories, distortion of memories); United States v. George, 975 F.2d 1431, 1432 \n(9th Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's denial of funds to defendant to hire Dr. Loftus to testify \nregarding eyewitness identification); Moore, 798 F.2d at 1311-13 (affirming district court's \nexclusion of Dr. Loftus's testimony about memory in context of eyewitness identifications, \nincluding testimony about diminished memory and the incorporation of inaccurate post-event \ninformation); Shiraishi, 2019 WL 1386365, at *5 (excluding Dr. Loftus's testimony regarding the \ncorruption of memory and related topics); Heine, 2017 WL 5260784, at *3 (excluding memory \nexpert and discussing Dr. Loftus and Libby); Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (excluding expert \ntestimony of one expert in case where the defendant also offered Dr. Loftus's research and \ntestimony tha\n... [truncated, 2103 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/31 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=31]", "char_count": 2103}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "jurors\"); see also R.D. v. Shohola, Inc., 16 Civ. 01056, 2019 WL 6053223, at *1043 (M.D. Pa. \nNov. 15, 2019) (in civil case, excluding Dr. Loftus's testimony because it \"simply restates matters \nwithin the common understanding of lay jurors\" and because her opinions were speculative).* \nMore recently, federal courts have been more receptive to allowing expert testimony \nbeyond general principles of human recall on a case-by-case basis, depending on the special \ncircumstances or particular facts of a case and only when such opinions are based on reliable \nscience and fit the facts of the case. See, e.g., Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 9-10 (\"There is no clear \ncase authority, or absolute rule, on when an expert should be permitted to testify on issues \nregarding memory and perception. . . [T]here is no per se rule for or against the admissibility of \nsuch testimony [on memory and perception]. And a court presented with a proffer of expert \ntestimony must determine its admissibility on a case-by-case basis.\" (citing cases)); Shiraishi, \n2019 WL 1386365, at *3 (discussing the need for the expert testimony to \"fit\" the evidence or \nfacts of the particular case); Shohola, 2019 WL 6053223, at *10-13 (\"First, courts have recognized \nthat expert testimony concerning the vagaries of human recollection that is stated with sufficient \ncertainty, is grounded upon reliable science, and fits the facts of the case satisfies \nthe Daubers standard and should be admitted at trial. In contrast, expert opinions regarding the \nscience of human recollection that are not presented with certainty, lack scientific rigor, or possess \n9 It appears that Dr. Loftus has testified as an expert in at least one federal criminal case and one \nfederal civil case. See, e.g., United States v. Seltzer, 794 F.2d 1114, 1118 (6th Cir. 1986) \n(discussing defense expert testimony of Dr. Loftus that it is not unusual for individuals to forget \nevents); Lam v. City of San Jose, No. 14 Civ. 877 (PSG), 2015 WL 695496\n... [truncated, 2204 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/32 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=32]", "char_count": 2204}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "only a tenuous factual fit are often excluded from evidence.\" (citing United States v. Mathis, 264 \nF.3d 321, 336 (3d Cir. 2001))). \nCourts, however, must exercise \"judicial oversight\" in this area. See Shohola, 2019 WL \n6053223, at *10-13. \"Left unregulated, memory expert testimony can invade the fundamental \nprovince of the jury—determining witness credibility,\" and must be excluded as unduly prejudicial \nunder Rule 403. Id. (citing cases); see also Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (excluding memory \nexpert's testimony because it would not be helpful to the jury, invaded the province of the jury, \nand was likely to confuse, mislead, or unduly influence the jury, among other things); Heine, 2017 \nWL 5260784, at *2 (excluding expert testimony under Rules 702 and 403 under the same \nprinciples as Libby because it would not be helpful to the jury and would \"invad[e] the jury's role \nin assessing the credibility of witnesses,\" and because the trial did \"not involve issues of repressed \nor recovered memories,\" among other things). \nC. Discussion \nAs set forth herein, although the Government acknowledges that testimony about memory \nmay be proper in response to Dr. Rocchio, Dr. Loftus's proposed testimony does not satisfy the \nDaubert standard. Specifically, the Government objects to any attempt by the defense to offer her \ntestimony as to (a) opinions as to false memory formation that are unreliable or do not fit the facts \nof the case, (b) commonsense principles within the ken of the jury, (c) opinions bearing on witness \ncredibility and demeanor, and (c) factual narratives about the case,. \n1. Opinions as to False Memory Formation \nDr. Loftus offers this opinion on false memory formation that is unreliable and lacks fit to \nthe case: \n30 \nEFTA00070870\n", "char_count": 1776}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "• \nHow false memories may be created through post-event information and occurrences, \nsuggestion, and influence, as described in Paragraph 3 above. \nThis opinion on false memory formation is central to Dr. Loftus's testimony, but the \ndefense has not carried its burden of establishing its reliability. See Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703; \nDaubert, 509 U.S. at 589. As an initial matter, the defense expert notice provides no information \nabout the bases or details of Dr. Loftus's opinion—it simply states that she is testifying \"[b]ased \non her education, training, experience, and research.\" (Ex. A at 1).1° \nMoreover, there is specific reason to doubt the reliability of Dr. Loftus's opinions as to \nfalse memory formation. A number of Dr. Loftus's opinions were tested and rejected in United \nStates v. Libby. See Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 8-18. There, the defendant relied on Dr. Loftus's \nresearch regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications, including research presented in a \n2006 article. See id. at 10-11 (citing, e.g., R. Schmechel, T. O'Toole, C. Easterly, & E. \nLoftus, Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 \nJurimetrics J. 177-214 (2006)). The district court rejected such research, concluding that \"the \ndesign of these surveys demonstrates their limited value.\" Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 11. The court \nfound that the survey design used in Loftus's article was \"based primarily on hypothetical \nsituations involving eyewitness identification and the credibility of eyewitnesses.\" Id. The court \n1° While the Government's expert notice for Dr. Rocchio contained similar language, it also \nexplained that Dr. Rocchio was testifying based on her \"extensive clinical experience treating \nindividuals who suffered sexual abuse and trauma in childhood and adolescence, as well as Dr. \nRocchio's experience conducting forensic psychological evaluations of people who have \nexperienced sexual abuse and trauma.\" (Del. Mot. 3 Ex. A at 2). Th\n... [truncated, 2336 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/34 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=34]", "char_count": 2336}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "also found—and Dr. Loftus \"reluctantly agreed\"—that the studies were \"structurally flawed\" \nbecause certain questions asked of respondents were \"unclear.\" Id. at 16. The Government, \nmoreover, understands that much of Dr. Loftus's research involves controlled laboratory \nexperiments rather than clinical work because studies about, for instance, the creation of false \nmemories, may be unethical in the clinical context. See, e.g. Elizabeth F. Loftus, UCI School of \nSocial Ecology, https://faculty.sites.uci.edu/eloftus/ (\"[Dr. Loftus's] experiments reveal how \nmemories can be changed by things that we are told.\"). Such research may thus be inapplicable to \nthe facts of this case. \nTo the extent that the Court believes that the defense may have carried its burden of \nestablishing the reliability of Dr. Loftus's opinions on false memory formation, the Government \nrespectfully requests a Daubert hearing to test the reliability of these opinions.\" \nEven if any such opinions are reliable, however, they should not be admitted absent an \naffirmative showing of \"fit\" for this case. For example, testimony about the ways in which \"false \nand/or distorted memories can be created as a result of post-event information and occurrences, \nsuggestion, influence, or the like\" is irrelevant to this case. At that level of generality, it has no \nobvious \"fit\" to the facts of this case. There is no evidence that whateveroccurrences, suggestion, \ninfluence, or the like\" about which Dr. Loftus intends to testify happened to any witness in this \ncase, much less in a manner that reliably affects memory or would be probative to the jury. Thus, \nas with Dr. Dietz, any reliable opinions Dr. Loftus seeks to offer on false memory formation should \nI I As with Dr. Dietz, see footnote 8, supra, if a hearing is necessary, the Government similarly \nrequests that it be conducted after receiving the defense response and after all necessary Rule 26.2 \ndisclosures have been made. \n32 \nEFTA00070872\n", "char_count": 1991}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "be limited to those as to which there is a clear evidentiary predicate establishing their \"fit\" to the \ncase. \n2. Commonsense Principles Within the Ken of the Jury \nThe following opinions by Dr. Loftus are commonsense opinions within the ken of the \njury: \n• \nHow memory fades and weakens over time, as described in Paragraph 1 above. \n• \nHow memory may become vulnerable to contamination, as described in Paragraph 2 above. \n• \nHow an individual with a false memory may believe that their memory is accurate, as \ndescribed in Paragraph 5(b) above. \n• \nExamples of suggestive activities, such as news and media \nreports and \ndiscussions/conversations with others, as listed in Paragraph 6 above. \nAny testimony from Dr. Loftus with respect to these common-sense principles of memory \nand perception should be excluded under Rules 703 and 403 because such testimony would not \naid the jury. \"It is common knowledge that memory fades with time.\" Labansat, 94 F.3d at 530. \nAn expert is simply not needed to \"point out that memory decreases over time.\" United States v. \nWelch, 368 F.3d 970, 973-75 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 12-13 (\"[O]n a \ndaily basis the average juror is personally faced with innumerable questions of memory and \ncognition, as everyone in their daily lives is called upon to store, encode, and retrieve information \nhe or she has been subjected to. Although the average juror may not understand the scientific basis \nand labels attached to causes for memory errors, jurors inevitably encounter the frailties of memory \nas a commonplace matter of course.\"). It is similarly common knowledge that memories can be \ncontaminated, including through exposure to news media. Jurors, like all individuals, may be \nasked to remember something, and may become confused as to the source of the memory. And it \n33 \nEFTA00070873\n", "char_count": 1859}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "is a tautology that someone who has a false memory—that is, unknowingly misremembers \nsomething—believes it to be accurate. Otherwise it would not be a memory. \n3. Opinions Bearing on Witness Credibility and Demeanor \nThe following opinions by Dr. Loftus invade the province of the jury by attempting to \ninstruct them on how to assess witness credibility and demeanor: \n• \nHow an individual with a false memory can describe that memory \"with confidence, detail \nand emotion,\" as described in Paragraph 5(a) above. \n• \nHow an individual with a false memory is \"not deliberately lying,\" as described in \nParagraph 5(b) above. \nDr. Loftus should be precluded from opining on victim or witness credibility, including by \nopining as to how a victim with an alleged false memory may testify (e.g., confidently) and \ndescribing a victim with an alleged false memory as a \"liar\" or \"not a deliberate liar.\" Such \nopinions would be highly prejudicial and inflammatory, would confuse and mislead the jury, and \nwould invade the fundamental province of the jury in determining witness credibility. See \nLumpkin, 192 F.3d at 288-89 (affirming district court's exclusion of expert testimony that a \nwitness's confidence does not correlate to the witness's factual accuracy in the context of an \nidentification because such testimony \"might confuse or mislead the jury\"); Shohola, 2019 WL \n6053223, at *1043 (discussing jury's province of determining witness credibility); Fed. R. Evid. \n403. Such opinions, moreover, are effectively defense arguments to be appropriately made during \ndefense summations. To allow Dr. Loftus to testify that a victim is essentially a liar (but may not \nrealize she is a liar) or that a witness may testify confidently even when testifying untruthfully \nwould effectively allow the defense to cloak its arguments under the imprimatur of a purported \n34 \nEFTA00070874\n", "char_count": 1886}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "expert. The Court will instruct the jury on witness credibility. A defense expert should not provide \na dueling instruction. See, e.g., Hygh, 961 F.2d at 364 \n4. Factual Narratives About the Case \nThe following opinions are objectionable vehicles for factual narrative about the case: \n• \nIdentification of \"some of the suggestive activities that occurred in the current case,\" as \ndescribed in Paragraph 6 above. \n• \nHow, \"in a case like this one, suggestion can lead individuals to the construction of \ndistorted memories,\" as described in Paragraph 7 above. \nDr. Loftus should be precluded from embedding a factual narrative about the case in her \nopinions. Dr. Loftus has not evaluated any of the victims in this case. Unlike Dr. Dietz, Dr. Loftus \ndoes not even describe what case-specific materials she has reviewed. (Cf. Ex. A at 3 (\"Attached \nas Exhibit C is a list of material reviewed by Dr. Dietz.\")). Dr. Loftus thus has no basis to comment \non whether or not certain \"suggestive activities\" may have influenced any of the victims before \nthe jury, much less a basis to show that she has \"reliably applied [her] principles and methods of \nthe facts of the case.\" Fed. R. Evid. 702. Any such opinions from Dr. Loftus regarding the facts \nof this particular case would thus lack any scientific basis, would be extremely prejudicial, and \nwould mislead the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703, 403; see also, e.g., Island Intellectual Prop., \n2012 WL 526722, at *2 (\"It is also inappropriate for experts to act as . . vehicles for factual \nnarrative\"). \nIII. \nIF DEFENSE CHALLENGES TO DR. ROCCHIO ARE ACCEPTED, THE \nDEFENSE EXPERTS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED \nIt bears noting that neither Dr. Dietz nor Dr. Loftus's proposed testimony can survive the \ndefense's own understanding of the reliability requirements of Dauber!. While the Government \n35 \nEFTA00070875\n", "char_count": 1861}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "does not share the defense's view of the law, to the extent the Court accepts that view, Dr. Loftus \nand Dr. Dietz should be excluded as well. \nThis point is valid in a number of respects, but three in particular bear noting. First, the \ndefense criticizes Dr. Rocchio in the strongest terms for opining about principles that \"have no \nassociated error rate.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 1, 7, 8, 12, 15; see Ex. A at 3-4). Neither Dr. Loftus nor \nDr. Dietz identify an error rate for a single one of their opinions, much less all of them. Second, \nthe defense argues that Dr. Rocchio's opinions cannot be reliably applied by a jury because she \ndescribes phenomena that occur reliably in her practice and the literature, but she does not specify \nhow often. (Def. Mot. 3 at 7-8, 10, 16 (\"Rocchio claims grooming `often' or `frequently occurs' \nwithout providing the jury any explanation of how to decide whether grooming actually occurred \nin this case.\")). The same could be said for Dr. Loftus and Dr. Dietz. (See Ex. A at 1 (\"[Dr. Loftus] \nwill describe scientific research showing that false memories can be described with confidence, \ndetail, and emotion, just like true memories.\" (emphasis added)); id. at 7 (\"False allegations of \nsexual assault do occur ....\")). Third, the defense argues that Dr. Rocchio's opinion that \"memory \nand disclosure of traumatic and abusive events is impacted by a number of factors, including the \ncircumstances surrounding the trauma,\" is \"so generic as to be meaningless.\" (Del Mot. 3 at 17). \nThat opinion is no more generic than the opinion that false memories can be \"created as a result of \npost-event information and occurrences, suggestion, influence, or the like.\" (Ex. A at 2). \nIn the Government's view, the defense's view in its Dauber! motion is unnecessarily \ncramped, and each expert opinion's reliability can be tested individually. But given the defense's \nview of Daubed and its progeny, if Dr. Rocchio's opinions are excluded based on the defense's \narg\n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00070837/39 or ?id=EFTA00070837&page=39]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00070837", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "CONCLUSION \nAccordingly, the Government respectfully requests that: \n• \nDr. Dietz be permitted to testify in response to Dr. Rocchio, limited to the opinion that it can \nbe difficult to assess whether grooming is occurring; \n• \nDr. Dietz be precluded from offering opinions regarding hindsight bias, the Halo effect, \npathways to false allegations of sexual assault, factors bearing on witness credibility, and \npost-traumatic stress symptoms, or in the alternative that a hearing be held; \n• \nDr. Loftus be precluded from offering opinions regarding commonsense principles of \nmemory, factors bearing on witness credibility, factual narratives, or false memory \nformation. \nDated: November 8, 2021 \nNew York, New York \nRespectfully submitted, \nDAMIAN WILLIAMS \nUnited States Attorney for the \nSouthern District of New York \nBy:  \nIsl \nAssistant United States Attorneys \n37 \nEFTA00070877\n", "char_count": 888}]}