{"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_count": 17, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00068501", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00068501.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nUnited States of America, \n—v—\nGhislaine Maxwell, \nDefendant. \nUSDC SONY \nDOCUMENT \nELECTRONICALLY PILED \nDOC 0: \nDATE FILED:i 102121 \n20-CR-330 (AJN) \nMEMORANDUM \nOPINION & ORDER \nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge: \nThe Defense on November 1, 2021, noticed eight expert witnesses. Def. Br., Ex. 1 \n(\"Notice\"). Two of those experts, Dr. Park Dietz and Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, are expected to offer \nopinions that rebut opinions of the Government's expert witness, Dr. Lisa Rocchio. The \nGovernment on November 8, 2021, filed a motion to partially preclude the testimony of Dr. \nDietz and Dr. Loftus. Dkt. No. 424. The Court has already addressed that motion. \nOn November 15, 2021, the Government moved to fully or partially preclude the \ntestimony of the remaining six experts. The Defense filed a response on November 19, 2021. \nThe Court addresses the motion to preclude Dr. Hall in this separate opinion. It will \naddress the other five experts in public rulings. \nI. \nLegal standard \nFederal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. That rule \nstates: \nA witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or \neducation may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: \n1 \nEFTA00068501\n", "char_count": 1312}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier \nof fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; \n(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; \n(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and \n(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. \nThe Court exercises a \"gatekeeper function\" in assessing the admissibility of expert \ntestimony. Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 575 (2d Cir. 2017). To determine whether an \nexpert's method is reliable, the Court considers the non-exhaustive list provided by the Supreme \nCourt in Dauber!, including whether the expert's method has been tested, whether it has been \nsubjected to peer review, the rate of error, standards controlling the method's operation, and \nwhether the method is accepted by the expert community. United States v. Kidd, 385 F. Supp. 3d \n259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Dauber! v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 \n(1993)). \nBut Rule 702 ultimately sets a \"liberal\" and \"permissive\" standard of admissibility. \nNimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2005). In particular, not every expert \nadmissible under Daubert need rely on a method that conforms with \"the exactness of hard \nscience methodologies.\" E.E.O.C. v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 07-CV-8383 (LAP), 2010 WL \n3466370, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010) (quoting United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d \n1115, 1123 (5th Cir. 2006)). \nAdditionally, the procedure for disclosing expert witnesses is governed by Federal Rule \nof Criminal Procedure 16. That rule states that when the Government makes a request, the \nDefense \"must ... give to the government a written summary of any testimony that the \ndefendant intends to use under Rules 702... . This summary must describe the witness's \nopinions, the bases and reasons for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications.\" Fed. R. \n2 \nEFTA00068502\n", "char_count": 1988}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(C). The purpose of this rule is to \"minimize surprise that often results from \nunexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continuances, and to provide the opponent with \na fair opportunity to test the merit of the expert's testimony through focused cross-examination.\" \nFed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1)(C) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment. Thus, to satisfy Rule \n16, a notice must not merely describe the \"general topics\" on which experts will testify but \nactually \"summarize the experts' opinions about those topics\" and \"describe the bases for the \nexperts' opinions.\" United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 115 (2d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added); \nUnited States v. Valle, No. 12-CR-847 (PGG), 2013 WL 440687, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2013) \n(\"Merely identifying the general topics about which the expert will testify is insufficient; rather, \nthe summary must reveal the expert's actual opinions.\"). \nIf the Defense's disclosure of an expert witness does not satisfy Rule 16, the Court has \n\"broad discretion\" to fashion an appropriate remedy. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 115. That discretion \nis guided by factors including \"why disclosure was not made, the extent of the prejudice, if any, \nto the opposing party, the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any other \nrelevant circumstances.\" Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 834 F.3d 145, 159 (2d Cir. 2016)). \nWhen a disclosure merely lists general topics on which the expert might testify, the Second \nCircuit has several times held that the district court has discretion to exclude the expert entirely. \nSee id. at 118; United States v. Vaccarelli, No. 20-3768-CR, 2021 WL 4805218, at *2 (2d Cir. \nOct. 15, 2021). \nII. \nDiscussion \nAs a preliminary matter, the Defense argues that the Government's motion is \n\"premature\" because the Government's arguments are about the relevance and prejudice of the \nwitnesses' testimony, not their qualifications or the reliability of their methods under Rule \n... [truncated, 2022 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/2 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=2]", "char_count": 2022}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Def. Br. at 1,5-6. But one aspect of the Rule 702 and Daubert inquiry is \"fit,\" which asks \n\"whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it \nwill aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.\" Alto v. Sun Pharm. Indus., Inc., No. 1:19-CV-\n09758 (GHW), 2021 WL 4803582, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2021) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at \n591). Fit is satisfied if the expert's opinion would assist the jury's decision on a relevant \nquestion of fact without \"usurp[ing] either the role of the trial judge in instructing the jury as to \nthe applicable law or the role of the jury in applying that law to the facts before it.\" Id. (quoting \nUnited States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97,101 (2d Cir. 1994)). The Court finds that at least some of \nthe Government's arguments that go to fit are ripe for preliminary resolution now. Other aspects \nof the Government's motion can be resolved only with additional information and the context of \ntrial. \nA. The Court will preclude the expert testimony of Dr. Ryan Hall \nThe Government moves to preclude the expert testimony of Dr. Ryan Hall. Dr. Hall was \nretained by Jeffrey Epstein to evaluate Alleged Victim 4, which Dr. Hall did in 2009, in \nconnection with Alleged Victim 4's civil suit against Epstein. Epstein admitted liability for \nsexually abusing Alleged Victim 4 and the dispute was about the extent of damages only. Dr. \nHall issued a report in 2009 that summarized his interview with Alleged Victim 4 and came to \nseveral conclusions about her mental health. The Defense anticipates that Dr. Hall will testify as \nto approximately four opinions. First, \"[h]e will offer the opinions and diagnoses contained in \nhis report.\" Notice at 12. Second, he will testify on \"the bases for those opinions[ and the \nsignificance of the diagnoses and opinions.\" Id. Third, \"[h]e will testify about the facts and \ncircumstances surrounding the evaluation\" and \"disclosures made [Alleged Victim 4].\" Id. And \nfourth, he w\n... [truncated, 2132 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/3 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=3]", "char_count": 2132}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "The Government argues, and the Court agrees, that the first two opinions based on Dr. \nHall's training and experience as a psychiatrist and so are expert opinions subject to Rule 702. \nThe latter two opinions are not expert opinions but instead testimony of fact that may or may not \nbe admissible under other rules of evidence. \nThe Court will address the expert opinions first. The Government argues that Dr. Hall's \ntestimony on psychological diagnoses is irrelevant and prejudicial under Rules 401 and 403. The \nSecond Circuit has set out controlling case law to guide the Court's decision: \nEvidence of a witness's psychological history may be admissible when it goes to \nher credibility. In assessing the probative value of such evidence, the court \nshould consider such factors as the nature of the psychological problem, the \ntemporal recency or remoteness of the history, and whether the witness suffered \nfrom the problem at the time of the events to which she is to testify, so that it may \nhave affected her ability to perceive or to recall events or to testify accurately. \nUnited States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341,347-48 (2d Cir. 1995) (cleaned up); see also United States \nv. Hamlett, No. 19-3069,2021 WL 5105861, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 3,2021); United States v. \nVitale, 459 F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2006). \nEven if psychological history is probative according to these factors, the Court still \nretains discretion to exclude the evidence if it is substantially prejudicial under Rule 403. Sasso, \n59 F.3d at 347-48. \nDr. Hall's report lists the following diagnoses: narcissistic personality disorder, \nborderline personality disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, depression, bulimia, and \npolysubstance abuse and dependence. Gov't Br., Ex. B (\"Report\") at 93-98,104-06. The report \nalso considers, but apparently rejects, diagnoses for bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, and post-\ntraumatic stress disorder. Id. at 93-94. But see id. at 107 (listing bipolar disorder). Dr. Hall \nconcluded \n... [truncated, 2131 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/4 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=4]", "char_count": 2131}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "The Court will preclude Dr. Hall's testimony on these psychological diagnoses. \nApplying the considerations in Sasso, the diagnoses have little probative value. First, the report \nis now over 12 years old. Courts in this circuit regularly find that diagnoses more than 10 years \nold lack probative value. E.g., United States v. Bari, 750 F.2d 1169, 1179 (2d Cir. 1984) \n(finding that more than 10 years is too remote); United States v. Glover, 588 F.2d 876, 878 (2d \nCir. 1978) (per curiam) (12 years too remote); United States v. Dupree, 833 F. Supp. 2d 255, 264 \n(E.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 706 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2013) (13 \nyears too remote); United States v. Paredes, No. 99-CR-290 (PKL), 2001 WL 1478810, at *1 \n(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2001) (\"A psychological condition from ten years earlier, however, is likely \nto be irrelevant.\"). The diagnoses are therefore too remote to bear on Alleged Victim 4's \ncredibility as a witness at trial. \nSecond, the nature of the conditions and their effect on memory or perception at the time \nof the events in question do not favor admission. Dr. Hall's report does not delineate clearly \nwhich conditions existed at the time of Epstein's abuse, but it appears that at least the \noppositional defiant disorder, depression, and substance abuse predate the conduct alleged in the \nIndictment. Report at 104-05. But at no point in his report does Dr. Hall suggest that these \nconditions—or any other diagnosed conditions—may have affected Alleged Victim 4's \nperception of events or her recollection of those events. Like in Sasso, \"there was no indication \nthat [the witness] was delusional or paranoid, or had any difficulties in memory or perception.\" \n59 F.3d at 348. \nIn its response, the Defense homes in first on narcissistic personality disorder. Def. Br. \n8-9. Dr. Hall reports that individuals with this diagnosis \"believe their needs are special and \nbeyond the ken of ordinary people,\" have \"a sense of entitlement and unreas\n... [truncated, 2037 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/5 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=5]", "char_count": 2037}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "of favorable treatment,\" \"expect to be given whatever they want or feel they need, no matter \nwhat it might mean to others,\" and \"form friendships or romantic relationships only when other \npeople seem to advance their purposes.\" Report at 94-95. But none of these traits affect \nmemory or recall, which is the primary purpose for admitting evidence of mental conditions \nidentified in Sasso, 59 F.3d at 348. \nThe Defense also emphasizes the diagnosis for borderline personality disorder. Def. Br. \nat 9-10. Individuals with the disorder \"are very sensitive to environmental circumstances and \nmay experience intense abandonment fears and inappropriate anger, even when faced with \nrealistic time limited separation,\" they \"have a pattern of unstable and intense relationships,\" \nincluding \"sudden and dramatic shifts concerning their perceptions of others, who are alternately \nseen as beneficent supporters or cruelly punitive.\" Report at 95-96. But based on the current \nrecord, Dr. Hall's description falls short of demonstrating that this disorder \"affect[s] her ability \nto perceive or to recall events or to testify accurately.\" Vitale, 459 F.3d at 196 (quoting Sasso, \n59 F.3d at 348); see United States v. Lopez, 611 F.2d 44,45 (4th Cir. 1979) (\"[M]any psychiatric \nproblems ... which a witness may have had are without any relevancy to the witness' credibility, \nconcerned as it is with whether the witness' mental impairment is related to his capacity to \nobserve the event at the time of its occurrence, to communicate his observations accurately and \ntruthfully at trial, or to maintain a clear recollection in the meantime.\" (cleaned up)). Indeed, the \nFirst Circuit in a case cited favorably both by the Second Circuit and by the Defense concluded \nthat there was an inadequate link between borderline personality disorder and a witness's \ncredibility. United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77,83,85 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that the diagnosis \ndid not prevent the witness \"from perceiving m\n... [truncated, 2064 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/6 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=6]", "char_count": 2064}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "The Defense also argues that Dr. Hall diagnosed Alleged Victim 4 with bipolar disorder, \nDe£ Br. at 10, a characterization that the Government disputes, Gov't Br. at 9. The Court agrees \nwith the Government that there is significant ambiguity as to this diagnosis. To be sure, Dr. Hall \nin his \"summary\" lists that Alleged Victim 4 has been diagnosed with \"Bipolar II Disorder . . . \nby history.\" Report at 107. But in his own \"diagnostic impression\" of Alleged Victim 4, Dr. \nHall states that Victim 4 \"is not able to describe any discrete periods\" consistent with bipolar \ndisorder. Report at 93. He states further that Alleged Victim 4 reports only \"irritability,\" but \n\"does not demonstrate the other required symptoms\" of bipolar disorder. Id. Such apparent \ncontradictions in the report reduce its relevance and increase the risk of confusing jurors. See \nHamlett, 2021 WL 5105861, at *2. \nRegardless, based on Dr. Hall's report, a diagnosis of bipolar disorder is not relevant \nunder Sasso. The Defense cites Dr. Hall's statements that link bipolar disorder with \"racing \nthoughts,\" \"distractibility,\" and \"depression.\" Report at 93; Def. Br. at 11. But these scattered \nsymptoms do not meaningfully impeach Alleged Victim 4's memory or perception of reality. \nFederal courts have repeatedly excluded diagnoses of bipolar disorder as irrelevant to a witness's \ncredibility. E.g., United States v. Fattah, 187 F. Supp. 3d 563, 568-69 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (\"[T]here \nis no basis to infer that [bipolar disorder] has affected the [witness's] memory, competence, or \nability or tendency to tell the truth in connection with the facts in this case.\"); United States v. \nBaxter, 761 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014); United States v. George, 532 F.3d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. \n2008) (\"Nothing in [the defendant's] proffer at trial indicated why bipolar disorder would cause . \n.. difficulty in perceiving reality or motivate [violence].\"). In a similar line of cases, courts in \nthis circuit have held that expert\n... [truncated, 2177 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/7 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=7]", "char_count": 2177}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "States v. Giovinco, No. 18-CR-14 (JSR), 2020 WL 832920, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2020) \n(finding that depression did not impact the witness's \"ability to accurately perceive or recall\" \nrelevant events); see also United States v. Cooper, No. 15-CR-152 (RMC), 2017 WL 11496709, \nat *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2017) (excluding diagnosis of major depressive disorder). \nLast, the Defense points to the diagnosis for oppositional defiant disorder, which the \nDefense and the Government say includes a criterion of \"vindictiveness.\" Def. Br. at 11 (quoting \nGov't Br. at 10). But, again, this is not a basis for impeaching Alleged Victim 4's ability to \ntestify truthfully under Sasso. 59 F.3d at 348; see also Hernandez v. Kelly, No. 09 CV 1576 \nTLM LB, 2011 WL 2117611, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011) (explaining that a condition must \n\"bear[ ] on [a witness's] ability to rationally perceive events at the time and to accurately \nrecollect and report his perceptions\"). \nIn assessing the relevance of each of these diagnoses, the Court also takes account of Dr. \nHall's conclusion that despite her several conditions, Alleged Victim 4 has no \"psychotic \nbelieves [sic], hallucinations or delusions.\" Report at 92; see also id. at 80 (\"she reports no \nperiod of... hallucinations\"). Further, Dr. Hall several times commented that Alleged Victim \n4's memory was very accurate. E.g., id. at 85 (\"No . . alterations in memory, or changes in \norientation or level of attention.\"); 92 (\"Her memory was impeccable and at multiple times \nduring the evaluation she pointed out to the examiner questions he did or didn't ask. She reported \nher memory is `perfect' and that she will remember every detail of the room in which the \nevaluation was done.\" (emphases in original)). On review, the Court cannot identify any point in \nthe report at which Dr. Hall doubts Alleged Victim 4's account of events. Instead, he appears to \nsummarize and accept her story of sexual conduct with Epstein. Id. at 100-01. In short, none o\n... [truncated, 2019 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/8 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=8]", "char_count": 2019}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "the diagnoses in Dr. Hall's report are adequately tied to Alleged Victim 4's credibility as a \nwitness. See Hamlett, 2021 WL 5105861, at *2. \nEven if any diagnosis were probative, the Court further finds that Rule 403 prejudice \noutweighs. First, the testimony may confuse jurors with old diagnoses that have little connection \nto the conduct at issue or Alleged Victim 4's credibility today. See id. Confusion is particularly \nlikely here given that Dr. Hall's report is at times unclear and even contradictory, as with the \nconfusion over bipolar disorder explained above. Id. Second, the Court takes account of the risk \nthat jurors will stereotype a witness with a history of mental illness or incorrectly assume that a \ndiagnosed mental condition renders the witness untrustworthy. See Hernandez, 2011 WL \n2117611, at *5. Third, mental health diagnoses are of a particularly sensitive nature and, if not \nrelevant, the witness's privacy should not be invaded. Paredes, 2001 WL 1478810, at *2 (citing \nIn re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325,1328-29 (2d Cir. 1992)). \nAnd fourth, Dr. Hall's testimony would be cumulative and cause undue delay. The \nGovernment anticipates that several aspects of Alleged Victim 4's mental health history will be \nadmitted either on direct or cross-examination, including that Alleged Victim 4 currently takes \nmedication for bipolar disorder and her history of substance abuse. Gov't Br. at 9-10. The \nSecond Circuit has previously held that where relevant issues of mental conditions can be aired \non cross-examination, the district court may preclude the witness's medical records and expert \ntestimony. Vitale, 459 F.3d at 196; Dupree, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (applying Vitale and Sasso). \nThe Court concludes that here, the cross-examination identified by the Government on Alleged \nVictim 4's current medication for bipolar disorder, along with lines of cross-examination \nunrelated to mental health, will provide the jury a sufficiently \"discriminating appraisal\" of \nAlleg\n... [truncated, 2111 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/9 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=9]", "char_count": 2111}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Woods, 547 F. Supp. 2d 253, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting United States v. Roldan-Zapata, \n916 F.2d 795, 806 (2d Cir. 1990)). The Court therefore concludes that the minimal probative \nvalue of each of Dr. Hall's diagnoses of Alleged Victim 4 is substantially outweighed by the risk \nof unfair prejudice. \nBut this balancing of Rules 401 and 403 is based on the present record. It is conceivable \nthat an additional proffer from the Defense that raises the probative value of a diagnosis, such as \nthat for borderline personality disorder, would change the Court's calculation. Cf. George, 532 \nF.3d at 937 (\"We do not foreclose the possibility that testimony by an expert ... could have \nshown evidence of [the witness's] condition to be relevant to her credibility . . . . But without \nsuch testimony, [defense] counsel had only words such as 'episodes of rage' and `racing \nthoughts.\"); Hamlett, 2021 WL 5105861, at *2 (affirming exclusion of a psychological witness \nthat failed to show a \"clear link between any particular mental health diagnosis and a witness's \ncredibility\"). \nThe Defense argues that apart from diagnoses of her mental health conditions, the \nDefense should be permitted to admit Dr. Hall's conclusion as to Alleged Victim 4's substance \nabuse and addiction. Def. Br. at 12-13 (collecting cases). The Second Circuit instructs: \nIt is, of course, within the proper scope of cross-examination to determine \nwhether a witness was under the influence of drugs or narcotics or alcohol at the \ntime of observation of events in dispute or at the time the witness is testifying. As \nWigmore points out, however, a general habit of intemperance tells us nothing of \nthe witness's testimonial incapacity unless it involves actual intoxication at the \ntime of the event observed or at the time of testifying. \nUnited States v. DiPaolo, 804 F.2d 225, 229-30 (2d Cir. 1986) (cleaned up) (cited in Gov't Br. \nat 11 and Def. Br. at 12); accord United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1265, 127\n... [truncated, 2164 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/10 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=10]", "char_count": 2164}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "The Court will therefore permit the Defense to cross-examine Alleged Victim 4 about her \nuse of substances during and after the conduct in question. Indeed, the Court was already under \nthe impression that the Defense intended to pursue this line of cross-examination after the \nDauber! hearing. Nov. 10 Tr. at 157 (\"[D]o you intend to impeach any witnesses based on \nsubstance abuse? ... Yes.\"). \nBut the extensive case law cited by the Defense about cross-examining witnesses on their \nsubstance use does not justify the request to admit Dr. Hall's testimony on substance use and \naddiction. For example, in United States v. Vitale, the district court gave the defense \"wide \nlatitude when cross-examining [the witness] about his drug use and rehabilitation, including \nquestions about the effects that the drugs had on his ability to perceive events when they \noccurred as well as on his memory at the time of trial.\" 459 F.3d at 196. The district court did \nnot, however, permit the defense to admit the witness's drug rehabilitation treatment records into \nevidence. Id. Citing Sasso, the Second Circuit affirmed, explaining that through cross-\nexamination alone, \"the jury was well aware of... [the witness's] drug abuse and treatment \nhistory.\" Id. The Second Circuit has made such a distinction—permitting cross-examination on \ndrug use but excluding a formal diagnosis of addiction—in several cases. E.g., DiPaolo, 804 \nF.2d at 230; Dobson v. Walker, 150 F. App'x 49,52 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that cross-\nexamination about a witness's drug use before witnessing a murder would be admissible, but the \ngeneral fact that the witness uses drugs is not). The Defense does not cite any case law to the \ncontrary. Even the nonbinding authority that the Defense refers to as \"instructive,\" Def. Br. at \n13, held only that a defendant had the right to review a witness's medical records and cross-\nexamine the witness about his drug use, Robinson, 583 F.3d at 1271-75. \n12 \nEFTA00068512\n", "char_count": 1992}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "In addition to diagnosing Alleged Victim 4's mental conditions, Dr. Hall also concluded \nthat Epstein's behavior had only a minimal impact on Alleged Victim 4's psychiatric profile. \nThe Government moved to exclude this conclusion and the Defense does not make a case for \nadmitting it. The Court will also preclude the opinion. In this circumstance, the lasting mental \nimpact of a crime is at best \"minimally probative\" of whether that crime was committed. United \nStates v. Hendricks, 921 F.3d 320, 329 (2d Cir. 2019). It also carries a high risk of Rule 403 \nprejudice by suggesting that the psychological impact on Alleged Victim 4 is relevant to Ms. \nMaxwell's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It would also cause substantial delay by opening the \ndoor to rebuttal evidence by the Government on Alleged Victim 4's mental health, which would \nlikely lead to mini-trials on irrelevant issues. \nNext, the disclosure states that Dr. Hall will testify to the \"significance\" of Alleged \nVictim 4's diagnoses. Notice at 12. First, the Court understands that Dr. Hall could not testify to \nthe \"significance\" of mental health diagnoses without first testifying to what those diagnoses are. \nBecause the Court is precluding Dr. Hall's testimony on Alleged Victim 4's diagnoses, the Court \nwill also preclude Dr. Hall's testimony on their significance. Additionally, the current disclosure \non this point does not satisfy Rule 16's requirement that the Defense provide Dr. Hall's opinion \nrather than just the general topic of the testimony. Even if the Court admitted Dr. Hall's \ntestimony as to Alleged Victim 4's diagnoses, the Court would preclude his testimony on \nsignificance until more specific opinions are disclosed to the Government. \nNext, the Defense anticipates that Dr. Hall will testify to the \"bases for those opinions\" in \nhis report. Id. Dr. Hall's report refers not only to what Alleged Victim 4 told him during their \nin-person interview but also other records like prior psychiatric\n... [truncated, 2151 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/12 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=12]", "char_count": 2151}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "63. These out of court statements would be hearsay if admitted for their truth, and so are \npresumptively inadmissible at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 802. The Defense identifies several means by \nwhich it may admit these hearsay statements. Def. Br. at 14-17. \nFirst, \"[u)nder Rule 703, experts can testify to opinions based on inadmissible evidence, \nincluding hearsay, if `experts in the field reasonably rely on such evidence in forming their \nopinions!\" United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 197 (2d Cir. 2008). But Rule 703 does not \npermit an expert to \"simply transmit that hearsay to the jury.\" Id. Rather, those underlying facts \nand data that would otherwise be inadmissible may be disclosed to the jury \"if their probative \nvalue in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.\" \nFed. R. Evid. 703. Here, the hearsay underlying Dr. Hall's diagnoses, including the medical \nrecords, criminal records, and depositions, would have little probative value unless the \nGovernment were to challenge the accuracy of Dr. Hall's diagnoses. See United States v. Chai, \nNo. 13-CR-290 (PAC), 2015 WL 293995, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2015). The Government \nrepresents in its brief that it would not do so in the event that Dr. Hall's diagnoses are admitted. \nGov't Br. at 13. And admitting the underlying hearsay, without a relevant need to substantiate \nthe accuracy of Dr. Hall's conclusions, would result in significant prejudice, including confusing \nthe jury and delaying the trial with a large volume of unnecessary details. The Court therefore \nconcludes that, based on the parties' current proffers, the facts and data underlying Dr. Hall's \nopinions are not admissible via Rule 703. \nSecond, the Defense says that Alleged Victim 4's statements are admissible under one of \ntwo hearsay exceptions in Rule 803. Def. Br. at 15. It says the statements were statements of \nher \"then-existing state of mind ... or emotional, sensory, or physical condition.\" Fed. R\n... [truncated, 2122 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/13 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=13]", "char_count": 2122}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "or emotional condition, her statements made to Dr. Hall in 2009 about events that took place \nyears earlier cannot be said to be \"then-existing.\" Id. The Defense also says Alleged Victim 4's \nstatements were \"made for medical diagnosis or treatment.\" Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). The Court \nfinds that this may be a permissible basis for admitting some of Alleged Victim 4's statements, \nthough they must be \"made for ... medical diagnosis or treatment,\" must \"describe[ ] medical \nhistory; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their general cause,\" and must \notherwise satisfy Rules 401 and 403. Fed. R. Evid. 803(4)(A), (B); see In re Agent Orange \nProd. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1245-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub nom., 818 F.2d 187 \n(2d Cir. 1987) (Weinstein, C.J.).' But without additional detail from the Defense on which \nportions of Dr. Hall's testimony it would seek to admit under this exception, the Court cannot \nmake a definitive ruling. \nThe Defense does not mention Alleged Victim 4's criminal records cited by Dr. Hall in \nhis report. The Court concludes that Alleged Victim 4's criminal records are inadmissible under \nFederal Rule of Evidence 609. Dr. Hall's report is not clear on the details of Alleged Victim 4's \ncriminal history, but her criminal history includes at least assault with a deadly weapon while she \nwas a minor and possession of illegal narcotics both as a minor and as an adult. These incidents, \nhowever, are now all over 10 years old, none appear to require proving \"a dishonest act or false \nstatement,\" and, for her juvenile offenses, admitting the evidence is not necessary to fairly \ndetermine the guilt or innocence of Ms. Maxwell. Fed. R. Evid. 609 (a), (b), (d). \n' The Defense also argues that Alleged Victim 4's statements would be \"admissible for their \neffect on Dr. Hall in forming his opinion.\" Def. Br. at 15. But, like Rule 703, this justification is \na relevant basis for admission only if the validity of Dr. Hall's dia\n... [truncated, 2045 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/14 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=14]", "char_count": 2045}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "B. The Court reserves judgment on the admissibility of Dr. Hall's fact testimony \nFinally, two of Dr. Hall's anticipated opinions are fact testimony not subject to Rule 702. \nSpecifically, Dr. Hall would testify that Alleged Victim 4 told him that she previously disclosed \nother sexual abuse to a prior mental health provider, Dr. Susan Pope, but did not disclose abuse \nby Epstein to Dr. Pope. Def. Br. at 16.2 Further, Dr. Hall would testify that in their interview \nAlleged Victim 4 \"did not identify Ms. Maxwell as a perpetrator of any abuse.\" Notice at 12. \nThe Defense argues these statements are admissible as prior inconsistent statements. Def. Br. at \n16-17. The Government concedes that Dr. Hall's testimony here would be admissible, including \npotentially as a prior inconsistent statement, if relevant and not otherwise excludable. Gov't Br. \nat 16, 18. \nThe Court reserves judgment on this question, but provides this guidance. The Defense \nwill cross-examine Alleged Victim 4 and, as the Court has previously ruled, it may ask whether \nAlleged Victim 4 on previous occasions implicated Ms. Maxwell in the alleged sexual abuse by \nEpstein. Nov. 1 Tr. at 27. Whether the Defense may then admit any of Dr. Hall's testimony will \ndepend on Alleged Victim 4's response to that question, whether any prior statement is actually \n\"inconsistent\" with her response, see United States v. Trzaska, 111 F.3d 1019,1024-25 (2d Cir. \n1997) (reversing a district court's admission of prior statements that were not inconsistent), and \nwhether the Defense satisfies the other requirements of admitting extrinsic evidence of a prior \ninconsistent statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 613. \n2 From the parties' briefing, the Court understands that the Defense would not seek to admit Dr. \nHall's testimony about what Alleged Victim 4 told Dr. Pope for the truth of the matter asserted, \nas that would be hearsay with no apparent exception. See Def. Br. at 16 (referring to Alleged \nVictim 4's stateme\n... [truncated, 2308 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00068501/15 or ?id=EFTA00068501&page=15]", "char_count": 2308}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00068501", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "III. \nConclusion \nThe Court therefore grants the Government's motion to preclude Dr. Hall's expert \ntestimony. Because this is a preliminary pre-trial ruling, it is possible that facts and \ncircumstances at trial would alter the Court's analysis. In that event, the Defense must re-raise \nits request to admit Dr. Hall as an expert witness. \nSO ORDERED. \nDated: November 22, 2021 \nNew York, New York \n17 \nALISON J. NATHAN \nUnited States District Judge \nEFTA00068517\n", "char_count": 466}]}