{"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_count": 22, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00066956", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00066956.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nUnited States of America, \n—v—\nGhislaine Maxwell, \nDefendant. \n20-CR-330 (MN) \nOPINION AND ORDER \nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge: \nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell has been indicted by a grand jury on charges of conspiracy \nto entice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; enticing a \nminor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2; conspiracy \nto transport minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; transporting \nminors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423 and 2; and two charges \nof perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The Court held a lengthy bail hearing on July 14, \n2020. After extensive briefing and argument at the hearing, the Court concluded that the \nDefendant was a clear risk of flight and that no conditions or combination of conditions would \nensure her appearance. Bail was therefore denied. \nThe Defendant has now filed a renewed motion for release on bail pending trial, which \nthe Government opposes. In her renewed motion, the Defendant attempts to respond to the \nreasons that the Court provided in denying bail and proposes a substantially larger bail package. \nBut by and large, the arguments presented either were made at the initial bail hearing or could \nhave been made then. In any event, the new information provided in the renewed application \nonly solidifies the Court's view that the Defendant plainly poses a risk of flight and that no \n1 \nEFTA00066956\n", "char_count": 1599}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "combination of conditions can ensure her appearance. This is so because: the charges, which \ncarry a presumption of detention, are serious and carry lengthy terms of imprisonment if \nconvicted; the evidence proffered by the Government, including multiple corroborating and \ncorroborated witnesses, is strong; the Defendant has substantial resources and foreign ties \n(including citizenship in a country that does not extradite its citizens); and the Defendant, who \nlived in hiding and apart from the family to whom she now asserts important ties, has not been \nfully candid about her financial situation. Thus, for substantially the same reasons that the Court \ndenied the Defendant's first motion for release on July 14, 2020, the Court DENIES the \nDefendant's renewed motion for release on bail.' \nI. \nBackground \nOn June 29, 2020, a grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned a six-count \nIndictment against the Defendant, charging her with facilitating Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse of \nmultiple minor victims between approximately 1994 and 1997. See Dkt. No. 1. On July 2, 2020, \nthe Indictment was unsealed, and that same day, the Defendant was arrested in New Hampshire. \nOn July 8, 2020, the Government filed a Superseding Indictment, which contained only small \nministerial corrections. Dkt. No. 17. \nOn July 14, 2020, this Court held a hearing regarding the Defendant's request for bail. \nAfter a thorough consideration of all of the Defendant's arguments and of the factors set forth in \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the Court concluded that no conditions or combination of conditions could \nreasonably assure the Defendant's appearance, determining as a result that the Defendant was a \nflight risk and that detention without bail was warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The \n' This Opinion & Order will be temporarily sealed in order to allow the parties to propose \nredactions to sensitive or confidential information. \n2 \nEFTA00066957\n", "char_count": 1962}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Defendant did not appeal the Court's determination that detention was required, and she has been \nincarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center since that time. \nIL \nLegal Standard \nPretrial detainees have a right to bail under the Eighth Amendment to the United States \nConstitution, which prohibits the imposition of \"[e]xcessive bail,\" and under the Bail Reform \nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq. The Bail Reform Act requires the Court to release a defendant \n\"subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that [it] \ndetermines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any \nother person and the community.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). Only if, after considering the \nfactors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3I42(g), the Court concludes that \"no condition or combination \nof conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of \nany other person and the community,\" may the Court order that the defendant be held without \nbail. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). \nIf there is probable cause to find that the defendant committed an offense specifically \nenumerated in § 3142(e)(3), a rebuttable presumption arises \"that no condition or combination of \nconditions will reasonably assure\" the defendant's appearance or the safety of the community or \nothers. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). In such circumstances, \"the defendant `bears a limited burden of \nproduction . . . to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that he does not pose \na danger to the community or a risk of flight.'\" United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d \nCir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also \nUnited States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (\"[A] defendant must introduce some \nevidence contrary to the presumed fact in order to rebut the presumption.\"). Nonetheless, \"'the \ngovernment retains the ultimate burden of persuasion by clear and convi\n... [truncated, 2041 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/2 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=2]", "char_count": 2041}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "defendant presents a danger to the community,' and `by the lesser standard of a preponderance of \nthe evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight.'\" English, 629 F.3d at 319 (quoting \nMercedes, 254 F.3d at 436); see also United States v. Manly., 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986) \n(\"The government retains the burden of persuasion [in a presumption case].\"). Even when \"a \ndefendant has met his burden of production,\" however, \"the presumption favoring detention does \nnot disappear entirely, but remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district \ncourt.\" United States v. Mattis, 963 F.3d 285, 290-91 (2d Cir. 2020). \nAfter a court has made an initial determination that no conditions of release can \nreasonably assure the appearance of the Defendant as required, the Court may reopen the bail \nhearing if \"information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and \nthat has a material bearing on the issue\" of whether pretrial detention is warranted. 18 U.S.C. § \n3142(0. But the Court is not required to reopen the hearing or to conduct another hearing if it \ndetermines that any new information would not have a material bearing on the issue. See United \nStates v. Raniere, No. 18-CR-2041 (NGG) (VMS), 2018 WL 6344202, at *2 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. \n5, 2018) (noting that \"[a]s the court has already held one detention hearing, it need not hold \nanother\" the standards set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0(2) are met); United States v. Havens, 487 \nF. Supp. 2d 335, 339 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (electing not to reopen a detention hearing because the \nnew information would not have changed the court's decision to detain the defendant until trial). \nIII. \nDiscussion \nThe Defendant bases her renewed motion for bail on both 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 and the \nCourt's inherent powers to review its own bail decisions. See Def. Mot. at 7-9. As already \nnoted, § 3142(0 provides that a bail hearing \"may be reopened ... at any time before trial if the \njudicial office\n... [truncated, 2101 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/3 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=3]", "char_count": 2101}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that \nwill reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other \nperson and the community.\" A court may also revisit its own decision pursuant to its inherent \nauthority, even where the circumstances do not match § 3142(0's statutory text. See, e.g., \nUnited States v. Rowe, No. 02-CR-756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, \n2003) (noting that \"a release order may be reconsidered even where the evidence proffered on \nreconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the original hearing.\"); United States v. \nPetrov, No. 15-CR-66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (noting the \n\"Court's inherent authority for reconsideration of the Court's previous bail decision\"). \nIn line with this, the Defendant's new motion aims to address the reasons that the Court \nprovided when it originally determined that no conditions could reasonably assure her \nappearance and that pretrial detention was warranted. First, the Defendant proposes a more \nexpansive set of bail conditions that she claims addresses any concerns regarding risk of flight. \nThe newly proposed conditions include a $28.5 million bail package, which consists of a $22.5 \nmillion personal recognizance bond co-signed by the Defendant and her spouse and secured by \napproximately $8 million in property and $500,000 in cash, along with six additional bonds—\nfive co-signed by the Defendant's friends and family members and the sixth posted by the \nsecurity company that would provide security services to the Defendant if she were granted bail \nand transferred to home confinement. See Def. Mot. at 2. The proposed conditions also provide \nthat the Defendant would be released to the custody of a family member, who would serve as her \nthird-party custodian under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i); that she would be placed in home \nconfinement with GPS monitoring and that he\n... [truncated, 2157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/4 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=4]", "char_count": 2157}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "counsel, medical visits, and upon approval by the Court or Pretrial Services. hi. at 2-3. \nFurthermore, the Defendant would have on-premises security guards that she would pay for who \nwould prevent her from leaving the residence at any time without prior approval by the Court or \nPretrial Services and who would escort her when she is authorized to leave. Id. at 3. \nThe motion also presents new information that, according to the Defendant, addresses the \nconcerns that the Court articulated when it determined that detention was warranted. This newly \npresented information, most of which was available to the Defendant at the time of the initial bail \nhearing, includes evidence of the Defendant's family ties in the United States, see Def. Mot. at \n10-14; a detailed financial report that provides a more comprehensive outlook on the \nDefendant's financial conditions and assets, see id. at 15-18; evidence that according to her \nrebuts the Government's original contention that she attempted to evade law enforcement prior \nto her arrest, see id. at 18-25; waivers of her right to contest extradition from the United \nKingdom and France, along with expert opinions claiming that the Defendant would not be able \nto resist extradition if she were to execute the waivers, see id. at 25-29; and evidence that she \nargues lays bare the weakness of the Government's case against her, see id. at 30-34. \nFinally, the Defendant argues that the conditions of her confinement, including as a result \nof the COVID-19 pandemic, present an additional factor favoring release. She claims that the \nconditions imposed are punitive and that those conditions interfere with her ability to participate \nin her defense, and she asserts that these factors further militate in favor of release. See id. at 34-\n38. \nHaving carefully considered all of the Defendant's arguments, the Court again concludes \nthat no conditions or combination of conditions could reasonably assure her appearance and that \n6 \nEFTA00066\n... [truncated, 2004 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/5 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=5]", "char_count": 2004}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "detention without bail is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(I). The Court accordingly denies \nDefendant's request to reopen the original bail hearing and denies her renewed motion for bail. \nA. The presumption in favor of detention applies \nThe Court is required to presume that no condition or combination of conditions of \npretrial release will reasonably assure the Defendant's appearance. The Bail Reform Act \nprovides that if a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim \nunder 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, \"it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of \nconditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the \ncommunity if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person \ncommitted.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). The Defendant's indictment by a grand jury suffices to \nestablish that there is probable cause to believe that she committed the offenses charged in the \nindictment. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that \nthat an indictment returned by a properly constituted grand jury \"conclusively determines the \nexistence of probable cause\" and that \"the return of an indictment eliminates the need for a \npreliminary examination at which a probable cause finding is made by a judicial officer pursuant \nto Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.\" (citations omitted)). In light of the \ncrimes charged in the indictment, the Court begins with the presumption that no condition or \ncombination of conditions of pretrial release will reasonably assure the Defendant's appearance. \nWhen the presumption applies, the Defendant bears a limited burden of production \n\"tending to counter the § 3142(e) presumption of flight,\" Contreras, 776 F.2d at 53 n.1. The \nDefendant's burden of production only requires that she \"introduce a certain amount of evidence \ncontrary to the presumed fact.\" United States v. Jessup, 757 F.\n... [truncated, 2046 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/6 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=6]", "char_count": 2046}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "abrogated on other grounds by United States v. O'Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990). That \nburden is \"limited.\" United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). The \nDefendant's proffer of evidence and information—including information relating to her financial \nconditions and her family ties to the United States, among other things-satisfies this limited \nburden. As the Court discussed at the July 14, 2020 hearing, these factors bear on the question \nof whether the Defendant poses a flight risk. And the evidence she advances in her renewed \nmotion for bail reasonably disputes the presumption that she poses a flight risk. In that sense, \nthis evidence is relevant to the ultimate determination and satisfies the relatively low threshold \nimposed by the burden of production. \nThe presumption of flight does not disappear entirely, however, and it \"remains a factor \nto be considered among those weighed by the district court.\" United States v. Mercedes, 254 \nF.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, \"[a] judicial officer \nconducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal \nevidence, continue to give the presumption of flight some weight by keeping in mind that \nCongress has found that these offenders pose special risks of flight, and that `a strong probability \narises' that no form of conditional release will be adequate to secure their appearance.\" Martir, \n782 F.2d at 1144 (citation omitted). \nB. The new information does not alter the Court's initial determination \nWhen determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the \nappearance of the person as required, courts are required to consider the factors outlined in 18 \nU.S.C. § 3142(g). Thus, the Court considers (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense \ncharged, including whether the offense involves a minor victim, (2) the weight of the evidence, \n(3) the defendant's history and characteristi\n... [truncated, 2073 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/7 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=7]", "char_count": 2073}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "any person or the community posed by pre-trial release. See Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436; see also \n18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). \nAt the July 14, 2020 bail hearing, the Court considered these factors before concluding \nthat no conditions of release could reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. \nAnd the first and fourth factors remain unchanged. As already noted, the Defendant is charged \nwith offenses involving minor victims, and it is undisputed that the nature and circumstances of \nthe offenses charged in the Superseding Indictment weighs in favor of continued detention. On \nthe other hand, the Government has not advanced any evidence that the Defendant poses a \ndanger to any person or to the community, a factor that weighs against detention. The \nDefendant's arguments therefore focus on the second and third factors. \nAs explained below, neither the arguments put forth in the Defendant's renewed motion \nfor bail nor the evidence she submitted in conjunction with her motion rebut the Court's \nconclusions, and the Court continues to find, after again applying these factors, that no \nconditions of release will reasonably assure the Defendant's appearance at future proceedings. \n1. The Weight of the Evidence \nThe Court will address the strength of the Government's case first. The Defendant \nargues that the Government lacks any meaningful documentary corroboration of the witness \ntestimony and that the discovery produced to date has included only a \"small number of \ndocuments from the time period of the conspiracy.\" Def. Mot. at 5. And she claims, as a result, \nthat the Government overstated the strength of its case in advance of the July 14, 2020 bail \nhearing. See id. at 30-33. So she argues that the second § 3142(g) factor supports release. \nThe Court disagrees. Arguing that the case against her \"is based almost exclusively on \nthe recollections of the three accusers, who remain unidentified,\" the Defendant contends that the \n9 \nEFTA00066964\n", "char_count": 1985}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "weight of the evidence is weak. Def. Reply at 2. But she too easily discredits the witness \ntestimony. According to the Government, and as reflected in the indictment, it is anticipated that \nthe three witnesses will provide detailed and corroborating accounts of the Defendant's alleged \nrole in enticing minors to engage in sex acts. See Gov't Opp'n at 10; see also Dkt. No. 17, SI \nSuperseding Indictment, ¶¶ 7, II, 13, 17. Moreover, the Government proffers that additional \nevidence, including flight records and other witnesses' corroborating testimony, will further \nsupport the main witnesses' testimony and link the Defendant to Epstein's conduct. Gov't \nOpp'n at 10-11. And while the Defendant contends that much of this evidence focuses on \nEpstein, not the Defendant, the nature of the conspiracy charge (along with the evidence linking \nthe Defendant to Epstein) renders this evidence relevant to the Government's charges against \nher. As the Court stated in the July 14,2020 hearing, although the Court does not prejudge the \nmerits of the Government's case or of the Defendant's defenses, for purposes of the bail \ndetermination stage, the Government's proffered case against the Defendant remains strong. See \nDkt. No. 93 (\"Tr.\") at 83:4-83:10. The Court again concludes that the Defendant's awareness of \nthe potential strength of the government's case against her creates a risk of flight, and none of the \nDefendant's new arguments meaningfully alter that conclusion. As a result, the second factor \nsupports detention. \n2. The Defendant's History and Characteristics \nAt the July 14,2020 bail hearing, the Court determined that the Defendant was a flight \nrisk in part because of her substantial international ties, including multiple foreign citizenships \nand familial and personal connections abroad and her ownership of at least one foreign property \nof significant value. See Tr. at 83:13-83:18. And the Court further noted that the Defendant's \nextraordinary financial resourc\n... [truncated, 2082 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/9 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=9]", "char_count": 2082}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "COVID-I9 related travel restrictions. Id. at 83:21-83:25. The Court also observed that the \nDefendant had family and personal connections to the United States but concluded that the \nabsence of any dependents, significant family ties, or employment in the United States also \nsupported the conclusion that flight would not pose an insurmountable burden for her. Id. at \n84:4-84:9. While the Defendant's renewed motion for bail addresses some of these factors, it \ndoes not alter the Court's conclusion. \nThe first few considerations remain relatively unchanged. The Defendant continues to \nhave substantial international ties and multiple foreign citizenships, and she continues to have \nfamilial and personal connections abroad. None of the evidence presented in support of the \npresent motion fundamentally alters those conclusions. To address the Court's concern that the \nDefendant's French citizenship presented the opportunity that she could flee to France and that \nshe would be able to resist extradition on that basis, see Tr. at 83:1843:20, the Defendant now \noffers to waive her right to extradition from both the United Kingdom and France, along with \nexpert opinions reports claiming that such waivers would likely make it possible to resist an \nextradition request from the United States to either country. See Def. Mot., Exs. T, U, V. As the \nGovernment points out in its brief, however, the legal weight of the waivers is, at best, contested. \nThe French Ministry of Justice, for instance, indicated in a letter submitted in conjunction to the \nGovernment's opposition that the French Code of Criminal Procedure \"absolutely prohibits\" the \nextradition of a French national. See Gov't Opp'n, Ex. B. And while the Defendant's own \nexpert attempts to rebut the Ministry of Justice's letter, see Def. Reply, Ex. A, even the \nDefendant's own experts use probabilistic, rather than absolute, language, leaving open the \npossibility that extradition would be blocked. See, e.g., Def. Mot., E\n... [truncated, 2139 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/10 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=10]", "char_count": 2139}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "successfully to resist extradition to the United States in relation to the charges in the superseding \nindictment dated 7 July 2020.\"); Def. Mot., Ex. V ¶ 76 (\"It would ... become a matter for the \nFrench government to decide on whether or not to issue an extradition decree against Ms. \nGhislaine Maxwell.\"); id. ¶ 77 (\"[I]t is highly unlikely that the French government would refuse \nto issue and execute an extradition decree against Ms Maxwell. . . .\"). Nor has the Defendant \npresented any cases where courts addressed the question of whether an anticipatory waiver of \nextradition is enforceable; while she cites cases where defendants offered to waive extradition, \nthe reasoning in those cases turned on other factors and the courts did not dwell on the \nenforceability of such waivers. See, e.g., United States v. Cirillo, No. 99-1514, 1999 WL \n1456536, at *2 (3d Cir. July 13, 1999); United States v. Salvagno, 314 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119 \n(N.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2004); United \nStates v. Chen, 820 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1992). In those cases, the courts included \nsuch waivers as one among several conditions of release, but they did not make any express \ndetermination that such waivers are enforceable. On the other hand, some courts have expressly \nopined that such waivers are unenforceable. See, e.g., United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d \n306, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (describing the \"Defense proposal to give advance consent to \nextradition and waiver of extradition rights\" as \"an empty gesture.\"); United States v. Morrison, \nNo. 16-MR-118, 2016 WL 7421924, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2016) (\"Although the defendants \nhave signed a waiver of extradition, such a waiver may not become valid until an extradition \nrequest is pending in Canada and may be subject to withdrawal.\"); United States v. Stroh, No. \n396-CR-139 (AHN), 2000 WL 1832956, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000) (\"[I]t appears that there \nis a substantial legal \n... [truncated, 2180 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/11 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=11]", "char_count": 2180}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "extradition from Israel (or any other country) would be, at best, a difficult and lengthy process \nand, at worst, impossible.\"). \nHaving carefully reviewed the experts' reports and the cases cited by the Defendant,2 the \nCourt's analysis of the relationship between the Defendant's French citizenship and the risk of \nflight remains fundamentally unchanged. Its reasoning is guided in part by the substantial legal \nquestions regarding the legal weight of anticipatory extradition waivers and the likelihood that \nany extradition would be a difficult and lengthy process (including, for instance, the likelihood \nthat the Defendant would contest the validity of those waivers and the duration it would take to \nresolve those legal disputes). The likelihood that the Defendant would be able to frustrate any \nextradition requests—even if she were correct that she would be unable to stop extradition \nentirely—weighs strongly in favor of detention. \nIn addition, the Defendant's extraordinary financial resources also continue to provide \nher the means to flee the country and to do so undetected. To be sure, this factor alone does not \nby itself justify continued detention. But as the Court noted at the initial bail hearing, the \nDefendant's financial resources, in combination with her substantial international ties and \nforeign connections and her experience avoiding detection (whether from the government, the \npress, or otherwise), do bear significantly on the flight risk analysis. See Tr. at 88:6-88:23 \n(distinguishing this case from United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), \n2 The Defendant also argues that \"a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal an extradition order \nhas been recognized as an indication of the defendant's intent not to flee.\" Def. Mot. at 27 \n(citing United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). The Court places \nlittle weight on this argument. Under the Defendant's theory, a defendant could strategically \noffer\n... [truncated, 2152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/12 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=12]", "char_count": 2152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "United States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), and United States v. Madoff; 586 \nF. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). \nThe Court's concerns regarding the absence of any dependents, significant family ties, or \nemployment in the United States, meanwhile, apply with somewhat less force in light of the \nevidence submitted in support of this motion. See id. at 84:4-84:9. The Defendant has \nsubmitted a litany of letters of support written by friends and family members. See Def. Mot., \nExs. A—N, W—X. These letters, according to the Defendant, support her claim that she has \nsignificant ties to the United States and attest to the Defendant's character. The Defendant \nplaces particular emphasis on the letter written by her spouse, whose identity and connection to \nthe Defendant was withheld from the Court at the initial bail hearing. See Def. Mot. at 11-13. \nIn that letter, her spouse expounds on the lives they led before her arrest, noting in particular that \nthe Government's characterization of the Defendant's \"transient\" lifestyle, Dkt. No. 4 at 9, was \nbelied by the \"quiet family life\" that they had enjoyed. Def. Mot. at 11; see also Def. Mot, Ex. A \n4-5. Other letters similarly highlight that the Defendant's family and affective ties in the \nUnited States are stronger than was originally presented to the Court in the initial bail hearing. \nThese letters substantiate the Defendant's claim that she has important ties to people in \nthe United States, but they leave unaltered the Court's conclusion that flight would not pose an \ninsurmountable burden for the Defendant. Among other things, the Defendant now argues that \nher newly revealed relationship with her spouse signals her deep affective ties in the country, but \nat the time she was arrested, she was not living with him and claimed to be getting divorced. See \nPretrial Services Report at 3. Indeed, she does not propose to live with him were she to be \nreleased on bail, undercutting her argument that that r\n... [truncated, 2160 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/13 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=13]", "char_count": 2160}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "does not mean that those people would be unable to visit her were she to flee to another country. \nIn addition, the Defendant continues to lack any employment ties to the United States—another \nfactor weighing in favor of detention. Furthermore, it is apparent from the letters that the \nDefendant has significant ties to family and friends abroad. In light of this, nothing in the \nrenewed motion for bail alters the Court's fundamental conclusion that flight would not pose an \ninsurmountable burden to the Defendant. \nOther factors that similarly speak to the Defendant's history and characteristics weigh in \nfavor of detention. Most notably, the Defendant's pattern of providing incomplete or erroneous \ninformation to the Court or to Pretrial Services bears significantly on the Court's application of \nthe third factor to the present case. Among other things, in July 2020 the Defendant represented \nto Pretrial Services that she possessed around $3.5 million worth of assets (while leaving out her \nspouse's assets and assets that had been transferred to trust accounts) and the representation that \nthe New Hampshire property was owned by a corporation and that she was \"just able to stay \nthere.\" See Pretrial Services Report at 2. The Defendant now claims that she \"was detained at \nthe time and had no access to her financial records and was trying to piece together these \nnumbers from memory. According to the Macalvins report, [the financial figures] are a close \napproximation of the value of the assets that Ms. Maxwell held in her own name at the time of \nher arrest.... For the reasons already discussed, Ms. Maxwell was reluctant to discuss anything \nabout her [spouse] and expressed that to Pretrial Services.\" Def. Mot. at 16 n.5. Even if the \nDefendant was unable to provide an exact number, however, the difference between the number \nshe originally reported to Pretrial Services and the number now presented to the Court in the \nMacalvins report, a report on the Defendant's \n... [truncated, 2164 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/14 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=14]", "char_count": 2164}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "was the result of the Defendant's misestimation rather than misdirection. And while the \nDefendant's concerns regarding her spouse's privacy are not insignificant, she fails to furnish \nany explanation as to why those concerns led her to misrepresent key facts to Pretrial Services \nand, by extension, the Court. In sum, the evidence of a lack of candor is, if anything, stronger \nnow than in July 2020, as it is clear to the Court that the Defendant's representations to Pretrial \nServices were woefully incomplete. That lack of candor raises significant concerns as to \nwhether the Court has now been provided a full and accurate picture of her finances and as to the \nDefendant's willingness to abide by any set of conditions of release. \nFor the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the third factor continues to weigh \nin favor of detention. \nC. Pretrial detention continues to be warranted \nIn light of the reasons stated above, the Government has again met its burden of \npersuasion by \"a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight.\" \nEnglish, 629 F.3d at 319 (quoting Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436). Taking the § 3142(g) factors into \naccount, the Court concludes that the presumption in favor of detention, the nature and \ncharacteristics of the charged offenses, the weight of the evidence, and the history and \ncharacteristics of the Defendant all weigh in favor of detention. Along similar lines, the \nGovernment has also shown, and the Court concludes for the reasons outlined below, that the \nDefendant's proposed bail package cannot reasonably assure her appearance. Thus, the Court's \noriginal conclusion that the Defendant poses a flight risk and that no set of conditions can \nreasonably assure her future appearance remains unaltered. \nAs already noted, the Defendant now proposes a $28.5 million bail package, which \nincludes a $22.5 million personal recognizance bond co-signed by the Defendant and her spouse \n16 \nEFTA00066971\n", "char_count": 1987}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "and secured by approximately $8 million in property and $500,000 in cash, along with six \nadditional bonds—five co-signed by the Defendant's friends and family members and the sixth \nposted by the security company that would provide security services to the Defendant if she were \ngranted bail and transferred to home confinement. See Def. Mot. at 2. At the initial hearing, the \nCourt noted that the opaqueness of the Defendant's finances rendered it difficult to set financial \nbail conditions that could reasonably assure her appearance in court. The financial information \nthat the Defendant presented to the Court at the initial bail hearing was undisputedly incomplete, \nand as the Court noted, the Court lacked \"a clear picture of Ms. Maxwell's finances and the \nresources available to her.\" Tr. at 86-87. \nThe Defendant has now presented to the Court what is perhaps a more thorough report on \nher finances prepared by Macalvins, an accounting firm in the United Kingdom. Macalvins \nanalyzed the Defendant's assets and finances for the past five years, basing its analysis on, \namong other things, bank statements, tax returns, and FBAR filings, providing a summary of \nthe assets held by the Defendant and her spouse as well as the assets held in trust for the \nbenefit of the Defendant for the period stemming from 2015 to 2020. See Def. Mot., Ex. O. \nIn addition, the Defendant retained a Certified Fraud Examiner and a former IRS Special \nAgent, who reviewed the Macalvins report and the underlying documents and determined that \nreport accurately represents the assets held by the Defendant and her spouse. See Def. Mot., Ex. \nP. The Defendant's new bail proposal is based on the numbers derived from the Macalvins \nreport. \nBut even assuming that the financial report provides an accurate analysis of the \nDefendant's finances, the Court is unpersuaded by her argument that the bail package reasonably \nassures her appearance. As the Government argues, the bail package would leave unre\n... [truncated, 2027 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/16 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=16]", "char_count": 2027}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "millions of dollars and other assets that she could sell in order to support herself. See Gov't \nOpp'n at 23. Furthermore, the proposed bond is only partially secured. Taking into account the \nvast amounts of wealth left relatively unrestrained by the bail package, that amount, standing \nalone, cannot reasonably assure that she would appear before the Court. Nor is the Court's \nconclusion altered by the fact that a number of third parties have pledged to support her bond; \nthe amount of wealth that she would retain were she to flee, in addition to contingent assets and \nfuture income streams that are not accounted for in the bail package, would plausibly enable her \nto compensate them, in part or in full, for their losses. And while the Defendant argues that she \nhas procured \"significant loans on the basis of a negative pledge\" over a property and that $4 \nmillion is invested in an \"illiquid hedge fund that could only be liquidated with considerable \ndifficulty,\" see Def. Reply at 6, these arguments do not alter the Court's ultimate conclusion \nthat the financial package does not meaningfully mitigate the possibility of flight. \nThe proposed conditions also provide that the Defendant would be released to the \ncustody of a family member, who would serve as the Defendant's third-party custodian under 18 \nU.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(3)(i); that the Defendant would be placed in home confinement with GPS \nmonitoring and that her travel would be restricted to the Southern and Eastern Districts of New \nYork and would be limited to appearances in Court, meetings with counsel, medical visits, and \nupon approval by the Court or Pretrial Services; that she would be under the strict supervision of \nPretrial Services; and that she would surrender all travel documents. Id. at 2-3. Furthermore, \nthe Defendant would have on-premises security guards who would prevent her from leaving the \nresidence at any time without prior approval by the Court or Pretrial Services and who would \nescort h\n... [truncated, 2064 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/17 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=17]", "char_count": 2064}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "None of these conditions would reasonably assure the Defendant's appearance. Here, \ntoo, the Court's original determination applies with equal force. As the Court noted at the \noriginal hearing, the Defendant has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to evade detection, \n\"[e)ven in the face of what the Defense has acknowledged to be extreme and unusual efforts to \nlocate her.\" Tr. at 87:4-87:19. Indeed, regardless of whether the Defendant sought to evade the \npress, rather than law enforcement, in the months leading up to her arrest, her sophistication in \nevading detection reveals the futility of relying on any conditions, including GPS monitoring, \nrestrictive home confinement, and private security guards, to secure her appearance. See Tr. at \n87:4-88:2. As other courts have observed, \"home detention with electronic monitoring does not \nprevent flight; at best, it limits a fleeing defendant's head start.\" United States v. Zarger, No. 00-\nCR-773-S-1 (JG), 2000 WL 1134364, at *I (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000). Furthermore, while the \nDefendant now represents that she would be released to the custody of a family member, who \nwould serve as the Defendant's third-party custodian under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i), and \nthat she secured a residence in the Eastern District of New York, see Def. Mot. at 3, that does not \noutweigh the other significant factors weighing in favor of detention. And finally, the \nDefendant's argument that private security guards could ensure her appearance at future \nproceedings runs afoul of the Bail Reform Act, which the Second Circuit has held \"does not \npermit a two-tiered bail system in which defendants of lesser means are detained pending trial \nwhile wealthy defendants are released to self-funded private jails.\" United States v. Boustani, \n932 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019). As in Boustani, the Defendant in the present case would be \ndetained regardless of her wealth, and \"if a similarly situated defendant of lesser means would be \ndetained, a we\n... [truncated, 2126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/18 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=18]", "char_count": 2126}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "In light of the above, the Court again concludes that the Government has shown by a \npreponderance of the evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight and that the \nDefendant's proposed conditions are insufficient to reasonably assure her appearance. The \npresumption in favor of detention, the weight of the evidence, and the history and characteristics \nof the Defendant all support that conclusion, and none of Defendant's new arguments change the \nCourt's original determination. \nD. The Defendant's conditions of confinement do not justify release \nLastly, the Court is unpersuaded by the Defendant's argument that the conditions of her \nconfinement are uniquely onerous, interfere with her ability to participate in her defense, and \nthus justify release. See Def. Mot. at 35-38. Indeed, the Defendant does not meaningfully \ndispute that she has received \"more time than any other inmate at the MDC to review her \ndiscovery and as much, if not more, time to communicate with her attorneys.\" Gov't Opp'n at \n29. To the extent that the Defendant has concerns regarding some of the measures taken by \nBOP, including a recent lockdown due to COVID-19 that curtailed in-person legal visitations, \nthe Defendant provides no authority to conclude that this, standing alone, violates her \nconstitutional right to participate in her defense. And while the Court acknowledges the \nDefendant's concerns regarding the conditions of her confinement, the Defendant has failed to \nprovide any basis to conclude that release is warranted on those grounds—even after the Court \nhas determined that she continues to pose a flight risk.3\n3 The Court will continue to ensure that the Defendant has the ability to speak and meet regularly \nwith her attorneys and to review all necessary discovery materials to prepare for her defense. \nDefense counsel shall confer with the Government on any specific requests. To the extent they \nare not reasonably accommodated, an application may be made to the Court. \n\n... [truncated, 2017 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00066956/19 or ?id=EFTA00066956&page=19]", "char_count": 2017}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Finally, as the Court expressed at the initial bail hearing, it has deep concerns about the \nspread of COVID-19 at BOP facilities, including at the MDC. Indeed, in recent weeks, the \nincidence of COVID-19 among the inmate population where the Defendant is housed is truly \nalarming. See COVID-19: Coronavirus, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/ \ncoronavirus/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (noting that the MDC currently has 99 inmates and 11 \nstaff members who have tested positive for COVID-19). It could be argued that in the face of \nthis, only those defendants who pose a danger to the community ought to be detained pending \ntrial. If that were the law and in light of the increasing positivity rate, the Court would not \nhesitate to reopen the detention hearing and release the Defendant on bail since the Government \nrests none of its arguments on dangerousness. But that is not the law. Moreover, as the Court \nfound at the initial bail hearing, the Defendant has no underlying health conditions that put her at \nheightened risk of health impacts were she to contract COVID. The pandemic, including \nincreasing positivity numbers in the MDC, is not a basis for release in this case where the Court \nfinds that the Defendant poses a substantial and actual risk of flight and that no combination of \nconditions could reasonably assure her appearance. \nE A hearing is unnecessary \nHaving carefully reviewed the parties' arguments, the Court determines that a hearing is \nunnecessary and that it can resolve the motion on the papers. The briefing from both sides \ncomprehensively lays out the parties' respective arguments For the reasons stated above, none \nof the new information has a material bearing on the Court's determination that the Defendant \nposes a flight risk. Indeed, many of the reasons that the Court provided at the July 14, 2020 \nhearing continue to apply with equal, if not greater, force. The Court need not hold another \n21 \nEFTA00066976\n", "char_count": 1973}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00066956", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "hearing to evaluate Maxwell's motion, and it declines to do so. See United States v. Raniere, No. \n18-CR-2041 (NGG) (VMS), 2018 WL 6344202, at *2 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2018). \nIV. \nConclusion \nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell's renewed motion for release on bail, Dkt. No. 97, is \nDENIED. \nSO ORDERED. \nDated: December 28, 2020 \nNew York, New York \n22 \nALISON J. NATHAN \nUnited States District Judge \nEFTA00066977\n", "char_count": 409}]}