{"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_count": 38, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00065989", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00065989.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \n \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nv. \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \n X \n20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nMEMORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL \nIN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT \nFOR BREACH OF NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT \nMark S. Cohen \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \nEFTA00065989\n", "char_count": 510}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS \nPage \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n1 \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \n7 \nA. \nThe Structure of the NPA \n8 \nB. \nThe Negotiation of the NPA \n11 \nARGUMENT \n12 \nI. \nThe Indictment Should Be Dismissed for Breach of the NPA. \n14 \nA. \nMs. Maxwell Has Standing to Enforce the NPA. \n15 \nB. \nThe NPA's Prohibition on Prosecution of Potential Co-Conspirators Is Not \nLimited to the SDFL. \n18 \n1. \nThe NPA is binding on the USAO in this District \n 18 \n2. \nUnited States v. Annabi does not alter the analysis.  \n 19 \na. \nThere is an \"affirmative appearance\" that the co-conspirator \nimmunity provision was intended to apply outside the SDFL \n20 \nb. \nThe Second Circuit's subsequent application of Annabi \nsupports Ms. Maxwell's position \n22 \nc. \nTo the extent that Annabi conflicts with Eleventh Circuit law, \nEleventh Circuit law applies and would require enforcement \nof the NPA here.  \n23 \nC. \nThe NPA's Prohibition on the Prosecution of Potential Co-conspirators Is \nNot Limited to Prosecution for Conduct Between 2001 and 2007 or for \nParticular Statutory Offenses. \n26 \nII. \nIn the Alternative, the Court Should Permit Discovery and Conduct an Evidentiary \nHearing Regarding the Parties' Intent \n28 \nCONCLUSION \n32 \nEFTA00065990\n", "char_count": 1222}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "TABLE OF AUTHORITIES \nPage(s) \nCases \nAdvani Enters., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, \n140 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998) \n23 \nBochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, \n405 F.3d 964 (I I th Cir. 2005) \n 15 \nOwn St v. Street Beat Sportswear; Inc., \n226 F. Supp. 2d 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) \n15 \nCrutsinger v. Hess, \n408 F. Supp. 548 (D. Kan. 1976) \n24 \nFlorida Power & Light Co. v. Mid-Valley, Inc., \n763 F.2d 1316 (11th Cir. 1985) \n 15 \nGiglio v. United States, \n405 U.S. 150 (1972) \n 13 \nIn re Wild, \n955 F.3d 1196 (I I th Cir.), reh'g en banc ranted, opinion vacated, 967 F.3d 1285 \n(11th Cir. 2020) \n 11 \nIndex Fund, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. An:., \n580 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1978) \n23 \nInnes v. Dalsheim, \n864 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1988) \n14 \nLaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass 'n v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., \n424 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2005) \n21, 27 \nPerez v. United States, \nNos. 14 Civ. 846, 04 Cr. 937-1, 2015 WL 3413596 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) \n 18 \nPort Consol., Inc. v. Intl Ins. Co. of Hannover, PLC, \n826 F. App'x 822 (I I th Cir. 2020) \n21, 27 \nSantobello v. New York, \n404 U.S. 257 (1971) \n 12 \nSubaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., \n425 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005) \n 15 \nEFTA00065991\n", "char_count": 1152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "United States v. Aleman, \n286 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2002) \nUnited States v. Annabi, \n771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985) \nUnited States v. Ashy*: \n29 \npassim \n320 F. App'x 26 (2d Cir. 2009) \n22 \nUnited States v. Brown, \nNo. 99-1230(L), 2002 WL 34244994 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) \n23 \nUnited States v. CFW Const. Co., \n583 F. Supp. 197 (D.S.C.), affd, 749 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1984) \n16 \nUnited States v. Clements, \n992 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1993) \n15 \nUnited States v. D'Amico, \n734 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) \n21 \nUnited States v. El-Sadig, \n133 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001) \n17 \nUnited States v. Feldman, \n939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) \n13, 26, 29, 30 \nUnited States v. Florida West Intl Airways, Inc., \n853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012) \n16, 17 \nUnited States v. Gebbie, \n294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) \n24, 25 \nUnited States v. Gonzalez, \n93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) \n14, 22, 27, 29 \nUnited States v. Harvey, \n791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986) \n24 \nUnited States v. Laskow, \n688 F. Supp. 851 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1988) \n21 \nUnited States v. Marquez, \n909 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991) \n15 \nUnited States v. Mozer, \n828 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) \n12 \niii \nEFTA00065992\n", "char_count": 1210}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "United States v. Papa, \n533 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1975) \n29 \nUnited States v. Persico, \n620 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985) \n22 \nUnited States v. Prisco, \n391 F. App'x 920 (2d Cir. 2010) \n22 \nUnited States v. Ready, \n82 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 1996) \n12 \nUnited States v. Russo, \n801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986) \n20, 21, 23 \nUnited States v. Salameh, \n152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) \n22 \nUnited States v. Sattar, \nNo. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 WL 22510398 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003) \n29 \nUnited States v. Van Thornout, \n100 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 1996) \n24 \nUnited States v. Vaval, \n404 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2005) \n13 \nStatutes \n18 U.S.C. § 2422 \n26 \n18 U.S.C.§ 2423 \n26 \nOther Authorities \nJustice Manual, Comment to § 9-27.630 \n19, 21 \niv \nEFTA00065993\n", "char_count": 751}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "PRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nGhislaine Maxwell respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of her Motion to \nDismiss the Superseding Indictment for Breach of the Non-Prosecution Agreement (\"Motion\"). \nOne does not need to engage in complex analysis to understand what has happened here: \nthe government has sought to substitute our client for Jeffrey Epstein, even if it means \nstretching—and ultimately exceeding—the bounds of the law. Yet, it is in precisely this \nsetting—involving a defendant who, despite her years of denials, has been publicly attacked, \nthreatened, and vilified like few others in recent memory—that the government's scrupulous \nadherence to the law in prosecuting a criminal defendant is most critical. As the motions being \nfiled today demonstrate, the government has repeatedly fallen short of its obligations here. The \nindictment must be dismissed. \nThe government's sudden zeal to prosecute Ms. Maxwell for alleged conduct with \nEpstein in the 1990s—conduct for which the government never even charged Epstein—follows a \nhistory that is both highly unusual and deeply troubling. The government (and state authorities) \ninvestigated Epstein thoroughly in 2006 for alleged conduct that is essentially identical to the \nconduct alleged in the current indictment. In 2007, the government's investigation was resolved \nwhen it entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement (\"NPA\") with Epstein, which was negotiated \nunder the supervision of R. Alexander Acosta, then United States Attorney for the Southern \nDistrict of Florida (\"SDFL\"), and approved by senior levels of Main Justice, including the Office \nof the Deputy Attorney General. In that NPA, the government agreed that any federal \nprosecution of Epstein in the SDFL would be deferred in exchange for Epstein's agreement to \nEFTA00065994\n", "char_count": 1817}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "plead guilty to a single-count Florida state indictment.' Epstein did so in 2008 and went to \nprison for 13 months. At that time, the government did not charge Ms. Maxwell. \nIn 2016, attorneys representing plaintiffs in civil litigation against Ms. Maxwell met with \na section chief in the United States Attorney's Office (\"USAO\") for the Southern District of New \nYork (\"SDNY\") and pitched the idea of bringing a criminal case against Ms. Maxwell for \nconduct similar, if not identical, to that alleged in the current indictment. The section chief \nappropriately declined. \nThen, in 2018, more than a decade after the NPA was executed, an explosive front-page \narticle in the Miami Herald reported detailed allegations, including from attorneys representing \nplaintiffs in civil litigation, about Epstein's conduct, Acosta's handling of the 2006 investigation, \nthe process by which the NPA had been negotiated, and its substantive terms. In the wake of the \narticle, the government indicted Epstein in this District for conduct allegedly committed between \n2002 and 2005. Again, the government did not charge Ms. Maxwell. \nThus, at three separate junctures over more than a decade, the government had occasion \nto consider whether to charge Ms. Maxwell for the now 25-year-old conduct alleged in the \ncurrent indictment. Every time, the government—appropriately—did not do so. Indeed, such \ncharges would have been baseless. \nBut in August 2019, Epstein was found dead in his jail cell. His death while in federal \ncustody was not only disturbing, but publicly embarrassing for the government, characterized by \nthe then-Attorney General as the result of \"a perfect storm of screw-ups.\" \nWorse still, almost to the day after Epstein died, the barrage of media attention shifted \nfrom Epstein to Ms. Maxwell, including in mainstream publications. She was portrayed as \nI The government had drafted a 60-count federal indictment against Epstein, which did not refer to Ms. Maxwell. \n2 \nEFTA00065995\n", "char_count": 1999}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Epstein's equal—if not his superior—and baselessly caricatured as a villain of near-mythical \nproportions. Only at this time did the government, according to its own account, decide to \nlaunch an investigation of Ms. Maxwell and prosecute her on allegations that it had previously, \nrepeatedly (and properly, since any charges would have been baseless) determined did not merit \ncharges. In short, the government's response to the media frenzy was not to adhere to its earlier \nobjective analysis and consideration of the facts, but to feed the frenzy and substitute Ms. \nMaxwell for Epstein. \nThus, the government announced its arrest and indictment of Ms. Maxwell on July 2, \n2020, the exact anniversary of Epstein's indictment. At an extraordinary press conference, the \nUnited States Attorney for this District described Ms. Maxwell's prosecution as the \"prequel\" to \nthe Epstein indictment; thereafter, the then-Attorney General, in rare public comments on bail \nproceedings in an individual case, expressed his delight that \"we were able to get Miss \nMaxwell.\" \nBut in trying \"to get\" Ms. Maxwell, the government compromised its standards, cut \ncorners, and exceeded its authority under the law. This is shown in the present motion and \nothers we are filing today, and includes the following: \n• \nThe government has pressed forward with this case even though the NPA expressly \nprovides that \"the United States ... will not institute any criminal charges against any \npotential co-conspirators of Epstein.\" Rather than argue, as it has time and again, that \nsuch agreements should be construed as drafted, the government does the opposite \nhere, retreating from the very agreement that its own agents negotiated and agreed to \nwith the approval of senior levels of Main Justice. \n• \nThe government has concocted a federal Mann Act case against Ms. Maxwell by \nalleging that, on some unspecified occasion during a four-year period between 1994 \nand 1997, and in an unspecified manner, she someho\n... [truncated, 2390 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/7 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=7]", "char_count": 2390}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "not expired, would be punishable by up to three months in prison — less time than Ms. \nMaxwell has already spent in pretrial detention. Yet, here, that misdemeanor has \nbeen set up as the basis for federal charges for which the government seeks to impose \nyears of imprisonment, if not the equivalent of a life term. Not only is this troubling \nin approach, but even the pieced-together Mann Act charges are time-barred under \nthe applicable statute of limitations. \n• \nIn seeking and obtaining confidential materials from pending civil litigation against \nMs. Maxwell, including the deposition transcripts that form the basis of the two \nperjury counts in the indictment, the government failed to tell the presiding judge \nabout its prior meeting with the plaintiff's counsel (and its prior decision not to \nproceed) notwithstanding direct questioning from the presiding judge, in which the \ncourt expressed concern about whether the plaintiff's counsel had prior meetings with \nthe government and was seeking to foment a criminal case in aid of civil litigation. \n• \nThe government has based the two counts of perjury on poorly worded questions that \nwere immaterial to the defamation case in which the depositions were taken, and has \nimproperly joined those counts to the Mann Act charges, as addressed in today's \nmotions to dismiss and to sever those counts. \n• \nIn an effort to allow other accusers to testify against Ms. Maxwell, the government \nhas added two conspiracy counts and, as alleged \"overt acts\" in furtherance of a \npurported conspiracy to cause minors to travel, has tacked on allegations from two \nother accusers—one of whom is not alleged to have traveled at all (and who was \nabove the legal age of consent in England, where the alleged conduct took place). \n• \nIn its rush to arrest Ms. Maxwell on the anniversary of Epstein's indictment and \nmaximize the announcement's appeal to the media, the government indicted Ms. \nMaxwell using a White Plains grand jury, thereby viola\n... [truncated, 2863 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/8 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=8]", "char_count": 2863}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "defendant); it is about whether the government, in bringing charges, has met the governing legal \nstandards. It has not done so here, and the indictment must be dismissed. \n* * * * \nThis memorandum focuses on the NPA. As this memorandum demonstrates, Ms. \nMaxwell's indictment violates the clear and unqualified terms of the NPA and should therefore \nbe dismissed. The NPA was heavily negotiated over approximately eight months and involved \nnot only Epstein and the SDFL but also senior levels of Main Justice in Washington, D.C., which \napproved the NPA before its execution. Given the blistering public criticism of the NPA and of \nAcosta's handling of the Epstein investigation, it is understandable that the current regime may \nwish the government had not entered into the NPA, or that it had negotiated different terms. \nIndeed, the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility (\"OPR\") found that \nAcosta exercised \"poor judgment\" and \"agreed to several unusual and problematic terms in the \nNPA,\" which OPR characterized as a \"unique resolution.\" \nBut the government is bound by the agreement it negotiated and executed. And the NPA \nis clear, explicit, and unambiguous. The government cannot now ask this Court to rewrite the \nagreement in a way more favorable to its current position, nor overlook key distinctions in the \nagreement, by claiming that they were drafting mistakes or omissions. Nor may the government \nask this Court to construe ambiguities in its favor, in contravention of black-letter law that non-\nprosecution agreements must be construed strictly against the government. \nThe government, in prior submissions, has raised three arguments why the NPA does not \napply here, none of which has merit: \nFirst, the government asserts that Ms. Maxwell lacks standing to enforce the NPA \nbecause she is not a party to it and is not named in it. The government ignores that the parties to \n5 \nEFTA00065998\n", "char_count": 1942}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "the NPA clearly intended to confer a benefit on any and all of Epstein's potential co-conspirators \nin explicitly giving them immunity. Under well-established principles of general contract law, \nand particularly under the law relating to non-prosecution agreements, any and all of Epstein's \npotential co-conspirators are third-party beneficiaries of the NPA. As federal courts have \nrepeatedly recognized in enforcing third-party immunity provisions, a third-party beneficiary \nneed not be expressly named in an immunity provision as long as she falls within the class of \npersons on whom the parties intended to confer immunity. Because the indictment alleges that \nMs. Maxwell was a co-conspirator of Epstein, she falls well within the protection provided by \nthe NPA. \nSecond, the government claims that the co-conspirator immunity provision applies only \nto prosecutions in the SDFL. But the NPA was a highly negotiated, non-standard agreement. It \nis not the standard agreement the government wishes it to be. The plain language of the NPA \nsquarely refutes the government's position. The co-conspirator immunity provision does not \nprohibit merely prosecutions by the USAO for the SDFL (\"USAO-SDFL\"), but by \"the United \nStates.\" This broad prohibition was intentional, as demonstrated by the express references \nelsewhere in the NPA to the United States Attorney and/or the USAO-SDFL. Indeed, compare \nthe NPA's immunity provision for Epstein himself, which is expressly limited to prosecutions in \nthe SDFL, and the co-conspirator immunity provision, which contains no such limitation. Even \nif the language were ambiguous as to its impact on prosecutions on the SDFL, which it is not, \nany ambiguity must be construed against the government. \nIn opposition, the government relies on the Second Circuit's statement that \"[a] plea \nagreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is \nentered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement\n... [truncated, 2055 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/10 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=10]", "char_count": 2055}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985). Annabi supports dismissal here by \nconfirming that where, as here, both the text of the NPA and the facts and circumstances of the \nunderlying negotiations demonstrate an intent to bind the United States (other USAOs), they are \nso bound. Alternatively, any application of Anna& that limits the NPA's effect to the SDFL \nwould conflict with the likely interpretation of the NPA by the Eleventh Circuit, which should \napply in case of any such conflict. \nThird, the government argues that the co-conspirator immunity provision prohibits only \nprosecutions for (i) conduct between 2001 and 2007 and (ii) statutory offenses specifically \nreferenced in the factual recitals to the NPA. Again, the co-conspirator immunity provision \ncontains no such limitations and thus forecloses this argument. The text is clear, but even if it \nwere ambiguous, it must be strictly construed against the government. \nIn the alternative, to the extent there is any doubt that the NPA bars this prosecution, the \nfacts and circumstances surrounding the NPA at least raise sufficient issues regarding the parties' \nintent to warrant discovery and an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Accordingly, if the \nindictment is not dismissed, Ms. Maxwell requests leave to conduct discovery as to the intent of \nthe parties to the NPA with respect to the co-conspirator immunity provision, as well as an \nevidentiary hearing in aid of this Motion. \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \nOn or about September 24, 2007, Epstein and his counsel entered into the NPA with \nAcosta, the United States Attorney for the SDFL.2 While USAOs in a number of judicial \ndistricts, including this District, typically use a standard template for plea agreements and other \nnon-prosecution agreements, this NPA did not follow such a standard format. To the contrary, \n2 A copy of the NPA is attached hereto as Exhibit A. \n7 \nEFTA00066000\n", "char_count": 1932}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "the NPA's language and structure, as well as the manner in which it was negotiated, were highly \natypical. The result was a one-off agreement that deviated in several material respects from, and \nbore little resemblance to, a standard agreement. \nThe Department of Justice's OPR, after investigating Acosta's handling of the Epstein \ncase, characterized the NPA as a \"unique resolution.\" Exh. B (Dep't of Justice, Office of \nProfessional Responsibility, Executive Summary of Report, Investigation into the U.S. \nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida's Resolution of its 2006-2008 Federal \nCriminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the \nInvestigation, November 2020) at x. In particular, the OPR concluded that Acosta \"agreed to \nseveral unusual and problematic terms in the NPA without the consideration required under the \ncircumstances.\" Id. While the co-conspirator immunity provision appears to be one of the terms \nto which the OPR was referring, the government is bound by it. \nA. \nThe Structure of the NPA \nThe NPA is a seven-page document consisting of several factual recitals (NPA at 1-2), a \nparagraph providing for the non-prosecution of Epstein if he complies with the NPA (id. at 2), a \nlist of enumerated \"terms\" (id. at 5), and, finally, five separate paragraphs containing various \nprovisions, including the co-conspirator immunity provision at issue here (id. at 5). Although it \ncontains no defined terms other than \"State Attorney's Office\" and \"Epstein,\" the NPA clearly \nseparates \"the United States\" as a whole from the USAO-SDFL, repeatedly referring explicitly to \nthe USAO where such a limitation is intended. See, e.g., id. at 3 (\"Epstein shall provide to the \nU.S. Attorney's Office copies of all proposed agreements . . . .\"); id. at 5 (\"the United States \nAttorney has no authority\" to bind state prosecutors); id. at 6 (\"Epstein hereby requests that the \nUnited States Attorney for the Southern District of Flor\n... [truncated, 2057 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/12 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=12]", "char_count": 2057}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "NPA's references to the \"United States\" demonstrate a definitional intent not to limit such \nprovisions to the USAO-SDFL. \nThe NPA begins with several factual recitals. After noting certain details of the \ninvestigation and indictment by the Florida State Attorney's Office, the recitals state, among \nother things, that (i) the \"United States Attorney's Office\" and the Federal Bureau of \nInvestigation (\"FBI\") have \"conducted their own investigation into Epstein's background and \nany offenses that may have been committed by Epstein against the United States from in or \naround 2001 through in or around September 2007, including\" five enumerated federal criminal \noffenses; (ii) Epstein seeks \"to resolve globally his state and federal criminal liability\" and thus \nis agreeing to comply with the terms of the NPA \"in exchange for the benefits provided by this \nagreement\"; and (iii) \"the interests of the United States, the State of Florida, and the Defendant \nwill be served by the following procedure.\" NPA at 1-2 (emphasis added). Nowhere in the \nrecitals is reference made specifically to the SDFL or to the USAO-SDFL, nor is there any \nsuggestion that the parties in any way intended to limit the \"global[]\" resolution of Epstein's \nliability. \nThe NPA then provides that \"prosecution [of Epstein] in this District for these offenses \nshall be deferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by\" \nthe terms of the NPA. NPA at 2. The NPA also provides that, after its terms are fulfilled, \nno prosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement [e.g., \nthe five enumerated federal offenses], nor any other offenses that have been the \nsubject of the joint investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the \nUnited States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses that arose from the Federal \nGrand Jury investigation; will be instituted in this District, and the charges \nagainst Epstein if any, will be dismissed. \n3 Like the \n... [truncated, 2145 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/13 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=13]", "char_count": 2145}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Id. Thus, the NPA limits the benefit to Epstein to immunity \"in this District.\" \nNext, the NPA sets forth 13 provisions labeled \"Terms of the Agreement.\" These include \nthe details of Epstein's guilty plea and proposed sentence in the Florida state court, as well as \nEpstein's agreement to waive his right to contest jurisdiction, liability, and damages up to an \nagreed-upon amount in certain civil actions brought by identified victims. NPA at 3-5. \nIn the paragraph following the \"Terms of the Agreement,\" the NPA provides that \n\"Epstein understands that the United States Attorney has no authority to require the State \nAttorney's Office to abide by\" the NPA. NPA at 5. This section further provides that Epstein \nretains the obligation to obtain the State Attorney's Office's compliance with the NPA's \nprocedures, \"which compliance will be necessary to satisfy the United States' interest,\" and to \nconvince the Florida state court to accept the proposed sentence. NPA at 5. The section contains \nno similar provision regarding compliance by other USAOs outside the SDFL. \nThe NPA then lays out the provision at issue in this motion: \nIn consideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to provide \ncompensation in the manner described above, if Epstein successfully fulfills all of \nthe terms and conditions of this agreement, the United States also agrees that it \nwill not institute any criminal charges a ainst an \notential co-cons irators of \nE stein, includin but not limited to \nNPA at 5 (emphasis added). Unlike the provision that Epstein will not be prosecuted \"in this \nDistrict\" (id. at 2), the sentence regarding co-conspirators contains no provision limiting co-\nconspirators' immunity to the SDFL. Unlike the agreement that Epstein will not be prosecuted \nfor \"offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation\" and \"offenses that arose from \nthe Federal Grand Jury investigation\" (id. at 2), the sentence regarding co-conspirators contains \nno limitation on\n... [truncated, 2099 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/14 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=14]", "char_count": 2099}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "prosecuted. Nor does the NPA contain any language limiting its binding effect on other USAOs, \nas standard agreements typically do. \nB. \nThe Negotiation of the NPA \nUnlike standard non-prosecution agreements, the NPA here was heavily negotiated. \nNegotiations began in January 2007, lasted for a period of eight months, and were \"extensive.\" \nIn re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1198-99 (11th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 967 \nF.3d 1285 (I I th Cir. 2020). Discovery has revealed that during these negotiations, several drafts \nof the NPA were exchanged. See, e.g., Exh. C (9/17/07 email from Villafana to Lefkowitz \nattaching draft NPA); Exh. D (9/21/07 email from Villafana to Lefkowitz attaching draft NPA). \nIn addition, the parties exchanged several drafts of an alternative plea agreement under \nwhich Epstein would have pled guilty to a federal offense. See, e.g., Exh. E (9/15/07 email from \nVillafana to Lefkowitz attaching draft information and plea agreement); Exh. F (draft plea \nagreement). Notably, those drafts of the plea agreement, unlike the NPA, expressly defined the \nterm \"United States\" as limited to the United States Attorney for the SDFL. Id. \nIt is our understanding that the negotiations involved the entire hierarchy of the USAO \nfor the SDFL, all of whom signed off on the NPA. Discovery indicates that Main Justice was \ndirectly involved in the negotiation and approval of the NPA, even to the extent that separate \npresentations regarding the NPA were made to, and approval of the NPA was obtained from, the \nOffice of the Deputy Attorney General. Further, the investigation leading up to the NPA was not \nlimited to the SDFL: A privilege log produced by the government in civil litigation indicates \nthat the USAO-SDFL involved the USAO for this District in its investigation of Epstein, and that \nattorneys from the USAO-SDFL traveled to New York and interviewed and/or subpoenaed New \nYork-based witnesses. Privilege Log, Doe v. United States, Case No. 9:08\n... [truncated, 2125 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/15 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=15]", "char_count": 2125}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "discovery demonstrates that the FBI's field offices in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and St. Thomas, \nVirgin Islands were contacted for assistance in the investigation. Exh. G (12/6/06 redacted FBI \nrequest). \nAs the NPA reflects, Epstein's objective in negotiating the NPA was to obtain a global \nresolution that would, among other things, provide maximum protection for any alleged co-\nconspirators, in significant part to minimize the likelihood that Epstein could be subpoenaed as a \npotential witness and have to testify under oath. NPA at 2 (noting that Epstein \"seeks to resolve \nglobally his state and federal criminal liability\"). The NPA makes clear that its identification of \nfour \"potential co-conspirators\" by \nnot \nintended to limit the immunity provision to those four individuals (\"but not limited to\"), and we \nunderstand that those individuals were specifically named in the provision only because they had \nreceived target letters. See Exh. H (9/16/07 email from \no \ntating that \"I will \nmention `co-conspirators,' but I would prefer not to highlight for the judge all of the other crimes \nand all of the other persons that we could charge\"). \nARGUMENT \nThe Supreme Court has long recognized the enforceability of plea agreements. \"[W]hen \na plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can \nbe said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.\" \nSantobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). \nWhile plea agreements are interpreted under basic principles of contract law, the Second \nCircuit has noted that \"plea agreements ... are unique contracts in which special due process \nconcerns for fairness and the adequacy of procedural safeguards obtain.\" United States v. Ready, \n82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. \nMozer, 828 F. Supp. 208, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (\"[A] prosecutor entering into a plea bargain \n12 \nEFTA00066005\n", "char_count": 1979}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "agreement is not simply a party to a contract. The Government is required to observe high \nstandards of integrity and honorable conduct, and the supervisory power of the court is designed \nto insure that such standards are observed.\"). Thus, plea agreements are construed \"strictly \nagainst the government.\" United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting \nUnited States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2005)). \"Because such agreements involve \nwaivers of fundamental constitutional rights, \"prosecutors are held to meticulous standards of \nperformance.\" Feldman, 939 F.3d at 189 (quoting Vaval, 404 F.3d at 153). Finally, \"[t]he \nprosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise \nmade by one attorney must be attributed ... to the Government.\" Feldman, 939 F.3d at 190 \n(quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). \nThe government's attempt to evade the NPA flies in the face of these time-honored, and \nhonorable, principles. Rather than stand behind the promises it made in the NPA, the \ngovernment tries to escape them by arguing that Ms. Maxwell has no standing to enforce them—\na position that is contradicted by the unambiguous text of the NPA as well as by clear precedent. \nThe government also tries to pretend that the NPA contains geographical and temporal \nlimitations that simply do not exist. In doing so, the government essentially turns the principles \nunderlying the interpretation and enforcement of such agreements on their head. Confronted \nwith an NPA that, in hindsight, the government wishes had been negotiated and drafted \ndifferently, the government cannot now manufacture ambiguity where none exists and cannot \nnow demand that the court construe such purported ambiguity in the government's favor, when it \nis a well-established principle that it must be construed in the defendant's favor. \nHere, it is wholly unnecessary for the Court to look beyond the four corners of the NPA \nto d\n... [truncated, 2105 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/17 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=17]", "char_count": 2105}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "that the facts and circumstances of the negotiation of the NPA are consistent with the parties' \nintent to provide potential co-conspirators with the broadest immunity possible. Even if there \nwere ambiguity, which there is not, that ambiguity must be construed against the government and \nin favor of the defense. Accordingly, the indictment must be dismissed. In the alternative, Ms. \nMaxwell should be permitted to take discovery regarding the intent of the parties to the NPA \nwith respect to the co-conspirator immunity provision, and the Court should hold an evidentiary \nhearing in aid of this Motion. \nI. \nThe Indictment Should Be Dismissed for Breach of the NPA. \n\"Plea agreements have long been interpreted in accordance with contract law principles.\" \nUnited States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 269 (2d Cir. 2004). \"In interpreting whether a plea \nagreement has been breached, this court looks to the reasonable understanding of the parties as to \nthe terms of the agreement.\" Id. at 269-70 (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, \nthe government \"must bear the burden for any lack of clarity in the agreement and ambiguities \nshould be resolved in favor of the defendant.\" Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. \n1988). Here, the NPA unambiguously precludes prosecution of Epstein's potential co-\nconspirators, and the indictment in this case must be dismissed. \nIn support of its July 2020 motion for Ms. Maxwell's detention, the government raised \nthree arguments why it contends the NPA does not bar Ms. Maxwell's prosecution: (i) that Ms. \nMaxwell supposedly lacks standing to enforce the NPA; (ii) that the co-conspirator immunity \nprovision applies only in the SDFL; and (iii) that the provision is limited to conduct occurring \nduring the 2001-07 time period and to violations of statutes specifically referenced in the NPA. \nGovernment's Reply Memorandum in Support of Detention (\"Reply Mem.\"), Dkt. No. 22 (filed \nJul. 13, 2020), at 5. None of these argumen\n... [truncated, 2032 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/18 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=18]", "char_count": 2032}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "A. \nMs. Maxwell Has Standing to Enforce the NPA. \nThe Second Circuit has long recognized that plea agreements may include promises of \nleniency for third parties. See, e.g., United States v. Clements, 992 F.2d 417, 419 (2d Cir. 1993) \n(\"it is now clearly established in the Second Circuit that the government may impose conditions \nwhich relate to the conduct or treatment of others\"); United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 742 \n(2d Cir. 1990) (\"Since a defendant's plea is not rendered involuntary because he enters it to save \nhimself many years in prison, it is difficult to see why the law should not permit the defendant to \nnegotiate a plea that confers a similar benefit on others.\"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991). \nYet the government has taken the position that such promises are effectively unenforceable by \nany third party who is not specifically identified by name. \nFundamental principles of contract law contradict the government's position, regardless \nof whether the Court applies the law of New York or that of Florida, where the NPA was \nnegotiated and performed. Both states' laws permit enforcement of a contract by a third-party \nbeneficiary where the parties to the contract intended to confer a benefit on the third party. \nSubaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru opm., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying New \nYork law); Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 982 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying Florida \nlaw). Moreover, lain intention to benefit a third-party may be gleaned from the contract as a \nwhole and the party need not be named specifically as a beneficiary.\" Chen St v. Street Beat \nSportswear; Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 355, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis added) (holding that \ngarment workers had standing as third-party beneficiaries to enforce wage compliance agreement \nbetween Department of Labor and clothing manufacturer that contracted with their employer); \nFlorida Power & Light Co. v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 763 F.2d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 1985) (\"\n... [truncated, 2123 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/19 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=19]", "char_count": 2123}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Contrary to the government's position here, courts applying these traditional contract \nprinciples to non-prosecution agreements have recognized that third parties who claim immunity \nin such agreements have standing to enforce their rights as third-party beneficiaries, even where \nthey have not been expressly named in the non-prosecution agreement. See, e.g., United States \nv. CFW Const. Co., 583 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D.S.C.) (\"an intended third party beneficiary of a \ncontract may enforce its provisions as against the promisor .... if the Government, in \nnegotiating the aforementioned plea agreements, `promised' that there would be no prosecution \nagainst [the third party] for antitrust violations arising in any jurisdiction, the promise must be \nenforced\") (emphasis in original), affd, 749 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1984). \nTwo cases in particular illustrate the infirmity in the government's argument. In United \nStates v. Florida West Intl Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012), the \ngovernment, following a plea agreement with a foreign air cargo provider that immunized certain \nclasses of the provider's employees and related corporations, indicted a U.S. airline and an \nindividual, both of whom asserted that they were within the scope of employees and corporations \ncovered by the plea agreement. Id. at 1215-16. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the \ncourt concluded that only the individual was covered by the plea agreement, but flatly rejected \nthe proposition that either party lacked standing to invoke the plea agreement if covered by it—\neven though the parties were not identified in the plea agreement by name. Id. at 1228-29. \nApplying Florida law, the court held that \"the signatory parties unmistakably intended to confer \nimmunity on a discrete class of corporations and individuals . . . that could include the \nDefendants.\" Id. at 1228. The court added: \nThe plea agreement unquestionably conferred a direct benefit on a class of \nindividuals: immunit\n... [truncated, 2155 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/20 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=20]", "char_count": 2155}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "provider], employees of [its] subsidiaries, and subsidiary corporations of [the \ncargo provider and a related foreign airline]. \nId. \nAn even more loosely defined immunity agreement was enforced in favor of a third party \nin United States v. El-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001). In El-Sadig, the court held \nthat the defendant, who was alleged to have purchased firearms unlawfully for two members of \nthe Saudi royal family who had traveled with a Saudi prince to the United States, had standing to \nenforce an oral agreement between the government and the prince not to prosecute any of the \nindividuals involved in the purchase. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 601. The court concluded that \"even if \nthe non-prosecution agreement was never directly communicated to [the defendant], he can \nenforce the non-prosecution agreement as a third party beneficiary.\" Id. at 608. Moreover, the \ncourt reasoned, because the prince himself \"was not involved in any of the illegal activity, his \nefforts to obtain a commitment not to prosecute were obviously intended by him to benefit third-\nparties,\" and therefore the defendant was a third-party beneficiary with standing to enforce the \nagreement. Id. at 609. \nBoth Florida West and EI-Sadig illustrate how the government's argument that Ms. \nMaxwell lacks standing to enforce the NPA is contrary to bedrock principles of contract law, as \napplied to immunity agreements. Like Ms. Maxwell, the defendants in Florida West and El-\nSadig were not parties to the agreements at issue. Like Ms. Maxwell, the defendants were not \nspecifically named in the agreements. Yet in both cases, the courts held that the defendants were \nthird-party beneficiaries with standing to enforce the agreements, because the parties to the \nagreements obviously intended to confer on them the benefit of immunity. Ms. Maxwell \nsimilarly has standing to enforce the co-conspirator immunity provision of the NPA, as the \n17 \nEFTA00066010\n", "char_count": 1956}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "parties to the NPA clearly intended to confer immunity on potential co-conspirators of Epstein, \nsuch as Ms. Maxwell. \nB. \nThe NPA's Prohibition on Prosecution of Potential Co-Conspirators Is Not \nLimited to the SDFL. \nThe NPA stands in contrast to the standard non-prosecution agreement used in this \nDistrict and other jurisdictions, which typically is explicitly limited to prohibit only prosecutions \nby the USAO for the district in which the plea is entered. The standard agreement in this District \ncontains the following language: \"It is further understood that this Agreement does not bind any \nfederal, state, or local prosecuting authority other than this Office.\" See, e.g., Perez v. United \nStates, Nos. 14 Civ. 846, 04 Cr. 937-1, 2015 WL 3413596 , at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). No such \nlanguage is included in the NPA. Moreover, unlike the standard agreement, the NPA refers \nseparately to \"the United States\" in some places and to the USAO-SDFL in others, in ways that \nmake clear that any reference to \"the United States\" was intended to refer to the government as a \nwhole, not merely the USAO-SDFL. \n1. \nThe NPA is binding on the USAO in this District. \nThe government's contention that the NPA does not bind the USAO in this District \ncannot be squared with the clear language of the co-conspirator immunity provision. On its face, \nthat provision does not limit the preclusive effect of the NPA as to potential co-conspirators to \nprosecutions in the SDFL. Indeed, consistent with Epstein's desire to obtain the broadest \nimmunity possible, the NPA expressly provides that, in exchange for Epstein's compliance with \nthe terms and conditions therein, \"the United States also agrees that it will not institute any \ncriminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein,\" with no express geographic \nlimitation. NPA at 5 (emphasis added). In contrast, the clauses regarding the non-prosecution of \nEpstein expressly defer \"prosecution in this District\" and provide that no pros\n... [truncated, 2034 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/22 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=22]", "char_count": 2034}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "offenses at issue will be \"instituted in this District.\" NPA at 2 (emphases added). In addition, \nthe use of the term \"the United States\" in the co-conspirator immunity provision contrasts with \nthe use elsewhere in the agreement of various terms that refer more specifically to the USAO-\nSDFL. When the government wanted a provision of the NPA to refer only to the USAO-SDFL, \nit knew how to do so; where it chose not to do so, a different intent is demonstrated. \nIndeed, the omission of express language limiting the co-conspirator immunity provision \nto the SDFL was contrary to Justice Department policy. The Justice Manual (formerly the U.S. \nAttorneys' Manual) expressly provides, and provided at the time the NPA was executed, that \"if \npracticable, the attorney for the government should explicitly limit the scope of his/her [non-\nprosecution] agreement to non-prosecution within his/her district.\" Justice Manual, Comment to \n§ 9-27.630. The government's deviation from a policy of which it was obviously aware—for \noffenses that, by their nature, involve interstate travel and are susceptible to prosecution in \nmultiple districts—cannot be regarded as an oversight, particularly where the policy was \nfollowed elsewhere in the NPA with respect to the immunity provision as to Epstein. \n2. \nUnited States v. Annabi does not alter the analysis. \nIn support of its position, the government has cited United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670 \n(2d Cir. 1985). Reply Mem. at 5. But Annabi does not support the government's position. In \nfact, to the extent it is relevant here, it supports dismissal. \nIn Annabi, the government, following a guilty plea to one count of a three-count \nindictment in the Eastern District of New York, agreed to move to dismiss the two open counts. \nUnlike here, there was no written agreement; rather, the prosecutor stated on the record at the \ntime of the plea that \"the only agreement that exists between the defendants and the Government \nis that at the time of\n... [truncated, 2183 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/23 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=23]", "char_count": 2183}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "moved to dismiss a subsequent indictment in this District as barred by what they claimed was an \nearlier \"plea agreement\" in the Eastern District, and the court denied the motion. Id. The \nSecond Circuit, in affirming the denial, stated simply that \"[a] plea agreement binds only the \noffice of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it \naffirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.\" Id. at 672. \nThus, not only is Annabi readily distinguishable from this case, but it explicitly \nrecognizes that plea agreements can be binding in other jurisdictions, and that a plea agreement \nthat has the \"affirmative appearance\" of broad applicability—as the NPA does here—will be \nenforced according to its terms. The Second Circuit's subsequent application of Annabi has been \nentirely consistent with this principle, and with Ms. Maxwell's position here. To the extent that \nAnnabi would preclude Ms. Maxwell from enforcing the NPA outside the SDFL, it is in conflict \nwith the likely resolution of the issue under Eleventh Circuit law, which should apply here. \na. \nThere is an \"affirmative appearance\" that the co-conspirator \nimmunity provision was intended to apply outside the SDFL. \nThe \"affirmative appearance\" contemplated by Annabi \"need not be an express \nstatement.\" United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1986). Here, the \"affirmative \nappearance\" that a broader restriction was intended is evident within the four corners of the \nNPA, when the NPA is reviewed as a whole. As noted above, the absence of any limiting \nlanguage in the co-conspirator immunity provision stands in sharp contrast to the NPA's \nprovision regarding the non-prosecution of Epstein, which is expressly limited to prosecution \"in \nthis District.\" NPA at 2. It is difficult to envision a clearer \"affirmative appearance\" than the \nexpress inclusion elsewhere in the agreement of a limitation that is conspicuously absent here. \nBasic prin\n... [truncated, 2201 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/24 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=24]", "char_count": 2201}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "provision as to Epstein. See, e.g., LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass 'n v. Nomura Asset Capital Cap., 424 \nF.3d 195, 206 (2d Cir. 2005) (\"In interpreting a contract under New York law, `words and \nphrases ... should be given their plain meaning,' and the contract `should be construed so as to \ngive full meaning and effect to all of its provisions.\") (citations omitted); Port Consol., Inc. v. \nInt'l Ins. Co. of Hannover, PLC, 826 F. App'x 822, 827 (11th Cir. 2020) (same under Florida \nlaw). The Justice Manual supports this view, admonishing prosecutors who do not wish to bind \nUSAOs in other districts to \"explicitly limit the scope\" of the NPA to their districts. Justice \nManual, Comment to § 9-27.630 (emphasis added). The absence of the phrase \"in this District\" \nfrom the co-conspirator immunity provision therefore compels the opposite inference: that the \nparties did not intend to limit the co-conspirator immunity provision to the SDFL. \nMoreover, \"a promise to bind other districts can be inferred from the negotiations \nbetween defendant and prosecutor.\" Russo, 801 F.2d at 626. One relevant factor in this analysis \nis the extent to which the USAO negotiating the plea agreement acted on its own, as opposed to \ninvolving other USAOs or other offices within the Department of Justice. Cf, e.g., United States \nv. D'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that defendant \"offers no \nmeaningful support for his claim that he `reasonably understood' the Agreement to bar \nsubsequent prosecutions in this District.... He does not claim, for example, that the SDNY \nUSAO was in any way consulted or involved in the plea negotiations.\"); United States v. \nLaskow, 688 F. Supp. 851, 854 (E.D.N.Y.) (\"defendants concede [] that the Central District had \nno knowledge of the investigation that was taking place in the Eastern District at the time the \nCentral District plea was being negotiated.... The Central District, unaware of defendants' \npotential criminal liability in the Eas\n... [truncated, 2175 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/25 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=25]", "char_count": 2175}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Here, we understand that senior levels of Main Justice were directly involved in the \nnegotiation and approval of the NPA, and the NPA itself reflects the involvement of the FBI. \nNPA at 1. Moreover, the USAO-SDFL's involvement of the USAO for this District in its \ninvestigation of Epstein, as well its contact with witnesses in New York, reflect a coordinated \neffort that transcended the USAO-SDFL. SDFL Privilege Log at 4, 5, 7. From these facts, it \naffirmatively appears that the government had every reason to foresee a potential prosecution of \nEpstein's co-conspirators in this District and, after multiple layers of review within the \nDepartment of Justice, intended to agree to preclude it. \nb. \nThe Second Circuit's subsequent application of Annabi supports \nMs. Maxwell's position. \nIn nearly all of the cases in which the Second Circuit has reiterated its statement in \nAnnabi in the context of written plea agreements, those agreements, unlike the NPA here, \ncontained language expressly limiting the enforceability of the NPA to the district in which it \nwas made. See, e.g., United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920, 921 (2d Cir. 2010) (\"agreement \nis limited to the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey and cannot bind \nother federal, state, or local authorities\"); United States v. Ashraf, 320 F. App'x 26, 28 (2d Cir. \n2009) (plea agreement \"by its express terms, bound only the U.S. Attorney's Office for the \nEastern District of Virginia\"); Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x at 270 (\"Paragraph 13 explicitly states that \nthe agreement binds only the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Mexico\"); \nUnited States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 119 (2d Cir. 1998) (\"[t]his agreement is limited to the \nUnited States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York and cannot bind other \nfederal, state or local prosecuting authorities\"); United States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836, 846 \n(S.D.N.Y.) (finding agreements \"clearly indicate that the \n... [truncated, 2150 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/26 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=26]", "char_count": 2150}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "defendant's plea agreement explicitly stated that it \"is binding on the United States only in [the \nEastern] district\"), aff'd, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985). Because there is no such language in the \nNPA here, Ms. Maxwell's position is entirely consistent with these cases, and they counsel in \nfavor of enforcement of the NPA in this case. \nOther Second Circuit cases citing Annabi also support Ms. Maxwell's position. In United \nStates v. Brown, No. 99-1230(L), 2002 WL 34244994 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002), the defendants \nrelied solely on their \"subjective beliefs\" and \"implicit understanding\" that they would not be \nprosecuted further in another district, which the court held irrelevant; they cited no \"affirmative \nappearance\" in support of their position, as Ms. Maxwell has. And in Russo, the court found it \nunnecessary to reach Annabi, but acknowledged that an \"affirmative appearance\" of an intent to \nbind other USAOs can be found even where a plea agreement does not contain an express \nstatement to that effect—an interpretation that supports Ms. Maxwell's position that the NPA \nbinds the government here. Russo, 801 F.2d at 626. \nc. \nTo the extent that Annabi conflicts with Eleventh Circuit law, \nEleventh Circuit law applies and would require enforcement of the \nNPA here. \nUnder federal choice-of-law rules, which apply in non-diversity cases, factors in \ndetermining which jurisdiction's contract law applies include (i) any choice-of-law provision in \nthe contract; (ii) the place where the contract was negotiated, issued, and signed; (iii) the place of \nperformance; (iv) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and (v) the domicile, \nresidence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties. Advani \nEnters., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 140 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1998). New York conflict-of-\nlaw rules similarly require that the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts and \ngreatest interest governs the constructio\n... [truncated, 2166 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/27 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=27]", "char_count": 2166}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "drafted and executed by the government's agents in the SDFL, and because Epstein performed \nunder the contract by entering a plea in a Florida court, any conflict of laws between the Second \nCircuit and the Eleventh Circuit should be resolved in favor of the application of Eleventh \nCircuit law to the NPA. \nThe Eleventh Circuit has not directly addressed whether a plea agreement or non-\nprosecution agreement signed by one USAO is binding on a USAO in another district. But it \nmay be presumed, as it frequently is when predicting how a state's highest court would rule in a \ncase of first impression, that the Eleventh Circuit would follow the weight of authority. See, e.g., \nCrutsinger v. Hess, 408 F. Supp. 548, 554 (D. Kan. 1976) (\"if state law is silent and there is a \nconflict of authority in other jurisdictions, the federal court construing the law of the state will \nassume that the state court would follow the weight of authority\"). \nHere, the weight of authority holds that, at least when a plea agreement refers to \"the \nUnited States\" or \"the Government,\" it binds USAOs in all districts absent a provision to the \ncontrary. See, e.g., United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 547-49 (3d Cir. 2002) (characterizing \nthe Second Circuit's statement in Annabi as an \"illogical posture\" unsupported by the prior \nSecond Circuit cases on which it relied); United States v. Van Thornout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th \nCir. 1996) (\"Absent an express limitation, any promises made by an Assistant United States \nAttorney in one district will bind an Assistant United States Attorney in another district\"); \nUnited States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986) (\"It is the Government at large—not \njust specific United States Attorneys or United States `Districts'—that is bound by plea \nagreements negotiated by agents of Government.\"). In Gebbie, the Third Circuit analyzed \nAnnabi and its predecessor Second Circuit cases in detail, concluding that the statement \n24 \nEFTA00066017\n", "char_count": 1992}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "articulated in Annabi \"really has no analytically sound foundation [in Second Circuit case law]. \nIt just keeps replicating itself each time it is cited.\" Gebbie, 294 F.3d at 547. \nIt appears that the Second Circuit is the only court of appeals to take the position \narticulated in Annabt Given that three circuits have held otherwise—and that one of them has \naddressed the Second Circuit's reasoning in Annabi in detail—it is likely that the Eleventh \nCircuit would follow the weight of authority and hold that absent an express provision to the \ncontrary, a plea agreement or non-prosecution agreement executed in the name of \"the United \nStates\" binds USAOs in other districts. \nAs previously demonstrated, there is no conflict between this position and Annabi as \napplied to these facts, because Annabi supports dismissal here. But to the extent that Annabi \ncould be construed as limiting the NPA's effect to the SDFL, it would be inconsistent with the \nEleventh Circuit's likely disposition of the issue and should not be followed here. \nWe understand that Epstein and his counsel sought to ensure, to the fullest extent \npossible, that third parties would not face criminal liability in connection with his actions, in part \nto minimize the likelihood that he would be subpoenaed as a witness. Thus, Epstein and his \ncounsel reasonably understood that, unlike Epstein's own immunity, the immunity for his alleged \nco-conspirators from federal prosecution would not be limited to the SDFL. To the extent that \nthe government intended to impose such a limitation, it was the obligation of the government, in \ndrafting the agreement, to ensure that such limitations were included. Having failed to do so, the \ngovernment may not now ask this Court to read limitations into the co-conspirator immunity \nprovision that it did not include at the time the NPA was negotiated. \n25 \nEFTA00066018\n", "char_count": 1895}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "C. \nThe NPA's Prohibition on the Prosecution of Potential Co-Conspirators Is \nNot Limited to Prosecution for Conduct Between 2001 and 2007 or for \nParticular Statutory Offenses. \nFinally, the government has characterized the NPA's co-conspirator immunity provision \nas \"limited by its terms to conduct spanning from 2001 to 2007 . . . and to violations of statutes \nnot charged in this Indictment.\" Reply Mem. at 5-6. This characterization is grossly inaccurate. \nThe co-conspirator immunity provision contains no limitation as to either the time period or the \nstatutes on which such criminal charges might be based.4\nJust as the NPA deviates from the standard agreement in failing to include language \nlimiting its scope to the SDFL, it also deviates from the standard agreement by failing to specify \nthe conduct, including the time period, for which the putative defendant—or, in this case, \npotential co-conspirators—cannot be prosecuted. As with its failure to limit the co-conspirator \nimmunity provision to the SDFL, the government may not now rewrite the NPA to limit the \nscope of covered conduct in a manner that it failed to do in drafting the NPA. At minimum, the \nabsence of any such limitation renders the scope of the provision ambiguous, and any ambiguity \nmust be construed against the government. See Feldman, 939 F.3d at 189. \nWhile the NPA's factual recitals reference the 2001-07 time period and list five potential \nstatutory offenses, the NPA's substantive provisions establish no such limit on the immunity for \npotential co-conspirators-or, for that matter, for Epstein himself—to either that time period or \nthose offenses. As to Epstein, the NPA provides immunity for (i) \"any offenses that arose\" from \nthe undefined \"Federal Grand Jury investigation\" and (ii) \"any other offenses that have been the \nsubject of the joint investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States \n4 The government's assertion that the co-conspirator immunity provision i\n... [truncated, 2427 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/30 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=30]", "char_count": 2427}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Attorney's Office.\" NPA at 2. The latter investigation, in turn, encompasses not only \"offenses\" \nfrom the 2001-07 time period, but also \"Epstein's background.\" Id. at 1. Thus, for example, \nprosecution of Epstein for a pre-2001 offense that arose out of the FB1/USAO investigation into \nEpstein's background, or for an unlisted statutory offense that arose from the grand jury \ninvestigation, would have been prohibited under the NPA. \nThe co-conspirator immunity provision does not include even those broad limitations. It \nprovides, simply, that the United States will not \"institute any criminal charges against any \npotential co-conspirators of Epstein.\" Id. at 5 (emphasis added). The provision could not be \nclearer, either on its face or in the context of the NPA as a whole. As with the absence of \nlanguage limiting the provision to prosecution in the SDFL, the absence of any language limiting \nthe offenses for which potential co-conspirators cannot be prosecuted, when such language is \nincluded as to Epstein, must be presumed under contract interpretation principles to have been \nintentional. See, e.g., LaSalle Bank, 424 F.3d at 206; Port Consot, 826 F. App'x at 827-28. At \nminimum, the silence as to time period and covered conduct is an ambiguity and therefore should \nbe resolved against the government. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x at 269. \nEven if the NPA were construed as placing some limitation on co-conspirator immunity, \nno rational limitation could exclude the conduct alleged here. The charges against Ms. Maxwell \ninvolve her alleged role as a co-conspirator of Epstein, involving alleged conduct almost \nidentical to the alleged conduct that led up to the NPA. Indeed, the United States Attorney for \nthis District, in announcing the current indictment, described it as \"the prequel to the earlier case \nwe brought against Jeffrey Epstein.\" See, e.g., Dienst, J., Valiquette, J., Winter, T., and \nFitzpatrick, S. \"Jeffrey Epstein Confidante Ghislaine Maxwell Arrested on Sex\n... [truncated, 2112 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/31 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=31]", "char_count": 2112}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "courtsighislaine-maxwell-arrested-jeffrey-epstein-aide/2495762/). And the government has \nacknowledged, by omission, that one of the three alleged victims referenced in the current \nindictment was interviewed by the USAO for the SDFL. See Reply Mem. at 6 (\"two of the \nvictims referenced in the Indictment were never approached or interviewed by the SDFL\"). \nAs noted above, Epstein and his counsel sought to prevent prosecution against his \nputative co-conspirators to the maximum extent possible. Had the government intended to limit \nthat protection to a specific time period or to violations of specific statutes, it could have done so. \nIt did not. Thus, by charging Ms. Maxwell with conduct in which she allegedly engaged as part \nof a conspiracy with Epstein—conduct that predates the NPA—the government has violated the \nNPA. \nIn sum, none of the three arguments proffered by the government regarding the \napplicability of the NPA is meritorious. Ms. Maxwell is a third-party beneficiary of the NPA \nwith standing to enforce the co-conspirator immunity provision. The co-conspirator immunity \nprovision binds all USAOs and is not limited to the SDFL. It imposes no limitation on the scope \nof covered conduct—and even if it did, the conduct alleged here would be covered. At most, the \nco-conspirator immunity provision is ambiguous, and thus must be construed against the \ngovernment. Because the co-conspirator immunity provision bars the government's prosecution \nof Ms. Maxwell on charges arising out of her alleged conspiracy with Epstein, the indictment \nshould be dismissed. \nII. \nIn the Alternative, the Court Should Permit Discovery and Conduct an Evidentiary \nHearing Regarding the Parties' Intent. \nThe language of the NPA and the facts submitted herewith are more than sufficient for \nthe Court to find that the NPA bars the prosecution of Ms. Maxwell, particularly when ally \n28 \nEFTA00066021\n", "char_count": 1914}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "ambiguities are construed, as they must be, against the government as drafter. In the alternative, \nhowever, the NPA and the circumstances of its execution merit discovery and an evidentiary \nhearing regarding the parties' intent. \nTo the extent that extrinsic materials do not make the parties' intent clear, the Court is \nobligated to make a finding as to the parties' reasonable understanding,\" with ambiguities \nresolved in Ms. Maxwell's favor. See Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x at 270 (emphasis and citation \nomitted). Courts in this circuit have routinely recognized the need for evidentiary hearings \nwhere the existence or scope of a plea agreement or non-prosecution agreement is in genuine \ndispute. See, e.g., id. at 270 (noting testimony from defendant's attorney); United States v. \nAleman, 286 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2002) (remanding where \"the district court failed to make a \nrecord that allows us to determine the existence, scope and effect of an immunity agreement\"); \nAnnabi, 771 F.2d at 671 (noting that district court heard testimony from two prosecutors, \ndefendant, and defendant's counsel as of the time the plea agreement was reached); United States \nv. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing \"two evidentiary hearings\"); United States \nv. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 WL 22510398, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003) (noting \nconclusion that \"an evidentiary hearing was warranted . . . to determine whether an agreement \nexisted, what its terms were, and whether there was compliance with those terms\"). \nMs. Maxwell's request for an evidentiary hearing, and for discovery, is at least as strong \nas that in Feldman. There, the district court denied discovery to a defendant who claimed that \nthe government had served a writ of execution in violation of oral representations made in \nconnection with the defendant's plea agreement, holding that the agreement's merger provision \nbarred the consideration of any oral agreements or representations. The Second Circuit reve\n... [truncated, 2123 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/33 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=33]", "char_count": 2123}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "contract arising out of commercial negotiations among private parties, we believe the court did \nnot correctly apply the standards that govern the interpretation of plea agreements with the \ngovernment. We have long recognized that plea agreements are significantly different from \ncommercial contracts.\" Feldman, 939 F.3d at 189 (emphasis added). The court explained: \nGovernment conduct in negotiating plea agreements must comport with the \nhighest standard of fairness. Because such agreements involve waivers of \nfundamental constitutional rights, prosecutors are held to meticulous standards of \nperformance. \nId. (citations and internal quotations omitted). The court held that given the absence of \ndiscovery and an evidentiary hearing, \"the record does not furnish a basis for a complete \nunderstanding of what happened in the course of the plea negotiations,\" and that the defendant's \nevidence was \"sufficient in these circumstances\" to require the district court to take such action. \nId. at 190. \nUnlike the agreement in Feldman, the NPA here contains no integration clause, and the \nco-conspirator immunity provision, on its face, bars prosecution of Epstein's potential co-\nconspirators without limitation as to judicial district, time period of the underlying conduct, or \nthe statutory violations alleged. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Feldman, Ms. Maxwell had \nno role in the negotiation of the NPA, and thus all of the information relevant to its construction \nis in the possession of third parties. However, we understand that Epstein sought the maximum \nprotection from prosecution possible for his potential co-conspirators and that Main Justice \nparticipated in the negotiation of the NPA, and there is evidence that the USAO-SDFL consulted \nwith the USAO for this District in its investigation. SDFL Privilege Log at 4, 5, 7. This \ninformation could be confirmed through discovery. \nMedia reports regarding the November 2020 OPR report further support Ms. Maxwell's \npositi\n... [truncated, 2103 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00065989/34 or ?id=EFTA00065989&page=34]", "char_count": 2103}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "executive summary does not discuss the co-conspirator immunity provision. It has been reported \nin the media, however, that the full OPR report states that the Assistant United States Attorney \nwho negotiated the deal recalled Epstein's counsel telling her that Epstein's intent was \"to make \nsure that he's the only one who takes the blame for what happened.\" Hill, J. \"Key Takeaways \nfrom the Justice Department review of Jeffrey Epstein sweetheart deal.\" ABC News. Nov. 16, \n2020 (https://abcnews.go.corn/US/key-takeaways-justice-department-review-jeffrey-epstein-\nsweetheart/story?id=74222922). If the reporting is accurate, the OPR report suggests that the \ngovernment understood Epstein's desire to protect his potential co-conspirators to the maximum \nextent possible, and that the government articulated no objection—Le., that there was no intent to \nlimit the scope of the co-conspirator immunity provision. The accuracy of this account, as well \nas other information about the plea negotiations and the parties' intent, can be confirmed through \ndiscovery. \n31 \nEFTA00066024\n", "char_count": 1085}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "CONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the \nindictment. In the alternative, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court conduct an \nevidentiary hearing regarding the scope of the NPA, and that Ms. Maxwell be permitted to take \ndiscovery in aid of such a hearing. \nDated: January 25, 2021 \nNew York, New York \nRespectfully submitted, \n/s/ Mark S. Cohen \nMark S. Cohen \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \n32 \nEFTA00066025\n", "char_count": 615}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00065989", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \nI hereby certify that on January 25, 2021, I served by email, pursuant Rule 2(B) of the \nCourt's individual practices in criminal cases, the within memorandum and any accompanying \nexhibits upon the following: \nU.S. Attorney's Office, SDNY \nEFTA00066026\n", "char_count": 278}]}