{"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_count": 21, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00040664", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00040664.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nUnited States of America, \n—v—\nGhislaine Maxwell, \nDefendant. \nUSDC SONY \nDOCUMENT \nELECTRONICALLY FILED \nDOC  \nDATE FILED: 6/25/2021 \n20-cr-330 (AJN) \nOPINION & ORDER \nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge: \nMaxwell moves to suppress evidence obtained through a grand jury subpoena to a law \nfirm involved in earlier civil litigation against her. She contends that because the documents \nsought by the subpoena were previously subject to a protective order, the Government obtained \nthem in violation of her rights against compelled self-incrimination, against unreasonable \nsearches and seizures, and to due process of law. For the reasons that follow, the Court \nconcludes that the evidence should not be suppressed and that Maxwell is not entitled to an \nevidentiary hearing. \nI. \nBackground \nIn late 2015, \nsued Maxwell for defamation. SeeMv. \nMaxwell, No. \n15-cv-7433 (S.D.N.Y.). =alleged \nthat Maxwell defamed her by accusing her of lying \nabout Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein sexually abusing her. The law firm Boies Schiller Flexner \nLLP (BSF) represented \nin the dispute. The parties litigated the case for about two years \nbefore signing a confidential settlement agreement. \nEarly in the civil litigation, one of the attorneys representing_approached an \nAssistant United States Attorney (AUSA) in the Southern District of New York and requested a \nEFTA00040664\n", "char_count": 1427}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "meeting to provide the Government information on possible criminal conduct. The AUSA met \nwith three attorneys who represente' \non February 29, 2016. The AUSA's notes from the \nmeeting reflect that it focused primarily on Epstein. However, the notes also identify Maxwell \nas Epstein's \"head recruiter\" of underage girls. The attorneys sent a few follow-up emails to the \nAUSA in the following weeks. The United States Attorney's Office did not pursue a criminal \ninvestigation at that time. \nMaxwell claims based on a New York Daily News article published in October 2020 that \na second meeting took place between federal prosecutors and a principal of BSF in the summer \nof 2016. The Government has represented to the Court that the AUSA who participated in the \nFebruary 29, 2016 meeting did not participate in a second meeting with BSF attorneys and that \nthe Government has \"uncovered no evidence that such a meeting ever occurred.\" Dkt. No. 204, \nat 92. However, for purposes of deciding this motion, the Court assumes that it occurred. \nAbout two weeks after the February 29, 2016 meeting, the judge presiding over the civil \ncase entered a protective order that allowed the parties in that case to designate documents \nproduced in discovery as confidential. See Dkt. No. 134-1. That order prohibited the parties \nfrom disclosing confidential documents to anyone other than people involved in the case. \nAlthough BSF initially proposed language that would allow disclosure of documents to law \nenforcement without a court order, the final version of the protective order included no such \nexception. The protective order did not require the parties to obtain the court's approval to mark \na document as confidential. It allowed the court to modify the order at any time for good cause \nafter notice to the parties. It also allowed the parties to use any confidential information at trial, \nat which point that information would become public. It required the parties to return or destroy \nconf\n... [truncated, 2056 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00040664/1 or ?id=EFTA00040664&page=1]", "char_count": 2056}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Following entry of the protective order, Maxwell testified in two depositions in the civil \ncase. The parties designated the depositions as confidential under the protective order. Counts \nfive and six of the SI superseding indictment in this case (and counts seven and eight of the S2 \nsuperseding indictment) charge that Maxwell made false statements under oath in each of the \ndepositions. \nThe Government represents that the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District \nof New York formally opened its investigation into Epstein on November 30, 2018, following a \nseries of articles in the Miami Herald about Epstein's conduct and the lenient plea deal he \nreceived in the Southern District of Florida. The same day, the AUSA who attended the \nFebruary 2016 meeting forwarded the emails she received from attorneys in the civil case to the \nprosecutors working on the fledgling investigation. There is no indication that she was involved \nin the decision to begin the investigation into Epstein in 2018. \nAbout two months later, the Government served a grand jury subpoena on BSF seeking \nto obtain documents for its investigation of Epstein. BSF informed the Government that many of \nthe requested documents fell under the protective order. The Government then applied for an ex \nparte order modifying the protective order to allow BSF to comply with the subpoena. The \nGovernment made a second, similar application in connection with a protective order in a \ndifferent case. \nThe judge who presided over the civil case passed away in March 2019, and so then-\nChief Judge McMahon heard the Government's ex parte application. In a hearing on March 26, \n2019, Judge McMahon explained that she believed the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell v. \nInternational Telephone & Telegraph Coip., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), governed the \nGovernment's application. Martindell held that a party should not provide documents subject to \n3 \nEFTA00040666\n", "char_count": 1961}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "a protective order to the Government absent a formal motion or subpoena. It further held that a \ncourt should modify a protective order that a party reasonably relied on only if the order had \nbeen improvidently granted or upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances or compelling \nneed. \nJudge McMahon held a second ex parte hearing on April 9, 2019. At that hearing, citing \na district court case called Chemical Bank for the proposition that civil litigants ought not foment \ncriminal investigations against their opponents to gain strategic advantage, she asked the \nGovernment about contacts between the U.S. Attorney's Office and BSF on the subject of the \nGovernment's investigation. The Government explained that BSF had informed the Government \nthat some of the documents the Government sought were covered by a protective order. The \nGovernment did not mention any of the communications with BSF attorneys in 2016. \nJudge McMahon issued a sealed order granting the Government's application followed \nby a sealed opinion dated April 9, 2019. In the opinion, she explained that Martindell governed \nthe Government's application, but that two of the Martindell factors supported modification of \nthe protective order. First, Maxwell did not reasonably rely on the protective order because it \nwas subject to modification. Second, the Government had shown extraordinary circumstances \nsupporting modification of the protective order because it could not otherwise obtain information \nabout the high-profile targets of its investigation without tipping them off. Magistrate Judge \nNetbum denied the Government's similar application in another case, applying the same \nstandard but concluding that the Government had not shown extraordinary circumstances or \ncompelling need. \nFollowing Judge McMahon's order, BSF turned over its records from the civil litigation \nto the Government. Those documents included transcripts of Maxwell's depositions. The \n4 \nEFTA00040667\n", "char_count": 1974}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Second Circuit later held that the court in the civil case withheld far too many documents from \npublic view and ordered that many of them be made publicly available. Brown v. Maxwell, 929 \nF.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2019). Much of what the Government obtained through its subpoena, \nincluding the bulk of the deposition transcripts Maxwell now seeks to suppress, have since been \nunsealed by court order in the civil case. See \nNo. 15-cv-7433, Dkt. Nos. 1137, 1212. \nII. \nDiscussion \nMaxwell objects both to the Government obtaining documents covered by the protective \norder and to the Government's conduct in doing so. She contends that she agreed to testify in the \ncivil case only because of the protective order, and thus that the Government's use of her \ndeposition testimony against her would violate her right against compelled self-incrimination. \nShe contends that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents covered by the \nprotective order, and thus that the Government should not have been able to obtain them without \na warrant. And she contends that the Government circumvented the requirements of Martindell \nand violated her due process rights by misleading Judge McMahon about the Government's prior \ncommunications with BSF. \nThe Court finds that none of these arguments support suppression of evidence or justify \nan evidentiary hearing. The Court begins with Maxwell's claim that the Government violated \nher right against compelled self-incrimination by obtaining her deposition testimony from the \ncivil case. It next turns to her claim that the Government violated her right against unreasonable \nsearches and seizures. Finally, it addresses Maxwell's claim that the Government misled Judge \nMcMahon in seeking modification of the protective order in the earlier civil case. \n5 \nEFTA00040668\n", "char_count": 1828}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "A. The Government did not violate Maxwell's right against self-incrimination \nThe Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal \ncase to be a witness against himself.\" U.S. Const. amend. V. \"The [Supreme] Court has held \nrepeatedly that the Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral \ncompulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege.\" Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. \n391, 397 (1976) (quoting Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)). It does not prohibit \nthe Government from using a defendant's voluntary statements in a subsequent criminal \nprosecution. \nTo establish a violation of the right against compelled self-incrimination, Maxwell must \n\"demonstrate the existence of three elements: I) compulsion, 2) a testimonial communication, \nand 3) the incriminating nature of that communication.\" In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 826 F.2d \n1166, 1168 (2d Cir. 1987). Maxwell contends that the Government violated her right against \ncompelled self-incrimination by obtaining copies of her deposition transcripts from her earlier \ncivil case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment \nrights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. \n248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed \nthe protective order in that case would prevent the Government from obtaining her testimony and \nusing it in a subsequent criminal case against her. \nSecond Circuit precedent expressly forecloses Maxwell's argument. \"A Rule 26(c) \nprotective order, no matter how broad its reach, provides no guarantee that compelled testimony \nwill not somehow find its way into the government's hands for use in a subsequent criminal \nprosecution.\" Andover Data Servs. v. Stat. Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. \n1989). As the Second Circuit has explained, a civil protective order may (as here) be overturne\n... [truncated, 2019 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00040664/5 or ?id=EFTA00040664&page=5]", "char_count": 2019}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "or modified by another court in another proceeding. Id. A civil protective order may (as here) \nbe limited by its terms to pretrial proceedings, in which case the parties must expect that \nconfidential documents will come to light as the case progresses. See In re Agent Orange Prod. \nLiab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); Dkt. No. 134-1 ¶ 13. A court may (as here) \nunseal documents covered by a civil protective order in the public interest. See Brown, 929 F.3d \nat 47;= \nv. Maxwell, 827 F. App'x 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2020); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of \nOnondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). Civil litigants have neither a reasonable basis nor \nlegal entitlement to rely on a civil protective order against the use of their testimony in a \nsubsequent criminal proceeding. \nMaxwell thus has failed to establish the first and most fundamental element of a violation \nof her right against compelled self-incrimination: compulsion. Because the protection typically \nafforded by a civil protective order is both porous and ephemeral, the Second Circuit has held \nthat \"a non-consenting witness may not be forced to answer potentially incriminating questions \nin reliance upon such an order.\" Andover, 876 F.2d at 1084. Maxwell was free to assert her \nFifth Amendment rights in her civil case and refuse to offer incriminating testimony. \nLongstanding precedent made clear that if she did not do so, the Government could use any such \ntestimony that it learned of against her in a later criminal case. Because the Government did not \ncompel Maxwell to offer incriminating testimony, it did not violate her right against compelled \nself-incrimination. \nMaxwell's alternative argument that BSF's act of turning over her deposition transcripts \nwas itself compelled testimony is likewise without merit. The Supreme Court has held that the \nact of producing documents in response to a subpoena implicates the Fifth Amendment only in \nnarrow circumstances—when the existence of responsive documents\n... [truncated, 2049 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00040664/6 or ?id=EFTA00040664&page=6]", "char_count": 2049}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "inculpatory. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-11. This is no such case. The existence of deposition \ntranscripts in Maxwell's civil case is not inculpatory. It is the content of those transcripts that is \nat issue. \nIn the face of these straightforward precedents, Maxwell relies primarily on a single \ndistrict court case decided the year before the Second Circuit's decision in Andover that quashed \na subpoena for deposition testimony covered by a civil protective order. See Dkt. No. 140, at \n16-17 (citing United States v. Oshatz, 700 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)); Dkt. No. 212, at 12-\n13 (same). Oshatz does not suggest that the use of civil deposition testimony in a subsequent \ncriminal trial would violate a defendant's right against compelled self-incrimination—and if it \ndid, that view would be plainly inconsistent with the Second Circuit's later, precedential \nopinions. Instead, the case simply describes the standard for whether a court should modify a \nprotective order to allow a government subpoena. Maxwell cites no case in which a court has \nsuppressed evidence because another court erred in modifying a protective order. Even if \nMaxwell were right that the protective order should not have been modified, it would not \ntransform her earlier deposition testimony into the product of coercion. \nThe Government would also be entitled to use Maxwell's deposition testimony against \nher in her perjury trial notwithstanding any violation of her right against compelled self-\nincrimination. The Supreme Court has held that a defendant may be prosecuted for false \nstatements in unlawfully compelled testimony. See United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174,179 \n(1977); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77,82 (1969). As in Knox, Maxwell seeks to suppress \nher deposition transcripts not because they are inculpatory \"for a prior or subsequent criminal \nact\" but because her statements in those depositions were themselves allegedly criminal. Knox, \n8 \nEFTA00040671\n", "char_count": 1967}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "396 U.S. at 82. In these circumstances, the Fifth Amendment does not bar the Government's use \nof her testimony in a prosecution for perjury. \nThe Court thus concludes that Maxwell is not entitled to suppress her deposition \ntranscripts based on her right against compelled self-incrimination. \nB. Maxwell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in documents produced in \ncivil litigation \n\"The Fourth Amendment protects `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, \nhouses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'\" Carpenter v. United \nStates, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). \nGovernment activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth Amendment only if it involves a \nphysical intrusion into a constitutionally protected space or the violation of a person's \n\"reasonable expectation of privacy.\" United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406-07 (2012) \n(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Thus, \ngovernment agents need a warrant to rummage through someone's home, listen in on their phone \ncalls, or search through their phones seized incident to arrest. The Fourth Amendment imposes \nno limitation on their ability to gather evidence of public activity or review public records. \nA person has a reasonable expectation of privacy only if they seek to keep something \nprivate and have an objectively reasonable expectation that it will remain private. Smith v. \nMaryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). The Supreme Court has held that people generally lack a \nreasonable expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily disclose to others. See id. at \n743-44; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976). This is true even if they expect that \ninformation to be safeguarded and used only for specific purposes. Thus, the Supreme Court has \nheld that police may obtain bank records or a list of phone numbers a person has dialed without a \nwarrant. Smith\n... [truncated, 2099 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00040664/8 or ?id=EFTA00040664&page=8]", "char_count": 2099}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Supreme Court has held that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in geographical \ninformation obtained from their cell phones, because that information provides a comprehensive \naccount of a person's movements akin to invasive physical surveillance. See Carpenter, 138 S. \nCt. at 2219-20. \nUnder this standard, Maxwell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents \nproduced during the civil litigation. Those documents may not have been public, but they were \nhardly private. The protective order allowed them to be shared freely with each of the following \ncategories of people: \n• \nThe parties to the case. \n• \nAttorneys involved in the case. \n• \nPeople employed by or associated with attorneys involved in the case. \n• \nExpert witnesses. \n• \nFact witnesses. \n• \nPotential witnesses. \n• \nCourt personnel and stenographers. \nIt also allowed any documents to be publicly used at trial. This is not a case like Carpenter \nwhere new technology has allowed police to access heretofore \"unknowable\" information about \na person's private life. Id. at 2218. This is a case where Maxwell shared information with third \nparties through the routine process of civil litigation and now objects that they shared it with the \nGovernment, too. \nSecond Circuit precedent makes clear that Maxwell had no reasonable expectation that \ndocuments covered by the protective order would remain shielded from view of the public or \nprosecutors. The Second Circuit has cautioned civil litigants that a civil protective order is no \nguarantee against the use of evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution. See Andover, 876 \nF.2d at 1083. Second Circuit precedent allows a court in a subsequent proceeding to modify a \n10 \nEFTA00040673\n", "char_count": 1738}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "protective order. Id. And if confidential materials turn out to be relevant to a court's ruling, \nSecond Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public \nnotwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or \ntheoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 \nF.3d at 48 & n.22; M, \n827 F. App'x at 145. It is \"unrealistic\" to believe that deposition \ntestimony central to a civil case of high public interest will remain effectively sealed indefinitely. \nAndover, 876 F.2d at 1083. \nMaxwell claims that she did not expect the Government to be able to obtain her \ndeposition testimony, and that if she knew it would, she never would have testified. If Maxwell \nsubjectively harbored this belief, it was nonetheless unreasonable. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743. \nThe Court further notes that Maxwell was ably represented by a number of attorneys during the \ncivil litigation, who the Court is confident were familiar with the precedents governing protective \norders and public access to judicial documents. \nBecause Maxwell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in documents shared with \nthird parties during the civil case, the Government did not engage in a search when it obtained \nthose documents from a third party by subpoena. Maxwell also makes a half-hearted argument \nthat obtaining those documents was a seizure of her personal property. Copies of documents \nheld by a law firm that represented Maxwell's adversary in a civil case were not Maxwell's \npersonal property. Thus, the Government engaged in neither a search nor a seizure, and so it did \nnot violate Maxwell's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. \nThe Government also contends that even if it improperly obtained documents pursuant to \nthe grand jury subpoena, the Court should not suppress those documents because the \nGovernment acted in good faith and would have obtained the documents a\n... [truncated, 2036 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00040664/10 or ?id=EFTA00040664&page=10]", "char_count": 2036}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). The Court \nagrees that, at the very least, the exception to the exclusionary rule for inevitable discovery \napplies to the documents that have since been unsealed and made public in the civil case. But \nbecause the Court finds no violation of the Fourth Amendment, it concludes that none of the \ndocuments should be suppressed. \nC. Maxwell is not entitled to suppression under due process or the Court's inherent \nauthority \nMaxwell next argues that the materials must be suppressed because the Government \nviolated her due process rights in obtaining them. The gravamen of this claim is that the \nGovernment misrepresented its prior contacts with BSF to Judge McMahon. Maxwell contends \nthat this misrepresentation violated her due process rights, or alternatively that the Court should \nexercise its inherent authority to suppress the evidence obtained through the subpoena as a \nsanction for governmental misconduct. She contends that even an inadvertent misstatement to a \ncourt requires suppression of evidence obtained as a result. She further seeks an evidentiary \nhearing to explore whether any misrepresentation by the Government in that hearing was \nintentional. \nThe Supreme Court has recognized that federal courts have a limited inherent authority to \nsuppress evidence obtained in \"willful disobedience of law.\" United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. \n727, 735 n.7 (1980) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). But it has \nalso cautioned that courts must exercise this power with restraint. Id. Thus, \"the court should \nnot exercise its inherent or supervisory power `as a substitute for Fourth Amendment \njurisprudence!\" United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 401 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting United \nStates v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 792 (2d Cir. 1996)). In situations where the Fourth Amendment \n12 \nEFTA00040675\n", "char_count": 1925}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "or another substantive constitutional provision supplies a standard for the suppression of \nevidence, courts must follow that standard, not invent their own. See Payner, 447 U.S. at 735. \nMaxwell has not established a violation of due process or justified the exercise of the \nCourt's inherent supervisory authority. Not every misstep by the Government during a criminal \ninvestigation justifies suppressing relevant evidence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly \nexplained that the exclusionary rule weighs the interest in deterring investigatory misconduct \nagainst the truth-seeking function of the judicial process. That balance \"do[es] not change \nbecause a court has elected to analyze the question under the supervisory power instead of\" some \nother constitutional provision. Id. at 736. Due process provides an independent basis to suppress \nevidence only when the Government engages in conduct that is \"fundamentally unfair or \nshocking to our traditional sense of justice\" or is \"so outrageous that common notions of fairness \nand decency would be offended were judicial processes invoked to obtain a conviction against \nthe accused.\" United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks \nomitted). \"Ordinarily such official misconduct must involve either coercion or violation of the \ndefendant's person.\" Id. (citations omitted). This case involves neither. Omitting information \nabout communications with BSF years earlier falls well short of the sort of extreme misconduct \nsupporting suppression as a matter of due process. \nTo the extent Maxwell asks the Court to engage in a freewheeling exercise of its inherent \nsupervisory power instead, the Court declines to do so. To begin with, suppression under a \ncourt's supervisory authority is only appropriate, if at all, when the Government has engaged in \n\"willful disobedience of law.\" Payner, 447 U.S. at 735 n.7 (emphasis added). Maxwell all but \nconcedes that the present record does not show willful mis\n... [truncated, 2136 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00040664/12 or ?id=EFTA00040664&page=12]", "char_count": 2136}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "misleading. Dkt. No. 134, at 14. In any event, the Court is not without guidance on when a \nprosecutor's misrepresentation requires a court to suppress evidence. Precedent requires courts \nto adhere to the standards governing analogous Fourth Amendment claims when asked to \nsuppress evidence under their inherent authority. See Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401-02. \nThe Supreme Court has set out a clear standard governing when a misrepresentation to a \nmagistrate in a warrant affidavit justifies suppression of evidence obtained as a result. See \nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). That standard requires more than an inadvertent \nmisstatement. \"To suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an affidavit containing erroneous \ninformation, the defendant must show that: (I) the claimed inaccuracies or omissions are the \nresult of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged \nfalsehoods or omissions were necessary to the issuing judge's probable cause finding.\" United \nStates v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713,717-18 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court's \ndecision in Franks forecloses the argument that all misstatements to a court—even all intentional \nmisstatements—necessarily require suppression. A defendant cannot circumvent this standard \nby couching the same arguments in due process or the court's inherent authority instead. See \nPayner, 447 U.S. at 736. \nFranks also defines the standard governing when a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary \nhearing on a motion to suppress based on the Government's misrepresentation to a court. To \njustify an evidentiary hearing, a defendant must make a \"substantial preliminary showing\" of a \ndeliberately or recklessly false statement and that the alleged false statement was necessary to the \ncourt's decision. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155. \"Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are \ninsufficient.\" Id. at 171. \n14 \nEFTA00040677\n", "char_count": 1937}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Although Maxwell relied on Franks in her opening brief, she argues in reply that she \nneed not satisfy that standard. See Dkt. No. 134, at 16; Dkt. No. 285, at 23. However, she \nprovides no explanation for why Franks should not apply. To the extent she offers any \nalternative framework in her reply, it is that an evidentiary hearing is required whenever any \nfactual issue related to a motion to suppress is in dispute. That formulation is far too broad. \nThe Court agrees with the Government (and the suggestion in Maxwell's opening brief) \nthat Franks provides the appropriate standard for whether Maxwell is entitled to an evidentiary \nhearing on her motion. To be sure, these cases are not identical. Franks dealt with an alleged \nfalse statement in a warrant affidavit. This case involves an alleged false statement in a hearing \nto modify a protective order to allow a grand jury subpoena. Franks involved a claim under the \nFourth Amendment, while Maxwell couches hers in the Fifth. But while not identical, these \nsettings are closely analogous. Each involves alleged misstatements to a court that allowed the \nGovernment to obtain evidence. Each presents a risk of a defense fishing expedition where no \nwrongdoing appears on the face of the Government's application. Each requires balancing \nsimilar interests—deterrence of deliberate misconduct on the one hand, and suppression of \nevidence inevitably discovered or obtained through innocent error on the other. The Second \nCircuit has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based \non alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 \nF.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard \nfor a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. \nMaxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' \nrequirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d\n... [truncated, 2127 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00040664/14 or ?id=EFTA00040664&page=14]", "char_count": 2127}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "deliberately or recklessly misrepresented facts to Judge McMahon. Second, she must make a \nsubstantial preliminary showing that Judge McMahon would have denied the Government's \napplication absent any such misrepresentation. The Court finds that Maxwell has not made a \nsubstantial preliminary showing on either prong. \nMaxwell's argument here centers on the Government's statements to Judge McMahon \nduring the second proceeding on April 9, 2019, concerning its application to modify the \nprotective order. At that proceeding, Judge McMahon explained that she wanted to make sure \nthe Government's request did not present a similar situation to that in Chemical Bank v. \nAffiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), where a party in civil litigation urged \nprosecutors to instigate a criminal investigation and then provided confidential documents in \nviolation of a protective order. To that end, she asked the Government to explain \"contacts \nbetween the United States Attorney's Office and the Boies Schiller firm prior to the issuance of \nthe subpoena on the subject of your investigation.\" The prosecutor at that hearing informed \nJudge McMahon about all communications between the U.S. Attorney's Office and BSF after \nthe current investigation began—namely, that the Government told the firm that it intended to \nmake a document request and that the firm told the Government that some of the materials were \nsubject to a protective order. Although the prosecutor was included on an email several months \nearlier from the AUSA who met with \nattorneys in 2016, he did not inform Judge \nMcMahon about any communications with BSF before the current investigation began. \nMaxwell has not made a substantial preliminary showing that the Government's \nstatement was a deliberate or reckless misrepresentation. The AUSA could reasonably have \nunderstood Judge McMahon's question to concern only communications about the \nGovernment's current investigation. Maxwell contends that the questio\n... [truncated, 2034 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00040664/15 or ?id=EFTA00040664&page=15]", "char_count": 2034}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "communications between BSF and the Government related to Epstein or Maxwell. But an \nequally plausible understanding of the phrase \"on the subject of your investigation\" is \"related to \nthe investigation itself.\" That interpretation is all the more reasonable in context, because \nChemical Bank involved communications between a party subject to a protective order and \nprosecutors during a pending criminal investigation. See Chemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 93. It \nwas not unreasonable for the prosecutor to assume that Judge McMahon was concerned with \nthose sorts of communications, not communications years earlier that did not lead to a criminal \ninvestigation. The Government has represented that its present investigation into Epstein (and \nlater Maxwell) began only following publication of the Miami Herald exposé in 2018. Maxwell \nhas made no substantial preliminary showing to the contrary. \nThe Court also concludes that Maxwell has made no substantial preliminary showing that \nJudge McMahon would have denied the Government's application to modify the protective order \nif she knew about the 2016 communications. Materiality under Franks requires more than that a \nfact be important. It allows suppression only if \"the allegedly false statement is necessa?y\" to \nthe court's finding. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added). If Judge McMahon would still \nhave ruled that the Government was entitled to ex pane modification of the protective order even \nafter setting aside the Government's alleged misrepresentation, then Maxwell is not entitled to \nsuppression. Judge McMahon's opinion reflects that she would have. \nJudge McMahon's ruling rested on two independent grounds. Analyzing the \nGovernment's application under Martindell, she first held that Maxwell could not have \nreasonably relied on the protective order to keep the Government from obtaining documents \nproduced during the civil litigation. Judge McMahon reasoned that a civil litigant ordinarily may \nnot rely on a prote\n... [truncated, 2091 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00040664/16 or ?id=EFTA00040664&page=16]", "char_count": 2091}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "prosecutors. As the Court has explained above, this is consistent with the Second Circuit's \nstatement that a protective order \"provides no guarantee that [evidence] will not somehow find \nits way into the government's hands for use in a subsequent criminal prosecution.\" Andover, 876 \nF.2d at 1083. Judge McMahon further reasoned that Maxwell could only have reasonably relied \non the protective order insofar as it prohibited BSF from fomenting an investigation against her \nwith confidential documents. If Judge McMahon had known of the 2016 meeting, it is \narguable—albeit far from certain—that she might have instead concluded that BSF breached \nMaxwell's reasonable reliance interests. \nBut Judge McMahon also held that the Government had shown extraordinary \ncircumstances justifying ex parte modification of the protective order. She observed that \nmodification of the protective order would serve a \"significant public interest\" and that the \nGovernment had demonstrated good cause to obtain the sought materials through a grand jury \nsubpoena without alerting potential targets of its criminal investigation. Extraordinary \ncircumstances or compelling need provide a sufficient, independent basis to modify a protective \norder under Martindell notwithstanding the parties' reasonable reliance on that order. See \nMinpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing \nMartindell, 594 F.2d at 296). Thus, even assuming that the Government should have told Judge \nMcMahon about communications with BSF in 2016, and even assuming that information was \nmaterial to her analysis of Maxwell's reasonable reliance on the protective order, Judge \nMcMahon would still have granted the Government's application. Because the Government's \nalleged misrepresentation was not necessary to Judge McMahon's ruling, it cannot support \nsuppression under Franks. \n18 \nEFTA00040681\n", "char_count": 1904}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "The Court thus finds that Maxwell has not made a substantial preliminary showing under \neither prong of Franks, and thus that she is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. For the same \nreasons, and because the present record does not establish a violation of due process, the Court \ndeclines to suppress the evidence obtained by the Government's grand jury subpoena. \nD. Martindell provides no independent basis for suppression \nThe Court turns finally to Maxwell's argument that Martindell provides an independent \nbasis for suppression. Maxwell cites no authority in her opening brief for the proposition that a \ncourt may suppress evidence because it disagrees with another court's decision to modify a \nprotective order under Martindell. Indeed, there is no such authority. No court has ever granted \na motion to suppress on this ground. The Court declines to review Judge McMahon's decision, \nbecause Martindell provides no basis to suppress evidence even if this Court were to disagree \nwith it. \nEven if Maxwell were right that this Court should review Judge McMahon's decision on \nthe merits, that decision—like a magistrate's probable cause determination—would be entitled to \n\"great deference.\" Leon, 468 U.S. at 914. Courts will uphold another judge's decision to allow \nthe Government to obtain evidence on a motion to suppress so long as there is a \"substantial \nbasis\" for the decision. Salameh, 152 F.3d at 113 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-\n39 (1983)). Judge McMahon found that the Government had established exceptional \ncircumstances to modify the protective order based on the factual record before her. Judge \nMcMahon concluded that modification was necessary under the circumstances to allow the \nGovernment to investigate a high-profile matter in secrecy and so not to tip off the target of the \ninvestigation. Although reasonable minds may differ—indeed, Judge Netbum reached the \nopposite conclusion—there was a substantial basis for Judge McMahon's decision\n... [truncated, 2034 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00040664/18 or ?id=EFTA00040664&page=18]", "char_count": 2034}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "entitled to deference. As discussed, the Court is aware of no authority suggesting review of \nJudge McMahon's modification order is necessary or appropriate in these circumstances. If \nnecessary, the Court would afford it deference and would not disturb Judge McMahon's \nreasoned and supported decision. \nMaxwell's reply brief recasts her claim for suppression under Martindell as simply \nanother argument for suppression under due process or the Court's inherent authority. Because, \nin her view, the Government did not satisfy the requirements of Martindell, its attempt to modify \nthe protective order violated her due process rights. And because, she alleges, the Government \nmisrepresented facts to Judge McMahon, this Court should exercise its inherent authority to \nsuppress evidence as a sanction for governmental misconduct. \nThe Court is not persuaded. For the reasons set forth above, the Government's \napplication for modification of the protective order did not violate Maxwell's due process rights. \nDue process does not categorically bar an ex parte modification to a protective order, and Judge \nMcMahon found that the Government had shown extraordinary circumstances to do so. To the \nextent Maxwell seeks suppression based on an alleged misrepresentation to Judge McMahon, for \nthe reasons set forth above, she has not met the high bar for a due process violation or made the \nrequired showing under Franks that would entitle her to an evidentiary hearing. Whether \nMaxwell advances these arguments under Martindell or directly under due process, they do not \nsupport suppression. \nConclusion \nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Government did not violate Maxwell's \nconstitutional rights when it obtained evidence covered by a protective order in her earlier civil \ncase. It further finds that Maxwell is not entitled to suppression of any evidence or to an \n20 \nEFTA00040683\n", "char_count": 1912}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00040664", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "evidentiary hearing. The Court thus DENIES Maxwell's motions to suppress (Dkt. Nos. 133, \n139). \nSO ORDERED. \nDated: June 25, 2021 \nNew York, New York \nALISON J. NATHAN \nUnited States District Judge \n21 \nEFTA00040684\n", "char_count": 217}]}