{"efta_number": "EFTA00039972", "page_count": 6, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00039972", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00039972.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00039972", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10) \n-1 of 6 -\nFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION \nOFFWOU. Rummy \nti ff n .j \n,—. en — \n..... \nDate of entry \n \n08/15/2019\n, Captain, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS (BOP), place of \nemployment METROPOLITAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER (MCC), 150 Park Row, New York, \nNY 10007, was interviewed at the FBI New York Field Office, 290 Broadway, \nNew York, NY 10278 by FBI Special Agent \nand DIG Special Agent \nAgents reviewed a standard OIG interview waiver form; \nsigned the form and agreed to a voluntary interview. \nAfter the \nAgents introduced themselves and explained the purpose of the interview, \nprovided the following information: \nbegan his career with the BOP in Florence, CO in 2005. In 2014, \nhe was transferred to the METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER (MDC) in Brooklyn, \nNY, where he was made Deputy Captain in 2015. In 2018, \nwas promoted \nto Captain at MCC, his current position, where he oversees security for the \nentire building. \ndirectly supervises approximately 13 Lieutenants, \nand has approximately 125-134 line staff / Correctional Officers under his \npurview. \nalso sits on the institution's Executive staff, which also \nincludes the Warden. \nprimary duty is to ensure that security \nprotocols are met by his Lieutenants and sub-staff, and that policy \nguidelines are being followed as set forth by the BOP. Among others, \nis responsible for the following: a Special Housing Unit (SHU) Lieutenant, \nLieutenant \n; an Administrative Lieutenant, responsible for maintaining \npaperwork, etc.; an S/S Lieutenant, responsible for paperwork; an Operations \n& \nActivities Lieutenant(s), responsible for day-to-day operations and \nmaintaining order for three (3) shifts; and an Emergency Preparedness \nLieutenant, a collateral duty responsible in the event of emergency \nincidents such as a fires, bomb threats, etc. \nadvised that his staff provides special considerations for high \nprofile inmates, if deemed appropriate and designated as such. In order to \nensure an inmate is provided with proper care, the facility evaluates the \ninmate \nusing \nseveral \nmeasures, \nincluding \nmental, \nphysical, \nmedical, \nInvestigation on 08/12/2019  at New York, New York, United States (In Person) \nFik \nDate drafted 08/13/2019 \nby \nThis document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the moµ\" ty of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents arc nor \nto be distributed outside your agency. \nEFTA00039972\n", "char_count": 2449}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039972", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) \nContinuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of \n.on \n08/12/2019 ins, 2 of 6 \npsychological, and sexual assault victim or predator assessments. \nSince \ndifferent inmates are admitted with different criteria, appropriate housing \nvaries. \ninteracted with inmate JEFFREY EPSTEIN on approximately three \noccasions at MCC, all of which EPSTEIN maintained a pleasant demeanor. \nDuring the first instance, EPSTEIN asked \nwho he was, and \nresponded by introducing himself and explaining his position at the jail. \nDuring another instance, \nexplained to EPSTEIN the policy regarding \nmeals during attorney sessions, and made certain EPSTEIN was accommodated \nwith water, visits to the restroom, etc. EPSTEIN spent most of the day with \nhis defense counsel, and was brought down as soon as attorney visiting \nopened. \nwas made aware of the possibility that EPSTEIN would be housed at \nMCC in advance of EPSTEIN'S arrival. \nwas not present when inmate \nEPSTEIN was admitted to the facility. \nEPSTEIN was thoroughly vetted to \ndetermine if he was fit for General Population (GP) and was ultimately \nplaced in the Special Housing Unit (SHU). MCC places inmates under three \ncategories of close supervision: 1. \"Dry Cell\" for those at risk for \nsmuggling contraband, 2. Psychological Observation, and 3. Suicide Watch. \nadvised that EPSTEIN preferred not to have a cellmate and engaged \nin manipulative behavior to avoid having one, including requesting to see a \npsychologist. At EPSTEIN'S request, he was interviewed by a psychologist. \nFollowing this assessment, EPSTEIN was initially placed on Suicide Watch. \nHe was later interviewed again and downgraded to Psychological Observation, \nbecause he was determined not to have suicidal tendencies. After some time, \nhe was returned to the SHU. \nbegan hearing talk that EPSTEIN was \ntrying to get back on Suicide Watch. Information like this is usually \ngenerated from rounds, \"kites\", and monitoring of phone calls and letters. \nOn or about July 23, 2019, EPSTEIN was found unresponsive on the floor of \nhis cell with a homemade piece of fabric on his chest. EPSTEIN'S cellmate \nhad flagged the attention of a staff member, who handcuffed the cellmate and \nremoved EPSTEIN to bring him to the medical unit. \nheard from his \nstaff that EPSTEIN may have been faking unconsciousness, because he was \nobserved opening his eyes and making other suspicious movements not \nconsistent with an unconscious state. \nEPSTEIN was medically assessed and \nEFTA00039973\n", "char_count": 2511}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039972", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) \nContinuation afFD-302 of ( U ) Interview of \n.on 08/12/2019 ins, 3 of 6 \nbecame coherent. EPSTEIN claimed that his cellmate, \ntried to take his life. \nHe was placed back on Suicide Watch for \napproximately one week. Unlike his first and previous placement on Suicide \nWatch, EPSTEIN now has definitive suicidal tendencies reported in his \nincarceration history. \nThe staff was tasked with determining whether \nEPSTEIN was in fact suicidal, or using manipulative tactics to avoid \nassignment of a cellmate. \nAfter Suicide Watch, EPSTEIN was placed on \nPsychological Observation and eventually returned to the SHU. \nAt the direction of the Warden, \ninitiated the process of compiling \npossible cellmates for EPSTEIN, vetting them, and submitting candidates to \nthe Warden for his review. \nand his staff fully screened potential \ncellmates and reported their determinations up to the Warden. \nwas selected and housed in a cell with EPSTEIN. \nThe Assistant Warden, \nWarden, and Regional Director were notified. \nThe Warden directed \ncellmate at all times, and \non multiple occasions that EPSTEIN needed a \nverbally informed his Lieutenants the \nsame. \nrepeatedly directed his SHU Lieutenant, Lieutenant \n, that \nEPSTEIN needed a cellmate at all times. \nAdditionally, \nvisited the \nSHU on multiple occasions and directed staff to be very alert and attentive \nabout EPSTEIN'S special accommodations. \nOn Friday, August 9, 2019, Lieutenant \nwas on leave and, thus, there \nwas no dedicated Lieutenant assigned to the SHU. \nIn this event, the \nOperation Lieutenant, Lieutenant \n, had oversight that day and took \nover the responsibilities of the SHU Lieutenant. \nLieutenant \nwas \naware that EPSTEIN was required to be housed with a cellmate, because \napproximately one week prior to EPSTEIN'S death, \ninformally advised \nhis Lieutenants that EPSTEIN was not be housed alone, and emphasized the \nneed to be vigilant about \"30-minute checks\" and unannounced rounds. \nInmates/cellmates are moved for various reasons, including but not \nlimited to, an incident in the cell, visits \nmedical, and recreation. \nOn Friday, August 9, \nhad court. It would not be uncommon for \nfor an extended period. \nEPSTEIN had an att \nEPSTEIN'S attorney was processed into the fac \nEPSTEIN was brought down to the attorney room. \nto court, legal library, \n2019, EPSTEIN'S cellmate, \nto be out of his cell \norney session that day. \nility in the morning and \nwas not notified that \nEFTA00039974\n", "char_count": 2484}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039972", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) \nContinuation afFD-302 of (U) Interview of \n.on \n08/12/2019 ins, 4 of 6 \nwas released from court. \nTypically, if an inmate is likely to be discharged or transferred \nfollowing court, their property is retrieved from their cell, boxed, and \nsecured with a property form by Receiving and Discharge staff. \nAll items \nare normally accounted for and inventoried. In order to enter the SHU, all \nstaff not assigned there must identify themselves and sign the logbook, then \nbe physically escorted by a Correctional Officer. Alternatively, the staff \ncan pick up inmate property at the Unit door. \nA Correctional Officer \nassigned to the SHU would have been aware that \nor any inmate's, \nbelongings were removed. \nAt this time, the Correctional Officer should \nnotify a Lieutenant, who would in turn brief \nwas not \nnotified that \n' belongings were removed. \nadvised that if he had \nknown that EPSTEIN was without a cellmate, he would have likely put EPSTEIN \non Psychological Observation. \nknowing that \n' property was moved. \nis not aware of any Lieutenants \nOn Saturday, August 10, 2019, \nreceived a phone call from \nLieutenant \naround 7:00 AM, and was told that EPSTEIN was found \nunresponsive in his cell. \ninquired about EPSTEIN'S cellmate and was \nsurprised to hear \nrespond that EPSTEIN did not have a cellmate. \nworked a 4:00 PM - 10:00 PM shift on August 9, 2019. \nwas \nrelieved by Lieutenant \n, who was assigned the 10 PM - 6 AM shift. \ndid not personally tell \nthat EPSTEIN required a cellmate at \nall times. \nHe believed she was aware because he had informed his \nLieutenants repeatedly, and instructed them to pass this message along and \nconvey the information amongst themselves. \ndid not hold a formal \nall-Lieutenant meeting regarding EPSTEIN, or send a staff email with the \nWarden's directive. \nHe verbally instructed his Lieutenants on an informal \nand individual basis, as many as possible with whom he had the opportunity. \nOn Saturday morning, August 10, 2019, \nwas relieved early by \nIn the SHU, 30-minute rounds need to be completed consistently at \nnonuniform intervals within a 40-minute time frame. \nThe purpose of these \nrounds is to ensure that good order is being maintained, there is no \nsuspicious activity, and all inmates are accounted for and responsive. 30-\nminute rounds are documented in TRUSCOPE, which serves as an electronic \nlogbook. After a round is physically done, the Correctional Officer can log \nEFTA00039975\n", "char_count": 2475}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039972", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) \nContinuation afFD-302 of ( U ) Interview of \n.on \n08/12/2019 ins, 5 of 6 \nin to TRUSCOPE and press a button certifying that the round was completed. \nUnfortunately, sometimes officers do not complete a 30-minute round, or \nexceed the 40-minute \nthreshold. \nTRUSCOPE also documents from \nwhat \nlocation/terminal the rounds are logged. \nis aware of at least two \n(2) terminals located in the SHU. The only way to determine if a 30-minute \nround was physically completed is to check the video surveillance footage. \nThere are two (2) Correctional Officers assigned to the SHU on morning \nwatch at midnight, SHU1 and SHU2. \nSHU2 is responsible for completing \nrounds. \nwas unaware that the camera system in the SHU was down. He left \nearly on Thursday when the discussion about the camera system would have \noccurred. MR. \n, the camera technician, notified \nthat he was \nworking on the system earlier that week, but \ndid not know specifics \nand was not informed that the cameras were not functioning. \nSince the \nbuilding is in the middle of a camera project, \nassumed the camera \nwork may have been related. \nwas first notified that the cameras were \ndown on Saturday morning, August 10, 2019, when he arrived at MCC and asked \nto see the video. \nCorrectional Officers do not typically know when the \ncameras are down. \nAfter receiving the phone call from \non the morning of Saturday, \nAugust 10, 2019, \nnotified Associate Warden \n, \nwho \ninformed the Warden. \nalso attempted to call Institution Duty Officer \n, the Chaplain, and the building, to get more information. \nHe then went to MCC, arriving before 8:00 AM, approximately. Upon arrival, \nscreened in and retrieved his gear from the 3rd Floor. \nHe went to \nthe SHU and signed the logbook. \nHe gathered any records pertaining to \nEPSTEIN, including the 30-minute rounds logbook, the attorney conference \nlogbook, count slips, and El's. He could not locate EPSTEIN'S inmate file. \nHe also asked to view the camera footage. The Warden was already present at \nthe facility when \narrived. \nexpressed to \nthat the staff admitted to her they did not \ncomplete rounds, the 3:00 AM and 5:00 AM counts, and that Officer \nentered EPSTEIN'S cell without supervision. EPSTEIN was placed on the floor \nto administer lifesaving -ff.r \ninformed Associate Warden \nabout what Officers \ndmitted to \nEFTA00039976\n", "char_count": 2370}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039972", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) \nContinuation oil:D-302 of ( U ) Interview of \n.on \n08/12/2019 ins, 6 of 6 \nhad concerns about the whereabouts of EPSTEIN'S cellmate. Some of \nhis staff were under the impression that \nwhich \nlater confirmed was not true. \nwas released from the SHU, \nThe purpose of the 3:00 AM and 5:00 AM counts is to physically count and \nconfirm each person in each cell. \nThere were no entries of counts in \nTRUSCOPE the entire night. If technology is down, the Correctional Officers \nalso have the option to document the count on a hardcopy form. \nAlthough \nthere are no electronic records of counts, hardcopies may have been \nretained. \nAll inmate phone calls in the SHU are monitored and inmates have limited \naccess to phone calls. All calls should be recorded. \nwas not aware \nof any issues or complaints with EPSTEIN related to phone calls. On \nSaturday, August 10, 2019, \nwas told that EPSTEIN made a phone call at \napproximately 7:00 PM on the evening of Friday, August 9, 2019. \nIt is \nuncommon to make an unrecorded phone call in the SHU, and \nwould \nadvise against it because calls should be surveilled. \nInmates can make a \nrecorded phone call in the Lieutenant's Office, where it is documented in a \nmonitored logbook. In the SHU, Correctional Officers are not permitted to \ngive inmates phone calls, but a Unit Team Member or the Chaplain can take \nthe inmate to the Lieutenant's office to make a call. \nis not briefed \non phone calls in the SHU, generally. \nwholeheartedly emphasized that he and his staff at MCC did their \nbest to supervise, safeguard and ensure the protection of EPSTEIN and all \ninmates effectively. \nHis staff is aware of the seriousness of the \ninvestigation into EPSTEIN'S death. \nEFTA00039977\n", "char_count": 1742}]}