{"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_count": 239, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00039421", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00039421.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nS 120 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \nx \nTHE GOVERNMENT'S OMNIBUS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION \nTO THE DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS \nAUDREY STRAUSS \nUnited States Attorney \nSouthern District of New York \nAttorney for the United States of America \nAssistant United States Attorneys \n- Of Counsel - \nEFTA00039421\n", "char_count": 413}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n1 \nBACKGROUND \n2 \nARGUMENT \n3 \nI. Jeffrey Epstein's Non-Prosecution Agreement Is Irrelevant to This Case \n3 \nA. The NPA Does Not Bind the Southern District of New York \n4 \n1. The Text of the Agreement Does Not Contain a Promise to Bind Other Districts \n5 \n2. The Defendant Has Offered No Evidence That the NPA Binds Other Districts  \n9 \nB. The NPA Does Not Immunize Maxwell from Prosecution \n15 \n1. The NPA Is Limited to Particular Crimes Between 2001 and 2007 \n15 \n2. The NPA Does Not Confer Enforceable Rights on Maxwell \n17 \nC. The Defendant Has Offered No Basis for Additional Discovery or a Hearing \n21 \nII. The Indictment Is Timely \n23 \nA. Statutory Background \n24 \nB. The 2003 Amendment to Section 3283 Applies Retroactively \n26 \n1. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step One of Landgraf \n28 \n2. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step Two of Landgraf \n32 \nC. The Defendant's Crimes Involved the Sexual Abuse of Minors \n36 \nIII. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Based on Alleged Improper Pre-\nTrial Delay Should Be Denied \n41 \nA. The Defendant Has Failed to Demonstrate Actual and Substantial Prejudice \n42 \n1. Applicable Law \n42 \n2. Discussion \n44 \nB. The Defendant Has Failed to Establish That the Government Delayed the Indictment for \nAn Improper Purpose \n52 \n1. Applicable Law \n52 \n2. Discussion \n54 \nIV. The Court Should Deny the Defendant's Motions to Suppress \n59 \nA. Factual Background \n61 \n1. The Civil Lawsuit against Maxwell \n61 \n2. February 2016 Meeting \n62 \n3. The April and July 2016 Depositions of Maxwell \n64 \n4. The USAO-SDNY Commences the Instant Investigation in 2018 \n65 \n5. The USAO-SDNY's Subpoenas and Ex Pane Applications for Materials \n66 \n6. Proceedings before Chief Judge McMahon \n68 \na. March 26, 2019 Hearing \n68 \nb. April 9, 2019 Hearing \n70 \nEFTA00039422\n", "char_count": 1841}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "c. Chief Judge McMahon's Memorandum and Order \n71 \n7. Magistrate Judge Netbum's Order \n74 \n8. Unsealing of Maxwell's Depositions \n74 \n9. The New York Daily News Article \n75 \nB. The Defendant's Suppression Motion Should Be Denied \n76 \n1. Martindell Provides No Basis to Grant the Relief the Defendant Seeks \n76 \na. Applicable Law \n76 \nb. Discussion \n79 \n2. Maxwell's Fourth Amendment Claim Fails \n82 \na. Maxwell Has Not Established Standing \n82 \ni. \nApplicable Law \n82 \nii. Discussion \n84 \nb. The Government Acted in Good Faith \n86 \ni. \nApplicable Law \n86 \nii. Discussion \n88 \nc. Suppression of Certain Materials Would Be Improper Under the Inevitable Discovery \nDoctrine \n93 \ni. \nApplicable Law \n93 \nii. Discussion \n94 \n3. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained Pursuant to the Subpoena \nUnder the Fifth Amendment Is Without Merit \n96 \na. Applicable Law \n96 \ni. The Fifth Amendment — Generally \n96 \nii. The Fifth Amendment — Act of Production Privilege \n97 \niii. The Fifth Amendment — When Private Action Is Deemed Government Action \n98 \nb. Discussion \n99 \n4. The Government Did Not Violate Maxwell's Due Process Rights \n103 \na. Applicable Law \n104 \nb. Discussion \n107 \n5. The Court Should Not Exercise Its Inherent Authority to Order Suppression \n109 \na. Applicable Law \n109 \nb. Discussion \n110 \n6. The Defendant Is Not Entitled to a Hearing \n111 \na. Applicable Law \n112 \nb. Discussion \n115 \nV. The Jury Should Decide Whether the Defendant Committed Perjury \n116 \nA. Factual Background \n117 \nB. Applicable Law \n119 \nC. Discussion \n122 \n1. April 2016 Deposition \n123 \n2. July 2016 Deposition \n129 \n3. Materiality \n135 \nEFTA00039423\n", "char_count": 1646}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "VI. Counts Five and Six Are Properly Joined and Should Not Be Severed \n138 \nA. Applicable Law \n138 \nB. Discussion \n141 \nVII. The Indictment Contains the Elements of Each Offense and Provides the Defendant \nMore Than Adequate Notice of the Charges Against Her \n150 \nA. Applicable Law \n150 \nB. Discussion \n152 \nVIII. There Is No Basis to Strike Any Portion of the Indictment \n157 \nA. Relevant Facts \n158 \nB. Applicable Law \n159 \nC. Discussion \n161 \nIX. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One or Count Three as Multiplicitous Is \nPremature \n169 \nA. Relevant Facts \n169 \nB. Applicable Law \n170 \nC. Discussion \n172 \nX. The Defendant's Various Disclosure Motions Should be Denied \n174 \nA. Bill of Particulars Is Not Warranted \n174 \n1. Applicable Law \n174 \n2. Discussion \n178 \nB. The Defendant's Requests for Early Production of a Witness List and Jencks Act Material \nShould Be Denied \n182 \n1. Applicable Law \n182 \n2. Discussion \n184 \nC. The Defendant's Additional Requests for Disclosure Should Be Denied \n185 \nXI. The Use of a Grand Jury Siting in White Plains Was Entirely Proper \n193 \nA. Background \n194 \n1. The SDNY and Local Rules for the Division of Business \n194 \n2. The SDNY Jury Plan \n195 \nB. Applicable Law \n197 \nC. Discussion \n198 \n1. The Defendant Was Properly Indicted by a Grand Jury Sitting in White Plains \n198 \n2. The Defendant's Fair Cross-Section Claim Is Meritless \n205 \na. The Defendant Has Not Established that Blacks or Hispanics Are Unfairly \nRepresented \n205 \nb. Any Potential Underrepresentation Is Not Due to Systematic Exclusion \n210 \nCONCLUSION \n212 \niii \nEFTA00039424\n", "char_count": 1598}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "EXHIBIT LIST \nExhibit 1: \nNotes from the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York \nExhibit 2: \nJune 14, 2007 Email \nExhibit 3: \nNovember 2020 Report, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional \nResponsibility \nExhibit 4: \nNotes from February 11, 2021 Call \nExhibit 5: \nNotes from February 29, 2016 Meeting \nExhibit 6: \nNovember 30, 2018 Email \nExhibit 7: \nDecember 6, 2018 Email \nExhibit 8: \nFebruary 28, 2019 Government Letter to Judge Sweet \nExhibit 9: \nFebruary 28, 2019 Government Letter to Judge Netburn \nExhibit 10: \nTranscript of April 22, 2016 Deposition \nExhibit 11: \nTranscript of July 22, 2016 Deposition \nExhibit 12: \nAffidavit of Dr. Bernard R. Siskin \niv \nEFTA00039425\n", "char_count": 711}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "TABLE OF AUTHORITIES \nCases \nAlbright v. Oliver, \n510 U.S. 266 (1993) \nAndover Data Servs., a Div. of Players Computer, Inc. v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., \nPage(s) \n152 \n876 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1989) \n106, 119, 149 \nArizona v. Youngblood, \n488 U.S. 51 (1988) \n76 \nAronson v. K. Arakelian, Inc., \n154 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1946) \n19 \nBerghuis v. Smith, \n559 U.S. 314 (2010) \n299, 302 \nBlaszczak, \n17 Cr. 357 (LAK) \n275 \nBlissett v. Lefevre, \n924 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1991) \n158 \nBlum v. Yaretsky, \n457 U.S. 991 (1982) \n143 \nBochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, \n405 F.3d 964 (11th Cir. 2005) \n24 \nBotha v. Don King Productions, Inc., \nNo. 97 Civ. 7587 (JGK), 1998 WL 88745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998) \n148 \nBoyd v. United States, \n116 U.S. 616 (1886) \n145 \nBranzburg v. Hayes, \n408 U.S. 665 (1972) \n110 \nBridges v. United States, \n346 U.S. 209 (1953) \n53 \nBronston v. United States, \n409 U.S. 352 (1973) \n181 \nBryson v. United States, \n396 U.S. 64 (1969) \n147 \nBurgess v. United States, \n552 U.S. 124 (2008) \n51 \nCaplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, \n491 U.S. 617 (1989) \n159 \nCarpenter v. United States, \n138 S. Ct. 2206 \npassim \nChambers v. Mississippi, \n410 U.S. 284 (1973) \n159 \nChemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., \n154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) \npassim \nEFTA00039426\n", "char_count": 1274}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., \n567 U.S. 142 (2012) \nColorado v. Connelly, \n51 \n479 U.S. 157 (1986) \n139, 141, 142 \nColorado v. Spring, \n479 U.S. 564 (1987) \n138 \nCounty of Sacramento v. Lewis, \n523 U.S. 833 (1998) \n152 \nCruz v. Maypa, \n773 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 2014) \n43 \nDavis v. United States, \n564 U.S. 229 (2011) \n122 \nDoe 1 v. United States, \n359 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (S.D. Fla. 2019) \n14 \nDoe No. 1. v. United States, \n749 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2014) \n173, 174, 176 \nDowling v. United States, \n493 U.S. 342 (1990) \n76 \nDuren v. Missouri, \n439 U.S. 357 (1979) \n289, 296 \nEdwards v. Mazzuca, \nNo. 00 Civ. 2290 (US), 2007 WL 2994449 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2007) \n234 \nFalter v. United States, \n23 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1928) \n45 \nFisher v. United States, \n425 U.S. 391 (1976) \n140, 146 \nFlagg v. Yonkers Say. & Loan Ass 'n, \n396 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2005) \n143 \nFranks v. Delaware, \n438 U.S. 154 (1978) \n166, 169, 170, 171 \nGatto, \n17 Cr. 686 (LAK) \n275 \nGolino v. City of New Haven, \n950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991) \n125 \nGraham v. Connor, \n490 U.S. 386 (1989) \n151 \nGrant v. United States, \n282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960) \n164 \nGreer v. Miller, \n483 U.S. 756 (1987) \n158 \nGrunewald v. United States, \n353 U.S. 391 (1957) \n248 \nHamling v. United States, \n418 U.S. 87 (1974) \n225, 227 \nvi \nEFTA00039427\n", "char_count": 1291}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Hemphill v. United States, \n392 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1968) \n268 \nHerring v. United States, \n555 U.S. 135 (2009) \n123 \nHowell v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, \n939 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2019) \n302 \nHuddleston v. United States, \n485 U.S. 681 (1988) \n254 \nIn re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. (\"Enterprise\", \n), 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004) \n36,43,44 \nIn re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, \n945 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1991) \n108, 113 \nIn re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct 29, 1992, \n1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993) \n140, 145 \nIn re Grand Jury Subpoena, \n826 F.2d 1166 (1987) \n136 \nIn re Grand Jury Subpoena, \n836 F.2d 1468 (4th Cir. 1988) \n149 \nIn re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, \n1999, 191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999) \n139 \nIn Re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Jan. 5, \n1988, 847 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1988) \n136 \nIn re U.S., \n834 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1987) \n284 \nIn re Various Grand Jury Subpoenas, \n924 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff'd, 579 F. App'x 37 (2d Cir. 2014) \n140 \nInt'l Equity !nvs., Inc. v. Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd., \nNo. 05 Civ. 2745 (JGK) (RLE), 2010 WL 779314 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2010) \n111 \nJohnson v. United States, \n520 U.S. 461 (1997) \n200 \nKungys v. United States, \n485 U.S. 759 (1988) \n222 \nLandgraf v. USI Film Products, \n511 U.S. 244 (1994) \n35,36, 41, 42 \nLeocal v. Ashcroft, \n543 U.S. 1 (2004) \n56, 57 \nMadanes v. Madanes, \n186 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) \n141 \nMartindell v. Intl Tel. and Tel. Corp., \n594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) \npassim \nMartinez v. McAleenan, \n385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) \n150, 151 \nMichigan v. Tucker, \n417 U.S. 433 (1974) \n137 \nvii \nEFTA00039428\n", "char_count": 1643}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Miller v. Pate, \n386 U.S. 1 (1967) \n157, 174, 175 \nMills v. Scully, \n826 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1987) \n158 \nMinnesota v. Mwphy, \n465 U.S. 420 (1984) \n144 \nMurray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., \n583 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2009) \n223 \nNyhawan v. Holder, \n557 U.S. 29 (2009) \n56 \nNix v. Williams, \n467 U.S. 431 (1984) \n132, 133 \nNorth Carolina v. Pearce, \n395 U.S. 711 (1969) \n259 \nOregon v. Elstad, \n470 U.S. 298 (1985) \n139, 141 \nPalmieri v. State of N.Y., \n779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985) \n108, 112, 114 \nRakas v. Illinois, \n439 U.S. 128 (1978) \n115, 116, 118 \nRatzlaf v. United States, \n510 U.S. 135 (1994) \n165 \nRawlings v. Kentucky, \n448 U.S. 98 (1980) \n116 \nRichardson v. Marsh, \n481 U.S. 200 (1987) \n212 \nRivera v. United States, \n928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) \n168, 172 \nRochin, \n342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 \n153 \nRosencrans v. United States, \n165 U.S. 257 (1897) \n296 \nRussell v. United States, \n369 U.S. 749 (1962) \n229 \nRutenberg v. United States, \n245 U.S. 480 (1918) \n292 \nSalinas v. United States, \n522 U.S. 52 (1997) \n245 \nSantobello v. United States, \nNo. 94 Cr. (RPP), 1998 WL 113950 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1998) \n21 \nSch. Dist. No. 7, \n167 F.3d 784 (2d Cir. 1999) \n61 \nSEC v. 71eStreetcom, \n273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001) \n109, 113 \nviii \nEFTA00039429\n", "char_count": 1234}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Silver, \n15 Cr. 93 (VEC) \n275 \nSkelos, \n15 Cr. 317 (KMW) \n275 \nSmith v. Maryland, \n442 U.S. 735 (1979) \n117, 118 \nStogner v. California, \n539 U.S. 607 (2003) \n45 \nSwain v. Alabama, \n380 U.S. 202 (1965) \n300 \nTaylor v. Louisiana, \n419 U.S. 522 (1975) \n299, 300 \nTaylor v. United States, \n495 U.S. 575 (1990) \n56 \nThom v. Ashcroft, \n369 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2004) \n47 \nToussie v. United States, \n397 U.S. 112 (1970) \n48 \nUnited State v. Nader, \n425 F. Supp. 3d 619 (E.D. Va. 2019) \npassim \nUnited States v. Ahmed, \n992 F. Supp. 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) \n166 \nUnited States v. Ahmed, \nNo. 10 Cr. 131 (PKC), 2011 WL 5041456 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011) \n243 \nUnited States v. Al Kassar, \n660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011) \n154 \nUnited States v. Alameh, \n341 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2003) \n77, 78, 81 \nUnited States v. Alberti, \n568 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1977) \n187 \nUnited States v. Aleman, \n286 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2002) \n27 \nUnited States v. Alfonso, \n143 F.3d 772 (2d. Cir. 1998) \n226 \nUnited States v. Amato, \n15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1994) \n209 \nUnited States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, \n184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) \n222 \nUnited States v. Anderson, \n747 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014) \n212 \nUnited States v. Anderson, \n772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014) \n162 \nUnited States v. Annabi, \n10 Cr. 07 (CM) \n286 \nix \nEFTA00039430\n", "char_count": 1279}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "United States v. Annabi, \n771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985) \n5, 7, 8 \nUnited States v. Annabi, \n771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1988) \n5 \nUnited States v. Arid, \n12 Cr. 24 (LAP) \n286 \nUnited States v. Arzberger, \n592 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) \n151 \nUnited States v. Ash, \n464 F. Supp. 3d 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) \n145 \nUnited States v. Ashburn, \n76 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) \n126 \nUnited States v. Awadallah, \n349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) \n166, 168 \nUnited States v. Bahna, \n68 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1995) \npassim \nUnited States v. Balde, \n20 Cr. 281 (KPF) \n298 \nUnited States v. Barlow, \n732 F. Supp. 2d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) \n300 \nUnited States v. Barlow, \n732 F. Supp. 2d 1 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 479 F. App'x 372 (2d Cir. 2012) \n300, 302 \nUnited States v. Barnes, \n520 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) \n300 \nUnited States v. Batchelder, \n442 U.S. 114 (1979) \n265 \nUnited States v. Bejasa, \n904 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1990) \n274 \nUnited States v. Bellomo, \n263 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) \n268 \nUnited States v. Ben Zvi, \n242 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) \n41 \nUnited States v. Benussi, \n216 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) \n248, 250 \nUnited States v. Biaggi, \n675 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) \n268 \nUnited States v. Biaggi, \n909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990) \n298, 300 \nUnited States v. Bin Laden, \n91 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) \n240 \nUnited States v. Bfrney, \n686 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1982) \n61, 65 \nUnited States v. Buren, \n470 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1972) \n183 \nEFTA00039431\n", "char_count": 1482}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "United States v. Blakney, \n941 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1991) \n205, 219 \nUnited States v. Blaszczak, \n308 F. Supp. 3d 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) \n279 \nUnited States v. Block, \nNo. 16 Cr. 595 (JPO), 2017 WL 1608905 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2017) \n267 \nUnited States v. Bonacorsa, \n528 F.2d 1218 (2d Cir. 1976) \n180, 190, 197, 199 \nUnited States v. Bonventre, \n646 F App'x 73 (2d Cir. 2016) \n271 \nUnited States v. Bortnovsky, \n820 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1987) \n266, 267, 274 \nUnited States v. Botti, \nNo. 08 Cr. 230 (CSH), 2009 WL 3157582 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2009) \n218 \nUnited States v. Brand, \n467 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2006) \n236 \nUnited States v. Brand, \n556 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1977) \n75 \nUnited States v. Brand, \nNo. 04 Cr. 194 (PKL), 2005 WL 77055 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2005) \n257 \nUnited States v. Broccolo, \n797 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) \n207, 214, 217 \nUnited States v. Brown, \n744 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) \n170 \nUnited States v. Brown, \n800 F. App'x 455 (9th Cir. 2020), cert denied, No. 20-5064, \nS.Ct. \n, 2021 WL 78235 (Jan. \n11, 2021) \nUnited States v. Brown, \n34, 39 \nNo. 07-0296, 2008 WL 161146 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2008) \n216 \nUnited States v. Brown, \nNo. 99-1230, 2002 WL 34244994, at (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) \n6 \nUnited States v. Bruno, \n159 F. Supp. 3d 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) \n7 \nUnited States v. Bunn, \n154 F. App'x 227 (2d Cir. 2005) \n237 \nUnited States v. Burke, \nNo. 09 Cr. 135 (SJ), 2011 WL 2609837 (E.D.N.Y. July I, 2011) \n82 \nUnited States v. Butler, \n351 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) \n243 \nUnited States v. Butler, \nNo. 04 Cr. 340, 2004 WL 2274751 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2004) \n208, 211 \nUnited States v. Calandra, \n414 U.S. 338 (1974) \n110 \nUnited States v. Caming, \n968 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1992) \n165 \nxi \nEFTA00039432\n", "char_count": 1710}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "United States v. Campo Flores, \nNo. 15 Cr. 765 (PAC), 2016 WL 5946472 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2016) \n281, 282 \nUnited States v. Canfield, \n212 F.3d 713 (2d Cir. 2000) \n167 \nUnited States v. Canter, \n338 F. Supp. 2d 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) \n283 \nUnited States v. Carbonaro, \nNo. 02 Cr. 743 (RCC), 2004 WL 2222145 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) \n83 \nUnited States v. Carpenter, \n680 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) \n50 \nUnited States v. Carson, \n464 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1972) \n217, 219 \nUnited States v. CFW Const. Co., \n583 F. Supp. 197 (D. S.C. 1984) \n23 \nUnited States v. Chacko, \n169 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1999) \n259 \nUnited States v. Chalmers, \n474 F. Supp. 2d 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) \n225, 226 \nUnited States v. Chambers, \n800 F. App'x 43 (2d Cir. 2020) \n69 \nUnited States v. Chan Lo, \nNo. 14 Cr. 491 (VSB), 2016 WL 9076234 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016), aff'd. 679 F. App'x 79 (2d \nCir. 2017) \nUnited States v. Chen, \n378 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2004) \nUnited States v. Cheung Kin Ping, \n555 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) \nUnited States v. Chuang, \n183 \n271 \n68, 81 \n897 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1990) \n115, 116 \nUnited States v. Coffey, \n361 F. Supp. 2d 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) \n228 \nUnited States v. Coke, \nNo. 07 Cr. 971 (RPP), 2011 WL 3738969 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) \n153, 160, 163 \nUnited States v. Collins, \n409 F. Supp. 3d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) \n278 \nUnited States v. Concepcion, \n983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) \n252 \nUnited States v. Coppa, \n267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001) \n274 \nUnited States v. Corbett, \n750 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2014) \n137 \nUnited States v. Cornielle, \n171 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1999) \n60, 77, 78, 85 \nUnited States v. Corr, \n543 F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1976) \n181 \nxii \nEFTA00039433\n", "char_count": 1639}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "United States v. Countentos, \n651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011) \n57, 58 \nUnited States v. Cromitie, \n727 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2019) \n154 \nUnited States v. Cromitie, et al., \n09 Cr. 558 (CM) \n286 \nUnited States v. Crouch, \n84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996) \n75 \nUnited States v. D'Amico, \n734 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) \n268 \nUnited States v. Davis, \n702 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983) \npassim \nUnited States v. DeFilippo, \nNo. 17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) \n169 \nUnited States v. Delacruz, \n970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) \n77 \nUnited States v. DePalma, \n461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) \n241, 250 \nUnited States v. Dewar, \n489 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) \n165 \nUnited States v. Diaz, \n176 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999) \n251, 253 \nUnited States v. DiGregorio, \n795 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) \n155 \nUnited States v. Dodge, \n597 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) \n54 \nUnited States v. Dornau, \n356 F. Supp. 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) \n73 \nUnited States v. Dorvee, \n616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010) \n236 \nUnited States v. Drago, \nNo. 18 Cr. 0394 (SW) (AYS), 2019 WL 3072288 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2019) \n86 \nUnited States v. Dumitru, \nNo. 18 Cr. 243 (LAK), 2018 WL 3407703 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2018) \n261 \nUnited States v. Eldred, \n933 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2019) \n123 \nUnited States v. E!-Sadig, \n133 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Ohio 2001) \n23 \nUnited States v. Elsbery, \n602 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979) \n62, 72 \nUnited States v. Estrada, \n320 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003) \n259 \nUnited States v. Ewell, \n383 U.S. 116 (1966) \n80 \nEFTA00039434\n", "char_count": 1524}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "United States v. Falso, \n544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) \nUnited States v. Fanner, \n137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) \nUnited States v. Feldman, \n939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) \nUnited States v. Fennell, \n166, 169 \n179, 180 \n8, 20, 27 \n496 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) \n284, 286 \nUnited States v. Figueroa, \n618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980) \n255 \nUnited States v. Fiumano, \nNo. 14 Cr. 518 (JFK), 2016 WL 1629356 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2016) \n70 \nUnited States v. Florence, \n456 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972) \n293 \nUnited States v. Florida West Int'l Airways, Inc., \n853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012) \n23, 24 \nUnited States v. Forde, \n740 F. Supp. 2d 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) \npassim \nUnited States v. Gallo, \nNo. 98 Cr. (JGK), 1999 WL 9848 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. II, 1999) \n275, 281 \nUnited States v. Gambino, \n838 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) \n70 \nUnited States v. Gaudin, \n515 U.S. 506 (1995) \n182, 184, 200, 222 \nUnited States v. Geaney, \n417 F.2d 1116 (2d Cir. 1969) \n284 \nUnited States v. Gentile, \n235 F. Supp. 3d 649 (D.N.J. 2017) \n48 \nUnited States v. Ghailani, \n751 F. Supp. 2d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) \n155 \nUnited States v. Ghavami, \nNo. 10 Cr. 1217 (KMW), 2012 WL 2878126 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) \n262 \nUnited States v. Gibson, \n175 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) \n268 \nUnited States v. Gilbert, \n266 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) \n62 \nUnited States v. Gillette, \n383 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1967) \n165 \nUnited States v. Gonzalez, \nNo. 00 Cr. 447, 2000 WL 1721171 \n85 \nUnited States v. Gottfried, \n165 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948) \n292 \nUnited States v. Gracesqui, \nNo. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC), 2015 WL 5231168 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2015), aff'd, 730 F. App'x 25 \n(2d Cir. 2018) \n209 \nxiv \nEFTA00039435\n", "char_count": 1658}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "United States v. Green, \n981 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2020) \n124 \nUnited States v. Greer, \n956 F. Supp. 525 (D. Vt. 1997) \n72 \nUnited States v. GrWith, \nNo. 99 Cr. (HB), 2000 WL 1253265 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2000) \n264 \nUnited States v. Guerrier, \n18 Cr. 284 (JSR) \n286 \nUnited States v. Guzman, \n337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) \n300 \nUnited States v. Halkbank, \nNo. 15 Cr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. I, 2020) \n261 \nUnited States v. Hallahan, \n756 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2014) \n19 \nUnited States v. Halper, \n590 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1978) \n216 \nUnited States v. Haqq, \n278 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2002) \n115 \nUnited States v. Harrison, \n764 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) \n72 \nUnited States v. Hastings, \n461 U.S. 499 (1983) \n160 \nUnited States v. Heath, \n455 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2006) \n132, 133 \nUnited States v. Henderson, \n337 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003) \n61, 62 \nUnited States v. Henry, \n861 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) \n269 \nUnited States v. Herbert, \n698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1983) \n293 \nUnited States v. Hernandez, \n85 F.3d 1023 (2d Cir. 1996) \n242 \nUnited States v. Hester, \nNo. 19 Cr. 324 (NSR), 2020 WL 3483702 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020) \n211 \nUnited States v. Heyward, \nNo. 10 Cr. 84 (LTS), 2010 WL 4484642 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010) \n154 \nUnited States v. Hillegas, \n578 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1978) \n79 \nUnited States v. Hoo, \n825 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1987) \n78 \nUnited States v. Hsia, \n24 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 1998) \n249 \nUnited States v. lannelli, \n461 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1972) \n64 \nxv \nEFTA00039436\n", "char_count": 1488}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "United States v. Israel, \n05 Cr. 1039 (CM) \n286 \nUnited States v. Jackman, \n46 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995) \n300, 301 \nUnited States v. Jeffries, \n405 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2005) \n33, 37, 38, 46 \nUnited States v. Jenkins, \n727 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2018) \n194 \nUnited States v. Jennings, \n960 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) \n162 \nUnited States v. Jimenez, \n824 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) \n240, 268 \nUnited States v. Johns, \n15 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1994) \n37 \nUnited States v. Johnson, \n21 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) \n294 \nUnited States v. Jones, \n482 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) \n259 \nUnited States v. Josephberg, \n459 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2006) \npassim \nUnited States v. Kaplan, \n758 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2018) \n182 \nUnited States v. Kenny, \n883 F. Supp. 869 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) \n294 \nUnited States v. Kidd, \n386 F. Supp.3d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) \n231, 232 \nUnited States v. King, \n560 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1977) \n64 \nUnited States v. Kozel, \nNo. 19 Cr. 460 (KMW), 2020 WL 4751498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020) \n236 \nUnited States v. Kross, \n14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994) \n183, 221, 222 \nUnited States v. LaFlam, \n369 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2004) \n254 \nUnited States v. Lahey, \n967 F. Supp. 2d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) \n168 \nUnited States v. Lambus, \n897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2018) \npassim \nUnited States v. Laskow, \n688 F. Supp. 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) \n8 \nUnited States v. Laskow, \n688 F. Supp. 851 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (tbl.) \n5 \nUnited States v. Laurenti, \n581 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1978) \n79 \nxvi \nEFTA00039437\n", "char_count": 1457}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "United States v. Lawson, \n683 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1982) \nUnited States v. Leo Sure Chief \n438 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2006) \nUnited States v. Leon, \n468 U.S. 897 (1984) \n60, 78 \n33, 38, 46 \n124, 125 \nUnited States v. Leonelli, \n428 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) \n268 \nUnited States v. Levy, \nNo. II Cr. 62 (PAC), 2013 WL 664712 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013) \n267 \nUnited States v. Lighte, \n782 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1986) \npassim \nUnited States v. Loera, \n333 F. Supp. 3d 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) \n152 \nUnited States v. Long, \n697 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) \n65 \nUnited States v. Lopez, \n944 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1991) \n21, 26 \nUnited States v. Lovasco, \n431 U.S. 783 (1977) \n76, 79, 80, 82 \nUnited States v. Mahabub, \nNo. 13 Cr. 908 (MN), 2014 WL 4243657 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014) \n266, 268, 269 \nUnited States v. Mandell, \n710 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) \n267 \nUnited States v. Marcus, \n628 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2010) \n248 \nUnited States v. Mariamma Vijua, \nNo. 15 Cr. 240, 2016 WL 107841 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) \n22 \nUnited States v. Marion, \n404 U.S. 307 (1971) \n59, 63, 72 \nUnited States v. Markiewicz, \n978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992) \n178, 180, 187, 198 \nUnited States v. Martin, \n426 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2005) \n167 \nUnited States v. Martinez, \nNo. 92 Cr. (SWK), 1993 WL 322768 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993) \n216 \nUnited States v. Martinez, \nNo. 94 Cr. (RPP), 1995 WL 10849 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1995) \n77 \nUnited States v. Mason, \n479 F. App'x 397 (2d Cir. 2012) \n248 \nUnited States v. Mast, \n735 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1984) \n144 \nUnited States v. McCourty, \n562 F.3d 458 (2d Cir. 2009) \n260 \nxvii \nEFTA00039438\n", "char_count": 1579}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "United States v. McDarrah, \n351 F. App'x 558 (2d Cir. 2009) \n257 \nUnited States v. Medina, \nNo. 13 Cr. 272 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014) \n261 \nUnited States v. Miller, \n116 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 1997) \n252, 292 \nUnited States v. Miller, \n425 U.S. 435 (1976) \n116, 117, 119 \nUnited States v. Miller, \n911 F.3d 638 (1st Cir. 2018) \n44 \nUnited States v. Ming He, \n94 F.3d 782 (2d Cir. 1996) \n161 \nUnited States v. Mitan, \nNo. 08-760, 2009 WL 2328870 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2009) \n218 \nUnited States v. Mitchell, \n966 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1992) \n144 \nUnited States v. Mitlof, \n165 F. Supp. 2d 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) \n268 \nUnited States v. Monserrate, \nNo. 10 Cr. 965 (CM), 2011 WL 3480957 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2011) \n267 \nUnited States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, \n892 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) \n118 \nUnited States v. Moore, \n968 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1992) \n125 \nUnited States v. Morgan, \n113 F.3d 1230, 1997 WL 268712 (2d Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion) \n45 \nUnited States v. Mostafa, \n965 F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) \n242, 243, 247, 262 \nUnited States v. Mulder, \n273 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) \n241, 242 \nUnited States v. Mullens, \n536 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1976) \n139 \nUnited States v. Murgio, \n209 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) \n231, 241, 247 \nUnited States v. Muric, \nNo. 10 Cr. 112 (LTS), 2010 WL 2891178 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) \n86 \nUnited States v. Myers, \n692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982) \n153, 161 \nUnited States v. Napolitano, \n552 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) \n241 \nUnited States v. Nejad, \nNo. 18 Cr. 224 (MN), 2019 WL 6702361 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019) \n225 \nUnited States v. Nemesian, \n824 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1987) \n233 \nxviii \nEFTA00039439\n", "char_count": 1640}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "United States v. Nitsche, \n843 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2011) \n201, 202 \nUnited States v. Nixon, \n418 U.S. 683 (1974) \n282 \nUnited States v. Noble, \nNo. 07 Cr. 284 (RJS), 2008 WL 140966 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2008) \n164 \nUnited States v. Okwumabua, \n828 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1987) \n138 \nUnited States v. Olivieri, \n740 F. Supp. 2d 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) \n146 \nUnited States v. Oshatz, \n700 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) \n147, 148 \nUnited States v. Page, \n657 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2011) \n205, 209, 210, 220 \nUnited States v. Pascarella, \n84 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996) \n252 \nUnited States v. Paulin, \n445 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2006) \n253 \nUnited States v. Payner, \n447 U.S. 727 (1980) \n115, 161, 162 \nUnited States v. Pena, \n932 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) \n221 \nUnited States v. Perez, \n940 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y.I996) \n281 \nUnited States v. Pierre-Louis, \nNo. 16 Cr. 541 (CM), 2018 WL 4043140 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) \npassim \nUnited States v. Pipola, \n83 F.3d 556 (2d Cir. 1996) \n253 \nUnited States v. Pirro, \n212 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2000) \n229 \nUnited States v. Pizarro, \nNo. 17 Cr. 151 (MN), 2018 WL 1737236 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018) \npassim \nUnited States v. Plaza-Andrades, \n507 F. App'x 22 (2d Cir. 2013) \n291 \nUnited States v. Polos, \n723 F. App'x 64 (2d Cir. 2018) \n195 \nUnited States v. Post, \n950 F. Supp. 2d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) \n226 \nUnited States v. Potamitis, \n739 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1984) \npassim \nUnited States v. Prisco, \n391 F. App'x 920 (2d Cir. 2010) \n4 \nUnited States v. Quinones, \n511 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2007) \n251 \nxix \nEFTA00039440\n", "char_count": 1527}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "United States v. Rahimi, \nNo. 16 Cr. 760 (RMB), 2017 WL 2984169 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017) \n225 \nUnited States v. Rahman, \n189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999) \n154 \nUnited States v. Rajaratnam, \nNo. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) \n172 \nUnited States v. Ramnath, \n131 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1997) \n300 \nUnited States v. Raymonda, \n780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015) \n124 \nUnited States v. Reeves, et al., \n16 Cr. 372 (VEC) \n286 \nUnited States v. Remington, \n208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953) \n146 \nUnited States v. Resendiz-Ponce, \n549 U.S. 102 (2007) \n227, 235 \nUnited States v. Ricco, \n549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1977) \n61 \nUnited States v. Richardson, \n512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975) \n49 \nUnited States v. Richardson, \n537 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2008) \n293 \nUnited States v. Rioux, \n930 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Conn. 1995) \n297, 298 \nUnited States v. Rioux, \n97 F.3d 648 (2d Cir. 1996) \npassim \nUnited States v. Rittweger, \n259 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) \n268 \nUnited States v. Rivera, \n546 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2008) \n204, 220, 224 \nUnited States v. Rivera, \nNo. 09 Cr. 619 (SJF), 2011 WL 1429125, at (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2011) \n262 \nUnited States v. Rivera, \nNo. 16 Cr. 175 (LGS), 2017 WL 1843302 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017) \n274 \nUnited States v. Roberts, \n660 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2011) \n138 \nUnited States v. Roberts, \n852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988) \n132 \nUnited States v. Rolan-Zapata, \n916 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1990) \n256 \nUnited States v. Rosa, \n11 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1993) \n253 \nUnited States v. Rosa, \n626 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2010) \n123 \nxx \nEFTA00039441\n", "char_count": 1531}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "United States v. Rubin, \n609 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1979) \n61 \nUnited States v. Rubinson, \n543 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1976) \n81 \nUnited States v. Ruiz, \n702 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) \n214 \nUnited States v. Ruiz, \n894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1990) \n207, 213, 214, 217 \nUnited States v. Russo, \n483 F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) \n274, 282 \nUnited States v. Russo, \n801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986) \n5, 11 \nUnited States v. Rutkoske, \n506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007) \n248 \nUnited States v. Salameh, \n152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) \n5, 6, 245 \nUnited States v. Salerno, \n481 U.S. 739 (1987) \n151 \nUnited States v. Salmonese, \n352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003) \n247, 249 \nUnited States v. Sampson, \n385 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2004) \n208 \nUnited States v. Sampson, \n898 F.3d 270 (2d Cir. 2018) \n200, 201 \nUnited States v. Sampson, \n898 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 2018) \n177, 178, 188 \nUnited States v. Samsonov, \nNo. 07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) \n269 \nUnited States v. Santiago, \n987 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) \n75 \nUnited States v. Sarwari, \n669 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2012) \n179, 180 \nUnited States v. Sattar, \n272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) \n27 \nUnited States v. Savage, \n970 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2020) \n302 \nUnited States v. Scala, \n388 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) \n67, 68, 71 \nUnited States v. Scaipa, \n897 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1990) \n69 \nUnited States v. Scaipa, \n913 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1990) \npassim \nUnited States v. Schaefer, \nNo. 17 Cr. 400 (HZ), 2019 WL 267711 (D. Or. Jan. 17. 2019) \n121 \nxxi \nEFTA00039442\n", "char_count": 1500}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "United States v. Schafrick, \n871 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1989) \n182 \nUnited States v. Schmidt, \n105 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997) \n153, 154 \nUnited States v. Schneider, \n801 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2015) \n51,52,54,57 \nUnited States v. Seabrook, \nNo. 10 Cr. 87 (DAB), 2010 WL 5174353 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010) \n282 \nUnited States v. Sensi, \nNo. 08 Cr. 253, 2010 WL 2351484 (D. Conn. June 7, 2010) \n34, 52 \nUnited States v. Sergentakis, \nNo. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2005) \n275 \nUnited States v. Serrano, \nNo. 13 Cr. 58 (KBF), 2014 WL 2696569 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2014) \n126 \nUnited States v. Shaw, \n260 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) \n165, 171 \nUnited States v. Sliker, \n751 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1984) \n255 \nUnited States v. Smith, \n985 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) \n241, 243, 247 \nUnited States v. Smith, \nNo. 05 Cr. 922 (DLC), 2007 WL 980431 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2007), affd, F. App'x 636 (2d Cir. \n2009) \nUnited States v. Snyder, \n668 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1982) \nUnited States v. Soares, \n66 F. Supp. 2d 391 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) \nUnited States v. Spears, \n206 \n63, 78 \n295 \n159 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 1999) \n62, 66, 67 \nUnited States v. Sprouts, \n282 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2002) \n63 \nUnited States v. Stavroulakis, \n952 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1992) \n225, 233 \nUnited States v. Stein, \n456 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1972) \n68 \nUnited States v. Stein, \n541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) \n142, 143 \nUnited States v. Stokes, \n733 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2013) \n124, 132 \nUnited States v. Stringer, \n730 E 3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) \n228, 229, 231 \nUnited States v. Strohm, \n671 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2011) \n180, 190 \nUnited States v. Swanson, \n210 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2000) \n170 \nEFTA00039443\n", "char_count": 1650}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "United States v. Sweig, \n441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1971) \n207, 211, 217 \nUnited States v. Tanu, \n589 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1978) \n79 \nUnited States v. Thai, \n29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994) \n252 \nUnited States v. Thompson, \n13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) \n281, 284 \nUnited States v. Thompson, \n896 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2018) \n236 \nUnited States v. Thompson, \nNo. 13 Cr. 378 (MN), 2013 WL 6246489 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) \n274 \nUnited States v. Torres, \n901 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1990) \n266, 268, 271 \nUnited States v. Towne, \n870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) \n251 \nUnited States v. Tracy, \n12 F.3d 1186 (2d Cir. 1993) \n283 \nUnited States v. Tram :::: ti, \n513 F.2d 1087 (2d Cir. 1975) \n225, 233 \nUnited States v. Tranquillo, \n606 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) \n284 \nUnited States v. Trippe, \n171 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) \n267 \nUnited States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., \n237 F. App'x 625 (2d Cir. 2007) \n184, 187 \nUnited States v. Turoff, \n853 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1988) \n204 \nUnited States v. Ulbricht, \nNo. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014) \n118, 275 \nUnited States v. Urena, \n989 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) \n28, 171 \nUnited States v. Valentine, \n820 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1987) \n156, 157, 158 \nUnited States v. Valona, \n834 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir. 1987) \n66 \nUnited States v. Vickers, \n708 F. App'x 732 (2d Cir. 2017) \n256 \nUnited States v. Vickers, \nNo. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (HKS), 2014 WL 1838255 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) \npassim \nUnited States v. Vilar, \nNo. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) \n169 \nUnited States v. Villegas, \n899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990) \n115 \nEFTA00039444\n", "char_count": 1630}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "United States v. Walker, \n191 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 1999) \n70 \nUnited States v. Walsh, \n194 F.3d. 37 (2d Cir. 1999) \n228, 266, 271 \nUnited States v. Walters, \n910 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 2018) \n152 \nUnited States v. Washington, \n431 U.S. 181 (1977) \n136, 137, 138 \nUnited States v. Watson, \n599 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir. 1979) \n78 \nUnited States v. Wedd, \nNo. 15 Cr. 616 (KBF), 2016 WL 1055737 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) \n271 \nUnited States v. Weiner, \n479 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973) \n187 \nUnited States v. Werner, \n620 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1980) \n205, 206, 208, 223 \nUnited States v. Wey, \nNo. 15 Cr. 611 (MN), 2017 WL 237651 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017) \n85, 227, 229 \nUnited States v. Williams, \n205 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2000) \n70 \nUnited States v. Williams, \nNo. 10 Cr. 622 (ADS), 2018 WL 4623017 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018) \n123 \nUnited States v. Winter, \n348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965) \n146 \nUnited States v. Wong, \n431 U.S. 174 (1977) \n146 \nUnited States v. Wright, \n343 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2003) \n62 \nUnited States v. Ying Lin, \nNo. 15 Cr. 601 (DLI), 2018 WL 5113139 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) \n206 \nUnited States v. Yonkers Contracting Co., Inc., \n682 F. Supp. 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) \n291 \nUnited States v. Young, \n08 Cr. 285 (KMK), 2008 WL 4178190 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008) \n235 \nUnited States v. Young, \nNo. 08 Cr. 285 (KMK), 2008 WL 4178190 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008) \n234 \nUnited States v. Zackson, \n12 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1993) \n253 \nUnited States v. Zodhiates, \n901 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2018) \n122, 126, 131 \nValentine v. Konteh, \n395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2005) \n235 \nVernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist., \n49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1995) \n42, 43 \nxxiv \nEFTA00039445\n", "char_count": 1636}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Washington v. Glucksberg, \n521 U.S. 702 (1997) \nWeingarten v. United States, \n865 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2017) \nZafiro v. United States, \n506 U.S. 534 (1993) \n209, \n151 \npassim \n210, 220 \nZicarelli v. Dietz, \n633 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1980) \n293 \nZietzke v. United States, \n426 F. Supp. 3d 758 (W.D. Wash. 2019) \n121 \nStatutes \n18 U.S.C. §I623(a) \n118 \n18 U.S.C. § 1591 \n152 \n18 U.S.C. § 1623 \n3, 115 \n18 U.S.C. § 2 \n2, 3 \n18 U.S.C. § 2243 \n155 \n18 U.S.C. § 2422 \npassim \n18 U.S.C. § 2422(a) \n17 \n18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) \n17 \n18 U.S.C. § 2423 \n3, 151 \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) \npassim \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) \n17, 37 \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(e) \n17 \n18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) \n87 \n18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) \n88 \n18 U.S.C. § 3282 \n24, 35 \n18 U.S.C. § 3283 \npassim \n18 U.S.C. § 3299 \n25 \n18 U.S.C. § 3500 \n181, 184 \n18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) \n181 \n18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) \n182 \n18 U.S.C. § 3509(a) \n37 \n18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8)  \n36 \n18 U.S.C. § 3509(d) \n152 \n18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) \n24, 36 \n18 U.S.C. § 371 \n2, 151, 155, 168 \n18 U.S.C. § 3771 \n116 \n28 U.S.C.§ 112 \n192 \n28 U.S.C. § 112(b) \n192, 200 \n28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq.  \n193, 194 \n28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) \n194 \n28 U.S.C. § I863(bX6) \n195 \n28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) \n194 \nxxv \nEFTA00039446\n", "char_count": 1181}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "28 U.S.C. § 1869(e) \n198, 200 \n28 U.S.C. § 81 \n192 \nNew York Penal Law § 130.55 \n155 \nPub. L. No. 101-647 \n24 \nPub. L. No. 103-322 \n24 \nPub. L. No. 108-21  \n25 \nPub. L. No. 109-162 \n25 \nPub. L. No. 109-248 \n25 \nRules \nFed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) \n99 \nFed. R. Civ. P 56 \n153 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 14(a) \n157 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 16 \n200 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 21  \n221 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 5(f) \n206 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) \n88 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 7 \n168 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) \n168 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 7(d) \n177 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 7(f) \n192 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) \n156 \nFed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) \n156 \nFed. R. Evid. 402 \n183 \nFed. R. Evid. 403 \n183, 185 \nFed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) \n184 \nFed. R. Evid. 801  \n210 \nN.Y. R.P.C. 3.7(b) \n166 \nRule 14 \n157 \nRule 404(b) \n186 \nOther Authorities \n149 Cong. Rec. S 5137 \n30 \n149 Cong. Rec. S 5147 \n30 \nH.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-66 \n29 \nPositivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, \n71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958) \n130 \nSexual Abuse Prosecutions, \n77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1986) \n24 \nxxvi \nEFTA00039447\n", "char_count": 1020}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nS 1 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \n \nx \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nThe Government respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition to the defendant's \ntwelve pre-trial motions, dated January 25,2021 (the \"Defense Motions\"). In her pretrial motions, \nthe defendant seeks to throw everything but the proverbial kitchen sink at the Indictment, raising \nmyriad arguments that find little support in fact or law. For the reasons that follow, the motions \nshould be denied in their entirety. \nFirst, the non-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice for the Southern District of Florida is entirely irrelevant to this case, and the defendant's \nmotion fails as a matter of law. Second, the indictment is timely under 18 U.S.C. § 3283, which \nprovides an extended statute of limitations for crimes involving the sexual abuse of minors. The \ndefendant's statute of limitations arguments run contrary to the text of the statute, the intent of \nCongress, and the weight of authority. Third, the defendant's claim that the Government delayed \nin bringing the indictment fails as a matter of law and fact. Fourth, both of the defendant's motions \nto suppress evidence obtained through a judicially approved subpoena are meritless, and her \nallegations of Government misconduct are baseless. Fifth, Counts Five and Six—which charge \nthe defendant with committing perjury—are properly pleaded, and the defendant's motion to \n1 \nEFTA00039448\n", "char_count": 1570}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "dismiss those charges improperly asks the Court to adjudicate her guilt. It is for the jury to decide \nwhether the defendant committed perjury, and the motion should be denied. Sixth, the crimes in \nthe indictment should be tried together, as all six counts of the indictment are logically connected \nand provable through overlapping evidence. The Court should not sever this case, and thereby \nrequire victims of child sexual abuse to testify at multiple trials. Seventh, the Indictment \nindisputably alleges each element of every offense charged and provides the defendant with ample \nnotice of the charges against her. Eighth, the Indictment is properly pled and there is no basis to \nstrike any portion of it as surplusage. Ninth, the defense motion to dismiss one of the conspiracy \ncharges as multiplicitous is premature. Tenth, the defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars \nor any of the other early disclosures she seeks. Finally, the use of a grand jury sitting in White \nPlains to return the Indictment in this case was entirely proper. \nBACKGROUND \nOn June 29, 2020, a grand jury sitting in this District returned an indictment charging the \ndefendant in six counts. On July 2, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBP\") arrested the \ndefendant. On July 8, 2020, a grand jury sitting in this District returned a superseding indictment \n(the \"Indictment\") containing the same charges, with ministerial corrections. (Dkt. No. 17). Count \nOne of the Indictment charges the defendant with conspiring with Jeffrey Epstein and others to \nentice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Two \ncharges the defendant with enticing a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, and aiding and \nabetting the same, in violation 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2. Count Three charges the defendant with \nconspiring with Epstein and others to transport minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation \nof 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Four charges\n... [truncated, 2075 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/28 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=28]", "char_count": 2075}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "illegal sex acts, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423 and 2. Counts \nFive and Six charge the defendant with perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.1\nARGUMENT \nI. \nJeffrey Epstein's Non-Prosecution Agreement Is Irrelevant to This Case \nThe defendant seeks to dismiss the Indictment based on a 2007 non-prosecution agreement \n(\"NPA\") between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of \nFlorida (the \"USAO-SDFL\"). (Def. Mot. I). She does so despite the fact that: (1) she did not \nnegotiate the NPA, was not a party to the NPA, and her name is not contained anywhere in the \ndocument; and (2) her crimes are not identified or named in any way in the NPA. Essentially, the \ndefendant claims she is immune from prosecution for any federal crime, during any time period, \nanywhere, in the United States, based on the language of a document that does not name her and \nwhich she did not sign. Moreover, she seeks to enforce the NPA against a U.S. Attorney's Office \nthat did not negotiate the NPA and is not bound by it. \nThe defendant's arguments are meritless, and the Court should reject them. As a threshold \nmatter, under the well-settled law of this Circuit, the NPA is not enforceable in this District, \nbecause the USAO-SDFL's agreement with Jeffrey Epstein is not binding on the U.S. Attorney's \nOffice for the Southern District of New York (the \"USAO-SDNY\"). Moreover, even if the NPA \napplied to this District—which it does not—the NPA does not immunize the defendant from \nprosecution for the crimes charged in the Indictment. Finally, because the defendant has failed to \n1 As the Government has repeatedly indicated, the investigation into Jeffrey Epstein's co-\nconspirators remains ongoing. (See, e.g., Gov't Letter dated Aug. 21, 2020, Dkt. No. 46; Gov't \nLetter dated Oct. 6, 2020, Dkt. No. 60; Gov't Letter dated Oct. 20, 2020, Dkt. No. 65). To the \nextent that investigation results in additional charges against the def\n... [truncated, 2243 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/29 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=29]", "char_count": 2243}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "offer any evidence to support her claim that the NPA applies to this District, to the defendant, or \nto the crimes in the Indictment, the Court should deny the defendant's request for discovery and \nan evidentiary hearing. \nA. \nThe NPA Does Not Bind the Southern District of New York \nAs an initial matter, the NPA is not enforceable in this District. To the contrary, it is black-\nletter law in this Circuit that a plea agreement in one district does not apply elsewhere, in the \nabsence of express indications not present here. Indeed, the Second Circuit has considered and \nrejected the exact arguments the defendant advances in her motion. The defendant's motion is \nwithout any basis in the law and should be denied. \nIt is well settled in the Second Circuit that \"a plea agreement in one U.S. Attorney's office \ndoes not, unless otherwise stated, bind another.\" United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920, 921 \n(2d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (\"A \nplea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea \nis entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.\")); \nUnited States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998). This Circuit \"presumes a narrow \nreading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can affirmatively establish that a \nmore expansive interpretation was contemplated.\" United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 851, 854 \n(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1988)(tbl.). To \nmeet this burden, a defendant must establish that either the text of the agreement or the \n\"negotiations between defendant and prosecutor\" indicate a promise to bind other districts. United \nStates v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1986). For the reasons set forth below, the defendant \nhas failed to establish that the USAO-SDFL promised Epstein that the NPA would bind other \ndistricts.\n... [truncated, 2018 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/30 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=30]", "char_count": 2018}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "1. \nThe Text of the Agreement Does Not Contain a Promise to Bind Other \nDistricts \nTurning first to the text of the NPA, the terms of the agreement do not contain an \n\"affirmative appearance\" that the parties who signed the NPA intended to bind any other U.S. \nAttorney's Office. To begin with, there can be no dispute that only representatives of the USAO-\nSDFL signed the agreement. There is no signature block for, nor specific mention of, any other \ndistrict or component of the Department of Justice. \nIn her motion, the defendant argues that the words \"United States\" in the NPA evince an \nintent to bind the entire United States Government. (Def. Mot. 1 at 18). But the Second Circuit \nhas rejected this very argument: \"[t]he mere use of the term `government' in the plea agreement \ndoes not create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other \nthan the particular district entering into the agreement.\" Salameh, 152 F.3d at 120 (citations and \ninternal quotation marks omitted). This rule also extends to plea agreements that use the term \n\"United States.\" See United States v. Brown, No. 99-1230, 2002 WL 34244994, at *2 (2d Cir. \nApr. 26, 2002) (summary order) (plea agreement does not bind other districts \"even if the plea \nagreement purports to bind `the Government' or the \"United States\"); United States v. Bruno, 159 \nF. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the \nphrase `United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the \nplea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL.\"). \nAs the Second Circuit first explained in Annabi, plea agreements apply only in the district \nin which they are executed, absent evidence that the parties agreed to broader restrictions: \nAs an original proposition, a plea agreement whereby a federal \nprosecutor agrees that `the Government' will dismiss counts of an \nindictment . . . might be thought to bar the United \n... [truncated, 2164 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/31 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=31]", "char_count": 2164}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "district in which the dismissed charges are initially brought. \nHowever, the law has evolved to the contrary. A plea agreement \nbinds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in \nwhich the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the \nagreement contemplates a broader restriction. \nAnnabi, 771 F.2d at 672 (citations omitted). Thus, under Annabi and its progeny, a plea agreement \nonly binds the U.S. Attorney's Office that executes the agreement, even if, as here, the agreement \nreferences \"the Government\" or \"the United States\" and even if the agreement lacks a provision \nthat \"expressly limits the scope of the agreement to the district\" in which the agreement was \nentered.2\nConfronted with this clear and controlling authority, the defendant's motion attempts to \nlimit the rule of Annabi by noting that some decisions applying Annabi concerned plea agreements \nthat also included express provisions limiting the enforceability of the agreements to the districts \nin which they were entered. (Def. Mot. 1 at 22). Essentially, the defendant argues that without an \nexpress provision limiting the scope of the agreement, every plea agreement should be interpreted \nto bind the entire federal government. But the law in this Circuit holds the opposite: the \npresumption is that a plea agreement in one district does not bind another, absent an affirmative \nappearance that the agreement extends more broadly. \nSee Laskow, 688 F. Supp. at 854 \n(\"Defendant's argument, in effect, is that unless there is an explicit statement to the contrary, it is \npresumed that a non-prosecution agreement binds offices of the United States Attorney that are \n2 The defendant's motion emphasizes that the Second Circuit has held, as a general matter, that \nplea agreements are construed against the Government. (Def. Mot. 1. at 13). That does not carry \nthe day here, as Annabi provides a specific mode of analysis for determining whether a plea \nagreement applies to other dis\n... [truncated, 2644 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/32 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=32]", "char_count": 2644}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "not parties to the agreement. This position is at odds with the law in this Circuit, which presumes \na narrow reading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can affirmatively \nestablish that a more expansive interpretation was contemplated.\") (citing Annabi, 771 F.2d at \n672). To hold otherwise would turn Annabi on its head. \nThe defendant next argues that the following provision of the NPA evinces an intent to bind \nthe entire federal government: \nIn consideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to \nprovide compensation in the manner described above, if Epstein \nsuccessfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions of this \nagreement, the United States also agrees that it will not institute any \ncriminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, \nincluding but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley \nGroff, or Nadia Marcinkova. \nNPA at 5; Def. Mot. 1 at 20-21. Aside from the reference to \"United States\" which, as noted \nabove, is insufficient, the defendant does not point to any language in this provision that \npurportedly binds other districts. Instead, she argues that the absence of language specifically \nlimiting this provision to the USAO-SDFL demonstrates an intent to bind the entire federal \ngovernment. This argument fails, for at least three reasons. First, the defendant's argument inverts \nthe holding of Annabi: in this Circuit, the presumption is that plea agreements bind only the district \nin which they are entered, absent affirmative indications otherwise. Put differently, the absence \nof express limiting language in this provision is not an affirmative indication of a broader \napplication. Accordingly, under Second Circuit law, the absence of limiting language in this \nspecific provision provides no support for the defendant's motion. \nSecond, the defendant's argument acknowledges that the plain terms of the NPA \nimmunized Epstein from prosecution in \"this District,\" that is, the Southern District o\n... [truncated, 2118 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/33 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=33]", "char_count": 2118}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "prosecution . . . will be instituted in this District\"). In other words, the NPA was expressly limited \nto the USAO-SDFL.3 Given this provision, it would be unnatural to read a broader application to \nother districts—based on no textual indicia—into the provision relating to co-conspirators. \nMoreover, the defendant's reading of the NPA would require the Court to adopt the view that, \nwhere a plea agreement contains limiting terms, they must be repeated in every paragraph in order \nto have their natural and common-sense effects. \nThird, and perhaps most importantly, the defendant's interpretation strains common sense. \nIn order to accept the defendant's arguments, the Court would have to reach the counterintuitive \nconclusion that Epstein expressly bargained for broader immunity for his co-conspirators than he \ndid for himself. That is, under the defendant's reading of the agreement, Epstein bargained to \nprotect co-conspirators nationally for crimes they committed with Epstein, but Epstein only sought \nprotection for himself in the Southern District of Florida. The text of the agreement does not \nsupport such a puzzling interpretation. Instead, the more natural reading of the NPA is that its \nrepeated references to the U.S. Attorney's Office and \"this District\" reflect a universal limitation \non the NPA: it applies only to the USAO-SDFL. \nFinally, at several points in her motion, the defendant emphasizes that the NPA contains the \nword \"global,\" but she does not appear to argue that this creates an affirmative appearance that the \nNPA binds other districts. (Def. Mot. 1 at 9, 12). Nor could she. The phrase \"Epstein seeks to \nresolve globally his state and federal liability,\" by its terms, refers to Epstein's liability alone. See \nNPA at 2. \nMoreover, this language appears directly after several paragraphs describing \ninvestigations conducted by the Florida State Attorney's Office and the USAO-SDFL. See id. at \n1-2. Thus, in this context, the terms \"global\" and \"sta\n... [truncated, 2223 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/34 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=34]", "char_count": 2223}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "prosecutions by those two offices, and only those two offices.4 The defendant therefore cannot \nargue that the word \"global\" in this provision means that the NPA binds the entire federal \ngovernment. \nIn sum, the defendant points to nothing in the text of the NPA that could possibly be \nconstrued to bind other districts. To the contrary, there are affirmative indications in the text that \nthe NPA applies only to the USAO-SDFL. Accordingly, under Annahi, the NPA is only binding \non the USAO-SDFL, and the defendant's motion fails as a matter of law. \n2. \nThe Defendant Has Offered No Evidence That the NPA Binds Other \nDistricts \nAlthough a defendant may offer evidence that the negotiations between the prosecutor and \ndefendant contained a promise to bind other districts, Russo, 801 F.2d at 626, the defendant has \nfailed to do so here. The defendant's motion is replete with bare assertions and conclusory \nallegations, but it fails to point to any evidence that the NPA binds the USAO-SDNY. \nThe lone document the defendant offers in support of her motion is a privilege log filed by \nthe USAO-SDFL in connection with a lawsuit filed by Epstein's victims. (Def. Mot. 1 at 22). The \nlog reflects that the FBI agents working with the USAO-SDFL interviewed witnesses in other \nstates—including New York—during their investigation. That is entirely unremarkable, since \nfederal investigations frequently involve gathering evidence in other states. This does not in any \nway establish the substantive involvement of any other districts in the prior investigation, let alone \nthat the USAO-SDFL promised Epstein that the U.S. Attorney's offices in those states would be \nbound by the NPA. \n4 Interpreting the term \"federal liability\" in this provision could not be read to encompass all U.S. \nAttorney's offices without also interpreting its neighboring term, \"state . . liability,\" to refer to \nevery state prosecutor's office in all fifty states. The USAO-SDFL clearly did not—and could \nnot—mak\n... [truncated, 2041 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/35 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=35]", "char_count": 2041}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "The privilege log also does not establish that the USAO-SDFL involved other U.S. \nAttorney's Offices in plea negotiations with Epstein. Grasping at straws, the defendant points to \na notation in the privilege log, which contains an entry for handwritten notes, reflecting that the \nprosecutor in the USAO-SDFL spoke with an Assistant U.S. Attorney in New York. (Def. Mot. 1 \nat 22). The notes referenced in the privilege log are attached hereto as Exhibit 1. As the notes \nreflect, the prosecutor at the USAO-SDFL reached out to an Assistant U.S. Attorney at the USAO-\nSDNY to ask about a civil lawsuit relating to Epstein that was handled by the Civil Division of \nthis Office in the 1990s. The Government is producing to defense counsel today emails that \nconfirm that this was the nature of the contact.5 One of those emails is attached hereto as Exhibit \n2 for the Court's reference. Put simply, those communications provide no indication that the \nUSAO-SDNY was involved in plea negotiations with Epstein. Rather, the USAO-SDFL asked \nabout an old civil case involving Epstein that an AUSA at the USAO-SDNY happened to handle \nyears earlier. In sum, the privilege log in no way establishes that other districts were involved in \nnegotiating the NPA, much less that Epstein was promised that the NPA would bind other districts. \nThe defendant proffers no other documentary evidence beyond the privilege log. Instead, \nwithout any citation, she broadly alleges that \"senior levels of Main Justice were directly involved \nin the negotiation and approval of the NPA.\" (Def. Mot. 1. at 22). This vague and unsworn \nallegation is not evidence. Moreover, any contacts between the USAO-SDFL and Main Justice \n5 In response to the allegations raised by the defense's motion, the Government identified the \nunderlying notes referenced in the privilege log. The Government is producing those underlying \nnotes, as well as the relevant emails, to defense counsel today. The Government has also been \ninforme\n... [truncated, 2535 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/36 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=36]", "char_count": 2535}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "would not, without more, establish that the USAO-SDFL intended to bind other districts, much \nless that the USAO-SDFL communicated a promise to Epstein that the NPA would extend beyond \nthe USAO-SDFL. The defendant's failure to offer any evidence is fatal to her claim. \nAlthough it is not the Government's burden to address and rebut every innuendo or \nconclusory statement in the defendant's motion, it is significant here that the circumstances of the \nNPA have been extensively litigated in a civil lawsuit, and have also been investigated by the \nDepartment of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility (\"OPR\"), resulting in a report of \nOPR's findings (the \"OPR Report).6 The records of both matters provide no support for the \ndefendant's claims. \nThe OPR Report notes that the USAO-SDFL periodically consulted with the Chief of the \nDepartment of Justice Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (\"CEOS\"), Andrew Oosterbaan, \nduring the investigation and plea discussions, and that the CEOS Chief attended a meeting with \ndefense counsel, during which defense counsel made a pitch that Epstein should not be prosecuted. \nNovember 2020 Report, United States Department of Justice, Office of Professional \nResponsibility, at 61-62. However, although the line prosecutor, Maria Villafaiia, subsequently \nsent the CEOS Chief a draft of the NPA, the OPR Report reflects that the CEOS Chief reported to \n6 The defendant's motion cites to the executive summary of the OPR Report. However, the entire \nreport is publicly available, is attached as Exhibit 3 hereto, and has been widely reported on and \npublished by the media. See, e.g., \"Read the report: Investigation into the U.S. Attorney's Office \nfor the Southern District of Florida's Resolution of Its 2006-2008 Federal Criminal Investigation \nof Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the Investigation,\" Wash. Post (Nov. \n12, 2020), hups://www.washingtonpost.corn/context/read-the-report-investigation-into-the-u-s-\na\n... [truncated, 2250 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/37 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=37]", "char_count": 2250}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "OPR that \"he did not recall having read the NPA at this juncture and `had no involvement with it.' \nOPR Report at 64 n. 105.7\nBeyond this, the OPR Report and the record in the civil case note contacts with Main \nJustice about the NPA, but only after the NPA was negotiated, drafted, and signed. In the civil \ncase, the district court detailed the history of the plea negotiations—and noted that, after the NPA \nwas signed, Epstein's counsel appealed to officials in Washington, D.C., hoping to avoid \nenforcement of the NPA's requirement that Epstein plead guilty to state offenses, as the agreement \nrequired. Doe I v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1212-13 (S.D. Fla. 2019). As the district \ncourt noted, that appeal was rejected. Id. at 1213. \nIn particular, and following the execution of the NPA, the report reflects that the USAO-\nSDFL contacted the CEOS Chief in connection with a letter from Epstein's counsel, Kenneth Starr, \nprotesting about complying with certain parts of the NPA. OPR Report at 95. According to the \nreport: \nAt the same time, at [USAO-SDFL supervisor] Lourie's request, \nVillafafta sent the NPA and its addendum to Lourie and Oosterbaan. \nOosterbaan responded to Lourie that he was \"not thrilled\" about the \nNPA; described Epstein's conduct as unusually \"egregious,\" \nparticularly because of its serial nature; and observed that the NPA \nwas \"pretty advantageous for the defendant and not all that helpful \nto the victims.\" He opined, however, that the Assistant Attorney \nGeneral would not and should not consider or address the NPA \n\"other than to say that she agrees with it.\" During her OPR \ninterview, [Assistant Attorney General] Fisher did not recall reading \nStarr's letter or discussing it with Oosterbaan, but believed the \ncomment about her \"agree[ing] with it\" referred to a federal \nprosecution of Epstein, which she believed was appropriate. She \ntold OPR, however, that she \"played no role in\" the NPA and did \nnot review or approve the agreement ei\n... [truncated, 2200 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/38 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=38]", "char_count": 2200}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "OPR Report at 95. The OPR Report further notes that, thereafter, Epstein sought to avoid \ncomplying with the NPA entirely, and his attorneys appealed to Main Justice in the hopes of \nvoiding the agreement. OPR Report at 94-108. That appeal was not successful. Id. In any event, \nthe involvement of Main Justice alone would not begin to establish the very different proposition \nthat Main Justice viewed the NPA as binding any district other than USAO-SDFL, let alone \nspecifically considered and approved such an outcome, or communicated such a promise to \nEpstein. \nFurther still, the record in the civil case makes clear that the USAO-SDFL's position was \nthat the NPA did not bind other districts. In a July 5, 2013 brief, the USAO-SDFL stated: \n[T]he Non-Prosecution agreement simply obligated the government \nnot to prosecute Epstein in the Southern District of Florida for the \noffenses set forth in the Non-Prosecution Agreement. The Non-\nProsecution Agreement does not bar the United States from bringing \nfederal criminal charges against Epstein for the offenses set forth in \nthe Non-Prosecution Agreement in any other district in the \nnation. \nNeither does the Non-Prosecution Agreement bar \nprosecution in any district for offenses not identified in the \nagreement. \nGovernment Brief, 08 Civ. 80736 (KAM), Dkt. No. 205-2, at 10-11 (S.D. Fla.) (emphasis in \noriginal); see also OPR Report at 81, n.125 (observing that a supervisor at the USAO-SDFL \n\"pointed out that the NPA was not a `global resolution' and other co-conspirators could have been \nprosecuted `by any other [U.S. Attorney's] office in the country.\"). \nAs the USAO-SDFL has explained, the NPA did not bind other districts, and could not. \nThat is because the USAO-SDFL lacked the authority to do so under applicable Department of \nJustice guidelines: \nSignificantly, under the governing provision of the United States \nAttorney's Manual, the USAO-SDFL did not have the authority to \nunilaterally bar Epstein's prosecution in\n... [truncated, 2106 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/39 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=39]", "char_count": 2106}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "including any agreement not to prosecute, which purports to bind \nany other district(s) or division without the express written approval \nof the United States Attomey(s) in each affected district and/or the \nAssistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division.' \nGovernment Brief, 08 Civ. 80736 (KAM), Dkt. No. 205-2, at 11 n. I I (S.D. Fla.) (quoting United \nStates Attorney's Manual, 9-27.641 (Multi-District (Global) Agreement Requests)). Significantly, \nthis brief was signed by the same prosecutor who negotiated and signed the NPA. Id. Although \nthe defendant makes the sweeping, self-serving, and unsupported allegation that \"the government \nhad every reason to foresee a potential prosecution of Epstein's co-conspirators in this District \nand, after multiple layers of review within the Department of Justice, intended to agree to preclude \nit,\" the USAO-SDFL's brief says otherwise. (Def. Mot. 1 at 22). Further still, the record \ndeveloped in both civil litigation and OPR's investigation does not support this claim. \nat \nAs the foregoing makes clear, the defendant has failed to produce any evidence that the USAO-\nSDFL promised Epstein that other districts would be bound by the NPA. There is no \"affirmative \nappearance\" that the NPA binds other districts, and the motion should be denied. Under Annabi \nand its progeny, the defendant has failed to establish that the NPA binds other districts. For this \nreason alone, the defendant's motion should be dismissed, in keeping with the well-established \nlaw in this Circuit.8\n8 In her motion, the defendant asks this Court to apply a bizarre and unprecedented choice-of-\nfederal-law doctrine, under which the defendant asks the Court to apply non-existent rulings from \nthe Eleventh Circuit on an issue that Court does not appear to have reached. (Def. Mot. 1 at 23-\n25). This argument has no legal foundation, and the defendant offers no authority for the \nproposition that federal plea agreements are governed by the choice of law princ\n... [truncated, 2136 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/40 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=40]", "char_count": 2136}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "B. \nThe NPA Does Not Immunize Maxwell from Prosecution \nEven if the NPA bound this District—which it does not—the NPA provides no basis for \ndismissing the Indictment. The NPA does not protect the defendant for at least two reasons. First, \nthe text of the NPA specifically limits the scope of the NPA to certain federal crimes committed \nbetween 2001 and 2007, and thus the NPA does not apply to the distinct offenses and time periods \ncharged in the Indictment. Second, the NPA does not protect the defendant at all, because the \nmere use of the word \"co-conspirator\" does not establish that the defendant was among the class \nof persons contemplated by the agreement, much less that the defendant has standing to enforce it. \n1. \nThe NPA Is Limited to Particular Crimes Between 2001 and 2007 \nContrary to the defendant's assertions, the NPA did not provide carte blanche immunity to \nEpstein or his \"co-conspirators.\" In fact, the NPA contains detailed provisions that limit the scope \nof the crimes immunized in the agreement. \nThe NPA begins by outlining the scope of the USAO-SDFL investigation. delineating the \ntimeframe of the offense conduct under investigation (\"from in or around 2001 through in or \naround September 2007\"), and listing each and every statutory offense under investigation. NPA \nat 1. The NPA does this for a reason, because these terms are later used in the agreement to set \nthe boundaries of immunity. In particular, the agreement provides: \n[N]o prosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this \nagreement, nor any other offenses that have been the subject of the \njoint investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the \nUnited States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses that arose from \nthe Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this \nDistrict, and the charges against Epstein if any, will be dismissed. \nNPA at 2. Thus, the NPA barred the USAO-SDFL from prosecuting Epstein for the specific \n15 \nEFTA00039462\n", "char_count": 1986}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "offenses enumerated in the NPA.9 While these same limitations are not repeated in the provision \nthat purports to immunize \"co-conspirators,\" these limitations apply with equal force across the \nagreement, because that is the only common-sense way to read the NPA. Indeed, and as noted \nabove in a related context, it would be exceedingly strange to interpret the \"co-conspirator\" \nprovision to extend broader immunity than Epstein negotiated for himself. \nThe defendant may assert that the \"co-conspirator\" provision has absolutely no limitations, \nbut such an argument would lead to absurd results. In particular, in arguing that the \"co-\nconspirator\" provision lacks any temporal or statutory limitations whatsoever, the defendant seems \nto claim that the NPA immunized her for future crimes including, for example, perjury offenses \nthat she is charged with committing almost a decade after the NPA was executed. (Def. Mot. 1 at \n32 (\"For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the \nindictment.\")). Although the defendant does not highlight this point in her motion—perhaps \nrecognizing how absurd it would be—that is the natural consequence of her illogical interpretation \nof the NPA. Despite advancing an argument that strains common sense, the defendant cites no \ncase in which a court has interpreted a plea agreement to bar prosecution for crimes that pre- or \npost-dated the period covered by the agreement. The Government is aware of no such authority. \nSee United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962, 974 (7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting defense argument that \nplea agreement barred prosecution for subsequent bail jumping, and, in interpreting the \n9 By its plain terms, the NPA did not immunize Epstein for his \"background,\" as the defendant \nsuggests. (Def. Mot. 1 at 27). This provision refers, instead, to a list of \"offenses\" under federal \nlaw. Indeed, it is unclear how any plea agreement could immunize a defendant's \"background.\" \nSimilarly, the\n... [truncated, 2592 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/42 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=42]", "char_count": 2592}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Government's promises in the plea agreement to only cover past crimes, observing that \"not \nlimiting the prohibition to past crimes would make it absurd and probably illegal\") (citing Aronson \nv. K. Arakelian, Inc., 154 F.2d 231, 233 (7th Cir. 1946) (\"[A] contract will not be presumed to \nhave imposed an absurd or impossible condition on one of the parties, but will be interpreted as \nthe parties must be supposed to have understood the conditions at the time.\")). \nFinally, the defendant claims that the NPA covers all violations of the Mann Act. (Def. \nMot. 1 at 26 n.4). Not so. The NPA lists specific statutory provisions within the Mann Act, but \nnone of the provisions contained in the Indictment. In particular, the NPA expressly covers \nviolations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b), 2423(b), and 2423(e), but it does not include the particular \nprovisions charged in the Indictment against Maxwell, which alleges violations of §§ 2422(a) and \n2423(a). These are plainly not the same crimes, and a plea agreement cannot be read to immunize \nunnamed crimes in the general ballpark of the specific crimes enumerated in the agreement. The \ndefendant cites no authority that supports her overbroad reading of this provision. \nAccordingly, the NPA immunizes only certain, specific offenses, none of which are \ncontained in the Indictment. As a result, the defendant cannot invoke the NPA to seek the dismissal \nof the Indictment. \n2. \nThe NPA Does Not Confer Enforceable Rights on Maxwell \nEven if this Court were to construe the NPA beyond its plain terms to preclude prosecutions \nfor the crimes contained in the Indictment, the defendant has established neither that those \nprotections extend to Maxwell specifically, nor that she has standing to pursue those protections. \nThe defendant asks this Court to interpret the NPA according to contract principles, and \naccord the defendant standing to enforce the NPA as a third party beneficiary. As a general matter, \nplea agreements are interpreted using\n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/43 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=43]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "limitations. As the defendant's motion recognizes, the Second Circuit has emphasized that plea \nagreements differ from commercial contracts in meaningful respects. (Def. Mot. 1 at 30 (citing \nUnited States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2019) (\"[W]hile the district court's analysis \nmight have been compelling with respect to a contract arising out of commercial negotiations \namong private parties, we believe the court did not correctly apply the standards that govern the \ninterpretation of plea agreements with the government. We have long recognized that plea \nagreements are significantly different from commercial contracts.\"))). Accordingly, although the \nthird party beneficiary doctrine is a tenet of contract law, its application to plea agreements under \nfederal law is a separate question. \nThe defendant correctly notes that plea agreements may address leniency for third parties. \n(Def. Mot. 1 at 15). However, it does not necessarily follow that a third party may enforce such a \npromise. Indeed, it is far from clear that, under federal law, a third party may enforce a plea \nagreement. At least one court in this Circuit has noted the absence of authority that a third party \nhas standing to enforce another individual's plea agreement. See Santobello v. United States, No. \n94 Cr. 119 (RPP), 1998 WL 113950, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1998) (\"Even if Santobello could \nestablish the existence of plea agreements between the Government and his co-defendants, there \nis little known authority that would allow him to enforce the agreements as a third party \nbeneficiary.\") (citing United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1991)). \nFollowing this logic, at least one court has concluded that third parties lack standing to \nenforce plea agreements. In United States v. Mariamma Viju, the defendant claimed that the \nGovernment had entered into a plea agreement with her husband, under which the Government \nhad promised not to prosecute her. No. 15 Cr. 240, 2016 WL\n... [truncated, 2151 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/44 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=44]", "char_count": 2151}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "respects from those underlying contract law, the district court concluded that \"third-party \nbeneficiaries have no contractual right to enforce plea agreements.\" Id. at '3-4. The court \nreasoned, \"[t]he right to enforce a plea deal does not exist for its own sake; rather, it is a means to \nachieve fairness in plea bargaining.\" Id. at '4. That is because a defendant has the right to enforce \nhis plea agreement, and \"enforcement by third parties adds nothing to protecting the defendant's \nright.\" Id. The same holds true here. \nIn support of her claim that she has standing to enforce the NPA, the defendant relies upon \nthree district court decisions, none of which analyzed the threshold question of whether third party \nstanding concepts from contract law apply to plea agreements. In United States v. Florida West \nInt 'I Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1228 (S.D. Fla. 2012), the district court applied the third \nparty beneficiary doctrine to a former airline employee based on a prior plea agreement with the \nairline that immunized, among others, current and former employees of the airline and its \nsubsidiaries. In its analysis, however, the court applied the doctrine without analyzing the question \nof whether third party beneficiary standing principles apply to plea agreements. Id. For similar \nreasons, the defendant's reliance on United States v. El-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d 600, 608-09 (N.D. \nOhio 2001) is misplaced. In that case, the court permitted a third party to invoke a plea agreement, \nbut it did not analyze or address whether third party standing rules apply to plea agreements. Id. \nLikewise, in United States v. CFW Const. Co., 583 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D.S.C. 1984), the court \napplied the third party beneficiary doctrine, but relied solely on contracts treatises for support, and \ndid not analyze whether that doctrine should be applied to plea agreements. \nIn any event, even if third party beneficiaries had standing to enforce federal plea \nagreements, the defe\n... [truncated, 2197 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/45 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=45]", "char_count": 2197}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "\"a direct and primary object of the contracting parties was to confer a benefit on the third party.\" \nFla. W. Intl Ainvays, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (quoting Boclzese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 \nF.3d 964, 982 (11th Cir. 2005)). In other words, \"the intent of the parties is the key\" to evaluating \nwhether an individual is a third party beneficiary. Id. \nHere, the defendant has offered no evidence that the parties intended to confer a benefit on \nher in particular, or that her crimes in the 1990s make her a member of the class of \"co-\nconspirators\" the parties had in mind when they negotiated the NPA. To the contrary, the OPR's \ninvestigation of the circumstances surrounding the inclusion of this provision in the NPA strongly \nundercuts any such argument, and OPR's findings demonstrate that the parties did not intend to \nconfer a benefit on the defendant. With respect to the \"co-conspirator\" provision, the OPR Report \nconcluded, in relevant part: \nOther than various drafts of the NPA and of a federal plea \nagreement, OPR found little in the contemporaneous records \nmentioning the provision and nothing indicating that the subjects \ndiscussed or debated it—or even gave it much consideration. Drafts \nof the NPA and of the federal plea agreement show that the final \nbroad language promising not to prosecute \"any potential co-\nconspirators of Epstein\" evolved from a more narrow provision \nsought by the defense. The provision expanded as [USAO-SDFL \nprosecutor Maria] Villafafia and defense counsel exchanged drafts \nof, first, a proposed federal plea agreement and, then, of the NPA, \nwith apparently little analysis and no substantive discussion within \nthe USAO about the Provision. \nOPR Report at 166. With respect to Maxwell in particular, OPR interviewed Maria Villafaiia, the \nlead prosecutor on the case, and noted: \nVillafafia acknowledged that investigators were aware of Epstein's \nlongtime relationship with a close female friend who was a well-\nknown socialite, but\n... [truncated, 2277 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/46 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=46]", "char_count": 2277}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "OPR Report at 167.1° After reviewing the facts and circumstances of the negotiation, OPR \nconcluded that \"the evidence does not show that [Former USAO-SDFL U.S. Attorney Alex] \nAcosta, [Former USAO-SDFL supervisor Andrew] Lourie, or Villafafia agreed to the \nnonprosecution provision to protect any of Epstein's political, celebrity, or other influential \nassociates.\" OPR Report at 168.\" \nIn view of OPR's conclusions—and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary \nproffered by the defendant—the defendant has failed to establish that that she was an intended \nthird party beneficiary of the NPA. Accordingly, the defendant lacks standing to enforce the NPA. \nC. \nThe Defendant Has Offered No Basis for Additional Discovery or a Hearing \nThe defendant's motion for discovery and a hearing fares no better. \nLacking any \nevidence—much less any legal authority—that the NPA applies to this District or the crimes in \nthe Indictment, the defendant asks the Court to order discovery and conduct a hearing. In short, \n10 The OPR Report further reflects that in OPR's interview of Villafafia, she reported that she did \nnot have anyone in mind aside from the four individuals named in the \"co-conspirator\" provision: \n\"Villafafia told OPR that she was willing to include a non-prosecution provision for Epstein's co-\nconspirators, who at the time she understood to be the four women named in the proposed \nagreement, because the USAO was not interested in prosecuting those individuals if Epstein \nentered a plea. Villafafia told OPR, `[W]e considered Epstein to be the top of the food chain, and \nwe wouldn't have been interested in prosecuting anyone else.' She did not consider the possibility \nthat Epstein might be trying to protect other, unnamed individuals, and no one, including the FBI \ncase agents, raised that concern.\" OPR Report at 70. Further, the OPR Report notes that: \n\"Villafafia told OPR that, apart from the women named in the NPA, the investigation had not \ndeveloped evidence o\n... [truncated, 2694 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/47 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=47]", "char_count": 2694}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "the defendant asks this Court to authorize an extensive and burdensome fishing expedition, \npremised on the defendant's pure conjecture. The Court should deny the motion. \nAlthough the defendant asserts that the Court is obligated to conduct a hearing, she has \nfailed to establish that any hearing is warranted. The defendant argues that courts conduct \nevidentiary hearings \"where the existence or scope of a plea agreement or non-prosecution \nagreement is in genuine dispute.\" (Def. Mot. 1 at 29). But the defendant has not established any \ngenuine factual dispute in this case that a hearing would be required to resolve. The defendant has \noffered bare conclusions in support of her motion, which are refuted by governing law, record \nevidence, and the four corners of the agreement itself. That is not a basis for a hearing. \nAs the Second Circuit explained in United States v. Aleman, 286 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2002), \"a \ndistrict court need not conduct a hearing every time a defendant summarily accuses the government \nof failing to live up to an alleged bargain.\" Id. at 91. In that case, the court held that a hearing \nwas required because the defendant had submitted affidavits from his attorney, as well as \ncorroborating affidavits from other attorneys, and the Government had not submitted any evidence. \nId.; see also United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying Aleman, \nand ordering an evidentiary hearing based upon the defendant's submission of an affidavit from \nan attorney with knowledge of the alleged oral agreement). Similarly, in United States v. Feldman, \n939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019), the Second Circuit held that a hearing was required based on the \ndefendant's uncontested assertions about specific representations made to him by a prosecutor. Id. \nat 184, 190. Here, by contrast, the defendant has offered no evidence in support of her allegations. \nThe defendant cannot seriously argue that she has made the type of showing that requires a \nh\n... [truncated, 2205 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/48 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=48]", "char_count": 2205}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "pointed to anything in the extensive record of either the OPR investigation or the civil litigation \nsurrounding the NPA that would suggest that the NPA applies to this District, or to the crimes in \nthe Indictment, or to Maxwell. In the absence of any such evidence—and in the face of substantial \ncontrary evidence gathered in the civil litigation and OPR investigation—the Court has no \nobligation to conduct a hearing. \nFor similar reasons, the defendant's motion for discovery should be denied. To the extent \nthe defendant seeks discovery under Rule 16, she has failed to meet her burden. A defendant \nseeking discovery under Rule 16 \"must make a prima fade showing of materiality and must offer \nmore than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is material.\" United States v. \nUrena, 989 F. Supp. 2d 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted). Here, the defendant has \noffered nothing more than her conjecture that some unspecified evidence might exist. The motion \nshould be denied. \nII. \nThe Indictment Is Timely \nCounts One through Four are timely charged because the applicable limitations period, 18 \nU.S.C. § 3283 (2003), permits prosecution for offenses \"involving the sexual or physical abuse... \nof a child\" at any time \"during the life of the child,\" and each of the victims identified in the \nIndictment remains alive. Maxwell contends that Section 3283 should not be applied to conduct \nthat predated its amendment in 2003 (Def. Mot. 2), but that argument is contrary to the text of the \nstatute, Congress's clear intent when extending the statute of limitations, and the decisions of other \ncircuits and district courts in this Circuit. In effect, the defendant's motion asks this Court to break \nnew ground, and become the first court to hold that Section 3283 applies only prospectively. \nIn the alternative, Maxwell argues that Section 3283 is inapplicable because the offenses \ncharged in the Indictment do not \"involv[e] the sexual or physical abuse . . . of\n... [truncated, 2035 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/49 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=49]", "char_count": 2035}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Mot. 2 at 12-14). Yet her argument runs contrary to the weight of authority that has adopted the \ncommon-sense view that crimes that necessarily entail the sexual or physical abuse of children \n\"involv[e] the sexual or physical abuse of a child.\" This Court should do the same and deny the \nmotion. \nA. \nStatutory Background \nBetween 1990 and 2006, Congress passed a series of laws that expanded the statute of \nlimitations for prosecutions of crimes against minors, ultimately extending the statute of \nlimitations to the lifetime of the minor victim and, for certain offenses, eliminating the statute of \nlimitations entirely. These laws reflect a virtually unbroken congressional policy that the default \nfive-year statute of limitations for federal crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 3282, is inadequate for such \noffenses. An extended statute of limitations is necessary because \"child sex abuse offenses . . . \nmay be difficult to detect quickly,\" in part because children often first report their abuse long after \nit occurs. Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing, e.g., David McCord, \nExpert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 77 J. \nCrim. L. & Criminology I, 60-61 (1986)). \nIn 1990, Congress enacted a new statute of limitation for certain crimes against children, \nwhich stated: \"No statute of limitation that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense \ninvolving the sexual or physical abuse of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such a \nprosecution before the child reaches the age of 25 years.\" Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. \n101-647, tit. II, § 225(a), 104 Stat. 4789, 4798 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (1990)). In 1994, \nCongress re-codified this provision, moving it to 18 U.S.C. § 3283 with identical language. \nViolent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXXIII, \n§ 330018(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2149 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (1994)) (\"No statute \n... [truncated, 2033 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/50 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=50]", "char_count": 2033}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse \nof a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution before the child reaches the \nage of 25.\"). \nAs the Second Circuit has recognized, \"after nearly a decade, Congress began to view even \nthe extended statute of limitations period in the 1994 version of § 3283 as `inadequate in many \ncases' because it released from criminal liability sex abusers whose crimes were not brought to the \nattention of federal authorities until after their victims turned twenty-five.\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d \nat 54 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-66, at 54 (2003)). Accordingly, in April 2003, Congress \namended Section 3283 to permit the prosecution of sex offenses against minors at any time during \nthe lifetime of the minor victim. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of \nChildren Today Act (\"PROTECT Act\") of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, tit. II, § 202, 117 Stat. 650, \n660 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003)) (\"No statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude \nprosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under \nthe age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child.\"). \nIn January 2006, Congress further amended Section 3283 to its current form to permit the \nprosecution of such offenses during the lifetime of the victim or ten years after the offense, \nwhichever is longer. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of \n2006, Pub. L. No. 109-162, tit. XI, § 1182(c), 119 Stat. 2960, 3126 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3283 \n(2006)) (\"No statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense \ninvolving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall \npreclude such prosecution during the life of the child, or for ten years after the offense, whichever \nis longer.\"). \n25 \nEFTA00039472\n", "char_count": 1979}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Finally, later that same year, Congress enacted a new statute as part of the Adam Walsh \nChild Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587. That statute \neliminated the statute of limitations entirely for certain crimes involving the sexual exploitation of \nminors. Id. tit. II, § 211(1), 120 Stat. at 616 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3299). \nB. \nThe 2003 Amendment to Section 3283 Applies Retroactively \nCounts One through Four of the Indictment charge crimes that occurred between 1994 \nand 1997. At the time of the offense conduct, the applicable statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3283 (1994), ran until \"the child reaches the age of 25.\" However, in 2003, while the statute of \nlimitations had not yet run for the crimes charged in the Indictment,12 Congress amended the \nstatute, extending the limitations period to permit a prosecution at any time \"during the life of the \nchild.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003). Because the victims are all alive, the Indictment is timely under \nthe 2003 amendment. \nPut simply, the 2003 amendment applies to any conduct that could have been charged at \nthe time of its enactment. The legislative purpose behind Section 3283 and a plain reading of the \nstatute compel this conclusion, and courts have repeatedly held that the 2003 amendment applies \nretroactively, provided that the statute of limitations had not run for the offense at the time of the \namendment. See, e.g., United States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2006) \n(\"Because Congress evinced a clear intent to extend, rather than shorten, the statute of limitations \napplicable to sexual abuse crimes, and because there is no ex post facto problem here, the \nprosecution was timely.\") (citing United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. \ndenied, 546 U.S. 1007 (2005)); United States v. Brown, 800 F. App'x 455, 461 (9th Cir. 2020) \n(\"Because Congress evinced a clear intent to extend the statute of limitations for these types of \n12 Th\n... [truncated, 2110 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/52 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=52]", "char_count": 2110}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "crimes in its amendments, and because there is no ex post facto problem here, the prosecution was \ntimely.\"), cert. denied, No. 20-5064, \nS.Ct. \n, 2021 WL 78235 (Jan. 11, 2021); United States v. \nPierre-Louis, No. 16 Cr. 541 (CM), 2018 WL 4043140, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) (denying \nmotion to dismiss child exploitation charges as time-barred) (\"Defendant's argument rests on the \nerroneous premise that the law requires the defendant to have committed the charged offense after \nthe effective date of the extension of the statute of limitations for the charge to not be time-barred. \nAs long as the original statute of limitations had not lapsed when the extension went into effect, \nthe prosecution is not time-barred.\"); United States v. Sensi, No. 08 Cr. 253, 2010 WL 2351484, \nat *2 (D. Conn. June 7, 2010) (holding that the 2003 amendment of Section 3283 applies to pre-\nenactment conduct, and rejecting the argument \"that the lack of a savings clause in the 2003 \nversion of section 3283 is fatal to extending the statute of limitations.\"); United State v. Nader, \n425 F. Supp. 3d 619, 624-30 (E.D. Va. 2019) (holding that the 2003 amendment of Section 3283 \napplies to pre-enactment conduct). \nIn Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Supreme Court set forth a \ntwo-part framework for determining whether a statute applies retroactively. At step one of the \nanalysis, \"if Congress `expressly prescribed' that a statute applies retroactively to antecedent \nconduct, `the inquiry ends[] and the court enforces the statute as it is written,' save for \nconstitutional concerns.\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54-55 (quoting In re Enter. Mon. Acceptance \nCo. Sec. Litig. (\"Enterprise'), 391 F.3d 401, 405-06 (2d Cir. 2004)). However, \"when a statute \n`is ambiguous or contains no express command' regarding retroactivity, a reviewing court must \ndetermine whether applying the statute to antecedent conduct would create presumptively \nimpermissible retroactive effects.\" Id. For t\n... [truncated, 2168 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/53 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=53]", "char_count": 2168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "1. \nThe 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step One of Landgraf \nAt step one of the Landgraf analysis, the question is whether Congress has \"expressly \nprescribed the statute's proper reach.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. When evaluating Congress's \nintent at step one of the Landgraf inquiry, the Second Circuit has considered both the text of the \nstatute and the legislative history. Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 406-08. In this case, the amended \nversions of Section 3283 evince Congress's express intent to extend the statute of limitations. The \ntext and history of Section 3283 firmly establish that, with each amendment of the statute of \nlimitations, Congress intended to repeal and replace the prior version of the statute and thereby \nextend the time to bring live charges of child sexual abuse. \nThe 2003 amendment, like the 1994 version of the statute, specifically states that \"[n]o \nstatute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution\" of a child sexual offense \"shall \npreclude\" prosecution of such offense during the life of the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003). \nClaims that were live in 2003 were, at the time, subject to the then-existing statute of limitations, \nwhich ran until the victims reached the age of 25. Whenever that statute of limitations ran, it would \n\"otherwise preclude prosecution.\" Instead, that statute of limitations was replaced by the 2003 \namendment. \nThe Eighth and Ninth Circuits have both held that Congress intended to extend the statute \nof limitations for live claims of sexual abuse. In United States v. Jef•ies, 405 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. \n2005), the Eighth Circuit reasoned that \"both the title and wording of § 3509(k) indicate that \nCongress intended by it to extend the general statute of limitations. . § 3509(k) was later \nrecodified at § 3283 and continued to extend the statute of limitations in child abuse cases.\" Id. at \n684 (citing United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that an earlier version \nof § 3509(k) applied to\n... [truncated, 2178 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/54 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=54]", "char_count": 2178}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "force to the 2003 amendment, which established an even broader statute of limitations. Following \nJqffries, the Ninth Circuit has similarly held that Section 3283 applies retroactively, because \n\"Congress evinced a clear intent to extend\" the statute of limitations. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d at \n924 (citing Jeffries, 405 F.3d at 685). \nNot only does the wording of the statute clearly express that Congress intended for the 2003 \namendment to be the only governing statute of limitations for live claims of child sexual abuse, \nbut the legislative history also supports this conclusion. The Joint Report accompanying the 2003 \namendment explains that Congress wanted to expand the statute of limitations out of concern that \nthe 1994 amendment did not go far enough to ensure that perpetrators of child sexual abuse were \nheld to account: \nWhile [the statute of limitations allowing for prosecution until the \nvictim reaches age 25] is better than a flat five-year rule [under \nSection 3282], it remains inadequate in many cases. For example, a \nperson who abducted and raped a child could not be prosecuted \nbeyond this extended limit — even if DNA matching conclusively \nidentified him as the perpetrator one day after the victim turned 25. \nH.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-66, at 54 (2003). Congress's express intention was to prevent \nperpetrators of crimes against children from escaping justice based on a timing technicality. \nMoreover, since the 2003 amendment extended the statute of limitations throughout the lifetime \nof the victim, it is clear that Congress expressly authorized prosecutions to occur decades after \ncrimes had been committed.13\n13 Although the defendant claims that prosecuting her crimes now presents unique fairness \nconcerns, there is nothing unusual about prosecuting sex crimes long after they have occurred. \nSee, e.g., United States v. Brown, 800 F. App'x 455, 461 (9th Cir. 2020) (2014 indictment charging, \namong other crimes, sex trafficking offenses dating to 2000 a\n... [truncated, 2343 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/55 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=55]", "char_count": 2343}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "The defendant argues that Congress did not intend for Section 3283 to apply to pre-\nenactment conduct, and asserts that the legislative history supports this interpretation. Specifically, \nthe defendant points to an earlier version of the bill, which contained an express retroactivity \nprovision that was not included in the final version of the statute. (Def. Mot. 2 at 6-7). The \ndefendant's argument on this point is both misleading and unpersuasive. The defendant quotes \nSenator Patrick Leahy's comments on the 2003 conference committee report to the effect that \"the \nconference agreed to drop language from the original House-passed bill that would have extended \nthe limitations period retroactively.\" (Def. Mot. 2 at 7). This is a selective quotation; the full \nstatement regarding retroactivity is as follows: \nA final point on section 202: I am pleased that the conference agreed \nto drop language from the original House-passed bill that would \nhave extended the limitations period retroactively. That language, \nwhich would have revived the government's authority to prosecute \ncrimes that were previously time-barred, is of doubtful \nconstitutionality. \nWe are already pushing the constitutional \nenvelope with respect to several of the \"virtual porn\" provisions in \nthis bill. I am pleased that we are not doing so in section 202 as \nwell. \n149 Cong. Rec. 55137, S5147 (Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (emphasis added). As \nthe full quotation makes clear, the legislative history does not support the conclusion that when \nCongress amended Section 3283, it declined to adopt the language in the House-passed bill \nbecause it wanted the lengthened statute of limitations to apply only prospectively. Instead, \nSenator Leahy's comments indicate that Congress declined to add language that would allow for \nthe resurrection of time-barred prosecutions, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.14 But that \nconduct in 2000). Indeed, that is precisely what Congress authorized wh\n... [truncated, 2417 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/56 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=56]", "char_count": 2417}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "concern is entirely separate from extending the statute of limitations for live claims, which is what \nCongress did here. Critically—and as discussed in greater detail below—there is no Ex Post Facto \nClause issue in this case, because the statute of limitations for Counts One through Four had not \nyet expired when the limitations period was extended in 2003.15\nAccepting the defendant's argument would undermine Congress's plain purpose in \nextending the limitations period. In 1990, 2003, and 2006, Congress extended—and ultimately \nabolished—the statute of limitations to ensure that prosecutors could seek justice for child sex \nabuse victims who come forward or identify their abusers after a delay. Applying the 2003 statute \nonly prospectively subverts that purpose by exempting all past offenders. According to the \ndefendant, in 2003, Congress wanted to ensure that every perpetrator who abused a minor in the \nfuture was subject to prosecution for the lifetime of the minor, but Congress simultaneously was \nversion was vetoed by the President, and the final version of the statute omitted the retroactivity \nprovision. As the Supreme Court explained, \"[t]he omission of the elaborate retroactivity \nprovision of the 1990 bill—which was by no means the only source of political controversy over \nthat legislation—is not dispositive because it does not tell us precisely where the compromise was \nstruck in the 1991 Act.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 256. Indeed, \"[i]t [was] entirely possible—indeed, \nhighly probable—that, because it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue with the clarity of \nthe 1990 legislation, Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the courts.\" \nId. at 261. \n15 Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim-2 were both younger than 25 in 2003, when Congress \nextended the limitations period. Minor Victim-3 was not, but this does not alter the inquiry, \nbecause the Indictment does not contain any counts that relate to Minor Victim-3 alone. Instead, \nsh\n... [truncated, 2884 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/57 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=57]", "char_count": 2884}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "content to let all previous perpetrators avoid prosecution whenever their victims turned twenty-\nfive. No such intent is manifest in either the text or in Senator Leahy's statement. \nThe reach of Section 3283 is clear. Because Congress has expressly extended the statute of \nlimitations to pre-enactment conduct, the Court should resolve its analysis at Landgraf step one \nand apply the statute as Congress intended. In the alternative, however, the statute is—at worst—\nambiguous. If the Court takes that view, it should proceed to Landgraf step two. \n2. \nThe 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step Two of Landgraf \nIf the Court were to determine that the legislative intent behind Section 3283 is ambiguous, \nthe inquiry then extends to the second step of the Landgraf analysis, which examines the \nretroactive effects of the statute. As the Supreme Court explained in Landgraf, \"[a] statute does \nnot operate `retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating \nthe statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law.\" 511 U.S. at 269. Instead, the \nquestion is whether the statute \"would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a \nparty's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already \ncompleted.\" Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist, 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995) \n(quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). Applying Section 3283 here would have none of those \neffects. Maxwell's rights, liabilities, and duties were governed by the substantive criminal statutes \ngoverning her conduct. Until the statute of limitations expired, Maxwell had the same legal \nliability, the same rights, and the same incentives to retain evidence. A statute extending that \nperiod attaches no new legal consequences; rather, it preserves the status quo. Therefore, the \nstatute does not operate \"retrospectively\" within the meaning of Landgraf. See Cruz v. Maypa, \n773 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014) (\"[A]pplying [\n... [truncated, 2065 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/58 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=58]", "char_count": 2065}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "were unexpired at the time of its enactment does not give rise to an impermissible retroactive effect \nunder Landgraf.\"). \nThe Second Circuit has considered in three cases whether retroactive statutes of limitation \nare permissible under Landgraf. In Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist, the Second \nCircuit held that a new statute shortening the filing period for a civil claim applied retroactively. \nIn reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that \"Landgraf and other cases countenance treating \nstatutes of limitations differently from statutory provisions that affect substantive rights,\" because \nstatutes of limitations regulate secondary, and not primary conduct. Vernon, 49 F.3d. at 890-91. \nIn In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit \nheld that applying an extended statute of limitations retroactively created impermissible retroactive \neffects. Yet in that case, it was critical to the Court's analysis that—unlike here—the statute \nrevived claims that were previously time-barred. Id. at 410 (\"In our view, the resurrection of \npreviously time-barred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect.\"). \nIn Weingarten, the Second Circuit considered, but did not ultimately reach, the issue of \nwhether Section 3283 applies retroactively.16 In discussing the second step of Landgraf, the Court \nobserved: \"Courts have routinely recognized a difference between revoking a vested statute of \nlimitations defense and extending a filing period for live claims.\" Id. at 57 (collecting cases). \nMoreover, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the Second Circuit explained why extending an \nactive criminal statute of limitations does not offend any concept of fairness: \nCertainly it is one thing to revive a prosecution already dead, and \nanother to give it a longer lease of life. The question turns upon how \nmuch violence is done to our instinctive feelings of justice and fair \nplay. For the state to assure a man that he has beco\n... [truncated, 2295 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/59 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=59]", "char_count": 2295}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "pursuit, and thereafter to withdraw its assurance, seems to most of \nus unfair and dishonest. But, while the chase is on, it does not shock \nus to have it extended beyond the time first set, or, if it does, the \nstake forgives it. \nFaker v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1928). The distinction between statutes that \nrevive expired prosecutions and those that extend existing limitations periods has deep roots in \nestablished jurisprudence. It is well-settled that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits laws that revive \ntime-barred prosecutions, but permits laws that retroactively extend limitations periods. Stogner \nv. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632 (2003) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not \"prevent \nthe State from extending time limits for . . . prosecutions not yet time barred.\"); United States v. \nMorgan, 113 F.3d 1230, 1997 WL 268712, at *7 (2d Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion) (\"The long-\nstanding rule in this circuit is that Congress has the power to extend the period of limitations \nwithout running afoul of the ex post facto clause, provided the original period has not already \nrun.\") (citing Faker, 23 F.3d at 425-26). And other circuits have emphasized this distinction in \nthe context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. \nRead together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and \nFaker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable \nprosecutions. That is precisely what has occurred here, because the charges in the Indictment were \nstill timely when the 2003 amendment extended the limitations period. As a result, applying \nSection 3283 in this case does not create impermissible retroactive effects. Therefore, step two of \nLandgraf is satisfied, and Section 3283 applies retroactively. \nResisting this conclusion, the defendant asserts that, in the criminal context, Landgraf s \nsecond step provides protections beyond the Ex Post Facto C\n... [truncated, 2253 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/60 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=60]", "char_count": 2253}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "in the criminal context, much less in the context of criminal statutes of limitations, Landgraf \nforecloses prosecutions permitted by the Constitution. Maxwell instead cites dictum by a single \njudge in a non-criminal case that, \"pp' [he] were judging on a clean slate,\" he would read Landgraf \nto prohibit some retroactive application of statutes that, \"while not the equivalent of criminal ex \npost facto, nevertheless would run afoul of Landgraf s considerations, and that he \"expect[ed] \nthat the Supreme Court's future decisions\" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 \nF.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., \"[s]peaking only for [him]self'). That footnote is \ntoo slender a reed to support Maxwell's entire motion to dismiss the Indictment as untimely. \nMoreover, Maxwell has identified no case in the intervening seventeen years in which the Supreme \nCourt has embraced Judge Calabresi's view. See Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 631 (finding arguments \nrelating to Judge Calabresi's footnote unpersuasive, and concluding that Section 3283 applies \nretroactively under Landgraf). As Weingarten recognized, any court to hold that \"retroactively \nextending a filing period for live charges is a presumptively impermissible retroactive effect under \nLandgraf' will be the first to do so. 865 F.3d at 58. \nThe defendant also argues that \"criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted \nin favor of repose,\" relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. \n112, 115 (1970). Toussie considered whether a person's failure to register for the draft was a \ncontinuing offense subjecting him to prosecution eight years later, notwithstanding the five-year \nlimitations period in Section 3282. Id. at 114. In that context, the Court invoked a presumption \nin favor of repose when determining whether the underlying conduct was time-barred. But that \npresumption says nothing about whether Congress intended an extension of a statute of limita\n... [truncated, 2212 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/61 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=61]", "char_count": 2212}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "2017), and that case, which did not concern Section 3283, relied extensively on a pre-Landgraf \nopinion requiring a clear statement of congressional intent in favor of retroactivity. See id. at 655 \n(citing United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975)). That clear-statement rule is \ninconsistent with the analysis required by Landgraf step two. See Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 631 \n(rejecting an identical argument relying on Toussie and Gentile). \n*** \nThe defendant asks this Court to break new ground and become the first court to hold that \nSection 3283 applies only prospectively. The Court should reject this invitation. For the reasons \nset forth above, the weight of authority holds that Section 3283 applies retroactively, in keeping \nwith Congress's express intent to expand prosecutions of individuals who sexually exploit \nchildren. The Indictment is timely, and the motion should be denied. \nC. \nThe Defendant's Crimes Involved the Sexual Abuse of Minors \nThe defendant next argues that Section 3283 does not apply at all, and she asks the Court to \nconclude that the crimes of sexual abuse alleged in the Indictment did not involve sexual abuse. \nHer argument runs contrary to both the case law and common sense. Her motion is meritless and \nshould be denied. \nBy its terms, Section 3283 applies to any \"offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, \nor kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3283. As discussed above, when \nthe statute was first enacted, it was located at 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). The definition of the term \n\"sexual abuse\" is located in a neighboring provision within that same section: \nFor purposes of this section ... the term `sexual abuse' includes the \nemployment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion \nof a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually \nexplicit conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form \nof sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children. \n36\n... [truncated, 2015 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/62 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=62]", "char_count": 2015}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8). The term \"sexually explicit conduct\" is in turn defined to mean, among \nother things, \"sexual intercourse, including sexual contact\"; and the term \"sexual contact\" means \n\"the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, \ninner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse \nor gratify sexual desire of any person.\" Id. § 3509(a)(9)(A). Courts have looked to the definition \nof \"sexual abuse\" set forth in Section 3509(a) to determine whether the statute of limitations of \nSection 3283 applies to an offense. United States v. Carpenter, 680 F.3d 1101, 1103-04 (9th Cir. \n2012) (\"We join our sister circuits in looking to subsection 3509(a) for a definition of `sexual \nabuse' under federal law, and find it the appropriate definition to use in applying section 3283's \nextended statute of limitations.\"); United States v. Vickers, No. 13 Cr. 128 (RJA) (HKS), 2014 WL \n1838255, at ■10 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) (applying the definition of \"sexual abuse\" set forth in \nSection 3509(a)). \nAs is evident from its plain text, the definition of \"sexual abuse\" set forth in Section 3509(a) \nincludes not only actual \"sexual contact,\" but also the \"the employment, use, persuasion, \ninducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in,\" \nsexual contact. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a). The breadth of this definition is underscored by Congress's \nuse of the word \"includes.\" The Supreme Court has held that Congress's choice of the word \n\"includes\" is \"significant because it \"makes clear that the examples enumerated in the text are \nintended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.\" Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. \n142, 162 (2012) (citing Burgess v. United States, 552 U.S. 124, 131 n.3 (2008)). Thus, sexual \nabuse \"as defined here encompasses a wider set of behavior than just rape or other unwanted sexual \ntouching.\" United St\n... [truncated, 2193 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/63 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=63]", "char_count": 2193}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "sexual act between a defendant and a specific child,\" Vickers, 2014 WL 1838255, at *11, but \ninstead reaches offenses involving the transportation of minors to engage in illegal sexual activity. \nSee Sensi, 2010 WL 2351484, at *2-3 (collecting cases interpreting the term \"sexual abuse\" to \nencompass \"all crimes that would logically relate to the common understanding of sexual abuse \neven when found in chapters 110 (`Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children') and 117 \n(`Transportation of Illegal Sexual Activity and Related Crimes') of title 18\"); Schneider, 801 F.3d \nat 196-97 (holding that Section 3283 applied to defendant convicted of traveling with the purpose \nof engaging in sex with a minor victim, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)); Vickers, 2014 WL \n1838255, at *11-12 (holding that violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) were crimes involving sexual \nabuse under Section 3283). \nThe defendant's motion does not engage with these authorities at all. Instead, the defendant \nasks the Court to apply an \"essential ingredients\" test, relying heavily upon the Supreme Court's \ndecision in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), which concerned the Wartime \nSuspension of Limitations Act (\"WSLA\"). (Def. Mot. 2 at 12-14). But Bridges is inapposite, \nsince it concerned a statute \"[t]he legislative history of [which] emphasize[d] the propriety of its \nconservative interpretation\" and \"indicate[d] a purpose to suspend the general statute of limitations \nonly as to\" certain narrowly defined offenses. Bridges, 346 U.S. at 216. There is no corresponding \nindication that Congress intended the \"essential ingredients\" test to apply to Section 3283. As the \nThird Circuit has explained in rejecting an identical argument: \nWhile Bridges did adopt an \"essential ingredient\" test, the \nlimitations-extending statute at issue was a narrowly drafted \nexception specifically intended to target frauds related to war \nprocurement. Unlike the WSLA, § 3283 has no such restrictive \nlangu\n... [truncated, 2273 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/64 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=64]", "char_count": 2273}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Schneider, 801 F.3d at 197 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) \n(en bane)); see Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 n.I0 (distinguishing Bridges because the \"essential \ningredient\" test there \"effectuated Congress's specific intent to limit the WSLA's extended \nlimitations period to only a few offenses,\" while \"Congress had the opposite intention for Section \n3283\"); see also Vickers, 2014 WL 1838255, at *11-12 (\"[T]he defendant argues that the charged \noffense does not \"involve\" the sexual abuse of a child, as reflected in the elements of the offense. \nDefendant's argument is illogical and clearly misinterprets the use of the term `involving' in \nsection 3283.\"). \nAlthough the Second Circuit has not yet reached this issue, it examined this question in \nWeingarten v. United States, in the context of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. \nWeingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. Rejecting the claim, the Second Circuit observed that none of the \ncriteria for applying the categorical approach are met in the context of Section 3283. Id. The \ncategorical approach—which focuses on the elements of the offense-is generally only used in \nsettings like sentencing and immigration, where a court is asked to evaluate the conduct from a \nprior conviction. Id. at 59. In such a context, a court attempting to examine the facts of the prior \nconviction to determine the present punishment or immigration consequences would encounter \nlogistical and constitutional obstacles. Id. (noting an Apprendi problem and \"daunting practical \ndifficulties and potential unfairness\"). None of those concerns is present here, where the relevant \nfacts will be proved at trial. \nThe Weingarten court also specifically rejected the argument Maxwell now asserts: that \nthe words \"offense involving\" require a categorical approach. \"[T]hat Congress used the word \n`involving' in § 3283 does not necessarily mean it intended to trigger the categorical approach. \n'Involving' \n. is equally c\n... [truncated, 2086 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/65 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=65]", "char_count": 2086}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "(citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (applying the circumstances-specific approach \nto a statute containing the word \"involves\")). Moreover, as the Weingarten court observed, the \nSupreme Court has applied the categorical approach to statutes containing the word \"involving\" \nwhere the statutes at issue also referenced \"elements\" of offenses, or specific prior \"convictions,\" \nin a manner that referred to specific convictions, as opposed to particular offense conduct. 865 \nF.3d at 59 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 \n(2004)). By contrast, the phrase \"sexual abuse\" in Section 3283 refers to specific conduct, and not \nthe statutory offenses charged in the Indictment. \nIn Weingarten, the Second Circuit further noted that applying the categorical approach to \nSection 3283 would run contrary to Congress's intention to \"cast a wide net to ensnare as many \noffenses against children as possible.\" 865 F.3d at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196). On \nthis point, it bears emphasizing that the interpretation the defendant advances would lead to absurd \noutcomes, as many federal crimes involving the sexual abuse of minors do not contain, as an \nelement, a requirement that the defendant commit a sex act with a minor. It would run contrary to \nCongress's intent to interpret Section 3283 in a manner that would exclude many—if not most-\nsexual offenses against children. \nThe lone Section 3283 case the defendant cites, United States v. Countentos, 651 F.3d 809 \n(8th Cir. 2011), is easily distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the Eighth Circuit considered, \namong other issues, whether the crime of possessing child pornography involved sexual abuse \nwithin the meaning of Section 3283. Id. at 816-18. In analyzing that question, the court discussed, \namong a variety of factors, the elements of the crime. But it did not consider the categorical \napproach, or purport to apply an \"essential ingredients\" test, as the d\n... [truncated, 2138 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/66 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=66]", "char_count": 2138}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "possesses child pornography sexually abuse the child portrayed in the images?\" Id. at 817. This \ninquiry has no relevance here, as this case does not involve the possession of child pornography. \nThe crimes charged in the Indictment plainly involved the sexual abuse of minors. First, \nthe Indictment clearly alleges that the minor victims were subjected to actual, physical sexual \ncontact as part of the defendant's crimes. See Indictment at ¶¶ 4 (alleging that conduct toward \nminor victims involved sexual abuse), 5 (alleging that \"Epstein's resulting abuse of minor victims \nincluded, among other things, touching a victim's breast, touching a victim's genitals, placing a \nsex toy such as a vibrator on a victim's genitals, directing a victim to touch Epstein while he \nmasturbated, and directing a victim to touch Epstein's genitals.\"), 7 (describing patterns of sexual \nabuse). Moreover, the Indictment alleges that the defendant persuaded, induced, enticed, and \ntransported minors for purposes of engaging in criminal sexual activity, and that she conspired to \ndo the same. As discussed above, the offenses charged in the Indictment accordingly involved the \nsexual abuse of minors as defined in Section 3509(a) and incorporated into Section 3283. \nBecause the defendant's crimes involved sexual abuse, the expanded statute of limitations \nset forth in Section 3283 applies to the crimes charged in Counts One through Four of the \nIndictment and her motion should be denied. \nIII. \nThe Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Based on Alleged Improper Pre-\nTrial Delay Should Be Denied \nThe defendant contends that the Indictment should be dismissed because the Government's \ndelay in bringing the charges violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Def. Mot. \n7). The defendant has not and cannot successfully establish such a violation. First, the defendant \nhas not established that any alleged pre-indictment delay caused actual prejudice to the defense. \nHer specula\n... [truncated, 2205 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/67 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=67]", "char_count": 2205}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "even if the Court finds actual prejudice to the defense, the defendant has not established that the \nGovernment's purpose in any alleged pre-indictment delay was improper or designed to gain any \nsort of tactical advantage. The Government obtained an indictment charging the defendant on \nJune 29, 2020, less than two years after opening its investigation and less than a year after victims \nwith information critical to the pending charges came forward. The defendant thus cannot \nestablish an undue delay, much less a delay caused by the Government for an improper purpose. \nBecause the defendant cannot establish either element, let alone both, her due process claim \nis meritless and should be denied. \nA. \nThe Defendant Has Failed to Demonstrate Actual and Substantial Prejudice \n1. \nApplicable Law \nIt is well-settled that the statute of limitations is \"the primary guarantee against bringing \noverly stale criminal charges.\" United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (internal \nquotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, when a case has been brought within the statute of \nlimitations, it is \"only rarely dismissed,\" and carries a \"strong presumption of validity.\" United \nStates v. ConiesIle, 171 F.3d 748, 752 (2d Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d \n688, 694 (2d Cir. 1982). \nThe Second Circuit standard for pit-indictment delay is clear, and it imposes a heavy \nburden on the defendant to show that: (i) \"he suffered actual prejudice because of the alleged pre-\nindictment delay,\" and (ii) \"that such delay was a course intentionally pursued by the government \nfor an improper purpose.\" Conzielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (citations omitted). The burden for proving \nboth prongs of the standard rests squarely on the defendant. United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.3d \n993, 1014 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 66 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. \nRicco, 549 F.2d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 1977). The burden is so heavy that it is rarely met by a defendant. \n4\n... [truncated, 2016 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/68 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=68]", "char_count": 2016}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "See DeMichele v. Greenburgh Centr. Sch. Dist No. 7, 167 F.3d 784, 790-91 (2d Cir. 1999) \n(\"[W]hile the [Supreme] Court may not have shut the door firmly on a contention that at some \npoint the Due Process Clause forecloses prosecution of a claim because it is too old, at most the \ndoor is barely ajar.\"). \nSubstantial prejudice is just that—substantial, actual, non-speculative prejudice. See \nUnited States v. Birney, 686 F.2d 102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1982) (a defendant's \"proof of prejudice \nmust be definite and not speculative\"); see also United States v. Henderson, 337 F.3d 914, 920 \n(7th Cir. 2003) (prejudice sufficient to warrant dismissal for pre-indictment delay must be \"actual \nand substantial\" and \"specific, concrete, and supported by evidence\"). Prejudice in this context \nrefers to \"actual prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial.\" United States v. Elsbety, 602 \nF.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1979). The mere loss of witnesses or evidence, without more, is \ninsufficient. Claims of loss of memory resulting from the passage of time have been held to be \ninsufficient to warrant dismissal of an indictment on due process grounds. See United States v. \nWright, 343 F.3d 849, 860 (6th Cir. 2003); Henderson, 337 F.3d at 919-20. Moreover, even when \na claim of prejudice is based upon the complete loss of a witness's testimony or other evidence, a \ndefendant nevertheless must show how that testimony or evidence would have affected the \noutcome or otherwise have assisted the case. See United States v. Gilbert, 266 F.3d 1180, 1187 \n(9th Cir. 2001) (defendant's pre-indictment delay claim rejected due to failure to show \"how the \ntestimony from [three absent] witnesses would have benefitted his case\"); United States v. Spears, \n159 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1999) (\"[A] defendant must do more than show that a particular \nwitness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have helped the defense. He must \nalso show that the witness would have testified, withstood cr\n... [truncated, 2153 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/69 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=69]", "char_count": 2153}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "also has the burden of showing that the lost testimony or information was not available through \nother means.'\" Pieire-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *4 (quoting United States v. Sprouts, 282 F.3d \n1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002)). \nThe vast majority of pre-indictment delay cases fail on the first prong. See, e.g., Marion, \n404 U.S. at 324-25 (fading witness memories insufficient; \"no one suggests that every delay-\ncaused detriment to a defendant's case should abort a criminal prosecution\"); United States v. \nSnyder, 668 F.2d 686, 689 (2d Cir. 1982) (death of a defense witness three years before indictment \ninsufficient prejudice); United States v. lannelli, 461 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1972) (unavailability \nof witnesses insufficient prejudice); United States v. King, 560 F.2d 122, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1977) \n(death of witness and missing documents insufficient prejudice); Pieire-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, \nat *4-5 (death of a defense witness and defendant's own memory issues insufficient prejudice). \n2. \nDiscussion \nThe defendant points to at least four ways in which she claims the passage of time \nprejudiced her defense, but none of her hypothetical claims of prejudice withstand scrutiny. In \nparticular, she contends that, as a result of the passage of time, four witnesses have died, unnamed \nEpstein employees have been \"lost,\" unspecified witnesses now have \"failed or corrupted\" \nmemories, and records have been lost or destroyed. She further contends that these collectively \ndemonstrate actual prejudice. (Def. Mot. 7 at 8-14). None has merit, individually or collectively. \nWith respect to the first three arguments, the fact that certain witnesses cannot testify \nbecause of their deaths or failed memories does not compel a finding of actual prejudice. \"Faded \nmemories or unavailable witnesses are inherent in any delay, even if justifiable. To merit dismissal \na defendant must demonstrate a substantial, actual prejudice to his ability to defend himself.\" \n44 \nEFTA00039491\n", "char_count": 1990}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "United States v. Long, 697 F. Supp. 651, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The defendant has not made such \na showing. Her speculative assertions simply do not rise to that level. \nThe defendant first claims she has suffered substantial prejudice as a result of pre-\nindictment delay due to the unavailability of Jeffrey Epstein, Epstein's mother, Michael Casey (the \nalleged agent of Minor Victim-1), and Palm Beach Police Department Detective Joseph Recarey. \nShe contends that the loss of Epstein demonstrates actual prejudice because Epstein \"would have\" \ntestified that the defendant did not engage in the criminal activity with which she is charged. (Def. \nMot. 7 at 8). That assertion is speculative at best, and the law is clear that \"proof of prejudice must \nbe definite and not speculative.\" Birney, 686 F.2d at 105-06; see also Long, 697 F. Supp. at 657 \n(finding that \"perceived prejudice is speculative\" where there was \"no way of knowing what [the \nunavailable witness's] testimony would have been\"). To credit Maxwell's argument is to assume \nthat Epstein, after being indicted with federal sex trafficking charges, would have taken the stand, \nwould not have invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, and would have provided testimony that \nexculpated Maxwell, which a jury would have credited in the face of contradictory trial evidence. \nThis is an exercise in chain upon chain of conjecture that comes nowhere close to meeting the \nburden of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Spears, 159 F.3d at 1085 (\"[A] defendant must do \nmore than show that a particular witness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have \nhelped the defense. He must also show that the witness would have testified, withstood cross-\nexamination, and that the jury would have found the witness credible.\" (citations omitted)); see \nalso United States v. Valona, 834 F.2d 1334, 1339 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that prejudice analysis \nmust consider whether the missing witness \"would have withstood cross-examination\n... [truncated, 2221 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/71 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=71]", "char_count": 2221}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "omitted)). The defendant has not and cannot establish that Epstein would have been available to \ntestify in the first instance, much less that he would have voluntarily agreed to testify at her trial \nin a way that would help, rather than hurt, the defendant. \nAs to Epstein's mother, who died in April 2004, the defendant contends that she \"would \nhave testified that she did not observe Ms. Maxwell with any Accusers between 1994 and 1997.\" \n(Def. Mot. 7 at 9). \"Counsel's unworn assertions as to vague generalities\" that witnesses, \"if \nalive, would give testimony helpful to [the defendant] do not show that [the defendant's] ability to \npresent a defense has been substantially and actually prejudiced.\" United States v. Scala, 388 F. \nSupp. 2d 396, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Here, \"there is no evidence before the Court as to what \n[the deceased witness] would have testified, much less specific evidence of how losing that \ntestimony has caused [the defendant] actual prejudice.\" Id. at 400. Further, unless Epstein's \nmother was with the defendant \"every moment\" between 1994 and 1997, \"it would be impossible \nfor [her] to testify that [the] defendant did not commit the charged crimes, so whatever helpful \ntestimony [she] might have offered (the details of which are sparse in the motion) would be easily \nundermined on cross-examination.\" Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at '4 (citing Spears, 159 \nF.3d at 1081-1085). Moreover, Epstein's mother died \"sufficiently prior to `any realistic trial \ndate,' to make it improbable that any prejudice it may have caused [the defendant] was the result \nof government delay.\" United States v. Cheung Kin Ping, 555 F.2d 1069, 1073 (2d Cir. 1977) \n(quoting United States v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844, 848 (2d Cir. 1972)). Indeed, Epstein's mother passed \naway before the Palm Beach Police Department even began investigating Epstein in 2005. (Def. \nMot. 7, Ex. D at i). \nThe defendant's claims relating to Michael Casey and Detective Recarey fare no better. \n... [truncated, 2113 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/72 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=72]", "char_count": 2113}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "2018 respectively, would have testified, and that such testimony would have been exculpatory and \nwould have materially helped the defense. (Def. Mot. 7 at 9-11). The defendant cannot establish \nthat Casey and Detective Recarey would have testified in a way that would help, rather than hurt, \nthe defendant. \nIn particular, the defendant contends that Michael Casey, the purported agent of Minor \nVictim-1, \"would be able to testify\" about Minor Victim-I's behavior during the \"relevant time \nperiod\" and the \"lack of any 'outcry' or `grooming.'\" (Id. at 10). The defense suggests that Casey \nnot having related any complaints about Maxwell to \"any authority, Ms. Maxwell, or any other \nknown witness\" means that he knew of no complaints. (Id. at 9-10). As an initial matter, \"there \nis no evidence before the Court as to what [Casey] would have testified.\" Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d \nat 400. Even assuming that Casey would have testified as the defendant now contends, such \ntestimony (which would be purely speculative and unsubstantiated) would also have no bearing \non whether the abuse, in fact, occurred. \nThe defendant argues that Detective Recarey would have testified that none of the \nwitnesses with whom he spoke in connection with a prior investigation told him about the \ndefendant participating in sex trafficking activities. (Def. Mot. 7 at 10-11). As a threshold matter, \nthe defendant has not established how such testimony, which would consist entirely of hearsay, \ncould even be admissible at the defendant's trial. Moreover, the fact that Epstein may have abused \nvictims without the defendant's participation is not exculpatory as to charges alleging the \ndefendant assisted in the grooming and abuse of other victims. The well-established law of this \nCircuit generally precludes a defendant from offering evidence that a defendant did not participate \nin criminal conduct on a particular occasion—or of her law-abiding conduct during uncharged \nperiods or uncharged events—to reb\n... [truncated, 2075 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/73 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=73]", "char_count": 2075}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "crimes or events. See, e.g., United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) (\"A defendant \nmay not seek to establish h[er] innocence . . . through proof of the absence of criminal acts on \nspecific occasions.\"); United States v. Chambers, 800 F. App'x 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2020) (\"A single \noccurrence of lawful conduct is `simply irrelevant' to other occurrences of lawful conduct.\" \n(quoting United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 1999)); United States v. Williams, \n205 F.3d 23, 34 (2d Cir. 2000) (\"We reject Williams's assertion that the evidence of innocent \ntravel was necessary to rebut the government's allegation that Williams had been involved in other \ncocaine importations from Jamaica. Although the government did argue that Williams had been \ninvolved in other importations, it did not allege that Williams had engaged in drug activity during \nthese particular trips.\"); United States v. Fiwnano, No. 14 Cr. 518 (JFK), 2016 WL 1629356, at \n*7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2016) (\"The principle is rather elementary. A defendant charged with \nrobbing a bank in Manhattan on April 22 cannot offer as evidence to disprove the charged crime \nthat he did not rob the bank's branches in Brooklyn or the Bronx on April 22 or that he did not rob \nthe Manhattan branch on April 20, 21, 23, and 24, because this evidence is irrelevant to the charge \nthat he robbed the Manhattan bank on April 22.\"); United States v. Gambino, 838 F. Supp. 744, \n748 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). \nInadmissibility aside, the Indictment specifically charges conduct between 1994 and 1997. \nThat a different investigative team focused on Epstein's conduct in the early 2000s may not have \nuncovered evidence about the defendant's conduct in the 1990s has no bearing on the charges in \nthis case, which was brought entirely independent of the prior SDFL investigation. Moreover, and \nas detailed further below, two of the victims referenced in the Indictment, Minor Victim-1 and \nMinor Victim-3, were never interviewed by t\n... [truncated, 2156 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/74 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=74]", "char_count": 2156}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "death.\" As such, it is neither surprising nor terribly probative of any issue in dispute in this case \nthat Detective Recarey might have testified to a lack of knowledge as to what the victims identified \nin this Indictment have told the USAO-SDNY. In sum, the defendant has not put \"specific \nevidence\" before this Court demonstrating that the loss of Detective Recarey's testimony, even if \nadmissible, has caused her actual prejudice. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 400. \nThe defendant next contends that had the Government brought the charges earlier, she \nwould have interviewed and subpoenaed as witnesses \"the many Epstein employees that were \npresent at the different locations during that three-year period.\" (Def. Mot. 7 at 11). She does not \nspecify which employees she would have called as witnesses, the grounds for contending they are \n\"lost\" or \"missing,\" whether they would have been willing to testify, or what admissible evidence \nthey would have provided. She merely speculates that the evidence could have helped her defense. \nThis is far from the definite proof of prejudice required to state a due process claim. See United \nStates v. Greer, 956 F. Supp. 525, 528 (D. Vt. 1997) (\"In the context of unavailable witnesses, the \ndefendant must offer some grounds for his belief that the absent witness would have helped his \ncase in a material way.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). \nThe defendant also argues that \"[m]any potential witnesses have been contacted in relation \nto this matter and other related litigations,\" noting that \"[s]ignificant numbers of potential \nwitnesses no longer remember when events may have occurred\" or \"who was present.\" (Def. Mot. \n7 at 12). Dimming or fading memories over the passage of time are not in themselves sufficient \nto \"demonstrate that [defendants] cannot receive a fair trial\" or \"justify the dismissal of the \nindictment.\" Marion, 404 U.S. at 326; Elsbery, 602 F.2d at 1059. Indeed, the fact that the defense \ndescribed \n... [truncated, 2289 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/75 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=75]", "char_count": 2289}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "to the extent the passage of time affects the memories of witnesses who testify at trial, the \ndefendant will have an opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses. See United States v. \nHarrison, 764 F. Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that \"the passage of time does affect \nwitnesses' memories and it may be relevant to the credibility of their testimony\" and that the \nGovernment also faces potential harms from the passage of time).18 Accordingly, the defendant's \nbald assertions regarding diminished memories of potential witnesses are speculative and, thus, \nfall short of the proof of actual prejudice required by the Supreme Court's standard in Marion. \nThe defendant also claims that because of the delay in the prosecution, she does not have \naccess to certain exculpatory documentary evidence. (Def. Mot. 7 at 12-14). Once again, this \nargument is entirely speculative. The defendant hypothesizes that if she had access to certain \ndocumentary evidence (some of which, such as travel records, has been produced in discovery), \nor evidence which she herself should have access to (e.g., her own emails from 1994 to 1997, her \nown phone records from 1994 to 1997, and her own travel records from 1994 to 1997), this \nevidence would have helped her. She offers no proof or basis for concluding that the records \nwould be helpful. Even if such records were helpful, dismissal of the Indictment would be too \nextreme a measure in light of the relative significance of this form of evidence to other proof in \nthe case. Thus, the defendant's claim that she no longer has access to certain evidence is not a \nproper basis to dismiss the Indictment. See United States v. Donau, 356 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 \n(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (\"A bare allegation that records have been lost or destroyed, which might relate \nIg The Government notes that it faces the same potential harms from the passage of time as does \nany party, including loss of witnesses through death or disappearance, diminishment of memories \n... [truncated, 2474 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/76 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=76]", "char_count": 2474}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "to the instant prosecution, is insufficient to show actual prejudice. .. . The fact that evidence may \nbe lost or destroyed during the pre-indictment stage is inherent in any delay, no matter what the \nduration. Furthermore, there has been no allegation in this case that the destruction of the records \nwas deliberate on the part of either the government or trustee.\" (internal citations omitted)). \nLastly, the defendant contends that prejudicial media reporting and inappropriate pm-trial \npublicity from at least 2011 through the present has resulted in prejudice to the defendant. (Def. \nMot. at 14). She claims that had the Government brought charges against her between 1996 and \n2011, the Government \"would have not prevailed,\" noting that the defendant's accusers would not \nhave been \"able to conform their `memories' to the often republished 'obvious lies.'\" (Id. at 15). \nThis argument, like the others contained in this motion, is steeped in speculation. The defendant \ncites not one case in support of her argument that pre-trial publicity can ever establish actual \nprejudice, nor does she point to any evidence that the Government fomented such publicity dating \nback to 2011. To the extent the defendant is concerned about pretrial publicity, she will have the \nopportunity to propose an appropriate examination of potential jurors during voir dire to identify \na panel of impartial jurors who have not been prejudiced by any publicity this case may have \ngarnered. \nIn short, the defendant's complaints are nothing more than the type of self-serving, vague, \nspeculative, and conclusory claims of prejudice that courts have consistently rejected as \ninsufficient to warrant dismissal of charges based upon pm-indictment delay.19 The motion should \ntherefore be denied. \n19 The defendant also complains about the Government's failure to \"provide discovery adequate \nto fully investigate the extent of the prejudice to Ms. Maxwell.\" (Def. Mot. 7 at 7). Among the \nitems the defense co\n... [truncated, 2391 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/77 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=77]", "char_count": 2391}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "B. \nThe Defendant Has Failed to Establish That the Government Delayed the \nIndictment for An Improper Purpose \n1. \nApplicable Law \nIf, and only if, a defendant has established significant, actual prejudice does the inquiry \nturn to the reason for the delay.20 See, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *5 (\"Because \nDefendant failed to show prejudice, the Court need not even address the second prong.\"). The \nreason for delay violates due process only if it is so extreme that it departs from fundamental \nnotions of \"fair play.\"' United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 795 (1977). The Supreme Court \nhas \"defined the category of infractions that violate `fundamental fairness' very narrowly,\" \nDowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990), and the Supreme Court has \"stressed the \nimportance for constitutional purposes of good or bad faith on the part of the Government when \nthe claim is based on loss of evidence attributable to the Government,\" Arizona v. Youngblood, \n488 U.S. 51, 57 (1988). \n16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides ample information about the \ncharged crimes and the victims referenced in the Indictment. \nAdditionally, many of the \ndefendant's requests fall within the scope of the Government's Giglio and Jencks Act obligations, \nwhich the Government intends to produce at the appropriate stage in the litigation, well in advance \nof trial. \n20 The defendant invites the Court to engage in a balancing test that weighs the prejudice to the \ndefendant against the Government's reasons for delay. (Def. Mot. 7 at 5, 6 n.4). This Court should \nreject the defendant's invitation. The defendant cites United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312, 1317 \nn.7 (5th Cir. 1977), for the proposition that a showing of prejudice triggers such balancing. (Def. \nMot. 7 at 5). However, the Fifth Circuit subsequently rejected such a balancing test, finding that \nthe \"Brand footnote is pure dicta\" and instead requiring that defendants demonstrate that the \npros\n... [truncated, 2748 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/78 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=78]", "char_count": 2748}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "The Second Circuit has clearly held that a defendant seeking the dismissal of an indictment \nfiled within the statute of limitations must establish that the Government acted intentionally, \ndeliberately, or with some strategy, and that the Government used that delay to gain a tactical \nadvantage over the defendant. See, e.g., Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (delay must be \"intentional \ndevice to gain [a] tactical advantage over the accused\"); see also United States v. Alameh, 341 \nF.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2003) (\"To show unjustifiable conduct, a defendant must demonstrate that \nthe government has intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical advantage.\"); see also United \nStates v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"Delacruz's motion to dismiss \nwould nevertheless fail for the independent reason that he has not made any showing that the \npreindictment delay was an intentional device designed by the Government to gain a tactical \nadvantage.\"); United States v. Martinez, No. 94 Cr. 219 (RPP), 1995 WL 10849, at ■4 (S.D.N.Y. \nJan. 12, 1995) (\"In order to establish improper delay by the Government in filing an indictment, a \ndefendant must show that the delay was the result of an intentional device of the Government to \ngain tactical advantage over the accused.\" (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing \nUnited States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1987))). Indeed, some version of the phrase \n\"deliberate device\" and \"tactical advantage\" is found in nearly every Second Circuit decision on \nthe issue. See, e.g., Alameh, 341 F.3d at 176 (\"intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical \nadvantage\"); Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (requiring \"intentional device\" to gain \"tactical \nadvantage\"); Lawson, 683 F.2d at 694 (delay not \"engineered by the government for an improper \npurpose, such as gaining a tactical advantage\"); Snyder, 668 F.2d at 689; United States v. Watson, \n599 F.2d 1149, 1157 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Tanu, 589 F.2d \n... [truncated, 2168 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/79 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=79]", "char_count": 2168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "2. \nDiscussion \nEven if the defendant could establish any actual prejudice—which she cannot—such \nprejudice would be \"necessary but not sufficient\" to establish a due process claim. Lovasco, 431 \nU.S. at 790. The defendant's motion fails because she has not demonstrated the other necessary \nelement to prevail: that the claimed delay by the Government was intentional and deliberate to \ngain a strategic advantage. Here, as in Lovasco, any pre-indictment delay was the result of the \nGovernment's continuing investigation of the case. The Lovasco Court held that the investigative \ndelay did not deprive the defendant of his due process rights and noted that imposing a duty upon \nprosecutors to file charges as soon as probable cause exists \"'would have a deleterious effect both \nupon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself.\"' Id. at 791 (quoting \nUnited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)). \nThe same is true in the present case. The defendant has not shown—and cannot show—\nthat the Government caused any pre-indictment delay in this case to gain a tactical advantage. The \ndefendant argues that \"[t]actical, reckless, and bad faith motives can reasonably be inferred from \nthe way the government has ignored evidence, delayed any prosecution, enlisted partisan lawyers \nto do its bidding, circumvented established precedent to illegally obtain evidence, and \nmisleadingly quoting banal testimony so that it could be labeled `perjury.\"' (Def. Mot. 7 at 15). \nBut rhetoric aside, the defendant offers nothing beyond baseless speculation in support of her \nclaims. \nThe defendant claims a twenty-six-year delay on the part of the Government in bringing \nCounts One through Four and a four-year delay as to Counts Five and Six. (Def. Mot. 7 at 4). \nThat is not so. The USAO-SDNY opened its investigation into Epstein and his co-conspirators in \nlate November 2018. See Section IV, infra. Epstein was charged by indictment on July 2, 2019. \nThereafter, th\n... [truncated, 2100 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/80 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=80]", "char_count": 2100}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "(Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim-3) for the first time. In particular, Minor Victim-1 first agreed \nto be interviewed in September 2019, and Minor Victim-3 first agreed to be interviewed in August \n2019.21 The Government conducted multiple additional interviews of both victims, as well as other \nwitnesses, and took additional investigative steps over the next several months before it was \nprepared to seek an indictment charging the defendant. Those two victims were critical to the \ninvestigation, as they helped form the basis of the charges in the Indictment, which the Government \nsought on June 29, 2020, less than a year after the victims came forward. That period of time—\nand, in particular, less than one year between when key victims came forward and the Indictment \nwas obtained—cannot possibly give rise to a colorable due process violation.11 See Cheung Kin \nPing, 555 F.2d at 1072 (finding that \"the government is not responsible for a period of delay during \nwhich an important witness is unavailable to it\" and describing the delay as the period between the \nwitness's cooperation and the date of indictment); United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 961 \n(2d Cir. 1976) (\"If there was any intentional delay in returning the instant indictment, it was due \nin significant measure to the refusal of critical witnesses until 1973 to reveal what they knew.\"). \nCf. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796 (\"Rather than deviating from elementary standards of fair play and \ndecency, a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek indictments until he is completely \n21 While the Government is proffering these facts for purposes of this Motion, the underlying \ninformation, which is contained in the FBI 302 reports of interviews with the victims, will be \nproduced to the defense as 3500 material in advance of trial. \nn In this respect, the Government notes that significant aspects of the defendant's argument rest \non a faulty premise: i.e., that the Government could have indicted the defenda\n... [truncated, 2725 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/81 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=81]", "char_count": 2725}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "satisfied that he should prosecute and will be able promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable \ndoubt.\" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). \nMoreover, even if the Court were to determine that a twenty-six-year period of delay were \napplicable here, the defendant's motion should be dismissed because she failed to show that the \nGovernment acted improperly to obtain a tactical advantage. See, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL \n4043140 (denying motion to dismiss for pre-indictment delay as to conduct charged in 2016 \ninvolving sexual abuse of minors from 1998 to 2007 as defendant failed to satisfy both prongs of \npre-indictment delay standard); United States v. Burke, No. 09 Cr. 135 (SO, 2011 WL 2609837, \nat *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss indictment based on thirty-year pre-\nindictment delay because even if unavailability of alibi witnesses were prejudicial, defendant failed \nto show that government delayed for its own benefit); United States v. Carbonaro, No. 02 Cr. 743 \n(RCC), 2004 WL 2222145 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2004) (in a racketeering conspiracy case in which \na 14-year-old murder was alleged as a predicate act, finding that, even assuming defendant had \nshown actual prejudice, defendant's motion to dismiss based on pre-indictment delay failed \nbecause defendant supplied no evidence that government's conduct was for an improper purpose). \nThe defendant claims that the Government intentionally delayed the indictment in this case \nwith a prescient view towards capitalizing on civil litigation. For instance, Maxwell asserts that it \n\"has been advantageous to the government to have aggressive lawyers collecting information from \nMs. Maxwell as part of civil discovery and disseminating that information to the public, as part of \nan ongoing campaign to vilify Ms. Maxwell.\" (Def. Mot. 7 at 16). She again cites the subpoena \nthe Government issued to Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP (\"Boles Schiller\") to obtain materials \nfrom the Giuffre ci\n... [truncated, 2193 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/82 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=82]", "char_count": 2193}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "process, the inference that the defendant urges this Court to draw—that the Government delayed \nseeking an indictment to gain a tactical advantage and did so through strategy in the pending civil \nlitigation—is both unsupported by the record and illogical. \nThe defendant makes much of the Government having moved to intervene and stay the \nproceedings in Doe v. Indyke, No. 20 Civ. 484 (JGK), while the Government has not moved to \nstay Giuf•e v. Maxwell. (Def. Mot. 7 at 16-19). She suggests that there is some \"sharp contrast\" \nbetween the Government's actions in the various civil matters, which \"establish a strong inference \nthat as long as the government stood to gain a tactical advantage by delaying the indictment .. ., it \nwould not move to intervene.\" (Id. at 19). Setting the defendant's conspiracy theories aside, the \ncivil matters were in completely different procedural postures, which implicate different concerns \nregarding a pending criminal case. The Giuffre v. Maxwell litigation was settled and complete \nwell before the Government even opened its investigation in this case. By contrast, the Doe v. \nIndyke case was initiated after the Government opened its investigation and remained ongoing \nafter the Indictment in this case was filed.23 The defendant quotes the Government's letter to Judge \nFreeman requesting permission to intervene and stay Doe v. Indyke (see id.), but omits the portion \nof that letter in which the Government explained that, as far as it was aware, Doe v. Indyke was \nthe \"lone case in this District that has not yet been either resolved or stayed at this point. . . In \n23 In particular, Giuffre v. Maxwell was resolved in 2017 and the determination of what material \nshould remain sealed remains the only open issue. Accordingly, there is no more discovery to be \nconducted in the Giuffre case and no possible concern to the Government that, for example, its \ntrial witnesses in the criminal case might be deposed in that civil case. In Doe v. Indy\n... [truncated, 2682 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/83 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=83]", "char_count": 2682}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "particular, this matter appears to be the only remaining active civil case in this District in which \nclaims against Ghislaine Maxwell have been asserted.\" (20 Civ. 484 (DCF) (JGK), Dkt. No. 80 \nat 2). The defendant's baseless conjecture about the Government's supposedly nefarious reasons \nfor delaying her prosecution are not sufficient to support a dismissal of the Indictment. The \ndefendant ignores the fact that cases such as this one take time to investigate and indict. \nThe defendant also suggests that the Government engaged in reckless disregard of \ncircumstances that would likely impede her ability to mount an effective defense. (Def. Mot. 7 at \n5-6, 15). As an initial matter, this argument falls short of \"a standard that requires a showing of \nintentionality.\" United States v. Wey, No. 15 Cr. 611 (AJN), 2017 WL 237651, at *13 n.8 \n(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2017).24 \nWhile this Court in Wey did not foreclose the possibility of \nrecklessness sufficing under certain circumstances, much as in Wey, \"the instant case does not \nrequire this Court to pass on the issue,\" id., because there is no evidence of recklessness in this \ncase. To the contrary, as detailed above, the Government acted promptly in bringing criminal \ncharges shortly after two key victims whose testimony helped give rise to those charges first agreed \nto speak with law enforcement. Baseless speculation aside, the defendant offers no argument or \nevidence as to how or why the Government acted recklessly here. \nIn sum, not only does the defendant fail to demonstrate actual, non-speculative prejudice \nowing to pre-indictment delay, but she also fails to establish that the Government intentionally \n24 This Court has noted \"some disagreement among the district courts in this Circuit as to whether \nreckless—as opposed to intentional—disregard of circumstances . . . may support a due process \nchallenge based on pre-indictment delay,\" but concluded that \"the pertinent decisions [], on \nbalance, more plainly compo\n... [truncated, 2518 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/84 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=84]", "char_count": 2518}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "manufactured any alleged delay to gain a tactical advantage over her. She has \"offered no credible \nevidence to suggest that the Government tarried in bringing charges against [her] solely to gain \nsome prosecutorial advantage.\" Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *5. As such, because the \ndefendant cannot meet her \"heavy burden\" of showing both actual prejudice and unjustifiable \nGovernment conduct, her motion to dismiss the Indictment for pre-indictment delay should be \ndenied.25\nIV. \nThe Court Should Deny the Defendant's Motions to Suppress \nThe defendant moves to suppress evidence the Government obtained pursuant to a grand \njury subpoena issued to Boies Schiller and to dismiss Counts Five and Six under the Due Process \nClause, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Second Circuit's decision in \nMartindell v. Intl Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979). (Def. Mots. 3 & 11). In \nparticular, the defendant contends that the Government violated the Second Circuit's decision in \nMartindell and misled Chief Judge McMahon in obtaining the modification of a protective order. \nShe also contends the subpoena was overly broad and amounted to an unlawful search of materials \nin which she had a reasonable expectation of privacy, as well as an infringement of her privilege \nagainst self-incrimination. Although the defendant styles her request for relief as two separate \n25 The defendant asks the Court for leave to supplement her motion \"after the government provides \nher with meaningful discovery\" and notes that \"after the disclosure of meaningful discovery, [she] \nmay request that the Court defer ruling on this motion until after any trial if the indictment has not \nbeen dismissed on other grounds.\" (Def. Mot. 7 at 1). As noted above and discussed further in \nSection X, infra, the Government has complied with its Rule 16 obligations and will produce \nGiglio and Jencks Act materials well in advance of trial. The Court should reject the defendant's \ninvitat\n... [truncated, 2530 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/85 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=85]", "char_count": 2530}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "motions, the suppression motions overlap in fact and argument, and accordingly, the Government \nresponds to both motions in this section. \nAs set forth herein, the defendant's suppression motions challenging a judicially approved \ngrand jury subpoena should be denied without a hearing for multiple reasons. As an initial matter, \nthe defendant's claim that the Government \"circumvented\" Martindell fails because the \nGovernment issued a valid grand jury subpoena, sought judicial authorization to permit \ncompliance with the subpoena, and obtained materials from Boies Schiller that otherwise would \nhave been covered by the relevant protective order only after receiving such authorization. In any \nevent, even if the Government's motion did not satisfy Martindell, Martindell provides no basis \nto suppress evidence, and the defendant cites no authority in support of that request. Second, the \ndefendant's claim that the subpoena was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth \nAmendment fails because she has not established standing to challenge a judicially approved grand \njury subpoena issued to a third party, and because the subpoena was entirely lawful. Even if she \nhad standing, her claim still fails because suppression would be improper under the good faith \nexception and the inevitable discovery doctrine. Third, the defendant's claim that the subpoena \nviolated her Fifth Amendment rights fails because, among other things, such a violation requires \ncoercion and state action. Fourth, the defendant's claim that the Government violated the Due \nProcess Clause is meritless, as the Government's conduct was not, by any reasonable definition, \noutrageous or conscience shocking. And finally, the defendant's request for a hearing should be \ndenied because she has proffered no admissible evidence to support her accusations of Government \nmisconduct; instead, she relies entirely on an anonymously sourced article that, as detailed herein, \nshe cites to describe certain events\n... [truncated, 2114 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/86 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=86]", "char_count": 2114}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "A. \nFactual Background \nThe defendant's motion is, at its core, premised on a false factual narrative. The defendant \nalleges, based on a New York Daily News article, that Boies Schiller and the Government colluded \nstarting in at least early 2016 with the \"precise[] design[]\" of having the defendant \"charged with \nperjury.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 10). In particular, she claims that Boies Schiller met with the \nGovernment in February 2016, urged the Government to open an investigation of Epstein and \nMaxwell, told the Government what was in its files, and met with the Government again in the \nsummer of 2016 to ask if it would consider charging the defendant with perjury after her two \ndepositions. (Id. at 2, 8). \nThat is not so. While a now former Assistant United States Attorney (\"AUSA-1\") met \nwith a lawyer from Boies Schiller and two other attorneys about Epstein in February 2016, that \nmeeting was not focused on the defendant, and AUSA-1 did not participate in a second meeting \nwith those attorneys. Moreover, that February 2016 meeting pre-dated the depositions that gave \nrise to the perjury counts in the Indictment, which itself was obtained more than four years \nthereafter.26 The Indictment was instead the product of an investigation that was not opened until \nlate 2018 and that had nothing to do with a meeting that had taken place nearly three years earlier \nwith an AUSA who played no part in the decision to open the 2018 investigation and similarly \nplayed no part in the 2018 investigation itself. \n1. \nThe Civil Lawsuit against Maxwell \nIn or about September 2015, Giuffre, represented by Boies Schiller, filed a civil defamation \nlawsuit against Maxwell in the Southern District of New York. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. \n26 While, as discussed herein, the Government has uncovered evidence of a phone call from one \nof the attorneys, Stan Pottinger, to AUSA-1 in early May 2016, AUSA-1 has no specific memory \nof that call, nor did AUSA-1 provide any notes or records of\n... [truncated, 2080 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/87 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=87]", "char_count": 2080}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "No. 1). In short, Giuffre alleged that Maxwell had defamed her when Maxwell stated that Giuffre \nwas not the victim of sex crimes perpetrated by Epstein and Maxwell. Giuffre alleged that \nMaxwell had made those false statements for the \"malicious purpose of further damaging a sexual \nabuse and sexual trafficking victim; to destroy Giuffre's reputation and credibility; to cause the \nworld to disbelieve Giuffre; and to destroy Giuffre's efforts to use her experience to help others \nsuffering as sex trafficking victims.\" (Id. at 8). \n2. \nFebruary 2016 Meeting \nAttorney Peter Skinner of Boies Schiller contacted AUSA-1, who was at that time the \nHuman Trafficking and Project Safe Childhood Coordinator of the USAO-SDNY, to request an \nopportunity for him and other attorneys to meet with AUSA-1 to present on a potential case. (See \nEx. 4 at 1).22 AUSA-1 agreed to the meeting, and on or about February 29, 2016, AUSA-1 met \nwith three attorneys—Peter Skinner of Boies Schiller, Brad Edwards, and Stan Pottinger—\nregarding Jeffrey Epstein. (See Ex. 4 at 1). Edwards and Pottinger were also attorneys for Virginia \nRoberts Giuffre, who had alleged that she is a victim of sex crimes perpetrated by Epstein and \nMaxwell.28 (Ex. 5 at 1).29\nAt the meeting, Edwards provided AUSA-1 with details about, among other things, the \nUSAO-SDFL's prior investigation of Epstein, as well as Giuffre's personal history and experience \nwith Epstein. (See Ex. 5). The focus of the meeting was on Epstein, and AUSA-1 understood that \nthe attorneys were advocating that the USAO-SDNY open an investigation into Epstein. (See Ex. \n22 On February 11, 2021, to help gather facts relevant to the reporting contained in the New York \nDaily News article, the USAO-SDNY and the FBI conducted a telephonic interview of AUSA-1. \nNotes of that interview are attached as Exhibit 4. \n28 Peter Skinner of Boies Schiller is not listed on the docket as an attorney representing Giuffre. \n\" AUSA-1's notes from the February 29, 201\n... [truncated, 2055 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/88 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=88]", "char_count": 2055}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "4 at 1, 4). During the meeting, the attorneys referenced multiple individuals who worked for and/or \nhelped Epstein, including Maxwell, but the attorneys primarily focused their presentation on \nEpstein. (See id. at 1-2, 4). The attorneys did not present particular criminal statutes that might \nbe pursued by the USAO-SDNY or make suggestions about investigative steps, nor did they \nsuggest the use of civil lawsuits as a means to conduct a criminal investigation. (Id. at 2-3). \nAUSA-1 did not tell the attorneys whether or not an investigation would be opened, consistent \nwith her standard practice. (Id. at 3). After the meeting, AUSA-1 received a limited number of \nemails from the attorneys (see Exs. 6 & 7).30 AUSA-1 did not participate in a second meeting with \nthose attorneys and has never met David Boies. (See Ex. 4 at 4). \nAUSA-1 recalls being aware of depositions as a general matter, but she does not recall \nhaving knowledge of who had been deposed or the substance of the depositions. (Id. at 5). AUSA-\n1 does recall thinking through the challenges of a potential perjury investigation, but she does not \nrecall who specifically would have been he target of such an investigation. (Id.). AUSA-1 does \nnot recall being asked if the USAO-SDNY would consider charging Maxwell with perjury. (Id.). \nMoreover, and critically for present purposes, the meeting described above pre-dated the \ndepositions which give rise to the perjury counts in the instant Indictment, making it all but \nimpossible that the attorneys suggested, during that February 2016 meeting, that Maxwell had \ncommitted perjury in depositions that, as detailed below, had yet to occur. \nThe Government has also conducted a review of AUSA-1's emails in an effort to determine \nwhether any further contacts occurred. One email dated May 3, 2016 from Pottinger to AUSA-1 \nappears to suggest that AUSA-1 spoke with Pottinger on or about May 2, 2016 by telephone (see \n3° AUSA-1 left the USAO-SDNY in 2019. Since receivin\n... [truncated, 2307 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/89 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=89]", "char_count": 2307}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "Ex. 7), but AUSA-1 does not recall the details of that conversation (see Ex. 4 at 4), nor is the \nGovernment aware of any notes or other records documenting the substance of the call. The \nGovernment has not identified any records that suggest AUSA-1 ever communicated via email \nwith Pottinger, Edwards, Skinner, or any other attorney at Boies Schiller regarding this matter after \nMay 3, 2016. \nThe USAO-SDNY did not open an investigation into Epstein or Maxwell in 2016. (Id. at \n4). \n3. \nThe April and .luly 2016 Depositions of Maxwell \nOn March 2, 2016, Maxwell moved for entry of a protective order for materials produced \nin discovery and submitted a proposed order for the consideration of the Honorable Robert W. \nSweet, the United States District Judge who was then overseeing the Giuffre v. Maxwell civil \nlitigation. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. Nos. 38 & 39-1). On or about March 4, 2016, Boies \nSchiller represented that Giuffre did not oppose the entry of a protective order, but opposed the \nform proposed by Maxwell out of concern that it was overly broad and could lead to over-\ndesignation of material as confidential. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 40 at 2). Boies Schiller \nsubmitted a redline of Maxwell's proposed protective order, deleting some provisions and adding \nlanguage that confidential material could be disclosed to law enforcement. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. B). \nOn March 18, 2016, Judge Sweet entered a protective order governing the discovery and \ndissemination of confidential information after the parties agreed to the form of the order originally \nproposed by Maxwell. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 62; see also Def. Mot. 3, Ex. G at 2-3). \n64 \nEFTA00039511\n", "char_count": 1699}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "The protective order, among other things, restricted the parties from disclosing discovery materials \nmarked confidential to third parties, absent express permission from the Court. \nIn connection with the defamation suit, Maxwell was deposed by Boies Schiller, counsel \nfor Giuffre, on April 22, 2016 and July 22, 2016. \nOn or about May 24, 2017, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and voluntarily \ndismissed the civil action. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 916). Boies Schiller has continued \nto represent Giuffre in post-settlement litigation. Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 18-2868 (2d Cir.); \nGiuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413 (2d Cir.). \n4. \nThe USAO-SDNY Commences the Instant Investigation in 2018 \nOn or about November 29, 2018, the USAO-SDNY initiated its investigation into Epstein \nand possible co-conspirators, and formally opened the investigation by completing the requisite \npaperwork to open an investigation on or about November 30, 2018. The investigation was \nprompted by a series of articles published by the Miami Herald earlier that same week relating to \nEpstein, his conduct, and the circumstances of his prior conviction. See Julie K. Brown, \"Even \nfrom Jail, Sex Abuser Manipulated the System. His Victims Were Kept in the Dark,\" Miami \nHerald (Nov. 28, 2018).31 AUSA-1 was not involved in the decision to open the investigation or \nin the investigation itself. (See Ex. 4 at 6). Indeed, AUSA-1 stopped serving as the Office's \nHuman Trafficking and Project Safe Childhood Coordinator as of April 2017. \nShortly after initiating the investigation, the prosecutors involved in the investigation \nlearned of the prior February 2016 meeting and requested copies of AUSA-1's notes and records \n31 Indeed, on July 8, 2019, at the press conference following the arrest of Epstein, Geoffrey S. \nBerman, then United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, stated that while he \nwas not \"going to go into any aspects of how our investigation originated[,] I wi\n... [truncated, 2095 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/91 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=91]", "char_count": 2095}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "from that meeting. On or about December 6, 2018, AUSA-1 provided the prosecutors with her \nnotes from the February 2016 meeting (which are attached as Exhibit 5) and documents the \nattorneys provided.32\n5. \nThe USAO-SDNY's Subpoenas and Ex Pane Applications for \nMaterials \nShortly after opening the investigation in late November 2018, the Government identified \npossible victims and their counsel through public filings or media reports, which included Boies \nSchiller. (Def. Mem. 3, Ex. E at 2-3). The USAO-SDNY first contacted Boies Schiller about its \ninvestigation on or about December 18, 2018. Shortly thereafter, in or about December or January \n2018, the Government indicated to Boies Schiller that it intended to make document requests. \nBoies Schiller generally advised the Government that a protective order would govern some of the \nmaterials. (Id. at 3). \nIn or about February 2019, approximately two months after the USAO-SDNY opened its \ninvestigation (and almost three years after the February 29, 2016 meeting described above), the \nUSAO-SDNY issued two criminal grand jury subpoenas to Boies Schiller. One of the subpoenas \nrequested non-privileged documents relating to Giuffre v. Maxwell, 15 Civ. 7433 (RWS); the other \n32 The Government has reviewed the file that AUSA-1 provided to the prosecution team on or \nabout December 6, 2018 and understands, based on a review of that file, that at the February 2016 \nmeeting, AUSA-1 received copies of Epstein's black book, flight records, and Palm Beach Police \nDepartment reports. Although AUSA-1 does not now recall the attorneys providing her with any \ndocuments at the meeting (Ex. 4 at 2), an email she sent to the prosecution team on December 6, \n2018 refers to these documents as materials that the attorneys provided at the meeting. \nThe Government notes that as of March 7, 2016, one week after AUSA-1's February 29, \n2016 meeting with the attorneys when she received these documents, Maxwell had only produced \ntwo emails i\n... [truncated, 2462 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/92 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=92]", "char_count": 2462}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 93, "text_content": "requested the same relating to Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein, et al., 17 Civ. 0616 (JGK) (SN). Because \nof the ongoing and covert nature of the grand jury investigation, and consistent with its standard \npractice under such circumstances, the Government did not notify the defendant or her counsel \nthat it had issued the subpoenas. \nIn response to receiving the subpoenas, Boies Schiller began producing materials not \ncovered by the protective orders in the relevant civil cases. However, Boies Schiller also had \nadvised the Government that although it would not otherwise contest compliance with the \nsubpoenas, it believed that the protective orders precluded full compliance.33 (Exs. 8 & 9). \nAccordingly, the Government applied a pate and under seal to each relevant court (Judge Sweet \nand Magistrate Judge Sarah Netbum, respectively) to request that each court modify the respective \nprotective orders to permit compliance with the subpoenas. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. C). \nFollowing a request by Judge Sweet for briefing supporting the Government's initial \napplication, see Del Mot. 3, Ex. D at 4, 20; Ex. G at 6, the Government submitted a pane and \nsealed letters in support of its applications to each court on or about February 28, 2019. (Exs. 8 & \n9). The Government wrote, \"Where, as here, a grand jury subpoena has validly issued, and the \nrecipient of the subpoena is not contesting compliance—but rather seeking authorization to comply \nwith the subpoena—a court should grant such permission through limited modification of an \napplicable protective order, absent countervailing interests not present in this case.\" (Id. at 2). The \nGovernment submitted that the court was \"best guided\" by Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. \nCo., 154 F.R.D. 91, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), in which the court rejected an application for a party in \ncivil litigation to be held in contempt for complying with a grand jury subpoena by producing \n33 Significantly, and as detailed herein, Boies Schiller did not produce t\n... [truncated, 2200 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/93 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=93]", "char_count": 2200}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 94, "text_content": "materials in violation of a protective order, without first obtaining authorization from the court, \nbecause the court would have granted such authorization had it been sought. (Id.). The court also \nstated that such formal judicial approval could be obtained ex pane if sufficient reason was \nprovided. (Id.). In its letters, the Government noted that its \"specific knowledge of the subject \nmatter of discovery materials is relatively limited, due to the confidential nature\" of the litigation. \n(Id. at 2 n.1). The Government also submitted that the court need not employ the Martindell \nbalancing test to evaluate the Government's ability to obtain access to materials covered by a \nprotective order because (1) the Martindell balancing test generally relates to \"instances where the \nGovernment sought protected information without [ ] grand jury process\" and (2) \"any \npresumption against modification of a protective order is unreasonable where, as here, the \nprotective order is on its face temporary or limited.\" (Id. at 3-4). \n6. Proceedings before Chief Judge McMahon \na. \nMarch 26, 2019 Hearing \nJudge Sweet passed away in March 2019 before ruling on the Government's application. \nAfter Judge Sweet's death, but before the civil case was reassigned to a new judge, Chief Judge \nMcMahon took up the Government's application. Chief Judge McMahon subsequently inquired \nabout the Government's application in two transcribed ex pane and sealed hearings. (Def. Mot. \n3, Exs. D & E). At the first hearing, on March 26, 2019, Chief Judge McMahon inquired as to \nwhy Boies Schiller did not make an application for permission to be relieved from the protective \norder, to which the Government replied that it could not \"speak to why Boies Schiller in particular \ndidn't make their own application.\" (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. D at 3). The Government further noted that \nBoies Schiller \"simply isn't in a position to be able to describe the investigation in the way that \nwe have in our submission.\" (Id. a\n... [truncated, 2077 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/94 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=94]", "char_count": 2077}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 95, "text_content": "Martindell was applicable. (Id. at 3). She stated that were the Government's application disclosed \nto the parties, \"Maxwell would protest\" and argue that the Government lacked standing as it was \nnot a party to the protective order. (Id. at 8). In response to questions from Chief Judge McMahon, \nthe Government explained that the protective order, on its face, did not implicate the types of \nconfidential business information or trade secrets ordinarily considered by courts in conducting \nthe Martindell balancing test. (Id. at 13). \nChief Judge McMahon stated that the protective order did not contain a provision allowing \na party to the order to disclose materials requested by law enforcement without permission of the \ncourt, noting her understanding that \"it may have been negotiated out.\" (Id. at 14-15). The court \ninquired whether the Government's position was that \"reliance on the nondisclosure of \nconfidential materials to law enforcement in connection with a grand jury subpoena that has been \nduly authorized would be unreasonable.\" (Id. at 14). The Government responded in the \naffirmative, stating that the Government believed a provision precluding compliance with a law \nenforcement request would be void for public policy. (Id. at 15). The Government further cited \nChemical Bank in support of the proposition that it would be unreasonable to rely on a protective \norder provision that barred the disclosure of information to law enforcement. (Id. at 15-16). \nIn response to questions about the breadth of the subpoena, the Government explained that \nit was \"essentially unable to significantly narrow the request for information . \n. We have either \nlittle or no additional information than the Court does in terms of what materials there are [and] \nwho was deposed.\" (Id. at 17). In response to Chief Judge McMahon's question about the privacy \ninterests implicated by the protective order, (id. at 16-17), the Government also noted that it was \ndissimilar to an ordinary th\n... [truncated, 2093 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/95 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=95]", "char_count": 2093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 96, "text_content": "of the materials in light of the \"extraordinary protections\" of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedue \n6(e). (Id. at 17-18). \nFinally, Chief Judge McMahon also inquired whether the materials sought by the \nGovernment might be used to commence criminal proceedings against either of the parties to the \nlibel case, i.e., including Maxwell. (Id. at 18). The Government acknowledged that possibility as \na general matter. (Id.). Chief Judge McMahon noted that the parties to the protective order relied \non that order \"in order to give whatever in discovery they gave, whether it was deposition \ntestimony they gave or — then again, I can't fathom why anybody who has any criminal exposure \nwould not have taken the Fifth Amendment in response to questions in a civil deposition, but I \ndon't know.\" (Id. at 18-19). The Government stated, \"I do not know, but I think it is entirely \npossible that what we are seeking is page after page of people taking the Fifth. That is entirely \npossible. But to the extent that it is not or there are other materials -- and this may be bad for our \nargument, but in all transparency and candor, I think there may be other individuals who also relied \non the protective order.\" (Id.). The Government further explained that it \"want[ed] to have a \nformal application\" for the relevant materials and took that approach to \"avoid the types of \nproblems\" created by other less formal government requests in other cited cases. (Id. at 20). \nb. \nApril 9, 2019 Hearing \nChief Judge McMahon held another conference on April 9, 2019. She stated that she \nwanted \"to make sure I'm not in a Chemical Bank kind of situation, so I would like to know about \ncontacts between [the USAO-SDNY and Boies Schiller] prior to the issuance of the subpoena on \nthe subject of your investigation.\" (Del Mot. 3, Ex. E at 2 (emphasis added)).34 In Chemical \n34 Tellingly, Maxwell omits the italicized portion of this question from her motion, thereby \nstripping important context from the nature o\n... [truncated, 2130 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/96 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=96]", "char_count": 2130}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 97, "text_content": "Bank, of course, as noted above, the subpoena recipient produced materials to a prosecutor in \ndirect violation of the relevant protective order, without seeking a modification of the protective \norder and without any court authorization to do so. 154 F.R.D. at 93. Moreover, in that case, the \nDistrict Attorney seemingly opened its investigation and issued the subpoena in direct response to \ninformation provided by the subpoena recipient who was then a party to civil litigation. Id. \nThe Government responded to Chief Judge McMahon by explaining its contacts with Boies \nSchiller in connection with the instant (and only) investigation it had opened on Epstein, that is, \nthe investigation prompted by, and opened following, public reporting on Epstein in November \n2018. In particular, the Government explained that the USAO-SDNY opened an investigation \nfirst, on either November 30, 2018 or December 3, 2018, and then made contact with Boies Schiller \nshortly thereafter. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. E at 2-3). In this respect, the Government further explained \nthat the USAO-SDNY, after opening the investigation, had endeavored to identify counsel who \nrepresented victims or witnesses in public filings or media reports, which included Boies Schiller, \nnoting that \"[w]ith respect to Boies Schiller in particular, we quickly came to learn during the \ninvestigation that they had at the time either active or recently completed civil litigation\" and \nindicated that the USAO-SDNY intended to make document requests. (Id.). The Government \nalso noted that, unlike in Chemical Bank, here Boies Schiller had informed the Government that it \nwould be unable to comply with the subpoena in light of the protective order. (Id. (noting that \nBoies Schiller \"generally advised us that they believed there was a protective order that would \ngovern at least some of the materials, and that is why we ultimately made the application to the \nCourt.\")). \nc. \nChief Judge McMahon's Memorandum and Order \n71 \nEFTA00\n... [truncated, 2007 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/97 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=97]", "char_count": 2007}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 98, "text_content": "On or about April 9, 2019, Chief Judge McMahon granted the Government's application \nand issued a memorandum and order. (Def. Mot. 3, Exs. F & G). The Court noted that while the \nGovernment's application was procedurally \"[i]rregular,\" there was precedent for granting the \nGovernment's request and, therefore, the Court would consider the application. (De£ Mot. 3, Ex. \nG at 6, 8-9). The Court found that, contrary to the Government's arguments, it was appropriate \nfor the Court to analyze the Government's application in light of the Martindell factors. (Id. at 9-\n12). \nIn so doing, Chief Judge McMahon considered, among other things, \"the degree to which \n. . . the party who could be expected to oppose unsealing[] reasonably relied on the protective \norder.\" (Id. at 16). She concluded that such reliance was unreasonable. (Id. at 22). She evaluated \nthe factors under Second Circuit case law that are relevant to assessing whether a party's reliance \non the protective order was reasonable, namely the scope of the protective order, the language of \nthe order itself, the court's level of inquiry before granting the order, and the nature of reliance on \nthe order. (Id. at 17). She concluded that first three factors favored granting the Government's \napplication for modification. (Id. at 17-20). Chief Judge McMahon noted that, as the order \n\"plainly gives the court the power to enter an order compelling disclosure to anyone—law \nenforcement included—Maxwell could not reasonably have relied on the absence of automatic \npermission for such disclosure to shield anything she said or produced from a grand jury's \nscrutiny.\" (Id. at 18-19). \nAs to the last factor, Chief Judge McMahon found that \"the nature of the parties' reliance \non the order does seem to weigh against modification.\" (Id. at 20). She noted that the record \nindicated that \"Giuffre likely could not have secured Maxwell's deposition—at least in the absence \nof substantial court involvement—without\" the protective or\n... [truncated, 2055 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/98 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=98]", "char_count": 2055}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 99, "text_content": "on which Maxwell or anyone else might reasonably have relied is that Giuffre or her lawyers would \nnot do what the defendant in Chemical Bank did—that is, forward discovery materials in their \npossession to prosecutors for the purpose of fomenting an investigation. But I am not faced with \nthat situation.\" (Id. at 21). Chief Judge McMahon further stated, \"Nothing in this record suggests \nto me that Giuffre or Boies Schiller had anything to do with the Government's decision to convene \na grand jury to look into the matters that were the subject of the [civil lawsuit].\" (Id.). Instead, \nshe explained that the Government informed the Court that it had \"contacted Boies Schiller as part \nof its search for parties who might have been victims in its investigation; and that Boies Schiller \ntold the Government that it could not consensually produce at least some documents in its files \nbecause of the existence of the Protective Order.\" (Id.). Chief Judge McMahon concluded that it \nwas \"quite clear that Boies Schiller did not foment the Government's investigation.\" (Id.). \nAmong other conclusions, Chief Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance \non the protective order in that case as a \"shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of \nConfidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may \nexercise its discretion to grant the Government's application.\" (Id. at 22). The Court further \nconcluded that \"[t]he Government has persuasively demonstrated extraordinary circumstances, \nwhich would entitle it to modification in any event.\" (Id.). She also noted that \"while in other \ncircumstances the breadth of the subpoena might be troubling, here the Government is in no \nposition to narrow its request, because [the civil case] was litigated almost entirely under seal.\" \n(Id. at 25). \nChief Judge McMahon permitted that the Government share the order—and only that \norder, which itself prohibited further dissemination, and not including any\n... [truncated, 2125 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/99 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=99]", "char_count": 2125}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 100, "text_content": "provided to Boies Schiller shortly after it was issued. The materials provided by Boies Schiller \nincluded, in addition to deposition transcripts of Maxwell and other individuals, materials \nproduced by Giuffre, Maxwell, and non-parties, and court-related pleadings in the civil case. \n7. \nMagistrate Judge Netburn's Order \nOn or about April 9, 2019, the Government advised Judge Netbum, who had not yet ruled \non the Government's other application in Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein, et at, 17 Civ. 0616 (JGK) (SN), \nof Chief Judge McMahon's decision via a pane and sealed letter. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. I). \nSubsequently, on April 16, 2019, Judge Netburn denied the Government's application. (Def. Mot. \n3, Ex. H). Judge Netburn found that she was authorized under the All Writs Act to modify the \nprotective order, but declined to do so as the Government had not established exceptional \ncircumstances or a compelling need. (Id. at 3). She concluded that on the record before her, the \nparties' reliance on the protective order was reasonable and the presumption of confidentiality \nshould apply. (Id. at 5-6). The court rejected the Government's arguments for exceptional \ncircumstances and compelling need as relying on \"the general desire for secrecy\" and \n\"unpersuasive\" under the Martindell standard. (Id. at 6). Judge Netbum concluded that \"the \nGovernment must demonstrate not that this investigation is an extraordinary circumstance, but that \nthe reason for seeking the documents is so extraordinary or compelling that there is a need to \nmodify the Protective Order. The Government has not met that standard.\" (Id. at 7) (emphasis in \noriginal). \n8. \nUnsealing of Maxwell's Depositions \nThree months after Chief Judge McMahon issued her Order, Giuffre v. Maxwell was \nreassigned to the Honorable Loretta A. Preska on July 9, 2019. On or about July 23, 2020, Judge \nPreska ordered unsealed certain litigation materials, including, and related to, Maxwell's April \n74 \nEFTA00039521\n", "char_count": 1979}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 101, "text_content": "2016 deposition transcript. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1077). Maxwell appealed Judge \nPreska's order, arguing that the court abused its discretion in ordering the unsealing of the \ndeposition materials and that Maxwell's interests outweighed the public's interests in access to the \nmaterials. Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413 (2d Cir.), (Dkt. No. 140-1 at 2). On October 19, 2020, \nthe Second Circuit found that Judge Preska \"correctly held that the deposition materials are judicial \ndocuments to which the presumption of public access attaches, and did not abuse its discretion in \nrejecting Maxwell's meritless arguments that her interests superseded the presumption of access.\" \n(Id. at 3). \nOn October 22, 2020, Maxwell's April 2016 deposition was publicly filed. (See 15 Civ. \n7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1137-13). \nOn January 27, 2021, a redacted version of Maxwell's July 2016 deposition was publicly \nfiled. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1201-14). On February 11, 2021, another version of the \nJuly 2016 deposition was publicly filed with fewer redactions. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. \n1212-1). \n9. \nThe New York Daily News Article \nOn October 13, 2020, the New York Daily News published an article describing the \nFebruary 29, 2016 meeting (the \"Daily News Article\" or the \"Article\").35 The Article stated, \namong other things, that defense attorneys representing victims of Epstein and Maxwell \"urged\" \nthe USAO-SDNY to \"open an investigation of the duo\" during that meeting. Citing two \nanonymous sources, the Article described the defense attorneys' alleged efforts to \"pique\" the \nGovernment's interest \"in a second meeting in the summer of 2016 after Maxwell allegedly \n35 See Stephen Rex Brown, Manhattan federal prosecutors declined to pursue Jeffrey Epstein and \nGhislaine Maxwell case in 2016: sources, New York Daily News, Oct. 13, 2020, \nhttps://wwvv.nydailynews.corninew-yorlc/ny-jeffity-epstein-maxwell-case-20201013-\njrnzhl7zdrzdgrbbs7yc6bfnszu-story.html. \n75 \nEFTA\n... [truncated, 2009 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/101 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=101]", "char_count": 2009}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 102, "text_content": "committed perjury.\" According to two anonymous sources, \"a second meeting occurred.\" \nHowever, the Article cites another anonymous source as \"insist[ing] [a second meeting] never \nhappened.\" \nB. \nThe Defendant's Suppression Motion Should Be Denied \nMaxwell seeks suppression of the evidence the Government obtained via a judicially \nauthorized subpoena to Boies Schiller under Martindell, the Fourth Amendment, Fifth \nAmendment, the Due Process clause, and the Court's inherent authority. However, Maxwell's \nmotion turns on erroneous facts, runs afoul of controlling law, and should be denied. \n1. \nMartindell Provides No Basis to Grant the Relief the Defendant Seeks \nMaxwell argues that the Government \"circumvented\" the Second Circuit's decision in \nMartindell and \"violated Maxwell's rights,\" which requires suppression of the evidence the \nGovernment obtained from the subpoena. (Def. Mot. 11 at 11-12). Even assuming that to be \ntrue—which, of course, as detailed above and herein, it is not—there is no basis in law to suppress \nevidence as a result of a Martindell violation, and Maxwell cites none in support of her claim. \nSetting that fatal flaw aside, however, her claim is wrong on both the facts and the law. The \nGovernment issued a valid grand jury subpoena for the materials, applied for judicial authorization \nto modify the protective order to permit compliance with the subpoena, and a district court judge, \nwho evaluated the Government's application under Martindell, properly exercised her discretion \nin modifying the protective order. Only after receiving that court order did the Government obtain \nany protected materials from Boies Schiller. Maxwell's motion should be denied. \na. \nApplicable Law \n\"[T]here is no question that a Rule 26(c) protective order is subject to modification,\" and \na decision to modify such an order is \"committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.\" In re \n76 \nEFTA00039523\n", "char_count": 1938}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 103, "text_content": "\"Agent Orange\" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Andover Data \nSows., a Div. of Players Computer, Inc. v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d \nCir. 1989) (\"It is well-settled here and elsewhere, for instance, that a Rule 26(c) protective order \nmay be overturned or modified based on a finding of improvidence, extraordinary circumstances \nor compelling need.\"). \nIn Martindell, the Government informally—and without use of a grand jury subpoena—\nsought access to discovery materials from a civil litigation that were subject to a protective order. \n594 F.2d at 294. The Second Circuit found that the \"deponents [had] testified in reliance upon [a] \nRule 26(c) protective order, absent which they may have refused to testify.\" Id. at 296. In so \nruling, the Second Circuit reasoned that the interest in the enforcement of Rule 26(c) protective \norders—which included securing just and speedy determination of civil disputes—was sufficient \nto outweigh the Government's interest in obtaining information by means of an informal document \nrequest. Id. at 295-96. The Second Circuit held that \"absent a showing of improvidence in the \ngrant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need, .. \n. a witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third \nparties, including the Government.\" Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated \nApr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) (\"The Martindell test [ ] does not transform \na protective order into a grant of immunity because the test allows a protective order to be \novercome by a showing of improvidence in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or \ncompelling need.\"); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that \n\"absent an express finding by the district court of improvidence in the magistrate's initial grant of \nthe protective orders or of extraord\n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/103 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=103]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 104, "text_content": "information protected thereunder, it was error for the district court to modify the magistrate's \norders\"). \nAt the same time, in Martindell, the court noted that \"[t]he reliance of a private party upon \nprotection of pre-existing documents from disclosure to the Government would normally be more \ndifficult to justify than that of a witness who would, absent the protective order, have invoked his \nprivilege and given no testimony at all.\" Id. at 297 n.8; see also United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d \n418, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding Martindell inapplicable and affirming enforcement of a grand \njury subpoena where \"there [was] no indication that [a witness] agreed to testify only in reliance \non [an] 'understanding\"' of confidentiality and where many records sought \"existed prior to the \nadvent of the litigation\"). In subsequent cases, the Second Circuit has clarified that the Martindell \npresumption comes into play only when a party reasonably relies on a protective order in providing \ndeposition testimony. See, e.g., Davis, 702 F.2d 418; SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 230-\n31 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that \"some protective orders may not merit a strong presumption against \nmodification,\" as the nature of some orders \"may not justify reliance by the parties\"). \nIn United States v. Davis, the Second Circuit explained that \"[r]anged against these \nconsiderations [relating to the policy in favor of enforcing Rule 26(c) protective orders] are the \nreasons for permitting the grand jury broad subpoena power in a criminal investigation.\" 702 F.2d \nat 421. The Second Circuit noted the grand jury's \"wide ranging authority to inquire into suspected \nviolations of the criminal law; and to effectuate such investigations it may compel the production \nof documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, as it deems necessary.\" Id. at 421-22 \n(citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). \"Wide latitude in gathering evidence \nis vital to the grand jury's investi\n... [truncated, 2179 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/104 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=104]", "char_count": 2179}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 105, "text_content": "supervision of a judge, the longstanding principle that 'the public . . . has a right to every man's \nevidence,' except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory \nprivilege is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings.\" (internal citations omitted)). \nb. \nDiscussion \nThe Government did not, in any way, attempt to circumvent Matthaei!. To the contrary, \nthe Government presented Martindell squarely to the relevant courts, first arguing that its test was \nnot applicable, and then, in the alternative, that the requested relief should be granted even if the \ncourts applied the Martindell standard. It cannot possibly be the case that the Government was \nattempting to \"circumvent\" a case that it cited 11 times in its argument to both relevant courts. \n(See (Exs. 8 & 9). Instead, the Government issued a subpoena to Boies Schiller in connection with \nits investigation and made an application to two judges to modify Rule 26(c) protective orders that \nprecluded full compliance with those subpoenas. While the Government argued that the court \nneed not employ the Manindell balancing test for several reasons, it also made arguments under \nMartindell in the alternative. Ultimately, both Chief Judge McMahon and Judge Netburn found \nthat Martindell applied and analyzed the Government's application under that framework. \nAs Chief Judge McMahon found, even under the Martindell approach, testimony provided \npursuant to a protective order can be divulged to a grand jury if the government establishes \"some \nextraordinary circumstance or compelling need.\" Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296. After concluding \nthat reliance on the protective order was unreasonable,36 Chief Judge McMahon found that the \n\"Government [ ] persuasively demonstrated extraordinary circumstances,\" citing \"significant \n36 See, e.g., hit'! Equity Ines., Inc. v. Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd., No. 05 Civ. 2745 (JGK) \n(RLE), 2010 WL 779314, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2010) (finding that \n... [truncated, 2381 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/105 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=105]", "char_count": 2381}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 106, "text_content": "public interest\" which resulted in the Government convening a grand jury to investigate a serious \ncrime. (Del. Mot. 3, Ex. G at 22-23). The Court also noted that because the investigation was not \npublicly known, \"the ordinary exercise of grand jury power [Le., to subpoena witnesses to testify \nand to produce documents] . . . would implicate and invite the very risk of disclosure—and the \npossibility of alerting potential criminal targets that they are under investigation, causing them to \ndestroy evidence, flee from prosecution, or otherwise seriously jeopardize the Investigation—that \ncaused the Government to proceed via subpoena [to Boies Schiller] and its related Application.\" \n(Id. at 23-24). The Court further noted that the \"Government's interest is bolstered\" as the request \nwas made by a grand jury that had issued a \"subpoena for the production of documents as part of \nan ongoing investigation.\" (Id. at 25). In support of her argument, the defendant cites Palmieri \nwhere the Second Circuit, applying Martindell, reversed the district court's decision granting the \nstate Attorney General's motion to intervene to modify sealing orders. (Def. Mot. 11 at 14). \nMaxwell's reliance on Palmieri is of no avail. There, the Second Circuit held that the district court \nerred by not expressly finding that the state had shown improvidence, extraordinary circumstances, \nor compelling need before modifying the sealing orders in a civil case. Palmieri, 779 F.2d at 862, \n866. By contrast, here Chief Judge McMahon made this explicit finding. \nJudge Netbum, on the other hand, rejected the Government's arguments for exceptional \ncircumstances and compelling need as \"unpersuasive\" under the Martindell standard. (Def. Mot. \n3, Ex. H at 6). Maxwell argues that Judge Netbum was \"exactly right\" in her analysis of whether \nexceptional circumstances existed, but ignores the fact that Chief Judge McMahon made contrary \nfindings on this point. That two neutral judicial officers were pres\n... [truncated, 2236 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/106 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=106]", "char_count": 2236}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 107, "text_content": "way circumvented Martindell; rather, the Government sought court approval to enforce a subpoena \nand then followed the directives it received.37\nMost critically, however, even if the Government's motion did not satisfy Martindell, \nMaxwell offers no legal authority for the proposition that suppression is the proper remedy.38\nIndeed, none of the Second Circuit cases applying Martindell contemplate suppression as a \nremedy. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d at \n1224 (remanding for findings \"on whether the protective order was improvidently granted or \nwhether the government had made a showing of exceptional circumstances or a compelling need\"); \nPalmieri, 779 F.2d at 862 (reversing district court's modification of protective orders where district \ncourt did not make an \"express finding\" of improvidence, extraordinary circumstances, or \ncompelling need and \"remand[ing] for further proceedings consistent with this opinion\"). \n37 Maxwell asks this Court to review and reverse Chief Judge McMahon's exercise of her \ndiscretion in modifying the protective order, because she disagrees with Chief Judge McMahon's \nanalysis of the Martindell factors. Although Chief Judge McMahon's order modifying the civil \nprotective order was not entered on the civil docket, that order, along with the Government's \napplication and related materials, were produced to the defense on or about August 12, 2020. As \na result, Maxwell could have sought review of Chief Judge McMahon's order in the Second \nCircuit. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). Maxwell asks this Court to second-guess a coequal district \ncourt's decision to modify a protective order. Putting aside the question of whether this Court \neven has the authority to do so, it should in any event decline Maxwell's invitation to act as a \nreviewing court to Chief Judge McMahon's decision, which was made in her \"sound discretion.\" \nIn re \"Agent Orange\" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d at 147. \n38 To the exte\n... [truncated, 2661 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/107 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=107]", "char_count": 2661}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 108, "text_content": "2. \nMaxwell's Fourth Amendment Claim Fails \nMaxwell's Fourth Amendment motion is premised on a wholly unsupported expansion of \nthe law. Because Maxwell lacked a privacy interest in the files of a third party law firm who \nrepresented her adversary in civil litigation, and because the subpoena was entirely lawful, she \ncannot make out a Fourth Amendment violation. Moreover, even if Maxwell had standing to assert \nthis claim, it would nonetheless fail because the Government relied in good faith on a judicial order \npermitting compliance with its subpoena. \na. Maxwell Has Not Established Standing \ni. \nApplicable Law \nThe Fourth Amendment protects the \"right of the people to be secure in their persons, \nhouses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\" U.S. Const. amend IV. \n\"The basic purpose of this Amendment ... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals \nagainst arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.\" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. \n2206, 2213 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \"It has been clear for a generation that \n`Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights ... [that] may not be vicariously asserted.\"' United \nStates v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 \n(1978)). Accordingly, a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights \"are violated only when the \nchallenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party.\" \nUnited States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis in original); see also United States \nv. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1333 (2d Cir. 1990). Ultimately, the Fourth Amendment inquiry is \n\"whether [a] defendant has established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.\" \nUnited States v. Chuang, 897 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). This threshold \nquestion involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether a defendant has demonstrated a subjective \n82 \nEFTA00039529\n", "char_count": 1990}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 109, "text_content": "expectation of privacy in the places and items that were searched; and (2) whether that expectation \nwas one that society accepts as reasonable. Id. It is axiomatic that \"[t]he proponent of a motion \nto suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by \nthe challenged search or seizure.\" Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 \nU.S. 98, 104 (1980). \nUnder the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment \"does not prohibit the obtaining of \ninformation revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities.\" \nUnited States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Supreme Court has long held that \"a person \nhas no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,\" \nSmith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979), \"even if the information is revealed on the \nassumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose,\" Miller, 425 U.S. 435, at 443. \nExceptions to the applicability of the third party doctrine are narrow. For example, in Carpenter, \n138 S. Ct. at 2220, the Supreme Court declined to extend the third party doctrine to cell site \nlocation information, holding that \"a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect has a \nlegitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.\" 138 S. Ct. at 2222. However, the \nCourt stressed that its holding was \"a narrow one,\" with specific consideration given to \"the unique \nnature of cell phone location information,\" id. at 2220, which \"provides an intimate window into \na person's life,\" id. at 2217. \n\"The law is clear that the burden on the defendant to establish [Fourth Amendment] \nstanding is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant \nor someone with personal knowledge.\" United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, \n106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), \n20\n... [truncated, 2093 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/109 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=109]", "char_count": 2093}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 110, "text_content": "ii. \nDiscussion \nMaxwell cannot assert a Fourth Amendment claim because she had no legitimate \nexpectation of privacy in the deposition transcripts or other materials she designated as confidential \nunder the protective order. The materials were held by a third party law firm that represented her \nadversary in the civil suit. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (\"a person has no legitimate expectation \nof privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties\"); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (no \nlegitimate expectation of privacy in materials held by a third party \"even if the information is \nrevealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose\"); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. \nat 2220 (\"We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller \n.\"). Maxwell cites no authority \nfor the proposition that she has standing to challenge a judicially approved grand jury subpoena \ndirected at a third party law firm, because there is none. \nMaxwell points to the fact that the materials were designated as confidential under the \nprotective order, but that reliance is misplaced. (Def. Mot. 11 at 6-8). Martindell by its own terms \ncontemplates the modification of a protective order in a civil action. See, e.g., Andover Data \nSews., 876 F.2d at 1083 (\"It is well-settled here and elsewhere . . . that a Rule 26(c) protective \norder may be overturned or modified based on a finding of improvidence, extraordinary \ncircumstances or compelling need.\"). And with respect to the specific protective order at issue, \nChief Judge McMahon found that because the order \"plainly gives the court the power to enter an \norder compelling disclosure to anyone—law enforcement included—Maxwell could not \nreasonably have relied on the absence of automatic permission for such disclosure to shield \nanything she said or produced from a grand jury's scrutiny.\" (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. Gat 18-19); see \nalso Def. Mot. 3, Ex. A at ¶ 5 (\"CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION[] shall not, without the \nconsent of the party\n... [truncated, 2101 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/110 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=110]", "char_count": 2101}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 111, "text_content": "marks omitted) (emphasis added)); In re \"Agent Orange\" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d at 145 (\"It \nis undisputed that a district court retains the power to modify or lift protective orders that it has \nentered.\"). It also bears noting that Martindell and its progeny do not discuss law enforcement \napplications in Fourth Amendment terms. \nIn an effort to avoid the application of the third party doctrine, Maxwell contends that she \ndid not in fact voluntarily share anything in the civil suit, and that \"every other circumstance\" \nsupported her \"expectation that her deposition transcripts would be private.\" (Def. Mot. 11 at 9). \nNeither argument withstands scrutiny. As an initial matter, the facts of this case are far removed \nfrom the \"narrow\" circumstances in which the Supreme Court has found an exception to the third \nparty doctrine. For example, the Carpenter Court, while stressing that its holding was a \"narrow \none,\" 138 S. Ct. at 2220, held that \"[g]iven the unique nature of cell phone location records,\" which \nprovide a \"intimate window into a person's life,\" \"the fact that the information is held by a third \nparty does not by itself overcome the user's claim to Fourth Amendment protection.\" Id. at 2217; \nsee also Zietzke v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 3d 758, 768 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (\"The Court . . . \nwill extend Carpenter to new circumstances only if they directly implicate the privacy concerns \nthat animated the majority. [T]he majority was overwhelmingly concerned with `Carpenter's \nanticipation of privacy in his physical location.' In other words, Carpenter was about \nsurveillance.\" (internal citation omitted)). \nThere can be no serious argument that the facts of this case, or the materials obtained \npursuant to the subpoena issued here, revealed Maxwell's physical location over a period of time \nor are otherwise in any way analogous to the narrow category of information contemplated by the \nmajority in Carpenter. To the extent the defendant argues that her dep\n... [truncated, 2147 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/111 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=111]", "char_count": 2147}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 112, "text_content": "at 10), the Court should reject the defendant's efforts to twist Carpenter's exception to the third \nparty rule beyond recognition. The defendant was not compelled to participate in the deposition \nor to answer questions without invoking her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; she \nvoluntarily chose to do so. Even if she chose to do so in reliance on the protective order, that \nprotective order was subject to modification under well-settled case law and by its own terms. \nContrary to the defendant's claims (Def. Mot. 11 at 10), she assumed the risk that the deposition \ntranscripts would divulged to the Government. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, No. 17 Cr. 400 \n(HZ), 2019 WL 267711, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2019) (declining to apply Carpenter where \ngovernment obtained defendant's eBay transactions without a warrant as defendant \"assumed the \nrisk that [eBay] would reveal to police the purchases he made\" and defendant \"did not have a \nreasonable expectation of privacy in the records of his purchases\"). \nBecause Maxwell had no legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the materials in \nBoies Schiller's possession, she has no standing to challenge their seizure, and no warrant was \nrequired to obtain those materials. Her motion should be rejected on this ground alone. \nb. \nThe Government Acted in Good Faith \nEven if the defendant had standing to bring this motion, it still fails because the \nGovernment only obtained these materials after obtaining a court order authorizing it to do so. The \nGovernment accordingly acted in good faith when it acted pursuant to that judicial order. \ni. \nApplicable Law \nUnder the so-called \"good faith\" exception, the exclusionary rule and its remedy of \nsuppression do not apply \"when the Government `act[s] with an \"objectively reasonable good-\nfaith belief that their conduct is lawful.\"' United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. \n2018) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (internal\n... [truncated, 2035 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/112 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=112]", "char_count": 2035}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 113, "text_content": "omitted)). \"As the rule seeks to deter future Fourth Amendment violations, the Supreme Court \nadvises district courts to only suppress evidence where it serves such a purpose.\" United States v. \nWilliams, No. 10 Cr. 622 (ADS), 2018 WL 4623017, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018) (internal \nquotation marks and citations omitted). \"`[T]he exclusionary rule is not an individual right and \napplies only where it results in appreciable deterrence.\" United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, \n118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)); see also Herring, \n555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that \"[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be \nsufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such \ndeterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.\"). As a result, exclusion should be a \"last \nresort\" rather than a \"first impulse.\" United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal \nquotation marks and citation omitted). The exclusionary rule should be used only where law \nenforcement \"`exhibit[s] deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth \nAmendment rights.\"' United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting \nUnited States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Green, 981 \nF.3d 945, 957 (11th Cir. 2020) (\"It follows that when officers act with `an objectively reasonable \ngood-faith belief that their conduct is lawful'—i.e., by acting in reasonable reliance on a warrant, \nstatute, or court order—the exclusionary rule does not apply because there is little, if any, \ndeterrence benefit in such circumstances.\" (citations omitted)). \nIn the context of search warrants, suppression will generally not be warranted where the \nevidence at issue was \"obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated \nsearch warrant.\" United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). As a result, although t\n... [truncated, 2226 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/113 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=113]", "char_count": 2226}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 114, "text_content": "establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.\" Id. \n(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d \n864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that the \"issuance of a warrant by a neutral magistrate, which \ndepends on a finding of probable cause, creates a presumption that it was objectively reasonable \nfor the officers to believe that there was probable cause\"). Indeed, the good faith exception does \nnot apply only in four narrow circumstances: \n(1) where the issuing magistrate has been knowingly misled; (2) \nwhere the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his or her judicial \nrole; (3) where the application is so lacking in indicia of probable \ncause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable; and (4) where the \nwarrant is so facially deficient that reliance upon it is unreasonable. \nUnited States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). The good \nfaith exception analysis applies in the context of court orders. See, e.g., Zodhiates, 901 F.3d at \n143 (applying good faith analysis in Fourth Amendment challenge to cell phone location \ninformation obtained by subpoena issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2)); United States v. \nSerrano, No. 13 Cr. 58 (KBF), 2014 WL 2696569, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2014) (finding good \nfaith exception would apply to cell site information obtained pursuant to a subpoena authorized by \nmagistrate judge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)); United States v. Ashburn, 76 F. Supp. 3d 401, \n406, 414-18 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (applying Leon to § 2703(d) orders for historical cell-site data \nobtained and finding that the good faith exception applied). \nii. \nDiscussion \nThe exclusionary rule and its remedy of suppression should not apply here, as the \nGovernment issued a grand jury subpoena; sought the materials after applying to the district court \nfor an order to modify the civil protective order; and only obtained the materials after the\n... [truncated, 2028 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/114 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=114]", "char_count": 2028}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 115, "text_content": "court modified the protective order and issued a 26-page decision. The Government acted in \nreasonable reliance on the district court's decision. \nThe defendant argues that the Government misled the Court when it \"claimed not to know \nwhat was in Boies Schiller's file and that Boies Schiller had no role in instigating the investigation \nof Maxwell.\" (Del. Mot. 11 at 1). The defendant's claims are both factually inaccurate and \nmeritless. \nFirst, the Government did not mislead Chief Judge McMahon about its contacts with Boies \nSchiller. As an initial matter, Maxwell's argument is premised solely on her use of selective \nsnippets from a lone Daily News Article that is premised, in meaningful part, on anonymous \nsources and hearsay. As the factual background set forth above—which is corroborated by notes \nand correspondence produced alongside this brief—makes clear, David Boies and Boies Schiller \nplayed no role in initiating, let alone \"fomenting\" the Government's investigation. \nThat \ninvestigation was opened more than two and a half years after the last known contact between any \nlawyer associated with any civil counsel for Giuffre and, in any event, was initially focused on \nEpstein, not this defendant. As detailed above, the USAO-SDNY opened the instant investigation \nin late November 2018 shortly after the Miami Herald published a series of articles about Epstein. \nAUSA-1 was not involved in that decision, which in any event had nothing to do with a meeting \nthat had taken place nearly three years prior.39 (Ex. 4 at 6). \n39 Maxwell repeatedly claims that Boies Schiller urged AUSA-1 to open an investigation of \nEpstein and Maxwell, (Def. Mot. 3 at 8), but that allegation, which is supported by nothing aside \nfrom the above-referenced media report, is incorrect. While AUSA-1 did meet with the three \nattorneys in February 2016, she understood the attorneys to be focused on Epstein, and not on \nEpstein and Maxwell as a \"duo.\" (Ex. 4 at I, 4). The presentation to AUSA\n... [truncated, 2175 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/115 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=115]", "char_count": 2175}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 116, "text_content": "The defendant repeatedly argues that the Government's failure to mention AUSA-1's prior \ncontact with Boies Schiller in 2016 was a misrepresentation that led to the modification of the \nprotective order. The argument, which relies principally on hyperbolic rhetoric, is simply \nincorrect. As an initial matter, the Government did not insist, contrary to Maxwell's twisted \nreading of the transcript, that \"there had been no contact whatsoever\" between Boies Schiller and \nthe Government at any time prior to the Government opening its investigation. (Def. Mot. 3 at 1). \nInstead, Chief Judge McMahon's question was more specific: referencing Chemical Bank and the \ndesire to avoid \"a Chemical Bank kind of situation,\" Chief Judge McMahon asked about contacts \nbetween the two parties \"prior to the issuance of the subpoena on the subject ofyour investigation.\" \n(Def. Mot. 3, Ex. E at 2 (emphasis added); see also Def. Mot. 3 at 7 (omitting the italicized portion \nof the question)). In response, the Government described accurately its communications with \nBoies Schiller that had occurred in the time period surrounding the opening of its investigation and \nthe issuance of the subpoena. Additionally, and in light of the Government's prior arguments to \nChief Judge McMahon relating to Chemical Bank,4° the Government attempted to address the \nmisconduct at issue in that case: namely the production of confidential documents without seeking \nmodification of a protective order by confirming that, here, no such production had yet occurred. \n(Def. Mot. 3, Ex. E at 2) (noting that Boies Schiller \"generally advised us that they believed there \n40 See, e.g., Exs. 8 & 9 at 2-3 (discussing Chemical Bank as rejecting a contempt request where a \nparty \"compl[ied] with a grand jury subpoena despite the existence of a protective order\" and \nfocusing arguments on the nature of the production of documents); (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. D at 15) (the \nGovernment describing Chemical Bank as \"essentially say[ing]\n... [truncated, 2510 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/116 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=116]", "char_count": 2510}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 117, "text_content": "was a protective order that would govern at least some of the materials, and that is why we \nultimately made the application to the Court.\")). \nWhile the Government appreciates, with the benefit of hindsight, that an answer that had \nalso referenced the February 2016 meeting (and the fact that USAO-SDNY took no action as a \nresult of that meeting) would have provided additional context—and would have further reinforced \nthat this was not a \"Chemical Bank situation\"—as noted above, the Government's response \naccurately described its contacts with Boies Schiller as relevant to \"your investigation\" and the \nissuance of the subpoena at hand. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that a description of the \nFebruary 2016 meeting would have been material to Chief Judge McMahon's analysis of whether \nshe was facing a \"Chemical Bank kind of situation.\" (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. E at 2). \nIn Chemical Bank, counsel for a civil party approached the Manhattan District Attorney's \nOffice \"suggesting that it had evidence of criminal violations relating to the case.\" 154 F.R.D. at \n93. In response, a grand jury subpoena was issued and \"confidential documents were produced by \nthe defendant without complying with any of the specific procedures or exceptions provided in the \n[confidentiality] orders.\" Id. Here, by contrast, the Government accurately conveyed to Chief \nJudge McMahon the opening of its investigation in late 2018, the reason it made contact with Boies \nSchiller shortly thereafter and served a subpoena in February 2019, and that no documents \ngoverned by the protective order had yet been produced. Aside from rank speculation loosely \npremised on an anonymously sourced news report, the defendant offers nothing to support her \nassertion that \"Boies Schiller was instrumental in fomenting the Maxwell prosecution\" (Def. Mot. \n3 at 2) (emphasis in original), or that AUSA-1 's February 2016 meeting with Boies Schiller (as it \nactually occurred) undercut the accuracy of the Government's\n... [truncated, 2141 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/117 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=117]", "char_count": 2141}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 118, "text_content": "Second, the Government did not misrepresent the extent of its knowledge of the contents \nof Boies Schiller's files. As the Government correctly represented to the court, the Government \nhad \"either little or no additional information than the Court does in terms of what materials there \nare [and] who was deposed.\" (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. D at 17). In support of her argument, Maxwell \ncites again to the Daily News Article, which reports that \"after Maxwell's two depositions, David \nBoies himself apparently approached the government in the summer of 2016, asking if the \nSouthern District would consider charging Maxwell with perjury\"' (Def. Mot. 3 at 8). But the \nGovernment has uncovered no evidence that such a meeting ever occurred. AUSA-1 does not \nrecall ever speaking with or meeting David Boies in her life. (Ex. 4 at 4). Moreover, AUSA-1 \ndoes not recall being asked if the USAO-SDNY would consider charging Maxwell with perjury \n(id. at 5), and while notes of the February 2016 meeting refer to the existence of depositions \ngenerally, there can be no question Chief Judge McMahon appreciated the Government's general \nunderstanding that such transcripts would be part of the civil litigation file. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. G at \n21). Simply put, there is no evidence that the Government had any significant knowledge of the \ncontents of Boies Schiller's files, or that the Government's representations to Chief Judge \nMcMahon were incorrect. \nIn sum, Maxwell has failed to put forth any evidence that the Government misled Chief \nJudge McMahon, and as such, the good faith exception applies. To the contrary, the record before \nthe Court demonstrates that the Government directly responded to Chief Judge McMahon's \nquestion and accurately described the contacts between Boies Schiller and the USAO-SDNY in \nconnection with the investigation, the Government's lack of knowledge of the contents of that file, \nand the fact that no protected materials had been produced in violation of the protective\n... [truncated, 2121 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/118 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=118]", "char_count": 2121}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 119, "text_content": "considered the Government's application and then issued a lengthy opinion ruling on that \napplication, the Government was entirely reasonable in its understanding that the order was lawful. \nIt was therefore similarly reasonable for the Government to obtain materials from Boies Schiller \nin response to the subpoena that had been analyzed and blessed by a court order. The Government \nacted with an 'objectively reasonable good-faith belief' that its conduct was lawful and in \nreasonable reliance on the district court's order. Zodhiates, 901 F.3d at 143 (internal quotation \nmarks and citations omitted). \nc. \nSuppression of Certain Materials Would Be Improper Under \nthe Inevitable Discovery Doctrine \nTo the extent materials the Government obtained from Boies Schiller have now been \nunsealed and posted on the public docket, there is no basis to suppress such materials because the \nGovernment would have inevitably been able to access them upon unsealing. \ni. \nApplicable Law \nUnder the inevitable discovery doctrine, \"evidence that was illegally obtained will not be \nsuppressed `if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably' \neven if there had been no statutory or constitutional violation.\" United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d \n671, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984)). When a claim of \ninevitable discovery is raised, the court must \"determine, viewing affairs as they existed at the \ninstant before the unlawful search occurred, what would have happened had the unlawful search \nnever occurred.\" Stokes, 733 F.3d at 444 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see also United \nStates v. Heath, 455 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2006) (The application of the inevitable discovery \ndoctrine \"turns on a central question: Would the disputed evidence inevitably have been found \nthrough legal means `but for' the constitutional violation? If the answer is `yes,' the evidence \nseized will not be excluded.\"). \n93 \nEFTA000395\n... [truncated, 2003 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/119 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=119]", "char_count": 2003}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 120, "text_content": "\"The government bears the burden of proving inevitable discovery by a preponderance of \nthe evidence.\" Stokes, 733 F.3d at 444 (citing Mr, 467 U.S. at 444). This requires establishing, \n\"'with a high level of confidence, that each of the contingencies necessary to the legal discovery \nof the contested evidence would be resolved in the government's favor.\" Id. (quoting Heath, 455 \nF.3d at 60). As the Supreme Court has explained, if the Government can establish that the evidence \ninevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, \"then the deterrence rationale [for the \nexclusionary rule] has so little basis that the evidence should be received.\" Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. \nii. \nDiscussion \nEven if the Court were to find that there had been some constitutional violation in the \nGovernment obtaining a modification of the protective order—which it should not—the question \nin an inevitable discovery analysis is whether the Government would inevitably have found the \ndisputed evidence. The answer is yes, at least as to some of the evidence, including the April 2016 \ndeposition that forms the basis of Count Five and part of the July 2016 deposition that forms the \nbasis of Count Six.41\n41 In January 2021, the defendant asked Judge Preska to reconsider her order unsealing certain \nportions of her testimony on the basis that, among other things, public release of the section would \nmake it more difficult for Maxwell to suppress the testimony as evidence against her at her criminal \ntrial. On February 8, 2021, Judge Preska \"decline[d] Ms. Maxwell's invitation to reconsider its \norder\" and noted that the defendant had both filed a suppression motion and available tools under \nthe Federal Rules of Evidence and Procedure. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1211 at 3, 5). \nThe portion of the July 2016 deposition transcript that forms the basis of Count Six that has been \nunsealed relates to the defendant denying that she has given a massage to anyone, including Epstein \nor Minor Vi\n... [truncated, 2612 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/120 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=120]", "char_count": 2612}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 121, "text_content": "The defendant asks the Court for a drastic remedy, namely suppression of all evidence the \nGovernment obtained pursuant to the subpoena, as well as the dismissal of Counts Five and Six. \nIn so doing, the defendant seeks a windfall to which she is not entitled based on unprecedented \nclaims that ignore the facts and the law. Suppression of all materials the Government obtained \npursuant to the subpoena is unwarranted here, particularly where certain of the materials have been \nsubsequently unsealed by Judge Preska in the underlying civil litigation, including Maxwell's \nApril 2016 deposition transcript. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1077). The Second Circuit \naffirmed Judge Preska's ruling in October 2020, finding that the Court \"correctly held that the \ndeposition materials are judicial documents to which the presumption of public access attaches, \nand did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Maxwell's meritless arguments that her interests \nsuperseded the presumption of access.\" Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413 (2d Cir.), (Dkt. No. 140-\n1 at 3).42 On October 22, 2020, the defendant's April 2016 deposition was publicly filed. (See 15 \nCiv. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1137-13). In February 2021, a redacted version of the defendant's July \n2016 deposition was publicly filed. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1212-1). In other words, \nhad the Government not obtained an order modifying the protective order, the Government \ninevitably would have discovered and obtained, at a minimum, the defendant's April 2016 \ndeposition transcript and a portion of the July 2016 transcript that form the basis of the charges in \nCounts Five and Six. \n42 Relatedly, the defendant moved to modify the criminal protective order in order to use \nconfidential criminal discovery materials in filings she intended to submit in civil litigation. The \ndefendant raised this precise point—that if the Court ultimately decided that it was inappropriate \nfor the Government to proceed by subpoena, the Govern\n... [truncated, 2609 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/121 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=121]", "char_count": 2609}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 122, "text_content": "3. \nThe Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained Pursuant to \nthe Subpoena Under the Fifth Amendment Is Without Merit \nThe defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to the subpoena on Fifth \nAmendment grounds fails for multiple, independent reasons. As an initial matter, Boies Schiller \nis not the Government and was not acting as an agent of the Government when it deposed the \ndefendant or otherwise litigated the civil case against her. That the defendant may regret her choice \nto respond to Boies Schiller's questions during two depositions instead of invoking her privilege \nagainst self-incrimination does not transform that choice into a Fifth Amendment violation. \na. \nApplicable Law \ni. \nThe Fifth Amendment — Generally \nThe Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: \"No person .. . shall be compelled in any \ncriminal case to be a witness against himself.\" U.S. Const. amend. V. To establish a Fifth \nAmendment violation, an individual must \"demonstrate the existence of three elements: \n1) compulsion, 2) a testimonial communication, and 3) the incriminating nature of that \ncommunication.\" In re Grand Jwy Subpoena, 826 F.2d 1166, 1168 (1987); see also, e.g., In Re \nThree Grand Jut), Subpoenas Jan. 5, 1988, 847 F.2d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1988). \nIt is \"axiomatic that the Amendment does not automatically preclude self-incrimination, \nwhether spontaneous or in response to questions put by government officials.\" United States v. \nWashington, 431 U.S. 181, 186 (1977). \"Indeed, far from being prohibited by the Constitution, \nadmissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable.\" Id. at 187. \"[T]he \nFifth Amendment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a `genuine compulsion of \ntestimony.'\" Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974)); see also Washington, \n431 U.S. at 187 (\"Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege \nis not violated by even the most damning admissions\n... [truncated, 2065 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/122 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=122]", "char_count": 2065}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 123, "text_content": "element which influences a criminal suspect to make incriminating admissions.\" Id. The question \nis not whether a witness was encouraged to speak, but whether his \"free will,\" when he spoke, \n\"was overborne.\" Id. at 188; see also, e.g., United States v. Corbett, 750 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. \n2014). \nIt follows that the Government need not inform a witness of the nature of its investigation, \nsee United States v. Olovumabua, 828 F.2d 950, 953 (2d Cir. 1987), much less his individual status \nin the investigation, see Washington, 431 U.S. at 189 & 190 n.6. The Constitution does not \n\"require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-\ninterest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.\" Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, \n576-77 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., id. at 577 (there is no requirement \nthat law enforcement give information that might affect \"the wisdom\" of speaking). Nor does the \nConstitution require that someone be questioned only in the manner most likely to ensure that he \ngives the decision whether to speak careful thought. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d \n149, 157 (2d Cir. 2011) (\"the Fifth Amendment does not protect against hard choices\" (internal \nquotation marks omitted)); United States v. Mullens, 536 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1976) (there is a \ndifference between \"those choices which are physically or psychologically coerced and those \nwhich are merely difficult\"). \nIn short, the Fifth Amendment is only violated by \"government misconduct\" that is \n\"coercive.\" Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. \n298, 312 (1985) (Fifth Amendment prohibits \"coercion\" effected \"by physical violence or other \ndeliberate means calculated to break the suspect's will\"). \nii. \nThe Fifth Amendment — Act of Production Privilege \nThe act of production privilege is a form of the Fifth Amendment privilege pertaining to \nthe production of\n... [truncated, 2099 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/123 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=123]", "char_count": 2099}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 124, "text_content": "to produce documents, the contents of which are not privileged, where the act of production is, \nitself, (1) compelled, (2) testimonial, and (3) incriminating.\" In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas \nDuces Tecwn Dated Jan. 29, 1999, 191 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1999). \nConsistent with these requirements, the privilege only \"prohibits the compelled disclosure \nof documents when the act of production has independent communicative aspects-such as an \nadmission that the documents exist, that the subject possesses or controls the documents, that the \ndocuments are authentic, or that the subject believes the documents are responsive to the \nsubpoena.\" In re Various Grand Jury Subpoenas, 924 F. Supp. 2d 549, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), \naff'd, 579 F. App's 37 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). \nIt follows that the privilege does not apply when \"[t]he existence and location of the [sought] \npapers are a foregone conclusion and the [compelled individual] adds little or nothing to the sum \ntotal of the Government's information by conceding that he in fact has the papers.\" Id. at 411; see \nalso In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993); \nMadanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (\"[E]ven if documents contain \nincriminating information, requiring a person to produce them does not implicate the Fifth \nAmendment unless the act of production is itself testimonial in nature and incriminating to the \nperson making the disclosure.\"). \niii. \nThe Fifth Amendment — When Private Action Is Deemed \nGovernment Action \nAs discussed above, \"[t]he sole concern of the Fifth Amendment . . is governmental \ncoercion.\" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170. \"[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned `with \nmoral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official \ncoercion.'\" Id. (quoting Elsiad, 470 U.S. at 305). For this reason, even \"[t]he most outrageous \n98 \nEFTA00039545\n", "char_count": 1988}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 125, "text_content": "behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that \nevidence inadmissible.\" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166. \nThis does not mean that only action undertaken directly by the Government may violate \nthe Fifth Amendment (or another right). In certain circumstances, a private entity may be deemed \nto be acting as a government agent. See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2008) \n(\"Actions of a private entity are attributable to the State if there is a sufficiently close nexus \nbetween the State and the challenged action of the entity so that the action of the latter may be \nfairly treated as that of the State itself.\" (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). \nHowever, this standard \"is not satisfied when the state merely approves of or acquiesces in \nthe initiatives of the private entity, or when an entity is merely subject to governmental regulation.\" \nId. (internal quotations marks and citations omitted; alterations incorporated)). Nor is it sufficient \nthat a non-government entity chooses to cooperate with a government investigation or has its own \nparallel investigation. See id. at 150. Non-government action is attributable to the government \n\"only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the \n[defendant] complains.\" Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (emphasis in original). \n\"Such responsibility is normally found when the State `has exercised coercive power or has \nprovided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be \ndeemed to be that of the State.\"' Stein, 541 F.3d at 147 (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004); see also \nFlagg v. Yonkers Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 396 F.3d 178, 187 (2d Cir. 2005). \nb. \nDiscussion \nAs an initial matter, the defendant's Fifth Amendment claim fails because she has not \ndemonstrated state action. Boies Schiller is not an agent of the Government and has not been at \nany time during the course o\n... [truncated, 2090 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/125 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=125]", "char_count": 2090}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 126, "text_content": "lawsuit against the defendant or took her deposition years before the Government initiated its own \ninvestigation. The defendant offers no evidence to the contrary, and there is no reason to believe, \non this record, that the Government in any way controlled Boies Schiller when it litigated a civil \ncase against the defendant. As such, the Fifth Amendment does not apply. \nThe defendant's claim further fails because without coercion or compulsion, there is no \nFifth Amendment violation. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (rejecting claim \nthat a \"failure to inform [the defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his \nconfession at trial\"); United States v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1992) (\"Inculpatory \nstatements are not involuntary when they result from a desire to cooperate, or from a defendant's \nignorance of, or inattention to, his right to remain silent.\"); United States v. Mast, 735 F.2d 745, \n750 (2d Cir. 1984) (same). The defendant implicitly argues that she only testified under oath in \nthe civil matter because she thought she would not be held to that oath. In other words, had she \nknown that she would be subject to the penalties of perjury, she would have invoked her Fifth \nAmendment right. \nBut the defendant's misguided expectation that she would face no \nconsequences cannot be said to coerce speech. The defendant, represented by able counsel, \nvoluntarily chose to waive her Fifth Amendment rights and testify under oath. And she chose to \ndo so in connection with civil depositions that occurred over two years before the Government \nopened its investigation. The circumstances surrounding that decision come nowhere near the type \nof coercion that rises to the level of a Fifth Amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, \n464 F. Supp. 3d 621, 627-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding suppression of defendant's phone \nunwarranted where defendant complied with former employer's request to return the phone \nbecause defendan\n... [truncated, 2096 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/126 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=126]", "char_count": 2096}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 127, "text_content": "employer was required to warn her that it might produce the phone to the government, even \nassuming arguendo that that employer's actions were attributable to the government). \nThe defendant's claim that her act of production privilege was somehow violated similarly \nfails. Counsel cites Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) for the proposition that \"a \ncompulsory production of the private books and papers . . . [also] is compelling . . . him to be a \nwitness against himself, within the meaning of the fifth amendment.\" (Det. Mot. 11 at 15) (quoting \nBoyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct 29, 1992, the \nSecond Circuit ruled that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the contents of private papers that \nare not business documents, and also noted that \"[s]everal aspects of the Boyd decision did not \nendure.\" 1 F.3d at 90 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)). \nFurther, the Fifth Amendment does not protect against being compelled to speak and then \nspeaking falsely. \"[E]ven if an individual's perjured testimony is improperly procured because of \ngovernment misconduct, that testimony may still be used to prosecute that defendant for perjury.\" \nUnited States v. Olivieri, 740 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing United States v. \nRemington, 208 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1953); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965)); \nsee also United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 180 (1977) (\"[P]erjury is not a permissible way of \nobjecting to the Government's questions. . . . Indeed, even if the Government could, on pain of \ncriminal sanctions, compel an answer to its incriminating questions, a citizen is not at liberty to \nanswer falsely.\"); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72, 90 (1969) (rejecting challenge to false \nstatement prosecution; \"[I]t cannot be thought that as a general principle of our law a citizen has a \nprivilege to answer fraudulently a question that the Government should not have asked. . . . \n... [truncated, 2170 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/127 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=127]", "char_count": 2170}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 128, "text_content": "Contrary to the defendant's argument (Def. Mot. 11 at 16), this case is distinguishable from \nUnited States v. Oshatz, 700 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). There, the defendant had already been \nindicted at the time of his deposition in a civil case, \"was reluctant to be deposed because of the \npending indictment, and he agreed only after the parties in the civil case stipulated that the \ndeposition would be sealed.\" Id. at 699-700. The court found that the subpoenas for the deposition \ntranscript were \"unenforceable\" because the \"government has not argued that the protective order \nwas improvidently granted or that there are some extraordinary circumstances or compelling need, \nin view of the holding in Martindell.\"43 Id. at 701. The court found that the protective order served \nthe \"'vital function\" described in Martindell, as the defendant had already been indicted at the \ntime of his deposition in a civil case for almost seven months; the defendant \"consistently resisted \nthe use of his testimony in the criminal action against him\"; and the Government did not seek the \ndeposition \"to aid it in a criminal investigation or grand jury proceeding.\" Id. at 700; see also \nBotha v. Don King Productions, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7587 (JGK), 1998 WL 88745 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. \n27, 1998) (noting importance of policy concerns of Martindell where Government obtained an \nindictment against witness \"long before his deposition in the civil action\" and where federal \ncriminal case remains pending after civil action is resolved). Here, by contrast, Chief Judge \nMcMahon found that the \"Government has persuasively demonstrated extraordinary \ncircumstances, which would entitle it to modification in any event.\" (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. G at 22). \nAs she noted in her opinion, the situation was distinct from Oshatz \"where the Government was \ntrolling for evidence to use at a trial, rather than seeking information as part of a criminal \ninvestigation or grand jury proceeding.\" (Id. at 24-25). As Chief Judge \n... [truncated, 2266 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/128 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=128]", "char_count": 2266}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 129, "text_content": "The defendant argues that Martindell \"authorized her to give deposition testimony under \nthe shield of the Protective Order without worrying whether the government could `insinuate itself' \ninto the case and use her own words against her.\" (Def. Mot. 11 at 15-16). That is not the law, \nand the defendant cannot use the protective order to cloak her testimony. The Second Circuit has \nrecognized that because \"[i]t is well-settled here and elsewhere . . . that a Rule 26(c) protective \norder may be overturned or modified based on a finding of improvidence, extraordinary \ncircumstances or compelling need[,]\" \"as a practical matter it is clear that the protections afforded \nby a Rule 26(c) order are not as extensive as those afforded by the fifth amendment, or by a \nstatutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a \nwitness' fifth amendment rights.\" Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); \nsee id. at 1084 (\"Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no \ndeponent may always effectively rely on a protective order to secure his right against self-\nincrimination.\") (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988))); \nDavis, 702 F.2d at 421-22 (\"Absent applicable grounds for exception, such as a previously asserted \nFifth Amendment privilege, no shield protects the civil evidence [ ] from compellable production \nbefore the grand jury which subpoenaed it\"). \n4. \nThe Government Did Not Violate Maxwell's Due Process Rights \nThe defendant also claims that the Government's conduct \"cannot be squared with \nelemental due process.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 14 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V)). This claim is meritless. \nBecause there was no Government misconduct—let alone the type of outrageous Government \n103 \nEFTA00039550\n", "char_count": 1848}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 130, "text_content": "misconduct that would justify the extraordinary remedy the defendant seeks—the motion must be \ndenied. \na. \nApplicable Law \nThe Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person . . . shall be \ndeprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . \n.\" The Due Process Clause \n\"protects individuals against two types of government action.\" Martinez v. McAleenan, 385 F. \nSupp. 3d 349, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Procedural due process \"ensures that government cannot \nunfairly and without meaningful process deprive a person of life, liberty, or property,\" while \nsubstantive due process \"prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the \nconscience, or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.\" Id. (internal \nquotation marks and citations omitted; alteration omitted). \nProcedural due process analysis focuses on whether government action depriving a person \nof life, liberty, or property. . . [is] implemented in a fair manner,\" United States v. Salerno, 481 \nU.S. 739, 746 (1987). \"Courts examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first \nasks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the \n[Government]; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were \nconstitutionally sufficient.\" United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) \n(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). \nAs to substantive due process, the Supreme Court is \"always . . . reluctant to expand the \nconcept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this \nunchartered area are scarce and open-ended.\" Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 \n(1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because of this reluctance, the Supreme \nCourt held in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), \"that where a particular Amendment \nprovides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection again\n... [truncated, 2043 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/130 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=130]", "char_count": 2043}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 131, "text_content": "government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due \nprocess, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.\" County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. \n833, 842 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1993) \n(\"[t]he protections of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters \nrelating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.\"). \nThe defendant bears the \"'very heavy' burden of establishing a due process violation.\" \nUnited States v. Walters, 910 F.3d 11, 27 (2d Cir. 2018). \"To succeed on a claim that the \ngovernment's conduct in pursuit of evidence violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment due process \nrights, the government's method of acquiring the evidence must be so egregious that it 'shocks the \nconscience.'\" United States v. Loera, 333 F. Supp. 3d 172, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal \nquotation marks and citations omitted). \n\"The concept of fairness embodied in the Fifth \nAmendment due process guarantee is violated by government action that is fundamentally unfair \nor shocking to our traditional sense of justice, or conduct that is `so outrageous' that common \nnotions of fairness and decency would be offended were judicial processes invoked to obtain a \nconviction against the accused.\" United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal \nquotation marks and citations omitted). \"Such outrageous or conscience shocking behavior \ninvolves egregious invasions of individual rights, or coercion.\" United States v. Coke, No. 07 Cr. \n971 (RPP), 2011 WL 3738969, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) (internal quotation marks and \ncitations omitted). The Second Circuit has explained: \nThe paradigm examples of conscience-shocking conduct are \negregious invasions of individual rights. See, e.g., Rochin, 342 U.S. \nat 172, 72 S. Ct. 205 (breaking into suspect's bedroom, forcibly \nattempting to pull capsules from his throat, and pumping his \nstom\n... [truncated, 2262 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/131 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=131]", "char_count": 2262}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 132, "text_content": "investigatory conduct is very heavy, see United States v. Schmidt, \n105 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1997). \nUnited States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 131 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d \n108, 121 (2d Cir. 2011) (\"Generally, to be `outrageous,' the government's involvement in a crime \nmust involve either coercion or a violation of the defendant's person. It does not suffice to show \nthat the government created the opportunity for the offense, even if the government's ploy is \nelaborate and the engagement with the defendant is extensive.\" (internal citations omitted)). The \nSecond Circuit has \"yet to identify a particular set of circumstances in which government \ninvestigative conduct was so egregious that it shocked the conscience and violated fundamental \nguarantees of due process.\" United States v. Heyward, No. 10 Cr. 84 (LTS), 2010 WL 4484642, \nat *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010); see also United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 218 (2d Cir. \n2019). \nThere also \"must be a causal connection between the violation and the deprivation of the \ndefendant's life or liberty threatened by the prosecution.\" United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. \n2d 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). \"That is to say, relief against the government in a criminal case is \nappropriate if, and only if, a conviction otherwise would be a product of the government \nmisconduct that violated the Due Process Clause.\" Id. \nEven where Government misconduct meets the outrageousness test, dismissal of an \nindictment is warranted only where the Government's behavior \"resulted in [] prejudice to the \n[defendant's] defense or legal representation.\" United States v. DiGregorio, 795 F. Supp. 630, \n635 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Absent a showing of prejudice, the appropriate remedy for conduct violating \nthe test for outrageousness is suppression of the evidence obtained as the result of the \nGovernment's outrageous misconduct. Id. \n106 \nEFTA00039553\n", "char_count": 1926}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 133, "text_content": "b. \nDiscussion \nThe defendant argues that the Due Process Clause requires the suppression of the evidence \nthe Government obtained pursuant to subpoena, including the April and July 2016 depositions, \nand the dismissal of Counts Five and Six. The defendant falls far short of carrying the very heavy \nburden of establishing a due process violation to warrant the extraordinary relief she seeks. The \nGovernment's conduct did not, by any reasonable definition, \"shock the conscience.\" \nThe defendant has not identified explicitly the component of her due process rights that the \nGovernment allegedly violated. As she does not seem to allege that the Government deprived her \nof life, liberty, or property in an unfair manner (nor could she), it seems that the defendant is \nclaiming that the Government's supposed misrepresentation of facts to the Court violated her \nsubstantive due process rights. As set forth above, the Government did not mislead Chief Judge \nMcMahon in connection with its ex pane application. The Government did not violate the law, \nmuch less participate in any violation that so \"shocks the conscience\" as to require suppression as \na matter of substantive due process. \nThe defendant has neither specified what \"fundamental right\" the Government allegedly \nviolated nor provided legal authority supporting her claim. She cites United States v. Valentine, \n820 F.2d 565, 570 (2d Cir. 1987), seemingly to argue that her right to a fair trial has been implicated \nbecause of the same alleged prosecutorial misconduct in connection with the modification of the \nprotective order described above. However, the defendant cites no authority for the proposition \nthat such misconduct (assuming, of course, it occurred, which it did not) would warrant the relief \nshe now seeks, and the primary case she relies upon is readily distinguishable. In Valentine, the \ndefendant was convicted of perjury based upon grand jury testimony in which he denied that he \nwas given a loan to make \n... [truncated, 2090 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/133 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=133]", "char_count": 2090}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 134, "text_content": "and held that it was a due process violation for the prosecutor to suggest that certain witnesses, \nwho had not testified at trial but who had testified before the grand jury, supported the \nGovernment's theory of the case, when in fact their testimony before the grand jury did not. Id. \nThe Second Circuit stated that this action \"violated the due process prohibition against a \nprosecutor's making `knowing use of false evidence,' including by misrepresenting the nature of \nnontestimonial evidence.\" Id. at 570-71 (quoting Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1967)). The \nSecond Circuit further noted that reversal of a criminal conviction is a \"drastic remedy that courts \nare generally reluctant to implement,\" and that the court would only do so \"when a prosecutor's \ntactics cause substantial prejudice to the defendant and thereby serve to deprive him of his right to \na fair trial.\" Id. \nThe instant case is easily distinguishable from Valentine, as it does not involve any of the \nsame facts, including any alleged mischaracterization of grand jury testimony at trial or any \nprosecutor making \"knowing use of false evidence.\" Id. at 570-71; see also Mills v. Scully, 826 \nF.2d 1192, 1195 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Valentine for the proposition that \"[e]ven where defense \ncounsel is aware of the falsity, there may be a deprivation of due process if the prosecutor \nreinforces the deception by capitalizing on it in closing argument, or by posing misleading \nquestions to the witnesses\" (citations omitted)). \"Prosecutorial misconduct denies a defendant due \nprocess only when it is `of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to \na fair trial!\" Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 440 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 \nU.S. 756, 765 (1987)). \nThe defendant has otherwise failed to identify how she has been deprived of the right to a \nfair trial. A jury will hear testimony about the defendant's statements during her April and July \n2016 deposition\n... [truncated, 2098 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/134 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=134]", "char_count": 2098}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 135, "text_content": "\"While the Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses . . it defines the \nbasic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment.\" \nCap/in & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617,633 (1989) (citations omitted). \"The \nright of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity \nto defend against the State's accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and \nto call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.\" \nChambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,294 (1973). And as noted, the defendant cites no legal \nauthority supporting the proposition that the Government's actions during its investigation have \nsomehow deprived her of a fair trial or otherwise violated her due process rights. In short, none \nof Maxwell's allegations of misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation. \nDismissal of Counts Five and Six of the Indictment would be all the more unwarranted \nhere, where there was no outrageous Government misconduct and where the defendant cannot \nshow that the Government's behavior prejudiced her defense or legal representation. Similarly, \nbecause there was no misconduct by the Government, there is no basis to suppress the evidence \nobtained pursuant to the subpoena. The defendant's motion—unsupported by the law and the \nfacts-must be denied. \n5. \nThe Court Should Not Exercise Its Inherent Authority to Order \nSuppression \nThe defendant urges the Court to exercise its inherent authority to order suppression. This \nCourt should decline the defendant's invitation to exercise this sparingly used power. \na. \nApplicable Law \n\"[T]he Supreme Court has recognized three purposes for the supervisory powers, `to \nimplement a remedy for violation of recognized rights, to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring \nthat a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury, and final\n... [truncated, 2035 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/135 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=135]", "char_count": 2035}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 136, "text_content": "designed to deter illegal conduct.' Coke, 2011 WL 3738969, at '6 (quoting United States v. \nHastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)). \"However, while there are times when a district court may \nproperly find it absolutely necessary[, in order] to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice \nsystem, to suppress evidence under its inherent or supervisory authority, 'the Supreme Court has \nexplained that a court's inherent power to refuse to receive material evidence is a power that must \nbe sparingly exercised [only in cases of] manifestly improper conduct by federal officials.\" United \nStates v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 401 (2d Cir. 2018) (alterations and emphasis in original) (internal \nquotations and citations omitted). The Second Circuit has \"'recognized that courts cannot fashion \ntheir own sub-constitutional limitations on the conduct of law enforcement agents.\" Id. (quoting \nUnited States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 792 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Myers, 692 \nF.2d 823, 847 (2d Cir. 1982). \"Accordingly, the court should not exercise its inherent or \nsupervisory power `as a substitute for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which adequately \nsafeguards against unlawful searches and seizures.' Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401 (quoting Ming He, \n94 F.3d at 792); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) (\"the supervisory \npower does not extend so far\" as to \"confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the \nconsidered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing\"). \nb. \nDiscussion \nBy asking the Court to exercise its inherent authority, the defendant apparently means to \nsuggest that the Court should grant the relief she seeks, even if she has failed to establish a violation \nof the Constitution or other governing law. The defendant fails to provide justification for the \nextraordinary remedy of suppression or to cite persuasive case law in favor of such an \nextraordinary use of the Court's inherent authority. \n110 \nEFTA00039557\n", "char_count": 1993}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 137, "text_content": "The law is clear that a district court's supervisory authority does not extend to suppressing \nevidence absent some violation of the Constitution or other governing law. See Payner, 447 U.S. \nat 737 (holding that \"the supervisory power does not extend\" to \"disregard[ing] the considered \nlimitations of the law it is charged with enforcing\"); United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969, 976 \n(2d Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 1992) (\"Absent a \nviolation of a recognized right under the Constitution, a statute, or a procedural rule, a district court \nis not entitled to exclude evidence as a sanction against government practices disapproved of by \nthe court.\"). The requirements established by the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit for \nsuppressing evidence would have little effect if district courts were free to disregard them and \nsuppress evidence by invoking their supervisory authority. Consistent with that principle, and \ngiven that this power is \"sparingly exercised,\" Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401, (emphasis in original), \nthis Court should not elect to do so here where the defendant has not established a violation of her \nFourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, or due process rights. See, e.g., id. at 401-02 (\"We can \nappreciate the district court's frustration at careless government representations that may impact \nthe integrity of judicial decisions, especially proffers in support of ex parte applications that an \nadversary has no opportunity to dispute[,]\" but finding that the district court erred in suppressing \nevidence by invoking its inherent authority); Coke, 2011 WL 3738969, at *6 (declining to exercise \nits supervisory powers to suppress wiretap evidence and finding defendant \"has no Fourth \nAmendment right, and the novel substantive due process right he asks this Court to create cannot \nbe described as a recognized right.\" (internal citations omitted)). \n6. \nThe Defendant Is Not Entitled to a Hearing \nThe defendant argues \n... [truncated, 2183 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/137 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=137]", "char_count": 2183}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 138, "text_content": "\"misstatements\" to Chief Judge McMahon and the extent of coordination between the USAO-\nSDNY and Boies Schiller prior to the issuance of the subpoena. (Def. Mot. 3 at 16). With respect \nto that alleged \"misconduct,\" the defendant appears to makes two general accusations: first, that \nin 2016 Boies Schiller encouraged the USAO-SDNY to investigate the defendant for perjury, and \nsecond, that the Government's statement to Chief Judge McMahon as to whether she was facing a \n\"Chemical Bank kind of situation\" was false. Neither is correct, for the reasons described above. \nBecause the defendant has proffered no reliable evidence to support any of the accusations \ncontained in her motion papers, and because the Government has responded to those accusations \nwith AUSA-1's contemporaneous notes of the February 29, 2016 meeting and notes from an \ninterview of AUSA-1 conducted by the USAO-SDNY and the FBI (see Exs. 4 & 5), as well as \nrelevant AUSA-1 emails (Exs. 6 & 7), such a hearing is not warranted. \na. \nApplicable Law \n\"[E]videntiary hearings should not be set as a matter of course, but only when the petition \nalleges facts which if proved would require the grant of relief.\" Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d \n165, 170 (2d Cir. 1960). \"In order to make the requisite showing in sufficient detail, the defendant \nmust submit an affidavit by someone with personal knowledge that disputed facts exist.\" United \nStates v. Noble, No. 07 Cr. 284 (RJS), 2008 WL 140966, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2008). \"In the \nabsence of such an affidavit, or when the allegations contained in such an affidavit are general and \nconclusory, an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary.\" United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp. 2d 351, \n359 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A district court may decide the motion without a hearing if the moving \npapers do not create a genuine issue as to any material fact. United States v. Carving, 968 F.2d \n232, 236 (2d Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135\n... [truncated, 2124 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/138 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=138]", "char_count": 2124}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 139, "text_content": "hearing requires \"an affidavit of someone with personal knowledge of the underlying facts.\" \nUnited States v. Shaw, 260 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also United States v. Gillette, \n383 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ahmad, 992 F. Supp. 682, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) \n(\"ordinarily [a factual issue must be] raised by an affidavit of a person with personal knowledge \nof the facts;\" otherwise \"there is no basis for holding an evidentiary hearing or suppressing the \nevidence\"). \nThe defendant's allegations are analogous to those raised when evaluating defendants' \nclaims of Government Franks violations. To obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a \n\"substantial preliminary showing,\" United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) \n(quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)), that (i) there were \"inaccuracies or \nomissions\" in the affidavit, (ii) \"the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the issuing \njudge's probable cause or necessity finding,\" and (iii) \"the claimed inaccuracies or omissions \n[were] the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth.\" Lambus, \n897 F.3d at 397; see also United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 64 (2d Cir. 2003). Even if a \ndefendant clears the first Franks hurdle with a substantial preliminary showing of a false statement \nor omission, the defendant is not entitled to a Franks hearing unless a reviewing court makes the \nlegal determination that the false statement or omission was \"necessary to the [issuing] judge's \nprobable cause finding.\" United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 718 (2d Cir. 2000). \nTo determine whether alleged errors and omissions are material, a court should revise the \naffidavit (adding alleged omissions and correcting alleged errors), and determine whether the \nrevised affidavit supports a finding of probable cause. See, e.g., Canfield, 212 F.3d at 719. If the \nrevised affidavit supports a probable cause finding, th\n... [truncated, 2159 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/139 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=139]", "char_count": 2159}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 140, "text_content": "alleged omissions and correcting the alleged errors, the \"ultimate inquiry\" is whether \"there \nremains a residue of independent and lawful information sufficient to support probable cause.\" \nUnited States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations \nomitted). \n\"[E]ven if the misrepresented or omitted information was material, a motion to suppress is \nto be denied unless the misrepresentations or omissions were intentional or deliberate, or were \nmade in reckless disregard for the truth.\" Lambus, 897 F.3d at 399. The standard to demonstrate \nmaterial false statements and omissions in an agent's affidavit is a \"high one.\" Rivera v. United \nStates, 928 F.2d 592, 604 (2d Cir. 1991). The intent prong of Franks is particularly demanding \nwith respect to omissions. \"Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that \nare made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead.\" Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 \n(emphasis in original). After all, \"la]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is \ntherefore not necessarily constitutionally significant that an affidavit `omit[s] facts which, in \nretrospect, seem significant.'\" United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) \n(quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. \n4, 2007)); see also United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727, at *2 \n(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) (\"As courts in this Circuit have recognized, it is not shocking that every \naffidavit will omit facts which, in retrospect, seem significant.\" (internal quotation marks and \ncitations omitted)). \nThe \"substantial preliminary showing\" requirement explained above exists to \"avoid \nfishing expeditions into affidavits that are otherwise presumed truthful.\" Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. \n\"[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law.\" United States v. \nPizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN), 2018 W\n... [truncated, 2072 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/140 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=140]", "char_count": 2072}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 141, "text_content": "Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 (\"To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more \nthan conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.\"). Instead, \nto warrant a Franks hearing: \n[t]here must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless \ndisregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied \nby an offer of proof . . . Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable \nstatements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence \nsatisfactorily explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent \nmistake are insufficient. The deliberate falsity or reckless disregard \nwhose impeachment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, \nnot of any nongovernmental informant. \nId. \nThe burden to even obtain a Franks hearing is a heavy one, and such hearings are thus \nexceedingly rare. See United States v. Brown, 744 F. Supp. 558, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (\"A \ndefendant seeking to have the Court hold a Franks hearing bears a substantial burden.\"); United \nStates v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788, 790 (7th Cir. 2000) (\"These elements are hard to prove, and thus \nFranks hearings are rarely held.\"). \nb. \nDiscussion \nIn an alternative effort to suppress the materials obtained pursuant to the subpoena, the \ndefendant argues that an evidentiary hearing is warranted to inquire into the Government's \n\"misrepresentations\" to Chief Judge McMahon. (Def. Mot. 3 at 16). However, as discussed \nextensively above, Maxwell's motion is little more than speculation and innuendo, itself rooted in \na lone news article that, as described above, is not fully accurate. She otherwise presents no \nadmissible evidence, affidavits, or other materials supporting the breathless accusations contained \nin her motion papers. As such, because the defendant does not include \"an affidavit of someone \nwith personal knowledge of the underlying facts,\" Shaw, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 570, and because the \n115 \nEFTA00039562\n", "char_count": 1947}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 142, "text_content": "Government has responded with reliable information directly rebutting the defendant's allegations, \nthere is no material issue of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing.4* \nThe defendant cites Franks, to suggest that a hearing is somehow warranted, but her motion \nfalls far short of the standard required to obtain a hearing. \"While the Franks analysis discussed \nabove is typically employed to evaluate misstatements and omissions relating to probable cause, \nthe Second Circuit has extended the Franks analysis to other Title III requirements for obtaining a \nwarrant.\" United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at *18 \n(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). The defendant fails to identify the standard that would govern such a \nhearing. In light of the interests implicated by a Title III wiretap, the USAO-SDNY submits that \nthe defendant's depositions in a civil matter, even with a protective order, are no more significant \nthan the interests implicated by a Title III wiretap. As such, the exacting standard of Franks should \napply. On this record, the defendant has not made a threshold showing that the Government acted \nwith the intent to mislead or in reckless disregard for the truth. The Franks standard is rightly a \n\"high one,\" Rivera, 928 F.2d at 604, and one the defendant has failed to meet here. \nThe defendant's bald assertions alone do not entitle her to a fishing expedition in the form \nof a hearing. \nV. \nThe Jury Should Decide Whether the Defendant Committed Perjury \nCounts Five and Six of the Indictment allege that, during the course of two depositions, the \ndefendant knowingly made false material declarations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The \ndefendant moves to dismiss those Counts, arguing that the Court can determine now—on a pre-\n44 For similar reasons, the defendant's request for discovery regarding this matter should be denied. \nThe defendant has failed to meet her burden under Rule 16 of making \"a prima fade showing of \nmat\n... [truncated, 2382 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/142 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=142]", "char_count": 2382}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 143, "text_content": "trial record—that the questions were fundamentally ambiguous, and the defendant's answers were \ntruthful and immaterial. (Def. Mot. 5). To the contrary, the Government expects to prove at trial \nthat the defendant understood the questions and that her answers were both false and materially \nso. This case does not present the narrow circumstances in which a court can and should dismiss \nperjury counts, let alone do so before trial. \nA. \nFactual Background \nOn July 7, 2008, following the USAO-SDFL entering into the non-prosecution agreement \nwith Epstein, two minors filed a petition under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3771, alleging that the prosecutors violated their rights under that statute. See Doe v. United \nStates, 08 Civ. 80736 (S.D.F.L). See generally Doe No. 1. v. United States, 749 F.3d 999, 1002 \n(11th Cir. 2014) (describing the background of the suit). On December 30, 2014, Virginia Roberts \nGiuffre moved to join the petition, alleging that the USAO-SDFL had also violated her CVRA \nrights. See Doe, No. 08 Civ. 80736, Dkt. No. 279.45 In her motion for joinder, Giuffre described \nthe defendant as \"'one of the main women' Epstein used to `procure under-aged girls for sexual \nactivities,\"' and as a \"'primary co-conspirator' with Epstein in his scheme. See Giuffre v. Maxwell, \nNo. 18-2868 (2d Cir. 2019), Dkt. No. 287 at 10 (containing the unsealed summary judgment \nopinion from 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP)). Among other allegations, Giuffre alleged that the defendant \n\"'persuaded' [her] to go to Epstein's mansion,\" and, \"when Giuffre began giving Epstein a \nmassage, [he] and [the defendant] 'turned it into a sexual encounter.'\" Id. at 11. Giuffre alleged \nthat the defendant also \"`participat[ed] in the sexual abuse\" of others. Id. A few days later, the \npress reported a statement by a spokesman for the defendant, Ross Gow. Among other things, \n45 Giuffre filed a corrected motion on January 2, 2015. See Doe, No. 08 Civ. 80736, Dkt. No. 280. \nThe court\n... [truncated, 2188 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/143 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=143]", "char_count": 2188}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 144, "text_content": "Gow stated that Giuffre's claims were \"untrue\" and \"obvious lies.\" (15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. \nNo. 1 at 6). \nAs described in the preceding section, in the fall of 2015, Giuffre sued the defendant for \ndefamation.\" (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1). Giuffre alleged that Epstein sexually abused \nher, \"with the assistance and participation of Maxwell\" at \"numerous locations\" between 1999 and \n2002, and that Epstein abused more than thirty minors between 2001 and 2007 \"with the assistance \nof numerous co-conspirators.\" (Id. at 3). \nDuring the defendant's first deposition on April 22, 2016, the defendant refused to answer \nquestions that she deemed related to consensual adult sexual interactions. (See, e.g., Ex. 10 at \n92:20-93:6). Giuffre moved to compel the defendant to answer, explaining that \"[a]t the core of \n[her] allegations is the allegation that [the] Defendant lured her into a sexual situation with the \noffer of a job making money as a massage therapist; that Epstein always habitually tried to turn \nmassages into sex . . . and that Maxwell recruited other females for an ostensibly proper position, \nsuch as therapeutic masseuse, with knowledge that the intent was for that person would be \npressured to provide sexual gratification to Epstein.\" (15 Civ. 7443 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1137-1 at 5-\n6). Giuffre also explained that the defendant's refusal to answer questions about adult consensual \nsex prevented Giuffre \"from seeking legitimate discovery,\" such as the identity of people the \ndefendant presently deemed adults. (id. at 6). \nThe Court granted Giuffre's motion. \n\"[N]otwithstanding\" the intrusiveness of the \nquestions and the fact that the defendant had not put her private affairs at issue, \"the questions are \ndirected to reveal relevant answers regarding Defendant's knowledge of Plaintiff's allegations.\" \n\" The below discussion is provided as context for the Court's consideration of the motion. As \ndiscussed further in the Government's opposition to the defendant\n... [truncated, 2148 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/144 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=144]", "char_count": 2148}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 145, "text_content": "(Def. Mot. 4, Ex. H at 9). \"That knowledge,\" the Court explained, \"goes directly to the truth or \nfalsity of the alleged defamation, a key element of Plaintiff's claim.\" (Id.). The Court therefore \nordered the defendant to answer the questions related to her sexual activity with or involving (1) \nEpstein, (2) Giuffre, (3) underage girls known to Epstein or who she thought might become known \nto Epstein, or (4) involving massage with individuals the defendant \"knew to be, or believed might \nbe, known to Epstein.\" (Id. at 10). The Court further ordered the defendant to answer questions \nabout her knowledge of the sexual activities of others in the same four categories. The Court added \nthat the \"scope of Defendant's answers are not bound by time period, though Defendant need not \nanswer questions that relate to none of these subjects or that is clearly not relevant.\" (Id.). The \ndefendant sat for a second deposition on July 22, 2016, before the case settled. \nAs discussed more fully below, the Indictment charges the defendant with two counts of \nperjury, one arising from statements made during the April 2016 deposition and one arising from \nstatements made during the July 2016 deposition. Indictment ¶y 21, 23. (Ex. 10 at 253:25-254:8, \n384:15-20; Ex. 11 at 88:9-89:13, 91:22-92:16, 113:2-12). The defendant now moves to dismiss \nboth counts, arguing that the Court can effectively decide now, as a matter of law, that the questions \nwere fundamentally ambiguous, her answers were true, and her answers were immaterial to the \ncase. \nB. \nApplicable Law \nSection 1623(a) imposes criminal penalties on anyone who \"in any proceeding before or \nancillary to any court ... knowingly makes any false material declaration.\" 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). \nIn perjury prosecutions, \"whether the witness believes that an answer is true or false generally \nturns on the declarant's understanding of the question.\" United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 372 \n(2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, and as is true o\n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/145 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=145]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 146, "text_content": "to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question.\" Id.; see, e.g. United \nStates v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).47\nA narrow exception arises when language in a question is so \"fundamentally ambiguous\" \nthat a Court can conclude, as a matter of law, that a perjury count cannot stand. Lighte, 782 F.2d \nat 375. A question is \"fundamentally ambiguous\" when \"it is not a phrase with a meaning about \nwhich [people] of ordinary intellect could agree, nor one which could be used with mutual \nunderstanding by a questioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time it were sought and \noffered as testimony.\" Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted). In such a case, the \"answers \nassociated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the perjury \nconviction.\" United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lighte, 782 \nF.2d at 375). For instance, in Lighte, a case involving post-conviction appellate review, the Court \nfound that a question was fundamentally ambiguous because it used the word \"'you' without \nindication that, unlike the prior two questions, the appellant was now being questioned in his role \nas trustee.\" 782 F.2d at 376. \"[F]undamental ambiguity,\" however, \"is the exception, not the \nrule.\" United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. \nFanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental \nambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are amenable to multiple meanings, \nor that an answer \"might generate a number of different interpretations.\" Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; \nUnited States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) (\"Simply plumbing a question for \npost hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence demonstrates the \ndefendant understood the question in context and gave a knowingly false answer.\"). \"If, in the \n47 The Second Circuit analyze\n... [truncated, 2342 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/146 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=146]", "char_count": 2342}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 147, "text_content": "natural meaning in the context in which words were used they were materially untrue, perjury was \nestablished.\" United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir. 1976). Critically, and as \nnoted with respect to Lighte above, courts generally evaluate whether a challenge to a perjury \ncount on the basis that a question was fundamentally ambiguous after trial and following the \ndevelopment of a full factual record. See, e.g., Strohm, 671 at 1175 (appeal following conviction); \nSanvaH, 669 F.3d at 406 (same); Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269 (appeal following conviction and \npartial Rule 29 dismissal) Marldewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United \nStates v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a perjury \ncount). Indeed, the defendant cites no case in which a court has dismissed a perjury count on the \nbasis of \"fundamental ambiguity\" before trial. \nBecause perjury requires a knowing false statement, the law does not permit conviction \nbased on answers that are literally true. See Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374. Nor can a conviction rest on \nanswers that are literally true but unresponsive, and therefore \"arguably misleading by negative \nimplication.\" Id.; see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). But when \"the answer \nis false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial.\" United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 \n(2d Cir. 1976). Even statements that \"could be literally true in isolation\" can support a perjury \nconviction if they are \"materially untrue\" in \"the context in which the statements were made.\" \nUnited States v. Schaftick, 871 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1989). \"[U]nless the questioning is \nfundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers is an issue \nfor the jury.\" Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); \ncf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers \"were literally \ntrue und\n... [truncated, 2073 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/147 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=147]", "char_count": 2073}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 148, "text_content": "Finally, even if a defendant makes a knowing false statement, a perjury conviction requires \nthat the statement be material. A false statement is material if it has \"a natural tendency to \ninfluence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was \naddressed.\" United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation \nmarks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if \"a truthful answer might \nreasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the \nunderlying suit.\" United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. \nBirrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to proceed in \nforma pauperis and for appointment of counsel, that \"it must be shown that a truthful answer would \nhave been of sufficient probative importance to the inquiry so that, as a minimum, further fruitful \ninvestigation would have occurred.\" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). \"The \ntestimony need not have actually influenced, misled, or impeded the proceeding.\" United States \nv. Chan Lo, No. 14 Cr. 491 (VSB), 2016 WL 9076234, at ■8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016), aff'd 679 F. \nApp'x 79 (2d Cir. 2017); see Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 412. Since materiality is an element of the \noffense, it is a question for the jury \"except in the most extraordinary circumstances.\" Forde, 740 \nF. Supp. 2d at 412 (citing Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23). \nC. \nDiscussion \nThe Government expects to prove at trial that the defendant's deposition statements were \nknowingly false. The defendant's strained efforts to inject ambiguity into the questioning and to \njustify her answers as truthful are in significant part, arguments that are properly put to the jury \nand not a basis to dismiss the counts pretrial and without the benefit of a complete record. See \nUnited States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 237 F. App'x 625, 627-28\n... [truncated, 2135 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/148 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=148]", "char_count": 2135}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 149, "text_content": "jury.\"). At this stage, the defendant must identify defects so fundamental that the charged \nstatements cannot, as a matter of law, support a perjury conviction. She has failed to do so, and \nher motion should be denied. \n1. \nApril 2016 Deposition \nAt the April 2016 deposition, Giuffre's counsel asked the defendant about how Giuffre \ncame to Epstein's home (Ex. 10 at 14:9-17:4), whether hired massage therapists engaged in sexual \nactivity with Epstein (id. at 51:13-55:16), and the defendant's knowledge of Epstein's Florida \ncriminal case (id. at 171:25-173:12, 183:25-186:21), among other topics. The transcript makes \nclear that when the defendant did not understand a question, she said so. (See, e.g., id. at 9:4-9 \n(\"[C]an you please clarify the question. I don't understand what you mean by female, I don't \nunderstand what you mean by recruit.\"), 39:23-24 (\"I don't understand what your question is \nasking.\"), 94:18-95:4 (\"You don't ask me questions like that. First of all, you are trying to trap \nme, I will not be trapped.\"), 138:6 (\"Define relationship.\"), 244:22-23 (\"You are not asking me a \ngood question, sorry.\"). \nCount Five charges the defendant with perjury arising from two colloquies at this \ndeposition. First, Giuffre's counsel asked the defendant a series of questions about whether the \ndefendant brought women to Epstein, which the defendant resisted by observing that she hired \n\"people across the board\" to \"work for Jeffrey.\" (Id. at 245:7-18). Giuffre's counsel asked \nwhether any minors worked as exercise instructors or masseuses at Epstein's home, and the \ndefendant testified that they were all adults except for Giuffre, who she acknowledged at least \nclaimed to have been seventeen. (Id. at 246:18-251:12). Giuffre's counsel then asked questions \nabout whether Epstein had a \"sexual preference for underage minors,\" which drew objections from \n123 \nEFTA00039570\n", "char_count": 1904}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 150, "text_content": "defense counsel and which the defendant ultimately answered by saying \"I cannot tell you what \nJeffrey's story is. I'm not able to.\" (Id. at 251:13-253:12). This colloquy followed: \nQ. Did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit underage girls to \nuse them for purposes of sexual massages? \nMR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. \nA. Can you ask me again, please? \nQ. Did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit underage girls to \nrecruit them for sexual massages? \nMR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. \nA. Can you ask it a different way? \nQ. Did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit underage girls for \nsexual massages? \nMR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. \nQ. If you know. \nA. I don't know what you are talking about.48\n(Ex. 10 at 253:13-254:8). \nThe defendant argues that the question was ambiguous, as shown by her requests for the \nquestioner to rephrase the question. (Def. Mot. 4 at 9-10, 18). A properly instructed jury could \nreadily conclude otherwise in light of the evidence the Government expects to introduce at trial. \nThe defamation case involved allegations that Giuffre was a victim of that scheme: Giuffre had \nalleged that Epstein and the defendant had sexualized a massage that Giuffre gave Epstein. The \npreceding questions focused on (I) whether the defendant brought underage masseuses to work \nfor Epstein, and (2) whether Epstein had a sexual preference for underage girls. Moreover, at trial \nand as discussed further below, the Government expects to elicit testimony from one or more of \n48 Underlined sentences are charged as false statements in the Indictment. \n124 \nEFTA00039571\n", "char_count": 1660}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 151, "text_content": "the victims specified in the Indictment about sexualized massages the victims provided to Epstein, \nconduct that obviously predated the deposition. See Indictment ¶ 7(a), (c). In context, and with an \nunderstanding of the Government's other evidence, a rational juror could readily conclude that the \nquestion \"did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages . . . [i]f \nyou know?\" had a clear meaning, and more important for purposes of the instant motion, any \nambiguity was not \"fundamental.\" Cl Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 237 F. App'x at 628 \n(concluding that an answer about \"this arrangement\" was not fundamentally ambiguous). \nNor is there any basis to dismiss the count now based on the defendant's professed \nconfusion or denial of knowledge of the scheme's existence. A defendant may commit perjury by \nfalsely denying memory or knowledge of an event. See, e.g., United States v. Alberti, 568 F.2d \n617, 625 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 926, 929 (2d Cir. 1973); Forde, \n740 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11. Viewing the question and answer \"in the context of the line of \nquestioning as a whole,\" the defendant \"consistently denied\" knowledge of Epstein's scheme, \nMarkiewicz, 978 F.2d at 810, and a jury could conclude that the \"question was not fundamentally \nambiguous—and thus that [the defendant], understanding the question, lied.\" See Sampson, 898 \nF.3d at 307; cf. Indictment ¶¶ 4(e) 11(c)-(d), 17(c)-(d) (discussing use of massage as part of the \nsexual abuse scheme). \nSecond, later in the deposition, Giuffre's counsel asked the defendant a series of questions \nin an attempt to identify other underage girls that the defendant met and brought to Epstein. \nSpecifically: \nQ. Can you list for me all the girls that you have met and brought to \nJeffrey Epstein's house that were under the age of 18? \nMR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. \n125 \nEFTA00039572\n", "char_count": 1939}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 152, "text_content": "A. I could only recall my family members that were there and I could \nnot make a list of anyone else because that list -- it never happened \nthat I can think of. \nQ. I'm talking about the time you were working for Jeffrey Epstein, \ncan you list all girls that you found for Jeffrey Epstein that were \nunder the age of 18 to come work for him in any capacity? \nMR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. \nA. I didn't find the girls. \nQ. You choose the word. \nMR. PAGLIUCA: If you have a question ask it, you don't choose \nthe word. \nQ. List all of the girls you met and brought to Jeffrey Epstein's home \nfor the purposes of employment that were under the age of 18? \nMR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. \nA. I've already characterized my job was to find people, adults, \nprofessional people to do the jobs I listed before; pool person, \nsecretary, house person, chef, pilot, architect. \nQ. Pm asking about individuals under the age of 18, not adult \npersons, people under the age of 18. \nA. I looked for people or tried to find people to fill professional jobs \nin professional situations. \nQ. So Virginia Roberts was under the age of 18, correct? \nA. I think we've established that Virginia was 17. \nQ. Is she the -- sorry, go ahead. Is she the only individual that you \nmet for purposes of hiring someone for Jeffrey that was under the \nage of 18? \nMR. \nPAGLIUCA: \nObjection \nto \nform \nand \nfoundation. \nMischaracterizes her testimony. \nA. I didn't hire people. \nQ. I said met. \n126 \nEFTA00039573\n", "char_count": 1523}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 153, "text_content": "A. I interviewed people for jobs for professional things and I am not \naware of anyone aside from now Virginia who clearly was a \nmasseuse aged 17 but that's, at least that's how far we know that I \ncan think of that fulfilled any professional capacity for Jeffrey. \nQ. List all the people under the age of 18 that you interacted with at \nany of Jeffrey's properties? \nA. I'm not aware of anybody that I interacted with, other than \nobviously Virginia who was 17 at this point? \n(Ex. 10 at 382:4-384:20). \nThe defendant argues that this question was \"grossly ambiguous: who was `Jeffrey'; what \nwere 'Jeffrey's properties;' to what time frame did the question apply; what was the basis for Ms. \nMaxwell to determine who may or may not have been `under the age of 18'; and what did `interact \nwith' mean?\" (Def. Mot. 4 at 11). These arguments only underscore the principle that perjury \nprosecutions are an inquiry into \"the natural meaning in the context in which words were used,\" \nBonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to \"plumb[] a question \nfor post hoc ambiguity,\" Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable jury, after hearing the evidence, \ncould readily conclude that the natural meaning of those words in context is abundantly clear. For \ninstance, at the end of trial, a jury could conclude that \"Jeffrey\" is Jeffrey Epstein; \"Jeffrey's \nproperties\" are Jeffrey Epstein's properties, including his houses in Palm Beach, New York, New \nMexico, and the United States Virgin Islands (see, e.g., Ex. 10 at 248:17-20 (naming those \nproperties)); and \"interact\" is an expansive word aimed at capturing any encounter, that was used \nafter the defendant resisted words like \"met,\" \"found,\" and \"hired\" in the prior questions, see \nInteract, Oxford English Dictionary Online, https://oed.corniview/Entry/97518 (last visited \nFebruary 25, 2021) (\"To act reciprocally, to act on each other.\"). Such inferences will be \nparticularly easy for a jury to reach after hearing \n... [truncated, 2060 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/153 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=153]", "char_count": 2060}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 154, "text_content": "interactions with the defendant and Epstein at Epstein's various properties. See, e.g., Indictment \n1 7(a) (\"MAXWELL subsequently interacted with Minor Victim-1 on multiple occasions at \nEpstein's residences.\"). Accordingly, a rational juror, after hearing the evidence, could find that \nthe question called for the names of minors that the defendant interacted with at any of Jeffrey \nEpstein's properties, that the defendant answered that she was aware of no such minors other than \nGiuffre, and therefore that her answer was false. And even if the defendant identifies some \nplausible ambiguity—and she has not—the terms in this question are ones \"with a meaning about \nwhich [people] of ordinary intellect could agree,\" and therefore are not fundamentally ambiguous. \nLighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted). \nThe defendant points out that, in response to an earlier question asking her to list the \nunderage girls she \"met and brought\" to Epstein's house, she said that she could not do so. (Del. \nMot. 4 at 12-13). She argues that the charged question was \"improper\" because it asked her to \ngenerate a list \"from events that had happened nearly two decades previously.\" (Id.). Her \nunpersuasive after-the-fact efforts to justify her answer provide no basis to keep this question from \nthe jury. As noted above, the transcript makes clear (and a jury could find) that when the defendant \ndid not understand or could not answer a question, she said so. To the extent the defendant is \narguing that her answer was literally true, a reasonable July could find otherwise. In this respect, \nthe Government notes, among other things, that in response to the earlier question, the defendant \nsaid that she could not make a list not because she could not remember events from that long ago \nbut \"because that list -- it never happened that I can think of.\" (Ex. 10 at 382:4-13) (emphasis \nadded). And in response to the charged question, the defendant said that she \"was not aware of\n... [truncated, 2213 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/154 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=154]", "char_count": 2213}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 155, "text_content": "denial...\"). A properly instructed jury could conclude after hearing all of the evidence at trial \nthat the defendant intended the natural meaning of the words she used, not the allegedly truthful \nanswer she suggests now, and therefore that she lied. In sum, the defendant's post-hoc efforts to \ninject confusion into clear questioning are unavailing and should be rejected, and the jury should \ndecide whether the defendant's answers were false. \n2. \nJuly 2016 Deposition \nCount Six charges the defendant with perjury arising from three colloquies at the second \ndeposition. \nans \nthaelMr. EPalBea \nat 544 \nAlthough she didiathe \nnames of any of aomen,,\n\"bloand\nllirrwyera \ntiefenarilTaWarlirt/d. \nFollowing that line of questioning, the following \ncolloquy occurred: \nEr. When you and Mr. Epstein were engaged in sexual activity that \nincluded these other women, were any devices or sex toys used as \npart of the sexual activity? \nA. No. \nQ. Were you ever involved in sexual activities in Mr. Epstein's Palm \nBeach house that included the use of sex toys or any kind of \nmechanical or other device? \nMR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to form and foundation. \nA. No. \nQ. Were you ever involved in sexual activities in any of Mr. \nEpstein's properties other than Palm Beach that included the use of \nsex toys or any kind of mechanical or other device? \n129 \nEFTA00039576\n", "char_count": 1362}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 156, "text_content": "Q. Were you aware of the presence of sex toys or devices used in \nsexual activities in Mr. Epstein's Palm Beach house? \nA. No. not that I recall. \nother pi \nquestion: \nGiuffre's lawyer asked the following \nQ. Do you know whether Mr. Epstein possessed sex toys or devices \nused in sexual activities? \nIr -ionl\nn and foundation. \nA. Ng, \nThe defendant now argues that these questions are ambiguous because they contain \n\"numerous undefined terms,\" such as \"sex toy or device\" and \"sexual activities.\" (Def. Mot. 4 at \n14). She asks, for instance, whether \"bath oil\" would count as a sex toy or device. (Id.). Yet this \nargument is simply another attempt to imbue ambiguity after the fact into commonly used words \nwith common sense meanings. The mere fact that a term could apply equally to several different \nobjects does not automatically mean that the question is impermissibly vague and can never form \nthe basis of a perjury charge. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and \nMorals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607 (1958) (\"A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the \npublic park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles . ?\"). Instead, it is well-\nsettled that \"[t]he jury should determine whether the question—as the declarant must have \nunderstood it, giving it a reasonable reading—was falsely answered.\" Lighte, 782 F.2d at 372. So \n130 \nEFTA00039577\n", "char_count": 1406}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 157, "text_content": "long as the question involves a phrase \"which could be used with mutual understanding by a \nquestioner and answerer,\" it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks \nomitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) (\"An individual of \nordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `real estate, \nstocks, bonds, ... or other valuable property' would allow omission of information regarding \nmoney market funds ....\"). \nThe use of broad or inclusive terms does not render the question fundamentally ambiguous. \nAs the Second Circuit explained in the context of the term \"employment activities,\" \"[t]he broad \nlanguage of the question is not fundamentally ambiguous; it is instead designed to capture all \nemployment activities in an applicant's recent history.\" United States v. Polos, 723 F. App'x 64, \n65-66 (2d Cir. 2018). So too here. A \"sex toy or device\" is an intelligible phrase with an \nunderstood \nmeaning. \nSee \nSex \nToy, \nOxford \nEnglish \nDictionary \nOnline, \nhttps://www.oed.corn/view/Entry/176989 (last visited February 12, 2021) (\"[A] device or object \ndesigned for sexual stimulation (as a dildo, vibrator, etc.) or to enhance sexual pleasure or \nperformance.\"). To the? \nal ac \nins a \n, it was de t \nearlier in the depositimardniyities\" \nto include \"Kissing, \ntouchinpwith hands ox mouths or otaa.1.= \nThe defendant's objections to the next colloquy in the indictment are similarly unavailing. \nShortly after the above exchange, the following conversation occurred: \n17.11 atrme\ntiittany circri=r\ni\ntsprcWres,taialyou engage in \nlexual activities with any woman other than when you had three-\n'ray sexual activities with Mr. Epstein? \nMR. PAGLIUCA: Object to the form. \n131 \nEFTA00039578\n", "char_count": 1797}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 158, "text_content": "A. Can you repeat the question? \nAt any time, in \nMr. Epstein's properties, did you engage \nin sexual activities \nany woman other than when you had thrill \nway sexual activities with Mr. Epstein? \nMR. PAGLIUCA: Same objection. \nA. No. \nQ. Other than yourself and the blond and brunette that you have \nidentified as having been involved in three-way sexual activities, \nwith whom did Mr. Epstein have sexual activities? \nr\n-Objection to form \nA. I wasn't aware that he was having sexual activities with anyone \nwhen I was with him other than myself. \nQ. I want to be sure that I'm clear. Is it your testimony that in the \n1990s and 2000s, you were not aware that Mr. Epstein was having \nsexual activities with anyone other than yourself and the blond and \nbrunette on those few occasions when they were involved with you? \nA. That is my testimony, that is correct. \nThe defendant primarily argues that her answers were literally true. In the defendant's \ntelling, the phrase \"[w]hen I was with him,\" refers not to the duration of the defendant's \nrelationship with Epstein, but instead to only those moments when she was in the act of having sex \nwith Epstein and either the blond or brunette identified above. (Def. Mot. 4 at 16). \nas the de gi\nrigimppuiggiggrEkred wh\nMile\" \nthree-perir \nencas \ninn \na fourth person, the answer 631‘firfi is no, she argil \nbeca \nI activities by defi \ncannot involve four people. And in any event, \nshe further argues, because the question asked the defendant about the 1990s and 2000s, it \ntherefore covered any 'sexual activities' spanning more than a millennium.\" (Id. at 16-17). \n132 \nEFTA00039579\n", "char_count": 1635}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 159, "text_content": "The defendant, therefore, argues that the questioner asked whether a logically impossible \nevent occurred or will occur at some point over the course of a millennium. But the defendant's \nprofessed confusion—which again was not raised during the deposition itself—ignores the plain \nand obvious context of the question, which did not refer to a time period far exceeding the human \nlife span, and was not limited to only the times in which the defendant was in the act of having sex \nwith Epstein. Plainly, a jury could find that the defendant correctly understood the question when \nshe answered it in July 2016, and that she ascribed a natural meaning to the words used in the \nquestions, and not the tortured illogical meaning she now assigns to those questions: whether, \nduring the course of her relationship with Epstein, she was aware of anyone other than herself \nhaving sexual relations with Epstein. The Government expects its evidence to show that she was. \nSee, e.g., Indictment ¶ 1 (stating that the defendant \"assisted, facilitated, and contributed to\" \nEpstein's sexual abuse of minors). At a minimum, the defendant's answers were not \"literally true \nunder any conceivable interpretation of the questions.\" Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374. And the \ndefendant's professed confusion now and proposed illogical reading of the questions in the instant \nmotion does not render them fundamentally ambiguous. See Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221 (\"A \ndefense to a charge of perjury may not be established by isolating a statement from context, giving \nit in this manner a meaning entirely different from that which it has when the testimony is \nconsidered as a whole.\"). Accordingly, a jury should be permitted to determine what meaning the \ndefendant ascribed to those questions and whether her answers were in fact false. \nFinally, the defendant answered the following questions: \nQ. Did you ever give a massage to anyone other than Mr. Epstein at \nany of Mr. Epstein's properties? \nA. First of all, I \n... [truncated, 2060 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/159 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=159]", "char_count": 2060}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 160, "text_content": "Q. I will ask that question if you want, but I was focusing on people \nother than Mr. Epstein right now. \nA. I don't give massages. \nQ. Let's just tie that down. It is your testimony that you've never \ngiven anybody a massage? \nA. I have not given anyone a massage. \nQ. You never gave Mr. Epstein a massage, is that your testimony? \nA. That is my testimony. \nQ. You never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage is your testimony? \nA. I never gave [Minor Victim-21 a massage. \n(Ex. II at 112:17-113:12). \nThe defendant argues that these questions were fundamentally ambiguous because the \ndeposition elsewhere discussed both sexual and professional massages. It was unclear, she \nexplains, what kind of massage the questioner meant. (Def. Mot. 4 at 17.) The defendant's \nargument is, yet again, misguided. This line of questioning used broad language, and at no point \nduring this set of questions did Giuffre's counsel suggest that the questions were limited to sexual \nor professional massages. Cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 376 (concluding that the word \"you\" was \nambiguous when the prior two questions asked about the defendant \"as an individual\" and then \nswitched \"without indication\" to the defendant \"as trustee\"). The defendant's answers were \nunequivocal, with no expressions of confusion or internal contradictions. Cf. Markiewicz, 978 \nF.2d at 809 (explaining that a question was ambiguous as to whether it asked about the deponent's \npersonal or professional capacities, in light of the deponent's confusion in the next questions). A \nproperly instructed jury could conclude that the defendant meant what she said: she never gave \nanyone a massage, including Epstein and Minor Victim-2. \n134 \nEFTA00039581\n", "char_count": 1706}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 161, "text_content": "The defendant is, of course, free to testify on her own behalf to her professed confusion or \notherwise argue to the jury that the questions were ambiguous or the answers truthful. The issue \nbefore the Court is whether the questions were so fundamentally ambiguous that a jury, after \nhearing the trial evidence, could not conclude that the \"response given was false as the defendant \nunderstood the question.\" Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted). The \ndefendant has failed to establish such a fundamental defect.° \n3. \nMateriality \nFinally, the defendant argues that none of these answers was material to the defamation \naction. As a threshold issue, however, materiality is also not appropriate for resolution on a motion \nto dismiss the indictment. As noted above, materiality is a jury question \"except in the most \nextraordinary circumstances.\" Forde, 740 F.Supp.2d at 412 (citing Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23). \nAs the Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), \"there is no \ndoubt that materiality is an element of perjury under § 1623,\" and its precedent \"therefore dictates \nthat materiality be decided by the jury, not the court.\" Id. at 465. \nThe Second Circuit has explained that it is inappropriate for courts to resolve questions \nrelating to the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion to dismiss the indictment. The Federal \nRules of Criminal Procedure contain no \"analogue for summary judgment under Federal Rule of \nCivil Procedure 56\" for several reasons. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 280 (2d Cir. \n2018). First, \"[p]ermitting civil `summary judgment'-like motions . . . would enable an end-run \naround the calibrated framework for discovery in criminal cases,\" and thereby \"upset the policy \n49 Even if the Court concludes that any of the individual statements charged in the Indictment \ncannot sustain a perjury conviction, the count survives so long as some statement can properly be \npresented to the jury. See Bo\n... [truncated, 2350 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/161 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=161]", "char_count": 2350}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 162, "text_content": "choices reflected in the criminal discovery rules.\" Id. Second, doing so \"risks invading 'the \ninviolable function of the jury' in our criminal justice system.\"' Id. at 281 (citation omitted). \nAccordingly, if the \"defense raises a factual dispute that is inextricably intertwined with a \ndefendant's potential culpability, a judge cannot resolve that dispute on a Rule 12(b) motion.\" Id. \nThe exception to this rule is \"extraordinarily narrow\" because, in the normal course, the \n\"government must make a detailed presentation of the entirety of the evidence before a district \ncourt can dismiss an indictment on sufficiency grounds,\" which the Government is not required to \ndo at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Id. at 282 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That \npoint is underscored by United States v. Nitsche, 843 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2011), on which the \ndefendant relies. There, the district court dismissed an indictment in a child enticement case for \ninsufficiency of the evidence. First, however, the court explained that the question was ripe \nbecause \"(1) Defendant has stipulated to the entire record that is relevant to Count I; (2) the \nGovernment has had several opportunities to make a proffer of any additional facts, to conduct \nany subsequent investigation, and to ask the Court for further delay to seek more evidence; and (3) \nbecause the record is limited to the chat.\" Id. at 9. Accordingly, \"[t]he transcripts themselves \nprovide the Court with all of the relevant undisputed facts to decide the motion.\" Id. Here, of \ncourse, that is simply not the case and, in particular, there is no stipulation as to the entire relevant \nrecord. \nUnder the relevant legal standard, the defendant's statements were material if they could \nhave led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the defendant's \ncivil case. Evaluating that standard necessarily implicates facts beyond the deposition testimony \nitself and Judge Preska's unsealing or\n... [truncated, 2279 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/162 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=162]", "char_count": 2279}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 163, "text_content": "statements at the heart of that case and the evidence that might have been uncovered had the \ndefendant answered the questions truthfully. A jury should be allowed to hear the questions in \ncontext to evaluate their materiality, which cannot be done at this stage.51 The Court therefore \nshould deny the motion. \nIn any event, the perjurious statements were material in both senses of the definition. First, \nthe questions were aimed at developing a record in the civil suit that Epstein and the defendant \nrecruited Giuffre to Epstein's Palm Beach property in the guise of hiring her as a masseuse, and \nthen sexualized that massage. Honest answers to those questions-for instance that Epstein in fact \nhad a scheme to recruit underaged girls for sexual massages—would have been corroborative of \nsome of Giuffre's claims. Second, had the defendant honestly answered the deposition questions, \nGiuffre could have located other victims or witnesses who may have corroborated her testimony. \nBut in any event, the question of materiality should be put to the jury and is inappropriate for the \nCourt to resolve on a motion to dismiss without the benefit of the full factual record. The motion \nshould be denied. \nallegations that were central to the dispute in Giuffre v. Maxwell.\" (Def. Mot. 4, Ex. I at 7:3-6.) \n(The last colloquy has been unsealed except for Minor Victim-2's name. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), \nDkt. No. 1212-1).) Yet Judge Preska's opinion as to the propriety of certain redactions in a civil \ncase is not controlling as to whether the Government can meet the elements of a criminal perjury \ncharge here. First, before Judge Preska were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, \nnot honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet \nauthorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil \nunsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity to be heard on this issue before Judge Preska. \n5I\n... [truncated, 2437 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/163 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=163]", "char_count": 2437}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 164, "text_content": "In sum, the defendant asks this Court to dismiss Counts Five and Six by stretching to read \nambiguity into clear questions and encouraging the Court to resolve questions committed to the \njury. The Court should reject those arguments and permit the jury to resolve these issues of fact. \nVI. \nCounts Five and Six Are Properly Joined and Should Not Be Severed \nThe Indictment charges the defendant with participating in a scheme to sexually abuse \nminors, and with committing perjury to conceal her crimes. All six counts of the Indictment are \nproperly joined: they are logically connected, subject to overlapping proof, and connected by a \ncommon scheme or plan. To sever the counts and justify holding a second trial at which a second \njury will be convened and the same witnesses—including victims of sexual abuse—will testify a \nsecond time, the defendant must carry a heavy burden by showing substantial prejudice from the \njoinder. She has not done so, and the severance motion should be denied. \nA. \nApplicable Law \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) permits the joinder of offenses that \"are of the \nsame or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or \nconstitute parts of a common scheme or plan.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). This rule establishes three \ntests for joinder, each \"reflect[ing] a policy determination that gains in trial efficiency outweigh \nthe recognized prejudice that accrues to the accused.\" United States v. Turoff, 853 F.2d 1037, \n1042 (2d Cir. 1988). \nCharges are \"similar\" if they are \"somewhat alike\" or \"hav[e] a general likeness to each \nother.\" United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Werner, \n620 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). \"Rule 8(a) does not require \n`too precise an identity between the character of the offenses!\" United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 \nCr. 151, 2018 WL 1737236, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Wern\n... [truncated, 2027 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/164 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=164]", "char_count": 2027}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 165, "text_content": "F.2d at 929). Offenses may be joined \"where the same evidence may be used to prove each count \nor if the counts have a sufficient logical connection.\" United States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126, 129 \n(2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). \"For purposes of analysis under \nRule 8(a),\" however, \"no one characteristic is always sufficient to establish `similarity' of offenses, \nand each case depends largely on its own facts.\" United States v. Blakney, 941 F.2d 114, 116 (2d \nCir. 1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). For instance, in United States v. Werner, \n620 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1980), the \"Second Circuit found sufficient similarity between two cargo \nthefts that occurred two years apart and only one of which was violent in nature,\" because \"'both \noffenses arose out of [defendant's] scheme to use his position as an insider ... to obtain money or \nproperty carried by it.\"' United States v. Smith, No. 05 Cr. 922 (DLC), 2007 WL 980431, at *2 \n(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2007), aff'd, 348 F. App'x 636, 638 (2d Cir. 2009) (first alteration in original) \n(quoting Werner, 620 F2d at 927). \nJoinder is also proper for \"distinct criminal acts where they originated from a common \nscheme.\" United States v. Ying Lin, No. 15 Cr. 601 (DLI), 2018 WL 5113139, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. \nOct. 19, 2018) (citing Werner, 620 F.2d at 927). Specifically in the context of perjury, \"[t]he law \nin this circuit clearly supports the joinder of underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts \nwhere, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses.\" United States v. Potamitis, \n739 F.2d 784, 791 (2d Cir. 1984); see United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1971). \nFalse statements can \"concern\" or be connected with substantive offenses even if they were not \nmade as part of an investigation into the specific substantive conduct. See United States v. Ruiz, \n894 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1990) (joining false statements on loan applications with perjury about \n\"att\n... [truncated, 2208 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/165 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=165]", "char_count": 2208}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 166, "text_content": "in a bankruptcy proceeding). Similarly, \"[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized the appropriateness \nof trying perjury or obstruction charges together with the underlying crimes to which the perjury \nrelates, where proof of the alleged perjury requires proof of knowledge of the underlying crime.\" \nUnited States v. Butler, No. 04 Cr. 340, 2004 WL 2274751, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2004) (Lynch, \nJ.) (permitting joinder of defendants under Rule 8(b)). \nIn the event that properly joined counts \"appear[] to prejudice a defendant or the \ngovernment,\" Rule 14(a) permits a court to \"order separate trials of counts . . . or provide any other \nrelief that justice requires.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). \"[I]n order to prevail\" on a Rule 14 motion, \n\"the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice.\" United States v. \nSampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant \ncarries this \"heavy burden\" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a \"balance\" between \"considerations \nof economy and speed\" and \"possible unfairness\" to the defendant. United States v. Amato, 15 \nF.3d 230, 237 (2d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, \"the principles that guide the district court's \nconsideration of a motion for severance usually counsel denial,\" Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at \n*5 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted), and severance should be granted \n\"only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the \ndefendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence,\" Zafiro \nv. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993).52 But \"Rule 14 does not require severance even if \nprejudice is shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district \ncourt's sound discretion.\" Id. at 538-39. \"[L]ess drastic measures . .. such as limiting instructions, \n52 While Zafiro involved a motion to sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supr\n... [truncated, 2392 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/166 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=166]", "char_count": 2392}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 167, "text_content": "often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice and permit joinder.\" Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (internal \nquotation marks omitted). \nB. \nDiscussion \nThe perjury counts should be tried jointly with Counts One through Four. The offenses are \nof similar character, are logically connected and will be proved through much of the same evidence \nbecause the perjury counts concern at least some of the same conduct relevant to the crimes \ncharged in Counts One through Four and, as such, are properly joined. See generally Potamitis, \n739 F.2d at 791. Severing the counts would waste judicial resources by requiring a second trial at \nwhich the Government would offer similar proof, including by calling the same victims of sexual \nabuse to testify again at a second trial. The defendant has identified no prejudice sufficient to \njustify imposing that burden on the victims, the Court, and the Government. \nFirst, the Government expects to prove the offenses charged in Counts One through Four \nand those charged in Counts Five and Six with much of the same evidence. See United States v. \nHester, No. 19 Cr. 324 (NSR), 2020 WL 3483702, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020) (\"Notably, the \nfact that evidence of the crime charged in one count may be admissible in the Government's direct \ncase in the trial of the other will typically defeat the need to severe the counts.\"). At trial, some of \nthe most critical evidence that the defendant committed the offenses charged in Counts One \nthrough Four will also form the crux of the Government's proof of the falsity of the defendant's \ndeposition testimony. In particular, victim testimony and related evidence offered to prove the \nexistence of Epstein's scheme to abuse underage girls, and Maxwell's participation therein, will \nalso provide much of the evidence demonstrating the falsity of the statements charged in Count \nFive. Compare, e.g., Indictment ¶ 4(c), (e) (discussing massages resulting in sexual abuse), with \nid. ¶ 21 (denying interacting with und\n... [truncated, 2182 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/167 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=167]", "char_count": 2182}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 168, "text_content": "massages that were part of the scheme, will also prove the falsity of the statements charged in \nCount Six. Indeed, were severance to be granted, the facts involving Counts One through Four \n\"would be central to a separate trial\" on Counts Five and Six. Butler, 2004 WL 2274751, at *4; \nsee Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19 (\"Virtually every overt act alleged in the conspiracy count formed \nthe subject matter of one of the eight perjury counts, and would therefore be admissible in a perjury \ntrial to show the falsity of Sweig's denial before the grand jury.\"). \nCritically, the Government expects that proof to include testimony from victims of sexual \nabuse. For instance, the Government anticipates that Minor Victim-2 will testify that the defendant \ngave her an unsolicited massage during which Minor Victim-2 was topless. Indictment \n7(b). \nThat is an overt act charged in Counts One and Three. Id. ¶¶ 11(c), 17(c). It is also strong evidence \nthat the defendant's statement \"I never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage\" was false, as charged \nin Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor \nVictim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) \n(recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid \"requiring victims and witnesses to \nrepeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying\"). \nSimilarly, the defendant's efforts to conceal her crimes by lying in a deposition is itself \ncompelling evidence of her consciousness of guilt as to the offenses charged in Counts One \nthrough Four and indeed would almost certainly be relevant and admissible at a trial as to those \ncounts even if severance were granted. In particular, and among other examples, the defendant's \nfalse denial of the existence of a scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages, and her \nspecific (and equally false) denials as to Minor Victim-2, would be admissible as evidence of the \ndefendant's consciousness\n... [truncated, 2188 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/168 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=168]", "char_count": 2188}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 169, "text_content": "consciousness of guilt, such as false exculpatory statements, may also tend to prove knowledge \nand intent of a conspiracy's purpose ....\" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). \nSecond, the offenses are logically connected and are part of the same common plan or \nscheme. It is settled law in this Circuit that joinder of \"underlying substantive crimes with perjury \ncounts\" is appropriate \"where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses.\" \nPotamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In \nRuiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founded a nonprofit that was developing a \nmall in the Bronx, and for which he provided consulting services. In 1984 and 1985, he made two \nloan applications for funds to invest in the project, on which he made false statements. Id. at 503-\n04. In 1986, the defendant also lied about his possession of a letter from the Senate Ethics \nCommittee to a grand jury that was investigating his consulting activities for the nonprofit. Id. at \n503. He was charged with two counts of false statements on the loan applications and one count \nof perjury, and he moved to sever the perjury charge. The district court denied the motion, \nexplaining that, although the \"alleged perjury did not occur during a specific investigation by the \ngrand jury into the alleged bank fraud,\" the statements nonetheless \"'concerned the defendant's \nscheme to maximize his personal gain from the [project], as well to cover any improprieties that \nscheme might involve.\"' Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 702 F. \nSupp. 1066, 1076-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)) (emphasis omitted). And the Second Circuit affirmed, \nexplaining that the counts had \"sufficient logical connection\" because they all \"relate to [the \ndefendant's] extra-senatorial activities through the [nonprofit],\" and therefore were \"part of a \ncommon scheme or plan.\" Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505. So too here: the d\n... [truncated, 2243 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/169 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=169]", "char_count": 2243}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 170, "text_content": "therein. See Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190-91 (joining counts involving use of businesses to \ncommit fraud with a count of falsely swearing in bankruptcy court that the defendant \"had not \nengaged in any business activity during the preceding six years\").53 Accordingly, and consistent \nwith the holdings in Ruiz and Broccolo, this Court should deny the severance motion. \nThe defendant argues that the offenses are not connected because they involve different \ntime periods. To be sure, Counts One through Four charge conduct involving certain victims from \n1994 to 1997, while the perjury counts charge statements made in 2016 in a case concerning \nGiuffre's abuse from 1999 to 2002. However, the specific statements charged in Count Five and \nCount Six directly relate to the conduct charged in Counts One through Four, including, in one \ninstance, a specific victim identified as relevant to those counts. And those statements were not \ntime-bound or restricted to Giuffre. For instance, the defendant denied the existence of any scheme \nto recruit underage girls for sexual massages, not the existence of such a scheme between 1999 \nand 2002, or a scheme specifically focused on Giuffre. The defendant also denied ever giving \nanyone a massage, specifically including Epstein and Minor Victim-2. She did not limit her denial \nto Giuffre or to a particular time period. There is, accordingly, a strong connection between the \ntruth or falsity of the defendant's broad denials and her acts in the period at issue in the substantive \ncounts. The cases on which the defendant relies are factually inapposite and do not support her \nargument, because they involve wholly unrelated events. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 590 \nF.2d 422, 431 (2d Cir. 1978) (severing a Medicaid fraud indictment from a tax evasion indictment \nwhere the only similarly was the defendant's manipulation of people he had employed—different \n53 While the defendant may argue that the fact that her deposition, unlike R\n... [truncated, 2445 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/170 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=170]", "char_count": 2445}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 171, "text_content": "in each indictment—to his personal profit); United States v. Brown, No. 07-0296, 2008 WL \n161146, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2008) (severing an \"isolated\" firearms possession charge on a \ncertain day from other narcotics and firearms charges); United States v. Martinez, No. 92 Cr. 839 \n(SWK), 1993 WL 322768, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993) (similar). \nThe defendant also contends that her false statements were not connected to the substantive \noffenses because they were made in a civil deposition, rather than \"to the grand jury or the FBI to \nderail its investigation.\" (Def. Mot. 5 at 8). As an initial matter, and as evidenced by the \ndefendant's own motions to suppress the fruits of the grand jury subpoena issued to Boies Schiller, \nthe defendant herself professes to have been concerned about the prospect of a criminal \ninvestigation at the time of her depositions, which strongly suggests that, on these facts, the \ndistinction is of little moment. (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 3 at 3-4 (explaining that the defendant \"flatly \nrejected\" a law enforcement exception to the civil protective order); Def. Mot. 11 at 2 (arguing \nthat the defendant \"declined to invoke\" her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination \nat the deposition after negotiating the protective order)). More important, and whatever moment \nthat distinction may have in other contexts, it has little bearing on the severance analysis which \nturns instead on whether the substance of the false statement relates to the substantive offense, and \nis thereby provable through overlapping evidence and part of the speaker's effort to conceal the \noffense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, \n464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance \nmotion where the false statements \"concern the substantive offenses\" and citing cases where the \nperjury count's proof overlapped with the evidence on the substantive counts). With r\n... [truncated, 2234 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/171 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=171]", "char_count": 2234}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 172, "text_content": "in bankruptcy proceeding). And the cases the defendant cites in which a perjury or false statements \ncount was severed only underscore this point. In both cases, the statement itself concerned an \nentirely different subject matter, provable through largely if not entirely different evidence. See \nUnited States v. Botti, No. 08 Cr. 230 (CSH), 2009 WL 3157582, at *1, *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, \n2009) (severing a structuring conspiracy and false statements related to that conspiracy from a \n\"separate\" corruption conspiracy); United States v. Milan, No. 08-760, 2009 WL 2328870, at *3 \n(E.D. Pa. July 28, 2009) (severing counts charging a fraud scheme from perjury count for an \naffidavit submitted as part of a bail motion, which \"was not as an attempt to cover up the scheme \nto defraud, but rather an attempt to show that Court had erred\" in its bail decision). \nFinally, the defendant argues that the counts are unrelated because the defendant's \ntestimony was given in response to questions \"tangential to the defamation action,\" and her \nanswers \"concealed\" no crimes because they were \"true and reflective of the poor questioning by \nthe plaintiffs lawyers.\" (Def. Mot. 5 at 8-9). The defendant is free to make at least some of these \narguments to the jury, but these assertions are not a lawful basis for severing Counts Five and Six. \nThis is merely an attempt to refashion the defendant's claim that she gave truthful, immaterial \nanswers to ambiguous questions. But, as discussed in detail in Section V, those arguments have \nno merit. \nThird, the defendant has failed to carry her heavy burden under Rule 14(a) to show \nprejudice. At the outset, \"[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury \nand related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected.\" Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. \nAnd courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts \nis \"interconnected.\" Blakney, 941 F.2d at 116; see Carson, 464 F.2\n... [truncated, 2048 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/172 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=172]", "char_count": 2048}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 173, "text_content": "of proof of the conspiracy and perjury crimes permitted joinder of the offenses . . . and denial of \nappellant's Rule 14 pretrial motion for severance.\"); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *6-*7. \nThe defendant argues that the trial on the perjury counts will require a \"full-blown re-\nlitigation of the defamation action.\" (Def. Mot. 5 at 9). That is a significant exaggeration. To \nlitigate the perjury counts, the parties will need to present evidence about the basic substance of \nthe civil suit—in particular, Giuffre's allegations and the defendant's denials-such that the jury \nwill be able to assess materiality and the statements' context. This can be done briefly—as stated \nin Section V, the Government is amenable to presenting that information through a stipulation—\nand, in any event, through minimal additional evidence. The stipulation or other evidence could \nbe crafted to minimize the risk of spillover prejudice, for instance by referring to Giuffre by a \npseudonym to avoid any connection she might have to testimony on the substantive counts. And \nany remaining prejudice could be vitiated by a limiting instruction that the jury should not consider \nGiuffre's allegations as evidence of the substantive counts. See Page, 657 F.3d at 130-31 \n(approving of similar precautions when introducing evidence of a defendant's prior felony \nconviction); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *7; see also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540 (\"[J]uries are \npresumed to follow their instructions.\" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). There is \nevery reason to think a jury could and would follow such an instruction. See, e.g., Rivera, 546 \nF.3d at 254 (using a limiting instruction to prevent spillover prejudice for counts involving the \nsexual exploitation of different children, especially in light of admissibility across counts); United \nStates v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (using a limiting instruction to address \nspillover prejudice from two murder for hire conspiracie\n... [truncated, 2254 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/173 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=173]", "char_count": 2254}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 174, "text_content": "as to those counts, and would consent to a similar limiting instruction, which a jury would be \npresumed to follow. And, of course, in a severed trial exclusively on the perjury counts, the \ndefendant would surely argue that a limiting instruction is necessary to prevent the jury from \nconcluding that the defendant's statements were false based in part on the substance of Giuffre's \nunproven allegations. Just as a jury would set aside the substance of Giuffre's allegations for that \npurpose, so can the jury set aside the substance of Giuffre's allegations for Counts One through \nFour. \nThe defendant contends instead that the perjury counts require a \"collateral trial\" on the \ntruth of Giuffre's statements and resolution of \"more than 50 substantive motions . . . pending \nbefore the District Court.\" (De£ Mot. 5 at 9-10). As described in Section V, a false statement in \na civil deposition is material ( 1) if a \"truthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the \ndiscovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit,\" United States v. Kross, 14 \nF.3d 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1994), or (2) if it has \"a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of \ninfluencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed,\" United States v. \nGaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). \nNeither of these standards requires the jury to determine whether the defendant's statements would \nhave tipped the scales in the defamation suit or would likely have led to the discovery of evidence. \nSee Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988) (\"It has never been the test of materiality \nthat the misrepresentation or concealment would more likely than not have produced an erroneous \ndecision, or even that it would more likely than not have triggered an investigation.\"); United States \nv. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the \"natural \ntendency test\" from a\n... [truncated, 2200 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/174 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=174]", "char_count": 2200}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 175, "text_content": "\"such evidence might lead to evidence . . . which would justify forfeiture\"). The jury need not \ndecide the outcome of the defamation case in order to evaluate whether truthful answers were \ncapable of influencing the decisionmaker or could reasonably have led to the discovery of \nadmissible evidence.54\nFinally, the defendant argues that severance is appropriate because including the perjury \ncounts \"will necessarily introduce into the trial the issue of Ms. Maxwell's credibility.\" (Def. Mot. \n5 at 13). That is true anytime perjury or false statements counts are joined with other offenses, yet \njoining perjury or false statements counts to the substantive crimes they concern is the rule, not \nthe exception. And more generally, the \"adverse effect of being tried for two crimes rather than \none\" is not prejudice. Werner, 620 F.2d at 929. \nTrying the perjury counts with the Mann Act counts they concern makes eminent sense. \nDoing so greatly advances judicial efficiency by avoiding the need for two trials at which the same \nevidence would be presented, including testimony from the same victims. Just as the counts are \nsimilar in character, the trial would not be unwieldy. Against these efficiencies, endorsed by the \nliberal joinder principles behind Rule 8, the defendant identifies at most only \"generalized claim[s] \nof prejudice,\" Rivera, 546 F.3d at 254, that can be cured by an appropriate limiting instruction. \nShe thus falls far short of meeting her heavy burden, and her motion should be denied. \n54 The defendant relatedly suggests that her counsel from the defamation suit may have to testify \nregarding the perjury counts, denying her counsel of her choice. She has not identified what factual \nissue they might testify to and why it must come from one of the lawyers who represented her on \nboth that case and this one. The Government notes, in this respect, that three of the defendant's \nattorneys in this case had no involvement in the civil suit. Even if such testimo\n... [truncated, 2408 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/175 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=175]", "char_count": 2408}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 176, "text_content": "VII. The Indictment Contains the Elements of Each Offense and Provides the Defendant \nMore Than Adequate Notice of the Charges Against Her \nThe defendant also moves to dismiss Counts One through Four on the grounds that the \nIndictment lacks specificity because it does not name minor victims, does not include specific \ndates, and uses language that the defendant claims not to understand. (Del. Mot. 12). The motion \nis meritless and should be denied. The plain language of the Indictment clearly and sufficiently \nsets forth every element of each crime charged, and the extensive details contained in the \nIndictment as further amplified through the voluminous discovery and the Government's various \npit-trial filing describing the case and its anticipated proof at trial provide the defendant with more \nthan sufficient notice of the charges against her. \nA. \nApplicable Law \nIt is well-established that \"[a]n indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of the \noffense(s) charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge(s) against which he must \ndefend.\" United States v. Rahimi, No. 16 Cr. 760 (RMB), 2017 WL 2984169, at ■1 (S.D.N.Y. \nJune 22, 2017) (citing United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); \nHamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). As a result, \"'an indictment need do little \nmore than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate \nterms) of the alleged crime\" in order to be sufficient. United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, \n693 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1113 (2d Cir. 1975)). As \nsuch, \"[a] defendant faces a high standard in seeking to dismiss an indictment.\" United States v. \nNejad, No. 18 Cr. 224 (MN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019) (internal quotation \nmarks omitted) (quoting United States v. Post, 950 F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). \nAdditionally, \"when deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept\n... [truncated, 2148 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/176 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=176]", "char_count": 2148}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 177, "text_content": "of the indictment and draw inferences as to proof to be adduced at trial, for `the sufficiency of the \nevidence is not appropriately addressed on a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment.' Id. \n(quoting United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 776-77 (2d. Cir. 1998)). \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 states in part that an indictment \"must be a plain, \nconcise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged . . . .\" \nFed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). There are two constitutional requirements an indictment must satisfy in \norder to be sufficient: first, it must \"contain[] the elements of the offense charged and fairly \ninform[] a defendant of the charge against which [s]he must defend,\" and second, it must \n\"enable[]\" a defendant \"to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the \nsame offense.\" United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) (internal quotation \nmark omitted) (quoting Handing, 418 U.S. at 117). \"[A]n indictment parroting the language of a \nfederal criminal statute is often sufficient . ..\" Id. at 109. As a general matter, \"[a]n indictment \ndoes not . . `have to specify evidence or details of how the offence was committed.' United \nStates v. Wey, No. 15 Cr. 611 (MN), 2017 WL 237651, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan, 18, 2017) (emphasis \nin original) (quoting United States v. Coffey, 361 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). \"When \nthe charges in an indictment have stated the elements of the offense and provided even minimal \nprotection against double jeopardy,\" the Second Circuit \"has repeatedly refused, in the absence of \nany showing of prejudice, to dismiss ... charges for lack of specificity.\" United States v. Stringer; \n730 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (ellipses in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting \nUnited States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d. 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1999)). \nAlthough courts have identified certain crimes for which an indictment may require greater \nspecificity beyond t\n... [truncated, 2198 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/177 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=177]", "char_count": 2198}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 178, "text_content": "is the \"specification of what statements are alleged to be false, and in what respect they are false, \nin charges of criminal falsity,\" as well as \"the subject matter of the congressional inquiry\" for \ncharges of \"refusal to answer questions in a congressional inquiry.\" Id. at 125-26 (citing, inter \nalia, Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962)). Similarly, \"where an indictment charges a \ncrime that depends in turn on violation of another statute, the indictment must identify the \nunderlying offense.\" United States v. PilTO, 212 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2000). When delineating the \ncontours of this narrow category of crimes requiring additional specificity in an indictment, the \nSecond Circuit has previously found that the failure to name a specific victim of fraud does not \nrender an indictment inadequate under this standard. See Stringer, 730 F.3d at 127. In other words, \nabsent some affirmative indication that additional specificity is required when charging a particular \nstatute, there is no basis to conclude that an indictment need contain more than the elements of the \noffense and the approximate time and place of the alleged violation. See Wey, 2017 WL 237651 \nat *5 (declining to \"depart from the usual sufficiency framework\" where defendant \"cites no \nauthority\" suggesting that the statutes at issue fall into the narrow exception to the general rule \nwhen considering motion to dismiss for lack of specificity). \nB. \nDiscussion \nBecause each of the four counts at issue—Counts One, Two, Three, and Four—clearly lays \nout each element of the charged offense and adequately informs the defendant of the accusations \nagainst her, the Indictment easily satisfies the standard for sufficiency. Tellingly, the defendant \ndoes not claim that any of these counts fails to allege an essential element or to track the language \nof the relevant statute. Nor could she, as the face of the Indictment not only contains each and \nevery essential element of the crimes charged, but al\n... [truncated, 2157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/178 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=178]", "char_count": 2157}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 179, "text_content": "asserts that the crimes charged in Counts One through Four require additional specificity without \nciting any authority in support of such a broad claim. (See Def. Mot. 12 at 2). In particular, the \ndefendant suggests that the failure to identify each minor victim by name, the presence of a date \nrange rather than specific dates, and the use of certain language that the defendant claims not to \nunderstand render Counts One through Four so deficient that they must be dismissed. Because the \ndefendant cites no authority indicating that violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2422, or 2423 fall into \nthe rare exception to \"the rule that `an indictment need do little more than to track the language of \nthe statute charged,'\" her motion should be denied. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, \n716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). \nFirst, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not \nwarrant dismissal of the Indictment. See Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124 (affirming sufficiency of fraud \nindictment InJotwithstanding its failure to specify the names of persons whose identifying \ndocuments were used\" in scheme where prosecution provided victims' names in advance of trial). \nThe identity of a victim is not required to be included on the face of a charging instrument, and the \n\"lack of any identity or date of birth information of the alleged victims does not warrant dismissal\" \nof charges alleging sexual abuse. United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). \nThe defendant cites no law to the contrary and has not identified a single indictment in this District \nthat includes the full names of minor victims of sexual abuse. Indeed, it makes good sense that a \ncharging instrument alleging sexual abuse of minors would not include the full names of minor \nvictims, whose privacy Congress has emphasized should be protected. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d) \n(delineating privacy protections for child victims and wit\n... [truncated, 2212 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/179 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=179]", "char_count": 2212}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 180, "text_content": "is particularly instructive here. See 386 F. Supp.3d at 366. In denying the motion to dismiss, \nJudge Marrero found Stringer's holding \"that the identity of a victim was not required to be \ncontained in an indictment, despite the centrality of the victim's identity to the charge\" to be \nequally applicable in a case involving sex trafficking charges. Id. at 369. The same logic follows \nhere. The use of pseudonyms to refer to the minor victims of sexual abuse in Counts One through \nFour is no more prejudicial to the defendant here than the absence of victim identities was to the \ndefendants in Kidd or Stringer. This is especially so when the Government has already provided \nthe defendant with the birth month and year of each victim, provided discovery regarding each \nvictim, and has repeatedly indicated that it will provide the defendant with the names of its \nwitnesses, including the minor victims referenced in the Indictment, four weeks in advance of trial. \nSuch disclosure will ensure that the defendant is readily able to bar future prosecutions for the \nsame offense, and together with the elements of each crime and additional details contained in in \nthe Indictment, is more than sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. \nSecond, the Indictment \"state[s] the time and place (in approximate terms)\" of the conduct \nalleged in Counts One through Four. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d at 693 (quoting Tramunti, 513 F.2d \nat 1113). In particular, Counts One through Four each allege that the defendant engaged in a \ncontinuing course of conduct involving the enticement and transportation of minors with intent to \ncommit illegal sex acts, as well as conspiracies to do so, between in or about 1994 and in or about \n1997. See Indictment ¶¶ 1, 6, 7, 9-11, 13, 15-17, 19. Courts in the Second Circuit have consistently \nupheld indictments containing a range of time rather than a specific date. See, e.g., Kidd, 386. F. \nSupp. 3d at 369 (\"[Th]e Second Circuit routinely upholds the 'on or abou\n... [truncated, 2227 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/180 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=180]", "char_count": 2227}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 181, "text_content": "1838255, at *1, 4-6 (W.D.N.Y. May 8, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss indictment charging \nenticement of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), \"between in or about 2000 to in or about \n2004,\" because \"the Indictment states all the elements of the crime charged by tracking the \nstatutory language,\" as well as \"the nature of the criminal activity\" and \"the underlying facts\"). \n\"This is especially true in cases of sexual abuse of children: allegations of sexual abuse of \nunderage victims often proceed without specific dates of offenses,\" including \"[i]n cases of \ncontinuing sexual abuse,\" for which \"it is sufficient for the indictment to specify a period of time—\nrather than a specific date—in which defendant committed the acts at issue ....\" United States v. \nYoung, No. 08 Cr. 285 (KMK), 2008 WL 4178190, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008) (internal \nquotation mark omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Mazzuca, No. 00 Civ. 2290 (US), 2007 WL \n2994449, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2007)). Indeed, lbJecause minors often are not capable of \nremembering the exact dates when the alleged acts occurred, 'fairly large time windows in the \ncontext of child abuse prosecutions are not in conflict with constitutional notice requirements!\" \nYoung, 2008 WL 4178190, at *2 (quoting Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 2005)). \nThe same is true here. The minor victims in this case cannot reasonably be expected to recall the \nexact dates when particular instances of abuse took place during their adolescence. This is \nespecially so for Minor Victim-1, who experienced numerous instances of abuse over multiple \nyears of her youth. Providing the approximate ranges of dates during which the offenses took \nplace fully satisfies the requirements of an adequately pled charging instrument. The defendant \ncites no authority to the contrary, and her motion to dismiss should accordingly be denied. \nThird, the Indictment lists in clear detail the allegations relevant to each element of every \ncrimi\n... [truncated, 2202 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/181 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=181]", "char_count": 2202}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 182, "text_content": "regarding how the defendant is alleged to have committed the crimes charged in Counts One \nthrough Four. See Indictment ¶¶ 1-11. Indeed, \"by providing Defendant with a narrative of the \nmanner in which Defendant is alleged to have committed the charged offenses, the Indictment \nprovides Defendant with more detail than is strictly necessary\" under the governing law. United \nStates v. Kozel, No. 19 Cr. 460 (ICMW), 2020 WL 4751498, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2020). \nAlthough the defendant complains that some of the terms used in the speaking portions of \nthe Indictment are somehow vague, she cites no authority to suggest that her difficulty \ncomprehending basic language in portions of a charging instrument that do not speak to the \nelements of the offense requires dismissal.55 Counts One and Three, charging the defendant with \nviolations of 18 U.S.0 § 371, \"clearly contain[] the elements of the offense charged, fairly inform[] \n[her] of the charge[s] against [her], and enable[] [her] to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of \nfuture prosecution for the same offense.\" United States v. Born, 154 F. App'x 227, 229 (2d Cir. \n2005). Counts Two and Four, charging violations of 18 U.S.0 §2422 and § 2243, respectively, \nsimilarly contain the elements of those offenses and adequately inform the defendant of the charges \n55 Alternatively, the defendant claims that the acts listed throughout the Indictment do not \nconstitute illegal behavior. In this vein, the defendant makes specific reference to \"grooming\" as \nconduct that is not illegal. (Def. Mot. 12 at 4). The defendant cites no authority for this argument, \nwhich is contrary to Second Circuit law. In particular, the Second Circuit has for many years \nfound grooming behavior to be a means to \"persuade, induce, or entice\" minors to engage in illegal \nsexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 896 F.3d 155, 173 (2d Cir. 2018) (\"Our \nprecedent, however, supports applying a broad definition of enticement in this co\n... [truncated, 3013 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/182 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=182]", "char_count": 3013}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 183, "text_content": "against her. The Indictment also cites the relevant state criminal statute under which the defendant \nis charged constituting \"sexual activity\" within the language of both § 2422 and § 2243, \nspecifically, violations of New York Penal Law § 130.55. Indictment ¶¶ 11(b), 13, 17(b), 19. The \ndefendant cites no authority for her suggestion that by providing additional detail regarding how \nthe defendant committed the charged crimes, the Government is somehow required to provide \neven more specificity beyond the basic elements of the crimes charged. Absent any such authority, \nand where there is no suggestion that the Indictment fails to allege the essential elements of each \ncrime charged, there is no basis to dismiss any of the counts in the Indictment. \nFor the foregoing reasons, the defendant's sufficiency challenges to the Indictment fail as \na matter of law, and her motion to dismiss Counts One through Four should be denied. \nVIII. There Is No Basis to Strike Any Portion of the Indictment \nThe defendant moves to strike any reference to Minor Victim-3 from the Indictment, \nclaiming that—contrary to the plain terms of the Indictment—the events involving Minor Victim-\n3 are unrelated to the conspiracies charged in Counts One and Three and that some of that the \nallegations regarding Minor Victim-3 are unduly prejudicial. (Def. Mot. 6). The motion is \nbaseless. First, as the Indictment itself makes clear, the defendant's and Epstein's interactions \nwith Minor Victim-3 were part of a broader scheme and agreement to entice and transport minor \nvictims with intent to commit illegal sex acts. Even if Minor Victim-3 was not ultimately \ntransported as a minor, the core of a conspiracy is an agreement to engage in criminal conduct; \nthere is no legal requirement that the agreed upon crime be completed. Although Minor Victim-\n3's experiences cannot alone form the basis of a timely substantive charge, both charged \nconspiracies include timely overt acts, and it is well establis\n... [truncated, 2147 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/183 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=183]", "char_count": 2147}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 184, "text_content": "conspiracy is timely. Second, the description of Minor Victim-3's experiences in the Indictment \nis no more inflammatory or prejudicial than those regarding Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim-2. \nFinally, even if evidence regarding Minor Victim-3 were not admissible as direct evidence of the \ncharged conspiracies—which it is—that evidence will be admissible under Federal Rule of \nEvidence 404(b) to prove the defendant's knowledge, intent, and modus operandi. Accordingly, \nthe motion to strike references to Minor Victim-3 as surplusage should be denied. \nA. \nRelevant Facts \nAs alleged in the Indictment, Minor Victim-3 was one of the minor girls whom the \ndefendant groomed to engage in sexual activity with Jeffrey Epstein. Minor Victim-3 was born in \n. At trial, the Government expects that Minor Victim-3 will testify,se in substance \nand in part, that when she was \n, she met the defendant. After meeting Minor Victim-\n3, the defendant befriended Minor Victim-3 by, among other things, discussing Minor Victim-3's \nlife and family with Minor Victim-3. As a result, the defendant came to know Minor Victim-3's \nage. \nMinor—Victim-3 to meet Epstein. At some-Rairm \n19 \nMinor Victim-3, who was still 17 years old, to the defendant's home in L \nwhere _II \ndefendant introduced Minor Victim-3 to Epstein. During that first visit, the defendant encouraged \nMinor Victim-3 to provide Epstein with a massage. During the ensuing massage, Epstein engaged \nin at least one sex act with Minor Victim-3. Subsequently, the defendant invited Minor Victim-3, \nwho was still 17 years old, to return to the defendant's home in London and massage Epstein again. \n56 While the Government is proffering these facts for purposes of this Motion, the underlying \ninformation, which is contained in the FBI 302 reports of interviews with Minor Victim-3, will be \nproduced to the defense as 3500 material in advance of trial. \n158 \nEFTA00039605\n", "char_count": 1926}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 185, "text_content": "Once again, the defendant encouraged Minor Victim-3 to provide a massage to Epstein. During \nthe ensuing massage, Epstein engaged in at least one sex act with Minor Victim-3. \nFollowing those two encounters, the defendant and Epstein invited Minor Victim-3 to \ntravel with them to Florida, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and New York. Minor Victim-3 eventually \naccepted these invitations, but she does not recall whether she was 17 or 18 when she took her first \ntrip at Epstein and the defendant's invitation. When Minor Victim-3 traveled with Epstein and the \ndefendant, she provided additional massages to Epstein, during which he engaged in multiple sex \nacts with Minor Victim-3. Over the course of their interactions, the defendant made multiple \nstatements to Minor Via \nthe defendant's awareness that Epstein engaged in sex \nacts with Minor Victim-3. _On at-acne occasion, the defendant asked Minor Victim-3 if she \nknew any otboviOunga\n acts with Epstein. \nB. \nApplicable Law \n\"Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure grant the Court authority to strike \nsurplusage from an indictment, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), li]t has long been the policy of courts \nwithin the Southern District to refrain from tampering with indictments.\"' United States v. Bin \nLaden, 91 F. Supp. 2d 600, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jimenez, 824 F. Supp. \n351, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). \"Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will be granted only \nwhere the challenged allegations are 'not relevant to the crime charged and are inflammatory or \nprejudicial.'\" United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1013 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting United States \nv. Napolitano, 552 F. Supp. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). \"'Ulf evidence of the allegation is \nadmissible and relevant to the charge, then regardless of how prejudicial the language is, it may \nnot be stricken.\"' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, \n797 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); see also United States v. Mulder, \n... [truncated, 2155 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/185 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=185]", "char_count": 2155}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 186, "text_content": "Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, \n985 F. Supp. 2d 547, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). \nIn setting forth allegations in an indictment, the Government is not limited to description \nof only the bare elements of a crime; rather, an indictment may be used to provide background to \nthe charged criminal conduct, to describe the circumstances, means, and methods of an offense, \nand to describe evidence that is otherwise admissible at trial. Simply put, \"[s]tatements providing \nbackground are relevant and need not be struck.\" United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, \n466 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Mulder, 273 F.3d at 100). Allegations also will not be stricken where \nthey elucidate the circumstances, means, and methods of a charged scheme or would be admissible, \nin the alternative, under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. \nHernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of motion to strike surplusage \nwhere \"[defendants' cocaine-related activity was clearly relevant evidence of the organizational \nstructure and method of operation of their heroin conspiracy, and it also tended to establish the \nnature of the relationship between Defendants and their supplier of heroin, defendant Jose Antonio \nHernandez,\" and citing Rule 404(b)). \nIn terms of timing, \"[c]ourts in this district routinely await presentation of the \nGovernment's evidence at trial before ruling on a motion to strike.\" Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d at \n467 (citing, inter alia, Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1012); see also United States v. Ahmed, No. 10 Cr. 131 \n(PKC), 2011 WL 5041456, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011). As multiple courts have concluded, \n\"'[t]here is little or no purpose in attempting to predict in advance of trial what evidence will prove \nadmissible or how specific allegations relate to the overall charges.\" Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d at \n612 (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Butler, 351 F. Supp\n... [truncated, 2048 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/186 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=186]", "char_count": 2048}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 187, "text_content": "C. \nDiscussion \nThe defendant's motion to strike should be denied—or at a minimum deferred until after \nthe conclusion of the Government's direct case—because all of the challenged allegations pertain \nto evidence that will be relevant and admissible at trial, and are not unduly prejudicial. \nFirst, the allegations regarding Minor Victim-3 are properly included in the Indictment's \ndescription of the conspiracies charged in Counts One and Three because evidence of those \nincidents is relevant and admissible at trial as direct evidence of the crimes charged. Counts One \nand Three allege that the defendant participated in conspiracies with Epstein both to transport \nminor victims and to entice minor victims to travel with the intent to commit illegal sex acts. \nIndictment¶¶ 9-11, 15-17. In the course and as part of those conspiracies, the defendant groomed \nmultiple minor victims for sexual abuse by Epstein through multiple methods, including \nbefriending victims and encouraging minor victims to provide massages to Epstein knowing he \nwould engage in sex acts with them. Id. ¶¶ I, 4, 7, 14. As detailed in the Indictment, that grooming \nwas a fundamental part of both conspiracies because it encouraged minor victims to be alone with \nand to engage in sex acts with Epstein. \n1, 4, 14. It follows that the defendant's role grooming \nMinor Victim-3 to engage in sex acts with Epstein was a part of and therefore constitutes evidence \nof these conspiracies. Id. ¶¶ 7(c), 11(d), 17(d). \nThe defense claims that because the Indictment does not allege that each element of \nsubstantive violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2423(a) was met as to Minor Victim-3, her \nexperiences cannot be direct evidence of the conspiracies to violate those statutes charged in \nCounts One and Three. But that argument ignores a fundamental tenet of conspiracy law. It is \naxiomatic that a conspiracy does not require a completed substantive crime. See Salinas v. United \nStates, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) (\"It i\n... [truncated, 2179 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/187 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=187]", "char_count": 2179}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 188, "text_content": "public, and so punishable in itself.\"). Indeed, \"[i]t is well settled that the essential elements of \nthe crime of conspiracy are: (1) that the defendant agreed with at least one other person to commit \nan offense; (2) the defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the specific intent to \ncommit the offenses that were the objects of the conspiracy; and (3) that during the existence of \nthe conspiracy, at least one of the overt acts set forth in the indictment was committed by one or \nmore of the members of the conspiracy in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy.\" United \nStates v. Salarneh, 152 F.3d 88, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1998). \nBecause a conspiracy does not require the completion of a substantive crime, it does not \nmatter whether Minor Victim-3 was ever in fact transported as a minor, or whether the elements \nof the substantive crimes of transportation an enticement are satisfied as to her. See Salinas, 522 \nU.S. at 65. What matters is whether the Indictment properly alleges that the defendant agreed to \nparticipate in schemes to transport and entice minors to travel with the intent that an illegal sex act \nwould be committed, and whether the allegations at issue are relevant and admissible evidence of \nthat conspiracy. Here, that is plainly the case. As alleged, the defendant's participation in \nrecruiting and grooming Minor Victim-3 to engage in sex acts as a minor with Epstein during the \nperiod charged in the Indictment, is itself evidence of the defendant's agreements with Epstein to \nidentify minor girls to entice and transport for purposes of illegal sex acts.57 Moreover, the \n57 The defendant takes issue with the Indictment's reference to these sex acts as \"abuse\" because, \nshe asserts, Minor Victim-3 was above the age of consent in the United Kingdom at the time they \noccurred. The description in the Indictment is factually accurate, however, because Minor Victim-\n3 will testify to her subjective experience of these acts with a much o\n... [truncated, 2591 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/188 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=188]", "char_count": 2591}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 189, "text_content": "Government further expects Minor Victim-3 will testify that \n, which is probative of the \ndefendant's intent, in her initial interactions with Minor Victim-3, to entice Minor Victim-3 to \ntravel and be transported for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts.58 Thus, even if Minor Victim-\n3 did not travel as a minor, the events involving Minor Victim-3 outlined in the Indictment \nconstitute direct and admissible evidence of the agreements between and the relationship of the \ndefendant and Epstein. Because evidence regarding Minor Vitim-3 is therefore relevant and \nadmissible at trial, there is no basis to strike these allegations from the Indictment. See Scarpa, \n913 F.2d at 1013. Given the relevance of these allegations, the defendant has not satisfied the \n\"exacting\" standard required to justify striking portions of an Indictment. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. \n3d at 724 (quoting Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 610). Accordingly, the motion should be denied, or, \nat the very least, deferred until \"presentation of the Government's evidence at trial\" after which \nthe Court will have a full understanding of how Minor Victim-3's experiences fit into the charged \nconspiracies. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 467. \nThe fact that the Government would be precluded, by virtue of the statute of limitations, \nfrom bringing a charge based exclusively on the experience of Minor Victim-3 is immaterial. It is \nwell-established that a prosecution for a conspiracy is timely so long as the conspiracy exists and \nat least one timely overt act is committed in furtherance of the conspiracy within the applicable \nstatute of limitations. See United States v. Sahnonese, 352 F.3d 608, 614 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing \nGrunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d \n170, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Mason, 479 F. App'x 397, 398 (2d Cir. 2012). \n5S Minor Victim-3 has been a \nshe was invitedil \nwhen she was 18 years old. Regardless, the subsequent invitation de\n... [truncated, 2130 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/189 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=189]", "char_count": 2130}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 190, "text_content": "Accordingly, overt acts that may, on their own, be untimely can nevertheless serve as direct \nevidence of the existence of a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Benussi, 216 F. Supp. \n2d 299, 301-07, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (admitting evidence of otherwise untimely acts during \nconspiracy trial); cf. United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to vacate \na conviction on a statute with only prospective application when \"the Government presented post-\nenactment evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements\" in addition to evidence of relevant pre-\nenactment conduct). Evidence regarding Minor Victim-3 is thus admissible to prove the existence \nof the conspiracy, even if a conviction could not be supported based on her experiences alone.S9\nThe Government agrees with the defendant that Minor Victim-3 turned 25 before 2003 \nand, as a result, a substantive count based exclusively on conduct involving Minor Victim-3 is \ntime-barred. As discussed above, however, the conduct involving Minor Victim-1 and Minor \nVictim-2 alleged in the Indictment is timely. Thus, if the jury concludes that the conspiracies \nexisted, involved either Minor Victim-1 or Minor Victim-2, and included at least one overt act as \nto either Minor Victim-1 or Minor Victim-2, then Counts One and Three are not time-barred. See \nSalmonese, 352 F.3d at 614. Moreover, and so as to ensure that any count of conviction is based \non timely conduct, the Government would have no objection to an appropriate instruction from \n\" As a fallback argument, the defense cites United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 1998), \nin which a District Judge concluded that alleged overt acts involving concealment or \"cover-ups\" \nwere not obviously within the scope of the charged conspiracy to defraud the United States by \nimpairing and impeding the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 20, 24-26. Although \nthe Court denied the motion to strike the alleged surplusage, it ordered the prosec\n... [truncated, 2848 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/190 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=190]", "char_count": 2848}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 191, "text_content": "the Court informing the jury that, to convict on any conspiracy count, it must find at least one overt \nact in furtherance of the conspiracy that occurred within the statute of limitations. See Benussi, \n216 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (describing a similar jury instruction provided fora conspiracy containing \nsome allegations that were time-barred and others that were timely). \nSecond, the allegations regarding Minor Victim-3 in the Indictment are no more \ninflammatory or prejudicial than those describing the experiences of Minor Victim-1 and Minor \nVictim-2. The references to \"sexual abuse\" accurately describe Minor Victim-3's experience of \nsex acts with Epstein as traumatic, exploitative, and abusive, and she will testify to that effect at \ntrial. Moreover, because these acts were committed in furtherance of the criminal conspiracies \ncharged in the Indictment, it is neither misleading nor prejudicial to imply that this activity \ninvolved illegal conduct. More to the point, because evidence regarding Minor Victim-3 \"is \nadmissible and relevant to the charge[s]\" contained in Counts One and Three of the Indictment, \nthe language describing Minor Victim-3's experiences in the Indictment \"may not be stricken\" \n\"regardless of how prejudicial the language is .. .\" Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1013 (quoting DePahna, \n461 F. Supp. at 797). \nFinally, even if Minor Victim-3's experiences did not constitute direct evidence of the \ncrimes charged—which they do—this same evidence will also be admissible pursuant to Rule \n404(b) to prove the defendant's knowledge, intent, and modus operandi. Federal Rule of Evidence \n404(b) provides, in pertinent part: \nEvidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove \na person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion \nthe person acted in accordance with the character. This evidence \nmay be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, \nopportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence \nof mis\n... [truncated, 2046 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/191 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=191]", "char_count": 2046}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 192, "text_content": "\"[E]vidence of uncharged criminal conduct is not evidence of `other crimes, wrongs, or acts' under \nRule 404(b) if that conduct is `inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged \noffense.'\" United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 309 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. \nTowne, 870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1989)). Where \"the indictment contains a conspiracy charge, \nuncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself.\" United States v. \nDiaz, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. \nMiller, 116 F.3d 641, 682 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir. \n1994). \"An act that is alleged to have been done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy \n. is not \nan `other' act within the meaning of Rule 404(b); rather, it is part of the very act charged.\" United \nStates v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992). \nThe Second Circuit \"follows the `inclusionary' approach to `other crimes, wrongs, or acts' \nevidence, under which such evidence is admissible unless it is introduced for the sole purpose of \nshowing the defendant's bad character, or unless it is overly prejudicial under Fed. R. Evid. 403 \nor not relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 402.\" United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. \n1996) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. \n2006); United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993). Under this approach, \nuncharged acts are admissible in a conspiracy case where they are used to (i) explain the \ndevelopment of the illegal relationship between coconspirators; (ii) explain the mutual criminal \ntrust that existed between coconspirators; and/or (iii) complete the story of the crime charged. See \nDiaz, 176 F.3d at 80; United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. \nRosa, 11 F.3d 315, 334 (2d Cir. 1993). In addition, evidence of \"other acts\" is admissi\n... [truncated, 2229 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/192 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=192]", "char_count": 2229}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 193, "text_content": "404(b)(2); (ii) is relevant to the crime for which the defendant is on trial; (iii) has probative value \nthat is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect; and (iv) is admitted with a \nlimiting instruction to the July, if requested. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-\n92 (1988); United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). \nHere, evidence regarding the defendant's interactions with Minor Victim-3 is admissible \nto prove the defendant's knowledge, intent, and modus operandi, all of which are permissible \npurposes under Rule 404(b). Testimony regarding the defendant's efforts to recruit and encourage \nMinor Victim-3 to engage in sex acts with Epstein in the context of massages establishes that the \ndefendant knew of Epstein's attraction to minor girls and knew that Epstein used massage to \ninitiate sexual contact with minor girls. Similarly, testimony regarding the defendant's interactions \nwith Minor Victim-3, including how the defendant befriended Minor Victim-3 and then \nencouraged her to engage in sex acts with Epstein, establishes that the defendant intended for \nminor girls to engage in sex acts with Epstein when she befriended them, invited them to travel, \nand arranged for their travel.60 Finally, the details of how the defendant interacted with Minor \nVictim-3 demonstrates that the defendant had a specific modus operandi when grooming minor \ngirls to engage in sexual activity with Epstein. As with Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim-2, the \ndefendant asked minor girls details about their lives, normalized sexual topics and activity, and \nused her presence as an adult woman to convince minor girls that the sexual activity Epstein \ninitiated was normal and acceptable. \"The similarity sufficient to admit evidence of past acts to \nestablish a recurring modus operandi need not be complete; it is enough that the characteristics \nrelied upon are sufficiently idiosyncratic to permit a fair inference of a pattern's existen\n... [truncated, 2316 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/193 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=193]", "char_count": 2316}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 194, "text_content": "States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 1984). Here, the defendant's specific and unique \napproach to preparing minor girls to engage in sex acts with Epstein demonstrate the existence of \nsuch an idiosyncratic pattern warranting admission. \nOther acts evidence is, like all other evidence, inadmissible under Rule 403 if its probative \nvalue is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. \nEvidence is unfairly prejudicial, however, \"only when it tends to have some adverse effect upon a \ndefendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence.\" \nUnited States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980). Other acts evidence is typically not \nunfairly prejudicial where it is not \"any more sensational or disturbing than the crimes\" with which \nthe defendant has been charged. United States v. Rolan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990). \nHere, as already discussed, evidence regarding Minor Victim-3's experiences with the defendant \nand Epstein are no more inflammatory or upsetting than those of Minor Victim-1 and Minor \nVictim-2. Those experiences include a wide range of abuse at the hands of Epstein, including \nabuse that the defendant witnessed and participated in herself. Evidence regarding similar events \ninvolving Minor Victim-3, who was of a similar age and experienced similar types of sexual \ncontact, is no more \"sensational or disturbing\" than the other acts detailed in the Indictment. Id. \nEvidence of other acts involving the grooming or abuse of minor victims is regularly admitted for \nsimilar purposes in cases where charges allege sexual activity with minors. See, e.g., United States \nv. Vickers, 708 F. App'x 732, 737 (2d Cir. 2017) (\"As to the testimony concerning Vickers' \n`grooming' of his victims, we conclude that such evidence was admissible even under Rule 404(b), \nbecause it was probative of Vickers' knowledge of how to secure adolescent boys' trust so that he \ncould s\n... [truncated, 2203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/194 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=194]", "char_count": 2203}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 195, "text_content": "403.\"); United States v. McDarrah, 351 F. App'x 558, 563 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming admission \npursuant to Rule 404(b) of defendant's \"e-mail responses to the Craigslist advertisements\" for \nerotic services because the e-mails \"were relevant to his knowledge and intent, because he wrote \nthose emails to girls he knew could be minors (he enthusiastically indicated that girls younger than \n18 are acceptable) and his e-mails showed his interest in actual sexual conduct\"); United States v. \nBrand, No. 04 Cr. 194 (PKL), 2005 WL 77055, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2005) (admitting \n\"evidence that Brand exhibited an interest in child erotica and child pornography on the intemet \nin the period leading up to the charged conduct\" under Rule 404(b) because evidence was \n\"pertinent to whether he used the intemet in an attempt to engage in sexual conduct with\" victim). \nAccordingly, Rule 403 does not bar the admission of evidence regarding Minor Victim-3, \nespecially given its probative value in demonstrating the defendant's knowledge, intent, and modus \noperandi. \nIn sum, because evidence regarding Minor Victim-3's experience is admissible both as \ndirect evidence of the conspiracies charged in Counts One and Three and pursuant to Rule 404(b), \nthere is no basis to strike the allegations regarding Minor Victim-3 from the Indictment. \nIX. \nThe Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One or Count Three as Multiplicitous Is \nPremature \nThe defendant moves to dismiss Counts One or Three on the ground that they are \nmultiplicitous. (Def. Mot. 8). Because the Second Circuit has made clear that a multiplicity \nchallenge does not become timely until after trial, this motion should be denied as premature. \nA. \nRelevant Facts \nCount One charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy, in violation of 18 \nU.S.C. § 371, to transport minors with the intent to commit an illegal sex act, in violation of 18 \nU.S.C. § 2422. See Indictment ¶¶ 9-11. Count Three charges the defendant with particip\n... [truncated, 2028 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/195 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=195]", "char_count": 2028}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 196, "text_content": "a conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, to entice minors to travel with the intent to commit \nan illegal sex act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). See Indictment ¶t 15-17. In other words, \nCount One and Count Three charge the defendant with agreeing to commit two separate and \ndistinct federal crimes. \nB. \nApplicable Law \nThe Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution \"protects against \nmultiple punishments for the same offense.\" North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). \nAccordingly, a defendant cannot be sentenced for multiplicitous charges covering the same crime. \n\"An indictment is multiplicitous when it charges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in \nseparate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed.\" United States v. \nChacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60, 72 (2d \nCir. 2006) (\"A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, 'unless the charged offenses are the \nsame in fact and in law.\"' (quoting United States v. Estrada, 320 F.3d 173, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). \nAlthough the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the \nsame offense, a defendant does have a right not to be punished twice for the same crime. United \nStates v. Joseplzberg, 459 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Accordingly, \"[i]f the jury \nconvicts on more than one multiplicitous count, the defendant's right not to suffer multiple \npunishments for the same offense will be protected by having the court enter judgment on only \none of the multiplicitous counts.\" Id. Similarly, where the judgment of conviction has already \nbeen entered on multiplicitous counts, that right is protected by vacating the convictions on all but \none count. Id. \nThe Second Circuit has clarified that District Courts should not rule on a motion to dismiss \na charge on multiplicity grounds until the time of sentencing. See id. (vacating district court's \n170 \n... [truncated, 2014 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/196 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=196]", "char_count": 2014}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 197, "text_content": "dismissal of count as multiplicitous prior to trial, as such a determination before trial is \"at best \npremature\"). Among other reasons, courts look to \"the record as a whole in determining whether \nan indictment is in fact multiplicitous,\" and the record cannot be fully established until trial is \ncomplete. United States v. McCouny, 562 F.3d 458, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). Additionally, because \ndouble jeopardy is meant to protect a defendant from successive punishments for the same offense, \na multiplicitous count does not violate the Clause unless and until sentence is imposed. See \nJosephberg, 459 F.3d at 355 (\"Where there has been no prior conviction or acquittal, the Double \nJeopardy Clause does not protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, so long \nas no more than one punishment is eventually imposed.\"). \nFollowing the Second Circuit's directive, courts in this Circuit regularly defer ruling on a \nmultiplicity motion until after the conclusion of trial. See, e.g., United States v. Halkbank,No. 15 \nCr. 867 (RMB), 2020 WL 5849512, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. I, 2020) (denying pretrial motion to \ndismiss multiplicitous count and noting that \"lc]ourts in this Circuit have routinely denied pre-\ntrial motions to dismiss potentially multiplicitous counts as premature.\" (quoting United States v. \nMedina, No. 13 Cr. 272 (PGG), 2014 WL 3057917, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014)1); United States \nv. Dwnitru, No. 18 Cr. 243 (LAK), 2018 WL 3407703, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2018) (denying \npretrial motion to dismiss multiplicitous count in light of \"the Circuit's controlling view that the \nquestion of multiplicitousness is properly considered only at a later point in the proceedings\"); \nUnited States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"[M]ultiplicity is properly \naddressed by the trial court at the sentencing stage.\"); United States v. Ghavami, No. 10 Cr. 1217 \n(KMW), 2012 WL 2878126, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012) (\"To the extent that the Indictmen\n... [truncated, 2216 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/197 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=197]", "char_count": 2216}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 198, "text_content": "the Court will enter judgment on only one of the multiplicitous convictions.\" (citations omitted)); \nUnited States v. Rivera, No. 09 Cr. 619 (SJF), 2011 WL 1429125, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2011) \n(\"Since it is possible that the jury will convict defendants on only one (1) of the respective counts \nthat they allege are multiplicitous, and acquit defendants on all of the counts with which they allege \nthat count is multiplicitous, the issue of whether the counts are multiplicitous in violation of the \nDouble Jeopardy Clause is premature at the pretrial stage.\"). \nC. \nDiscussion \nThe defendant's motion to dismiss Counts One or Three of the Indictment as multiplicitous \nis, at best, premature. Consistent with the directive of the Second Circuit, this Court should defer \nruling on this motion until after the completion of trial. The additional time will ensure that the \nfull factual record is developed before the Court conducts the multiplicity analysis, and the motion \nmay become moot depending on the jury's verdict. \nFirst, the Court cannot conduct the multiplicity analysis before hearing all of the evidence \nregarding the charges contained in the Indictment. Prior to trial, the record will not be fully \ndeveloped, and the Court cannot conduct the necessary analysis to determine whether the counts \nare in fact multiplicitous. Consistent with the directive of the Second Circuit and the consistent \npractice in this District, the Court should defer conducting any multiplicity analysis until after \nhearing all of the evidence at trial. See Josepliberg, 459 F.3d at 355. \nSecond, the motion may become moot because it is possible that the jury could conclude \nthat the defendant is guilty of one of the charged conspiracies but not guilty of the other. That is \nbecause each charged conspiracy alleges that the defendant agreed to violate a different criminal \nstatute. Count One alleges that the defendant agreed to transport minors with the intent that they \nengage in illegal se\n... [truncated, 2100 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/198 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=198]", "char_count": 2100}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 199, "text_content": "with the intent that they engage in illegal sex acts. In other words, Count One requires proof of an \nagreement to transport, while Count Three requires proof of an agreement to entice. Transportation \ndoes not necessarily require enticement, and likewise enticement to travel does not necessarily \nrequire transportation. See United States v. Griffith, No. 99 Cr. 786 (HB), 2000 WL 1253265, at \n*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2000) (denying post-trial motion to dismiss as multiplicitous 18 U.S.C. \n§ 2422 transportation charge and 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) enticement charge involving same alleged \nconduct and noting \"[t]hat persuasion and transportation involve proof of different facts is hardly \ncontentious\"). \nHere, it is possible that the jury could conclude, after hearing all the evidence, that the \ndefendant agreed to transport one or more minors interstate, but that she did not agree to entice \nminors to travel. For example, the jury could theoretically conclude that although the defendant \nagreed to arrange transportation for a minor victim, the defendant herself did not agree to persuade \nor entice a minor victim to travel. Likewise, the jury could theoretically conclude that the \ndefendant agreed to entice, or encourage, one or more minors to travel interstate, but she did not \nagree to actually transport or assist in the transportation itself. Although the Government expects \nto prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in fact agreed both to entice and to transport \none or more minor victims, it is possible that the jury may reach a different conclusion. Depending \non the inferences the jury draws from the evidence presented at trial, it could convict on one \nconspiracy count while acquitting on the other, or it could conclude that the defendant agreed both \nto transport and to entice, in which case it could convict on both counts. That possibility means \nthat a motion to dismiss counts as multiplicitous is premature. Because the Government has the \ndiscretion to p\n... [truncated, 2207 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/199 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=199]", "char_count": 2207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 200, "text_content": "355 (\"It is well established that '[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a \ngrand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion,' and 'a defendant has no \nconstitutional right to elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his \nindictment and prosecution . . .'\" (brackets and ellipses in original) (quoting United States v. \nBatchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979)). \nOnly after the Court has heard all of the evidence at trial and received the jury's verdict \nwill the defense motion be ripe. Accordingly, the motion should be denied as premature. \nX. \nThe Defendant's Various Disclosure Motions Should be Denied \nMaxwell's motions also include an assortment of requests for orders requiring the \nGovernment to make various disclosures, all of which are meritless or, at best, premature. \nA. \nBill of Particulars Is Not Warranted \nFirst, the defendant moves for a bill of particulars, demanding the Government set out an \narray of details regarding the Government's theory of its case and anticipated witness testimony. \nThe defendant, like all defendants, is entitled to sufficient information to understand the charges \nagainst her, to prepare a defense, and to protect against double jeopardy. \nHowever, the \nGovernment has provided such information, and much more, in the Indictment, extensive \ndiscovery, and various pretrial filings, including this memorandum. The defendant will also \nreceive trial exhibits, a witness list, and Jencks Act material reasonably in advance of trial. As \nsuch, she has not established an entitlement to a bill of particulars under well-established governing \nlaw. \n1. \nApplicable Law \nThe proper purpose of a bill of particulars under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) is \n\"to provide defendant with information about the details of the charge against him if this is \n174 \nEFTA00039621\n", "char_count": 1902}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 201, "text_content": "necessary to the preparation of his defense, and to avoid prejudicial surprise at trial.\" United States \nv. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. \nMarcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). \nAccordingly, \"[a] bill of particulars is required 'only where the charges of the indictment are so \ngeneral that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused!\" United \nStates v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234); see United \nStates v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014). \nIn exercising its broad discretion to determine whether the charges are so general that they \nrequire supplementation through a bill of particulars, the Court should consider not just the text of \nthe Indictment, but also discovery and other information supplied to the defendant to date. See \nUnited States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g., Pierre-Louis, 2018 \nWL 4043140, at *7 (denying request for bill of particulars where indictment charged sex \ntrafficking conspiracy spanning two decades because indictment and discovery \"would suggest \nthat defendant has enough information to apprise him of the charges with enough precision to \nenable him to prepare a defense, avoid unfair surprise at trial, and preclude a second prosecution \nfor the same offense\"); United States v. Block, No. 16 Cr. 595 (JPO), 2017 WL 1608905, at *6-7 \n(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2017) (denying request for bill of particulars as to alleged fraud and unindicted \nco-conspirators where indictment sufficiently advised defendant of nature of charges against him \nand described with specificity acts he allegedly committed, nature of conspiracy, and explained in \nlanguage closely tracking statute crimes alleged); United States v. Monserrate, No. 10 Cr. 965 \n(CM), 2011 WL 3480957, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2011) (denying re\n... [truncated, 2244 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/201 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=201]", "char_count": 2244}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 202, "text_content": "(denying bill of particulars request in stock fraud case where indictment was fifteen pages long \nand substantial discovery had been provided). \nAlthough the Government cannot provide \"mountains of documents to defense counsel\" \nas a substitute for a bill of particulars where one would otherwise be required, see Bortnovsky, 820 \nF.2d at 575, the provision of voluminous discovery in combination with some guidance about what \nis most relevant can vitiate a need for further particulars, see, e.g., United States v. Mandell, 710 \nF. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying request for particularization of alleged \nmisrepresentations where the indictment was thirty-four pages long and Government had provided \nvoluminous, organized discovery). In no event should volume of discovery alone warrant a bill of \nparticulars; \"[w]hile [a] [c]ourt may sympathize with counsel's task of reviewing a large quantity \nof materials that continue to be produced,\" that concern is addressed by granting the defense \nsufficient time in which to conduct the review in advance of trial. See United States v. Levy, No. \n11 Cr. 62 (PAC), 2013 WL 664712, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013). \nA bill of particulars would undoubtedly be helpful to the defense in any case. But \"the law \ndoes not impose upon the Government an obligation to preview its case or expose its legal \ntheories,\" United States v. Leonelli, 428 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and therefore \"[t]tle \nultimate test must be whether the information sought is necessary, not whether it is helpful.\" \nUnited States v. Maio! 165 F. Supp. 2d 558, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (emphasis added); Mahabub, \n2014 WL 4243657, at *2 (\"The purpose of a bill of particulars is to ensure that a defendant has the \ninformation necessary to prepare a defense, not to turn over all information that would aid the \ndefendant.\"); United States v. Rittweger, 259 F. Supp. 2d 275, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying \nbill of particulars request as \"'an impermissible attempt t\n... [truncated, 2058 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/202 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=202]", "char_count": 2058}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 203, "text_content": "evidentiary details of its case' (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. \n1987)). \nA bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose \"the \nmanner in which it will attempt to prove the charges, the precise manner in which the defendant \ncommitted the crime charged, or a preview of the Government's evidence or legal theories.\" \nMitlof, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 569; see also Torres, 901 F.2d at 234 (\"Acquis i t ion of evidentiary detail \nis not the function of the bill of particulars.' (quoting Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45, 49 \n(8th Cir. 1968))). The \"wheres, whens and with whoms\"' are \"beyond the scope of a bill of \nparticulars.\" Mitlof, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (citing Torres, 901 F.2d at 233-34; Jimenez, 824 F. \nSupp. 351, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); see also, e.g., United States v. D 'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321, \n335 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (\"A bill of particulars is not a general investigative tool, a discovery device \nor a means to compel the government to disclose evidence or witnesses to be offered prior to trial.' \n(quoting United States v. Gibson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))); United States v. \nBellomo, 263 F. Supp. 2d 561, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (\"A bill of particulars is not designed to: \nobtain the government's evidence; restrict the government's evidence prior to trial; assist the \ndefendant's investigation; obtain the precise way in which the government intends to prove its \ncase; interpret its evidence for the defendant, or disclose its legal theory.\"); United States v. Henry, \n861 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (\"This instrument should not function to disclose \nevidence, witnesses, and legal theories to be offered by the Government at trial or as a general \ninvestigative tool for the defense.\"). \nThere are good reasons why bills of particulars are warranted only where the allegations in \nthe indictment, as supplemented by discovery and other disclosures, are so general as to render it \nimposs\n... [truncated, 2109 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/203 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=203]", "char_count": 2109}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 204, "text_content": "to particulars furnished,\" it can \"restrict unduly the Government's ability to present its case.\" \nHenry, 861 F. Supp. at 1197; see also Mit(of, 2014 WL 4243657, at *2 (recognizing that \"care \nmust be taken\" because \"[t]he government's presentation of evidence at trial is limited to the \nparticulars contained in the bill\"); United States v. Samsonov, No. 07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL \n176721, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) (\"The vehicle of a bill of particulars serves to inform a \ndefendant of the nature of the charge, when he is otherwise insufficiently informed, and must not \nbe misused to compel disclosure of how much the Government can prove, nor to foreclose the \nGovernment from using proof it may develop as the trial approaches.\"). Moreover, where the \nGovernment's provision of particulars is tantamount to an itemized preview of its proof, it creates \nthe very real danger that a defendant will \"tailor her testimony to explain away the Government's \ncase.\" Henry, 861 F. Supp. at 1197. These concerns animate the rule that \"if the defendant has \nbeen given adequate notice of the charges against her and can prepare fully for trial with reasonably \ndiligent efforts, the Government cannot be required to disclose additional details about its case.\" \nId. \n2. \nDiscussion \nThere is no basis for a bill of particulars in this case. The charges against the defendant \nare clear from the face of the Indictment, which provides significant detail regarding the charged \ncrimes. As is apparent from the 18-page Indictment, the charges concern the defendant's \nparticipation in conspiracies to transport and entice minor girls to travel with the intent that they \nengage in illegal sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein from 1994 through 1997, and the defendant's attempt \nto cover up that conduct during her civil deposition testimony in 2016. Specifically, the Indictment \nmakes plain that the defendant is charged with engaging in a conspiracy to transport minor girls \nwith intent that they engage\n... [truncated, 2088 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/204 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=204]", "char_count": 2088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 205, "text_content": "minor girls to travel with the intent that they engage in sexual activity with Epstein, aiding and \nabetting the transportation and enticement of a particular minor girl interstate for the purpose of \nengaging in sex acts with Epstein, and lying about those same crimes during her 2016 civil \ndeposition testimony. The charged time periods are made plain in each count, as is the statute she \nis accused of violating. \nThe speaking Indictment in this case goes above and beyond a mere recitation of the \nelements of each offense by detailing the defendant's specific role in the crimes charged. Among \nother things, it specifies three minor victims in particular and describes the steps the defendant \ntook with respect to each as part of the charged crimes. See, e.g., Indictment ¶ 7. Additionally, \nthe Indictment details the types of sex acts that Epstein committed with the minor victims as part \nof the charged crimes and the locations where those acts occurred. See, e.g., id.1 5-6. In this way, \nthe Indictment makes clear the Government's theory that the defendant groomed three minor girls \nto engage in sex acts in Florida, New Mexico, New York, and London with Epstein between 1994 \nand 1997. The Indictment further specifies during which portion of that period each of those three \nvictims interacted with the defendant and Epstein as minors. See id. 17. Additionally, the \nIndictment identifies the precise answers that the Government alleges constituted perjury, and \nalleges facts, in the earlier portions of the Indictment, that indicate how and why the Government \nwill seek to prove the answers were false. Compare id. ¶¶ 21, 23 with id. ¶¶ 1-11. Simply put, \nthis is not a case in which the allegations in the Indictment \"are so general that they do not advise \nthe defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused.\" Walsh, 194 F.3d at 47 (internal quotation \nmark omitted) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234). Thus, the Indictment itself provides a sufficient \nbasis to deny th\n... [truncated, 2204 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/205 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=205]", "char_count": 2204}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 206, "text_content": "Particulars are necessary only where indictment charges are `so general that they do not advise the \ndefendant of the specific acts of which he is accused.'\" (internal citation omitted) (quoting Torres, \n901 F.2d at 234; United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151, 163 (2d Cir. 2004))); United States v. Wedd, \nNo. 15 Cr. 616 (KBF), 2016 WL 1055737, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) (denying motion for \nbill of particulars where \"the Indictment is a `speaking' Indictment that provides a significant \namount of detail as to the Government's theory of the case and the nature of the proof that will \nunderlie the charges at trial\"). \nAdditional particularity relating to the details of the counts in the Indictment might be \nhelpful for the defendant, but that is both true in every case and not the appropriate standard. \nInstead, the inquiry is properly focused on whether the information already available to her is so \ngeneral that a bill of particulars is necessary to the preparation of her defense. Plainly it is not. In \naddition to the speaking Indictment, the defendant has received over 2.7 million pages of discovery \nin this case. Although that is a high volume of discovery, it is clear from the defense's own motion \nthat the defense has apparently already reviewed that material (at least in significant part), \nidentified relevant materials therein, and is aware of their relevance to the allegations in the \nIndictment. (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 10 at 6). Indeed, much of the discovery is text searchable, and \nthe time period that each document relates to is readily ascertainable. \nIn this vein, the defendant has received \nctment, w \n=IMIIMIPItiding \nflights with the defendant and flightsMill \nn\n61\nflect instawhen one of the inif \n61 Records of commercial flights were unavailable by the time the Government opened its \ninvestigation in this case. Accordingly, the Government has no records of commercial flights that \nthe defendant, Epstein, or any victims may have taken during the releva\n... [truncated, 2030 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/206 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=206]", "char_count": 2030}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 207, "text_content": "Indictment traveled on the private plane during the period alleged in the Indictment. Business \nrecords from a particular educational institution reflect instances when Epstein and the defendant \nwere present at a summer camp that same minor victim attended, which line up with flight records \nconfirming they were in the \nsame summer the victim attended the camp \nin 1994. Diary entries identify the perioan \na different minor victim identified in the \nIndictment first met Epstein, and customs a \nindicate times in 1994 whendiostein and tS\ndefendant traveled internationally cma \nanother minor victim'\n 11 \ndiscovery also incleontemporary phar \nof each of the three villINVege \nin \nIndialfrom th \nantj \nand the Government has provided the defense with the \nbirth month and year of each minor victim.62\nIn other words, as the Government has previously indicated, the discovery provides the \ndefendant with more than sufficient information about the three minor victims to permit her to \nprepare for trial. The discovery also provides the defense the ability to identify specific private \nplane flights that are relevant to the Indictment. Any remaining detail regarding the specifics of \nabuse, particular interactions, and additional trips will come from witness testimony. As is to be \nexpected when describing events more than two decades in the past, that testimony will provide \napproximate time periods when events occurred, rather than specific dates. Given the information \nthe defendant already has from the discovery, the Indictment, and the Government's court filings \n(including this memorandum), any additional detail would essentially serve as early Jencks Act \nproduction, allowing the defendant to tailor any testimony to the Government's case. The \ndiscovery gives the defense ample information to assist in its investigation, and given the defense's \n62 In this memorandum, the Government has also clarified that Minor Victim-3 was 17 years old \nat the time of the events described\n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/207 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=207]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 208, "text_content": "apparent ability to understand who the three victims are from the productions, there is no real \nconcern that the defense will waste efforts conducting any such investigation before receiving \nJencks Act material 63\nMoreover, with respect to the perjury counts, to the extent there could plausibly be any \nremaining ambiguity about the nature of the charges, the Government has addressed and resolved \nsuch ambiguity in responding to the instant motions. In this memorandum, the Government has \nsummarized how the defendant's false statements during her deposition were material to the \npending civil litigation. See Section V, supra. Perhaps more importantly, the defendant personally \nparticipated in that civil litigation, and she is undoubtedly quite familiar with it. \nTogether, the discovery productions, briefing in which the Government has described \naspects of its evidence and theory (see, e.g., Government Memorandum in Opposition to Renewed \nBail Motion, Dec. 18, 2020, Dkt. No. 100, at 8-12), the contents of this memorandum, and the \ndetails contained in the Indictment more than adequately inform the defendant of the charges \nagainst her. This is simply not a case where the \"relevance of key events [are] shrouded in \nmystery.\" See Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d at 574. Accordingly, the Court should deny the motion for a \nbill of particulars. \nB. \nThe Defendant's Requests for Early Production of a Witness List and Jencks \nAct Material Should Be Denied \n1. \nApplicable Law \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 \"does not require the Government to furnish the \nnames and addresses of its witnesses in general.\" United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 139 (2d \n63 Although the victims' identities are clear from the discovery, and the defendant's motion makes \nclear that she strongly suspects their identities, there is no basis to require the Government to turn \nover the names of its witnesses, including its victim-witnesses in advance of its Jencks Act \nproduction, which is customary in\n... [truncated, 2060 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/208 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=208]", "char_count": 2060}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 209, "text_content": "Cir. 1990). Thus, \"Iiin the absence of a specific showing that disclosure [of a witness list] [is] \nboth material to the preparation of [the] defense and reasonable in light of the circumstances \nsurrounding [the] case,' the request for a witness list should be denied.\" United States v. Russo, \n483 F. Supp. 2d 301, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Bejasa, 904 F.2d at 139-40). \"Courts in the \nSecond Circuit typically deny motions for the early disclosure of witness lists where, as here, \nDefendants have not made a specific showing of need.\" United States v. Rivera, No. 16 Cr. 175 \n(LGS), 2017 WL 1843302, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017). The claim that \"given the complexity \nof the case, disclosure of the government witness list will level the playing field\" amounts to an \n\"abstract statement of need\" that does not justify provision of a witness list. Russo, 483 F. Supp. \n2d at 309. \nThe Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, covers disclosure of statements or reports made by \nGovernment witnesses, and the rule mandates that such materials not be the subject of discovery \nor inspection \"until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.\" 18 \nU.S.C. § 3500(a); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) (\"[T]he Jencks \nAct prohibits a District Court from ordering the pretrial disclosure of witness statements.\"); United \nStates v. Thompson, No. 13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) \n(denying request for early production of Jencks Act material in light of Coppa). \nTypically in this District, and as is the case here, the Government confirms that it will \nproduce 3500 material and Giglio (or impeachment) material reasonably in advance of trial, and \nwill engage in good faith discussions with the defense regarding a schedule for pretrial disclosures. \nSee United States v. Sergentakis, No. 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. \nAug. 17, 2005) C' 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Governmen\n... [truncated, 2146 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/209 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=209]", "char_count": 2146}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 210, "text_content": "with the regular practice in this District, the Government intends to make Section 3500 material \navailable to the defense at the same time as impeachment material, [and that] in order to avoid any \ndelay in the trial, the Government will produce such material sufficiently in advance of each \nGovernment witness's testimony' ... is more than adequate.\"); United States v. Gallo, No. 98 Cr. \n338 (JGK), 1999 WL 9848, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1999) (\"[T]he Government has indicated that \nit is aware of its obligations under Giglio .. . and the Jencks Act and that it will provide the required \ninformation to the defendants in accordance with its responsibilities under Giglio and the Jencks \nAct sufficiently in advance of each witness's testimony to allow adequate time to prepare for cross-\nexamination. These representations are sufficient.\"). \n2. \nDiscussion \nTrial is still more than four months away. The degree of complexity to this case, and the \nvolume of discovery, is on par with other recent high-profile trials in this District, and in those \ncases witnesses have typically been disclosed approximately three to four weeks before trial. E.g., \nGallo, 17 Cr. 686 (LAK); Blaszczak, 17 Cr. 357 (LAK); Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW); Silver, 15 Cr. \n93 (VEC); Uthricht, 14 Cr. 68 (KBF). As the Government has noted for some time now, the \nGovernment intends to match or even go above and beyond that practice in this case. Specifically, \nthe Government has offered repeatedly to provide non-testifying witness statements to the defense \nas much as eight weeks before trial, thereby allowing extra time for the defense to determine \nwhether it wishes to call any of the witnesses the Government does not intend to present at trial, \nand to provide testifying witness statements and Giglio material as much as four weeks in advance \nof trial. Given that the defense has already been able to initiate its investigation of the charges, \nand given that the discovery makes clear who the three minor vi\n... [truncated, 2149 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/210 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=210]", "char_count": 2149}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 211, "text_content": "to review the statements of testifying witnesses. The Government remains open to engaging in \ngood faith discussions with the defense to mutually agree on a schedule for reciprocal pretrial \ndisclosures.64 Accordingly, the motion for a witness list and early production of Jencks Act \nmaterial should be denied. \nC. \nThe Defendant's Additional Requests for Disclosure Should Be Denied \nThe defendant also makes a variety of motions seeking disclosures to which she is not \nentitled, all of which should be denied. \nFirst, the defendant requests \ndenti fled as \"A\" \nFin a 2 \ne to a \nbuash \nsubpoenas , which the defense attached to their motion as Exhibit B. (Def. Mot. \n10 at 7-8). The defense assumes that because asposiasaily_ \nMAIM \nthereby, according to the defense, rendering any record of \nthose interviews exculpatory. But that defense theory rests on a faulty premise. The Government \nhas reviewed the document memorializing \nand \nconfirmed that it inculpates the defendant and contains nothing exculpatory. The Government has \nalso reviewed \nl it,±I \nI! \niii \nand \nconfirmed that it also inculpates the defendant. The Government has, however, identified a single \nline in \nthat could arguably be considered helpful to \nthe defense.65 With the possible exception of that one line, there is nothing exculpatory contained \n64 The Government has requested reciprocal discovery from the defendant and, to date, she has \nproduced nothing. \n65 In articular, Mr/Wf2 of the notes from this 206glinMew, a single line \nted, \"rumor is that JE is gay,\" an apparent reference to Jeffrey Epstein's rumored sexual \n185 \nEFTA00039632\n", "char_count": 1626}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 212, "text_content": "in \nmade by\nss \"M\" in 2006. Accordingly, the records of \nthese interviews constitute witness statements covered by the Jencks Act and are not subject to \ndisclosure by statute until after each witness has completed direct examination at trial. See 18 \nU.S.C. § 3500. As noted above, however, the Government fully intends to provide all Jencks Act \nmaterial of both testifying and non-testifying witnesses, which will of course include the records \nrelating to these interviews, to the defense multiple weeks in advance of trial. The Government \nrespectfully submits that is sufficient to meet its obligations with respect to these documents, and \nthe defendant's motion for their immediate disclosure should be denied. \nSecond, the defendant's request for an unredacted copy of the FBI report attached to the \nDefense Motion as Exhibit C should be denied as moot because the Government has already \nproduced an unredacted copy of that report to the defense. (Def. Mot. 10 at 8-9). Specifically, the \ndocument was produced without redactions under bates numbers SDNY_GM_00380550 through \nSDNY_ GM_ 00380554 as part of the Government's discovery production dated November 9, \n2020.\" This motion should accordingly be denied as moot. \nThird, the defendant's request for unredacted copies of the FBI report regarding \nis based purely on her speculation that the redacted portions \nof those materials contain exculpatory information. (Def. Mot. 10 at 8-9). Once again, the \n61.1.  Out of an abundance of caution, today the Government has informed defense counsel \nof witness \"M.\" \nof this single line \n\" Notably, the unredacted report does not contain \ndemonstrating that defense counsel's speculation about \nsupposed Brady material lurking beneath redactions is inaccurate. The redacted copy defense \ncounsel attached as Exhibit C was recovered during the execution of a search warrant for one of \nEpstein's devices and was produced to defense counsel in the form in which it was recovered from \nthe devi\n... [truncated, 2237 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/212 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=212]", "char_count": 2237}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 213, "text_content": "Government has reviewed the full report and confirmed that there is nothing exculpatory contained \ntherein. To the contrary, the report inculpates the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant is not \nentitled to its immediate disclosure. The Government will produce an unredacted version of this \ndocument together with all other witness statements in advance of tria1.67\nFourth, the defense requests production of pages from a personal diary that is in the custody \nof a civilian third party and is not in the custody or control of the Government. (Def. Mot. 10 at \n10). Leaving aside the fact that the defense cites no authority for the proposition that the \nGovernment has an obligation to obtain the personal papers of a third party, see United States v. \nCollins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (\"The Government's `Brady obligations extend \nonly to materials within prosecutors' possession, custody or control or, in appropriate cases, that \nof the Department of Justice, perhaps another part of the Executive Branch, or a comparable state \nauthority involved in the federal prosecution.'\" (quoting United States v. Blaszczak, 308 F. Supp. \n3d 736, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2018))), the Government has already represented that it has asked the third \nparty at issue about the materials the defendant purports to seek and that no such materials exist. \nIn particular, to the extent the defense is concerned with whether there are diary entries from the \nspring of 1996, the Government has already indicated in response to the defendant's second bail \nmotion that it is aware of none. (See Dkt. No. 100 at 11 n. 2 (\"Because this victim stopped writing \nin her journal about a month after that first meeting with Epstein, there are no entries regarding the \nsubsequent trip she took months later to visit Epstein, during which she met the defendant. This \nvictim provided the Government with copies of her journal entries relating to Epstein and informed \nthe Government that the remaining entries are \n... [truncated, 2379 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/213 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=213]", "char_count": 2379}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 214, "text_content": "Epstein or the defendant.\")). In other words, the defendant again seeks supposedly exculpatory \nevidence that does not exist. The defendant offers no basis on which to conclude that this \nrepresentation is false or that any such evidence does in fact exist. As such, this motion should be \ndenied. \nFifth, the defendant asks this Court, again without citing any legal authority, to order the \nGovernment to produce copies of all subpoenas it has issued for the defendant's records as part of \nits investigation in this case. (Def. Mot. 10 at 11). This incredibly broad request is nothing more \nthan a fishing expedition inappropriately seeking the details of investigative requests made through \nthe grand jury process. The defense has cited no legal basis for the Court to direct the Government \nto provide the defense with copies of the subpoenas themselves (as opposed to records or other \nmaterials received in response to such subpoenas), let alone every subpoena issued for the \ndefendant's records during a multi-year and ongoing grand jury investigation. The types of \nrequests issued by the grand jury have no conceivable bearing on the defense or on any motion the \ndefense may seek to bring. The Government has already produced to the defense all discoverable \nmaterial that it has received in response to subpoenas issued to date during this investigation. In \nthe absence of any legal authority justifying this request, it should be denied. Additionally, for the \nreasons discussed above in Sections I and IV, the defendant is not entitled to discovery or a hearing \nrelating to her motion to dismiss the Indictment based on the NPA or her motion to suppress \nsubpoena returns. \nSixth, the defendant asks the Court to direct the Government to immediately disclose any \nBrady and Giglio material. (Def. Mot. 10 at 11-13). The motion for disclosure of Brady material \nshould be denied as moot because the Government has conducted a search for any such material \nand has already disclosed a\n... [truncated, 2091 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/214 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=214]", "char_count": 2091}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 215, "text_content": "aware, consistent with the Rule 5(0 Brady order previously issued by the Court in this case. See \nFed. R. Crim. P. 5(0; Dkt. No. 68. The Government recognizes its continuing obligation to \ndisclose any Brady material, and to make a diligent search for any relevant material that may be \nin the possession of the prosecution team, including investigating agents and officers. As the \nGovernment has already emphasized in this case, the Government takes its disclosure obligations \nvery seriously and has committed to being transparent with the Court and the defense regarding its \napproach to obtaining and reviewing files, including other agency files, that may be relevant to \nthis case. (See, e.g., Gov't Letter dated October 7, 2020, Dkt. No. 63). Consistent with that \ncommitment, the Government has completed an initial review of its files for Brady material and \nRule 16 material and has produced more than 2.7 million pages of discovery as a result of that \nreview. These productions have included specific disclosures of certain witness statements that \nmay arguably be exculpatory. The Government also intends to produce all statements and potential \nimpeachment material in its possession regarding any potential witness identified during its \ninvestigation, including those individuals whom the Government does not intend to call at trial. \nAs discussed below, the Government is in the process of reviewing all files in its possession for \npotential impeachment material. The Government remains cognizant of its Brady obligations and \nwill promptly produce any potentially exculpatory material if any is identified during that review. \nThe Government is not currently aware of any undisclosed Brady material in its possession, \nbut it will certainly provide timely disclosure of any additional Brady material if any such material \ncomes to light. Courts in this Circuit routinely deny specific requests for Brady material where, \nas here, the Government has made a good-faith representatio\n... [truncated, 2241 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/215 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=215]", "char_count": 2241}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 216, "text_content": "the court and defense counsel that it recognizes and has complied with its disclosure obligations \nunder Brady,' \ndefendants' \nrequest \nfor \nimmediate \nor \notherwise \nearly \nproduction of Brady materials is denied.\" (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. \nPerez, 940 F. Supp. 540, 553 (S.D.N.Y.1996))); Gallo, 1999 WL 9848, at *8 (denying defendant's \nmotion to compel production of purported Brady material based on Government's representations \nthat \"it is aware of its obligations under Brady . . . and will produce any Brady material to the \ndefense well before trial\"); United States v. Campo Flores, No. 15 Cr. 765 (PAC), 2016 WL \n5946472, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2016) (\"The Government represents that it is aware of its \nobligation under Brady; that it has complied; and will continue to comply. That is sufficient to \ndeny Defendants' motion for Brady relief.\" (internal citations omitted)). Given the Government's \nextensive efforts to review its files for any material warranting disclosure, and its commitment to \ncontinue meeting its disclosure obligations, the motion should be denied. \nFor similar reasons, the motion for disclosure of Giglio material should be denied as \npremature. The Government is fully aware of its obligation to disclose impeachment material, is \nin the process of reviewing all files in its possession for any such material, and will produce any \nsuch material several weeks in advance of trial. As noted above, that is consistent with governing \nlaw in this Circuit, and the defendant cites no authority for the proposition that she is entitled to \nsuch material as much as four months in advance of trial. Courts in this Circuit have repeatedly \nrefused to compel disclosure of impeachment or Giglio material well in advance of trial, and the \ndefense has provided no particularized basis for even earlier disclosure here. See United States v. \nNixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) (\"Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is \ninsuf\n... [truncated, 2204 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/216 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=216]", "char_count": 2204}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 217, "text_content": "anticipated witnesses available . . . ten days before trial. There is no need to depart from the \ncustomary rule in this district of disclosure shortly before trial.\"); United States v. Seabrook, No. \n10 Cr. 87 (DAB), 2010 WL 5174353, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010) (\"The Government represents \nto the Court that it is aware of its Brady, Giglio, Jencks Act, and 404(b) obligations and will \ncomply with them in a timely fashion, as appropriate. Based on the Government's representations, \nand on the current posture of this case, the Court expects that the Government will comply timely \nwith all of its obligations under Brady, Giglio, the Jencks Act, and Rule 404(3), and does not find \na need to order compliance at this time.\" (internal citation omitted)); Russo, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 308 \n(\"Here the government has represented that it intends to produce Giglio material no later than the \nFriday of the week before a witness is scheduled to testify at trial, in accordance with its usual \npractice. To the extent that the government's disclosure in this case proves unusually voluminous \nor complex, \nthe \ngovernment \nhas \nin \ngood-faith \nrepresented \nthat \nit \nintends to \nproduce Giglio material sufficiently in advance of their witnesses' testimony so as to avoid any \ndelay in trial. At the time of those disclosures, to the extent that Defendants feel that additional \ntime is necessary given the volume or complexity of the materials provided, the Court will \nconsider applications to continue or recall witnesses. It is unnecessary, however, to \norder early disclosure at this time.\"); United States v. Canter, 338 F. Supp. 2d 460, 461-62 \n(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying analogous motion and noting that \"[i]t has been the practice of this \nCourt and of other courts in this district to require that the Government produce these materials a \nfew days before the start of trial\"). Because the Government has committed to providing the \ndefense with Giglio material multiple weeks in advance of tr\n... [truncated, 2156 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/217 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=217]", "char_count": 2156}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 218, "text_content": "Seventh, the defendant seeks a proffer of all co-conspirator statements that the Government \nintends to offer at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). (Def. Mot. 10 at 13-\n14). In making this motion, the defense cites authority confirming that co-conspirator statements \nmay be admitted at trial on a conditional basis without the need for any pretrial consideration of \ntheir admissibility. See United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993) (\"The decision \nas to whether the four prerequisites have been met, like all other preliminary questions of \nadmissibility, is to be made by the court. If the government succeeds in persuading the court that \nthe conditionally admitted coconspirator statements were made during and in furtherance of a \nconspiracy of which both the declarant and the defendant were members, the statements are \nallowed to go to the jury. If the court is not so persuaded, it either should instruct the jury to \ndisregard the statements, or, if those statements were `so large a proportion of the proof as to render \na cautionary instruction of doubtful utility,' should declare a mistrial.\" (internal citations omitted) \n(quoting United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969))). Indeed, the Second \nCircuit has rejected the suggestion that non-exculpatory co-conspirator statements are discoverable \nunder Rule 16 or by any means other than the Jencks Act. See In re U.S., 834 F.2d 283, 284-87 \n(2d Cir. 1987) (issuing a writ of mandamus reversing District Court's order directing the \nGovernment \"to produce all oral statement made by the defendants and coconspirators that the \nGovernment planned to offer at trial as admissions of a defendant\" under Fed. R. Evid. 801). \nConsistent with the Government's intention to produce Jencks Act material several weeks in \nadvance of trial, the defense will receive notice of any co-conspirator statements that the \nGovernment may seek to introduce through witness statements with suffic\n... [truncated, 2112 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/218 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=218]", "char_count": 2112}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 219, "text_content": "Finally, the defendant requests early disclosure of Rule 404(b) material that the \nGovernment may seek to introduce at trial. (Def. Mot. 10 at 17). As is customary in this district, \nthe Government will provide notice to the defense of its intent to use any such evidence at least 45 \ndays in advance of trial, which will leave sufficient time for the defense may file any motions in \nlimine to be considered at the final pretrial conference. See Thompson, 2013 WL 6246489 at *9 \n(\"The Government has represented that it will disclose the substance of [the 404(b) evidence it \nintends to introduce at trial] ... in a timely fashion in order to permit the defendants the opportunity \nto challenge admission and to permit the Court to make an appropriate finding. This is all that Rule \n404(b) requires.\" (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Tranquillo, \n606 F. Supp. 2d 370, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (\"The Government has indicated that it will make the \nrequired disclosure two weeks prior to trial, a practice that typically comports with Rule 404(6)); \nUnited States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp. 2d 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (\"The government has in good \nfaith noted its obligations under Rule 404(b), and indicated that it intends to provide notice of the \n404(b) evidence it intends to introduce two weeks before the beginning of trial. There is therefore \nno need to issue the order Defendant seeks.\"). Accordingly, this motion should be denied. \nXI. \nThe Use of a Grand Jury Siting in White Plains Was Entirely Proper \nOn June 29, 2020, amidst a global pandemic that suspended grand juries across the country, \nthe Government sought and obtained an indictment from a grand jury of the Southern District of \nNew York (the \"Southern District\" or \"SDNY\") sifting in White Plains. The defendant now \nchallenges the pool from which that grand jury was drawn, alleging that it does not reflect a \"fair-\ncross section of the community,\" and moves to dismiss the Indictment und\n... [truncated, 2125 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/219 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=219]", "char_count": 2125}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 220, "text_content": "premises, and at any rate fail to meet the elements of a claim under the Sixth Amendment. \nTherefore, the defendant's motion must be denied. \nA. \nBackground \n1. \nThe SDNY and Local Rules for the Division of Business \nThe defendant's brief repeatedly uses the term \"Division\" to describe a \"White Plains \nDivision\" and a \"Manhattan Division.\" (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 9 at 2 (\"On June 29, 2020, the \ngovernment filed a sealed indictment of Ms. Maxwell in the Manhattan Division of this Court. The \ngovernment has conceded that Ms. Maxwell's indictment was obtained using a grand jury seated \nin White Plains, apparently with jurors drawn exclusively from the White Plains Division.\")). Her \nuse of the term \"division\" is imprecise and attributes legal significance where there is none. \nUnderstanding how that is so requires some background. \nDistrict courts in each state in the United States are prescribed by statute. United States \ndistrict courts in New York State are divided between four districts: Northern, Southern, Eastern \nand Western. 28 U.S.C. § 112. While certain districts in other states are further divided into \n\"divisions\" by statute, see, e.g., id. § 81 (dividing Alabama into three \"districts\" and multiple \n\"divisions\" within each district), the federal districts in New York State are not so divided. That \nis, in the Southern District, no \"divisions\" have been created by statute. Id. § 112(b). The statute \nprovides only that \"Court for the Southern District shall be held at New York, White Plains, and \nin the Middletown-Wallkill area of Orange County or such nearby location as may be deemed \nappropriate.\" Id. \nIn the Southern District, the only authority determining whether particular cases are heard \nin the Manhattan or White Plains courthouse is the SDNY Business Division Rules. These rules \nbegin with an important preface: they \"shall not be deemed to vest any rights in litigants . \n.\" \n194 \nEFTA00039641\n", "char_count": 1940}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 221, "text_content": "SDNY Business Division Rules, available at httpsillwww.nysd.uscourts.govisitesidefaultifiles/ \nlocal_rules/rules-2018-10-29.pdf. Moreover, the Rules do not describe—much less limit—what \nmatters may be heard by what grand jury. Cf. SDNY Business Division Rule 6 (describing \nproceedings after an indictment has been returned). Rather, the Rules provide only that once an \nindictment is returned, \"[t]he U.S. attorney designates on the criminal cover sheet that the case is \nto be assigned to White Plains if the crime was allegedly committed in whole or in predominant \npart in the Northern Counties.\" SDNY Business Division Rule 18(b)). Furthermore, the Rules \nspecifically contemplate that cases may be reassigned from one courthouse to another. SDNY \nBusiness Division Rule 19. Consistent with these Rules, it is common for cases to be indicted by \ngrand juries sitting in the White Plains courthouse and tried in the Manhattan courthouse. See, \ne.g., United States v. Israel, 05 Cr. 1039 (CM), Dkt. No. 25; United States v. Cromitie, et at, 09 \nCr. 558 (CM), Dkt. No. 183, 200; United States v. Annabi, 10 Cr. 07 (CM), Dkt. No. 45; United \nStates v. Arici, 12 Cr. 24 (LAP), Dkt. No. 115, 117; United States v. Reeves, et at, 16 Cr. 372 \n(VEC), Dkt. No. 51; United States v. Guerrier, 18 Cr. 284 (JSR), Dkt. No. 98. \n2. \nThe SDNY Jury Plan \nThe Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (the \"JSSA\"), \nprovides the structure for the selection of juries in federal district courts. The JSSA requires each \ndistrict to \"devise and place into operation a written plan for random selection of grand and petit \njurors .. ..\" 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a). Each district in New York selects grand and petit juries pursuant \nto a plan adopted by the judges of the district and approved by the Judicial Conference of the \nSecond Circuit. Id.; see also United States v. Bahna, 68 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1995). The plan for \nthe Southern District has been in place since February 2009. See Amende\n... [truncated, 2129 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/221 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=221]", "char_count": 2129}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 222, "text_content": "https://www.nysd.uscourts.govisitesidefauItalles/pdgiutypIatfeb_2009.pdf (the \"SDNY Jury \nPlan,\" or the \"Plan\"). \nUnder the terms of the SDNY Jury Plan, the initial selection of persons to be considered \nfor service as grand and petit jurors are made at random from voter registration lists. SDNY Jury \nPlan at Art. III.A. Two Master Jury Wheels are constructed from these lists: one for the Manhattan \ncourthouse and one for the White Plains courthouse. Id. at Art. III.B. The Manhattan Master Jury \nWheel draws from voter lists from the following counties: New York, Bronx, Westchester, \nPutnam, and Rockland. See id. at Art. III.C. The White Plains Master Jury Wheel draws from \nvoter lists from the following counties: Westchester, Putnam, Rockland, Orange, Sullivan, and \nDutchess. See id. Both Master Jury Wheels are emptied and refilled no later than September 1 \nfollowing the date of each Presidential Election. Id. at Art. III.B. \nTo meet anticipated demand for jurors, names are drawn randomly from the Master Jury \nWheels. Id. at Art. III.D. These individuals are sent a questionnaire to examine their qualifications \nand availability for jury service. Id. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b), all persons are qualified for \njury service unless he or she: \n(1) Is not a citizen of the United States at least eighteen years old who has resided for a \nperiod of one year within the judicial district; \n(2) Is unable to read, write, and understand English with a degree of proficiency sufficient \nto fill out the juror qualification questionnaire; \n(3) Is unable to speak English; \n(4) Is incapable, by mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service; or \n(5) Has a charge pending for the commission of, or has been convicted in a State or Federal \ncourt, of a felony and his or her civil rights have not been restored. \nId. at Art. VII. Additionally, certain persons are declared exempt from jury service, including \nactive service members in the Armed Forces of the United St\n... [truncated, 2051 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/222 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=222]", "char_count": 2051}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 223, "text_content": "departments, and public officers in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the State or \nFederal Government who are actively engaged in the performance of official duties. Id. at Art. V; \n28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(6). Finally, because jury service for certain groups of individuals would \n\"entail undue hardship or extreme inconvenience,\" those individuals are excused or deferred upon \nindividual request. SDNY Jury Plan at Art. VI. These groups include: \n(1) Persons over 70 years of age; \n(2) Persons having legal custody and active daily care of a child under the age of 12, or who \nare essential to the daily care of aged or infirm persons; \n(3) Persons who have satisfactorily served as grand or petit jurors in a State or Federal court \nwithin the last four years; \n(4) Volunteer safety personnel; and \n(5) Persons as to whom a judge finds, for any other reason, that jury service would \nconstitute an undue hardship and extreme inconvenience. \nId. \nThe names of individuals who are determined to be qualified to serve as jurors, and are not \n\"exempt, excused, or deferred,\" comprise the Qualified Jury Wheels—one for service at the \nManhattan courthouse and one for service at the White Plains courthouse. Id., Art. IV.A-B. When \njurors are needed, names are drawn randomly from the Qualified Jury Wheels, and summonses are \nsent to those whose names are drawn. Id., Art. IV.C. After being summoned, these individuals \nare randomly assigned to jury panels as needed, for individual trials and grand juries at the \ncourthouse corresponding to the Qualified Wheel from which they were drawn. Id. \nB. \nApplicable Law \n\"The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a jury selected from a fair cross \nsection of the community.\" United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648, 654 (2d Cir. 1996). In Duren v. \nMissouri, the Supreme Court articulated a three part test that defendants must meet in order to \n197 \nEFTA00039644\n", "char_count": 1930}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 224, "text_content": "establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement: (1) the excluded group is \n\"distinctive\"; (2) \"representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair \nand reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;\" and (3) the \n\"underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.\" \n439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). \nC. \nDiscussion \nThe Government's decision to seek an indictment of the defendant from a grand jury sitting \nin White Plains was entirely appropriate and consistent with the Constitution, the JSSA, and the \nSDNY local rules. The defendant's claims to the contrary rest on a faulty premise: That a \ndefendant who is likely to be tried in the Manhattan courthouse must be indicted by a grand jury \nsitting in that same courthouse. That is not the law. See Section XI.C.1, infra. \nThat foundational error is fatal to the defendant's fair cross-section claim. When the proper \ncomparators are considered—the White Plains Master (or Qualified) Wheels to the voting age \npopulation of the counties from which juries in White Plains are drawn, rather than the defendant's \napples-to-oranges comparison of the White Plains Qualified Jury Wheel to the population of the \nManhattan \"Division\"—the defendant fails to establish unfair underrepresentation under the \nsecond prong of the Duren test. Moreover, the defendant has not established that any disparity \nresulted from systemic exclusion of a particular group. Accordingly, the motion should be denied. \n1. \nThe Defendant Was Properly Indicted by a Grand Jury Sifting in \nWhite Plains \nAt the heart of the defendant's fair cross-section claim is her contention that the \nGovernment seeking an indictment from a grand jury sitting in White Plains—which was the only \n198 \nEFTA00039645\n", "char_count": 1846}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 225, "text_content": "available grand jury that day, due to the global pandemic68—\"was a deviation from the established \npractice of indicting defendants in the division where the offense is alleged to have occurred and \nwhere the case will be tried.\" (Def. Mot. 9 at 2). Because the offense is alleged to have occurred \nin the \"Manhattan Division\" and the defendant assumes that her jury trial will occur there too, she \nargues that the \"appropriate comparison,\" for the purpose of her fair cross-section claim, \"is \ntherefore between the Manhattan Division and the qualified wheel for White Plains.\" (Def. Mot. \n9 at 6). This premise is faulty. \n\"It is well-settled that neither the jury selection statute nor the Constitution requires that \njurors be drawn from an entire district.\" Bahna, 68 F.3d at 24 (collecting cases); see also United \nStates v. Plaza-Andrades, 507 F. App'x 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2013) (\"[O]ur precedent makes clear that \nthe Sixth Amendment does not entitle a defendant to be tried in a geographic location any more \n68 This case was indicted on June 29, 2020, on which date the grand jury sitting in White Plains \nwas the only available grand jury in the District. Beginning on or about June 25, 2020, grand jury \nquorums returned in Manhattan, but with substantially less availability than before the pandemic. \nAs a result, the Government has sought indictments from grand juries sitting in White Plains and \nManhattan, as availability permits. In this instance, the Government was prepared to indict on \nJune 29, 2020, and the only grand jury available in this District on that day sat in White Plains. \nThe global pandemic's effect on grand jury availability continues to evolve, but at no point have \ngrand juries in White Plains or Manhattan resumed normal activity. \nThe defendant speculates that the Government sought an indictment on June 29, 2020 \nbecause of some arbitrary desire to arrest the defendant on July 2, 2020, one year to the day after \na grand jury returned a sealed indictment \n... [truncated, 3110 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/225 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=225]", "char_count": 3110}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 226, "text_content": "specific than the District where the offense was allegedly committed.\"). Rather, \"[c]ourts have \nbroad latitude in defining the geographic area from which juries will be selected.\" United States \nv. Yonkers Contracting Co., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 757, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Consistent with the \nforegoing, the SDNY Jury Plan creates two separate Master Wheels—one for the White Plains \ncourthouse and one for the Manhattan courthouse, each of which draws from certain counties, with \nsome overlapping counties. SDNY Jury Plan Art. III.B, III.C. This is perfectly consistent with \nthe JSSA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1869(e), and with longstanding precedent, as Judge Hand has explained: \n[T]he district and circuit courts have had power since the first \nJudiciary Act of 1789 to divide a district territorially in the interest \nof an impartial trial, of economy, and of lessening the burden of \nattendance. \nThere cannot be the faintest question of the \nconstitutionality of this statute; the courts have again and again \nrecognized its validity. Furthermore, it would be impossible in \npractice to administer it, if it were a condition that that the divisions \nmade must be so homogeneous that they showed an equal \npercentage of all possible groups. There are probably no districts in \nthe Union, which can be divided without disclosing in the sections \ndifferent racial, religious, political, social or economic percentages. \nTo demand that they shall not, would be a fantastic pedantry which \nwould serve no purpose and would put an end to the statute. \nUnited States v. GotOied, 165 F.2d 360, 364 (2d Cir. 1948); accord Bahna, 68 F.3d at 24-25. \nThere is accordingly no constitutional or statutory basis for the defendant's claimed \nentitlement to a grand July drawn from the population of the same \"division\" in which the offense \noccurred and she assumes she will ultimately be tried. To the contrary, the Second Circuit has \nrejected a similar claim. In Bahna, a defendant in the Eastern District of New Yor\n... [truncated, 2421 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/226 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=226]", "char_count": 2421}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 227, "text_content": "courthouse, were drawn from Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Id. at 24. The defendant argued that \nthe district court erred by selecting the jury from the \"Long Island Division\" wheel because there \nwas under-representation of Blacks and Hispanics in that \"division\" as compared to the Eastern \nDistrict as a whole. Id. at 23-24. The Second Circuit rejected the argument, finding that it \"[wa]s \nbased upon an improper premise.\" Id. at 24. Contrary to the defendant's claims, \"[w]here a jury \nvenire is drawn from a properly designated division, we look to that division to see whether there \nhas been any unlawful or unconstitutional treatment of minorities.\" Id. (emphasis added). \nConsistent with Bahna, courts have repeatedly found that defendants in criminal cases have \nno constitutional or statutory right to a jury drawn from the entire district or from a particular \ngeographic area within a district, such as the county or \"division\" where the offense was \ncommitted. See, e.g., Rutenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918) (rejecting claim that \ndefendant had Sixth Amendment right to jury drawn from entire district); United States v. Miller, \n116 F.3d 641, 659 (2d Cir. 1997) (\"Th[e] [Sixth] Amendment's guarantees of an impartial jury `of \nthe State and district' in which the crime was committed does not require a narrower geographical \nfocus than the district itself.\"); United States v. Richardson, 537 F.3d 951, 959 (8th Cir. 2008) (a \ncriminal defendant \"does not have a right to have his trial in or jurors summoned from a particular \ndivision of the state and district where the crime was committed\"); United States v. Herbert, 698 \nF.2d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that \"[a] petit jury may be drawn constitutionally from only \none division and not the whole district\"); Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 318 (3d Cir. 1980) \n(\"[T]there is no constitutional right to a jury chosen from the division where the offense was \ncommitted or from the entire district which inc\n... [truncated, 2250 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/227 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=227]", "char_count": 2250}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 228, "text_content": "Because the defendant has no right to insist that either the grand or petit jury be drawn from \nany particular geographic area within the Southern District, she is wrong to assert that her fair \ncross-section claim must be analyzed against the geographic location in which the offense was \ncommitted or the trial is expected to occur. Rather, \"[w]here a jury venire is drawn from a properly \ndesignated division, we look to that division to see whether there has been any unlawful or \nunconstitutional treatment of minorities.\" Bahna, 68 F.3d at 24 (emphasis added). Here, \nconsistent with the SDNY Grand Jury Plan, the venire for the grand jury that indicted the defendant \nwas drawn from the voter lists of the following counties: Westchester, Putnam, Rockland, Orange, \nSullivan, and Dutchess. That is undoubtedly a \"properly designated division\" pursuant to the \nJSSA. As noted, the Southern District is not divided into \"divisions\" by statute. See 28 U.S.C. \n§ 112(b). For purposes of the JSSA, district courts in such undivided districts have the authority \nto determine \"divisions\" comprised of \"counties, parishes, or similar political subdivisions \nsurrounding the places where court is held.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1869(e). Accordingly, while the SDNY \nJury Plan neither creates nor ever uses the term \"White Plains Division\" or \"Manhattan Division,\" \nit contemplates Master Jury Wheels drawn from two geographic areas that satisfy the definition of \n\"division\" under the JSSA. Thus, in evaluating the defendant's fair cross-section claim, this Court \nmust \"look to that division\"—the counties from which the White Plains Master Wheel is drawn—\n\"to see whether there has been any unlawful or unconstitutional treatment of minorities.\" Bahna, \n68 F.3d at 24 (emphasis added). \nIn the face of this authority, the defendant cites only two district court cases for the \nproposition that \"community\" for purposes of a fair cross-section claim is \"widely understood to \nmean the district or division where \n... [truncated, 2179 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/228 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=228]", "char_count": 2179}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 229, "text_content": "it is inapposite as well: both cases appear to concern instances in which the grand jury and trial \njury sat in the same courthouse, and thus there was no cause to consider whether the same \n\"community\" was relevant to separate challenges to the grand and petit juries. See United States \nv. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. \n869, 874-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). As such, neither case supports the proposition that where a \ndefendant is challenging the selection of the grand jury, the relevant \"community\" is the \npopulation of the location in which her trial will be held. Such a comparison is unjustified, as \nBahna makes clear: That case appears to involve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to \nhave been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to \nUniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the \"Long Island Division.\" Yet the Second \nCircuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and \nRichmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's \nhere—was based on a flawed premise. \nThe defendant's proposed rule—comparing the composition of the grand jury venire to the \npopulation of the expected trial location—makes little legal or practical sense. Where, as here, \nthe defendant's challenge is to the indictment, the proceeding for which the defendant is entitled \nto expect a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is not the trial, but the grand \njury proceeding itself. Indeed, that must be the case, as it is not yet determined where the trial in \nthis matter will in fact occur. The defendant assumes that her trial will ultimately be held at the \nManhattan courthouse. While that is likely to be the case, it is not necessarily so. Bahna again \nillustrates the point, as a case originally tried in Brooklyn was reassigned to Uniondale for the \nretrial \"to accommodate trial congesti\n... [truncated, 2171 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/229 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=229]", "char_count": 2171}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 230, "text_content": "Southern District, cases are commonly transferred from one courthouse to another, including cases \nthat are indicted in White Plains but tried in Manhattan. See Section XLA.1, supra (collecting \nexamples). That is entirely consistent not just with the foregoing authority, but also with the \nSouthern District's Local Rules for the Division of Business. See SDNY Business Division Rules \n18, 19. Criminal cases are also sometimes transferred to other Districts for trial. See Fed. R. Crim. \nP. 21. Under the defendant's approach, it would be impossible for prosecutors to determine ex \nante that that they were seeking an indictment from a grand jury drawn from a representative cross-\nsection of the relevant community, because they would not yet know with certainty in which \ncommunity the case will be tried. \nThe defendant's argument therefore boils down to an unfounded complaint that it is \"a \ndeviation from the established practice\" to seek an indictment in a courthouse other than the one \nin which the case will likely be tried. (Def. Mot. 9 at 2). This argument is inconsistent with the \nforegoing law that the defendant has no right to jurors drawn from any particular geographic area \nwithin the district. See also Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257, 260-63 (1897) (finding no \nerror in grand July returning indictment in a division different from the division in which the trial \nproceeded). It also finds no succor in the SDNY Business Division Rules, which vest no rights in \nany parties and, in any event, contemplate that judges may reassign cases from one courthouse to \nanother. And it falls exceedingly flat on the facts of this case. The Government did not forum \nshop to achieve some perceived advantage. Rather, it sought a timely indictment from a grand \njury in White Plains because it was the only grand jury with a quorum sitting in the Southern \nDistrict on that date (a relatively rare situation created by an unprecedented public health crisis). \n204 \nEFTA000396\n... [truncated, 2003 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/230 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=230]", "char_count": 2003}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 231, "text_content": "In sum, the decision to indict the defendant in White Plains was entirely proper, and the \nlack of any constitutional or statutory basis for the defendant's contrary argument is fatal to her \nfair cross-section claims, as described below. \n2. \nThe Defendant's Fair Cross-Section Claim Is Meritless \nThe defendant's fair cross-section claim is based on the assertion that Black or African-\nAmerican and Hispanic or Latino individuals are unfairly underrepresented in the relevant jury \npool. (Def. Mot. 9 at 5). While these are \"distinctive\" groups, satisfying Duren's first prong, the \ndefendant's claim fails on each of the other two prongs. \na. \nThe Defendant Has Not Established that Blacks or Hispanics \nAre Unfairly Represented \nThe second prong of the Duren test requires the Court to determine whether representation \nof either or both of the \"distinctive\" groups in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and \nreasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. \nThis requires determining the relevant comparators—Le., what is the \"relevant jury pool\" and what \nis the community \"population\" against which it is compared—as well as the appropriate method \nof statistical comparison. See Rioux, 97 F.3d at 656. \nHere, the defendant contends that the relevant jury pool is the White Plains Qualified \nWheel. (Def. Mot. 9 at 5-6). The Government believes that the relevant jury pool is the White \nPlains Master Wheel, but, as set forth below, the defendant's claim fails even using the White \nPlains Qualified Wheel. \n\"Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has defined the `relevant jury pool' \nwith any specificity.\" United States V. Rioux 930 F. Supp. 1558, 1565 (D. Conn. 1995). In a \ndetailed survey of the case law, the district court in Rioux found that cases have examined different \nrelevant pools, including the master wheel, the qualified wheel over a period of time, the venires \n205 \nEFTA00039652\n", "char_count": 1980}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 232, "text_content": "appearing around the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, \nthe district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent \ncases is that \"the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect \nidentified by the defendant.\" Id. at 1568. In that case, the claimed defects were in the construction \nof the qualified wheel and, therefore, the \"relevant jury pool\" was the \"qualified wheel over the \nlife of the wheel.\" Id. at 1575. \nAffirming that decision, the Second Circuit did not hold that the qualified wheel is \nnecessarily the \"relevant jury pool.\" Rather, after stating that the relevant jury pool \"may be \ndefined by: (1) the master list; (2) the qualified wheel; (3) the venires; or (4) a combination of the \nthree,\" the Circuit noted that the parties had agreed that the district court properly used the qualified \nwheel over the life of the wheel as the \"relevant jury pool.\" Rioux, 97 F.3d at 657. The court's \nacceptance of the qualified jury wheel as the \"relevant jury pool\" for that case—an issue which \nwas not in dispute—does not mean it necessarily must be applied in all cases. Id. Indeed, in other \ncases where the claim of error was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different \n\"relevant jury pools\" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main \nthrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists \nsystemically excluded African-Americans and Hispanics from jury service—a claim which is \ndirected at the composition of the master wheel—and the Second Circuit identified the district's \nmaster wheel as the relevant jury pool. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 677 (2d Cir. 1990). \nHere, the defendant claims that \"the primary reason\" for the alleged underrepresentation is \nthe Government's \"choice to pursue an indictment from a grand jury drawn from the White Plains \nDivision, \n... [truncated, 2209 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/232 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=232]", "char_count": 2209}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 233, "text_content": "how the particular Master Wheel is selected. It says nothing about the process by which a Master \nWheel is reduced to the subset of qualified jurors contained in the Qualified Wheel. Because the \n\"systematic defect\" alleged by the defendant relates to the Master Jury Wheel, the White Plains \nMaster Jury Wheel is the appropriate \"relevant jury pool.\" Rioux, 930 F. Supp. at 1566-68. \nAlthough the Master Jury Wheel does not include reliable information regarding the race \nand ethnicity of the individuals selected from voter registration lists, the racial and ethnic makeup \nof the White Plains Master Jury Wheel can be estimated using geocoding and Bayesian Improved \nSurname Geocoding (\"BISG\").69 Taking into account those estimates, the White Plains Master \nWheel is 11.20% Black or African-American and 12.97% Hispanic or Latino. (Siskin Aff. at ¶ \n28). By contrast, the White Plains Qualified Wheel is 8.76% Black or African-American and \n10.48% Hispanic or Latino. (Id. at ¶ 17). \nThe community population for purposes of assessing representativeness is the population \neligible for jury service in the community. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 524 (1975) \n(focusing on population eligible for jury service); Rioux, 97 F.3d at 657 (\"We conclude that the \nappropriate measure in this case is the eighteen and older subset of the population ....\"). But how \nshould the relevant \"community\" be defined? The defendant contends that it is the jury eligible \npopulation of the \"Manhattan Division,\" because that is where the offense occurred and where she \nassumes she will be tried. (Def. Mot. 9 at 6). As set forth above, she is wrong. The relevant \n69 The defense motion references the expert report of an expert witness named Jeffrey O'Neal \nMartin (\"Martin Aft\"), which was prepared for the defense in United States v. Balde, No. 20 Cr. \n281 (KPF), where a similar motion is currently pending before Judge Failla. The Government is \nlikewise attaching the expert report of Dr. B\n... [truncated, 2500 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/233 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=233]", "char_count": 2500}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 234, "text_content": "comparator is the jury eligible population of the five counties from which the White Plains Master \nWheel is drawn. \nThe American Community Survey (\"ACS\") 2018 data indicate that the jury eligible \npopulation for the White Plains counties in 2018 was 12.45% Black or African-American and \n14.12% Hispanic or Latino.70 (See Siskin Aff. at ¶ 19; see also Martin Aff. at ¶ 21). \nOnce the relevant comparators are defined, an additional threshold question is the statistical \nmethod by which to compare them. Courts have applied different approaches over time, such as \nthe statistical decision theory, the comparative disparity theory, and the absolute disparity theory. \nSee Biota, 97 F.3d at 655. Although no method is perfect, see Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, \n329 (2010), the Second Circuit has made clear that the comparative disparity theory is disfavored \nand strongly suggested that the absolute disparity theory is generally appropriate, see Rioux, 97 \nF.3d at 655-56; see also United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (\"[T]he \nabsolute disparity approach is the primary approach used in this Circuit.\"). \nThe \"absolute disparity\" approach measures the absolute numerical difference between the \ndistinctive group's representation in the community population and the group's representation in \nthe relevant jury pool. See Rioux, 97 F.3d at 655; United States v. Barlow, 732 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30-\n31 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), gird 479 F. App'x 372, 373 (2d Cir. 2012). For example, if Blacks \nrepresented 10% of the community population but only 2% of the relevant jury pool, the \"absolute \ndisparity\" would be 8%. \nThere is no specific numerical threshold that constitutes unacceptable disparity under the \n\"absolute disparity\" method. \"[P]erfectly proportional representation is not required, since no \n70 The American Community Survey gathers demographic information in between the decennial \ncensus, and is published by the United States Census Bureau. (See Siskin Aff. at ¶\n... [truncated, 2149 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/234 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=234]", "char_count": 2149}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 235, "text_content": "source list will be an exact statistical mirror of the community.\" United States v. Guzman, 337 F. \nSupp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. The mere fact that a jury \nselection system is imperfect does not make it invalid. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 \n(1965) (overruled on other grounds). Accordingly, the Second Circuit has found that absolute \ndisparities as high as nearly 5% fail to establish a prima facie case of underrepresentation. See, \ne.g., Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 677-78 (3.6% for Blacks and 4.7% for Hispanics); United States v. \nRamnath, 131 F.3d 132, 132 (2d Cir. 1997) (3.45% for African-Americans and 4.87% for \nHispanics); see also Barlow, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 34-35 (collecting out-of-circuit cases rejecting \nclaims presenting similar and even higher disparities).71\nProperly calculated, the \"absolute disparity\" in this case falls comfortably within the range \ndeemed acceptable by the Second Circuit and other courts. As noted, the \"relevant jury pool\" is \nthe White Plains Master Wheel, which is comprised of 11.20% Black or African-American persons \nand 12.97% Latino or Hispanic persons. (Siskin Aff. at ¶ 28). The \"community population\" is the \njury eligible population for the five counties from which the White Plains Master Wheel is drawn, \nwhich was comprised of 12.45% Black or African-American persons and 14.12% Hispanic or \nLatino persons in 2018. (Id. at ¶ 19). This yields an \"absolute disparity\" of 1.25% for Black or \nAfrican-American persons and 1.15% for Latino or Hispanic persons. (Id. at ¶ 28). That disparity \ndoes not rise to the level of satisfying the second prong of the Duren test. \n71 In United States v. Jackman, the Second Circuit held that an absolute disparity of 2.5% for Black \nor African-American persons and 3.4% for Hispanic or Latino persons was sufficient to satisfy the \nsecond prong of the Duren test. 46 F.3d 1240 (2d Cir. 1995). The unique facts of Jackman make \nit readily distinguishable. The jury clerk i\n... [truncated, 2629 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00039421/235 or ?id=EFTA00039421&page=235]", "char_count": 2629}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 236, "text_content": "The result is the same even if the defendant's preferred relevant jury pool is used. The \nWhite Plains Qualified Wheel is comprised of 8.76% Black or African-American persons and \n10.48% Latino or Hispanic persons. (Id. at ¶ 17; see also Martin Aff. at ¶ 55). This results in \nabsolute disparities of 3.69% and 3.64%, respectively. These figures are also comfortably within \nthe range that the Second Circuit has determined does not satisfy the second prong of the Duren \ntest. Moreover, as discussed below, the factors that cause the disparity between the White Plains \nQualified Wheel and the White Plains Master Jury Wheel, as well as the voting age population, \nare not the result of systematic exclusion. \nIt is only by employing an apples-and-oranges method of comparing the White Plains \nQualified Wheel to the jury eligible populations of the \"Manhattan Division\" or the entire Southern \nDistrict that the defendant is able to identify disparities that might arguably satisfy the second \nprong of Duren. Because that method has no basis in the law, the defendant's claim fails at the \nsecond prong. \nb. \nAny Potential Underrepresentation Is Not Due to Systematic \nExclusion \nEven assuming the defendant had satisfied the second prong of the Duren test—which she \nhas not—she most certainly has not demonstrated that any underrepresentation is \"due to \nsystematic exclusion of the group in the fray-selection process.\" Rioux, 97 F.3d at 654 (emphasis \nadded). That is, she cannot establish that the exclusion is the product of \"the system of jury \nselection itself, rather than external forces.\" Id. at 658 (emphasis added). She therefore cannot \nsatisfy the third prong of Duren. \nAs then-District Judge Bianco explained, \"systematic exclusion does not occur simply \nbecause a facially neutral disqualification criterion disproportionately impacts a particular group.\" \nBarlow, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 40; see also United States v. Barlow, 479 F. App'x 372, 373 (2d Cir. \n210 \nEFTA00039657\n", "char_count": 1993}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 237, "text_content": "2012) (affirming Judge Bianco's \"thorough and well-reasoned\" opinion). Indeed, \"la] selection \nprocess that is facially neutral is unlikely to demonstrate systematic exclusion.\"' United States v. \nSavage, 970 F.3d 217, 259 (3d Cir. 2020) (brackets in original) (quoting Howell v. Superintendent \nRockview SCI, 939 F.3d 260, 269 (2d Cir. 2019)). Moreover, a defendant cannot \"make out a \nprima facie case merely by pointing to a host of factors that, individually or in combination, might \ncontribute to a group's underrepresentation.\" Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 332 (emphasis in original). \nInsofar as the underrepresentation here is measured by a comparison of the White Plains \nQualified Wheel to the July eligible population of the \"Manhattan Division\" or entire Southern \nDistrict, the defendant's argument rests entirely on the prosecution's decision to pursue an \nindictment in White Plains rather than Manhattan. (Def. Mot. 9 at 7). That decision was entirely \nproper, as set forth above. See Section XI.C.1, supra. And even if it were the case that this decision \nresulted in substantial underrepresentation, it nevertheless does not amount to \"systematic \nexclusion . . . in the jwy-selection process.\" The prosecution's decision as to where to seek an \nindictment was based entirely on the availability of grand juries during a pandemic, which has \nnothing to do with the process by which the grand jury is selected. The defendant points to no \nother source of any supposed systemic exclusion of any identified group. Accordingly, the \ndefendant's claim also fails at the third prong of Duren. \n211 \nEFTA00039658\n", "char_count": 1618}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00039421", "page_number": 238, "text_content": "CONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny all twelve of the defendant's pre-trial \nmotions. \nDated: New York, New York \nFebruary 26, 2021 \nRespectfully submitted, \nAUDREY STRAUSS \nUnited States Attorney \nBy: \nIs \nAssistant United States Attorneys \n(212) 637-2225 \n212 \nEFTA00039659\n", "char_count": 301}]}