{"efta_number": "EFTA00037104", "page_count": 5, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00037104", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00037104.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00037104", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10019-JSR Document 248-1 Filed 10/23/23 Page 1 of 5 \nOctober 19, 2023 \nHand Delivery \nHonorable Jed S: Rakoff \nDaniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse \n500 Pearl Street \nRoom 1340 \nNew York, NY 10007 \nRe: Doe v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:22-CV-10019 (S.D.N.Y.) \nDear Judge Rakoff: \nThe Attorneys General of New Mexico, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, the \nDistrict of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Oregon, \nPennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont write concerning the proposed settlement in Doe v. \nJPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:22-CV-10019 (S.D.N.Y.) because it contains language that \npurports to release state Attorney General parens patriae claims under Section 1595(d) of the \nTrafficking Victims Protection Act (\"TVPA\") for damages on behalf of trafficking victims. \nThe Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 requires that settlement defendants in a class \naction serve notice of the settlement on the appropriate state officials, thereby giving them an \nopportunity to review and respond to the settlement prior to its approval. The legislative history \nof CAFA establishes \"that notice of class action settlements be sent to appropriate state and \nfederal officials ... so that they may voice concerns if they believe that the class action settlement \nis not in the best interests of their citizens.\" S. REP. 109-14, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6. Case law \nalso recognizes this role of state Attorneys General. See, e.g., Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., \n517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1301 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting role of Attorneys General in class \nsettlement approval process); True v. American Honda Motor Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1082 \n(C.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing views of state Attorneys General with respect to class action \nsettlement grounded in products liability claims). Since the passage of the Act, state Attorneys \nGeneral have successfully objected to or brought about the modification of settlements which \nwere unfair to its citizens. \nSection 1595(d) gives state Attorneys General authority, as parens patriae, to civilly \nprosecute persons who engage in sex-trafficking as set forth in Section 1591 of the TVPA and \nto obtain appropriate relief. The undersigned have reviewed the proposed settlement agreement \nin this case and have significant concerns about the potentially precedential scope of the release in \nSection 1.25, which the New Mexico Attorney General's Office raised with counsel for JPMorgan. \nWhile the issue is now mooted as to the U.S. Virgin Islands Attorney General by its parallel \nsettlement with JPMorgan, allowing such a broad release of claims may have serious implications \nfor future cases brought by state law enforcement against perpetrators of sex-trafficking under the \nTVPA. \nSection 1.25 releases claims \nEFTA00037104\n", "char_count": 2859}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00037104", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10019-JSR Document 248-1 Filed 10/23/23 Page 2 of 5 \nthat could be brought to recover damages from the Released Defendant Parties on \nbehalf of a Member of the Class by any other party, including any sovereign or \ngovernment, relating to or arising from any Member of the Class's harm, injury, \nabuse, exploitation, or trafficking by Jeffrey Epstein or by any person who is in any \nway connected to or otherwise associated with Jeffrey Epstein, as well as any right \nto recovery on account thereof. (Emphasis added.) \nThe Doe settlement with Deutsche Bank, by contrast, does not contain the same language releasing \n\"any sovereign or government\" claims.' \nIn adding Section 1595(d) to the civil remedy section of the TVPA, which previously only \nexplicitly recognized victim suits, Congress intended to \"unleash\" the power of state law \nenforcement to prosecute these heinous sex-trafficking crimes, recognizing that, in many \ncircumstances, victims are unable or unwilling to come forward and \"more prosecutors,\" \"more \ninvestigators,\" and \"more resources\" are needed to \"address this growing problem throughout our \ncountry.\" 164 Cong. Rec. S1849-08, 2018 WL 1415914, at *S1864. \"This amendment is needed \nin order to give enhanced powers to State attorneys general that they can provide the extra litigation \nleverage for individuals who are impacted in a devastating manner.\" 164 Cong. Rec. H1290-02, \n2018 WL 1073890, at *H1303. If broad releases of non-party state Attorneys General law \nenforcement actions under the TVPA seeking victim-specific relief were deemed permissible \nwithout their express consent, state Attorneys General may be deterred from bringing these \nimportant civil law enforcement actions in the future — upsetting Congress' very purpose in \namending the TVPA to add state law enforcement. \nStates have frequently been allowed to sue in parens patriae to enforce federal statutes, \nboth at common law, see, e.g., Snapp, 458 U.S. 592 (Puerto Rico had standing to sue in parens \npatriae under the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act on behalf of its \nmigrant farm workers); New York v. II Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982) (New York had \nstanding to sue in parens patriae for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 on behalf of individuals with \nmental disabilities); New York by Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Grp., P.C., 877 F. Supp. 143, 146 \n(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (collecting cases), and by statute, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6504(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § \n7706(0(1); 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(3). \nStates may seek damages for residents within their authority as parens patriae. See New \nYork by Abrams v. General Motors Corp., 547 F Supp at 706-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (\"The State's \ngoal of securing an honest marketplace in which to transact business is a quasi-sovereign interest \n... This conclusion is not altered by the State's decision to seek ... damages on behalf of those \nwho allegedly have been defrauded by GM.\"); New York by Underwood v. Larose Indus., 386 F. \nSupp. 3d 214, 218 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (even if the state seeks victim-specific relief as one aspect \nof its case, \"such damages would not strip the State of its quasi-sovereign interests\") (citing cases); \nPurdue Pharma v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 220 (2d Cir. 2013) (\"Even assuming consumers are \nTo the extent \"any right to recovery on account thereof' means something other than \"damages \nfrom the Released Defendant Parties on behalf of a Member of the Class,\" the State Attorneys \nGeneral further object to that language as well to the extent it seeks to release any other claims by \nStates, including for civil penalties, fines, and/or injunctive relief \nEFTA00037105\n", "char_count": 3680}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00037104", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10019-JSR Document 248-1 Filed 10/23/23 Page 3 of 5 \nthe real parties for certain discrete claims asserted by the Attorney General ... does not necessarily \nnegate the parens patriae nature of the action.\").2\nCourts outside the Second Circuit agree. See Illinois v. AU Optronics Corp., 794 F. Supp. \n2d 845, 853 (ND. 111. 2011) (\"As many courts have held, a State is not automatically rendered a \nnominal party when it seeks both broad injunctive relief and monetary damages for injured \nresidents\") (emphasis in original); id. at 858 (Attorney General enforcement action against \nviolators, including \"to pursue relief on behalf of aggrieved individuals ...is more analogous to \nthe role of the EEOC or other regulator when it brings an action on behalf of a large group of \nemployees or a segment of the public\"); In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 2011 WL \n560693, at *5 (ND. Cal. Feb. 15, 2011) (\"The damages that California seeks, while on behalf of \nits consumers, would first be paid to the State and distributed on an equitable basis. The fact that \nprivate parties may benefit from the States' actions does not negate the State's substantial interests \nin these cases.\"); New Mexico by Balderas v. Real Estate Law Ctr., P.C., 430 F. Supp. 3d 761, 875 \n(D.N.M. 2019) (\"New Mexico has authority to bring the suit parens patriae and to seek restitution \nfor [aggrieved individuals]\"); West Virginia by McGraw v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 842 F. Supp. \n2d 984, 989 (S.D. W.Va. 2012) (\"A state may have a quasi-sovereign interest in bringing an action \nto enforce its laws, disgorge the proceeds of ill-gotten gains, and refund them to its citizens.\"). \nFederal appeals courts have consistently held that private parties lack the authority to \nrelease a government's claims for relief to vindicate sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests \nbelonging to the state or government. See Sec 'y United States Dept Lab. v. Kwasny, 853 F.3d 87, \n90, 95-96 (3d Cir. 2017) (private judgment does not preclude subsequent enforcement action by \nthe Secretary of Labor for recovery of damages implicated in the prior judgment; the government's \n\"interest in maintaining the integrity of, and public confidence in, the pension system\" is \"broader \nthan the interests of private litigations\"); US. Commodity Future Trading Comm 'n v. Kratville, \n796 F.3d 873, 889 (8th Cir. 2015) (\"quite apart from whether the individual victims are satisfied \nwith their private settlements, full and ample restitution [and] disgorgement of profits, serve \ndistinct deterrence functions that are vital to the national public interest ... [and] those settlements \ncannot preclude [the government] from later seeking additional or more full restitution or any other \nremedy); Herman v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1424 (1 1 th Cir. 1998) (private \nclass settlement did not bar government's restitution claims because the government's enforcement \n2 \"If the State is only a nominal party without a real interest of its own then it will not have standing \nunder the parens patriae doctrine.\" Purdue Pharma, 704 F.3d at 215 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at \n600); Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602 (distinguishing quasi-sovereign interest from where a State attempts \nto \"pursue the interests of a private party, and pursue those interests only for the sake of the real \nparty in interest\") (emphasis added); New York by Abrams v. Seneci, 817 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir. \n1987) (\"[w]here the complaint only seeks to recover money damages for injuries suffered by \nindividuals\" the state lacks parens patriae standing) (emphasis added); In re Baldwin-United Corp., \n770 F.2d 328, 341 (2d Cir. 1985) (\"when the state merely asserts the personal claims of its citizens, \nit is not the real party in interest and cannot claim parens patriae standing\") (emphasis added). \nEven if the State lacks common law parens patriae capacity to prosecute a suit \"only ... to recover \nmoney damages for injuries suffered by individuals,\" Seneci, 817 F.2d at 1017 (emphasis added), \nCalifornia v. Frito-Lay, Inc., on which Seneci relies, concludes a state can be \"empowered to act\" \nto seek damages on behalf of individuals, but \"that authority must come through ... legislation,\" \n474 F.2d 774, 776077 (9th Cir. 1972). \nEFTA00037106\n", "char_count": 4297}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00037104", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10019-JSR Document 248-1 Filed 10/23/23 Page 4 of 5 \naction was pursuing \"public interests separate and distinct from those of the private litigants\"); \nKerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Hartigan, 816 F.2d 1177, 1181 n.4 (7th Cir. 1989) (state attorney \ngeneral was not bound by private litigation, \"to assume that private individuals can be properly \nviewed as representative of a particular government is a ... daring analytical leap\"); see also Beck \nv. Levering, 947 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1991) (resjudicata does not prohibit Secretary of Labor \n\"from recovering monetary relief that duplicates the relief granted in the prior action\"). \nIn New York by Cuomo v. Coventry First LLC, the court held that the arbitration agreement \nbetween defendants and their alleged victims \"does not bar the [New York] Attorney General from \npursuing victim-specific judicial relief [including damages] in his enforcement action.\" 13 N.Y. \n3d 108, 112, 114 (2009). \"Like the EEOC, the Attorney General should not be limited, in his duty \nto protect the public interest, by an [] agreement he did not join. Such an arrangement between \nprivate parties cannot alter the Attorney General's statutory role or the remedies that he is \nempowered to seek.\" Id. at 14? \nThe undersigned do not object to any other aspect of the Doe settlement and believe that \nJeffrey Epstein's surviving victims should be fully compensated for the profound ham they have \nsuffered. However, as it now stands, the settlement agreement improperly seeks to release States' \nparens patriae claims for victim-specific relief and should be amended to make clear that such \nclaims are not released. \nRespectfully submitted, \nRatil Torrez \nNew Mexico Attorney General \n3 Any damages recovered in a state law enforcement case under the TVPA would only add to, not \nundo, any victims' recovery, and would protect absent non-responding class members whose \nclaims may otherwise be released by a settlement. Further, to the extent that the state Attorneys \nGeneral obtain victim-specific relief, including damages or restitution, courts can set off the \namounts paid to class members against any recovery by the state attorneys general. See EEOC v. \nWaffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295a96 (2002) (EEOC could not obtain double recovery based \non prior settlement and acknowledging prior private settlement amounts would be offset from \ngovernment recovery); Beck, 947 F.2d at 642 (same). The possibility of a post-judgment setoff of \ndamages in a state's case does not support a wholesale release of the state's claim for that relief. \nEFTA00037107\n", "char_count": 2608}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00037104", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:22-cv-10019-JSR Document 248-1 Filed 10/23/23 Page 5 of 5 \nKris Mayes \nArizona Attorney General \nAnthony G. Brown \nMaryland Attorney General \nRob Bonta \nCalifornia Attorney General \n• l..4.,e_.3/71. \nWilliam Tong \nAttorney General of Connecticut \nKeith Ellison \nMinnesota Attorney General \n• \n' ' \nLetitia James \nAttorney General State of New York \n\\c--) e4Ar\", .. \nKathleen Jennings \nAttorney General of the State of Delaware \nEllen R. Rosenblum \nOregon Attorney General \nrif';: \nVii. rt/ \nBrian Schwalb \nDistrict of Columbia Attorney General \nAk-uht E Late-2—\nAnne E. Lopez \nAttorney General, State of Hawai'i \nware Raoul \nIllinois Attorney General \nf \nEyati \n) \nAttorney General. Slate \nCharity R. Clark \nAttorney General State of Vermont \n.„/X..-7.de 4 * 7/7 \nMichelle A. Henry \nPennsylvania Attorney General \nJonathan Skrmetti \nTennessee Attorney General & Reporter \nSean D. Reyes \nUtah Attorney General \n0. c)ASZ.. \nEFTA00037108\n", "char_count": 942}]}