{"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_count": 18, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00031918", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00031918.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nv. \n20 Cr. 330 (AJN) \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \nREPLY MEMORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL \npi SUPPORT OF HER THIRD MOTION FOR RAII \nBobbi C. Sternheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemhcim \n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor \nNew York NY 10011 \nPhone: \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \n800 Third Avenue \nNew York NY 10022 \nPhone:_ \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Mcnninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.0 \n150 East 10th Avenue \nDenver CO 80203 \nPhone: \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \nEFTA00031918\n", "char_count": 590}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Preliminary Statement \nThe issue before the Court, as it has been since Ms. Maxwell's first bail application, \nis whether conditions exist that can reasonably assure Ms. Maxwell's appearance at trial. \nOn her third application (the \"Third Bail Motion\") (Dkt.I60), Ms. Maxwell has put before \nthe Court significant enhancements to the already extraordinary bail package previously \npresented to the Court in her renewed application for bail (the \"Second Bail Motion\") \n(Dkt. 97),I Together, these two motions present a unique and comprehensive bail package \nwith the strictest of conditions known in any bail application: \n• $28.5 million in bonds (including a $IM bond co-signed by a security \ncompany); \n• $9.5 million in real property; \n• $550,000 in cash; \n• Asset Monitoring by a retired federal district court judge; \n• Renunciation of British and French citizenship; \n• Irrevocable written waivers of the right to contest extradition; \n• Surrender of all travel documents; \n• Nome confinement in Ncw York City; \n• Electronic GPS monitoring; \n• In-residence third-party custodian;2\n• On-premises 24/7 private security to prevent Ms. Maxwell from leaving the \nMs. Maxwell's present motion (the \"Third Bail Motion\") (Dkt.160) incorporates her Memorandum in Support of \nHa Renewed Motion for Bail and accompanying exhibits (Dkt. 97, including Attachments 1-24) and her Reply \nMemorandum in Support of Her Renewed Motion for Bail (Dkt. 103, including Attachments 1-2) (collectively, the \n\"Second Bail Motion\"). \n2 To assist Ms. Maxwell in making up for lost time preparing for her upcoming trial, one of her lawyers (not trial \ncounsel) has agreed to reside with her and serve as an additional residential custodian. \nEFTA00031919\n", "char_count": 1732}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "residence without pre-approval by the Court or Pretrial Services and to \nescort her when authorized to leave the residence; \n■ \nVisitors to be pre-approved by Pretrial Services: \n• Strict supervision by Pretrial Services; \n• Such other terms as the Court deems appropriate. \nThe government goes to great lengths to oppose bail arguing technicalities and \noffering unfounded innuendo ripped from the tabloid headlines to avoid addressing the \nmerits of Ms. Maxwell's exceptional bail package, which puts at risk everything she has, \nincluding the assets of her spouse and the financial security of her family and closest \nfriends. \nThe Court Retains Jurisdiction to Decide Matters Related to Bai( \nThe government asserts that the Court should not consider the present bail motion \nbecause appeal of denial of the Second Bail Motion, not yet briefed, is pending before the \nSecond Circuit. (Dkt. 165 at 2-3). It is ironic that the government takes this position given that it \ncreated this problem by opposing Ms. Maxwell's request for an enlargement of time to file a \nnotice of appeal to the Court's denial of her Second Bail Motion. Indeed, Ms. Maxwell sought \nthe extension to avoid this very issue. (Dkt. 109). The government should not now be allowed to \nturn that procedural sword into a jurisdictional shield to prevent the Court from considering the \ninstant motion. \nDivestiture of jurisdiction in the district court while an appeal is pending is not a per sc \nrule. Rather, it is a judicially crafted rule rooted in the interest of judicial economy that is \ndesigned to avoid confusion or waste of time resulting from having the same issues before two \ncourts at the same time. Divestiture of jurisdiction, therefore, should not be automatic, but \ninstead guided by concerns of efficiency. Here, it is unclear whether interlocutory appeal of a \n2 \nEFTA00031920\n", "char_count": 1870}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "district court's decision regarding bail \"divests the court of its control over aspects of the case \ninvolved in the appeal.\" United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1996). Were it so, a \ndistrict court would have no authority to remand or modify bail conditions of a defendant \nreleased while the government appeals the grant of bait. Such a rule would detract from, rather \nthan promote, judicial economy and would be unworkable in practice. \nShould the Court believe it does not have jurisdiction to decide the present bail \nmotion, Ms. Maxwell will move the Circuit to withdraw her notice of appeal without \nprejudice and thereby remove any theoretical bar to this Court's jurisdiction over the \npresent bail motion. Should the Court summarily deny the present motion on the merits, \nMs. Maxwell will file a notice of appeal and request consolidation of both appeals. \nRenunciation of Foreign Citizenship is a Valid and Significant Condition of Release \nRelying on a letter from the French Ministry of Justice, the government urges the \nCourt to give no weight to Ms. Maxwell's agreement to renounce her foreign citizenship. \nBut the letter is wrong on the law and should be disregarded. The letter asserts that the loss of \nFrench nationality subsequent to the criminal act which the person is alleged to have committed \ndoes not affect the rule against the extradition of nationals, as nationality must be assessed at the \ntime of commission of the offense and not at the time of the extradition request. As discussed in \nthe opinion from William Julie, French legal counsel (attached as Exhibit A), the \ngovernment's assertion is entirely incorrect for the following reasons: \n• The government's argument goes against the letter of the law. \n• The government's argument goes against the spirit of the law. \n• The government's argument is contradicted by precedent and case law. \n(Julie Opinion ¶¶ 6-26). \n3 \nEFTA00031921\n", "char_count": 1941}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "The language of the extradition treaty between the United States and France and the \napplicable French statues are clear that anyone seeking to contest extradition on the basis of \nFrench citizenship must be a French national at the time of the extradition request. (Id.1 II). \nThe provisions on which the government relies were not intended to apply in cases where the \nperson whose extradition is sought had lost French citizenship. To the contrary, it was \ndesigned to apply to individuals who had acquired French citizenship subsequent to the \ncommission of the alleged crime \"in order to avoid fraudulent nationality applications of \noffenders seeking to escape extradition.\" (Id. TO 15-16). If the person is no longer a French \nnational at the time of the request, the provision does not apply. The government cites no case \nwhere the relevant statute was applied to protect a formerly French national from extradition, \nand we have found none ourselves. (kill 19-21). By contrast, there are numerous examples \nof French courts deporting individuals who have lost French nationality following the \ncommission of an offense. (Id. ¶ 21). Accordingly, Mr. Julio concludes: \"[I]t cannot have been \nthe intention of French lawmakers that Article 696-4 be construed as meaning that a person \nwho has lost French nationality would still be entitled to be protected from extradition.\" (Id. \n¶ 26). \nMs. Maxwell's agreement to give up both British and French citizenship and waive \nany and all right to contest extradition is a fonnidable challenge to the assertion that Ms. \nMaxwell would likely flee if released from custody and goes above and beyond the \n\"reasonable assurances\" that the Bail Reform Act requires to grant bail. While we \nmaintain that Ms. Maxwell's written waivers of the right to challenge extradition should \nsuffice, her willingness to forfeit citizenship birthrights exceeds what is necessary and \nprofoundly demonstrates her commitment to abide by conditions of release and appe\n... [truncated, 2031 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00031918/4 or ?id=EFTA00031918&page=4]", "char_count": 2031}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Monitoring of Assets is a Valid and Significant Condition of Relestsc \nTo address the Court's concern about Ms. Maxwell's access to assets, the bail \nmotion proposed another extremely significant and restrictive bail condition — the \nimposition of a monitor to supervise the assets of Ms. Maxwell and her spouse and \napprove expenditures. Rather than suggest conditions to satisfy its concerns, the \ngovernment urges the Court to summarily reject the proposed monitorship. \nWilliam S. Duffey, Jr., a retired federal district court judge and the former United \nStates Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, has agreed to undertake appointment by \nthe Court as asset monitor. Judge Duffey has extensive experience evaluating and monitoring \nfunds held in and disbursed from financial accounts. He has agreed to serve by appointment of \nthe Court in a capacity similar to other trustees and receivers who serve as officers of the Court \nand are entrusted, pursuant to court order, with oversight authority to restrain, monitor, and \napprove disbursement of assets requiring his signature. Similar to others who have been \nappointed by courts to oversee financial matters, Judge Duffey will be compensated at the same \nhourly rate billed for his services as an ADR panelist for Federal Arbitration (FedArb). \nThe proceeds from the sale of Ms. Maxwell's London home will be restrained and \nmonitored by Judge Duffey. As required by court order, documentation concerning the \nproceeds of the sale will be provided to Judge Duffey and the funds will be deposited in the \nfinancial account approved by Judge Duffey. \nThe government tries to steer the Court's attention to allegations of Ms. Maxwell's lack \nof candor to dissuade the Court from considering the proposed monitorship as a meaningful \nrestraint on the assets of Ms. Maxwell and her spouse. As previously stated, despite being \nquestioned by Pretrial Services following a period of solitary confinement, suicide watch, sleep \n5 \nEFTA00031\n... [truncated, 2004 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00031918/5 or ?id=EFTA00031918&page=5]", "char_count": 2004}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "deprivation, and other conditions adverse to her physical health and mental well-being, Ms. \nMaxwell responded appropriately and accurately to questions posed by Pretrial Services which \nwere restricted to her personal assets. Since then, financial documents - collected and \nprofessionally vetted by a highly respected accounting firm — have been submitted to the \ngovernment and the Court and provide full details and supporting documentation concerning \nMs. Maxwell's personal assets and those jointly held with the spouse. Further, no valid \nchallenge has been made to those submissions. \nThe government challenges the Court by inanely stating that if \"the only way to keep \nthe defendant from using her assets to flee is to take away control of her assets, then she is too \ngreat a risk to release.\" (Dkt.165 at 8.) This statement is fundamentally illogical as it \nundermines most conditions of release. For example, the same could be said of electronic \nmonitoring — i.e., if the only way to keep a defendant from fleeing the jurisdiction is to place \nhim on home confinement with electronic monitoring, then he is too great a flight risk to \nrelease.3 The Court should readily dismiss this frivolous argument. Under the Bail Reform Act, \nif there are appropriate conditions for release, bail should be granted. The conditions \ncollectively proposed in the previous and present bail applications provide ample assurance that \nMs. Maxwell will be present at trial. \n3 Moreover, in an effort to further obtliscate the merits of Ms. Maxwell's bail application, the government \ndesperately argues that funds for legal services, presently held in attorney escrow accounts, would be \nreleased and made available to support Ms. Maxwell as a fugitive. To suggest that defense counsel would \nbecome accomplices to a violation of's court order shows utter disrespect for Ms. Maxwell's defense team. \nIn particular, New York counsel, who have spent the entirety of their legal careers practicing in this d\n... [truncated, 2148 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00031918/6 or ?id=EFTA00031918&page=6]", "char_count": 2148}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Conceded Problems Undermine the Strength of the Government's Case \nAs Ms. Maxwell's period of detention passes the nine-month mark, the government has \ncontinuously upgraded Ms. Maxwell from a \"plain [ J risk of flight\" to a \"substantial and \nactual risk of flight\" to a \"serious flight of risk\" and now to an \"extreme risk of flight.\" (Dkt. \n165 at 1.) Ironically, her level of flight risk increases as the strength of government's case \nagainst her diminishes. Ms. Maxwell has challenged the strength of the government's case \nin pretrial motions pending before the Court. Among other things, Ms. Maxwell has \npersuasively argued that the Non-Prosecution Agreement entered into by Jeffrey Epstein in \n2007, which immunizes \"any potential co-conspirators of Epstein,\" bars Ms. Maxwell's \nprosecution in this case, and that the counts charging her with alleged sexual abuse are \ntime-barred. \nThe government's response to Ms. Maxwell's pretrial motions shines further light \nof the weaknesses of its case. For example, the government concedes it cannot establish that \neither Ms. Maxwell or Epstein ever caused, or sought to cause, Accuser-34 to travel while she \nwas a minor or that she was underage when she allegedly engaged in sex acts with Epstein. \n(See Opp.162-65 & fn. 57-58.)5 Hence, her allegations cannot support the conspiracies charged \nin the Indictment, leaving the government with only two witnesses to prove the charges against \nMs. Maxwell. More importantly, in connection with the government's response, it \nproduced documents indicating that government prosecutors misled a federal judge to \nAccuser-3 is identified in the Indictment as \"Minor Victim-3.\" \n5 -Opp.\" references are to page numbers of the Government's Omnibus Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's \nPre-Trial Motions, dated February 26, 2021 and not yet publicly flied. \n7 \nEFTA00031925\n", "char_count": 1873}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "obtain evidence against Ms. Maxwell (see, e.g.,. Opp. Ex. 4-7) - a shocking revelation that \nundermines the viability of the perjury counts, not to mention the integrity of the entire \nprosecution. \nThe ongoing review of discovery confirms the lack of evidence in support of the \nstale allegations in the indictment. Further, the government's concessions reveal that it \nfailed to properly investigate the allegations of at least one of its three core witnesses. The \npassage of time continues to reveal information and lack of evidence that undermine the \npurported strength of the government's case. \nBail Must Be Granted \nThe detention of Ms. Maxwell on 25-year-old allegations — based on the lowest grade \nmisdemeanor under New York Penal Law 130.556 — presented in a sensationalized \nindictment containing pictures to inflame the public and entice and feed the media frenzy' — \nis unwarranted in the face of the unique bail package before the Court. Relentless media \ncoverage of Ms. Maxwell, which preceded and impacted the bringing of this prosecution. \nhas increased significantly since her arrest and detention. Ms. Maxwell's continued \ndetention — providing daily fodder for media for the past nine months—continues to severely \nundermine her presumption of innocence. \nIn the face of this enhanced bail package, the government's claim that Ms. Maxwell \nposes \"an extreme risk of flight\" rings hollow. The government urges the Court to apply a \nstandard that defies the law - an absolute guarantee against all risks. See United States v. \nCounts Two and Four allege violations of New York Penal Law § 130.55 - sexual abuse in the third degree - a \nclass B misdemeanor punishable by maximum penalties of three months in jail or one year probation. \nWhat other purpose could be served by the inclusion of a picture of Ms. Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein taken over a \ndozen years after the period of the conspiracy alleged and pictures of three high-value residences? \n8 \nEFTA00031926\n", "char_count": 1989}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Ona, 760, F.2d 887, 888 n.4 (8th Cir. 1985) (\"The legalstandard requiredby the [Bail \nReform) Act is one of reasonable assurances, not absolute guarantees.\"). Under the Bail \nReform Act, Ms. Maxwell must be released unless there are \"no conditions\" that would \nreasonably assure her presence. Here, the proposed bail package - uniquely strengthened \nby Ms. Maxwell's agreement to renunciate her foreign citizenship and have assets \nmonitored by a retired federal district court judge - satisfies the actual governing standard. \nTo find there are absolutely no conditions to satisfy flight risk of a 59-year-old \nwoman with no criminal history, who poses no danger to the community, who has made \nAmerica her home for the past 30 years, and who has established strong roots and forged \nimportant connections with family and friends who reside here, is incredulous. The \nconcerns regarding foreign citizenship and restraint of assets have been addressed. To say \nthat renunciation of foreign citizenship and strict monitoring of assets by a retired federal \ndistrict court judge does not suffice when combined with an eight-figure bond secured by \nreal property and cash and the strictest terms of home confinement and electronic \nmonitoring strains credulity. The government gains a strategic advantage each day Ms. \nMaxwell remains in custody — her case is tried daily in the court of public opinion based \non allegations that arc inadmissible in a court of law; the likelihood of seating jurors who \narc not implicitly biased against her is being severely jeopardized; her physical strength \nand concentration are becoming increasingly impaired by the conditions of her \nconfinement; and she is being denied a full and fair opportunity to prepare her case for \ntrial.s \n\" Ms. Maxwell continues to experience difficulty reviewing electronic discovery, including discs that can only be \nreviewed on the MDC computer but are not readable on that computer, and thousands of pages still not readable on \n\n... [truncated, 4629 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00031918/9 or ?id=EFTA00031918&page=9]", "char_count": 4629}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Conclusion\nThe Court should grant bail for Ms. Maxwell on the extraordinary conditions \nproposed. Should the Court determine that additional conditions are necessary, Ms. \nMaxwell is willing to satisfy and abide by those terms as well. \nDated: March 16, 2021 \nRespectfully submitted: \nPat C. St \n:m. \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim \n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor \nNew York NY 10011 \nPhone: \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \n800 Third Avenue \nNcw York. NY 10022 \nPhone: \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.0 \n150 East 10th Avenue \nDenver CO 80203 \nPhone: \nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell \nEast Building, where Ms. Maxwell is detained, have been reviewed by an HVAC expert retained by the Federal \nDefenders of New York and have been characterized as a \"death trap.\" The MDC claims it is in the process of \ninstalling HEPA filters, a request long overdue in light of concerns regarding ventilation in legal visiting rooms \nraised early in the pandemic. The alternative — to meet in the opearea where social visiting had been conducted-\naffords no privacy for confidential attomercl lent communication, especially under constant oversight by Ms. \nMaxwell's guards and a hand-held camera focused on both Ms. Maxwell and counsel. Further, confidential \nattomeycl ient communications conducted during video teleconferencing (VTC) arc now further compromised by \nthe repositioning of a camera with sensitive audio recording, putting a chill on privileged communication. During \nVTC conferences, counsel can hear conversation among the guards, so it is likely that the guards, who seem to be \nwriting during those sessions, are able to hear discussions between Ms. Maxwell and counsel. Last night, prior to the \nfiling of defense replies to Ms. Maxwell's pretrial motions, the MDC refused her request to speak with her lawyers \nto provide information bearing on those filings,. Such denial violates the BOP's Program Statement pertaining to \n... [truncated, 4742 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00031918/10 or ?id=EFTA00031918&page=10]", "char_count": 4742}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "EXHIBIT A \nEFTA00031929\n", "char_count": 24}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "WILLIAM \nJULIE \nAVOCAT A LA COUR - ATTORNEY AT LAW \nMarch 14th 2021 \nRe: Additional opinion on the extradition of nationals by the French government \nThis memorandum was written pursuant to a request from Olivier Laude, a partner at \nthe French firm Laude Esquier Champey acting on behalf of Cohen & Gresser LLP as \ncounsel for Ms Ghislaine Maxwell. The request was made in the context of ongoing bail \nproceedings involving Ms Maxwell in the United States of America (hereafter \"USA\"), \nwhere Ms Maxwell is being detained pre-trial on charges relating to her alleged role in \nsexual activities involving Jeffrey Epstein from 1994 to 1997. \n2. In a previous opinion, I have outlined why French authorities could decide to execute \nan extradition request against a French citizen under the Extradition Treaty between the \nUSA and France, without violating any superior norm of French and international law. \n3. As I understand the defendant's French nationality continues to be regarded by the Court \nas a bar to her release pending trial, I am informed that the defendant is prepared to \nrenounce French nationality under Article 23-4 of the French Civil Code, if the Court \nso requires. \n4. \na letter to the Department of Justice dated 9 March 2021, the Head of the International \nCriminal Assistance Bureau of the French Ministry of Justice, Mr Philippe laegle, \nasserts that the loss of French nationality after the criminal act which the person is \nalleged to have committed does not affect the rule against the extradition of nationals, \nas nationality must be assessed at the time of commission of the offence and not at the \ntime of the extradition request. \n5. This report was written to provide a counter opinion on this issue, in support of the \nproposition that the French government would be legally entitled to execute an \nextradition request against an individual who is no longer a French national. \n6. The Ministry of Justice's assertion must be regarded as incorrect for three reason\n... [truncated, 2202 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00031918/12 or ?id=EFTA00031918&page=12]", "char_count": 2202}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "WILLIAM JULIE \nAVOCAT A LA COUR - ATTORNEY AT LAW \n(ii) Nor is it supported by the spirit of the law; \n(iii) Case law and precedents in fact suggest the opposite. \n7. First, the Ministry's interpretation goes against the letter of the law. \n8. American extradition requests are principally governed by the Extradition Treaty \nbetween the USA and France of 23 April 1996 (\"the Treaty\") and the French Code of \nCriminal Procedure for matters not dealt with under the Treaty. \n9. Article 3(1) of the Treaty provides: \n\"There is no obligation upon the Requested State to grant the extradition of a person \nwho is a national of the Requested State, but the executive authority of the United \nStates shall have the power to surrender a national of the United States if, in its \ndiscretion, it deems it proper to do so. The nationality of the person sought shall be \nthe nationality of that person at the time the offense was committed\". \n10. Article 696-4 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the same rule. \nunder similar wording: \n\"Extradition shall not be granted: \n1° When the person claimed has French nationality, the latter being assessed at the time \nof the offense for which extradition is requested\" \nI I. Under a literal reading of these provisions, the nationality protection only applies where \nFrench authorities are faced with an extradition request against a person who is a French \nnational at the time of the extradition request. Both the Treaty and the French Code of \nI Other relevant international treaties include: the Agreement on Extradition between the United States of \nAmerica and the European Union s ivied in Washington on 25 June 2003, and the Instalment Amending the \nTreaty of 23 Apnl 1996 between the United States of Amok a and France signed in the Hague on 30 September \n2004. \n2 \n51, RUE AmvERE • 75017 RARis tee. 01 88 33 51 80 — FAX. 01 88 33 51 81 \nwjeJwjavocats.com • WVAV.WiMocats.com - PALMS C1652 \nEFTA00031931\n", "char_count": 1965}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "WILLIAM \nJULIE \nAVOCAT A LA COUR - ATTORNEY AT LAW \nCriminal Procedure use the present tense (\"a person who is a national of the Requested \nState\"/\"the person claimed has French nationality\"), which can only mean that the \nextradition of a person is denied when that person is in fact a French national. If the \nperson is no longer a French national at the time of the request, the provision does not \napply. \n12. I-lad these provisions been intended to apply in cases where the person has lost French \nnationality subsequent to the commission of the alleged crime, the texts would have \nexpressly stated so or would at least have used both the present and the past tense to \nqualify the national affiliation of the requested person. \n13. Furthermore, it is a well-known principle of legal interpretation across all jurisdictions \nthat exceptions to rules must be construed strictly. The nationality ban being an \nexception to extradition, it must be interpreted in a restrictive manner and its application \nto a person who is no longer a French national must be rejected. \n14. Second, the Ministry's interpretation goes against the spirit of the law \n15. The literal reading of Article 3 of the Treaty and Article 696-4 of the French Code of \nCriminal Procedure is further supported by the fact that these provisions were in fact \nnot intended to apply in cases where the person sought has lost French citizenship, but \nonly in cases where that person has acquired French citizenship subsequent to the \ncommission of the alleged crime. \n16. In other words, the rule that \"nationality shall be assessed at the time of the offence for \nwhich extradition is requested\" seeks to deny the extension of the benefit of French \nnationality to persons who have acquired French nationality after committing an \noffence, in order to avoid fraudulent nationality applications of offenders seeking to \nescape extradition. \n3 \n51. RUE AMPERE - 75017 PARIS • TEL. 01 88 33 SI 80 — FAX. 01 88 33 SI 81 \nwj(Swjavocat\n... [truncated, 2054 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00031918/14 or ?id=EFTA00031918&page=14]", "char_count": 2054}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "WILLIAM JULIE \nAVOCAT A LA COUR - ATTORNEY AT LAW \n17. This concern over opportunistic nationality applications is precisely the justification of \nthe rule mentioned in academic literature (see for example Repertoire de droll penal et \nde procedure penale Extradition Pa. - Conditions de fond de l'estradition \nDelphine Brach-Thiel-October 2t I 8„f59). \n18. Third, the French Ministry of Justice's interpretation is contradicted by precedents \nand case law \n19. The French Ministry of Justice's interpretation finds no support in case law, as no case \ncan be found where Article 696-4 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure was applied \nto protect a formerly French national from extradition. \n20. Instead, precedents exist in which Article 696-4,1° of the French Code of Criminal \nProcedure was relied on by French authorities to execute an extradition request against \nan individual who had acquired French nationality after committing an offence, which \nis the natural use of this provision (for example, a ruling issued by the Criminal Chamber \nof the French Cow de caseation on 4 January 2006, n°05-86.258). \n21. Although we have found no precedent where French authorities were faced with the \nextradition of a person who had lost French nationality, we have found cases where \nFrench authorities were faced with the deportation of a person who had lost French \nnationality. Both extradition and deportation allow for the removal of a person from \nFrench territory by the police and its surrender to the authorities of a third State, with \nthe consent and cooperation of the authorities of that State. \n22. The European Court of Human Rights (the \"ECtHR\") treats extradition and deportation \nanalogously. More specifically, the ECtHR considers that the same human rights bars \napply to all types of removal of a person from the territory of a State party (\"the Court \nconsiders that the question whether there is a real risk of treatment contrary to Article \n3 in another State cannot depend \n... [truncated, 2284 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00031918/15 or ?id=EFTA00031918&page=15]", "char_count": 2284}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "WILLIAM \nJULIE \nAVOCAT A LA COUR - ATTORNEY AT LAW \nextradition and other removals\", ECtHR 12 April 2012, Babar Ahmad and Others v. \nthe United Kingdom, no. 24027/07, §168). \n23. France has no difficulty with deporting individuals who have lost French nationality by \napplication of Article 25 of the Civil Code, which enumerates the list of crimes that may \ngive rise to a deprivation of citizenship. For example, a dual French-Algerian citizen \nnamed Djamel Beghal was recently deported to Algeria after he was convicted of \nterrorist offences and subsequently deprived of his French nationality'. \n24. While in custody in France, Djamel Beghal was also convicted in absentia to a term of \nprison in Algeria, but his extradition initially seemed impossible, not because he used \nto be a French citizen, but because the case law of the ECtIIR specifically prohibits \nState parties from deporting persons deprived of their nationality to the State of which \nthey remain a national, when there is a risk of torture or degrading treatment'. Beghal \nwas eventually deported to Algeria where he was arrested upon landing for the purpose \nof standing trial. In this case, the French government's decision to deprive Djamel \nBeghal of his French nationality was clearly intended to allow for his removal from \nFrance, whether through extradition or deportation, as both means of removal were \nconceivable at the time. Had there not been a risk of violation of the ECHR at the time \nof the Algerian extradition request, he may well have been extradited as opposed to \ndeported a few years later, when that risk was eliminated. \n25. In any case, the deportation of formerly French citizens shows that the loss of French \nnationality prevents any retroactive application of domestic provisions which are \nintended to protect French nationals, be it from deportation or extradition. \n2 https://vnvw.lemonde.fr/societe/anicle/2018/07/16/incertitude-sur-le-sort-de-l-islamiste-cljamel-beghal-qui-sort-\nde-prison•\n... [truncated, 2497 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00031918/16 or ?id=EFTA00031918&page=16]", "char_count": 2497}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00031918", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "WILLIAM JULIE \nAVOCAT A LA COUR — ATTORNEY AT LAW \n26. In these circumstances, it cannot have been the intention of French lawmakers that \nArticle 696-4 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure be. construed as meaning that \na person who has lost French nationality would still be entitled to be protected from \nextradition since the French government has on several occasions deported to third \ncountries individuals who had been deprived of their' rench nationality following the \ncommission of criminal offences. \nWilliam JULIE \nAvocar o Jo Cour \n6 \n51, RUC AMPCRC • 75011 PARIS • It. \n01 80 33 51 no - FAX. 01 SO 33 51131 \n- www.wjavocatccom - PALMS C1652 \nEFTA00031935\n", "char_count": 674}]}