{"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_count": 14, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00028785", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00028785.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 1 of 14 \nU.S. Department of Justice \nUnited States Attorney \nSouthern District of New York \nThe Silvio J. Mollo Building \nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza \nNew York. New York 10007 \nJuly 12, 2019 \nVIA ECF \nThe Honorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Court \nSouthern District of New York \nUnited States Courthouse \n500 Pearl Street \nNew York, New York 10007 \nRe: \nUnited States v. Jeffrey Epstein, 19 Cr. 490 (RMB) \nDear Judge Berman: \nThe Government respectfully submits this letter in response to the defendant's Motion for \nPretrial Release (the \"Release Motion\"), dated July 11, 2019 (Dkt. 6), and in further support of its \nMemorandum in Support of Detention (the \"Detention Memo\"), submitted to Magistrate Judge \nPitman on July 8, 2019, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. A). \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nThe defendant is a serial sexual predator who is charged with abusing underage girls for \nyears. A grand jury has returned an indictment alleging that he sexually exploited dozens of \nminors, including girls as young as 14 years old, in New York and Florida. To this day, he is a \nregistered sex offender designated by New York State in the highest category of risk to reoffend, \ndespite unsuccessfully attempting to have that classification lowered. And any doubt that the \ndefendant is unrepentant and unreformed was eliminated when law enforcement agents discovered \nhundreds or thousands of nude and seminude photographs of young females in his Manhattan \nmansion on the night of his arrest, more than a decade after he was first convicted of a sex crime \ninvolving a juvenile. \nThe defendant also faces substantial evidence of his guilt, founded on the corroborated \ntestimony of numerous victims, and this case presents the very real possibility that he will go to \nprison for the rest of his life. The defendant has at his disposal a vast fortune, the details of which \nremain largely concealed from the Court.\n... [truncated, 2694 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/0 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=0]", "char_count": 2694}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 2 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 2 \nlaw, seeks to diminish and demean the harm caused to the many victims of the defendant's \nappalling sexual abuse, and utterly fails to meet its burden of rebutting the presumption that no \ncondition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as \nrequired and the safety of the community. Rather than even attempting to address the grave risks \nof releasing a defendant with extraordinary financial resources and a history of abusing minors, \nthe defendant instead proposes a bail package that amounts to little more than a barely-secured \nbond masquerading as a 14-point plan. The Court should reject the defendant's application and \norder him detained pending trial. \nAmong other things, the proposed bail package contemplates the defendant pledging as the \nprincipal security a property that has already been identified by the Government as subject to \nforfeiture upon the defendant's conviction, and which therefore is of no value as collateral. His \nproposed global waiver of extradition is unenforceable, and even if enforceable would be little \ncomfort to victims forced to wait additional years while the defendant is located and returned to \nthis country. The promise to \"deregister or otherwise ground\" his private jet is meaningless given \nhis wealth and ability to easily secure other means of travel. The two co-signers he proposes only \nfurther highlight his minimal community ties, including his lack of any family in or near the \nDistrict. Electronic monitoring would merely give the defendant less of a head start in fleeing—\nand does not guard against the risk of him endangering victims in the very home where he has \ncontinued to hoard nude images of young women and girls. And the private security force he \nproposes to guard his gilded cage, a proposal already rejected by this Court in simil\n... [truncated, 3761 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/1 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=1]", "char_count": 3761}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 3 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 3 \nThe defendant, through counsel, continues to evidence a complete lack of appreciation for \nthe gravity of the offenses with which he is charged.' As an initial matter, there can be no plausible \nsuggestion that the allegations against the defendant involve isolated or aberrational conduct; they \ninvolve repeated, regular acts of sexual abuse committed over a period of many years. And \nfollowing the defendant's prior conviction, as described previously by the Government, the \ndefendant continued to maintain at least hundreds and possibly thousands of nude photos of young \nsubjects. The defendant's victims in this case, often particularly vulnerable girls, were as young \nas 14 years old when he abused them. The defendant knew he was abusing minors, including \nbecause victims told him directly they were underage. And he preyed on his victims habitually \nand repeatedly—day after day, month after month, year after year. \nThe defense calls these disturbing alleged acts \"simple prostitution!' Mag. Tr. 12:12; see \nalso D. Tr. at 6:15-19 (\"This is basically the Feds today . . . redoing the same conduct that was \ninvestigated 10 years ago and calling it, instead of prostitution, calling it sex trafficking\"). That \ncharacterization is not only offensive but also utterly irrelevant given that federal law does not \nrecognize the concept of a child prostitute—there are only trafficking victims—because a child \ncannot legally consent to being exploited. \nDefense counsel's repeated assertion that the \nGovernment's case is infirm because no threats or coercion are alleged—e.g., Mag. Tr. at 12 \n(\"There was no coercion. There were no threats. There was no violence.\"), 17 (\"there was no \ncoercion. There was no intimidation. There is no deception.\"); Release Motion at 2 (\"There are \nno allegations . . . that he forced, coerced, defrauded, or e\n... [truncated, 3831 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/2 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=2]", "char_count": 3831}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 4 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 4 \nARGUMENT \nThe Government respectfully submits that the defendant cannot overcome the statutory \npresumption in favor of detention in this case for the following reasons, among others: \nI. \nVictims Seek Detention \nPursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act (\"CVRA\"), a crime victim has the right to be \nreasonably heard at certain public proceedings in the district court, including proceedings \ninvolving release. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). Consistent with that requirement, the Government has \nbeen in contact with victims and counsel identified through this investigation in connection with \nthe argument regarding bail. \nMultiple victims and/or their counsel have asked the Government to seek detention (and to \ninform the Court of their views in that respect) for multiple reasons. First, they believe that the \ndefendant's continued detention is necessary under the CVRA's right to be reasonably protected \nfrom the accused. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1). They have specifically conveyed to the Government \nthat they would be fearful for their safety if the defendant were released. For the reasons articulated \nherein, the Government believes those concerns to be well-founded. \nAdditionally, certain victims have asked the Government to advise the Court that they are \nspecifically concerned about the defendant's proposal to be released even if under conditions that \nincluded home detention and full-time private guards. They believe it would be unfair to victims \nof a wealthy defendant, like Epstein, if he were to be given greater freedoms than others would be \nin similar circumstances, and that such an arrangement would be inconsistent with their rights. \nThey specifically asked the Government to advise the Court that they believed such an arrangement \ncould result in harassment and abuse by the defendant. 3\nII. \nThe Defendant's Proposal Does Not\n... [truncated, 3036 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/3 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=3]", "char_count": 3036}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 5 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 5 \nIndeed, while the defendant has still not filled out a financial affidavit, under penalty of \nperjury, in connection with his application for bail, his token effort to account for his finances \nmakes painfully clear the need for detention. The defendant reports having an extraordinary \namount of money in both total assets and cash or cash-equivalent holdings. And while the \ndefendant repeatedly represents in his Release Motion that his assets are \"in the United States,\" \nthere is absolutely nothing in the defendant's minimal financial submission to verify that. \nIndeed, and as discussed further below, even assuming the defendant's assets are presently \nin the United States, nothing in the proposed package would prevent the defendant from \ntransferring liquid assets out of the country quickly and in anticipation of flight or relocation. The \ndefendant is an incredibly sophisticated financial actor with decades of experience in the industry \nand significant ties to financial institutions and actors around the world. He could easily transfer \nfunds and holdings on a moment's to places where the Government would never find them so as \nto ensure he could live comfortably while a fugitive. \nBut perhaps most important, even were the defendant to sacrifice literally all of his current \nassets, there is every indication that he would immediately be able to resume making millions or \ntens of millions of dollars per year outside of the United States. He already earns at least \n_ \n$10,000,000 per year, according to records from Institution-1, while living in the U.S. Virgin \nIslands, traveling extensively abroad, and residing in part in Paris, France; there would be little to \nstop the defendant from fleeing, transferring his unknown assets abroad, and then continuing to do \nwhatever it is he does to earn his vast wealth from a comput\n... [truncated, 3734 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/4 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=4]", "char_count": 3734}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 6 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 6 \ncontained in the Indictment. All this in less than a week, and all in addition to an Indictment that \nalready alleges the existence of dozens of victims in New York and dozens of victims in Florida. \nB. The Proposed Bond is Inadequate to Overcome the Presumption of Detention \nThe defendant's \"slate of highly restrictive\" measures which purportedly \"amply suffice to \nsecure his release\" are neither highly restrictive nor amply sufficient. Rather, they are effectively \nstandard conditions of home confinement, monitoring, and bond unsecured by the defendant's \nassets—broken out into 14 pieces. The Government will address the most concerning and salient \nelements of the defendant's proposal below. \nI. Lack of Meaningful Bond Security \nThe defendant proposes that the Court accept his Manhattan mansion as the primary \nsecurity for a personal recognizance bond of an indeterminate amount, to be co-signed by the \ndefendant's brother and a friend. Release Motion at 4. This is plainly insufficient. \nAs an initial matter, and as noted above, the defendant's Manhattan mansion has been \nidentified in the Indictment as subject to forfeiture because it is alleged to have been used to \ncommit or facilitate the commission of the sex trafficking offenses charged there. See 18 U.S.C. \n§ 1594(c)(1). \nBecause the defendant would thus be likely to lose that property following a \nconviction, it provides no value whatsoever as collateral. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4) (\"In \nconsidering the conditions of release described . . . the judicial officer . . . shall decline to accept \nthe designation, or the use as collateral, of property that, because of its source, will not reasonably \nassure the appearance of the person as required.\"). And while the defendant offers to also pledge \nhis private jet as additional collateral, there is absolutely no reason t\n... [truncated, 3382 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/5 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=5]", "char_count": 3382}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 7 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 7 \n2. Co-Signers, Moral Suasion, and Ties to the Community \nThe dearth of detailed financial information about the defendant himself, much less his \nbrother or friend, further shows the hollowness of the proposal. The Court cannot possibly \nevaluate whether there would be any incentive whatsoever for those the two proposed co-signers \nto exercise moral suasion over the defendant—or whether, as noted above, the defendant could \neasily compensate them, perhaps many times over, for any loss they incurred through the \ndefendant's flight from justice. The defendant provides no information about his brother other \nthan that he lives half the year in the home he purportedly would pledge, and even less information \nabout Mr. Mitchell, other than that he is \"Mr. Epstein's friend,\" his \"close personal friend of \ndecades,\" and his \"close personal friend.\" Release Motion at 4, 9. Their willingness to \"guarantee\" \nhis appearance, Release Motion at 9, is meaningless in the absence of such information. \nMoreover, the notion that any individual co-signer could meaningfully secure a bond for \nthis defendant strains credulity. Given the defendant's wealth and his extraordinary risk of flight, \nany bond for this defendant would assuredly have to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars to \neven be claimed to be sufficient to guard against the risks posed by the defendant's release. The \ndefendant offers no reason to believe any co-signers could meaningfully sign such a bond, much \nless these two particular individuals, which is yet another reason the proposed package is patently \ninsufficient. \n3. The Defendant's \"Consent\" to Extradition is Unenforceable and Impractical \nThe defendant's offer to sign a so-called \"consent\" to extradition provides no additional \nreassurance whatsoever. As an initial matter, the Government would need to find and \n... [truncated, 3777 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/6 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=6]", "char_count": 3777}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 8 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 8 \n4. Home Confinement and Electronic Monitoring Provide No Assurance \nThe defendant's proposal of ankle-bracelet monitoring should be of no comfort to the \nCourt. In particular, the defendant's endorsement of a GPS monitoring bracelet rather than a radio \nfrequency bracelet is farcical because neither one is useful or effective after it has been removed. \nAt best, home confinement and electronic monitoring would reduce his head start should he decide \nto cut the bracelet and flee. See United States v. Zarger, No. 00 Cr. 773, 2000 WL 1134364, at *1 \n(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000) (rejecting defendant's application for bail in part because home detention \nwith electronic monitoring \"at best . . . limits a fleeing defendant's head start\"); see also United \nStates v. Casteneda, No. 18 Cr. 047, 2018 WL 888744, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2018) (same); United \nStates v. Anderson, 384 F. Supp.2d 32, 41 (D.D.C. 2005) (same); United States v. Benatar, No. 02 \nCr. 099, 2002 WL 31410262, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (same). \n5. Private Security is Inadequate, Unfair, and Impractical Here \nThe defendant also proposes the use of a private security force to march him to and from \ncourt under the threat of deadly force. This proposal should be rejected. \nAt the outset, it is far from clear that private jail, which seeks to replicate the conditions of \na government-run detention facility in the defendant's home, is a condition of \"release\" that \nimplicates the Bail Reform Act. \"[T]here is a debate within the judiciary over whether a defendant, \nif she is able to perfectly replicate a private jail in her own home at her own cost, has a right to do \nso under the Bail Reform Act and the United States Constitution.\" United States v. Valerio, 9 F. \nSupp. 3d 283, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (Bianco, J.) (collecting cases). The Second Circuit has never \ndirectly add\n... [truncated, 3975 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/7 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=7]", "char_count": 3975}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 9 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 9 \narmed private guards attempting to stop the defendant, potentially by force—rather than the \ndefendant being in the environment of a federal facility—also greatly magnifies the danger of the \ndefendant's flight to the public. See United States v. Boustani, 356 F. Supp. 3d 246, 257 (E.D.N.Y. \n2019). \"This is why, as the Government correctly notes, federal prisoners should be detained in \nfacilities run by trained personnel from federal correctional facilities.\" Id. at 258 (citing Sablznani, \n493 F.3d at 74 n.13 (\"To the extent [armed private guards] implies an expectation that deadly force \nmay need to be used to assure defendant['s] presence at trial... [s]uch a conclusion would, in fact, \ndemand a defendant's detention\")). \nThe Second Circuit has held it is not legal error \"for a district court to decline to accept,\" \nas \"a substitute for detention,\" a defendant hiring private security guards to monitor him. United \nStates v. Bank, 369 Fed. App'x 152, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2010). In the same decision, the Second \nCircuit noted that it was \"troubled\" by the possibility of \"allow[ing] wealthy defendants to buy \ntheir way out by constructing a private jail.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Id.; accord, e.g., \nUnited States v. Cilins, No. 13 Cr. 315 (WHP), 2013 WL 3802012, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2013) \n(\"it is contrary to underlying principles of detention and release on bail that individuals otherwise \nineligible for release should be able to buy their way out by constructing a private jail, policed by \nsecurity guards not trained or ultimately accountable to the Government, even if carefully \nselected' (quoting Borodin v. Ashcroft, 136 F. Supp. 2d 125, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2001))); Valerio, 9 \nF. Supp. 3d at 293-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (\"There is nothing in the Bail Reform Act that would \nsuggest that a defendant (or even, hypothetica\n... [truncated, 4161 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/8 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=8]", "char_count": 4161}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 10 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 10 \nBruno, 89 F. Supp. 3d 425, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"Even if Defendant had the financial capacity \nto replicate a private jail within his own home, this Court is not convinced that such a set of \nconditions would be sufficiently effective in this case to protect the community from Defendant, \nor that such disparate treatment based on wealth is permissible under the Bail Act.\")); Borodin, \n136 F. Supp. 2d at 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (Nickerson, J.) (\"It is contrary to underlying principles of \ndetention and release on bail that individuals otherwise ineligible for release should be able to buy \ntheir way out by constructing a private jail, policed by security guards not trained or ultimately \naccountable to the government, even if carefully selected.\"). \nIf the defendant's appearance can only be assured through use of round-the-clock guards, \nthe defendant belongs in a federal detention center, not released under bail conditions that \neffectively create a private prison of one, using guards to be paid by the defendant himself. It is \nfrankly outrageous for the defendant to suggest that preventing him from using his vast wealth to \nduplicate a private prison that cannot control, monitor, and contain him consistent with the \nrequirements of the Bail Act would cause him to somehow \"bear a special disadvantage.\" Release \nMotion at 12 n.9. Indeed: \"What more compelling case for an order of detention is there than a \ncase in which only an armed guard and the threat of deadly force is sufficient to assure the \ndefendant's appearance?' Zarrab, 2016 WL 3681432, at *12 (quoting United States v. Valerio, 9 \nF. Supp. 3d at 295). \nIII. \nThe Defendant Provides No Assurance He is Not a Danger to the Community and a \nRisk to Obstruct Justice \nA. Danger to the Community \nIn the first instance, the defendant's argument that 14 years without a crimi\n... [truncated, 3459 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/9 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=9]", "char_count": 3459}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 11 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 11 \nB. Danger to Obstruct Justice \nThe defendant has also already demonstrated a willingness to use intimidation and \naggressive tactics in connection with a criminal investigation. Far from being \"musty,\" Release \nMotion at 6 n.6, the defendant's past behavior in connection with being investigated for sexually \nabusing children is the best predictor of his likely incentives and activities in connection with being \ncharged with sexually abusing children. For example, in the incident the defendant now claims \nwas not attributable to or authorized by him, the contemporaneous police report indicates that \npressure tactics were at the vet), least coordinated closely with individuals in the defendant's orbit. \nSee Palm Beach Police Report (the \"Police Report\") (Ex. B). According to the Police Report, the \nparent of one of the defendant's victims was driven off the road by a private investigator. The \nPolice Report provides further information regarding victim and witness threats and intimidation \nreported against an individual who was directly in contact with an assistant of the defendant, \nfollowed \"immediately\" by a call to that same individual from a phone number associated with the \ndefendant's businesses and associates. \nSeparately, and in addition, there are also extensive allegations of obstruction and \ntampering in connection with civil lawsuits brought against the defendant following his 2008 \nconviction. See Doe v. United States, 08 Civ. 80736 (S.D. Fla.), Dkt. 291-15 at 21-23, 31. \nMoreover, police reports suggest that an associate of Epstein's was offering to buy victims' silence \nduring the course of the prior investigation. Specifically, one victim reported that \"she was \npersonally contacted through a source that has maintained contact with Epstein,\" who \"assured \n[the victim] that she would receive monetary compen\n... [truncated, 3712 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/10 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=10]", "char_count": 3712}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 12 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 12 \nIV. \nThe Defendant Raises Legal Arguments Not Relevant Here \nFinally, the defendant raises certain legal arguments he contends he will litigate at the \nappropriate stage and which he further suggests mitigate in favor of bail. None is meritorious, and \ncertainly none should give the Court any comfort whatsoever that the defendant would, if granted \nbail, refrain from fleeing so he could attempt to vindicate himself via dubious legal strategies. \nNevertheless, the Government will address the defendant's arguments briefly in turn. \nA. The Non-Prosecution Agreement Does Not Preclude Prosecution \nAs an initial matter, as the Court itself noted at the parties' initial appearance earlier this \nweek, and as the defendant appears to concede, the instant Indictment charges conduct well beyond \nthe scope of the NPA — that is, alleged conduct that occurred here in New York and involving New \nYork based victims. D. Tr. 6-8; Release Motion at 2. For present purposes, that alone is sufficient \nto put this issue to rest, because even assuming the defendant were to mount a meritorious \nchallenge to the NPA, he would still have to stand trial on Count Two of the Indictment and \nadditional charges brought based on New York conduct. \nBut more generally, the reasons the defendant can be prosecuted in the Southern District \nof New York—or anywhere else outside the SDFL—are manifold. The language of the NPA \noverwhelmingly refers to the SDFL, and the core terms and text of the agreement are limited to \nthe SDFL. The prefatory language states: \"THEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander \nAcosta, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for \nthese offenses shall be deferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida.\"' The final \nparagraph of the prefatory language also states, among other \n... [truncated, 3638 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/11 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=11]", "char_count": 3638}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 13 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 13 \n(2d Cir. 2010) (\"A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the \ndistrict in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates \na broader restriction.\") (citing United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (per \ncuriam)). Moreover, any references in an NPA to the \"Government\" or the \"United States\" do not \nabrogate these principles. Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672 (\"[A] plea agreement whereby a federal \nprosecutor agrees that 'the Government' will dismiss counts of an indictment ... might be thought \nto bar the United States from reprosecuting the dismissed charges in any judicial district unless the \nagreement expressly limits the scope of the agreement .. . . However, the law has evolved to the \ncontrary.\"). \"The mere use of the term 'government' in the plea agreement does not create an \naffirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other than the particular \ndistrict entering into the agreement.\" United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) \n(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Brown, No. 99-1230, \n2002 WL 34244994, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (in analyzing an SDFL plea agreement, \nreiterating the holding of Annabi and noting that it applies \"even if the plea agreement purports to \nbind 'the Government' or the \"United States\") (summary order); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. \nSupp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"The Court disagrees with Defendant's argument that the \nphrase 'United States' shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney's Offices. Rather, the \nplea agreement covers only Defendant's liability in the SDFL.\"). \nIn sum, this issue is a distraction that has little relevance to the bail determination and does \nnothing to address the defendant's risk of \n... [truncated, 3795 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/12 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=12]", "char_count": 3795}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00028785", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 14 of 14 \nHonorable Richard M. Berman \nUnited States District Judge \nJuly 12, 2019 \nPage 14 \nSecond, he is also wrong on the law. Courts have found that Section 1591 applied to both \nsuppliers and consumers of commercial sex acts. See, e.g., United States v. fingers, 702 F.3d \n1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 2013) (upholding the conviction of a defendant who attempted to pay for oral \nsex from an underage girl and explaining: \"The sole issue raised on appeal is whether '[t]he plain \nand unambiguous provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 apply to both suppliers and consumers of \ncommercial sex acts.' We conclude they do.\") (alteration in original). The lone case cited by the \ndefendant, Flom v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 13042630 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012), relied \nheavily on the statutory interpretation undertaken by two district courts in the District of South \nDakota, United States v. Bonestroo, No. 11 Cr. 40016, 2012 WL 13704 (D.S.D. Jan. 4, 2012), and \nUnited States v. Jungers, 11 Cr. 40018, 2011 WL 6046495 (D.S.D. Dec. 5, 2011), both of which \nwere explicitly overruled by the Eighth Circuit decision in Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066. In the seven \nyears since Fierro has been decided, it does not appear to have been cited by a single other court. \nAdditionally, other cases in this Circuit and elsewhere have upheld convictions of procurers or \ncustomers. See United States v. O'Connor, 650 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding convictions \nunder Section 1591 of both the buyer and seller of a child); United States v. Cook, 782 F.3d 983 \n(8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a constitutional challenge that Section 1591 would be void for vagueness \nif applied to purchasers); United States v. Mikoloyck, No. 09 Cr. 036, 2009 WL 4798900 (W.D. \nMo. Dec. 7, 2009) (\"contrary to defendant's argument, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 clearly applies to those \nwho attempt to purchase underage sex, not merely the pimps of actual exploited children\") (citing \nUnited States v.\n... [truncated, 2909 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00028785/13 or ?id=EFTA00028785&page=13]", "char_count": 2909}]}