{"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_count": 34, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00027307", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00027307.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 1 of 34 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \n \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA \n19 Cr. 830 (AT) \nTOVA NOEL and MICHAEL THOMAS, \n: \nDefendants. \nx \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA \nIN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MICHAEL THOMAS'S MOTION TO COMPEL \nGEOFFREY S. BERMAN \nUnited States Attorney \nSouthern District of New York \nAssistant United States Attorneys \n- Of Counsel - \nEFTA00027307\n", "char_count": 474}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 2 of 34 \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n1 \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \n2 \nI. \nThe Indictment \n2 \nII. \nPretrial Discovery and the Defendant's Request for Additional Materials \n3 \nA. \nThe Government's Discovery Production \n3 \nB. \nDefense Requests for Additional Discovery Materials \n4 \nARGUMENT \n7 \nI. \nApplicable Law \n7 \nA. \nBrady & Giglio \n7 \nB. \nRule 16 \n8 \nII. \nThomas is Not Entitled to Additional Materials \n8 \nA. \nThe Government Has Satisfied its Discovery and Disclosure Obligations \n8 \nB. \nThe Requested Records Are Not \"Material\" to Preparing a Defense and Are \nSought for the Impermissible Purpose of Jury Nullification \n 10 \nI.Applicable Law \n10 \n2.Discussion \n12 \nC. \nThe Government is Not Required to Collect Materials From Agencies Who \nWere Not Part of the Prosecution Team \n15 \nI.Applicable Law \n16 \n2.Discussion \n 19 \nD. \nAny Draft Inspector General Report is Not Subject to Disclosure \n21 \nE. \nThomas Has Not Carried His Burden With Respect to Discovery of Material in \nSupport of a Selective Prosecution Claim \n24 \nI.Applicable Law \n24 \n2.Discussion \n26 \nCONCLUSION \n29 \nEFTA00027308\n", "char_count": 1159}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 3 of 34 \nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES \n27 \npassim \nCases \nAmnesty Int'l USA v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) \nBrady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) \nColor of Change v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 325 F. Supp. 3d 447 \n(S.D.N.Y. 2018) \n27 \nDept of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) \n26, 27 \nGiglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) \nIn re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997) \npassim \n26 \nIn re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008) \n15 \nKyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) \n19 \nN.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) \n26 \nNat'l Res. Del  Council v. United States Ening. Prot. Agency, 954 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. \n2020) \n26 \nStandefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980) \n13 \nUnited States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2003) \n29, 30, 31 \nUnited States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, (1996) \npassim \nUnited States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) \n19, 25 \nUnited States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) \n7 \nUnited States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2015) \n19 \nUnited States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002) \n30, 33 \nUnited States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974) \n30, 31 \nUnited States v. Blaszczak, 308 F. Supp. 3d 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) \n20 \nUnited States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1989) \n24 \nUnited States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2005) \n12 \nUnited States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) \n20 \nii \nEFTA00027309\n", "char_count": 1520}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 4 of 34 \nUnited States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001) \nUnited States v. Defritas, No. 07 Cr. 543 (DLI), 2011 WL 317964, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. \n7, 8 \nJan. 31, 2011) \n12, 17 \nUnited States v. Delacruz, No. 14 Cr. 815 (KBF), 2015 WL 2211943, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. \nMay 12, 2015) \n16 \nUnited States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1996) \n13 \nUnited States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1992) \n30, 31, 33 \nUnited States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) \n26 \nUnited States v. Finnerty, 411 F. Supp. 2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) \n20 \nUnited States v. Floyd, No. 99 Cr. 0234 (DAB), 1999 WL 476438, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. \nJuly 7, 1999) \n16 \nUnited States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) \n26 \nUnited States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1992) \n15 \nUnited States v. Ghailani, 687 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) \n21 \nUnited States v. Gibbons, 602 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1979) \n16 \nUnited States v. Gonzalez, No. 19 Cr. 123-2 (NRB), 2020 WL 1809293, at *5 \n(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2020) \n10 \nUnited States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982) \n7 \nUnited States v. Levin, No. 15 Cr. 101 (KBF), 2016 WL 2990831, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. \nJan. 25, 2016) \n13, 16 \nUnited States v. Lewis, 35 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1994) \n28 \nUnited States v. Lewis, 517 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2008) \n32 \nUnited States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006) \n24 \nUnited States v. Manzano, 945 F.3d 616 (2d Cir. 2019) \n13, 17 \nUnited States v. McGuinness, 764 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) \n11 \nUnited States v. Middendotf, No. 18 Cr. 36 (JPO), 2018 WL 3956494, at *4-5 \n(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018) \n20, 22 \nUnited States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983) \n30, 33 \niii \nEFTA00027310\n", "char_count": 1693}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 5 of 34 \nUnited States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200 (2d Cir. 1995) \nUnited States v. Pelull°, 399 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005) \nUnited States v. Perez, 940 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) \nUnited States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011) \n8 \n21 \n10 \n8 \nUnited States v. Reese, 933 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) \n13, 16 \nUnited States v. Rigas, 258 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) \n11, 12 \nUnited States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) \n20 \nUnited States v. Rosado, 728 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1984) \n17 \nUnited States v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1972) \n15 \nUnited States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1973) \n7 \nUnited States v. Sanders, 17 F. Supp. 2d 141 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) \n29 \nUnited States v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1985) \n15 \nUnited States v. Stein, 424 F. Supp. 2d 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) \n21 \nUnited States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175 (2d Cir. 1993) \n9, 12 \nUnited States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) \n12 \nUnited States v. Undenvood, No. 04 Cr. 424 (RWS), 2005 WL 927012, at *I \n(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2005) \n10 \nUnited States v. Upton, 856 F. Supp. 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) \n21 \nUnited States v. Volpe, 42 F. Supp. 2d 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) \n24 \nUnited States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) \n14, 15 \nUnited States v. White, 972 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992) \n33 \nUnited States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) \n19 \niv \nEFTA00027311\n", "char_count": 1417}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 6 of 34 \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nThe Government respectfully submits this memorandum of law in opposition to defendant \nMichael Thomas's motion to compel discovery. (Dkt. No. 33) (\"Mot.\"). Thomas seeks an order \ncompelling the Government to collect materials that are not in its possession, not discoverable \nunder any legal basis, and not related to any legally cognizable defense. Thomas's motion is \nentirely without merit and should be denied.' \nThomas concedes that the Government has produced a \"multitude\" of discovery directly \nrelevant to the charges against him. (Mot. 6). Nonetheless, he seeks an order compelling the \nGovernment to collect and produce additional materials that he believes would support his \npurported defenses, namely, that he committed the offenses because of staffing issues and \nsupervisory lapses, and that he was singled out for prosecution. Specifically, Thomas seeks: (i) a \ncopy of a report being prepared by the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General \n(\"DOJ-OIG\"), which does not yet exist and would principally be based on the same primary \nmaterials that the Government produced to Thomas in December 2019 (Mot. 5, 8-9); (ii) reports \nand documents prepared by the Bureau of Prisons (\"BOP\") and other agencies who were not and \nare not members of the prosecution team (Mot. 6-7); (iii) reports and documents related to \"any \nand all [Metropolitan Correctional Center (\"MCC\")] employees\" who have engaged in \"the same \nor similar conduct,\" including an incident in \"2005 or 2006\" where officers failed to conduct \ncounts or rounds and an inmate committed suicide (Mot. 6); and (iv) reports, statistics, and \ndocuments related to purported staffing issues, supervisory lapses, and the application of BOP \nTova Noel did not file any pretrial motions, and has not joined in Thomas's pretrial \nmotions. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3) (\"If a party does not meet the deadline for making a Rule \n12(\n... [truncated, 2147 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/5 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=5]", "char_count": 2147}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 7 of 34 \npolicies which relate to the \"much larger context\" at the BOP (Mot. 6, 7, 9, 10). \nAs an initial matter, the Government has satisfied its Rule 16, Brady, and Giglio obligations \nand is not in possession of the additional materials that Thomas seeks. More importantly, Thomas \nis not entitled to compel the Government to collect the additional records for at least four separate \nreasons. First, the records are not \"material\" to preparing a defense because they are wholly \nirrelevant to the false statement charges against Thomas and are intended to prompt jurors to \nnullify the charges against him. Second, the BOP records Thomas seeks are not in the \"possession\" \nof the prosecution team, and there is no legal basis for compelling the Government to collect \nmaterials from other agencies or components of the Department of Justice who are not and were \nnot part of the criminal investigation that led to the charges against Thomas. Third, there is no \nlegal basis to require the Government to produce a draft of the report being prepared by the DOJ-\nOIG, which is subject to the deliberative process privilege. Fourth, Thomas is not entitled to \ndiscovery relating to what happened to other MCC employees when they \"falsiflied] the same \ndocuments,\" (Mot. 6), because he has utterly failed to identify evidence that the decision to \nprosecute him had a discriminatory effect and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. \nThomas's motion should be denied in all respects. \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \n1. \nThe Indictment \nIndictment 19 Cr. 830 (AT) (the \"Indictment\") was filed on November 19, 2019, charging \ndefendants Tova Noel and Michael Thomas in six counts: (i) conspiring to defraud the United \nStates and to make or use a false writing or document, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, \nSection 371 (Count One); and (ii) five counts of making or using a false writing or document, in \nviolation of Title 18, United States \n... [truncated, 2075 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/6 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=6]", "char_count": 2075}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 8 of 34 \nBoth defendants are charged in Counts One, Four, Five, and Six; defendant Noel only is charged \nin Counts Two and Three. The charges in the Indictment stem from a fourteen-hour time period, \nfrom approximately 4:00 p.m. on August 9, 2019 to approximately 6:30 a.m. the following day, \nAugust 10, 2019, when the defendants were working as correctional officers at the MCC. As \ncharged in the Indictment, during that time period, the defendants failed to perform mandated \ncounts of prisoners housed in MCC's Special Housing Unit (\"SHU\"), but nevertheless signed false \ncertifications attesting to having conducted those counts, when, in fact, no counts or rounds of the \nSHU were conducted from approximately 10:30 p.m. on August 9 to 6:30 a.m. on August 10. \nII. \nPretrial Discovery and the Defendants' Request for Additional Materials \nA. \nThe Government's Discovery Production \nAt the initial pretrial conference on November 25, 2019, the Court set a discovery deadline \nof December 31, 2019. On that date, pursuant to a protective order entered by the Court, the \nGovernment made a substantial discovery production to both defendants, consisting in part of the \nfollowing: surveillance video for the common area of the SHU; analysis of the computers used by \nNoel and Thomas from August 9 to 10, 2019; count slips and thirty-minute round reports; MCC \nphone records; personnel records and prior work schedules; and reports and notes of witness \ninterviews prepared by agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (\"FBI\") and the DOJ-OIG \nwho were participating in the investigation.2\nSubsequently, the Government made three additional discovery productions, much more \nlimited in scope. On January 23, 2020, the Government produced additional interview reports and \n2 The Government does not concede that production of all of the materials was required \nunder Rule 16, but nonetheless produced the materials in its possession out o\n... [truncated, 2045 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/7 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=7]", "char_count": 2045}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 9 of 34 \nnotes. On January 30, 2020,3 the Government reproduced video surveillance footage with \ntimestamps, and on March 16, 2020, the Government produced forensic reports for three electronic \ndevices and a photograph of a text message. \nB. \nDefense Requests for Additional Discovery Materials \nThe defendants have made a number of requests for additional discovery materials, in \nresponse to which the Government has provided information in its possession as consistent with \nRule 16 and its other disclosure obligations, as described below. \nAt the initial pretrial conference on November 11, 2019, Thomas, through counsel, raised \nthe issue of an \"ongoing . . . report\" by the Office of the Inspector General and requested the \n\"status\" of the report and when it would be completed.4 (Conf. Tr., Nov. 25, 2019, at 3-4, 7-9). \nIn response, the Government explained that \"to the extent counsel's asking for a summary of the \nresults of the criminal investigation, obviously we'll be turning over in discovery all of the \nunderlying results of the criminal investigation. . . I don't have a time frame on the Mnspector \n[G]eneral report, but the [G]ovemment will produce to the defense all of the relevant discovery \nmaterials in this matter, which includes the Rule 16 materials relevant to the criminal charges that \nhave been brought against the defendants.\" (Id. at 7-8). As there was no pending issue to resolve, \nthe Court declined to rule at that time. \nOn January 29, 2020, Thomas and Noel each submitted discovery requests to the \nGovernment. Thomas's letter reiterated his prior request for \"any and all reports, memorandums, \n3 The January 30, 2020 production was made to Noel's counsel on January 24, 2020, while \nthe Government was still waiting for an additional hard drive from Thomas's counsel. \n4 Based on conversations with attorneys at DOJ-OIG tasked with preparing this report, the \nGovernment understands that the report wi\n... [truncated, 2122 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/8 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=8]", "char_count": 2122}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 10 of 34 \nwritten statements, photos, videos, and incident reports created, manufactured or possessed by the \nUnited States Inspector General.\" Noel's January 29 letter sought materials related to the MCC \nvideo surveillance system and additional surveillance video, as well as assistance locating \nparticular information in the surveillance video footage that the Government had previously \nproduced in discovery. \nAt the pretrial conference the following day, Thomas, through counsel, renewed his request \nfor \"whatever investigation was done and whatever information there is that is discoverable with \nrespect to the Inspector General's report.\" (Conf. Tr., Jan. 30, 2020, at 6, 9). The Court directed \nThomas to file a motion formalizing his request. (Id. at 9).5\nThe Government responded to the defendants' discovery requests by letter dated March \n14, 2020. As for Thomas's request for materials related to any forthcoming Inspector General's \nreport, the Government referred Thomas to its prior response as stated at the November 25, 2019 \npretrial conference. With respect to Noel's requests for additional materials related to the MCC \nvideo surveillance system, the Government explained that to the extent such materials were in the \nGovernment's possession and currently subject to disclosure, they had already been produced. In \naddition, the Government provided additional information answering certain of Noel's questions, \nincluding video timestamps to assist with review of the surveillance footage. \nOn March 27, 2020, Thomas submitted another discovery request to the Government, \nseeking, among other things, information from the BOP regarding other correctional officers and \ninformation about the Government's charging decisions. The Government responded by letter \n5 Thomas, through counsel, previewed that he would also likely file a motion to dismiss \nthe indictment based on \"selective prosecution.\" (Conf. Tr., Jan. 30,\n... [truncated, 2176 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/9 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=9]", "char_count": 2176}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 11 of 34 \ndated April I, 2020, explaining that any responsive information in the Government's possession \nand subject to disclosure had already been produced. The letter further explained that to the extent \nthe requests called for items not in the Government's possession or not subject to disclosure, \nThomas had not identified any legal basis or authority for his requests and the Government was \nnot aware of any authority requiring the Government to obtain or produce the requested \ninformation. \nOn April 9, 2020, Thomas filed the instant motion seeking an order from the Court \ncompelling the Government to produce the following: \n• \nThe Inspector General's report investigating the death of Jeffrey Epstein \nand BOP policies and procedures (referred to herein as the \"Inspector \nGeneral's Report\"), as well as all supporting memoranda and other \ndocuments, (Mot. 4-5); \n• \nAny and all \"reports generated by investigators within the [BOP] regarding \nthe August 10, 2019 incident\" as well as \"documents, reports, witness \nstatements and disciplinary records of any and all MCC employees who \nhave engaged in the same or similar conduct,\" including \"results of any \ndisciplinary proceedings and documents maintained by the BOP regarding \nthe discipline or administrative adjudication of any other employees who \nhave failed to conduct rounds or inmate counts,\" (Mot. 4, 6); \n• \nAny previously undisclosed reports, witness statements, and documents \ncreated by \"any other federal agencies that investigated the circumstances \nsurrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein,\" (Mot. 4, 7). \nFor the reasons that follow, Thomas is not entitled to the materials he seeks, and his motion \nshould be denied. \n6 \nEFTA00027317\n", "char_count": 1771}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 12 of 34 \nARGUMENT \nI. \nApplicable Law \nA. \nBrady & Giglio \nThe Government has an obligation under the Due Process Clause to make a timely \ndisclosure of any exculpatory or impeaching evidence that is material and in its possession. See \nBrady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also \nUnited States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001). Evidence is \"material\" in this sense \nonly if \"its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial.\" United States v. Bagley, \n473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). \"The rationale underlying Brady is not to supply a defendant with all \nthe evidence in the Government's possession which might conceivably assist the preparation of \nhis defense, but to assure that the defendant will not be denied access to exculpatory evidence only \nknown to the Government.\" United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 619 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing \nUnited States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir. 1973)). \nImpeachment evidence is material only \"where the witness at issue supplied the only \nevidence linking the defendant(s) to the crime, or where the likely impact on the witness's \ncredibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecution's case.\" United States v. \nPayne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1210 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). \nSimilarly, \"where the undisclosed evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on which to \nchallenge a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable or is subject to \nextensive attack by reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may properly be viewed as \ncumulative, and hence not material.\" United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) \n(citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, \nin Coppa, rejected the argument that such material should be disclosed when defendants make a \n7 \nEFTA00027318\n... [truncated, 2001 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/11 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=11]", "char_count": 2001}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 13 of 34 \ndemand for it. 267 F.3d at 146. The court held that as a general rule, Brady and its progeny do \nnot require immediate disclosure of all impeachment material upon a defendant's request. Id. It \nfound that the time required for its effective use would depend on the materiality of the evidence \nas well as the particular circumstances of the case, and suggested that district courts may order \ndisclosure of material it deems material as a matter of case management. Id. As described above, \nthe Government disclosed reports and notes of witness statements as part of its discovery \nproductions, such that the defendants will have possessed substantial material that may serve as \npotential impeachment evidence for one year in advance of trial. \nB. \nRule 16 \nRule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the Government to permit the \ndefendants to inspect and copy documents and objects within the Government's possession, \ncustody, or control if the items are material to preparing the defense, if the Government intends to \nuse them in its case-in-chief at trial, or if the items were obtained from or belong to the defendant. \nFed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). An item is \"material to preparing the defense\" under Rule 16 \"if it \ncould be used to counter the Government's case or bolster a defense.\" United States v. Stevens, \n985 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (2d Cir. 1993). \nII. \nThomas is Not Entitled to Additional Materials \nA. \nThe Government Has Satisfied its Discovery and Disclosure Obligations \nAs an initial matter, the Government is aware of, has satisfied, and will continue to satisfy \nits discovery and disclosure obligations. \nThe Government has met its Rule 16 discovery and disclosure obligations. As set forth \nabove, the Government has produced an expansive amount of discovery, which includes among \nother things, hundreds of hours of video surveillance going back to July 5, 2019 (despite the fact \n8 \nEFTA0002\n... [truncated, 2005 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/12 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=12]", "char_count": 2005}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 14 of 34 \nthat the Indictment relates to a 14-hour time period); count slips, thirty minute round forms, and \nstaffing rosters for the three-week period surrounding Epstein's suicide; internal MCC phone \nrecords; employee files and staffing history for Noel and Thomas; and a wide range of written \nBureau of Prison policies and regulations, among other documents and materials. In addition and \nwhile not required by Rule 16, the Government produced months in advance of trial (and now, \napproximately a year in advance of trial) statements for all of the witnesses interviewed during the \ninvestigation. While the Government is not aware of any other information that warrants \ndisclosure, it will produce any such materials to the extent it becomes aware of them. \nThe Government is likewise aware of, and has complied with, its Brady and Giglio \nobligations. The Government has already produced any evidence in its possession that is arguably \nexculpatory or impeaching. To the extent Giglio material exists in notes of witness statements or \nattorney proffers made on behalf of witnesses that have not already been produced, the \nGovernment intends to comply with its obligations and will make such disclosures sufficiently in \nadvance of trial to be effectively used. Based on that representation alone, the defendant's motion \nshould be denied. See United States v. Gonzalez, No. 19 Cr. 123-2 (NRB), 2020 WL 1809293, at \n*5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2020) (denying a motion to compel because the government \"represented \nthat it had complied with and would continue to comply with its Brady and Rule 16 obligations); \nUnited States v. Undenvood, No. 04 Cr. 424 (RWS), 2005 WL 927012, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, \n2005) (\"The courts of this Circuit repeatedly have denied pretrial requests for discovery orders \npursuant to Brady where the government has made such good faith representations.\"); United \nStates v. Perez, 940 F. Supp. 540, 553 (S.D.N.Y\n... [truncated, 2173 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/13 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=13]", "char_count": 2173}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 15 of 34 \nB. \nThe Requested Records Are Not \"Material\" to Preparing a Defense and Are \nSought for the Impermissible Purpose of Jury Nullification \nAll of the records Thomas seeks in his motion are not \"material to preparing a defense\" \nunder Rule 16, and are not exculpatory under Brady, because they are irrelevant to countering the \nGovernment's false statements case or advancing a legitimate defense. Instead, Thomas seeks \nevidence of staffing shortages, working conditions, the implementation of BOP policies, \nsupervisory lapses, and instances in which other BOP employees were not prosecuted so that he \ncan engage in attempted jury nullification by arguing that those conditions \"led\" to the criminal \nconduct that he is charged with and are a reason to acquit him. (Mot. 5, 7, 9, 14). Thomas is not \nentitled to records—and certainly would not be entitled to introduce any such evidence at trial—\nthat would aid in that nullification effort because Rule 16 only entitles a defendant to discovery \nfor purposes of bolstering a defense to the Government's case in chief, not the merits of the \ndecision to prosecute. \n1. \nApplicable Law \nAn item or record that the Government does not intend to use in its case-in-chief at trial is \ndiscoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) only if it \"is material to preparing the defense.\" Fed. R. Crim. \nP. 16(a)(1)(E). \"It is [a defendant's] burden to make a prima facie showing that documents sought \nunder Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) are material to preparing the defense.\" United States v. Rigas, 258 F. \nSupp. 2d 299, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing United States v. McGuinness, 764 F. Supp. 888, 894 \n(S.D.N.Y. 1991)). As noted above, an item is \"material to preparing the defense\" under Rule 16 \n\"if it could be used to counter the Government's case or bolster a defense.\" Stevens, 985 F.2d at \n1180-81. The defendant must \"offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested \nevidence is material.\" Rig\n... [truncated, 2157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/14 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=14]", "char_count": 2157}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 16 of 34 \ndefendants to examine records \"material to the preparation of their defense against the \nGovernment's case in chief,\" it does not authorize discovery for defenses that do not rebut the \n\"merits to the criminal charge itself.\" 517 U.S. 456, 462-63 (1996) (holding that Rule 16 does not \nauthorize discovery relating to a selective prosecution claim). For that reason, because evidence \nthat would be impermissibly used to encourage jury nullification does not relate to the merits of \nthe criminal charges, it is not discoverable under Rule 16. Id.; see also United States v. Defreitas, \nNo. 07 Cr. 543 (DLI), 2011 WL 317964, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011) (rejecting discovery \nrequest related to something that is \"not a defense\" and has \"nothing to do with the issues of \nwhether defendants . . . committed the ... crimes charged\"). Since jury nullification is \"a practice \nwhereby a juror votes in purposeful disregard of the evidence,\" United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d \n606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997), or \"out of compassion or compromise,\" Standefer v. United States, 447 \nU.S. 10, 22 (1980) (internal citation omitted), it is not error for a court to preclude evidence that is \n\"not a valid defense\" aimed at nullification, United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17, 19-20 (2d Cir. \n1996). See also United States v. Reese, 933 F. Supp. 2d 579, 583-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (precluding \ndefense arguments or evidence related to \"possible consequences for the defendant of conviction, \njury nullification, and the Government's motive and conduct in prosecuting [defendant]\"); United \nStates v. Levin, No. 15 Cr. 101 (KBF), 2016 WL 299031, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2016) (barring \nevidence \"intended to elicit sympathy\" and attempts to \"use jury nullification as a defense\" as \n\"plainly improper\"). Indeed, \"trial courts have the duty to forestall or prevent jury nullification\" \neven where the defendant or the court may \"strongly disagree[] with \n... [truncated, 2201 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/15 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=15]", "char_count": 2201}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 17 of 34 \n2. \nDiscussion \nThomas's motion makes clear that he intends for his principal defense at trial to be that—\nirrespective of his guilt or innocence of the false statements charges—he should be acquitted \nbecause the MCC was understaffed, Thomas was overworked, his supervisors did not catch his \ncrime in the moment, and falsification of count slips is rampant within the BOP. (See Mot. 3 \n(\"staffing issues, staffing shortages, supervisory lapses and the enforcement/interpretation of BOP \nprocedures go to the heart of his defense to the government's criminal allegations\"); 9 (\"Mr. \nThomas will assert that the rampant staffing shortages present at the MCC in August of 2019 led \nto the conduct for which Mr. Thomas is now criminally charged.\")). Thomas has failed to meet \nhis burden in establishing the materiality of discovery about these topics to preparing a valid \ndefense because the materials he seeks do not rebut the merits of the criminal charges and instead \nwould be impermissibly used to encourage jury nullification. \nThe purported reasons for Thomas's decision to falsify count slips—being tired, \noverworked, or understaffed—are not a valid legal defense, and therefore evidence related to those \nissues is not relevant. Put simply, were the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas \nintentionally made materially false statements and also that did so while tired or overworked, it \nwould still be required to convict him. See United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213,221 (2d Cir. 2005) \n(holding that \"it was proper for the district court to instruct the jury that it had a duty to find [the \ndefendant] guilty if the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense \nwith which he was charged\" (internal citation omitted)). \nNone of Thomas's proffered excuses relate to proving or rebutting the elements of a \nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 100I(a)(3) as they do not concern whether a writing \n... [truncated, 2135 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/16 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=16]", "char_count": 2135}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 18 of 34 \nand willfully made a false statement. Nor are those excuses relevant to whether Thomas had a \ncriminal agreement with his co-defendant. Indeed, evidence as to a defendant's purportedly \ninnocent motive in a false statement case is irrelevant to the question of intent. See United States \nv. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 493-94 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that proof of a good or innocent \nmotive is not probative of intent where the mens rea is \"knowingly and willfully\"); In re Terrorist \nBombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 93, 154 n.49 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Washington, \n705 F.2d at 493, for \"the irrelevance of a motive to the question of whether conduct is intentional\"); \nUnited States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 56, 64 (D.D.C. 1992) (rejecting the defendant's \"context \nargument\" for why materials could be relevant to the crime charged). \nFor the same reasons, \"other people were doing it\" is not a defense to a false statements or \nconspiracy charge because the conduct of other BOP employees is irrelevant to each of the \nforegoing elements. Thomas argues that because he was aware of incidents where BOP employees \nfalsified records and \"their conduct did not lead to their indictment or incarceration,\" evidence of \nwhat other BOP employees have done is relevant to his intent. (Mot. 6.) Not so. Whether Thomas \nbelieved falsifying records was illegal or was subject to criminal penalties is not relevant to the \ncharges against him. See United States v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1985) \n(\"Ignorance of the law is no defense to a charge of purposeful and intentional action.\"); United \nStates v. Rosenfield, 469 F.2d 598, 601 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972) (\"As long as the inexcusable intent is \npresent, it is not necessary that the defendant know that his conduct is subject to criminal \npenalties.\"). And in any event, it would be fundamentally inappropriate, and extremely prejudicial, \nfor the jury to c\n... [truncated, 2299 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/17 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=17]", "char_count": 2299}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 19 of 34 \nwere not on trial). \nThomas's efforts to garner sympathy, put the Government on trial, and deflect blame for \nhis own criminal actions plainly sound in nullification. See Reese, 933 F. Supp. 2d at 583-84; \nLevi,:, 2016 WL 2990831, at *12. Evidence on those points does not relate to whether the \ndefendant committed the crimes charged, but rather is intended to elicit sympathy, compassion, or \ncompromise from the jury. The records Thomas seeks are no more discoverable than the \nnullification evidence precluded in Armstrong and its progeny. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 462-\n63 (defendant not entitled to discovery on race of other narcotics defendants to aid in selective \nprosecution claim); United States v. Delacruz, No. 14 Cr. 815 (KBF), 2015 WL 2211943, at *4 \n(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2015) (rejecting defendant's \"demands for general information and statistics \nrelating to the Government's use of sting operations\"); United States v. Floyd, No. 99 Cr. 0234 \n(DAB), 1999 WL 476438, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1999) (rejecting discovery request for \n\"background data, records and investigative reports\" of the New York City Police Department \n(\"NYPD\") as well as information about NYPD officers' conduct in other cases); Defreitas, 2011 \nWL 317964, at *10 (rejecting discovery demands related to a \"factual impossibility\" defense to a \nconspiracy charge). It is the Court's \"duty to forestall or prevent\" jury nullification. Manzano, \n945 F.3d at 627 (holding that \"District courts have a duty to forestall or prevent [jury nullification \narguments] and the district court in this case abdicated its duty by ruling that defense counsel could \nargue jury nullification.\"); see also United States v. Rosado, 728 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1984) \n(criticizing trial court for inviting nullification by permitting the defendants to mount a \"political \ndefense\" and stating that it was an \"erroneous assumption that good motive for committing a crim\n... [truncated, 2149 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/18 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=18]", "char_count": 2149}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 20 of 34 \nirrelevant matters, such as what \"led\" him to the criminal conduct or the broader \"context\" in \nwhich he committed specific criminal acts. There is no basis to compel production of evidence \nrelated to those matters under Rule 16, Brady, or Giglio because they are not material and because \nthe evidence sought is in furtherance of a transparent attempt at nullification. Thomas's motion \nshould be denied on this basis alone. \nC. \nThe Government is Not Required to Collect Materials From Agencies Who \nWere Not Part of the Prosecution Team \nThomas asks the Court to compel the Government to produce \"any reports, witness \nstatements, memorandum, and documents from any separate investigation conducted by the \nBOP,\" \"documents, reports, witness statements and disciplinary records of any and all MCC \nemployees who have engaged in the same or similar conduct,\" and any previously undisclosed \nreports, witness statements, and documents created by \"any other federal agencies that investigated \nthe circumstances surrounding the death of Jeffrey Epstein.\" (Mot. 4, 7 (emphasis added)). Even \nif Thomas had satisfied the materiality requirement under Rule 16 or Brady with respect to these \nitems—and he has not—Thomas's motion would still fail because the materials he seeks are not \nin the prosecution team's possession. \nThe BOP is not, and never has been, part of the prosecution team. Nor did the BOP conduct \nan investigation jointly or in coordination with the prosecution team.6 To require the Government \nto obtain and produce any records from the BOP from a separate investigation, as well as evidence \nthat would support Thomas's purported (and improper, for the reasons discussed in Part II.B, \n6 The defendant claims, based on a CNN article, that the U.S. Marshal Service (\"USMS\") \nconducted an investigation. The Government is unaware of such an investigation, and in any \nevent, any such inquiry by the USMS was not conduc\n... [truncated, 2077 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/19 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=19]", "char_count": 2077}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 21 of 34 \nsupra) defenses, is not legally required and would impose a nearly insurmountable obligation on \nthe Government of marshaling and reviewing information and data in the possession of an entirely \nseparate entity. \n1. \nApplicable Law \nAs described above, Rule 16, Brady, and Giglio apply to materials in the Government's \n\"possession.\" As a general matter, while \"[lin individual prosecutor is presumed . . . to have \nknowledge of all information gathered in connection with his office's investigation of the \ncase, . . . knowledge on the part of persons employed by a different office of the government does \nnot in all instances warrant the imputation of knowledge to the prosecutor.\" United States v. \nAvellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). The imposition of such \"an \nunlimited duty on a prosecutor to inquire of other offices not working with the prosecutor's office \non the case in question would inappropriately require us to adopt a monolithic view of government' \nthat would `condemn the prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.\" Id. (citation & \nquotation marks omitted); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (Government's \ndiscovery and disclosure obligations extend only to information in the custody of the prosecutor \nor \"others acting on the government's behalf in the case\"). Thus, discovery and disclosure \nobligations only extend \"information known to persons who are a part of the `prosecution \nteam' ... who perform investigative duties or make strategic decisions about the prosecution of \nthe case,\" including \"police officers and federal agents who submit to the direction of the \nprosecutor and participate in the investigation.\" United States v. Barcelo, 628 F. App'x 36, 38 (2d \nCir. 2015) (citation omitted). Brady is not a basis to compel the Government to gather information \nin the possession of third parties on behalf of the defense. See United States \n... [truncated, 2038 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/20 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=20]", "char_count": 2038}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 22 of 34 \n56, 112 (2d Cir. 2003) (defendants were not deprived of due process by any alleged failure of U.S. \ngovernment to help them obtain cooperation from foreign authorities). \nIn considering whether Rule 16 and Brady apply to records in the possession of another \ngovernment agency, a prosecutor's duty extends to reviewing such evidence only where the \nGovernment conducts a \"joint investigation\" with that agency or branch of government. See \nUnited States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court opinion holding that \nthere was \"no joint investigation with the [Securities and Exchange Commission (\"SEC\")]\" and \ntherefore the Government did not need to produce documents in the custody of the SEC); United \nStates v. Blaszczak, 308 F. Supp. 3d 736, 742-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that the Government \nwas not obligated to review SEC material for Brady where SEC was not involved in grand jury \npresentation, did not attend every interview, did not review documents gathered only by \nprosecution, and did not develop prosecutorial strategy); United States v. Middendorf, No. 18 Cr. \n36 (JPO), 2018 WL 3956494, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2018) (holding that the Government was \nnot required to conduct a search because the [Public Company Accounting Oversight Board \n(\"PCAOB\")] was not involved in witness interviews or developing prosecutorial strategy, and the \nSEC was not involved in the grand jury presentation, reviewing the fruits of the Government's \ninvestigation, or developing prosecutorial strategy); United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, \n241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (no joint investigation between Government and SEC); United States v. \nFinnerty, 411 F. Supp. 2d 428, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Chin, J.) (no joint investigation between \nGovernment and New York Stock Exchange (\"NYSE\")); United States v. Upton, 856 F. Supp. \n727, 749-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that USAO and Federal Aviation Administr\n... [truncated, 2157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/21 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=21]", "char_count": 2157}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 23 of 34 \nMoreover, even where agents from a component of an agency are involved in an \ninvestigation, that does not render the entirety of an agency part of the prosecution team. See, e.g., \nUnited States v. Stein, 424 F. Supp. 2d 720, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (\"While the prosecution's [Rule \n16] disclosure obligation in some circumstances may extend to materials beyond the knowledge \nof the individual prosecutors assigned to a case, it does not extend to the collective knowledge of \nthe entire United States government or even to the entire government agency concerned.\"); United \nStates v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (\"[T]hat other agents in the ([Department of \nLabor (\"DOL\")] participated in this investigation does not mean that the entire DOL is properly \nconsidered part of the prosecution team.\"); see also United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 949 (2d \nCir.1993) (refusing, for Brady purposes, to impute to AUSAs prosecuting that action with the \nassistance of certain FBI agents knowledge of reports prepared by FBI agents who were \n\"uninvolved in the investigation or trial of the defendants\"); but see United States v. Ghailani, 687 \nF. Supp. 2d 365, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that, in the context of a speedy trial motion, other \nmembers of the Department of Justice who were involved in making decisions about timing and \nprogress of the case were part of the \"government\" for Rule 16 purposes). \nThus, as the foregoing precedents recognize, the factors relevant in determining whether \nan agency or a component of an agency are part of the prosecution team, and therefore their records \nare in the \"possession\" of the Government include whether the agency or component: \"(1) \nparticipated in the prosecution's witness interviews, (2) was involved in presenting the case to the \ngrand jury, (3) reviewed documents gathered by or shared documents with the prosecution, (4) \nplayed a role in the development of pro\n... [truncated, 2133 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/22 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=22]", "char_count": 2133}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 24 of 34 \n2. \nDiscussion \nAs described above, the Government has produced Brady, Giglio, and Rule 16 material in \nthe possession of the prosecutors and agents at the United States Attorney's Office, the FBI, and \nthe DOJ-OIG who have worked on this investigation and prosecution. Thomas seeks materials \nthat are not in the possession of the United States Attorney's Office or the case teams at the FBI \nand DOJ-OIG who worked on this criminal investigation. \nThomas seeks a variety of records from the BOP. The BOP was not a member of the \nprosecution team, and no employee of the BOP performed investigative duties or made strategic \ndecisions about the prosecution of the case. Indeed, the Government obtained records from the \nMCC (a component of the BOP) pursuant to a grand jury subpoena to the institution and written \nrequests to the MCC's legal department. Likewise, the Government was not involved in any \ninternal BOP investigation into the circumstances surrounding Epstein's suicide. Notwithstanding \nthose facts, the defendant asserts that the BOP is \"allied with the prosecution\" and therefore the \nGovernment's discovery and disclosure obligations extend to materials exclusively in the \npossession of the BOP. That argument is not only belied by the facts, but it is settled law in this \nCircuit that a prosecutor's duty extends to reviewing the materials in the possession, custody, or \ncontrol of another agency for Brady evidence only where the Government conducts a \"joint \ninvestigation\" with that agency. None of the indicia of a \"joint\" or \"allied\" prosecution, as \ndiscussed in the foregoing case law, is present here. A straightforward application of those factors \nconsidered by courts in this Circuit reveals that the investigation was in no way joint: the BOP did \nnot participate in the prosecution's witness interviews; it was not involved in presenting the case \nto the grand jury; no BOP employees aided in the re\n... [truncated, 2052 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/23 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=23]", "char_count": 2052}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 25 of 34 \nGovernment; the BOP was not involved in the strategic decisions; and no BOP personnel \naccompanied the prosecution to court proceedings. \nMoreover, even if the BOP had conducted a joint investigation with the Government into \nthe events of August 9 and 10, 2019 (which they did not), Thomas has offered no reason to believe \nthat most if not all of the records that he seeks-such as records of other instances of BOP \nemployees failing to conduct rounds and counts—would be part of the BOP's investigation. There \nis simply no basis to seek an order compelling the Government to search for records in the \npossession of the BOP, without any temporal limitation or factual nexus to the charged case, \nregarding staffing shortages at the MCC, other instances where BOP employees failed to conduct \nrequired rounds and counts, and disciplinary records for other BOP employees who have at other \ntimes also allegedly falsified records. \nThe cases Thomas cites do not support a contrary result. In United States v. Biyan, the \nNinth Circuit concluded that the government could not limit its discovery obligations to documents \nlocated in the district of prosecution since the case came out of a single, nationwide IRS \ninvestigation. 868 F.2d 1032, 1035-37 (9th Cir. 1989). In reaching that holding, the Circuit \nexplained that \"a federal prosecutor need not comb the files of every federal agency which might \nhave documents regarding the defendant\" and that Rule 16's disclosure requirements are cabined \nto anything in the possession \"of any federal agency participating in the same investigation of the \ndefendant.\" Id. at 1036 (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Volpe, 42 F. Supp. 2d \n204, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), the court explained, in denying the defendant's discovery motion, that \n\"[c]ourts have construed the term `government' . . . narrowly to mean the prosecutors in the \nparticular case or the governmental agencies \n... [truncated, 2171 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/24 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=24]", "char_count": 2171}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 26 of 34 \n2d I, 9 (D.D.C. 2006), required the prosecutors to obtain records from the Office of the Vice \nPresident and the Central Intelligence Agency, even though those parts of government did not \nparticipate in the grand jury investigation, that holding was an outlier, which has never been cited \nby another court, and the decision itself has never been cited in this Circuit. \nFinally, even if such materials had any conceivable relevance to the charges at hand (which, \nas discussed above, they do not), asking the Government to conduct a broad canvassing of the \nBOP's records—including searching databases located out of state, reviewing large quantities of \ndocuments, attempting to pull archived records going back as far as 2005, and parsing through \nattorney work product—would be inordinately time consuming and burdensome for attorneys for \nthe Government, which does not have custody of the files, is not familiar with the files, and knows \nof no effective way to search them. It would, as the Circuit warned against in Avellino, \"condemn \nthe prosecution of criminal cases to a state of paralysis.\" 136 F.3d at 255. Such a result is not \nlegally required by Rule 16, Brady, or Giglio, and therefore Thomas's motion should be denied. \nD. \nAny Draft Inspector General Report is Not Subject to Disclosure \nThomas argues that any report by the Inspector General and related materials must be \nproduced because he speculates that such a report will address systemic issues at the BOP, \nincluding purported staffing shortages at the MCC. (Mot. 5,9-10). For the reasons set forth above, \nany draft Inspector General Report is not discoverable because the issues Thomas believes it will \ndiscuss are not material to the preparation of a valid defense, see Part II.B, and the draft reports, \nto the extent they exist, are protected from disclosure by the deliberative process privilege. While \nthe prosecution team has had no involvement i\n... [truncated, 2253 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/25 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=25]", "char_count": 2253}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 27 of 34 \nsuch, there are no drafts of the Report to disclose, and Thomas's motion can be denied on that \nreason alone. Moreover, Thomas's request for draft versions of the Report—which do not yet \nexist-fails for two additional reasons. \nFirst, drafts of the Inspector General's Report, which has not been completed and will \nlikely make recommendations about reforms at the BOP, are protected from disclosure under the \ndeliberative process privilege, which \"covers 'documents reflecting advisory opinions, \nrecommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions \nand policies are formulated.'\" Dep't of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass 'n, 532 \nU.S. 1, 8 (2001) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975)). The \nprivilege is applicable in criminal and civil cases involving the government. See, e.g., United \nStates v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 2000) (government's death penalty \nevaluation form and prosecution memoranda were shielded from discovery under the deliberative \nprocess privilege); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737-40 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (indicating that the \nprivilege applies to grand jury subpoenas); United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 284 \n(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (internal memoranda covered by privilege). \"In order for the privilege to apply, \nthe agency record at issue must be (1) an inter-agency or intra-agency memorandum or letter; (2) \npre-decisional; and (3) deliberative.\" Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 954 F.3d \n150, 155 (2d Cir. 2020). \"It is well-settled that draft documents, by their very nature, are typically \npre-decisional and deliberative [because] Whey reflect only the tentative view of their authors; \nviews that might be altered or rejected upon further deliberation by their authors or by their \nsuperiors.\" Color of Change v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 325 F. Supp. 3d 447, 453\n... [truncated, 2207 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/26 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=26]", "char_count": 2207}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 28 of 34 \nbeen completed, let alone reached a point where the final version will be disclosed to the public. \nIt is also deliberative in that it will likely make recommendations about the BOP, and those \nrecommendations will be under discussion within the Office of the Inspector General prior to being \nfinalized and publicly announced. Internal deliberations are an important tool for agencies in \nreaching decisions, including recommendations in DOJ-OIG reports. The ability to have these \ndiscussions is important in identifying a broad range of policy and legal issues. Here, disclosure \nof any draft report or other work product related to the preparation of the Report will undermine \nthe DOJ-OIG's ability to engage in meaningful discussions of the issues at the BOP relating to \ninmate security and staffing, among other topics, and will potentially stifle rigorous discourse on \nthe issues. Accordingly, Thomas's motion should be denied for the reason that the materials \nsought are protected by the deliberative process privilege. Klamath, 532 U.S. at 9. \nSecond, Thomas has offered no support for his contention that drafts of the Inspector \nGeneral's Report itself (and any related work product)—as opposed to the underlying materials \nupon which the Report is based—are subject to disclosure. To the extent that the forthcoming \nInspector General's Report relies on information gathered during the instant investigation and \nprosecution, those underlying materials—which focus primarily on the events of August 9 and 10, \n2019, the incarceration of Jeffrey Epstein, and related MCC records—have already been disclosed \nto the defendants. Thomas contends that those tasked with preparing the Report may \"possibl[y]\" \nhave generated additional witness statements and \"other information\" that has not been produced \nby the Government to date. (Mot. 5). Thomas provides no support for such assertions besides \nmere speculation. The pros\n... [truncated, 2277 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/27 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=27]", "char_count": 2277}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 29 of 34 \ndiscovered any potential Brady material. As such, given that the prosecution has already produced \nin discovery all of the materials it provided to the DOJ-OIG attorneys preparing the Report, the \nunderlying materials for the Report would be merely cumulative of information in the defendants' \npossession. Any analysis of those materials by the attorneys preparing the Inspector General's \nReport is not subject to disclosure pursuant to Rule 16 and cannot constitute Brady material. See \nUnited States v. Lewis, 35 F.3d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting generally that \"nothing contained \nin [an] OIG report would ordinarily have been discoverable\"). \nAt bottom, Thomas has not cited a single authority requiring the production of a draft, \nunpublished report by an inspector general or related work product, and such production is not \nrequired by Rule 16, Brady, Giglio, or any other disclosure obligation. \nE. \nThomas Has Not Carried His Burden With Respect to Discovery of Material \nin Support of a Selective Prosecution Claim \nThomas seeks \"information and statistics that show the conduct in which the defendant is \nbeing charged with a crime were . . . rampant throughout the BOP\" and that the application of \ncriminal laws to him is \"possibl[y] discriminatory.\" (Mot. 7.) This request, which is effectively a \ndemand for discovery in furtherance of a selective prosecution claim, should be denied not only \nfor the reasons set forth in Section II.B, but also because Thomas has not made the requisite \nshowing that is necessary to obtain discovery for a selective prosecution claim. Indeed, Thomas \nhas failed to put forth any evidence that his prosecution was the result of discriminatory effect or \ndiscriminatory purpose. \n1. \nApplicable Law \n\"A selective-prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge itself, \nbut an independent assertion that the prosecutor has brought the charge for reasons for\n... [truncated, 2127 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/28 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=28]", "char_count": 2127}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 30 of 34 \none,\" id., as the defendant must \"overcome the strong presumption of regularity on the part of \nfederal prosecutors, and 'in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they \nhave properly discharged their official duties.\"' United States v. Sanders, 17 F. Supp. 2d 141, 144 \n(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464), aff'd, 211 F.3d 711 (2d Cir. 2000). \nA defendant claiming selective prosecution must present \"clear evidence\" that the decision \nto prosecute not only (1) \"had a discriminatory effect\" but was also (2) \"motivated by a \ndiscriminatory purpose.\" Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 173 \n(2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Moon, 718 \nF.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983). \"The discriminatory effect prong requires a showing that \n`similarly situated individuals of a different [classification] were not prosecuted.'\" Alameh, 341 \nF.3d at 173 (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465). In other words, the defendant must show that \nhe has been \"singled out\" as a member of a protected class. Fares, 978 F.2d at 59 (quoting Moon, \n718 F.2d at 1229). To establish discriminatory purpose, the defendant must show that the \nGovernment's discriminatory \"selection of the defendant for prosecution has been invidious or in \nbad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to \nprevent his exercise of constitutional rights.\" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration \nincorporated). Where a defendant \"has not shown that the Government prosecuted him because \nof his protected status or conduct, his claim fails. Id. \nIn order to obtain discovery on a selective prosecution claim, the defendant must offer \n\"some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense.\" \nArmstrong, 517 U.S. at 468 (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2\n... [truncated, 2237 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/29 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=29]", "char_count": 2237}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 31 of 34 \nintent\"); Fares, 978 F.2d at 59 (same). \"[T]he showing necessary to obtain discovery should itself \nbe a significant barrier to the litigation of insubstantial claims.\" Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464. \n\"Mere assertions and generalized proffers on information and belief are insufficient\" to meet this \nburden. Fares, 978 F.2d at 59; see, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470 (affidavits \"recount[ing] \nhearsay and report[ing] personal conclusions based upon anecdotal evidence\" are not sufficient to \njustify discovery); Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211 (affidavit from defendant and attorney that they \n\"believe[d]\" there was improper motive and that \"hundreds\" of similarly situated individuals went \nunprosecuted was insufficient); Alameh, 341 F.3d at 174 (defendant's statistical analysis was \ninsufficient to merit discovery on selective prosecution claim). \n2. \nDiscussion \nThomas is not entitled to discovery that would relate to a selective procession or \n\"discriminatory application\" claim. He has not carried his burden through a showing of any \nevidence that his prosecution for the charges in the Indictment is discriminatory. \nAs to the first required prong (discriminatory effect), Thomas has failed to put forth any \nevidence that \"others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against because of \nconduct of the type forming the basis of the charge against [him].\" Fares, 978 F.2d at 59 (internal \nquotation marks omitted). \"A similarly situated offender is one outside the protected class who \nhas committed roughly the same crime under roughly the same circumstances but against whom \nthe law has not been enforced.\" United States v. Lewis, 517 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2008). Thomas \nalleges that there was an \"almost identical incident in 2005 or 2006 wherein officers failed to \nconduct institutional counts or rounds and an inmate committed suicide,\" and one of the four \nofficers involved was given a suspension. (Mot\n... [truncated, 2160 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/30 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=30]", "char_count": 2160}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 32 of 34 \nthose officers \"in 2005 or 2006\" did falsify count slips, Thomas has still not put forth any evidence \nthat those officers were \"outside of the protected class,\" meaning of a different race, gender, \nnationality, or other protected class than Thomas. In any event, even were the conduct similar, \nthat Thomas can point to but a single other instance in which officers were not criminally \nprosecuted for that type of conduct hardly rings of selectiveness. \nSimilarly, Thomas points to the fact that \"Officer-1\" and \"Officer-2\" in the Indictment, \nwho falsified count slips along with Tova Noel for the 4 p.m. and 10 p.m. institutional counts on \nAugust 9, 2019, respectively, were not prosecuted. (Mot. 10; Ind. ¶¶ 15, 17, 19). Even assuming \narguendo that Officer-1 and Officer-2 were similarly situated to Thomas in that they each falsified \none count slip—while Thomas falsified three—Thomas has failed to put forth any evidence that \neither Officer-1 or Officer-2 were outside of a \"protected class\" to which Thomas belongs.' Nor \ncould he: Officer-1 and Officer-2 are the same race, gender, and nationality as Thomas. Thomas \nalso questions why his supervisors or other MCC personnel who received and reviewed Thomas's \nfalse count slips were not also prosecuted with making false statements, but those supervisors or \npersonnel are not similarly situated to Thomas because they did not actually make the false \nstatements—Thomas did. In addition, Courts have repeatedly held that the \"suspicion [and] \nsurmise\" contained in Thomas's motion simply do not constitute \"objective evidence\" warranting \ndiscovery. See United States v. White, 972 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1992) (conclusory allegations as to \ntiming of indictment, Government's failure to follow internal guidelines, and improprieties of \n7 In so noting, the Government does not intend to comment on its deliberative process or \nthe exercise of its prosecutorial discretion.\n... [truncated, 2301 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/31 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=31]", "char_count": 2301}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 33 of 34 \nprosecutors not \"objective evidence\" warranting discovery); Moon, 718 F.2d at 1230 (\"to engage \nin a collateral inquiry respecting prosecutorial motive, there must be more than mere suspicion or \nsurmise\"). Thomas's failure to make an evidentiary showing in support of the first required prong \nmeans that his motion for discovery on his selective prosecution claim must be denied. See, e.g., \nBass, 536 U.S. at 863. \nAs to the second required prong, Thomas has failed to even allege, let alone establish, that \nthe decision to prosecute him was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. To make such a \nshowing, a defendant must establish that the Government's \"selection of the defendant for \nprosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations \nas race, religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights.\" Fares, 978 F.2d at \n59 (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration incorporated). Thomas has not put forth any \nevidence whatsoever that the Government's decision to prosecute Thomas was based on anything \nother than his guilt. Instead, Thomas challenges the Government's decision to prosecute him at \nall, based on his wholly unsupported claim that the criminal conduct with which he is charged is \n\"rampant\" within the BOP. (Mot. 7). But the mere fact that other people were not prosecuted for \ncommitting the crime that Thomas committed does not mean that the Government harbored \ndiscriminatory intent in prosecuting Thomas's\n8 Even if Thomas had not failed to carry his burden on his discovery motion (and he has \nfailed), he would still not be entitled to put such evidence or argument regarding selective \nprosecution before a jury because the \"selective prosecution defense is an issue for the court rather \nthan the jury.\" Regan, 103 F.3d at 1082. The Second Circuit's directive makes sense. A claim of \nimproper prosecutorial motive, whatever its g\n... [truncated, 2656 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00027307/32 or ?id=EFTA00027307&page=32]", "char_count": 2656}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00027307", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 1:19-cr-00830-AT Document 35 Filed 04/24/20 Page 34 of 34 \nHaving failed to meet the \"rigorous standard\" required to obtain discovery on a selective \nprosecution defense, Thomas's requests for discovery of any materials related to other incidents \nin which officers were not prosecuted for falsifying count slips should be denied. Armstrong, 517 \nU.S. at 464. \nCONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to compel should be denied. \nDated: New York, New York \nApril 24, 2020 \nRespectfully submitted, \nGEOFFREY S. BERMAN \nUnited States Attorney \nBy: \ns/ \nAssistant United \nUnited States Attorneys \nfrom a determination of whether the elements of the offense charged had been proved beyond a \nreasonable doubt into a wide-ranging inquiry into matters far beyond the scope of legitimate issues \nin a criminal trial\"). Accordingly, courts routinely and correctly preclude defendants from raising \nthese arguments at trial. See Regan, 103 F.3d at 1082 (\"[W]e agree with the district court's \ndecision to resolve for itself whether the government's conduct was lawful and to prevent Regan \nfrom presenting evidence on that subject.\"); United States v. Raniere, No. 18 Cr. 204 (NGG), Dkt. \n622 (precluding argument regarding propriety of Government's prosecution), United States v. \nStewart, Cr. No. 03-717 (MGC), 2004 WL 113506, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004) (granting \nmotion to preclude the defendant from \"presenting arguments or evidence that would invite the \njury to question the Government's motives in investigating and indicting\" the defendant); United \nStates v. Larkin, No. 12-CR-319, 2017 WL 928915, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2017) (\"Defendant will \nbe precluded from presenting evidence regarding the government's motive for prosecution in the \ninstant case as such evidence is not relevant.\"); United States v. Starks, No. 10-CR-0160, 2012 \nWL 12878587, at *1 (N.D. Miss. July 20, 2012) (same). \n29 \nEFTA00027340\n", "char_count": 1943}]}