{"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_count": 34, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00022091", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00022091.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 1 of 34 \nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nUnited States of America, \n—v—\nGhislaine Maxwell, \nDefendant. \nUSDC SDNY \nDOCUMENT \nELECTRONICALLY FILED \nDOC N: \nDATE FILED: 4/16/21 \n20-cr-330 (AJN) \nOPINION & ORDER \nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge: \nIn June 2020, a grand jury returned a six-count indictment charging Ghislaine Maxwell \nwith facilitating the late financier Jeffrey Epstein's sexual abuse of minor victims from around \n1994 to 1997. The Government filed a first (S1) superseding indictment shortly thereafter, \nwhich contained only small, ministerial corrections. The SI superseding indictment included \ntwo counts of enticement or transportation of minors to engage in illegal sex acts in violation of \nthe Mann Act and two counts of conspiracy to commit those offenses. It also included two \ncounts of perjury in connection with Maxwell's testimony in a civil deposition. Trial is set to \nbegin on July 12, 2021. \nMaxwell filed twelve pretrial motions seeking to dismiss portions of the Si superseding \nindictment, suppress evidence, and compel discovery. After the parties fully briefed those \nmotions, a grand jury returned a second (S2) superseding indictment adding a sex trafficking \ncount and another related conspiracy count. \nThis Opinion resolves all of Maxwell's currently pending pretrial motions other than \nthose seeking to suppress evidence, which the Court will resolve in due course. The motions, and \nthis Opinion, deal exclusively with the S 1 superseding indictment and do not resolve any issues \nEFTA00022091\n", "char_count": 1627}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 2 of 34 \nrelated to the newly added sex trafficking charges. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies \nMaxwell's motions to dismiss the SI superseding indictment in whole or in part. It grants her \nmotion to sever the perjury charges for a separate trial. It denies her motion to further expedite \ndiscovery. \nThe Court provides a brief summary of its conclusions here and its reasoning on the \npages that follow: \n• \nMaxwell moves to dismiss all counts based on a non-prosecution agreement between \nJeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. The Court \nconcludes that the agreement does not apply in this District or to the charged offenses. \n• \nMaxwell moves to dismiss all counts as untimely. The Court concludes that the \nGovernment brought the charges within the statute of limitations and did not unfairly \ndelay in bringing them. \n• \nMaxwell moves to dismiss the Mann Act counts because they are too vague, or in the \nalternative to require the Government to describe the charges in greater detail. The \nCourt concludes that the charges are specific enough. \n• \nMaxwell moves to dismiss the perjury counts because, in her view, her testimony \nresponded to ambiguous questioning and was not material. The Court concludes that \nthese issues are best left for the jury. \n• \nMaxwell moves to sever the perjury counts from the Mann Act counts so that they can \nproceed in a separate trial. The Court concludes that severance is appropriate and will \ntry the perjury counts separately. \n• \nMaxwell moves to strike language from the indictment that she believes is superfluous \nand to dismiss conspiracy counts she believes are redundant. The Court concludes that \nthese motions are premature before trial. \n• \nMaxwell moves to compel the Government to immediately disclose certain categories \nof evidence. The Court concludes that she is not entitled to do so, but the Court will \norder Maxwell and the Go\n... [truncated, 2298 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/1 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=1]", "char_count": 2298}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 3 of 34 \nI. \nJeffrey Epstein's non-prosecution agreement does not bar this prosecution \nIn September 2007, under investigation by both federal and state authorities, Jeffrey \nEpstein entered into a non-prosecution agreement (\"NPA\") with the Office of the United States \nAttorney for the Southern District of Florida. Dkt. No. 142 at 1-2. Epstein agreed in the NPA to \nplead guilty in Florida state court to soliciting minors for prostitution and to serve eighteen \nmonths in a county jail. Id. In exchange, the U.S. Attorney's Office agreed not to charge him \nwith federal crimes in the Southern District of Florida stemming from its investigation of his \nconduct between 2001 and 2007. Id. It also agreed not to bring criminal charges against any of \nhis \"potential co-conspirators.\" Id. \nAs a recent report from the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility \nobserved, the NPA was unusual in many respects, including its breadth, leniency, and secrecy. \nOPR Report, Gov. Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 204-3, at x, 80, 175, 179, 260-61. The U.S. Attorney's \npromise not to prosecute unidentified co-conspirators marks a stark departure from normal \npractice for federal plea agreements. This provision appears to have been added \"with little \ndiscussion or consideration by the prosecutors.\" Id. at 169, 185. The report concluded that the \nU.S. Attorney's negotiation and approval of the NPA did not amount to professional misconduct, \nbut nonetheless reflected \"poor judgment.\" Id. at 169. \nOnly the NPA's effect, and not its wisdom, is presently before the Court. Maxwell \ncontends that the NPA bars this prosecution, because she is charged as a co-conspirator of \nJeffrey Epstein and the NPA's co-conspirator provision lacks any geographical or temporal \nlimitations. The Court disagrees for two independent reasons. First, under controlling Second \nCircuit precedent, the NPA does not bind the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District\n... [truncated, 2113 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/2 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=2]", "char_count": 2113}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 4 of 34 \nA. The non-prosecution agreement does not bind the U.S. Attorney for the \nSouthern District of New York \nUnited States Attorneys speak for the United States. When a U.S. Attorney makes a \npromise as part of a plea bargain, both contract principles and due process require the federal \ngovernment to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. \nReady, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for \nthe Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District \nof New York. The question is whether the terms of the NPA did so. Applying Second Circuit \nprecedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. \nIn United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: \"A plea agreement binds only the \noffice of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it \naffirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.\" 771 F.2d 670, 672 \n(2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam). This is something akin to a clear statement rule. Single-district plea \nagreements are the norm. Nationwide, unlimited agreements are the rare exception. Applying \nAnnabi, panels of the Second Circuit have stated that courts cannot infer intent to depart from \nthis ordinary practice from an agreement's use of phrases like \"the government\" or \"the United \nStates.\" United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. \nGonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004). Those are common shorthand. A plea \nagreement need not painstakingly spell out \"the Office of the United States Attorney for Such-\nand-Such District\" in every instance to make clear that it applies only in the district where \nsigned. \nMaxwell asks this Court to draw the opposite conclusion. The provision of the NPA \ndealing with co-conspirators does not expres\n... [truncated, 2167 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/3 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=3]", "char_count": 2167}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 5 of 34 \nits entirety, reads as follows: \"the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal \ncharges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein.\" Dkt. No. 142-1 at 5. Under Annabi, \nSalatneh, and Gonzalez, a statement that \"the United States\" agrees not to prosecute implies no \nrestriction on prosecutions in other districts. \nTwo provisions of the NPA refer specifically to prosecution in the Southern District of \nFlorida. The first states that the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida will defer \n\"prosecution in this District\" if Epstein complies with the agreement. Dkt. No. 142-1 at 2. The \nsecond states that no prosecution \"will be instituted in this District, and the charges against \nEpstein if any, will be dismissed\" after he fulfills the agreement's conditions. Maxwell contends \nthat the lack of similar language in the co-conspirator provision must mean that it lacks any \ngeographical limitation. If anything, that language reflects that the NPA's scope was expressly \nlimited to the Southern District of Florida. It is not plausible—let alone \"affirmatively \napparent\", Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672,—that the parties intended to drastically expand the \nagreement's geographic scope in the single sentence on the prosecution of co-conspirators \nwithout clearly so saying. \nWithout an affirmative statement in the NPA's text, Maxwell turns to its negotiation \nhistory. Under Second Circuit precedent she may offer evidence that negotiations of the NPA \nbetween the defendant and the prosecutors included a promise to bind other districts. See United \nStates v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1986). She alleges that officials in the U.S. \nAttorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida sought and obtained approval for the NPA \nfrom the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and communicated with attorneys in other \ndistricts. Any involvement of attorneys outside the Southern Dist\n... [truncated, 2144 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/4 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=4]", "char_count": 2144}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 6 of 34 \nabout the NPA's negotiation history in the form of the OPR report and yet identifies no evidence \nthat the Department of Justice made any promises not contained in the NPA. The OPR report \nreflects that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General reviewed the NPA, but only after it was \nsigned when Epstein tried to get out of it. OPR Report at 103. Other documents show that \nattorneys in the Southern District of Florida reached out to other districts for investigatory \nassistance but not for help negotiating the NPA. Dkt. No. 204-2. Nor would direct approval of \nthe NPA by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General change the meaning of its terms. No \nevidence suggests anyone promised Epstein that the NPA would bar the prosecution of his co-\nconspirators in other districts. Absent such a promise, it does not matter who did or did not \napprove it. \nSecond Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that a plea agreement binds only \nthe U.S. Attorney's office for the district where it was signed. Maxwell identifies nothing in the \nNPA's text or negotiation history to disturb this presumption. The Court thus concludes that the \nNPA does not bind the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. \nB. The non-prosecution agreement does not cover the charged offenses \nThe NPA would provide Maxwell no defense to the charges in the Si superseding \nindictment even against an office bound to follow it. The NPA bars prosecution, following \nEpstein's fulfillment of its conditions, only for three specific categories of offenses: \n(1) \"the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2\" of the NPA; namely, \"any offenses that \nmay have been committed by Epstein against the United States from in or around \n2001 through in or around September 2007\" including five enumerated offenses; \n(2) \"any other offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the \nFederal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Att\n... [truncated, 2112 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/5 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=5]", "char_count": 2112}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 7 of 34 \nDkt. No. 142-1 at 2. The NPA makes clear that the covered charges are those relating to \nand deriving from a specific investigation of conduct that occurred between 2001 and 2007. \nMaxwell contends that the NPA's co-conspirator provision lacks any limitation on the \noffenses covered. The Court disagrees with this improbable interpretation. The phrase \n\"potential co-conspirator\" means nothing without answering the question \"co-conspirator in \nwhat?\" The most natural reading of the co-conspirator provision is that it covers those who \nconspired with Epstein in the offenses covered by the NPA for their involvement in those \noffenses. Thus, it would cover any involvement of Maxwell in offenses committed by Epstein \nfrom 2001 to 2007, other offenses that were the subject of the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office \ninvestigation, and any offenses that arose from the related grand jury investigation. \nThe Court has no trouble concluding that the perjury counts are not covered by the NPA. \nThose charges do not relate to conduct in which Maxwell conspired with Epstein and stem from \ndepositions in 2016, more than eight years after Epstein signed the NPA. Maxwell now \nconcedes as much, though her motion sought to dismiss the Si superseding indictment in its \nentirety, perjury counts and all. \nThe Mann Act counts, too, fall comfortably outside the NPA's scope. The Si \nsuperseding indictment charges conduct occurring exclusively between 1994 and 1997, some \nfour years before the period covered by the Southern District of Florida investigation and the \nNPA. The NPA does not purport to immunize Epstein from liability for crimes committed \nbefore the period that was the subject of the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office investigation. \nMaxwell's protection is no broader. The Court thus concludes that the NPA does not cover the \noffenses charged in the SI superseding indictment. \n7 \nEFTA00022097\n", "char_count": 1968}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 8 of 34 \nC. Maxwell is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing \nIn the alternative to dismissing the indictment, Maxwell requests that the Court conduct \nan evidentiary hearing as to the parties' intent in the NPA. The Court finds no basis to do so. \nThe cases Maxwell cites where courts held hearings on the scope of a plea agreement \nmostly involved oral agreements where there was no written record of the full set of terms \nreached by the parties. All of them involved defendants with first-hand knowledge of \nnegotiations who claimed prosecutors breached an oral promise. \"An oral agreement greatly \nincreases the potential for disputes such as . .. a failure to agree on the existence, let alone the \nterms, of the deal.\" United States v. Aleman, 286 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, an \nevidentiary hearing may be necessary to determine the terms of an agreement never committed to \nwriting. This is no such case. The NPA's terms are clear. Beyond the NPA itself, an extensive \nOPR report details its negotiation history. No record evidence suggests that prosecutors \npromised Epstein anything beyond what was spelled out in writing. The Court agrees with the \nGovernment that Maxwell's request for a hearing rests on mere conjecture. \nFor the same reason, the Court will not order the discovery on the NPA. In any case, it \nappears that the Government has already produced two of the documents Maxwell seeks in her \nmotion—the OPR report and notes mentioned in a privilege log. Of course, the Government's \ndisclosure obligations would require it to disclose to Maxwell any exculpatory evidence or \nevidence material to preparing the defense, including any evidence supporting a defense under \nthe NPA. The Government shall confirm in writing within one week whether it views any \nevidence supporting Maxwell's interpretation of the NPA as material it is required to disclose, \nand, if so, whether it has disclosed any and all such evid\n... [truncated, 2041 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/7 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=7]", "char_count": 2041}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 9 of 34 \nII. \nThe indictment is timely \nA. The indictment complies with the statute of limitations \nFederal law imposes a five-year limitations period for most non-capital offenses. 18 \nU.S.C. § 3282(a). Recognizing the difficulty of promptly prosecuting crimes against children, \nCongress has provided a longer limitations period for \"offense[s] involving the sexual or \nphysical abuse, or kidnaping\" of a minor. 18 U.S.C. § 3283. Until 2003, the operative version \nof § 3283 allowed prosecution of these offenses until the victim reached the age of twenty-five. \nCongress further extended the limitations period in the PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-\n21, 117 Stat. 650, to allow prosecution any time during the life of the victim. \nThe parties agree that the Mann Act charges are timely if subject to the PROTECT Act, \nbut untimely under the general statute of limitations for non-capital offenses or the pre-2003 \nversion of § 3283. Maxwell contends that the charged offenses do not qualify as offenses \ninvolving the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a minor and are thus governed by the \ngeneral statute of limitations. Alternatively, she contends that the pre-2003 version of § 3283 \napplies because the charged conduct occurred prior to 2003. The Court concludes that statute of \nlimitations in the PROTECT Act applies and that the charges are timely. \n1. The Mann Act charges are offenses involving the sexual abuse of minors \nMaxwell does not dispute that the facts alleged in the SI superseding indictment involve \nthe sexual abuse of minors. The indictment charges that Epstein sexually abused each of the \nalleged minor victims and that Maxwell allegedly enticed them to travel or transported them for \nthat purpose. Instead, Maxwell contends that charged offenses do not qualify as offenses \ninvolving the sexual abuse of minors because sexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each \nstatutory offense. See Brid\n... [truncated, 2084 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/8 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=8]", "char_count": 2084}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 34 \nfor example, it is possible to transport a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity \nand not follow through with the planned sexual abuse, and so sexual abuse is not an essential \ningredient of the offense. Maxwell makes the same argument for the enticement and related \nconspiracy charges. \nThis approach is analogous to the \"categorical approach\" employed by courts to evaluate \nprior convictions for immigration and sentencing purposes. See Taylor v. United States, 495 \nU.S. 575, 602 (1990). Generally speaking, the \"categorical approach\" requires that courts \"look \nonly to the statutory definitions—i.e., the elements\" of the relevant offense to determine if the \nprovision applies \"and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions.\" Descamps v. \nUnited States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether a statute \nrequires a categorical or case-specific approach is a question of statutory interpretation. To \ndetermine whether Congress used the word \"offense\" in a statute to refer to an offense in the \nabstract or to the facts of each individual case, the Court must examine the statute's \"text, \ncontext, and history.\" United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2327 (2019). \nThough it has not authoritatively settled the question, the Second Circuit has strongly \nsuggested that Maxwell's approach is the wrong one. In Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d \n48, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2017), the Second Circuit discussed at length how the text, context, and \nhistory of § 3283 show that Congress intended courts to apply the statute using a case-specific \napproach. The Third Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Schneider, 801 \nF.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 2015). \nThe Court sees no reason to depart from the reasoning in Weingarten. First, \"[t]he \nSupreme Court's modem categorical approach jurisprudence is confined to the post-conviction \ncontexts of criminal s\n... [truncated, 2092 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/9 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=9]", "char_count": 2092}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 11 of 34 \nTo the extent that the categorical approach is ever appropriate in other contexts, it is \ninappropriate here. \nThe Court begins with the statute's text. Statutes that call for application of the \ncategorical approach typically deal with the elements of an offense in a prior criminal conviction. \nId. at 59. \"The language of § 3283, by contrast, reaches beyond the offense and its legal \nelements to the conduct involv[ed]' in the offense. That linguistic expansion indicates Congress \nintended courts to look beyond the bare legal charges in deciding whether § 3283 applied.\" Id. at \n59-60 (alteration in original) (quoting § 3283). Maxwell cites one case holding otherwise, but \nthat case involved a venue statute presenting significantly different concerns. See United States \nv. Morgan, 393 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has likewise held that a \nstatute which uses the language \"an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to \nthe victim or victims exceeds $10,000\" is \"consistent with a circumstance-specific approach.\" \nNijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 32, 38 (2009) (emphasis added). Thus, the word \"involves\" \ngenerally means that courts should look to the circumstances of an offense as committed in each \ncase. This reading accords with a robust legislative history indicating that Congress intended to \napply § 3283 to a wide range of crimes against children. See Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 60; \nSchneider, 801 F.3d at 196. \nThe purposes underlying the categorical approach do not apply here either. For statutes \ndealing with prior convictions, \"[t]he categorical approach serves `practical' purposes: It \npromotes judicial and administrative efficiency by precluding the relitigation of past convictions \nin minitrials conducted long after the fact.\" Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200-01 (2013). \nIn the context of § 3283, there is no prior conviction to assess, and the jury \n... [truncated, 2135 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/10 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=10]", "char_count": 2135}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 12 of 34 \n865 F.3d at 60. Maxwell nonetheless contends that using a case-specific approach for § 3283 \nwould be impractical because the Government would need to prove conduct beyond the elements \nof the offense. It may be true that this approach requires the Government to prove some \nadditional facts, but any statute-of-limitations defense presents factual issues (including, at least, \nwhen the alleged conduct took place). This is not a serious practical problem and does not \njustify setting aside the statute's language and apparent purpose. \nMaxwell relies primarily on Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), to urge this \nCourt to cast Weingarten aside. The Supreme Court in Bridges addressed a statute that extended \nthe limitations period for defrauding the United States during the Second World War. In that \ncase, the Supreme Court first concluded that making false statements at an immigration hearing \nwas not subject to the extended limitations period because it lacked any pecuniary element as \nrequired by the statute. Id. at 221. Then, as an alternative basis for its holding, it explained that \nthe offense did not require fraud as an \"essential ingredient.\" Id. at 222. It reached that \nconclusion in large part because the statute's legislative history made clear that Congress \nintended it to apply only to a narrow class of war frauds causing pecuniary loss. Id. at 216. \nAs the Second Circuit explained in Weingarten, Congress had the opposite intent in the \nenacting in the PROTECT Act. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 & n. 10. \"In passing recent statutes \nrelated to child sex abuse, including extensions of the § 3283 limitations period, Congress \n`evinced a general intention to \"'cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as \npossible.\"' Id. at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 \nF.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). The primary basis for Bri\n... [truncated, 2217 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/11 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=11]", "char_count": 2217}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 13 of 34 \nBased on the statute's text, context, and history, the Court follows Weingarten and \nconcludes that the appropriate inquiry is whether the charged offenses involved the sexual abuse \nof a minor on the facts alleged in this case. There is no question that they did. The Court thus \nconcludes that § 3283 governs the limitations period for the charges here. \n2. The 2003 amendment to the statute of l\"tations applies to these offenses \nMaxwell next contends that because the charged conduct took place before the \nPROTECT Act's enactment, that statute did not lengthen the statute of limitations applicable to \nher alleged offenses. Here too, the Second Circuit has provided guidance in its decision in \nWeingarten. Although the court did not provide a definitive answer there, it explained that the \nview Maxwell now takes conflicts with established principles of retroactivity and the decisions \nof at least two other circuit courts. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58 & n.8; see Cruz v. Maypa, 773 \nF.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. \n2006). \nThe Supreme Court has set out a two-step framework to determine whether a federal \nstatute applies to past conduct. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). \nCourts look first to the language of the statute. If the statute states that it applies to past conduct, \ncourts must so apply it. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54. Otherwise, the statute applies to past \nconduct unless doing so would create impermissible retroactive effects. Id. \nThe Court begins with Landgraf s first step. To assess a statute's meaning here, courts \nmust consider the text of the statute along with other indicia of congressional intent, including \nthe statute's history and structure. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig. v. Enter. \nMortg. Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2004). \n13 \nEFTA00022103\n", "char_count": 1975}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 14 of 34 \nSection 3283, as amended by the PROTECT Act, broadly states that \"[n]o statute of \nlimitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or \nphysical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution \nduring the life of the child.\" The statute lacks an express retroactivity clause, but courts have \nheld that no such clause is necessary, including for this particular statute. See Leo Sure Chief, \n438 F.3d at 923. The statute's plain language unambiguously requires that it apply to \nprosecutions for offenses committed before the date of enactment. Instead of simply providing a \nnew limitations period for future conduct, Congress stated that no statute of limitations that \nwould otherwise preclude prosecution of these offenses will apply. That is, it prevents the \napplication of any statute of limitations that would otherwise apply to past conduct. \nCourts have reached the same conclusion for other statutes employing similar language. \nThe Eighth Circuit has held that the 1994 amendments to § 3283, which allowed prosecution of \nsex crimes against children until the victim reached age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See \nUnited States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed \nthat the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, \nillustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. \nAcceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d at 407. That statute eliminated the statute of \nlimitations for claims on defaulted student loans by stating that \"no limitation shall terminate the \nperiod within which suit may be filed.\" Id. The PROTECT Act's language is quite similar. \nThe history of § 3283 confirms Congress's intent to apply the extended limitations period \nas broadly as the Constitution allows. With each successiv\n... [truncated, 2244 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/13 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=13]", "char_count": 2244}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 15 of 34 \nWeingarten, 865 F.3d at 54. Congress enacted the limitations provision of the PROTECT Act \nbecause it found the prior statute of limitations was \"inadequate in many cases.\" H.R. Conf. \nRep. No. 108-63, at 54 (2003). For example, a person who abducted and raped a child could not \nbe prosecuted beyond this extended limit—even if DNA matching conclusively identified him as \nthe perpetrator one day after the victim turned 25.\" Id. \nMaxwell makes no argument based on the statute's text. Instead, she contends that \nbecause the House version of the bill included an express retroactivity provision absent from its \nfinal form, the Court should infer that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to past \nconduct. However, the legislative history makes clear that Congress abandoned the retroactivity \nprovision in the House bill only because it would have produced unconstitutional results. The \nSupreme Court has explained that a law that revives a time-barred prosecution violates the Ex \nPost Facto Clause of the Constitution, but a law that extends an un-expired statute of limitations \ndoes not. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 632-33 (2003). Senator Leahy, who co-\nsponsored the PROTECT Act, expressed concerns in a committee report that the proposed \nretroactivity provision was \"of doubtful constitutionality\" because it \"would have revived the \ngovernment's authority to prosecute crimes that were previously time-barred.\" 149 Cong. Rec. \nS5137, S5147 (Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Congress removed the provision \nshortly thereafter for this reason. The removal of the express retroactivity provision shows only \nthat Congress intended to limit the PROTECT Act to its constitutional applications, including \npast conduct—like Maxwell's—on which the statute of limitations had not yet expired. \nBoth the text and history of the PROTECT Act's amendment to § 3283 reflect that it \napplies Maxwell's conduct\n... [truncated, 2088 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/14 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=14]", "char_count": 2088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 16 of 34 \nHowever, it also concludes that even if the statute were ambiguous, it would properly apply to \nthese charges. \nAt Lanfgraf s second step, the Court asks whether application of the statute to past \nconduct would have impermissible retroactive effects. IA] statute has presumptively \nimpermissible retroactive effects when it 'takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under \nexisting laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in \nrespect to transactions or considerations already past.'\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 56 (quoting \nLandgraf, 511 U.S. at 290). Thus, applying a new statute of limitations to previously time-\nbarred claims has an impermissible retroactive effect. Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. \nLitig., 391 F.3d at 407. Applying it to conduct for which the statute of limitations has not yet \nexpired does not. Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995). \nMaxwell concedes that these offenses were within the statute of limitations when \nCongress enacted the PROTECT Act. Thus, the Act did not deprive her of any vested rights. \nMaxwell contends that it is unfair to allow the Government to prosecute her now for conduct that \noccurred more than twenty years ago, but there is no dispute that Congress has the power to set a \nlengthy limitations period or no limitations period at all. It has done so here, judging that the \ndifficulty of prosecuting these offenses and the harm they work on children outweighs a \ndefendant's interest in repose. Maxwell's fairness argument is a gripe with Congress's policy \njudgment, not an impermissibly retroactive application of the statute. The Court concludes that \n§ 3283 allows her prosecution now. \nB. The Government's delay in bringing charges did not violate due process \n\"As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Marion, the statute of limitations is 'the \nprimary guarantee against \n... [truncated, 2088 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/15 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=15]", "char_count": 2088}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 17 of 34 \n171 F.3d 748, 751 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, \n322 (1971)). There is a strong presumption that an indictment filed within the statute of \nlimitations is valid. To prevail on a claim that pm-indictment delay violates due process, a \ndefendant must show both that the Government intentionally delayed bringing charges for an \nimproper purpose and that the delay seriously damaged the defendant's ability defend against the \ncharges. See id. This is a stringent standard. \"Thus, while the [Supreme] Court may not have \nshut the door firmly on a contention that at some point the Due Process Clause forecloses \nprosecution of a claim because it is too old, at most the door is barely ajar.\" DeMichele v. \nGreenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 167 F.3d 784, 790-91 (2d Cir. 1999). \nThe Court sees no evidence that the Government's delay in bringing these charges was \ndesigned to thwart Maxwell's ability to prepare a defense. However, it is enough to say that \nMaxwell does not make the strong showing of prejudice required to support this sort of claim. \nMaxwell contends that the Government's delay in bringing charges has prejudiced her interests \nbecause potential witnesses have died, others have forgotten, and records have been lost or \ndestroyed. It is highly speculative that any of these factors would make a substantial difference \nin her case. \nMaxwell first points to several potential witnesses who have passed away. These include \nJeffrey Epstein and his mother, one individual Maxwell believes worked with one of the alleged \nvictims in this case, and a police detective who investigated Epstein in Florida. She contends \nthey all would have provided exculpatory testimony were they alive today. Courts have \ngenerally found that vague assertions that a deceased witness might have provided favorable \ntestimony do not justify dismissing an indictment for delay. See, e.g., Uni\n... [truncated, 2131 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/16 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=16]", "char_count": 2131}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 18 of 34 \nprovides no indication of what many of these potential witnesses might have testified to. The \ntestimony she suggests the detective might have offered—that witnesses in the Palm Beach \ninvestigation did not identify Maxwell by name—is propensity evidence that does nothing to \nestablish her innocence of the charged offenses. There are also serious doubts under all of the \nrelevant circumstances that a jury would have found testimony from Epstein credible even if he \nhad waived his right against self-incrimination and testified on her behalf. See United States v. \nSpears, 159 F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1999). \nMaxwell's arguments that the indictment should be dismissed because of the possibility \nof missing witnesses, failing memories, or lost records fail for similar reasons. These are \ndifficulties that arise in any case where there is extended delay in bringing a prosecution, and \nthey do not justify dismissing an indictment. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-26 \n(1971); see United States v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1979). \nFinally, the Court finds no substantial prejudice from the pretrial publicity this case has \ngarnered. Maxwell contends that lengthy public interest in this case has transformed her \nreputation from that of Epstein's friend to a co-conspirator. And she also alleges—without \nevidence—that her accusers fabricated their stories based on media allegations. The Court will \nnot dismiss the indictment on Maxwell's bare assertion that numerous witnesses are engaged in a \nperjurious conspiracy against her. And the Court will take all appropriate steps to ensure that the \npretrial publicity in this case does not compromise Maxwell's right to a fair and impartial jury. \nThe Court thus concludes that Maxwell has failed to establish actual prejudice from the \nGovernment's delay in bringing charges. She may renew her motion if the factual record at trial \nshows otherwise. O\n... [truncated, 2126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/17 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=17]", "char_count": 2126}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 19 of 34 \nIII. \nThe indictment describes the charged offenses with specificity \nMaxwell seeks to dismiss the Mann Act counts for lack of specificity or in the alternative \nto compel the Government to submit a bill of particulars providing greater detail of the charges. \nThe Court concludes that the charges in the S1 superseding indictment are clear enough. \nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7, an indictment must contain \"a plain, \nconcise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.\" \nThe indictment must be specific enough to inform the defendant of the charges and allow the \ndefendant to plead double jeopardy in a later prosecution based on the same events. United \nStates v. Stavrouiakis, 952 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1992). \"Under this test, an indictment need do \nlittle more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in \napproximate terms) of the alleged crime.\" United States. v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1113 (2d \nCir. 1975). In addition to dismissal, \"Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure \npermits a defendant to seek a bill of particulars in order to identify with sufficient particularity \nthe nature of the charge pending against him, thereby enabling defendant to prepare for trial, to \nprevent surprise, and to interpose a plea of double jeopardy should he be prosecuted a second \ntime for the same offense.\" United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987). \nThe S1 superseding indictment sets out the elements of each charged crime and the facts \nsupporting each element. Nonetheless, Maxwell contends that the indictment is too vague \nbecause it refers to open-ended time periods, describes conduct like \"grooming\" and \n\"befriending\" that is not inherently criminal, and does not identify the alleged victims by name. \nMaxwell's first argument fails because the Government need only describe the time and\n... [truncated, 2213 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/18 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=18]", "char_count": 2213}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 20 of 34 \nto describe the window of when a violation occurred.\" United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp. 3d \n364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. \n1987)). \"This is especially true in cases of sexual abuse of children: allegations of sexual abuse \nof underage victims often proceed without specific dates of the offenses.\" United States v. \nYoung, No. 08-cr-285 (KMK), 2008 WL 4178190, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008) (collecting \ncases). As here, these cases frequently involve alleged abuse spanning a lengthy period of time, \nand witnesses who were victimized as children may struggle to recall the precise dates when \nabuse occurred. The indictment adequately describes the time and place of the charged conduct. \nMaxwell next contends that allegations of noncriminal conduct render the charges \nimpermissibly vague. The Court disagrees. Rule 7 requires only that the language of the \nindictment track the language of the statute and provide a rough account of the time and place of \nthe crime. Tram ;;;; ti, 513 F.2d at 1113. The language of the Si superseding indictment does so. \nThe Government's decision to provide more details than those strictly required does not hamper \nMaxwell's ability to prepare a defense. Maxwell's argument that some of the conduct alleged is \nnot inherently criminal goes to the merits of the Government's case, not the specificity of the \ncharges. \nFinally, Maxwell argues that the indictment is vague because the government does not \nprovide the names of the alleged victims. The Court sees no basis to require that the alleged \nvictims' names be included the indictment. The names of victims, even if important, generally \nneed not appear there unless their omission would seriously prejudice the defendant. See United \nStates v. Stringer, 730 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp. 3d 364, \n369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Maxwell likely kno\n... [truncated, 2165 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/19 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=19]", "char_count": 2165}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 21 of 34 \nMoreover, the Government has agreed to disclose their names in advance of trial. There is thus \nno unfairness here. See Stringer, 730 F.3d at 126. As discussed below, the Court will require \nthe parties to negotiate and propose a full schedule for all remaining pretrial disclosures. \nIV. \nThe perjury charges are legally tenable \nThe Court turns next to Maxwell's motion to dismiss the perjury counts stemming from \nher answers to questions in a deposition in a civil case. She contends that these charges are \nlegally deficient because the questions posed were fundamentally ambiguous and the questions \nwere not material to the subject of the deposition. The Court concludes that the charges are \nlegally tenable and Maxwell's defenses are appropriately left to the jury. \nThe applicable perjury statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who \"in any \nproceeding before or ancillary to any court ... knowingly makes any false material declaration.\" \n18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). Testimony is perjurious only if it is knowingly false and is material to the \nproceeding in which the defendant offered it. \nA. The questions posed were not too ambiguous to support a perjury charge \nThe requirement of knowing falsity requires that a witness believe that their testimony is \nfalse. United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1986). As a general matter, \"[a] jury is \nbest equipped to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question.\" Id. \nCourts have acknowledged a narrow exception for questions that are so fundamentally \nambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also \nUnited States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally \nambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte, 782 F.2d \nat 375. The existence of some arguable ambiguity does not foreclose a perjury charge against a \nwitne\n... [truncated, 2050 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/20 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=20]", "char_count": 2050}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 22 of 34 \nAt a minimum, Maxwell's motion is premature. Courts typically evaluate whether a \nquestion was fundamentally ambiguous only after the development of a full factual record at \ntrial. See, e.g., United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992). The evidence at \ntrial may shed further light on whether the questions posed were objectively ambiguous in \ncontext or whether Maxwell subjectively understood them. In any event, the Court has closely \nconsidered each of the categories of questions that Maxwell argues are ambiguous. None of the \nalleged ambiguities Maxwell identifies rise to the level supporting dismissal of the charges. The \ncontext of the questions and answers, in conjunction with the Government's evidence, could lead \na reasonable juror to conclude that the statements were perjurious. Truth and falsity are \nquestions for the jury in all but the most extreme cases. The Court declines to usurp the jury's \nrole on the limited pretrial record. \nB. A reasonable juror could conclude that Maxwell's statements were material \nMaxwell also argues that the perjury counts should be dismissed because none of the \nallegedly false statements were material to the defamation action. In a civil deposition, a \nstatement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful answer \nmight reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 \nU.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing \nfalsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be \"decided by the jury, \nnot the court.\" Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465 (1997). Only the most extraordinary \ncircumstances justify departure from this general rule. United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d \n406, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23). \nThe charged statements do not fall within this narrow ex\n... [truncated, 2152 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/21 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=21]", "char_count": 2152}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 23 of 34 \ncivil case, but that is not the legal standard. The Government may prevail if it proves that \nMaxwell's answers could have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the \nfactfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a \nreasonable juror could conclude that truthful answers to the questions may have permitted the \nplaintiff to locate other victims or witnesses who could have corroborated the plaintiff's \ntestimony. The factual disputes relating to materiality are at least enough to preclude pretrial \nresolution. In criminal cases, courts must guard against \"invading the 'inviolable function of the \njury' in our criminal justice system,\" and if the \"defense raises a factual dispute that is \ninextricably intertwined with a defendant's potential culpability, a judge cannot resolve that \ndispute on a Rule 12(b) motion.\" United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 2018). \nThe Court concludes that the perjury charges are legally tenable and appropriately \npresented to the jury. \nV. \nThe perjury charges must be severed and tried separately \nAlthough the perjury charges are legally tenable, the Court concludes that the interests of \njustice require severing those counts and trying them separately. Trying the perjury counts \ntogether with the Mann Act counts would require admitting evidence of other acts likely to be \nunduly prejudicial. It would also risk disqualifying Maxwell's chosen counsel based on their \ninvolvement in the earlier civil case. \nRule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a court to order separate \ntrials if joining all offenses in a single trial would prejudice the defendant. A defendant seeking \nseverance must show significant unfairness to outweigh the burden on the court of conducting \nmultiple trials. United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1998). The harm to the \ndefendant must be mor\n... [truncated, 2094 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/22 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=22]", "char_count": 2094}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 24 of 34 \none.\" United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 929 (2d Cir. 1980). Though this standard is \ndemanding, the Court concludes that, due to unique features of the perjury counts, Maxwell \nmeets it here. Trying all counts together would compromise Maxwell's right to the counsel of \nher choice and risk an unfair trial. \nTrying the perjury counts together with the Mann Act counts would risk an unfair trial on \neach set of counts. First, it would introduce unrelated allegations of sexual abuse, which would \npotentially expose the jury to evidence that might otherwise not be admissible. In particular, a \njoint trial would potentially expose the jury to a wider swath of information regarding civil \nlitigation against Epstein that is remote from Maxwell's charged conduct. This presents a \nsignificant risk that the jury will cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find \nguilt when, if considered separately, it would not do so. See United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d \n422, 430 (2d Cir. 1978). Second, the evidence presented on the Mann Act counts may prejudice \nthe jury's ability to fairly evaluate Maxwell's truthfulness in her deposition, a critical element of \nthe perjury counts. The Court has concerns that a limiting instruction may be inadequate to \nmitigate these risks given the nature of the allegations involved. \nImportantly, a joint trial is also likely to require disqualification of at least one of \nMaxwell's attorneys from participating as an advocate on her behalf. The perjury counts likely \nimplicate the performance and credibility of her lawyers in the civil action—two of whom \nrepresent her in this case. The New York Rules of Professional Conduct generally forbid a \nlawyer from representing a client in a proceeding in which the lawyer is likely also to be a \nwitness. N.Y. R. Prof'/ Conduct § 3.7(a). Maxwell's counsel in the civil action and the \ndeposition may be important fact witnesses o\n... [truncated, 2163 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/23 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=23]", "char_count": 2163}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 25 of 34 \ncounsel testify on her behalf on the perjury charges and having them assist her in defending the \nMann Act charges. \nThe Second Circuit has recognized that witness testimony offered by a party's attorney \npresents serious risks to the fairness of a trial. See Murray v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, \n178 (2d Cir. 2009). The lawyer might appear to vouch for their own credibility, jurors might \nperceive the lawyer as distorting the truth to benefit their client, and blurred lines between \nargument and evidence might confuse the jury. Id. Disqualification of counsel also implicates \nMaxwell's Sixth Amendment right to be represented by the counsel of her choice. See, e.g., \nUnited States v. Kincade, No. 15-cr-00071 (JAD) (GWF), 2016 WL 6154901, at *6 (D. Nev. \nOct. 21, 2016). The prejudice to Maxwell is especially pronounced because the attorneys who \nrepresented her in the civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with \nthe facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d \n1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982). \nThe Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial \nparticipants. But much of the proof relevant to the perjury counts and the Mann Act counts does \nnot overlap. In particular, materiality for statements made in a civil deposition is broad, and \nevidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at \n753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to \nboth sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the scope of the trial far \nbeyond the narrower issues presented. And while the Court agrees with the Government that at \nleast some of Maxwell's concerns are overstated, there is little question that the jury's \nconsideration of the nature of the defamation action will require a significant investment of ti\n... [truncated, 2070 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/24 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=24]", "char_count": 2070}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 26 of 34 \nThe balance of these considerations favors severance. \"Motions to sever are committed \nto the sound discretion of the trial judge.\" United States v. Casarnento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d \nCir. 1989). In its discretion, the Court concludes that trying the perjury counts separately will \nbest ensure a fair and expeditious resolution of all charges in this case. \nVI. \nMaxwell's motion to strike surplusage is premature \nMaxwell moves to strike allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the SI \nsuperseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture. \nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an \nindictment on a defendant's motion. \"Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will be \ngranted only where the challenged allegations are not relevant to the crime charged and are \ninflammatory and prejudicial.\" United States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1996) \n(cleaned up). Courts in this District generally delay ruling on any motion to strike until after the \npresentation of the Government's evidence at trial, because that evidence may affect how \nspecific allegations relate to the overall charges. See, e.g., United States v. Nejad, No. I 8-cr-224 \n(MN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019); United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. \nSupp. 2d 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). \nMaxwell contends that the allegations related to \"Minor Victim-3\" are surplusage \nbecause the indictment does not charge that Minor Victim-3 traveled in interstate commerce or \nwas below the age of consent in England where the alleged activities took place. Thus, she \nargues, these allegations do not relate to the charged conspiracy and instead reflect an attempt to \nintroduce Minor Victim-3's testimony for impermissible purposes. \nThe Court will not strike any language from the S 1 superseding indictment at this \njuncture. The standard under Rule 7(d)\n... [truncated, 2075 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/25 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=25]", "char_count": 2075}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 27 of 34 \nclearly that the allegations are irrelevant to the crimes charged. United States v. Napolitano, 552 \nF. Supp. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The indictment does not allege that the alleged victim \ntraveled in interstate commerce or was underage during sexual encounters with Epstein. But the \nCourt cannot rule out that the allegations may reflect conduct undertaken in furtherance of the \ncharged conspiracy or be relevant to prove facts such as Maxwell's state of mind. See United \nStates v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992). The Court will follow the well-worn \npath of others in this District and reserve the issue for trial. Maxwell may renew her motion \nthen. \nVII. \nMaxwell's motion to dismiss multiplicitous charges is premature \nMaxwell's motion to dismiss either the first or third count of the SI superseding \nindictment as multiplicitous is also premature. Maxwell contends that the Government has \nalleged the same conspiracy twice in the indictment. \"An indictment is multiplicitous when it \ncharges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, \nonly one crime has been committed.\" United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999). \n\"The multiplicity doctrine is based upon the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, \nwhich assures that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple \npunishments for the same offense.\" United States v. Nakashian, 820 F.2d 549, 552 (2d Cir. 1987) \n(cleaned up). \n\"Where there has been no prior conviction or acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause does \nnot protect against simultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, so long as no more than one \npunishment is eventually imposed.\" United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. \n2006). \"Since Josephberg, courts in this Circuit have routinely denied pre-trial motions to \ndismiss potentially multiplicitous counts as prematur\n... [truncated, 2061 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/26 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=26]", "char_count": 2061}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 28 of 34 \n(PGG), 2014 WL 3057917, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014) (collecting cases). The Court therefore \ndenies Maxwell's motion to dismiss multiplicitous counts without prejudice. \nVIII. The parties shall negotiate all remaining disclosures \nMaxwell moves to compel the Government to produce certain documents she believes it \nhas in its possession and has failed to produce. She also seeks accelerated disclosure of the \nGovernment's witness list, Jencks Act material, Brady and Giglio material, co-conspirator \nstatements, and Rule 404(b) material. Based on the Government's response in briefing and \nletters the parties have since submitted to the Court, it appears that most of these requests have \nbeen overtaken by events. Accordingly, although the Court concludes that Maxwell is not \nentitled to expedite this discovery based on the arguments in her motion papers, the Court will \nrequire the parties to confer on an overall schedule for all remaining pretrial disclosures. \nA. The Court accepts the Government's representations that it has disclosed all \nBrady and Giglio Material \nThe Supreme Court's decisions in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. \nUnited States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) require the Government to disclose to defendants certain \nevidence that will aid their defense. Brady requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence. Under \nGiglio, the Government has a duty to produce \"not only exculpatory material, but also \ninformation that could be used to impeach a key government witness.\" United States v. Coppa, \n267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154). As a general rule, \"Brady and \nits progeny do not require immediate disclosure of all exculpatory and impeachment material \nupon request by a defendant.\" Id. at 146. \"[A]s long as a defendant possesses Brady evidence in \ntime for its effective use, the government has not deprived the defendant of due process of law \nsimply beca\n... [truncated, 2075 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/27 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=27]", "char_count": 2075}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 29 of 34 \nMaxwell requests an order directing immediate disclosure of all Brady and Giglio \nmaterial and also requests a few specific documents she contends the Government has failed to \ndisclose. The Court begins with the specific requests. The requested materials include (1) \nrecords of witness interviews in connection with an ex pane declaration in support of a response \nto a motion to quash subpoenas; (2) an unredacted copy of two FBI reports; (3) pages from a \npersonal diary that is in the custody of a civilian third party; and (4) copies of all subpoenas the \nGovernment has issued for Maxwell's records as part of its investigation in this case. \nThe Government represents that it is cognizant of its Brady obligations, that is has \nreviewed the witness interviews and one of the FBI reports, and that neither set of documents \nincludes exculpatory information not previously disclosed. The Court has no reason to doubt the \nGovernment's representation in this case that it is aware of its Brady obligations and that it has \ncomplied and will continue to comply with them. And because the witness statements are \ncovered by the Jencks Act, the Court cannot compel production of such statements under the \nterms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500; Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government \nrepresents that it has already produced an unredacted copy of the other requested FBI report, and \nso that request is moot. The diary pages she requests are within the control of a civilian third \nparty, not the Government, and so the Government need not (and perhaps cannot) produce them. \nSee United States v. Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Finally, Maxwell's \nrequest for copies of all subpoenas the Government has issued is overly broad and lacks a legal \nbasis. Maxwell is not entitled to compel production of these documents. \nThe Court also will not issue an order requiring the immediate disclosure of Brady \n... [truncated, 2214 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/28 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=28]", "char_count": 2214}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 30 of 34 \nreason to doubt these representations given its expansive approach to document production thus \nfar in this case. The Government has agreed in its recent letter to produce Giglio material six \nweeks in advance of trial. The parties shall negotiate the specific timing, but assuming a \nschedule along those lines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be able to effectively \nprepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d at 144. \nB. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator statements \nMaxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks Act material and non-exculpatory \nstatements of co-conspirators that the government may offer at trial. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. \n§ 3500, \"provides that no prior statement made by a government witness shall be the subject of \ndiscovery until that witness has testified on direct examination.\" Coppa, 267 F.3d at 145. The \nstatute therefore prohibits a district court in most cases from ordering the pretrial disclosure of \nwitness statements unless those statements are exculpatory. \"A coconspirator who testifies on \nbehalf of the government is a witness under the Act.\" In re United States, 834 F.2d 283, 286 (2d \nCir. 1987). The Court therefore lacks the inherent power to expedite these disclosures. In any \ncase, the Government has agreed to produce all Jencks Act material at least six weeks in advance \nof trial. \nThe Court also rejects Maxwell's alternative request for a hearing to determine the \nadmissibility of co-conspirator declarations. Co-conspirator statements may often be admitted at \ntrial on a conditional basis. If the Court determines that the Government has not met its burden \nto show that the conditionally admitted statements were made in furtherance of the charged \nconspiracy, the Court should provide a limiting instruction or, in extreme cases declare a \nmistrial. United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993). Although conditional \nadmissions can pose a\n... [truncated, 2090 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/29 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=29]", "char_count": 2090}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 31 of 34 \nhas committed to producing co-conspirator statements at least six weeks in advance of trial to \nallow Maxwell to raise any objections. Maxwell will have adequate time to object to any \nproffered co-conspirator testimony following the Government's Jencks Act disclosures. \nC. Witness list \nAs a general matter, \"district courts have authority to compel pretrial disclosure of the \nidentity of government witnesses.\" United States v. Cannon, 528 F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 1975). \nIn deciding whether to order accelerated disclosure of a witness list, courts consider whether a \ndefendant has made a specific showing that disclosure is \"both material to the preparation of the \ndefense and reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding the case.\" United States v. \nBejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 139-140 (2d Cir. 1990) (cleaned up). \nMaxwell has made a particularized showing that the Government must produce a witness \nlist reasonably in advance of trial. The nature of the allegations in this case—decades-old \nallegations spanning multiple locations—present considerable challenges for the preparation of \nthe defense. However, the Government's proposed disclosure schedule—which will afford \nMaxwell at least six weeks to investigate testifying witness statements—allows Maxwell \nsignificantly more time to review disclosures than schedules adopted in most cases in this \nDistrict. See, e.g., United States v. Rueb, No. 00-CR-91 (RWS), 2001 WL 96177, at *9 \n(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2001) (thirty days before trial); United States v. Nachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d 565, \n580 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (fourteen days before trial). In addition, on April 13, 2021, the \nGovernment produced over 20,000 pages of interview notes, reports and other materials related \nto non-testifying witnesses. After considering the circumstances, including the complexity of the \nissues in this case and what the defense has already received and likely learned in the course of \n\n... [truncated, 2105 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/30 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=30]", "char_count": 2105}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 32 of 34 \nD. Rule 404(b) material \nMaxwell's final discovery request is for early disclosure of evidence the Government \nseeks to offer under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(6). Under Rule 4O4(b), if the prosecutor in a \ncriminal case intends to use \"evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act\" against a defendant, the \nprosecutor must \"provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the \nprosecutor intends to offer at trial\" and must \"do so in writing before trial—or in any form \nduring trial if the court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.\" The Government \nrepresents that it will notify the defense of its intent to use 404(b) evidence at least 45 days in \nadvance of trial to allow Maxwell to file any motions in limine to be considered at the final \npretrial conference. The Government's proposal will give Maxwell an opportunity to challenge \nadmission of that evidence and to bring to the Court's attention any issues that require resolution \nbefore trial. \"This is all that Rule 404(b) requires.\" United States v. Thompson, No. 13-cr-378 \n(AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013). The Court concludes this schedule is \ngenerally reasonable, although additional time to enable briefing and resolution in advance of \ntrial is strongly encouraged. \nThe Court's denial of Maxwell's requests to compel pretrial disclosures does not preclude \nthe parties from negotiating in good faith for an expedited discovery timeline that will account \nfor Maxwell's specific concerns. \"[I]n most criminal cases, pretrial disclosure will redound to \nthe benefit of all parties, counsel, and the court.\" United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 132 \n(2d Cir. 1974). In general, the Court will require the parties to negotiate a final, omnibus \nschedule to propose to the Court. The Court concludes that the disclosure of all of the above \nmaterials approximately six to eight weeks in advance of tria\n... [truncated, 2051 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022091/31 or ?id=EFTA00022091&page=31]", "char_count": 2051}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 33 of 34 \nGiven the complexities of the case and the addition of two counts via the S2 indictment, the \nCourt encourages the parties to agree to approximately eight weeks. \nIX. \nThe S2 superseding indictment moots Maxwell's grand jury challenge \nThe Court has not received supplemental briefing on the motions in light of the return of \nthe S2 superseding indictment and so does resolve any such issues here.' However, Maxwell's \nmotion seeking to dismiss the Si superseding indictment because it was returned by a grand jury \nsitting at the White Plains courthouse appears moot. Maxwell argued that the use of a grand jury \ndrawn from the White Plains Division in this District did not represent a fair cross-section of the \ncommunity, because her trial would proceed in the Manhattan Division. A grand jury sitting in \nManhattan returned the S2 superseding indictment. By April 21, 2021, Maxwell shall show \ncause why her grand jury motion should not be dismissed on that basis. \nConclusion \nThe Court DENIES Maxwell's motions to dismiss the indictment as barred by Epstein's \nnon-prosecution agreement (Dkt. No. 141), to dismiss the Mann Act counts as barred by the \nstatute of limitations (Dkt. No. 143), to dismiss the indictment for pre-indictment delay (Dkt. No. \n137), to dismiss the Mann Act counts for lack of specificity (Dkt. No. 123), to dismiss the \nperjury counts as legally untenable (Dkt. No. 135), to strike surplusage (Dkt. No. 145), to \ndismiss count one or count three as multiplicitous (Dkt. No. 121), and to expedite pretrial \ndisclosures (Dkt. No. 147). The Court GRANTS Maxwell's motion to sever the perjury counts \nfor a separate trial (Dkt. No. 119). \n' The parties shall negotiate and propose a schedule for any available additional or supplement rulings in \nlight of the filing of the S2 indictment. \n33 \nEFTA00022123\n", "char_count": 1903}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022091", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 34 of 34 \nThe Court ORDERS the Government to confirm within one week whether it considers \nany evidence related to negotiation of the non-prosecution agreement to constitute Brady or Rule \n16 material and, if so, to confirm that it has or will disclose such evidence. \nThe Court further ORDERS the parties to negotiate a final schedule for all pretrial \ndisclosures that remain outstanding, including: Brady, Giglio, and Jenks Act materials, including \nco-conspirator statements; non-testifying witness statements; testifying witness statements; the \nidentity of victims alleged in the indictment; 404(b) material; and the Government's witness list. \nThe Court also requires the parties to negotiate a schedule for any additional or supplemental \nmotions briefing in light of the S2 indictment. The Court ORDERS a joint proposal to be \nsubmitted by April 21, 2021. If agreement is not reached, the parties shall submit their \nrespective proposals. \nThe Court further ORDERS Maxwell to show cause by April 21, 2021 why her motion to \ndismiss the SI superseding indictment under the Sixth Amendment (Dkt. No. 125) should not be \ndenied as moot. \nSO ORDERED. \nDated: April 16, 2021 \nNew York, New York \nALISON J. NATHAN \nUnited States District Judge \n34 \nEFTA00022124\n", "char_count": 1321}]}