{"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_count": 11, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00022027", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00022027.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "U.S. Department of Justice \nUnited States Attorney \nSouthern District of New York \nThe SilWoJ. Mollo Building \nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza \nNew York. New York 10007 \nApril 5, 2021 \nBY ECF \nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan \nUnited States District Judge \nSouthern District of New York \n40 Foley Square \nNew York, New York 10007 \nRe: \nUnited States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, S2 20 Cr. 330 (MN) \nDear Judge Nathan: \nThe Government respectfully submits this letter in connection with the Court's Order of \nMarch 24, 2021, regarding the defendant's application for an order authorizing a subpoena \npursuant to Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for records from Boies Schiller \nFlexner LLP (\"BSF\"). For the reasons set forth herein, the Government respectfully requests that \nthe Court (1) direct the defendant to provide the Government with a copy of the proposed subpoena \nto BSF and notice of all existing and future applications for subpoenas under Rule 17(c) returnable \nin advance of trial, and (2) direct that any productions made in response to Rule 17(c) subpoenas \nbe produced to the opposing party and marked confidential under the protective order. \nBackground\nI. \nAs the Court is aware, the Government has produced to the defendant more than 2.7 million \npages of discovery pursuant to the Government's various discovery obligations, including Rule \n16. The parties are also in discussions about the timing of further productions by the Government, \nincluding material provided pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and Giglio material. \nEFTA00022027\n", "char_count": 1559}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Page 2 \nThose obligations, and not Rule 17 subpoenas, provide the avenue through which \ndefendants in criminal cases obtain discovery. As the Supreme Court has explained, \"[i]t was not \nintended by Rule 16 to give a limited right of discovery, and then by Rule 17 to give a right of \ndiscovery in the broadest terms.\" Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951); \nsee also United States v. Purin, 486 F.2d 1363, 1368 (2d Cir. 1973) (\"A subpoena duces tecum in \na criminal case is not intended as a means of discovery.\"). Unlike the rules of civil procedure—\npermitting the issuance of subpoenas to seek production of documents or materials which, although \nthemselves not admissible, may lead to admissible evidence—the criminal rules do not authorize \nthe issuance of such broad pretrial subpoenas under Rule 17. See United States v. Cherry, 876 F. \nSupp. 547, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Gross, 24 F.R.D. 138, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) \n(Rule 17(c) cannot be used \"to obtain leads as to the existence of additional documentary evidence \nor to seek information relating to the defendant's case. This type of discovery, permissible under \nthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has not been authorized for criminal trials.\"). \nThe purpose of Rule 17(c) is to \"expedite the trial by providing a time and place before \ntrial for the inspection of specific materials that the parties intend to offer into evidence. See \nUnited States v. Tagliaferro, No. 19 Cr. 472 (PAC), 2021 WL 980004, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, \n2021) (citing Bowman Dab), Co., 341 U.S. at 220 (1951)); see also United States v. Ulbricht, 858 \nF.3d 71, 109 (2d Cir. 2017) (explaining that the rule \"allows parties to subpoena documents and \nobjects to be introduced at criminal trials\"), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United \nStates v. Chambers, 751 F. App'x 44, 46 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order). \nAccordingly, \nthe Supreme Court has explained that, to require production of materials pursuant t\n... [truncated, 2215 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022027/1 or ?id=EFTA00022027&page=1]", "char_count": 2215}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Page 3 \nof due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial \nwithout such production and inspection in advance of trial and that \nthe failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay \nthe trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not \nintended as a general \"fishing expedition.\" \nUnited States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974) (footnote omitted); see United States v. \nSkelos, 988 F.3d 645, 661 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming a decision to quash subpoenas through \napplication of Nixon); United States v. Pena, No. 15 Cr. 551 (AJN), 2016 WL 8735699, at *1-*2 \n(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2016) (applying Nixon, rather than the \"more liberal standard\" of United States \nv. Tucker, 249 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), to the propriety of a Rule 17(c) subpoena). \nThe Nixon test is demanding. The defendant must establish that the defense's \"application \nis made in good faith and is not intended as a general `fishing expedition.' Nixon, 418 U.S. at \n700; United States v. Yian, No. 94 Cr. 719 (DLC), 1995 WL 614563, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, \n1995) (quashing subpoena that \"call[s] for the production of the entire investigative file and is \naccurately described as a fishing expedition\"); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 144 \n(3d Cir. 1980) (\"[T]est for enforcement is whether the subpoena constitutes a good faith effort to \nobtain ident\ned evidence rather than a general `fishing expedition' that attempts to use the rule as \na discovery device.\" (emphasis added)). Indeed, because the Rule poses such a risk of abuse and \nmisuse, courts are stringent in holding those seeking to obtain documents to Rule 17(c) to their \nburden of demonstrating that the documents sought are (1) relevant, (2) admissible, (3) specifically \nidentified, and (4) not otherwise procurable, and it is \"insufficient\" for a party to show only that \nthe subpoenaed documents \"are potentially relevant or may be admissible,\" United States v. RW \nProf! Leasing Servs. C\n... [truncated, 2280 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022027/2 or ?id=EFTA00022027&page=2]", "char_count": 2280}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Page 4 \nevidence; it cannot be used as a device to gain understanding or explanation.\" United States v. \nRich, No. 83 Cr. 579 (SWK), 1984 WL 845, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1984) (internal quotation \nmarks omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, subpoenas that call for \"any\" and \"all\" records \n\"do not evince specificity\" and \"read[] like a discovery request, which is not permitted under Rule \n17(c).\" Tagliaferro, 2021 WL 980004 at *3; see Pena, 2016 WL 8735699, at *3. And \"[g]enerally \nthe need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of \ntrial.\" Nixon, 418 U.S. at 701 (citations omitted); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(h) (\"No party may \nsubpoena a statement of a witness or of a prospective witness under this rule.\"). \nIf a subpoena calls for \"personal or confidential information about a victim,\" the subpoena \nmay be served \"only by court order\" following \"notice to the victim so that the victim can move \nto quash or modify the subpoena or otherwise object.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(3). After a subpoena \nissues, \"[t]he court may direct the witness to produce the designated items in court before trial or \nbefore they are to be offered in evidence.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1). \"When the items arrive, the \ncourt may permit the parties and their attorneys to inspect all or part of them.\" Id. \nII. \nThe Court Should Direct the Defendant to Provide Notice of Prior and Future \nApplications Under Rule 17(c) to the Government \nThe Government has legitimate and cognizable interests in Rule 17(c) subpoenas issued by \nthe defense. In particular, courts have routinely found that the Government has standing to move \nto quash Rule 17(c) subpoenas that target information about anticipated Government witnesses \n\"based on the Government's 'interest in preventing any undue lengthening of the trial, any undue \nharassment of the witness and his family, and any prejudicial over-emphasis on the witness's \ncredibility.\"' United States v. Ray, -- F.R.D. --,\n... [truncated, 2252 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022027/3 or ?id=EFTA00022027&page=3]", "char_count": 2252}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Page 5 \nCr. 746 (PKC), 2017 WL 6887596, at *2-*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2017) (\"Preventing the undue \nharassment of a cooperating witness is a legitimate governmental interest giving rise to standing \nin this context.\"); cf. United States v. Nachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d 552, 558-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) \n(concluding that the Government failed to establish a legitimate interest where, among other \nthings, none of the subpoenaed entities had been \"publicly identified by the Government as trial \nwitnesses, or as particularly vulnerable witnesses\"). That is particularly true where the subpoena \nat issue seeks material that the defendants would be entitled to, if at all, as Giglio or 3500 material \ngiven that the Government has a cognizable interest in \"controlling the timing of disclosures as \nto\" witnesses who are expected to testify at trial, and for whom the Government has various \ndisclosure obligations. United States v. Cole, No. 19 Cr. 869 (ER), 2021 WL 912425, at *2 \n(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2021); see Bergstein, 2017 WL 6887596, at *3. Finally, the Government has \nstanding to challenge subpoenas that call for its own communications. See United States v. Carton, \n17 Cr. 680 (CM), 2018 WL 5818107, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) (quashing a subpoena for \ncommunications with the Government).' \nThe only way for the Government to vindicate those interests is with notice so that the \nGovernment may, as appropriate, have an opportunity to quash the subpoenas. There is no avenue, \nafter a subpoena is issued and fulfilled, for the Government to protect its interests in the timing of \ndisclosures about victims or the disclosure of the Government's own communications. That is \nparticularly important given that a subpoena recipient may lack sufficient knowledge about the \n' The Government also has standing to challenge a Rule 17(c) subpoena at the request of a victim, \nwitness or third-party impacted by the subpoena. See Ray, 2020 WL 6939677, at *7 (\"Courts have \nacknowledged that the Governmen\n... [truncated, 2276 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022027/4 or ?id=EFTA00022027&page=4]", "char_count": 2276}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Page 6 \ncase or motivation to move to quash an otherwise improper subpoena. 2 Accordingly, the \nGovernment respectfully requests notice of all subpoenas with pretrial return dates issued or sought \nto be issued under Rule 17(c).3\nWhile, as the Court noted in its Order, Rule 17(c) subpoenas are frequently issued ex parte \nin this district, the issue is rarely litigated. See, e.g., United States v. States v. Wey, 252 F. Supp. 3d \n237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (noting, without extended discussion, that subpoena had issued upon ex \nparte application); United States v. Earls, No. 03 Cr.0364 (NRB), 2004 WL 350725, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. \nFeb. 25, 2004) (noting that the defendant may seek subpoenas ex parte). When courts have considered \nthe issue, however, many have directed that the parties should give each other notice of Rule 17(c) \nsubpoenas unless a party can justify proceeding ex parte. See United States v. Skelos, No. 15 Cr. \n317 (KMW), 2018 WL 2254538, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2018) (explaining that courts have \npermitted ex parte requests \"where a reason existed for doing so,\" and requiring notice \"[t]o further \nreduce the risk that trial will be delayed, unless a party has a compelling reason for proceeding ex \nparte with a subpoena request\"), aff'd, 988 F.3d 645 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. St. Lawrence, \n16 Cr. 259 (CS), Dkt. No. 66 at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016) (requiring motions for Rule 17(c) \nsubpoenas and permitting ex parte applications \"if the movant can articulate a reason why it should \nbe\"); United States v. Boyle, No. 08 Cr. 523 (CM), 2009 WL 484436, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, \n2009) (requiring noticed motions for Rule 17(c) subpoenas to \"assur[e] that such subpoenas are \nnot abused or used for impermissible discovery,\" and permitting ex parte applications \"where a \n2 For example, a financial institution may lack sufficient knowledge about the case or motivation \nto expend the resources to move to quash what appears to be a routine subpoena that broadly seeks \n... [truncated, 2271 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022027/5 or ?id=EFTA00022027&page=5]", "char_count": 2271}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Page 7 \nparty can demonstrate\" a basis (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Weisman, 01 Cr. 529 (BSJ), \n2002 WL 1467845, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2002) (similar); see also United States v. Fox, 275 F. \nSupp. 2d 1006, 1012 & n.7 (D. Neb. 2003) (surveying the caselaw and adopting the \"majority \nview\" that Rule 17(c) \"does not ordinarily permit the use of ex parte applications by the \ngovernment or the defense for subpoenas seeking pretrial production of documents unless the sole \npurpose of seeking the documents is for use at trial,\" and even then, only if \"there is a good trial-\nrelated reason\" and generally requiring production in the presence of the opposing party); 2 Wright \n& Miller, Fed. Prac. & Procedure § 275 (46' ed.) (\"It has been held, however, that in limited \ncircumstances, both the government and a defendant may make an ex parte application for a pre-\ntrial subpoena duces tecum\" (emphasis added)). But see Ray, 2020 WL 6939677 at *8 (\"Courts \nin this District have long followed the practice of permitting both the defense and the Government \nto submit ex parte applications for Rule 17(c) subpoenas.\"); United States v. Reyes, 162 F.R.D. \n468, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (permitting ex parte applications because a party must \"detail its trial \nstrategy or witness list in order to convince a court that the subpoena satisfies the Nixon \nstandards\"). Notice of Rule 17(c) subpoenas is similarly appropriate in this case to prevent abuse \nand address objections expediently. And such a requirement is consistent with the plain language \nof Rule 17: while Rule 17(b) expressly provides for an ex parte procedure for indigent defendants \nseeking to subpoena a witness for trial, it makes no such provision for an application for the \nproduction of documents and objects pursuant to Rule 17(c).4\n4 In Ray, the Court concluded that Rule 17(c) is simply an extension of Rules 17(a) and (b)'s \nprovisions of subpoenas to witnesses, which may issue without notice. See 2020 WL 6939677, at \n... [truncated, 2511 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022027/6 or ?id=EFTA00022027&page=6]", "char_count": 2511}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Page 8 \nMoreover, as the information currently available to the Government about the BSF \nsubpoena makes plain, the Government's concerns are well founded. Indeed, the defendant has \nalready sought issuance of a subpoena that appears to directly implicate the Government's interests \nby expressly and improperly seeking broad categories of victim information and communications \nwith the Government. While the Government has not seen the subpoena to BSF, it also appears \nthat the subpoena constitutes a fishing expedition for potential impeachment material, which \nplainly runs afoul of the Nixon test. (Letter from BSF to the Court at 2, Dkt. No. 191).5 Insofar \nas the defendant is attempting to engage in such an improper expedition in this case—or even if \nthe defendant is merely pushing the limits of a Rule 17 subpoena—the Government respectfully \nsubmits that it should be afforded the opportunity to bring its concerns to the Court's attention. \nThe Government recognizes that some information, such as portions of a defendant's \nexplanation for why a particular request in a particular subpoena meets the Nixon standard, may \nreveal critical defense strategy meriting ex parte consideration by the Court. But the Government \nrespectfully submits that interest can be served through specific defense requests tailored to the \nparticular redaction or application at issue, rather than a default whereby the defendant is permitted \nto proceed entirely ex parte in seeking documents and materials pursuant to Rule 17(c). \n(emphasis added); see United States v. Reyes, 162 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (\"Rules 17(a) \nand 17(b), which govern the issuance of subpoenas returnable at trial, also do not provide guidance \nas to the proper procedure for obtaining a pretrial subpoena duces tecum.\"). These procedures are, \nat a bare minimum, in tension with proceeding ex parte or under the rules that govern subpoenas \nfor trial testimony. \n5 The Government has also not seen any response filing\n... [truncated, 2350 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022027/7 or ?id=EFTA00022027&page=7]", "char_count": 2350}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Page 9 \nIII. \nAny Records Obtained Pursuant to a Rule 17(c) Subpoena Should Be Marked \nConfidential Under the Protective Order and Produced to the Opposing Party \nAdditionally, and to the extent the defendant has issued or will issue other subpoenas a \npane pursuant to Rule 17(c), the responsive records should be produced to the Government and \nmarked confidential pursuant to the protective order. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1). \nFirst, materials gathered pursuant to a Rule 17(c) subpoena by either party should be \npromptly made available to their adversary. As noted above, the text of Rule 17(c) plainly provides \nthat materials obtained pursuant to a subpoena may be returned to the Court which \"may permit \nthe parties and their attorneys to inspect all or part of them.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1). Nowhere \ndoes the Rule provide for one party's ability to use a subpoena to secretively gather material in \nadvance of trial, nor does it include a categorical exception due to concerns about defense or trial \nstrategy. Indeed, because the purpose of Rule 17 is to obtain evidence for use at trial, and not to \ninvestigate for evidence or obtain impeachment material, disclosure of the fruits of a Rule 17(c) \nsubpoena fits neatly with Rule 16's reciprocal obligations for disclosure of evidence that the \ndefendant intends to introduce in her case-in-chief. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(bX1)(A); United States \nv. St. Lawrence, 16 Cr. 259 (CS), Dkt. No. 66 at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016) (\"It seems to the Court \nthat because Rule 17(c) subpoenas are intended to obtain specific materials that the party expects \nto offer into evidence, Rule 16 would oblige the party to make the materials available to the other \nside anyway.\").6\nBy contrast, to the extent the defendant has improperly obtained information through a \nRule 17(c) subpoena, the Government should have the opportunity to move to preclude its use at \ntrial. In order to permit such a motion to be made in a timely manner—and so as to\n... [truncated, 2168 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00022027/8 or ?id=EFTA00022027&page=8]", "char_count": 2168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Page 10 \nunnecessary delay and disruption that will occur if the Government only learns of the existence of \nsuch material during trial—the Government seeks disclosure of any records obtained in response \nto such a subpoena. At a minimum, the Court should order production of subpoena returns directly \nto the Court, so it may screen out irrelevant or improper information and determine whether any \nmaterials should be made available to the Government as well as the defendant. \nSecond, the Court should direct that any material obtained pursuant to a Rule 17 subpoena \nbe marked confidential and subject to the protective order. As noted above, the BSF subpoena \nappears to call for a substantial amount of sensitive personal information about victims. For \ninstance, according to the letter from BSF, the subpoena to BSF requests the \"original, complete \ncopy\" of a victim's diary. (Letter from BSF to the Court at 5, Dkt. No. 191). To the extent the \ndefendant has obtained or will obtain sensitive information about victims or witnesses, it should \nbe treated as \"confidential\" under the protective order much like other such information in this \ncase. \nEFTA00022036\n", "char_count": 1172}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00022027", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Page 11 \nIV. \nConclusion \nThe Government respectfully requests that the Court order the defendant to provide notice \nto the Government of pending and future applications for Rule 17(c) subpoenas returnable in \nadvance of trial, and for the Court to order that any records obtained in response to Rule 17(c) \nsubpoenas be treated as confidential under the protective order and disclosed to the Government. \nRespectfully submitted, \nAUDREY STRAUSS \nUnited States Attorney \nby:  \nIs/\nAssistant United States Attorneys \ncc: \nCounsel of Record (by ECF) \nEFTA00022037\n", "char_count": 562}]}