{"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_count": 17, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00013811", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00013811.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nSUBMISSION TO THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL \nIN THE MATTER OF JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN \nJeffrey Epstein, a successful businessman and noted philanthropist with no prior criminal \nrecord, has been investigated for potential violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(b). \nSince the limited review conducted by CEOS, two Supreme Court decisions—one authored by \nJustice Scalia and the other by Justice Thomas—have revitalized the bedrock principles that \nfederal criminal statutes must be narrowly construed, that they may not be stretched to federalize \nconduct not clearly covered by their prohibitions, and that whenever there are two plausible \nconstructions of a criminal statute, the narrower construction (hich safeguards liberty) rather than \nthe broader construction (which expands the federal prosecutor's arsenal) controls under the \nvenerable rule of lenity. \nMr. Epstein's conduct—including his misconduct—falls within the heartland of historic \nstate police and prosecutorial powers. Absent a significant federal nexus, matters involving \nprostitution have always been treated as state-law crimes even when they involve minors. Mr. \nEpstein's conduct lacks any of the hallmarks that would convert this quintessential state crime \ninto a federal one under any of the statutes prosecutors are considering. \nMr. Epstein lived in Palm Beach, and his interstate travel was merely to go home. My \nsexual conduct that occurred after he arrived was incidental to the purposes for his travel. Even \nCEOS admitted that applying § 2423(b) to a citizen traveling home would be \"novel.\" In fact, it \nwould be both unprecedented and in conflict with Supreme Court cases that have withstood the \ntest of time for over 60 years. \nMoreover, Mr. Epstein did not use the intemet (either via email or chatrooms) to \ncommunicate with any of the witnesses in this investigation. Indeed, he did not use any other \nfacility of interstate commerce, including the phone, to knowi\n... [truncated, 3397 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/0 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=0]", "char_count": 3397}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nsexual trafficking. The statute has never been applied to a \"John,\" and only a highly and \nimpermissibly selective prosecution could stretch § 1591 to reach conduct like that at issue in \nthis case. \nIn short, without \"novel\" interpretive expansions—a description used by CEOS itself—it \ncannot be shown that Mr. Epstein violated any of the three federal statutes identified by \nprosecutors. As the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Santos and Cuellar make clear, federal \nlaw may not be stretched in that manner, and the current federal investigation relies, as its \nfoundation, on impermissibly elastic stretches of each statute beyond any reported precedent; \nbeyond the essential elements of each statute; well outside the ordinary construction of each \nstatute's limitations; and on a selective, extraordinary, and unwarranted expansion of federal law \nto cover conduct that has always been exclusively within the core of state powers. \nAt this point in time, the need for Departmental oversight is critical. We appreciate this \nopportunity to submit our assessment of the key facts in this case and review of the pertinent \nfederal statutes, and respectfully request that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General end \nfederal involvement in this matter so that the State of Florida may resolve this case appropriately. \nSummary of the Facts \nMr. Epstein has maintained a home in Palm Beach, Florida for the past 20 years. While \nthere, he routinely conducted business, received medical attention, socialized with friends, and \nhelped care for his elderly mother. Mr. Epstein also had various women visit his home to \nperform massages. He did not personally schedule the massage appointments or communicate \nwith the women over the phone or the Internet. Rather, Mr. Epstein's personal assistants \nscheduled many types of appointments, personal trainers, chiropractors, business meetings and \nmassages. \nThe phone message pad taken from his house and in the possession o\n... [truncated, 3285 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/1 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=1]", "char_count": 3285}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nTr. at 6 8, 22, 45; Tab 7, \nTr. 13; Tab 8 \nTr. at 8; Tab 9, \nTr. at 5; and \nTab \nTr. at 14-15 (excerpts from these transcripts are included below). Furthermore, \nthe women who visited Mr. Epstein's home all visited voluntarily and many willingly returned \nseveral times. \nThe State Attorney's Office (the \"SAO\") has vast experience prosecuting sex crimes and \nconducted an exhaustive, 15-month investigation of Mr. Epstein. A Grand Jury has concluded \nthat Mr. Epstein was merely a local \"John,\" guilty of soliciting prostitution in violation of state \nlaw. Notably, Florida law distinguishes soliciting from procuring and compelling prostitution if \nminors are involved. Indeed, soliciting is a misdemeanor except for the commission of a third \nsubsequent offense, turning it into a felony. The SAO, therefore, sought and obtained an \nindictment charging Mr. Epstein with felony solicitation of prostitution. Mr. Epstein is prepared \nto plead guilty and accept a sentence for that offense—a sentence that, notably, is far more \nsevere than that meted out to other \"Johns\" convicted of violating Florida's solicitation laws for \ncases in which sexual activity was alleged. \nThough CEOS points out its admirable goal of \"protecting children,\" a moniker that \nengenders high emotions, the conduct alleged here involves women over 16, which is the age of \nconsent in 38 states and supplies the effective federal age of consent. The young women were by \nno means the target of high-school trolling; they were individuals who, with friends, visited Mr. \nEpstein's house—a home full of friends and staff. The civil complaints filed against Mr. Epstein \nreiterate the fact that the individuals who visited Mr. Epstein would visit with their friends. And \nMr. Epstein never spoke to or had any contact with these women before they arrived at his \nhouse. And again, the State is handling this matter appropriately. \nWe respectfully submit that that should be the beginning and the end of\n... [truncated, 3237 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/2 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=2]", "char_count": 3237}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nSummary of the Law \nWe have reviewed every reported case under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b), and 2423(b), \nand cannot find a single one that resulted in a conviction on facts akin to the ones here. In some \nrespects, it is not surprising that no precedent supports federal prosecution of a man who engaged \nin consensual conduct, in his home, that amounts to solicitation under State law. After all, \nprostitution, even when the allegations involve minors, is fundamentally a State concern, United \nStates v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, n.1 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that federal law \"does not \ncriminalize all acts of prostitution (a vice traditionally governed by state regulation)\"), and there \nis no evidence that Palm Beach County authorities and Florida prosecutors cannot effectively \nprosecute and punish the conduct. See also Batchelder v. Gonzalez, No. 4:07-cv-00330-SPM-\nAK, 2007 WL 5022105 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2007). In fact, the opposite is true—the state-elected \nofficials, cognizant of the local mores of the community, have a lauded history of just such \nprosecutions. \nIn any event, and as set forth below, none of the federal statutes in this case remotely \nsupports a prosecution on the facts of this case without each and every element being stretched in \na novel way to encompass the behavior at issue. We begin with first principles. Courts in this \ncountry have \"traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of federal criminal statutes, \nboth out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 \n(1985), and out of concern that `a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the \ncommon world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed!\" Arthur \nAndersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703 (2005) (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 \nU.S. 25, 27 (1931)) (citation omitted). \nTwo recent Supreme Court decisions dramatically underscore these principles and hel\n... [truncated, 3260 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/3 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=3]", "char_count": 3260}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nCongress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead.\" \nSlip op. at 6.' \nIn Cuellar, the Court examined the link between the money-laundering statute's mere rea \nrequirement and the underlying elements of the offense. After a careful textual analysis of the \nstatute and its structure, the Court ruled that the defendant's conviction could be sustained only if \nhe knew that the transportation of funds to Mexico was designed to conceal their nature, \nlocation, source, ownership or control—not merely that the defendant knew that the funds had \nbeen hidden during their transportation to Mexico. Slip op. at 10-17. \nBoth decisions relied on the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms Congress chose. \nAnd both rejected attempts to broaden those words to cover conduct not clearly targeted by \nCongress. Taken together, these decisions reject the notion that prosecutors can take language \nfrom a narrowly drawn federal statute—especially one that itself federalizes the prosecution of \nconduct traditionally within the heartland of State police powers—and convert it into a license to \nreach additional conduct by ignoring, rewriting or expansively interpreting the law. Both cases \nadditionally rejected the notion that statutes should be broadly construed in order to facilitate \nprosecutions or to in anyway diminish the burden on prosecutors to prove each essential element \nof a federal charge in conformity with Congress's determinations as to what is within the federal \ncriminal law and what is not. The conflict between the Santos and Cuellar decisions and \nCEOS's grant of effectively unlimited discretionary authority to the USAO to take federal law to \n\"novel\" places where they have never reached before could not be starker. \nThese lessons have no less force in the context of Executive Branch decision-making \nthan they do in the context of Judicial interpretation. As you are aware, when federal prosecutors \nexercise th\n... [truncated, 3303 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/4 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=4]", "char_count": 3303}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nscope—not the local conduct that is alleged here—and each of these statutes requires proof of \nthe defendant's actual knowledge that simply is not present in this case. Any attempt to stretch \nthe language of these statutes to cover this case would be a misuse of the law and contrary to \nexpress legislative intent. In short, the elements under each federal statute-18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, \n2422(b) and 2423(b)—are not satisfied here. \n1. \n18 U.S.C. & 2422(b1 \n18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the \ndefendant engaged in communications over an interstate facility (e.g., the Internet or phone) with \nfour concurrent intentions: (I) to knowingly (2) persuade, induce, entice or coerce, or attempt to \npersuade, induce, entice, or coerce (3) a minor (4) to engage in prostitution or criminal sexual \nactivity for which the person can be charged. Mr. Epstein's conduct does not satisfy the \nelements of § 2422(b). Each element must be individually stretched, and then conflated in a \ntenuous chain to encompass the alleged conduct with any individual woman. \nAs the statute makes clear, the essence of this crime is the communication itself—not the \nresulting act. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Murrell, underscores the point: \nThe defendant in Bailey contended that attempt under § 2422(b) `requires the \nspecific intent to commit illegal sexual acts rather than just the intent to persuade \nor solicit the minor victim to commit sexual acts.' Id. at 638. In response, the \ncourt held `[w]hile it may be rare for there to be a separation between the intent to \npersuade and the follow-up intent to perform the act after persuasion, they are two \nclearly separate and different intents and the Congress has made a clear choice to \ncriminalize persuasion and the attempt to persuade, not the performance of the \nsexual acts themselves. Hence, a conviction under the statute only requires a \nfinding that the defendan\n... [truncated, 3258 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/5 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=5]", "char_count": 3258}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \ndid result, it was mainly self-pleasuring masturbation and not necessarily illegal, but spontaneous \nand resulted from face-to-face conversations during the massage. Thus, the fact that Mr. Epstein \nlater may have persuaded any particular masseuse to engage in unlawful activity during the \nmassage does not work retroactively to render the earlier scheduling phone call an offense under \n§ 2422(b). Nor is there any evidence that women who returned to Mr. Epstein's home time and \nagain were somehow coerced or induced over a facility of interstate commerce to do so. \nThe first essential element of § 2422(b) that \"[w]hoever, using the mail or any facility or \nmeans of interstate or foreign commerce,\" by its plain language, requires that the \ncommunication, which is the essence of the crime and its actus reus, take place during the use of \nthe facility of interstate commerce (in this case, unlike the vast majority of Internet chat room \nsting operations, a telephone). The statute is not ambiguous. It requires that the criminal \nconduct occur while the defendant is \"using\" (i.e. engaged in the communication), not thereafter. \nGiven the utter lack of direct evidence against Mr. Epstein, prosecutors have signaled that \nthey intend to offer a purely circumstantial case if this matter proceeds to trial—essentially \narguing that \"routine and habit\" evidence could substitute for actual proof that an interstate \nfacility was used to solicit sex from minors. Thus, despite the fact that the calls themselves were \nnot made by Mr. Epstein and did not contain the necessary explicit communication to knowingly \ninduce minors to provide sexual favors for money, prosecutors are seeking to turn the phrase \"are \nyou available\"—the same phrase used with friends, chiropractors, and trainers—into a ten-year \nmandatory prison sentence. In any case, the prosecution's attenuated argument regarding \n\"routine and habit\" will also not fit the facts of this case. The witness tes\n... [truncated, 3756 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/6 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=6]", "char_count": 3756}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nThe prosecution has never represented to counsel that they have evidence that would \nprove that the inducement or enticement to engage in illegal sexual acts occurred over the phone \n(or Internet). The prosecution's references to \"routine and habit\" evidence that would substitute \nfor the explicit communications usually found in the transcripts from chat rooms or sting \noperations is tenuous at best. In essence, the prosecution would be alleging communications \nunderstood, but not spoken, by two people, one of whom was usually a secretary or assistant. \nSeparating the actus reus and the mens rea, however, and premising criminal liability on \npersuasion that might occur after the communication, or on the existence of a specific intent to \nengage in illegal sex with a minor that arises after the communication would violate the bedrock \nprinciple of criminal law that predicates liability on the concurrence of the act and the criminal \nstate of mind. Even if, arguendo, the communication and mens rea could be separated (a \npremise which is at odds with the requirement of concurrence), Mr. Epstein denies that the \nfactual proof demonstrates such a pattern or practice. Instead, the evidence compellingly proves \nthat there was no regularity or predictability to the content of the communication or in what \noccurred at meetings that were telephonically scheduled (including those that are the subject of \nthis investigation). \nA second essential element of 2422(6) requires that the defendant \"knowingly\" induce, \npersuade, entice or coerce a person believed to be a minor. \" .. . [K]knowingly . . . induces . ..\" \nrequires the Court to define inducement so it is consistent with its ordinary usage and so the term \nis not so broad that it subsumes the separate statutory terms of \"entices\" and \"persuades.\" \nInducement has a common legal meaning that has been endorsed by the government when it \noperates to narrow the affirmative defense of entrapment. Inducement \n... [truncated, 3639 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/7 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=7]", "char_count": 3639}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nThere is insufficient evidence that Mr. Epstein targeted minors, as required. \nThe \nevidentiary pattern does not even establish willful blindness since Mr. Epstein took steps to \nensure his visitors were over 18—and certainly took none to avoid knowing. But, even if the \ngovernment contends that it possesses evidence that could demonstrate that Mr. Epstein knew or \nshould have known or suspected that a small number of the masseuses were underage, that would \nstill not make this an appropriate case for federal, rather than state prosecution. The federal \nstatutes were not intended to supersede state prosecutions involving isolated instances of \nunderage sex. \nInstead, the federal statutes were intended for large-scale rings or for an \nindividual who was engaged, while using interstate facilities such as the Internet, with the willful \ntargeting of minors. \nThe government's evidence, even when stretched to the limit, will not show a pattern of \ntargeting underage persons for illegal sexual activity. A federal prosecution should not become a \ncontest between the prosecution and defense over whether the defendant knew, suspected or \nshould have known whether a particular person was or was not over age. The history of cases \nbrought under this statute make crystal clear that knowledge of the defendant regarding the age \nof the women is required—either by admission or by incontrovertible transcripts of \nconversations (i.e. stings operations which require repeated acknowledgment of the defendant's \nawareness of the victims' age). Even states with absolute liability about mistake regarding age \nrarely prosecute cases where definitive proof is lacking (Palm Beach County rarely does and \nwhen it does, it imposes house arrest sentences). This is a matter for the exercise of state \nprosecutorial discretion and not federal mandatory minimum statutes that were not intended to \ncover such conduct. \nA third essential element of § 2422(b) is the requirement tha\n... [truncated, 3603 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/8 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=8]", "char_count": 3603}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nsexual organ of another; anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; or the \nhandling or fondling of the sexual organ of another for the purpose of masturbation.\" Fla. Stat. § \n796.01(1Xd). Also, the Florida Supreme Court jury instructions define prostitution as involving \n\"sexual intercourse.\" As a result, topless massages—even ones for hire that include self-\nmasturbation—fall outside the ambit of the state-law definition of prostitution. Absent proof \nbeyond a reasonable doubt that, at the critical time of the communication, Mr. Epstein had a \nspecific intent to persuade another to engage in prostitution or \"sexual activity,\" as defined by \nFlorida law, he cannot be guilty of an offense under § 2422(b). \nAs important, the plain language of the phrase \"for which any person can be charged\" \nnecessarily excludes acts as to which the state's statute of limitations has run. Under Florida \nlaw, prostitution and prostitution-related offenses are misdemeanors in the second degree for a \nfirst violation.2 See Fla. Stat.. § 796.07(4)(a). The limitations period for a misdemeanor in the \nsecond degree is one year, and there is no tolling provision based upon the victim's age. See Fla. \nStat. § 775.15(6). Even as to allegations of third degree felonies, the statute of limitations is \nthree years. Thus, any conduct alleged to have occurred before mid-June 2005 cannot be \ncharged as a matter of state law and thus cannot be a predicate for a § 2422(b) offense—even if \nthe federal statute of limitations has not run on any given § 2422(b) offense because of the \nlengthier statute codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Thus, no prosecution under § 2422(b) can be \nbrought based upon inducement of prostitution or sexual activity for which Florida's statute of \nlimitation has run. Furthermore, in Florida, the statute of limitations does not simply give rise to \nan affirmative defense. On the contrary, statute of limitations \"creates a substantive right whi\n... [truncated, 3037 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/9 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=9]", "char_count": 3037}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \n18 U.S.C. § 1591, a sex trafficking statute, provides up to 40 years' imprisonment for \nanyone (1) who recruits or obtains by any means a person in interstate commerce (ii) knowing \nthat the person is under 18 and (iii) knowing that the person will be caused to engage in a \ncommercial sex act. The most heinous of crimes, described on the CEOS website, fall within \nthis statute and include the buying and selling of children and the forced servitude of third-world \nimmigrants brought to this country to be enslaved. Mr. Epstein's behavior is nowhere near the \nheartland of this statute. This statute has also been previously reserved for prostitution rings \ninvolving violence, drugs and force. In stark contrast, there is no jurisdictional hook that brings \nMr. Epstein's conduct within the ambit of the statute, and securing a prosecution on these facts \nwould require a court to set aside both reason and precedent to convict a local `John' with a sex-\nslavery crime. It can not be said that Mr. Epstein engaged in trafficking and slavery nor did he \nknowingly recruit or obtain underage women with knowledge that they would be caused to \nengage in a commercial sex act. Thus, prosecuting him under this statute would expand the law \nfar beyond its scope. \nTo the extent there are cases where prosecutors think that Mr. Epstein should have known \nthat certain women were underage, there is no evidence that Mr. Epstein \"caused [them] to \nengage in a commercial sex act.\" The term \"cause\" naturally implies the application of some \nsort of force, coercion, or undue pressure, but there is no evidence that Mr. Epstein's interactions \nwith the women were anything but consensual. Again, many of the women phoned Mr. \nEpstein's assistant themselves in order to determine whether he wanted a massage. Nor can the \ncause requirement be proved simply by the fact that Mr. Epstein compensated the women. After \nall, the statute elsewhere requires that the women \"engage in a comm\n... [truncated, 3186 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/10 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=10]", "char_count": 3186}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \n18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), a statute enacted to prevent sex tourism, provides up to 30 years of \nimprisonment for anyone who travels across state lines (i) for the purpose of engaging in (ii) \nillicit sexual conduct with a minor. Neither of those elements is satisfied here. \nMr. Epstein did not travel to Palm Beach for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity \nwith a minor, within the meaning of the statute. The evidence is indisputable that Palm Beach \nwas where Mr. Epstein spent most of his discretionary time, and that his travels to Palm Beach \nwere merely trips returning often to his home of twenty years—not the escapades of a sex tourist \noff to some destination inextricably intertwined with the required significant or dominant \npurpose of that trip to be to have \"illicit sexual conduct.\" Epstein's trips to Palm Beach were \nsimply those of a businessperson traveling home for weekends or stopping over on his way to or \nfrom New York and St. Thomas or to visit his sick and dying mother in the hospital for months \non end. He certainly did not travel to his home in Florida for the dominant purpose of engaging \nin sexual conduct with a person who he knew was under 18 when he did not know, at the time he \ndecided to travel, from whom he was to receive a massage, if he were to receive one at all. \nIn Cuellar, the unanimous Supreme Court linked the term \"design\" in the money-\nlaundering statute to the terms \"purpose\" and \"plan,\" and stressed that those terms all required \nthe defendant to \"formulate a plan for; devise\"; \"[t]o create or contrive for a particular purpose or \neffect\"; [carry out] \"[a] plan or scheme\"; or \"to conceive and plan out in the mind.\" Slip. op. at \n12 (citing dictionary definitions). The same link is present here, and it simply cannot be said that \nMr. Epstein's design, plan, or purpose in traveling to Palm Beach was to engage in illicit sexual \nconduct with minors; his design or plan or purpose was simply to return to his home.\n... [truncated, 3698 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/11 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=11]", "char_count": 3698}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nRelevant Past Cases \nWe have not been able to find a single federal prosecution based on facts like these—but \nhave voluminous evidence of federal prosecutors routinely declining to bring charges in cases far \nmore egregious than this one. To take just one obvious example, federal prosecutors have self-\nconsciously refrained from involvement in the literally dozens of sexual cases of former priests, \nopting instead to allow seasoned state prosecutors (like the ones in this case) to pursue the \naccused former clergymen. That is so despite (1) the large number of victims, (2) the vast \ngeographic diversity of the cases, and (3) the fact that some of these cases involve allegations \nthat the defendant forcibly molested, abused, or raped literally dozens of children—including \nsome as young as five years old—over a period of years. Nonetheless, federal prosecutors have \nnot hesitated to let their state counterparts pursue these cases free from federal interference—\neven though the sentences meted out vary greatly on account of the fact that \"[c]riminal penalties \nare specific to localities or jurisdictions.\"3 The facts of this case, which involve the solicitation \nof consensual topless massages and some sexual contact, entirely in the privacy of his home and \nalmost entirely by women over the age of 18, pale in comparison to the outright sexual abuse and \ndegradation of preteen minors in many of the priest cases. \nNor does this case bear any of the hallmarks that typify the cases that federal prosecutors \nhave pursued under the federal statutes at issue here. When asked, the closest case suggested by \nthe prosecutors was United States v. Boehm—and it hardly could differ more from Mr. Epstein's \ncase. In Boehm, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine \nbase to minors, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 84I(a)(1), and 859(a); being a felon in \npossession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I); and sex tr\n... [truncated, 3639 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/12 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=12]", "char_count": 3639}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nTo the extent there is a similar, but more egregious, local Florida case on the books, it is \nthat of Barry Kutun, a former North Miami city attorney accused of having sex with underage \nprostitutes and videotaping the sessions. Mr. Kutun pleaded guilty on May 18, 2007 in a Miami-\nDade County courtroom as part of an agreement with State prosecutors and he received five \nyears probation and a withholding of adjudication with no requirement to register as a sex \noffender—all without a shred of involvement by federal prosecutors, who declined to prosecute \nhim. Indeed, given the wide use of the telephone in today's society, it gives a rogue prosecutor \ncarte blanche to turn any local crime into a federal offense. Given the federal government's \ndecision to abstain from prosecuting that case, it is hard to understand how the federal \nprosecutors responsible for this case think that the State's treatment of Mr. Epstein somehow \nleaves federal interests substantially unvindicated. There is simply no basis for the federal \nprosecutors' disparate treatment of Mr. Epstein. \nSummary of the Evidence \nFinally, we wish to share new evidence—obtained through discovery in connection with \nthe civil lawsuits filed in this matter—which confirms that further federal involvement in this \nmatter would be inappropriate. This testimony taken to date categorically confirms that (i) Mr. \nEpstein did not target minors; (ii) women under 18 often lied to Mr. Epstein about their ages; (iii) \nMr. Epstein did not travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in illegal sexual \nactivity; (iv) Mr. Epstein did not use the Internet, telephone or any other means of interstate \ncommunication to coerce or entice alleged victims; (v) Mr. Epstein did not apply force or \ncoercion to obtain sexual favors; and (vi) all sexual activity that occurred was unplanned and \npurely consensual. The women's own statements—made under oath—demonstrate the absence \nof a legitimate feder\n... [truncated, 2967 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/13 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=13]", "char_count": 2967}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \nalso had conversations with other women in which these women hoped \nthat \"Jeffrey didn't find out [their] age[s].\" See Tab 6, \nTr., p. 45. \no Ms. \nalso stated that she: \"would tell my girlfriends just like \napproached me. Make sure you tell him you're 18. Well, these girls that I \nbrought, I know that they were 18 or 19 or 20. And the girls that I didn't \nknow and I don't know if they were lyiiiinot, I would say make sure \nthat you tell him you're 18.\" See Tab 6, \nTr., p. 22. \no Ms. \nstated that Ms.. \ntold her say that she was 18 if asked. See \nTab 14, \nTr. A, p. 8. \nstated that she \"told him I was 19.\" See Tab 5, \nTr., p. 16. \n• \nMr. Epstein did not know these women would be caused to engage in a sex act \n(necessary for a conviction under § 1591) and any sexual activity that took place was \nunplanned. \no Ms. \nstated \"sometimes [Mr. Epstein] likes topless massages, but \nyou don't have to do an\n you don't want to do. He just likes \nmassages.\" See Tab 6, \nTr., p. 7. \no Ms. \nalso stated \"[s]ometimes [Mr. Epstein] just wanted his feet \nmassaged. Sometimes he just wanted a back massage.\" See Tab 6, \nTr., p. 19. \n• \nMr. Epstein did not use an interstate facility to communicate an illegal objective to \nthe alleged victims (necessary for a conviction under § 2422(b)). \no Ms. \nconfirmed that Mr. Epstein never emailed texted, or chatted \nin an Internet chat room with her. See Tab 13, \nTr. (deposition), \np. 30. \n• \nMr. Epstein did not target minors (necessary for a conviction under § 2422(6)) \no Ms. \nstated, \"I arinade sure -- I had a fake ID, anyways, saying \nthat I was 18. And I \n(who is \nfriend who brought her to \nMr. Epstein's home)] just said make sure sire \n18 because Jeffrey \ndoesn't want any underage girls.\" See Tab 6, \nTr., p. 8. \n• \nMr. Epstein did not use the phone or the Internet to induce proscribed sexual activity \n(necessary for a conviction under § 2422(b)). \no Ms. \nstated that there was never any discussion over the phone about \nher comin\n... [truncated, 2209 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/14 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=14]", "char_count": 2209}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \n`Would you like to come over and give a massage.\" See Tab 14, \nTr. \nA, p. 15 \no Ms. \nconfirmed that she was informed that she was going to Mr. \nEpstein's house to give him a massage and nothing else, and that no one \n\"said anything to [her] on the telephone [or over the Internet] about sexual \nactivity with Mr. Epstein.\" See Tab 13, \nTr. (deposition), p. 24-\n25. \no Ms. \nalso confirmed that no one associated with Mr. Epstein ever \ntried to call her or contact her through the Internet to try to persuade, \ninduce entice or coerce her to engage in any sexual activity. See Tab 13, \nTr. (deposition), p. 31. \n• \nMr. Epstein did not travel to Palm Beach for the purpose of engaging in sexual \nactivity with a minor (necessary for a conviction under § 2423(b)). \no Mr. Epstein spent at least 100 days a year in Palm Beach for family \npurposes, business purposes, and social purposes, and to maintain a home. \no While in Palm Beach, Mr. Epstein routinely visits family members and \nclose friends, has seen his primary care physician for checkups and \nprescribed tests in the Palm Beach area, and until her death in April of \n2004, regularly saw his mother who was hospitalized and then \nconvalesced in south Florida. \no From 2003 through 2005 there was no month when Mr. Epstein did not \nspend at least one weekend in Palm Beach. \no The Palm Beach area is the home base for his flight operations, for \nmaintenance of his aircraft, and for periodic FAA inspections. \no Additionally, Mr. Epstein's pilots and engineers all resided in Florida. \n• \nMr. Epstein's conduct did not involve force, coercion or violence and any sexual \nactivity that took place was consensual. The witness transcripts are replete with \nstatements such as the following: \no Ms. \nstated that she was not persuaded, induced, enticed or \ncoerced by anyone to engage in any sexual activity. See Tab 13, \nTr. (deposition), p. 31. \no Ms. \nstated: \"[Mr. Epstein] never tried to force me to do anything.\" \nSee Tab 1\n... [truncated, 2186 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/15 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=15]", "char_count": 2186}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00013811", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP \ndon't feel comfortable with. And I said okay, but I willingly took it off.\" \nSee Tab 6, \nTr., p. 10. \no Ms. \nalso stated \"[s  mimgirls didn't want to go topless and Jeffrey \ndidn't mind.\" See Tab 6, \nTr., p. 23. \n• \nMr. Epstein did not engage in luring. \no Mr. Epstein's message books show that several masseuses would regularly \ncall Mr. Epstein's assistants, without any prompting by Mr. Epstein or his \nassistants, asking to visit Mr. Epstein at his home. \no Ms. \nstated \"a lot of girls begged me to bring them back [to Mr. \nEpstein's house].\" \n• \nThere was no alcohol or drugs involved, a fact that is not in dispute. \n• \nMr. Epstein has no prior criminal history, a fact that is not in dispute. \n• \nThese women do not see themselves as victims. \no Ms. \nindicated under oath that the FBI attempted to persuade her that \nshe was in fact a \"victim\" of federal crimes when she herself repeatedly \nconfirmed that she was not. See Tab 14, \nTr. A, p. 9-12 and Tab 15, \nTr. B, p. 7. \nConclusion \nJeffrey Epstein, a self-made businessman with no prior criminal history, should not be \nprosecuted federally for conduct that amounts to, the solicitation of prostitution. A federal \nprosecution based on these facts would be an unprecedented exercise of federal power, a misuse \nof federal resources, and a prosecution that would carry with it the appearance, if not the reality, \nof unwarranted selectivity given the incongruity between the facts as developed in this matter \nand the factual paradigms for all other reported federal prosecutions under each of the three \nstatutes being considered. It would require the pursuit of a novel legal theory never before \nsanctioned by federal law—and that indeed is inconsistent with each of the statutes prosecutors \nhave identified. Accordingly, we respectfully request that you direct the U.S. Attorney's Office \nfor the Southern District of Florida to discontinue its involvement in this matter, and return \nresponsibility for this case\n... [truncated, 2044 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00013811/16 or ?id=EFTA00013811&page=16]", "char_count": 2044}]}