{"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_count": 23, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/EFTA00011452", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/EFTA00011452.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT \nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK \nx \nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, \nv. \nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, \nDefendant. \n: \n20 Cr. 330 (MN) \nx \nMEMORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL \nIN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE TO \nSUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S SUBPOENA \nTO BOIES SCHILLER AND TO DISMISS COUNTS FIVE AND SIX \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \n150 East 10th Avenue \nDenver, CO 80203 \nPhone: 303-831-7364 \nMark S. Cohen \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \n800 Third Avenue New \nYork, NY 10022 \nPhone: 212-957-7600 \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim \n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor \nNew York, NY 10011 \nPhone: 212-243-1100 \nAttorneys for Chislaine Maxwell \nEFTA00011452\n", "char_count": 782}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES \nii \nTABLE OF EXHIBITS \niv \nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT \n1 \nFACTUAL BACKGROUND \n2 \nA. \nThe Protective Order in \nv. Maxwell \n2 \nB. \nMaxwell's April and July 2016 depositions \n4 \nC. \nThe Settlement And Boies Schiller's Refusal To Comply With The Protective Order \n6 \nD. \nThe Government's False Statements To Judge McMahon \n6 \nE. \nJudge Netburn Separately Rejects An Identical Gambit By The Government \n 10 \nARGUMENT \n11 \nA. \nPursuant To Its Inherent Power, This Court Should Suppress The Evidence Obtained \nFrom Boies Schiller, And Dismiss Counts Five And Six, Which Are The Fruits Of That \nEvidence \n 11 \nI. \nThe role of protective orders in civil litigation \n 11 \n2. \nThe government circumvented the protective order \n 12 \n3. \nThe government violated due proces  • \n 14 \n4. \nThis court possesses the inherent authority to order suppression \n 15 \nB. \nAt A Minimum, This Court Should Order A Hearing At Which Maxwell May Inquire \nInto The Circumstances Surrounding The Government's Misrepresentations To Judge \nMcMahon \n 16 \nCONCLUSION \n16 \nCertificate of Service \n 18 \nEFTA00011453\n", "char_count": 1153}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "TABLE OF AUTHORITIES \nCases \nBenkovitch v. Gorilla, Inc., No. 2:15-ev-7806 (WJM), 2017 WL 4005452 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2017) \n \n17 \nBrown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41 (2d Ck 2019) \n3, 6 \nChambers v. NASCO, Inc., 510 U.S. 32 (1991) \n 17 \nChemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) \npassim \nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) \n 18 \nGiglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972) \n 16 \nv. Maxwell, 325 F. Supp. 3d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) \n6 \nKlein v. Weidner, Civ. No. 08-3798, 2017 WL 2834260 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2017) \n 17 \nManhattan Review LLC v. Ytni, 16 Civ. 0102 (LAK) (JCF), 2017 WL 11455317 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. \n21, 2017) \n17 \nMartindeli v. Intl Tel. & Tel. Cotp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979) \n 12, 13 \nS.E.C. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001) \n12 \nStewart v. Hudson Hall LLC, 20 Civ. 885 (SLC), 2020 WL 7239676 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2020) 12 \nUnited States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998) \n16 \nUnited States v. Cortina, 630 F.3d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980) \n 16 \nUnited States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2018) \n 16 \nUnited States v. Paredes-Cordova, No. S I 03 CR. 987DAB, 2009 WL 1585776 (S.D.N.Y. June \n8, 2009) \n18 \nUnited States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013) \n 18 \nUnited States v. Valentine, 820 F.2d 565 (2d Ck. 1987) \n 16 \nYoung v. United States, 481 U.S. 787 (1987) \n 16 \nii \nEFTA00011454\n", "char_count": 1337}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Other Authorities \nNorman Mailer, \"An Appeal to Lillian Hellman and Mary McCarthy,\" 5/11/80 New York Times \n \n2 \nStephen Rex Brown, Manhattan federal prosecutors declined to pursue Jeffrey Epstein and \nGhislaine Maxwell case in 2016, New York Daily News (Oct. 13, 2020) \n9 \nRules \nFed. R. Civ. P. 1 \n 12 \nConstitutional Provisions \nU.S. CONST. amend. V \n15 \niii \nEFTA00011455\n", "char_count": 376}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "TABLE OF EXHIBITS \nEXHIBIT A: Civil Protective Order \nEXHIBIT B: \nProtective Order Proposal \nEXHIBIT C: Sealed Affirmation and Application, USAO Ref. No. 2018R01618, 2/5/2019 \nEXHIBIT D: Transcript, 3/26/2019 \nEXHIBIT E: Transcript, 4/9/2019 \nEXHIBIT F: Sealed Order (19 Misc. 149 (CM)), 4/9/2019 \nEXHIBIT G: Sealed Memorandum Decision and Order Granting the Government's Application to \nModify the Protective Order (19 Misc. 149 (CM)), 4/9/2019 \nEXHIBIT H: Sealed Order (19-MC-00179 (SN)), 4/16/2019 \nEXHIBIT I: Sealed Letter to Judge Netbum, 4/9/2019 \niv \nEFTA00011456\n", "char_count": 571}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Ghislaine Maxwell moves to suppress all evidence the government obtained from a grand \njury subpoena it issued to Boies Schiller Flexner LLP and to dismiss Counts Five and Six, which \nare the fruits of that unlawful subpoena. \nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT \nCounts Five and Six allege that Maxwell committed perjury during two civil depositions \nconducted by Boies Schiller in a defamation action it filed against Maxwell on behalf of one of \nthe firm's clients. \nv. Marvell, Case No. 15-cv-7433 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y). A Protective \nOrder entered in that case prohibited the parties and their lawyers from sharing confidential \ndiscovery material (including the two Maxwell depositions) with anyone else, including with the \ngovernment and law enforcement. Faced with that Protective Order, the government issued a \ngrand jury subpoena for Boies Schiller's file and instituted an ex parte proceeding before Chief \nJudge McMahon to modify the Protective Order. By proceeding ex parte, the government \nensured that no one before the court would be able to contest the accuracy of its representations \nin support of its application. \nThe government then took full advantage. Judge McMahon, citing this Court's decision \nin Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), asked the \ngovernment, point blank, whether Southern District prosecutors had previously met with the \nBoies Schiller firm or otherwise \"collu[ded]\" with that firm in arranging the discovery request. \nThe government lawyer assured Judge McMahon that the prosecutors had no idea what was in \nBoies Schiller's file. Indeed, he insisted, there had been no contact whatsoever between Boies \nSchiller and United States Attorney's Office before the government commenced its investigation. \nNor, said the prosecutor, did Boies Schiller have any role instigating the Maxwell inquiry. \nEFTA00011457\n", "char_count": 1887}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "To paraphrase Mary McCarthy's philippic about Lillian Hellman, every word of the \ngovernment's representation was untrue, \"including 'and' and `the.\" The government knew \nwhat was in the Boies Schiller file; the law firm had provided that information well before the \ninvestigation began. The government did indeed have previous contact with the firm. And Pomp \nSchiller was instrumental in fomenting the Maxwell prosecution. \nThe record is surpassingly clear: But for the government's misrepresentation, witting or \nnot, Judge McMahon never would have permitted the circumvention of the civil Protective \nOrder, on which Maxwell relied in agreeing to sit for her depositions. This Court therefore has \nboth the authority and the duty to suppress the fruits of that misrepresentation, including the \ndeposition transcripts and the two perjury counts based on those transcripts. If the Court is \ndisinclined to exercise that inherent authority on the present record, Maxwell should be granted a \nhearing to examine the circumstances that resulted in the government's misrepresentations to \nJudge McMahon. \nFACTUAL BACKGROUND \nA. The Protective Order in \nv. Maxwell \nCounts Five and Six of the superseding indictment allege that Maxwell committed \nperjury during two civil depositions taken in \nv. Maxwell, a civil defamation case \nfiled in 2015. \nclaimed that Maxwell defamed her when Maxwell's attorney-hired \npress agent denied as \"untrue\" and \"obvious lies\" \nnumerous allegations, over the span \nof four years, that Maxwell had participated in a scheme to cause \nto be \"sexually abused \nand trafficked\" by Jeffrey Epstein. \n' See Norman Mailer, \"An Appeal to Lillian Hellman and Mary McCarthy,\" 5111/80 New York \nTimes. \n2 \nEFTA00011458\n", "char_count": 1739}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 7, "text_content": ", a public figure required to prove actual malice, had an uphill battle—even she \nwas constrained to acknowledge that many of her public statements were false. Using a time-\nhonored if unfortunate litigation tactic, her lawyers at Boies Schiller therefore sought to turn the \nlawsuit into a proxy prosecution of Epstein. Not surprisingly, discovery in the case was bitter, \nhard-fought, and wide-ranging. It spanned more than a year and included large document \nproductions, many responses to interrogatories, and thirty-some depositions, including \ndepositions of \nand Maxwell as well as several third parties. See Brown v. Maxwell, 929 \nF.3d 41, 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that discovery was \"hard-fought\" and \"extensive\" and \nnoting that the court file, which includes only some of the documents created during discovery, \ntotals in the \"thousands of pages\"). \nsought and obtained a wide variety of private and confidential information about \nMaxwell and others, including information about financial and sexual matters. Brown, 929 F.3d \nat 48 n.22. Given the intimate and highly confidential nature of the discovery exchanged between \nthe parties, the district court entered a stipulated Protective Order. See Ex. A. The Protective \nOrder included a mechanism for one party to challenge another party's confidentiality \ndesignation (such a challenge never occurred) and provided that it did not apply to any \ninformation or material disclosed at trial. (Because the case settled before trial, that sole \nexception to the Protective Order was never triggered.) \nNotably, Boies Schiller sought to add a \"law enforcement\" exception to the Protective \nOrder, doubtless because the firm was eager to enlist the government in its campaign against \nMaxwell. In particular, Boies Schiller proposed to include a provision stating that \n\"CONFIDENTIAL information shall not be disclosed or used for any purpose except the \npreparation and trial of this case and any related matter, including but not \n... [truncated, 2125 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/7 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=7]", "char_count": 2125}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "this proposal, and it was never included in the Protective Order. Ex. A.2 To the contrary, the \norder strictly limited the parties' disposition of Confidential Material, including at the conclusion \nof the case. In particular, paragraph 12 of the order provided that: \n[a]t the conclusion of this case, unless other arrangements are agreed upon, each \ndocument and all copies thereof which have been designated as CONFIDENTIAL \nshall be returned to the party that designated it CONFIDENTIAL, or the parties \nmay elect to destroy CONFIDENTIAL documents. Where the parties agree to \ndestroy CONFIDENTIAL documents, the destroying party shall provide all parties \nwith an affidavit confirming destruction. \nEx. Al 12. \nB. Maxwell's April and July 2016 depositions \nRelying on the confidentiality protections of the Protective Order, Maxwell declined to \ninvoke her privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and agreed to testify at her April \n2016 deposition. In that deposition, \nattorneys asked Maxwell whether \"Jeffrey Epstein \n[had] a scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages? If you know.\" Maxwell replied, \"I \ndon't know what you're talking about.\" And when asked to \"[I]ist all the people under the age of \n18 that you interacted with at any of Jeffrey's properties,\" Maxwell responded, \"I'm not aware of \nanybody that I interacted with, other than obviously [M\nI who was 17 at this point.\" Count \nFive of the superseding indictment alleges those two answers were false. \nFollowing the deposition, \nmoved to compel Maxwell to answer additional \nintimate and personal questions that she had previously declined to answer. In support of the \nmotion, Boies Schiller assured the district court that \"[s]uch questions are entirely appropriate in \nthe discovery phase of this case, particularly where any answers will be maintained as \nconfidential under the Protective Order in this case.\" \n'This proposal was rejected because of justifiable concerns about the misuse and abuse of th\n... [truncated, 2192 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/8 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=8]", "char_count": 2192}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "The district court granted the motion. In requiring Maxwell to answer highly intrusive \nquestions \"relating to [her] own sexual activity\" and \"her knowledge of the sexual activity of \nothers,\" the court held that Maxwell's \"privacy concerns are alleviated by the protective order in \nthis case.\" \nSecure in the belief that the Protective Order would be honored, Maxwell appeared at a \nsecond deposition. in July 2016. and answered hundreds of pages worth of questions about her \n\"own sexual activity\" and \"her knowledge of the sexual activities of others.\" From the very first \nquestion, Maxwell discussed the intimate details of her sexual activity with Epstein, with other \nadult men, with other adult women, the use of sex toys, participation in \"threesomes,\" and a full \ngamut of other sordid sexual topics. She was asked where she had sex, when she had sex, with \nwhom she had sex, what types of sexual predilections Epstein had, whether others watched her \nhaving sex, whether she watched other people having sex, and whether she slept with clothes on. \nShe was asked whether Epstein had sex with any number of women, and the names of women he \nmight have had sex with. Maxwell was also grilled extensively about massages: when, where, \nwhat she was wearing, who gave them. \nCount Six of the superseding indictment alleges that Maxwell provided false testimony \nwhen she testified during her July 2016 deposition that: (1) she could not recall whether sex toys \nor devices were used in sexual activities at Epstein's Palm Beach house; (2) she did not know \nwhether Epstein possessed sex toys or devices used in sexual activities; (3) she wasn't aware that \nEpstein was having sexual activities with anyone other than herself when she was with him; and \n(4) she never gave anyone, including Accuser-23, a massage. \nThe indictment refers to the accusers as Minor Victim-I, Minor Victim-2, and Minor Victim-3. \nWe will refer to them as Accuser-1, Accuser-2, and Accuser-3. \n5 \nEFTA00011461\n", "char_count": 1993}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "C. The Settlement And Boies Schiller's Refusal To Comply With The \nProtective Order \nIn 2017, the parties settled the defamation claim, and the case was dismissed. \nv. \nMaxwell, 325 F. Supp. 3d 428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), vacated and remanded sub nom. Brown, \n929 F.3d 41. As the district court found, \"a significant, if not determinative, factor\" in reaching a \nsettlement was its confidentiality. Id. at 446. \nAfter the case was settled and concluded, Maxwell repeatedly invoked Paragraph 12 of \nthe Protective Order and demanded that \neither return or destroy all confidential \ninformation, including her deposition transcripts. Boies Schiller refused. Instead, and \nunbeknownst to Maxwell. Boies Schiller produced some 90,000 pages of discovery material to \nthe government, including both of Maxwell's deposition transcripts. \nD. The Government's False Statements To Judge McMahon \nOnly in August 2020, after she was indicted in this case, did Maxwell finally learn that \nthe government had obtained the Boies Schiller file by grand jury subpoena. Maxwell also \nlearned that, to overcome the strictures of the Protective Order, the government had instituted an \nex parte proceeding before Judge McMahon, Case No. 19-Misc.-149 (CM) (S.D.N.Y). \nNeedless to say, neither Maxwell nor her attorneys were given the opportunity to oppose that \napplication or to contest the government's representations in support of the application. This was \nall in direct violation of Paragraph 14 of the Protective Order, which provides that the order may \nbe modified by the court only \"for good cause shown following notice to all parties and an \nopportunity to be heard.\" Ex. A Y 14 (emphasis added). \nIn its ex pane application, the prosecutors professed that they had sought out Boies \nSchiller's file only because \"publicly available information regarding the [ \nv. Maxwell] \n6 \nEFTA00011462\n", "char_count": 1880}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Litigation, including the complaint and other docketed filings ... appear[ed] to make reference \nto certain subjects relating to the Investigation.\" That \"publicly available information,\" the \ngovernment claimed, indicated that the Boies Schiller file might \"contain information relevant to \nthe ongoing Investigation\" of Jeffrey Epstein. Ex. C, 4. Nowhere did the government \nacknowledge that Boies Schiller had in fact approached the prosecutors multiple times well \nbefore the grand jury subpoena issued. \nIn March 2019, in the first appearance before Judge McMahon, the Government \ncontinued this refrain, professing ignorance about what was in Boies Schiller's file or who was \ndeposed in the case. The prosecutor defended the subpoena's breadth—which sought all \"copies \nof discovery and related materials\" in \nv. Maxwell-o n the ground that the government \nsimply had too little knowledge of what was in the law firm's files to craft a more narrowly \ntailored subpoena: \nHere, we are essentially unable to significantly narrow the request for information \nin part for exactly the reasons that you describe. We have either little or no \nadditional information than the Court does in terms of what materials there are, who \nwas deposed, and that is in marked contrast to some of the other cases. \nEx. D, p 17. For all the government knew, according to the Assistant U.S. Attorney, what he was \nseeking was \"page after page of people taking the Fifth.\" Ex. D. p 19. \nThe government appeared a second time before Judge McMahon in April 2019. Ex. E. \nJudge McMahon held that conference for one reason: to learn \"about contacts between the \nUnited States Attorney's Office and the Boies Schiller law firm prior to the issuance of the \nsubpoena.\" Ex. E, p 2. The Assistant U.S. Attorney told Judge McMahon that the government's \ninvestigation began on either November 30 or December 3, 2018, omitting mention of any \ncontacts between Boies Schiller and the government prior to that time: \nIn the init\n... [truncated, 2168 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/11 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=11]", "char_count": 2168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "possible victims who we should speak to. In the process of doing so, we identified \ncertain counsel that were identified as representing victims or witnesses either in \npublic filings or in media reports. Boies Schiller was among those plaintiff \nattorneys. So following the opening of the investigation, we were in touch with \nBoies Schiller, among other plaintiff and witness counsel, in connection with their \nrepresentation of witnesses or victims. \nWith respect to Boies Schiller in particular, we quickly came to learn during \nthe investigation that they had at the time either active or recently completed civil \nlitigation and so asked them, as is our standard practice, told them, I should say, \nthat we expected to make document requests. They generally advised us that they \nbelieved there was a protective order that would govern at least some of the \nmaterials, and that is why we ultimately made the application to the Court. \nEx. E, 99 pp 2-3. \nThose representations were false. At the time the government claims it began the \ninvestigation (late November or early December 2018), its knowledge of the civil case was not \nbased exclusively on public filings. It knew that Boies Schiller possessed relevant information \nbecause the firm had come to the government asking it to open an investigation. In particular, on \nFebruary 29, 2016, AUSA \nmet with attorneys from Boies Schiller, who \"urged \nn\no open an investigation of\" Epstein and Maxwell!' Then, after Maxwell's two \ndepositions, David Boies himself apparently approached the government in the summer of 2016, \nasking \"if the Southern District would consider charging Maxwell with perjury.\" Brown, supra \nn.2. Said Mr. Boies: \n\"We were saying to anyone who would listen: We've got clients who were abused. \nSome of them were underage. We have the evidence. There's a whole record that's \nbeen developed. We can establish beyond any reasonable doubt there was a massive \nsex trafficking ring going on.\" \nId. \nStephen Rex Brown, M\n... [truncated, 2277 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/12 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=12]", "char_count": 2277}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "At that time, however, the government did not act. Boles \"was particularly frustrated by \nthe failure to pursue a perjury charge [against Maxwell],\" reported one person, who recalled him \nsaying, \"We have her dead to rights.\"5 M. All of this contradicts The government's \nrepresentations to Judge McMahon, who specifically asked if the government had any contact \nwith Boies Schiller before it issued the subpoena. \nReassured by the government that no contact had occurred, Judge McMahon modified \nthe Protective Order so that Boies Schiller could comply with the subpoena. Ex. F. Judge \nMcMahon found that Maxwell could not have reasonably relied on the Protective Order as \nprohibiting Boies Schiller from cooperating with the government. In making this finding, Judge \nMcMahon relied on the Assistant U.S. Attorney's misrepresentations, and she distinguished the \ngovernment's subpoena to Boies Schiller from the subpoena at issue in Chemical Bank. Said \nJudge McMahon: \n[T]he ic ting on which Maxwell or anyone else might reasonably have relied is \nthat \nor her lawyers would not do what the defendant in Chemical Bank \ndid—that is, forward discovery materials in their possession to prosecutors for the \npurpose of fomenting an investigation. But I am not faced with that situation. \nNothing in this record suggests to me that \nor Boies Schiller had anything to \ndo with the Government's decision to convene a grand jury to look into the matters \nthat were the subject of the \nAction. On the contrary—the Government has \nadvised the Court that it contacted Boies Schiller as part of its search for parties \nwho might have been victims in its investigation; and that Boies Schiller told the \nGovernment that it could not consensually produce at least some documents in its \nfiles because of the existence of the Protective Order. There is no evidence of \n\"collusion,\" to invoke a term of the moment, and it is quite clear that Boies Schiller \ndid not foment the Government's investigation. Moreov\n... [truncated, 2467 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/13 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=13]", "char_count": 2467}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Contrary to the government's misrepresentations, Boies Schiller did foment the \ninvestigation (or at least it tried to). And the evidence of \"collusion\" between the government \nand Boies Schiller was ample, tracing to at least early 2016 and precisely designed to have \nMaxwell charged with perjury.° Had Judge McMahon known the truth, she likely would have \ndenied the government's application to modify the \nv. Maxwell Protective Order, and the \ngovernment would have been unable to secure a copy of Boies Schiller's ninety-thousand-page \nfile, including Maxwell's two deposition transcripts. \nE. Judge Netburn Separately Rejects An Identical Gambit By The \nGovernment \nAround the same time that Judge McMahon granted the government's ex parte request, \nMagistrate Judge Netbum rejected an identical request from the government in a different civil \ncase, Jane Doe 43 v. Epstein, Case No. 17-cv-616 (JGK) (SN). Judge Netburn recognized the \ngovernment's conduct for what it was: an attempt to deprive Maxwell of notice and an \nopportunity to be heard. Ex. H. Indeed, Judge Netbum rebuffed the government even after it \nalerted her to Judge McMahon's order. Ex. I. As Judge Netbum found, the government's \n\"abstract concern\" about the \"secrecy\" of its investigation—a concern that exists with any \ninvestigation and is hardly unique to this case—could not overcome the parties' reasonable \nreliance on the Protective Order or justify the government's secret, ex parte application. Ex. H, p \n6. Judge Netburn also implicitly recognized what Judge McMahon never knew—that Boies \nSchiller was all too eager for the government to investigate and prosecute Maxwell: \n6 Maxwell has not yet been provided discovery of whether Boies Schiller shared actual sealed \nmaterials or the contents of sealed materials during its meetings with the United States Attorney's Office \nin 2016. As noted below, the bare minimum that is required here is an evidentiary hearing to probe the \nextent to which Boies Schiller \n... [truncated, 2086 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/14 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=14]", "char_count": 2086}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "fl'The extraordinary posture of the case requires the Court to police carefully \ngovernment intrusions into areas of protections agreed to by civil litigants and so-\nordered by the Court. The Government is attempting to side-step these protections \nby serving a subpoena only upon a party who is willing (and perhaps eager) to \ncomply with the Government's investigation. \nEx. H, p 6. \nARGUMENT \nA. Pursuant To Its Inherent Power, This Court Should Suppress The \nEvidence Obtained From Boies Schiller, And Dismiss Counts Five And \nSix, Which Are The Fruits Of That Evidence \n1. The role of protective orders in civil litigation. \nProtective orders serve a \"vital function\" in civil litigation. Martindell v. Intl Tel. & Tel. \nCorp., 594 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1979). They promote \"the `secure the just, speedy, and \ninexpensive determination' of civil disputes, by encouraging full disclosure of all evidence.\" Id. \n(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). \"If protective orders were easily modified . . . parties would be less \nforthcoming in giving testimony and less willing to settle their disputes.\" S.E.C. v. \nTheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2001). In particular, as here, \"witnesses might be \nexpected frequently to refuse to testify pursuant to protective orders if their testimony were to be \nmade available to the Government for criminal investigatory purposes in disregard of those \norders.\" Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295-96. Parties thus rely on protective orders, and courts strictly \nenforce them. See, e.g., Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC, 20 Civ. 885 (SLC), 2020 WL 7239676, at \n*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2020) (\"In the Second Circuit, there is a strict standard for modification of \na protective order entered by a district court.\" (citation and quotation marks omitted)). \nThis case illustrates just how crucial a protective order is. The Maxwell depositions \nsought highly intrusive evidence of the most personal aspects of Maxwell's life. Her sexual \npractices. Her sexual preferences. Her sex\n... [truncated, 2168 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/15 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=15]", "char_count": 2168}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "expressly invoked the assurances of the Protective Order. So did the district court in permitting \nthese intrusions and ordering Maxwell to sit for a second deposition. Maxwell likewise relied on \nthe Protective Order in choosing to render such intimate details, rather than assert her Fifth \nAmendment privilege as she had every right to do. \nAnd why shouldn't Maxwell have relied on the Protective Order? The central protection \nin the Order was that none of Maxwell's answers could be disclosed to the government. Boies \nSchiller had expressly sought a law enforcement exception but was rebuffed. Instead, the law \nfirm was required either to return the confidential material or, at Maxwell's option, to destroy it. \nMaxwell had every reason to take that assurance seriously, even if Boies Schiller did not. \n2. The government circumvented the protective order. \nFaced with a duly entered Protective Order—which quite deliberately omitted any \"law \nenforcement\" exception—the government had lawful options to pursue the confidential \ndiscovery. It could have moved to intervene in the civil case and to amend the Protective Order. \nIt could have issued a subpoena for the materials and given Maxwell an opportunity to respond. \nMartindell, 594 F.2d at 294. It could even have applied for a search warrant, assuming \n(counterfactually) that it could show probable cause in support of such a warrant. \nThe government did none of those things. Instead. it initiated an ex parte proceeding and \nsecured a secret modification of the Protective Order based on material misrepresentations to the \npresiding judge. This was not among the lawful options available to the government. \nIt cannot fairly be disputed that Judge McMahon's ruling to amend the Protective Order \nwas based on the government's misrepresentations. Immediately before issuing her decision, \nJudge McMahon held a hearing with the sole purpose of asking the prosecutor, point blank, \nabout the government's contacts with Boies Schiller\n... [truncated, 2156 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/16 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=16]", "char_count": 2156}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "had in the Chemical Bank case. In no uncertain terms, Judge McMahon explained why she had \nhaled the prosecutor back into court: \nI'll be very up-front with you. I want to make sure I'm not in a Chemical Bank kind \nof situation, so I would like to know about contacts between the United States \nAttorney's Office and the Boies Schiller firm prior to the issuance of the subpoena \non the subject of your investigation. \nEx. E, p 2. \nIn Chemical Bank, a protective order precluded parties to a civil case from disclosing \nconfidential documents to others. 154 F.R.D. at 92-93. Despite this prohibition, counsel for the \ndefendant approached the Manhattan District Attorney's Office and suggested that it had \nevidence of criminal violations relating to the case. Id. at 93. A grand jury issued a subpoena, \nand the defendant produced to the government various confidential documents without \ncomplying with any of the specific procedures or exceptions provided in the protective order. Id. \nOnce this collusion came to light, the district court reprimanded the defendant for its \"disregard \nof the [protective] order[]\" and admonished its behavior as \"contrary to the traditions of the Bar \nwhich dictate that court orders be respected.\" Id. \nIn addressing the government's application here, Judge McMahon specifically asked \nwhether Boies N',1;t11t- had acted as the defendant did in Chemical Bank. The prosecutor omitted \nany mention of his office's previous meetings with the firm, and falsely led the court to believe \nthat Boies Schiller had not encouraged its investigation. Reassured by the misrepresentations, \nJudge McMahon commented: \nNothing in this record suggests to me that \nor Boies Schiller had anything to \ndo with the Government's decision to convene a grand jury to look into the matters \nthat were the subject of the \nAction. On the contrary—the Government has \nadvised the Court that it contacted Boies Schiller as part of its search for parties \nwho might have been victims in its\n... [truncated, 2230 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/17 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=17]", "char_count": 2230}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "\"collusion,\" to invoke a term of the moment, and it is quite clear that Boies Schiller \ndid not foment the Government's investigation. \nHad Judge McMahon known the truth, she likely would not have granted the government's \napplication to modify the Protective Order to allow Boies Schiller to comply with the subpoena. \n3. The government violated due process. \nThe government's conduct cannot be squared with elemental due process. U.S. CONST. \namend. V. Pursuant to this guarantee, \"[t]he responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from \nthat of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.\" Young v. United \nStates, 481 U.S. 787, 803 (1987). The government engages in misconduct and violates due \nprocess when it materially misrepresents facts before a court. See United States v. Valentine, 820 \nF.2d 565, 570 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the government violated due process and reversing \nconviction when the government mischaracterized the substance of grand jury testimony). \nThe prosecutor may well have known that his representations to Judge McMahon were \nfalse (or at best misleading). But the Assistant U.S. Attorney's personal knowledge doesn't \nmatter. \"An individual prosecutor is presumed . . . to have knowledge of all information gathered \nin connection with his office's investigation of the case.\" United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, \n255 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (\"The prosecutor's office is \nan entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney \nmust be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government.\"). At the barest minimum, a federal \nprosecutor has a duty to check the entire file to ensure that his representations to a federal judge, \nsubmitted on behalf of the office he serves and under oath, are true and complete. The Assistant \nU.S. Attorney did not discharge that basic function. \n14 \nEFTA00011470\n", "char_count": 1951}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "4. This court possesses the inherent authority to order suppression. \nIncident to its inherent power to superintend proceedings, this Court has the authority to \nsuppress the fruits of the government's misrepresentation. See, e.g., United States v. Cortina, 630 \nF.3d 1207, 1214 (7th Cir. 1980) (\"The court has inherent authority to regulate the administration \nof criminal justice among the parties before the bar .... [by] exclud[ing] evidence taken from \nthe defendant by willful disobedience of law.\" (citation omitted)); United States v. Iambus, 897 \nF.3d 368, 386 (2d Cir. 2018) (\"It is within the court's inherent authority to suppress evidence \ngathered unlawfully in order to maintain the integrity of its own proceedings . . . .\"); Benkovitch \nv. Gorilla, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-7806 (WJM), 2017 WL 4005452, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2017) \n(\"District courts have `inherent authority' to impose a variety of sanctions, including ... \nsuppression of evidence . . . .\"). \nIt does not matter that the government made its misrepresentations to Judge McMahon \nand not directly to this Court. \"As long as a party receives an appropriate hearing, . . . the party \nmay be sanctioned for abuses of process occurring beyond the courtroom . . .\" Chambers v. \nNASCO, Inc., 510 U.S. 32, 57 (1991). \"Courts have held that inherent authority sanctions may be \nimposed for misconduct in another court where the misconduct is . . . in some way related to the \ncase before the sanctioning court.\" Klein v. Weidner, Civ. No. 08-3798, 2017 WL 2834260, at *6 \n(E.D. Pa. June 30, 2017) (citation and alteration omitted); Manhattan Review LLC v. Year, 16 \nCiv. 0102 (LAK) (JCF), 2017 WL 11455317, *7 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2017) (\"The inherent \npower ... can punish conduct before a different court if it is intimately related to the relevant \ncase.\" (citing Klein, 2017 WL 2834260, at *4)). Here, the government's misrepresentation to \nJudge McMahon was not simply \"related\" to Counts Five and Six; only by the governm\n... [truncated, 2199 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/19 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=19]", "char_count": 2199}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "B. At A Minimum, This Court Should Order A Hearing At Which Maxwell \nMay Inquire Into The Circumstances Surrounding The Government's \nMisrepresentations To Judge McMahon \nIf the Court is disinclined to grant relief on the present record, then at a minimum it \nshould hold an evidentiary hearing to probe the government's misstatements to Judge McMahon \nand the extent to which the prosecutor's office had, in fact, coordinated with Boies Schiller prior \nto the issuance of the grand jury subpoena. These factual issues go directly to whether the \npredicate finding for Judge McMahon's ruling—namely, that no Chemical Bank collusion had \noccurred—was mistaken. See, e.g., United States v. Paredes-Cordova, No. SI 03 CR. 987DAB, \n2009 WL 1585776, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2009) (\"An evidentiary hearing is normally required \nto address motions to suppress where a factual issue is in dispute.\"). \nAn evidentiary hearing is warranted for an additional reason as well: If it turns out that \nthe prosecutor knew (or was reckless in not knowing) that Boies Schiller had previously \napproached his office, both before and after the Maxwell depositions, in an effort to stir up a \ncriminal prosecution and dangled the deposition transcripts as a carrot, then suppression would \nbe warranted on that basis alone. Cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); United \nStates v. Rajaratnani, 719 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 2013) (\"Franks instructs a district court to hold \na hearing to determine whether the alleged misstatements or omissions in the warrant or wiretap \napplication were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth and, if so, whether \nany such misstatements or omissions were material.\"). \nCONCLUSION \nFor these reasons, this Court should: (1) suppress all evidence the government obtained \nfrom Boies Schiller and any other evidence derived therefrom; or (2) suppress the April and July \n2016 depositions and all evidence derived therefrom; and (3) dismiss Counts Five and S\n... [truncated, 2079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/EFTA00011452/20 or ?id=EFTA00011452&page=20]", "char_count": 2079}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Dated: January 25, 2021 \nRespectfully submitted, \ns/ Jeffrey S. Pagliuca \nJeffrey S. Pagliuca \nLaura A. Menninger \nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. \n150 East 10th Avenue \nDenver, CO 80203 \nPhone: 303-831-7364 \nMark S. Cohen \nChristian R. Everdell \nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP \n800 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 Phone: \n212-957-7600 \nBobbi C. Stemheim \nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim \n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor \nNew York, NY 10011 \nPhone: 212-243-1100 \nAttorneys for Chislaine Maxwell \n17 \nEFTA00011473\n", "char_count": 501}, {"efta_number": "EFTA00011452", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Certificate of Service \nI hereby certify that on January 25, 2021, served by email, pursuant Rule 2(B) of the \nCourt's individual practices in criminal cases, the Memorandum of Ghislaine Maxwell in Support \nof Her Motion Under the Due Process Clause to Suppress All Evidence Obtained from the \nGovernment's Subpoena to Boies Schiller and to Dismiss Counts Five And Six upon the \nfollowing: \nU.S. Attorney's Office, SDNY \nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza \nNew York, NY 10007 \ns/ Christian R. Everdell \n18 \nEFTA00011474\n", "char_count": 510}]}