{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_count": 455, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00019237", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/DOJ-OGR-00019237.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-1, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page1 of 2\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\nDate: September 10, 2020 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 20-3061 DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nDOCKETING NOTICE\n\nAn appeal in the above-referenced case has been docketed under number: 20-3061. This number\nmust appear on all documents related to this case that are filed in this Court. Appellate counsel of\nrecord either represented the appellant before the district court, filed the notice of appeal, or\nacted as counsel for appellee in the district court. For pro se parties the docket sheet with the\ncaption page, and an Acknowledgment and Notice of Appearance Form are enclosed. In\ncounseled cases the docket sheet is available on PACER. Counsel must access the\nAcknowledgment and Notice of Appearance Form from this Court's website\n\nhttp://www.ca2.uscourtts.gov.\n\nThe form must be completed and returned within 14 days of the date of this notice. The form\nrequires the following information:\n\nYOUR CORRECT CONTACT INFORMATION: Review the party information on the docket\nsheet and note any incorrect information in writing on the Acknowledgment and Notice of\nAppearance Form.\n\nThe Court will contact one counsel per party or group of collectively represented parties when\nserving notice or issuing our order. Counsel must designate on the Acknowledgment and Notice\nof Appearance a lead attorney to accept all notices from this Court who, in turn will, be\nresponsible for notifying any associated counsel.\n\nCHANGE IN CONTACT INFORMATION: An attorney or pro se party who does not\n\nimmediately notify the Court when contact information changes will not receive notices,\ndocuments and orders filed in the case.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019237\n\n", "char_count": 1960}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-1, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page2 of 2\n\nAn attorney and any pro se party who is permitted to file documents electronically in CM/ECF\nmust notify the Court of a change to the user's mailing address, business address, telephone\nnumber, or e-mail. To update contact information, a Filing User must access PACER's Manage\n\nMy Appellate Filer Account, https://www.pacer.gov/psco/cgi-bin/cmecf/ea-login.pl. The Court's\nrecords will be updated within 1 business day of a user entering the change in PACER.\n\nA pro se party who is not permitted to file documents electronically must notify the Court of a\nchange in mailing address or telephone number by filing a letter with the Clerk of Court.\n\nCAPTION: In an appeal, the Court uses the district court caption pursuant to FRAP 12(a), 32(a).\nFor a petition for review or original proceeding the Court uses a caption pursuant to FRAP 15(a)\nor 21(a), respectively. Please review the caption carefully and promptly advise this Court of any\nimproper or inaccurate designations in writing on the Acknowledgment and Notice of\nAppearance form. If a party has been terminated from the case the caption may reflect that\nchange only if the district court judge ordered that the caption be amended.\n\nAPPELLATE DESIGNATIONS: Please review whether petitioner is listed correctly on the party\nlisting page of the docket sheet and in the caption. If there is an error, please note on the\nAcknowledgment and Notice of Appearance Form. Timely submission of the Acknowledgment\nand Notice of Appearance Form will constitute compliance with the requirement to file a\nRepresentation Statement required by FRAP 12(b).\n\nFor additional information consult the Court's instructions posted on the website.\n\nInquiries regarding this case may be directed to 212-857-8503.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019238\n\n", "char_count": 1825}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Casest: 20-A06038OATNENDOctiniGr G20 FileA009/0412 7 aBagetl 16 o :\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nng\nSEP 0.4 2020\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nPlaintiff, S.D.N.Y. - APPEALS\nVv.\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, 20-CR-330 (AJN)\n\nDefendant.\nini ip ined i nn X\n\nNOTICE OF APPEAL\n\nPLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Ghislaine Maxwell, Defendant in the above-captioned\ncase, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from the\ndistrict court’s September 2, 2020, Memorandum Opinion and Order denying her motion to\nmodify the protective order. Pichler v. UNITE, 585 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have\njurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the denial of the motion to modify the\nProtective Order and the denial of the motion to reconsider.”); Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity\nServs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (denial of motion to modify protective order is\nimmediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine) (citing Cohen y. Beneficial Industrial\nLoan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949)); see also Brown y. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir.\n2019) (appeal by intervenors challenging denial of motions to modify protective order and\nunseal).\n\nDated: September 3, 2020.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019239\n\n", "char_count": 1267}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Casest:20-G06038bATNenD bez, Mert D2 0 Filegoa9/0412 0 aBagek id 9\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\ni+)\n\nura A. Menninger (LM-1374)\neffrey S. Pagliuca (pro hac vice) |\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN,\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nPhone: 303.831.7364\n\nFax: 303.832.2628\nImenninger@hmflaw.com\njpagliuca@hmflaw.com\n\nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019240\n\n", "char_count": 363}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Casest:20-G06038bATNenD dee, Mert D2 0 Filegoa9/0412 0 aBageBid 9 7\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI certify that on September 3, 2020, I filed this Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of Court\nby mail pursuant to Section 17 of the CM/ ECF Rules and served all parties of record by email.\n\n/s/ Nicole Simmons\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019241\n\n", "char_count": 319}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` Court Name: District Court Division: 1 Receipt Numbers: A6546126683E Cashier ID: Swooten Transaction Date: 09/23/2020 Payer Name: OHISLANE MAXWELL NOTICE OF APPEAL/DOCKETING FEE For: OHISLANE MAXWELL Amount: $505.00 CHECK Check/Money Order Num: 329 Amt Tendered: $505.00 Total Due: $505.00 Total Tendered: $505.00 Change Given: $0.00 2OCR00013E ``` | OBJECTS: - A printed receipt from a court transaction - A notice of appeal/docketing fee for OHISLANE MAXWELL - A check with the amount tendered and the total due - A cashier ID label - A receipt number label | SETTING: - The setting appears to be an indoor office environment, likely a court or legal office, given the context of the document. | ACTIVITY: - The activity depicted is a court-related transaction involving the payment of a docketing fee by OHISLANE MAXWELL. | NOTABLE: - The document is a formal notice of appeal and docketing fee, indicating a legal proceeding. - The amount tendered matches the total due, suggesting that the payment was made in full. - The cashier ID and receipt numbers indicate a system for tracking transactions within the court.", "char_count": 1192}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Cases: 20-0603 8bATNe nD bexMENtD20 FilegCas/OAl2PaBagebigi9 .\n\nHaddon, Morgan and Foreman, p.c\n\n: 150 East 10th Avenue\nDenver, Colorado 80203\n\nPH 303.831.7364 Fx 303.832.2628\nHADDON www.hmflaw.com\nMORGAN\nFOREMAN\n\nSeptember 3, 2020\n\nVIA OVERNIGHT DELIVERY\n\nSouthern District of New York\n\nCourt Clerk’s Office\n\n500 Pearl Street\n\nNew York, NY 10007-13122\n\nRe: US v. Maxwell, Case No. 20 cr. 330 (AJN) Notice of Appeal\n\nDear Clerk of Court:\n\nAttached hereto is the Notice of Appeal for filing and a check in the amount of $505.00\nfor the docketing and processing fees.\n\nIf you have any questions, please feel free to call me at the phone number referenced\nabove.\n\nVery truly yours,\nNecole Stmmone\n\nNicole Simmons\n\nEnclosures\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019243\n\n", "char_count": 741}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Casest:20-G06038bATNenD bce, Mert 20 Filegoa9/0412 aBagebid 9\n\nSaale MCREYNOLDS LTR\nerate Hae\nHAD Oe Roan aa FOREMAN, P.\n150 EAST OTH A\nDENVER CO 80203\n\nPUNITTT UPTIN\n\nSHIP i\nLERK OF COURT\nSACRE oT RICT COURT SDNY\nDANIEL Be MOYNIHAN US COURTHOUSE\n\nNEW YORK NY 10007\n\nie NY 102 9-10\n\nee ill\n\n4 NEXT DAY AIR\n\nTm\n\nUPS CARBON NEUTRAL SHIPMENT\n\nBILLING: P/P\n\nReference #1: Maxwell 20 cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nXQL 20.08.05 N45 31.04 07/2020*\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019244\n\n", "char_count": 445}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "US DISTRICT COURT - spNy\nSOG PEARL ST\n\nNEW YORK NY 19097\nP:PURPLE s:FRNT 1: 928\n\n‘A18-1416 = J\n\naa ee 6904 1636\neet tae B28 8758187020,\n\ne\n\nExpress Envil\n\nPOENOAD-OZ DSEPO\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019245\n\n\"3\n\n", "char_count": 195}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "9/9/2020 Casest:20-G060380AINeND OTe IBS Ghile 4209/04/12 0 aBagesvict 9\n\nts\n\nTracking Details\n\n1Z2F4661F0194176904\n\nUpdated: 09/09/2020 10:55 A.M. EST\n\nDelivered\n\nDelivered On\n\nFriday\n09/04/2020\n\nDelivery Time\n\nat 10:11 A.M.\n\nSend Updates\n\nDelivered To\nNEW YORK, NY, US\n\nLeft At: Dock\nReceived By: EDDIE\nProof of Delivery\n\nThis website uses cookies x\n\nour BRET AGR ARES RLS CPR AeaR Ae Gener REL an eal BAARGISTARE nage) for more\n\ninformation. You can manage your preferences by selecting Cookie Settings.\n\nhttps:/Avww.ups.com/track?loc=null&tracknum=1ZF4661F0194176904&requester=WT/trackdetails 1/2\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019246\n\n", "char_count": 620}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "9/9/2020 Casest:20-G060380 AINE ND dcemie iS Uihilesans/04120 aPaged1at 9\n\nShipment Progress\n\nVv\nShipment Details A\nService\nUPS Next Day Air®_ (2 _(https://www.ups.com/content/us/en/shipping/time/service/next_day.html)\n\nwith UPS Carbon Neutral\nshow More +\nNe} Track\n\nHelp [4\n\nCopyright ©1994- 2020 United Parcel Service of America, Inc. All rights reserved.\n\nThis website uses cookies x\nWe do this to better understand how visitors use our site and to offer you a more personal experience. Please see\n\nour Privacy Notice (https://www.ups.com/us/en/help-center/legal-terms-conditions/privacy-notice, page), for more\ninformation. You can manage your preferences by selecting Cookie Settings.\n\nhttps:/Avww.ups.com/track?loc=null&tracknum=1ZF4661F0194176904&requester=W T/trackdetails 2/2\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019247\n\n", "char_count": 805}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-2, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page10 of 19\nAPPEAL,ECF\nU.S. District Court\n\nSouthern District of New York (Foley Square)\nCRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:20-cr-00330-AJN All Defendants\n\nCase title: USA v. Maxwell Date Filed: 06/29/2020\n\nAssigned to: Judge Alison J.\nNathan\n\nDefendant (1)\n\nGhislaine Maxwell represented by Christian R. Everdell\nalso known as Cohen & Gresser LLP\nSealed Defendant | 800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\n212-707-7268\n\nFax: 212-957-4514\n\nEmail: ceverdell@cohengresser.com\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nHaddon Morgan and Foreman\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\n(303)—-83 1-7364\n\nFax: (303)—832-—2628\n\nEmail: jpagliuca@hmflaw.com\nLEAD ATTORNEY\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHaddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.\n150 East Tenth Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n(303)-831—-7364\n\nFax: (303)-832—2628\n\nEmail: Imenninger@hmflaw.com\nLEAD ATTORNEY\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nMark Stewart Cohen\n\nCohen & Gresser, LLP (NYC)\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\n\n(212) 957-7600\n\nFax: (212)957—45 14\n\nEmail: mcohen@cohengresser.com\n\nLEAD ATTORNEY\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nPending Counts Disposition\n18:371.F CONSPIRACY TO\nENTICE MINORS TO TRAVEL\nTO ENGAGE IN ILLEGAL SEX\nACTS\n\n(1)\n18:371.F CONSPIRACY TO\n\nENTICE MINORS TO TRAVEL\nTO ENGAGE IN ILLEGAL SEX\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019248\n\n", "char_count": 1339}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-2, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page11 of 19\n\nACTS\n(Is)\n\n18:2422.F COERCION OR\nENTICEMENT OFA MINOT TO\nTRAVEL TO ENGAGE IN\nILLEGAL SEX ACTS\n\n(2)\n\n18:2422.F COERCION OR\nENTICEMENT OF MINOR TO\nENGAGE IN ILLEGAL SEX\nACTS\n\n(2s)\n\n18:371.F CONSPIRACY TO\nTRANSPORT MINORS WITH\nINTENT TO ENGAGE IN\nCRIMINAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY\n(3)\n\n18:371.F 18:371.F CONSPIRACY\nTO TRANSPORT MINORS WITH\nINTENT TO ENGAGE IN\nCRIMINAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY\n(3s)\n\n18:2423.F COERCION OR\nENTICEMENT OF MINOR\nFEMALE (TRANSPORTATION\nOF A MINOR WITH INTENT TO\nENGAGE IN CRIMINAL\nSEXUAL ACTIVITY)\n\n(4)\n\n18:2423.F TRANSPORTATION\nOF A MINOR WITH INTENT TO\nENGAGE IN CRIMINAL\nSEXUAL ACTIVITY\n\n(4s)\n\n18:1623.F FALSE\nDECLARATIONS BEFORE\nGRAND JURY/COURT\n(PERJURY)\n\n(5-6)\n\n18:1623.F FALSE\nDECLARATIONS BEFORE\nGRAND JURY/COURT\n(5s—6s)\n\nHighest Offense Level (Opening)\n\nFelony\nTerminated Counts Disposition\nNone\n\nHighest Offense Level\n(Terminated)\n\nNone\n\nComplaints Disposition\nNone\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019249\n\n", "char_count": 966}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 20\n\nPlaintiff\nUSA\n\n-3061, Document 1-2, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page12 of 19\n\nrepresented by Alex Rossmiller\nU.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of\nNew York\n1 St. Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, NY 10007\n(212)-637-2415\nEmail: alexander.rossmiller@usdoj.gov\nLEAD ATTORNEY\nPRO HAC VICE\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nDesignation: Assistant US Attorney\n\nAlison Gainfort Moe\n\nUnited States Attorney's Office, SDNY\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n(212)—637-2225\n\nEmail: alison.moe@usdoj.gov\n\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nDesignation: Assistant US Attorney\n\nMaurene Ryan Comey\n\nUnited States Attorney's Office, SDNY\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n(212)-637-2324\n\nEmail: maurene.comey(@usdoj.gov\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nDesignation: Assistant US Attorney\n\nLara Elizabeth Pomerantz\nUnited States Attorney's Office\nOne St. Andrew's Plaza\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n212-637-2343\n\nFax: 212-637-2527\n\nEmail: Lara.Pomerantz@usdoj.gov\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nDate Filed #\n\nDocket Text\n\n06/29/2020 1\n\n07/02/2020 2\n\n07/02/2020\n\nSEALED INDICTMENT as to Sealed Defendant 1 (1) count(s) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-6. (jm)\n(Main Document 1 replaced on 7/2/2020) (jm). (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\nOrder to Unseal Indictment as to Sealed Defendant 1. (Signed by Magistrate Judge\nKatharine H. Parker on 7/2/20)(jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\nINDICTMENT UNSEALED as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\n07/02/2020\n\nCase Designated ECF as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\n07/02/2020\n\n07/02/2020\n\n07/02/2020 4\n\nCase as to Ghislaine Maxwell ASSIGNED to Judge Alison J. Nathan. (jm) (Entered:\n07/02/2020)\n\nAttorney update in case as to Ghislaine Maxwell. Attorney Alex Rossmiller,Maurene\nRyan Comey,Alison Gainfort Moe for USA added. (jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\nMOTION to detain defendant . Document filed by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell.\n(Moe, Alison) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019250\n\n", "char_count": 1909}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-2, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page13 of 19\n\n07/02/2020\n\nArrest of Ghislaine Maxwell in the United States District Court — District of New\n\nHampshire. (jm) (Entered: 07/06/2020)\n\nLETTER by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from\nAUSAs Maurene Comey, Alison Moe, and Alex Rossmiller dated July 5, 2020 re:\nRequest to Schedule Initial Appearance Document filed by USA. (Comey, Maurene)\n(Entered: 07/05/2020)\n\n07/05/2020 5\n\n07/06/2020 6\n\nRule 5(c)(3) Documents Received as to Ghislaine Maxwell from the United States\nDistrict Court — District of New Hampshire. (jm) (Entered: 07/06/2020)\n\n07/06/2020 7 | ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. This matter has been assigned to me for all\npurposes. In its July 5, 2020 letter, the Government on behalf of the parties requested\nthat the Court schedule an arraignment, initial appearance, and bail hearing in this\nmatter in the afternoon of Friday, July 10. See Dkt. No. 5. In light of the COVID\npublic health crisis, there are significant safety issues related to in—court proceedings.\nIf the Defendant is willing to waive her physical presence, this proceeding will be\nconducted remotely. To that end, defense counsel should confer with the Defendant\nregarding waiving her physical presence. If the Defendant wishes to waive her\nphysical presence for this proceeding, she and her counsel should sign the attached\nform in advance of the proceeding if feasible.If this proceeding is to be conducted\nremotely, there are protocols at the Metropolitan Detention Center that limit the times\nat which the Defendant could be produced so that she could appear by video. In the\nnext week, the Defendant could be produced by video at either 9:00 a.m. on July 9,\n2020 or sometime during the morning of July 14, 2020. Counsel are hereby ordered to\nmeet and confer regarding scheduling for this initial proceeding in light of these\nconstraints. If counsel does anticipate proceeding remotely, by 9:00 p.m. tonight,\ncounsel should \n... [truncated, 4921 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/14 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=14]", "char_count": 4921}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-2, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page14 of 19\n\nproceeding. See Dkt. No. 7. If the Defendant consents, and is able to sign the form\n(either personally or, in accordance with Standing Order 20-MC-—174 of March 27,\n2020, by defense counsel), defense counsel shall file the executed form at least 24\nhours prior to the proceeding. In the event the Defendant consents, but counsel is\nunable to obtain or affix the Defendant's signature on the form, the Court will conduct\nan inquiry at the outset of the proceeding to determine whether it is appropriate for the\nCourt to add the Defendant's signature to the form. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1),\nthe Government must make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of,\nand accorded, the rights provided to them in that section. This includes [t]he right to\nreasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding... involving the\ncrime or of any release... of the accused and \"[t]he right to be reasonably heard at any\npublic proceeding in the district court involving release.” Id. § 3771(a)(2), (4). The\nCourt will inquire with the Government as to the extent of those efforts. So that\nappropriate logistical arrangements can be made, the Government shall inform the\nCourt by email within 24 hours in advance of the proceeding if any alleged victim\nwishes to be heard on the question of detention pending trial. Finally, the time between\nthe Defendant's arrest and July 6, 2020 is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act due to\nthe delay involved in transferring the Defendant from another district. See 18 U.S.C. §\n3161(h)(1)(F). And the Court further excludes time under the Speedy Trial Act from\ntoday through July 14, 2020. Due to the logistical issues involved in conducting a\nremote proceeding, the Court finds \"that the ends of justice served by [this exclusion]\noutweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.\" 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3161(h)(7)(A). The exclusion is also supported \n... [truncated, 4787 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/15 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=15]", "char_count": 4787}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-2, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page15 of 19\n\nthe United States may access the live audio feed by calling 214—416—0400 and using\nthe same access code and PIN. These phone lines can accommodate approximately\n500 callers on a first come, first serve basis. The Court will provide counsel for both\nsides an additional dial-in number to be used to ensure audio access to the proceeding\nfor non-speaking co—counsel, alleged victims, and any family members of the\nDefendant. The United States Attorney's Office should email Chambers with\ninformation regarding any alleged victims who are entitled, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\n§3771(a)(4), to be heard at the bail hearing and who wish to be heard. The Court will\nthen provide information as to the logistics for their dial-in access. As the Court\ndescribed in a previous order, members of the press and public may watch and listen to\nthe live video feed in the Jury Assembly Room, at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan\nCourthouse, 500 Pearl Street. See Dkt. No. 10. However, in light of COVID-19,\nseating will be limited to approximately 60 seats in order to enable appropriate social\ndistancing and ensure public safety. Counsel for the Defendant and the Government\nmay contact Chambers by email if there is a request to accommodate alleged victims\nor family members of the Defendant. Members of the credentialed in—house press\ncorps may contact the District Executive's Office about seating. Otherwise, all seating\nwill be allocated on a first come, first serve basis and in accordance with the S.D.N.Y.\nCOVID-—19 Courthouse Entry Program and this Court's previous order of July 7, 2020.\nSee Dkt. No. 10. If conditions change or the Court otherwise concludes that allowing\nfor in-person viewing of the video feed at the courthouse is not consistent with public\nhealth, the Court may provide audio access by telephone only. Any photographing,\nrecording, or rebroadcasting of federal court proceedings is prohibited by law.\nViolation of these prohibitio\n... [truncated, 4469 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/16 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=16]", "char_count": 4469}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-2, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page16 of 19\n\n07/14/2020 | 24 | Waiver of Right to be Present at Criminal Proceeding as to Ghislaine Maxwell re:\nArraignment, Bail Hearing, Conference. (jw) (Entered: 07/14/2020)\n\n07/15/2020 ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. Initial non-electronic discovery, generally to\ninclude search warrant applications and subpoena returns, is due by Friday, August 21,\n2020. Completion of discovery, to include electronic materials, is due by Monday,\nNovember 9, 2020. Motions are due by Monday, December 21, 2020. Motion\nresponses are due by Friday, January 22, 2021. Motion replies are due by Friday,\nFebruary 5, 2021. Trial is set for Monday, July 12, 2021 ( Discovery due by\n8/21/2020., Motions due by 12/21/2020) (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on\n7/15/20)Gw) (Entered: 07/15/2020)\n\n07/21/2020 | 26 | ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell: The Court has received a significant number of\nletters and messages from non—parties that purport to be related to this case. These\nsubmissions are either procedurally improper or irrelevant to the judicial function.\nTherefore, they will not be considered or docketed. The Court will accord the same\ntreatment to any similar correspondence it receives in the future. SO ORDERED.\n(Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 7/21/2020) (Inl) (Entered: 07/21/2020)\n\n07/21/2020 | 27 | LETTER MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Jeffrey S. Pagliuca\ndated July 21, 2020 re: Local Criminal Rule 23.1 . Document filed by Ghislaine\nMaxwell. (Pagliuca, Jeffrey) (Entered: 07/21/2020)\n\n07/23/2020 | 28 | ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell: The Defense has moved for an order \"prohibiting\nthe Government, its agents and counsel for witnesses from making extrajudicial\nstatements concerning this case.\" Dkt. No. 27 at 1. The Court firmly expects that\ncounsel for all involved parties will exercise great care to ensure compliance with this\nCourt's local rules, including Local Criminal Rule 23.1, and the rules of professional\nresponsibil\n... [truncated, 4536 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/17 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=17]", "char_count": 4536}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-2, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page17 of 19\n\n07/28/2020 | 34 | AFFIDAVIT of Alex Rossmiller by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (Rossmiller, Alex)\n(Entered: 07/28/2020)\n\n07/29/2020 | 35 |LETTER REPLY TO RESPONSE to Motion by Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to\nJudge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated July 29, 2020 re 29 LETTER\nMOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated July\n27, 2020 re: Proposed Protective Order .. (Everdell, Christian) (Entered: 07/29/2020)\n\n07/30/2020 PROTECTIVE ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell...regarding procedures to be\nfollowed that shall govern the handling of confidential material. SO ORDERED:\n(Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 7/30/2020)(bw) (Entered: 07/31/2020)\n\n07/30/2020 MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. Both parties have\nasked for the Court to enter a protective order. While they agree on most of the\nlanguage, two areas of dispute have emerged. First, Ms. Maxwell seeks language\nallowing her to publicly reference alleged victims or witnesses who have spoken on\nthe public record to the media or in public fora, or in litigation relating to Ms. Maxwell\nor Jeffrey Epstein. Second, Ms. Maxwell seeks language restricting potential\nGovernment witnesses and their counsel from using discovery materials for any\npurpose other than preparing for the criminal trial in this action. The Government has\nproposed contrary language on both of these issues. For the following reasons, the\nCourt adopts the Government's proposed protective order Under Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 16(d)(1), \"[a]t any time the court may, for good cause, deny,\nrestrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.\" The good\ncause standard \"requires courts to balance several interests, including whether\ndissemination of the discovery materials inflicts hazard to others... whether the\nimposition of the protective order would prejudice the defendant,\" and \"the public's\ninterest i\n... [truncated, 5221 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/18 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=18]", "char_count": 5221}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-2, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page18 of 19\n\n08/10/2020\n\n08/10/2020\n\nDistrict of New York, all of which the Court expects the Government to scrupulously\nfollow. Furthermore, the Government indicates that it will likely only provide potential\nwitnesses with materials that those witnesses already have in their possession. See Dkt.\nNo. 33 at 6. And of course, those witnesses who do testify at trial would be subject to\nexamination on the record as to what materials were provided or shown to them by the\nGovernment. Nothing in the Defense's papers explains how its unprecedented\nproposed restriction is somehow necessary to ensure a fair trial. For the foregoing\nreasons, the Court adopts the Government's proposed protective order, which will be\nentered on the docket. This resolves Dkt. No. 29. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge\nAlison J. Nathan on 7/30/2020)(bw) (Entered: 07/31/2020)\n\nLETTER MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell\ndated August 10, 2020 re: Discovery Disclosure and Access . Document filed by\nGhislaine Maxwell. (Everdell, Christian) (Entered: 08/10/2020)\n\nAFFIDAVIT of Christian R. Everdell by Ghislaine Maxwell. (Everdell, Christian)\n(Entered: 08/10/2020)\n\n08/11/2020\n\nMEMO ENDORSEMENT as to Ghislaine Maxwell on re: 38 LETTER MOTION\naddressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated August 10, 2020\nre: Discovery Disclosure and Access. ENDORSEMENT: The Government is hereby\nORDERED to respond to the Defendant's letter motion by Thursday, August 13, 2020.\nThe Defendant's reply, if any, is due on or before Monday, August 17, 2020.\n(Responses due by 8/13/2020. Replies due by 8/17/2020) (Signed by Judge Alison J.\nNathan on 8/11/2020) (ap) (Entered: 08/11/2020)\n\n08/13/2020\n\nLETTER RESPONSE in Opposition by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to\nJudge Alison J. Nathan from Alex Rossmiller dated August 13, 2020 re: 38 LETTER\nMOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated\nAugust 10\n... [truncated, 4228 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/19 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=19]", "char_count": 4228}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 1-2, 09/09/2020, 2927741, Page19 of 19\n\nresponse to the Court's Order of August 18, 2020 Document filed by USA.\n(Rossmiller, Alex) (Entered: 08/21/2020)\n\n08/24/2020 | 48 | LETTER MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Laura A. Menninger\ndated August 24, 2020 re: Request to File Under Seal: Proposed Redactions to Request\nto Modify Protective Order and Reply in Support Thereof . Document filed by\nGhislaine Maxwell. (Menninger, Laura) (Entered: 08/24/2020)\n\n08/25/2020 | 49 | MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: denying without prejudice 38 LETTER\nMOTION as to Ghislaine Maxwell (1). On August 10, 2020, the Defendant filed a\nletter motion related to two issues. Dkt. No. 38. First, the Defendant seeks an order\ndirecting the Government to disclose to defense counsel immediately the identities of\nthe three alleged victims referenced in the indictment. Second, the Defendant seeks an\norder directing the Bureau of Prisons (\"BOP\") to release the Defendant into the general\npopulation and to provide her with increased access to the discovery materials. For the\nreasons that follow, Defendant's requests are DENIED without prejudice....[See this\nMemorandum Opinion And Order]... I. Conclusion: For the reasons stated above,\nDefendant's requests contained in Dkt. No. 38 are DENIED without prejudice.\nFollowing the close of discovery, the parties shall meet and confer on an appropriate\nschedule for pre-trial disclosures, including the disclosure of § 3500 material, exhibit\nlists, and witness lists, taking into account all relevant factors. The Government is\nhereby ORDERED to submit written status updates every 90 days detailing any\nmaterial changes to the conditions of Ms. Maxwell's confinement, with particular\nemphasis on her access to legal materials and ability to communicate with defense\ncounsel. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 8/25/2020) (bw)\n(Entered: 08/25/2020)\n\n09/02/2020 MEMORANDUMOPINION AND ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell: On August 17,\n... [truncated, 3837 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/20 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=20]", "char_count": 3837}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Cas@ds2@@¢ra0as3 RAGIN Ed Gl MEMiB2.0 AE EtP09/GH)2 8 aRatgef Hof\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT |\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\n\nDOC #:\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DATE FILED:__ 9/2/20\n\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUnited States of America,\n\n_y_\n20-CR-330 (AJN)\nGhislaine Maxwell,\nMEMORANDUM\n\nDefendant. OPINION AND ORDER\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:\n\nOn August 17, 2020, Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell filed a sealed letter motion seeking\nan Order modifying the protective order in this case.! Specifically, she sought a Court order\nallowing her to file under seal in certain civil cases (“Civil Cases”) materials (“Documents”) that\n\nshe received in discovery from the Government in this case. She also sought permission to\n\n! This Order will not refer to any redacted or otherwise confidential information, and as a result it will not be sealed.\nThe Court will adopt the redactions to Defendant’s August 17, 2020 letter motion that the Government proposed on\nAugust 21, 2020, and it will enter that version into the public docket. The Court’s decision to adopt the\nGovernment’s proposed redactions is guided by the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v.\nPyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Under this test, the Court must: (i) determine whether the\ndocuments in question are “judicial documents;” (ii) assess the weight of the common law presumption of access to\nthe materials; and (iii) balance competing considerations against the presumption of access. /d. at 119-20. “Such\ncountervailing factors include but are not limited to ‘the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency’\nand ‘the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.’” /d. at 120 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044,\n1048 (2d Cir.1995) (“Amodeo IP’)). The Government’s proposed redactions satisfy this test. First, the Court finds\nthat the defendant’s letter motion is “relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial\nprocess,” thereby qua\n... [truncated, 3180 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/21 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=21]", "char_count": 3180}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Cas@ds2@@¢ra0es3 RAGIN Ebel MEiis2.0 Ai etPA9/GWI2B aRatyefDof 5\n\nreference, but not file, other discovery material that the Government produced in this case. For\nthe reasons that follow, Defendant’s requests are DENIED.\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), a Court may enter a protective order\nonly after it finds that good cause exists. Within this framework, the Federal Rules of Criminal\nProcedure leave it to the discretion of the Court to determine whether modification of an existing\nprotective order is warranted.” To make that decision, the Court takes into account all relevant\nfactors, including the parties’ reliance on the protective order and whether the moving party has\nsufficiently substantiated a request to deviate from the status quo in the instant matter.\n\nOn July 30, 2020, this Court entered a protective order in this case, having determined\nthat good cause existed. Dkt. No. 36. The parties agreed that a protective order was warranted.\nSee Dkt. No. 35 at 1 (“The parties have met and conferred, resolving nearly all the issues relating\nto the proposed protective order.”). The Defendant’s Proposed Protective Order included a\nprovision that stated that all discovery produced by the Government “[s]hall be used by the\nDefendant or her Defense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this criminal action, and\nnot for any civil proceeding or any purpose other than the defense of this action.” Dkt. No. 29,\nEx. A ¥ 1(a). That language was included in the Court’s July 30, 2020 protective order. See Dkt.\nNo. 36 4 1(a), 10(a), 14(a). Shortly thereafter, the Government began to produce discovery.\n\nUpon receipt of some of the discovery, the Defendant filed the instant request, which\n\nseeks modification of the protective order in order to use documents produced in the criminal\n\n? Tn the civil context, there is a “strong presumption against the modification of a protective order.” In re Teligent,\nInc., 640 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)\n... [truncated, 2739 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/22 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=22]", "char_count": 2739}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Cas@ds2@@¢ra0egs3 RAGIN be MEiMis2.0 Ai etP09/GH)2 8 aRathetDof 5\n\ncase in other civil proceedings. She bases her request on the premise that disclosure of the\nDocuments to the relevant judicial officers is allegedly necessary to ensure the fair adjudication\nof issues being litigated in those civil matters. But after fourteen single-spaced pages of heated\nrhetoric, the Defendant proffers no more than vague, speculative, and conclusory assertions as to\nwhy that is the case. She provides no coherent explanation of what argument she intends to\nmake before those courts that requires the presentation of the materials received in discovery in\nthis criminal matter under the existing terms of the protective order in this case. And she\nfurnishes no substantive explanation regarding the relevance of the Documents to decisions to be\nmade in those matters, let alone any explanation of why modifying the protective order in order\nto allow such disclosure is necessary to ensure the fair adjudication of those matters. In sum, the\narguments the Defendant presents to the Court plainly fail to establish good cause. The\nDefendant’s request is DENIED on this basis.\n\nIndeed, good cause for the requested modification of the protective order is further\nlacking because, as far as this Court can discern, the facts she is interested in conveying to the\njudicial decisionmakers in the Civil Cases are already publicly available, including in the\nGovernment’s docketed letter on this issue. See Dkt. No. 46. In the opening paragraph of her\nreply letter dated August 24, 2020, the Defendant states that she is essentially seeking to disclose\nunder seal to certain judicial officers the following factual information:\n\n1. Grand jury subpoenas were issued to an entity (“Recipient”) after the Government\nopened a grand jury investigation into Jeffrey Epstein and his possible co-\nconspirators;\n\n2. The Recipient concluded that it could not turn over materials responsive to the grand\n\njury subpoena absent a mo\n... [truncated, 2081 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/23 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=23]", "char_count": 2081}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Cas@ds2@@¢ra0es3 RAIN doe MEM 0 A etPA9/GW2 0 aRaget4of 5\n\n3. In February 2019, the Government, ex parte and under seal, sought modification of\nthose civil protective orders so as to permit compliance with the criminal grand jury\nsubpoenas;\n\n4. In April 2019, one court (“Court-1”) permitted the modification and, subsequently,\nanother court (“Court-2”) did not;\n\n5. That as a result of the modification of the civil protective order by Court-1, the\nRecipient turned over to the Government certain materials that had been covered by\nthe protective order; and\n\n6. That the Defendant learned of this information (sealed by other courts) as a result of\nRule 16 discovery in this criminal matter.\n\nWith the exception of identifying the relevant judicial decision makers and specific civil\nmatters, all of the information listed above is available in the public record, including in the letter\nfiled on the public docket by the Government on this issue. See Dkt. No. 46. Although this\nCourt remains in the dark as to why this information will be relevant to those courts, so that\nthose courts can make their own determination, to the extent it would otherwise be prohibited by\nthe protective order in this matter, the Court hereby permits the defendant to provide to the\nrelevant courts under seal the above information, including the information identifying the\nrelevant judicial decision makers and civil matters.\n\nIn addition, the Government has indicated that “there is no impediment to counsel\nmaking sealed applications to Court-1 and Court-2, respectively, to unseal the relevant\nmaterials.” Dkt. No. 46 at 3 n.5. In her reply, the Defendant asserts that she is amenable to such\na solution if the Court agrees with the Government that doing so would not contravene the\n\nprotective order in this case. To the extent it would otherwise be prohibited by the protective\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019261\n\n", "char_count": 1887}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Cas@ds2@@¢ra0es3 RAGIN Ede MEii20 AG etPA9/GH)2 8 aRatgefSof 5\n\norder in this matter, the Defendant may make unsealing applications to those Courts if she\n\nwishes.\n\nSO ORDERED. AY 0 iste\n\nDated: September 2, 2020\nNew York, New York ALISON J. NATHAN\nUnited States District Judge\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019262\n\n", "char_count": 298}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-1, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page of 1\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\nDate: September 10, 2020 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 20-3061 DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nNOTICE OF RECORD ON APPEAL FILED\n\nIn the above referenced case the document indicated below has been filed in the Court.\n_ Record on Appeal - Certified List\n\n_ Record on Appeal - CD ROM\n\n_ Record on Appeal - Paper Documents\n\nX___ Record on Appeal - Electronic Index\n\n__ Record on Appeal - Paper Index\n\nInquiries regarding this case may be directed to 212-857-8503.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019263\n\n", "char_count": 809}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page1 of 12\n\nCAO02db Intake\n\nFrom: NYSD_ECF_Pool@nysd.uscourts.gov\n\nSent: Wednesday, September 9, 2020 12:43 PM\n\nTo: NYSD CourtMail\n\nSubject: Activity in Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN USA v. Maxwell Appeal Record Sent to USCA - Electronic File\n\nThis is an automatic e-mail message generated by the CM/ECF system. Please DO NOT RESPOND to this e-mail\nbecause the mail box is unattended.\n\n*** NOTE TO PUBLIC ACCESS USERS*** Judicial Conference of the United States policy permits attorneys of record and\nparties in a case (including pro se litigants) to receive one free electronic copy of all documents filed electronically, if\nreceipt is required by law or directed by the filer. PACER access fees apply to all other users. To avoid later charges,\ndownload a copy of each document during this first viewing. However, if the referenced document is a transcript, the\nfree copy and 30 page limit do not apply.\n\nU.S. District Court\nSouthern District of New York\nNotice of Electronic Filing\n\nThe following transaction was entered on 9/9/2020 at 12:43 PM EDT and filed on 9/9/2020\n\nCase Name: USA v. Maxwell\nCase Number: 1:20-cr-00330-AJN\nFiler:\n\nDocument Number: No document attached\n\nDocket Text:\n\nAppeal Record Sent to USCA (Electronic File). Certified Indexed record on Appeal Electronic\nFiles as to Ghislaine Maxwell re: [55] Notice of Appeal were transmitted to the U.S. Court of\nAppeals. (tp)\n\n1:20-cr-00330-AJN-1 Notice has been electronically mailed to:\n\nJeffrey S.Pagliuca jpagliuca@hmflaw.com, nsimmons@hmflaw.com\n\nLaura A. Menninger Imenninger@hmflaw.com, alundberg@hmflaw.com, nsimmons@hmflaw.com\n\nChristian R. Everdell ceverdell@cohengresser.com, autodocket@cohengresser.com\n\nMark Stewart Cohen mcohen@cohengresser.com, Mark-Cohen-1234@ecf.pacerpro.com,\nautodocket@cohengresser.com, managingclerksoffice@cohengresser.com\n\nLara Elizabeth Pomerantz Lara.Pomerantz@usdoj.gov, CaseView.ECF@usdoj.gov, USANYS.ECF@USDOJ.GOV\nAlison Gainfort Moe — alison.moe\n... [truncated, 2176 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/27 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=27]", "char_count": 2176}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page2 of 12\n\nMaurene Ryan Comey maurene.comey@usdoj.gov, CaseView.ECF @usdoj.gov, USANYS.ECF@USDOJ.GOV\n\n1:20-cr-00330-AJN-1 Notice has been delivered by other means to:\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019265\n\n", "char_count": 237}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page3 of 12\nAPPEAL,ECF\nU.S. District Court\n\nSouthern District of New York (Foley Square)\nCRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:20-cr-00330-AJN All Defendants\n\nCase title: USA v. Maxwell Date Filed: 06/29/2020\n\nAssigned to: Judge Alison J.\nNathan\n\nDefendant (1)\n\nGhislaine Maxwell represented by Christian R. Everdell\nalso known as Cohen & Gresser LLP\nSealed Defendant | 800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\n212-707-7268\n\nFax: 212-957-4514\n\nEmail: ceverdell@cohengresser.com\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nHaddon Morgan and Foreman\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\n(303)—-83 1-7364\n\nFax: (303)—832-—2628\n\nEmail: jpagliuca@hmflaw.com\nLEAD ATTORNEY\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHaddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.\n150 East Tenth Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n(303)-831—-7364\n\nFax: (303)-832—2628\n\nEmail: Imenninger@hmflaw.com\nLEAD ATTORNEY\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nMark Stewart Cohen\n\nCohen & Gresser, LLP (NYC)\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\n\n(212) 957-7600\n\nFax: (212)957—45 14\n\nEmail: mcohen@cohengresser.com\n\nLEAD ATTORNEY\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nPending Counts Disposition\n18:371.F CONSPIRACY TO\nENTICE MINORS TO TRAVEL\nTO ENGAGE IN ILLEGAL SEX\nACTS\n\n(1)\n18:371.F CONSPIRACY TO\n\nENTICE MINORS TO TRAVEL\nTO ENGAGE IN ILLEGAL SEX\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019266\n\n", "char_count": 1337}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page4 of 12\n\nACTS\n(Is)\n\n18:2422.F COERCION OR\nENTICEMENT OFA MINOT TO\nTRAVEL TO ENGAGE IN\nILLEGAL SEX ACTS\n\n(2)\n\n18:2422.F COERCION OR\nENTICEMENT OF MINOR TO\nENGAGE IN ILLEGAL SEX\nACTS\n\n(2s)\n\n18:371.F CONSPIRACY TO\nTRANSPORT MINORS WITH\nINTENT TO ENGAGE IN\nCRIMINAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY\n(3)\n\n18:371.F 18:371.F CONSPIRACY\nTO TRANSPORT MINORS WITH\nINTENT TO ENGAGE IN\nCRIMINAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY\n(3s)\n\n18:2423.F COERCION OR\nENTICEMENT OF MINOR\nFEMALE (TRANSPORTATION\nOF A MINOR WITH INTENT TO\nENGAGE IN CRIMINAL\nSEXUAL ACTIVITY)\n\n(4)\n\n18:2423.F TRANSPORTATION\nOF A MINOR WITH INTENT TO\nENGAGE IN CRIMINAL\nSEXUAL ACTIVITY\n\n(4s)\n\n18:1623.F FALSE\nDECLARATIONS BEFORE\nGRAND JURY/COURT\n(PERJURY)\n\n(5-6)\n\n18:1623.F FALSE\nDECLARATIONS BEFORE\nGRAND JURY/COURT\n(5s—6s)\n\nHighest Offense Level (Opening)\n\nFelony\nTerminated Counts Disposition\nNone\n\nHighest Offense Level\n(Terminated)\n\nNone\n\nComplaints Disposition\nNone\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019267\n\n", "char_count": 966}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Paged of 12\n\nPlaintiff\nUSA\n\nrepresented by Alex Rossmiller\nU.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of\nNew York\n1 St. Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, NY 10007\n(212)-637-2415\nEmail: alexander.rossmiller@usdoj.gov\nLEAD ATTORNEY\nPRO HAC VICE\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nDesignation: Assistant US Attorney\n\nAlison Gainfort Moe\n\nUnited States Attorney's Office, SDNY\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n(212)—637-2225\n\nEmail: alison.moe@usdoj.gov\n\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nDesignation: Assistant US Attorney\n\nMaurene Ryan Comey\n\nUnited States Attorney's Office, SDNY\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n(212)-637-2324\n\nEmail: maurene.comey(@usdoj.gov\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nDesignation: Assistant US Attorney\n\nLara Elizabeth Pomerantz\nUnited States Attorney's Office\nOne St. Andrew's Plaza\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n212-637-2343\n\nFax: 212-637-2527\n\nEmail: Lara.Pomerantz@usdoj.gov\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nDate Filed #\n\nDocket Text\n\n06/29/2020 1\n\n07/02/2020 2\n\n07/02/2020\n\nSEALED INDICTMENT as to Sealed Defendant 1 (1) count(s) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-6. (jm)\n(Main Document 1 replaced on 7/2/2020) (jm). (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\nOrder to Unseal Indictment as to Sealed Defendant 1. (Signed by Magistrate Judge\nKatharine H. Parker on 7/2/20)(jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\nINDICTMENT UNSEALED as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\n07/02/2020\n\nCase Designated ECF as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\n07/02/2020\n\n07/02/2020\n\n07/02/2020 4\n\nCase as to Ghislaine Maxwell ASSIGNED to Judge Alison J. Nathan. (jm) (Entered:\n07/02/2020)\n\nAttorney update in case as to Ghislaine Maxwell. Attorney Alex Rossmiller,Maurene\nRyan Comey,Alison Gainfort Moe for USA added. (jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\nMOTION to detain defendant . Document filed by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell.\n(Moe, Alison) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019268\n\n", "char_count": 1907}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page6 of 12\n\n07/02/2020\n\nArrest of Ghislaine Maxwell in the United States District Court — District of New\n\nHampshire. (jm) (Entered: 07/06/2020)\n\nLETTER by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from\nAUSAs Maurene Comey, Alison Moe, and Alex Rossmiller dated July 5, 2020 re:\nRequest to Schedule Initial Appearance Document filed by USA. (Comey, Maurene)\n(Entered: 07/05/2020)\n\n07/05/2020 5\n\n07/06/2020 6\n\nRule 5(c)(3) Documents Received as to Ghislaine Maxwell from the United States\nDistrict Court — District of New Hampshire. (jm) (Entered: 07/06/2020)\n\n07/06/2020 7 | ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. This matter has been assigned to me for all\npurposes. In its July 5, 2020 letter, the Government on behalf of the parties requested\nthat the Court schedule an arraignment, initial appearance, and bail hearing in this\nmatter in the afternoon of Friday, July 10. See Dkt. No. 5. In light of the COVID\npublic health crisis, there are significant safety issues related to in—court proceedings.\nIf the Defendant is willing to waive her physical presence, this proceeding will be\nconducted remotely. To that end, defense counsel should confer with the Defendant\nregarding waiving her physical presence. If the Defendant wishes to waive her\nphysical presence for this proceeding, she and her counsel should sign the attached\nform in advance of the proceeding if feasible.If this proceeding is to be conducted\nremotely, there are protocols at the Metropolitan Detention Center that limit the times\nat which the Defendant could be produced so that she could appear by video. In the\nnext week, the Defendant could be produced by video at either 9:00 a.m. on July 9,\n2020 or sometime during the morning of July 14, 2020. Counsel are hereby ordered to\nmeet and confer regarding scheduling for this initial proceeding in light of these\nconstraints. If counsel does anticipate proceeding remotely, by 9:00 p.m. tonight,\ncounsel should f\n... [truncated, 4919 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/32 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=32]", "char_count": 4919}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page/7 of 12\n\nproceeding. See Dkt. No. 7. If the Defendant consents, and is able to sign the form\n(either personally or, in accordance with Standing Order 20-MC-—174 of March 27,\n2020, by defense counsel), defense counsel shall file the executed form at least 24\nhours prior to the proceeding. In the event the Defendant consents, but counsel is\nunable to obtain or affix the Defendant's signature on the form, the Court will conduct\nan inquiry at the outset of the proceeding to determine whether it is appropriate for the\nCourt to add the Defendant's signature to the form. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1),\nthe Government must make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of,\nand accorded, the rights provided to them in that section. This includes [t]he right to\nreasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding... involving the\ncrime or of any release... of the accused and \"[t]he right to be reasonably heard at any\npublic proceeding in the district court involving release.” Id. § 3771(a)(2), (4). The\nCourt will inquire with the Government as to the extent of those efforts. So that\nappropriate logistical arrangements can be made, the Government shall inform the\nCourt by email within 24 hours in advance of the proceeding if any alleged victim\nwishes to be heard on the question of detention pending trial. Finally, the time between\nthe Defendant's arrest and July 6, 2020 is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act due to\nthe delay involved in transferring the Defendant from another district. See 18 U.S.C. §\n3161(h)(1)(F). And the Court further excludes time under the Speedy Trial Act from\ntoday through July 14, 2020. Due to the logistical issues involved in conducting a\nremote proceeding, the Court finds \"that the ends of justice served by [this exclusion]\noutweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.\" 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3161(h)(7)(A). The exclusion is also supported \n... [truncated, 4786 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/33 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=33]", "char_count": 4786}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page8 of 12\n\nthe United States may access the live audio feed by calling 214—416—0400 and using\nthe same access code and PIN. These phone lines can accommodate approximately\n500 callers on a first come, first serve basis. The Court will provide counsel for both\nsides an additional dial-in number to be used to ensure audio access to the proceeding\nfor non-speaking co—counsel, alleged victims, and any family members of the\nDefendant. The United States Attorney's Office should email Chambers with\ninformation regarding any alleged victims who are entitled, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\n§3771(a)(4), to be heard at the bail hearing and who wish to be heard. The Court will\nthen provide information as to the logistics for their dial-in access. As the Court\ndescribed in a previous order, members of the press and public may watch and listen to\nthe live video feed in the Jury Assembly Room, at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan\nCourthouse, 500 Pearl Street. See Dkt. No. 10. However, in light of COVID-19,\nseating will be limited to approximately 60 seats in order to enable appropriate social\ndistancing and ensure public safety. Counsel for the Defendant and the Government\nmay contact Chambers by email if there is a request to accommodate alleged victims\nor family members of the Defendant. Members of the credentialed in—house press\ncorps may contact the District Executive's Office about seating. Otherwise, all seating\nwill be allocated on a first come, first serve basis and in accordance with the S.D.N.Y.\nCOVID-—19 Courthouse Entry Program and this Court's previous order of July 7, 2020.\nSee Dkt. No. 10. If conditions change or the Court otherwise concludes that allowing\nfor in-person viewing of the video feed at the courthouse is not consistent with public\nhealth, the Court may provide audio access by telephone only. Any photographing,\nrecording, or rebroadcasting of federal court proceedings is prohibited by law.\nViolation of these prohibition\n... [truncated, 4468 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/34 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=34]", "char_count": 4468}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page9 of 12\n\n07/14/2020 | 24 | Waiver of Right to be Present at Criminal Proceeding as to Ghislaine Maxwell re:\nArraignment, Bail Hearing, Conference. (jw) (Entered: 07/14/2020)\n\n07/15/2020 ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. Initial non-electronic discovery, generally to\ninclude search warrant applications and subpoena returns, is due by Friday, August 21,\n2020. Completion of discovery, to include electronic materials, is due by Monday,\nNovember 9, 2020. Motions are due by Monday, December 21, 2020. Motion\nresponses are due by Friday, January 22, 2021. Motion replies are due by Friday,\nFebruary 5, 2021. Trial is set for Monday, July 12, 2021 ( Discovery due by\n8/21/2020., Motions due by 12/21/2020) (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on\n7/15/20)Gw) (Entered: 07/15/2020)\n\n07/21/2020 | 26 | ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell: The Court has received a significant number of\nletters and messages from non—parties that purport to be related to this case. These\nsubmissions are either procedurally improper or irrelevant to the judicial function.\nTherefore, they will not be considered or docketed. The Court will accord the same\ntreatment to any similar correspondence it receives in the future. SO ORDERED.\n(Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 7/21/2020) (Inl) (Entered: 07/21/2020)\n\n07/21/2020 | 27 | LETTER MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Jeffrey S. Pagliuca\ndated July 21, 2020 re: Local Criminal Rule 23.1 . Document filed by Ghislaine\nMaxwell. (Pagliuca, Jeffrey) (Entered: 07/21/2020)\n\n07/23/2020 | 28 | ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell: The Defense has moved for an order \"prohibiting\nthe Government, its agents and counsel for witnesses from making extrajudicial\nstatements concerning this case.\" Dkt. No. 27 at 1. The Court firmly expects that\ncounsel for all involved parties will exercise great care to ensure compliance with this\nCourt's local rules, including Local Criminal Rule 23.1, and the rules of professional\nresponsibili\n... [truncated, 4535 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/35 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=35]", "char_count": 4535}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page10 of 12\n\n07/28/2020 | 34 | AFFIDAVIT of Alex Rossmiller by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (Rossmiller, Alex)\n(Entered: 07/28/2020)\n\n07/29/2020 | 35 |LETTER REPLY TO RESPONSE to Motion by Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to\nJudge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated July 29, 2020 re 29 LETTER\nMOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated July\n27, 2020 re: Proposed Protective Order .. (Everdell, Christian) (Entered: 07/29/2020)\n\n07/30/2020 PROTECTIVE ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell...regarding procedures to be\nfollowed that shall govern the handling of confidential material. SO ORDERED:\n(Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 7/30/2020)(bw) (Entered: 07/31/2020)\n\n07/30/2020 MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. Both parties have\nasked for the Court to enter a protective order. While they agree on most of the\nlanguage, two areas of dispute have emerged. First, Ms. Maxwell seeks language\nallowing her to publicly reference alleged victims or witnesses who have spoken on\nthe public record to the media or in public fora, or in litigation relating to Ms. Maxwell\nor Jeffrey Epstein. Second, Ms. Maxwell seeks language restricting potential\nGovernment witnesses and their counsel from using discovery materials for any\npurpose other than preparing for the criminal trial in this action. The Government has\nproposed contrary language on both of these issues. For the following reasons, the\nCourt adopts the Government's proposed protective order Under Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 16(d)(1), \"[a]t any time the court may, for good cause, deny,\nrestrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.\" The good\ncause standard \"requires courts to balance several interests, including whether\ndissemination of the discovery materials inflicts hazard to others... whether the\nimposition of the protective order would prejudice the defendant,\" and \"the public's\ninterest i\n... [truncated, 5221 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/36 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=36]", "char_count": 5221}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page11 of 12\n\n08/10/2020\n\n08/10/2020\n\nDistrict of New York, all of which the Court expects the Government to scrupulously\nfollow. Furthermore, the Government indicates that it will likely only provide potential\nwitnesses with materials that those witnesses already have in their possession. See Dkt.\nNo. 33 at 6. And of course, those witnesses who do testify at trial would be subject to\nexamination on the record as to what materials were provided or shown to them by the\nGovernment. Nothing in the Defense's papers explains how its unprecedented\nproposed restriction is somehow necessary to ensure a fair trial. For the foregoing\nreasons, the Court adopts the Government's proposed protective order, which will be\nentered on the docket. This resolves Dkt. No. 29. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge\nAlison J. Nathan on 7/30/2020)(bw) (Entered: 07/31/2020)\n\nLETTER MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell\ndated August 10, 2020 re: Discovery Disclosure and Access . Document filed by\nGhislaine Maxwell. (Everdell, Christian) (Entered: 08/10/2020)\n\nAFFIDAVIT of Christian R. Everdell by Ghislaine Maxwell. (Everdell, Christian)\n(Entered: 08/10/2020)\n\n08/11/2020\n\nMEMO ENDORSEMENT as to Ghislaine Maxwell on re: 38 LETTER MOTION\naddressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated August 10, 2020\nre: Discovery Disclosure and Access. ENDORSEMENT: The Government is hereby\nORDERED to respond to the Defendant's letter motion by Thursday, August 13, 2020.\nThe Defendant's reply, if any, is due on or before Monday, August 17, 2020.\n(Responses due by 8/13/2020. Replies due by 8/17/2020) (Signed by Judge Alison J.\nNathan on 8/11/2020) (ap) (Entered: 08/11/2020)\n\n08/13/2020\n\nLETTER RESPONSE in Opposition by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to\nJudge Alison J. Nathan from Alex Rossmiller dated August 13, 2020 re: 38 LETTER\nMOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated\nAugust 10\n... [truncated, 4229 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/37 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=37]", "char_count": 4229}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 5-2, 09/09/2020, 2927755, Page12 of 12\n\nresponse to the Court's Order of August 18, 2020 Document filed by USA.\n(Rossmiller, Alex) (Entered: 08/21/2020)\n\n08/24/2020 | 48 | LETTER MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Laura A. Menninger\ndated August 24, 2020 re: Request to File Under Seal: Proposed Redactions to Request\nto Modify Protective Order and Reply in Support Thereof . Document filed by\nGhislaine Maxwell. (Menninger, Laura) (Entered: 08/24/2020)\n\n08/25/2020 | 49 | MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: denying without prejudice 38 LETTER\nMOTION as to Ghislaine Maxwell (1). On August 10, 2020, the Defendant filed a\nletter motion related to two issues. Dkt. No. 38. First, the Defendant seeks an order\ndirecting the Government to disclose to defense counsel immediately the identities of\nthe three alleged victims referenced in the indictment. Second, the Defendant seeks an\norder directing the Bureau of Prisons (\"BOP\") to release the Defendant into the general\npopulation and to provide her with increased access to the discovery materials. For the\nreasons that follow, Defendant's requests are DENIED without prejudice....[See this\nMemorandum Opinion And Order]... I. Conclusion: For the reasons stated above,\nDefendant's requests contained in Dkt. No. 38 are DENIED without prejudice.\nFollowing the close of discovery, the parties shall meet and confer on an appropriate\nschedule for pre-trial disclosures, including the disclosure of § 3500 material, exhibit\nlists, and witness lists, taking into account all relevant factors. The Government is\nhereby ORDERED to submit written status updates every 90 days detailing any\nmaterial changes to the conditions of Ms. Maxwell's confinement, with particular\nemphasis on her access to legal materials and ability to communicate with defense\ncounsel. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 8/25/2020) (bw)\n(Entered: 08/25/2020)\n\n09/02/2020 MEMORANDUMOPINION AND ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell: On August 17,\n... [truncated, 3837 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/38 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=38]", "char_count": 3837}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 6, 09/10/2020, 2927908, Page’ of 1\n\nACKNOWLEDGMENT AND NOTICE OF APPEARANCE\n\neee ee ree ee\n\nShort Title: United States of America v. Ghislaine Maxwell Docket No.: No. 20-3061\n\nLead Counsel of Record (name/firm) or Pro se Party (mame): Laura A. Menninger /Haddon Morgan & Foreman, P.C.\n\nAppearance for (party/designation): Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell\nDOCKET SHEET ACKNOWLEDGMENT/AMENDMENTS\n\nCaption as indicated is:\n\nCorrect\n\n() Incorrect. See attached caption page with corrections.\n\nAppellate Designation is:\nCorrect\n(C)) Incorrect. The following parties do not wish to participate in this appeal:\nParties:\n\n(_) Incorrect. Please change the following parties’ designations:\nParty Correct Designation\n\nContact Information for Lead Counsel/Pro Se Party is:\nCorrect\n\n() Incorrect or Incomplete. As an e-filer, I have updated my contact information in the PACER “Manage My Account” screen.\n\nName: Laura A. Menninger\n\nFirm: Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C.\n\nAddress: 150 E. 10th Ave., Denver, CO 80203\n\nTelephone: 303-831-7364 Fax: 303-831-2628\nEmail: menninger@hmflaw.com\n\nRELATED CASES\n\nThis case has not been before this Court previously.\n(_) This case has been before this Court previously. The short title, docket number, and citation are:\n\n(Vv) Matters related to this appeal or involving the same issue have been or presently are before this Court. The short titles,\ndocket numbers, and citations are: Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413 (Ms. Maxwell will be filing a motion to consolidate this case with No. 20-2413);\n\nBrown v. Maxwell, No. 18-2868 (consolidated with No. 16-3945)\n\nCERTIFICATION\n\nI certify that Iam admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by LR 46.1(a)(2), have renewed my admission on\nOR that () | applied for admission on. or renewal on\n\nIf the Court has not yet admitted me or approved my renewal, I have completed Addendum A.\nSignature of Lead Counsel of Record: $/ Laura A. Menninger\nType or Print Name: Laura A. Menninger\n\nOR\n\nSignatu\n... [truncated, 2153 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/39 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=39]", "char_count": 2153}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 7, 09/10/2020, 2927910, Page‘ of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nCRIMINAL APPEAL TRANSCRIPT INFORMATION - FORM B\n\nTO BE COMPLETED BY ATTORNEY:\n\nCASE NAME: United States of America, Plaintiff V,\nGhislaine Maxwell, Defendant\nDOCKET NUMBER: No. 20-3061\nCOUNSEL'S NAME: Laura A. Menninger\nCOUNSEL’s ADpREss; 190 E. 10th Ave.\nDenver, CO 80203\nCOUNSEL’S PHONE: 303-831-7364\nQUESTIONNAIRE\n___|l am ordering a transcript.\nv | am not ordering a transcript. Reason: | Daily copy available U.S. Atty. placed order\n\nOther (attach explanation)\n**Explanation: There is no transcript\n\nbecause the district court decided the\nPrepare transcript of motion on the papers without a hearing\n\nN/A\n\nTRANSCRIPT ORDER\n\nPre-trial proceedings:\n(Description & Dates)\n\nTrial: N/A\n\n(Description & Dates)\n\nN/A\n\nSentencing:\n(Description & Dates)\n\nN/A\n\nPost-trial proceedings:\n(Description & Dates)\n\nN/A\n\n(counsel’s name)\n\n, hereby certify that | will make satisfactory arrangements with\n\nthe court reporter for payment of the costs of the transcript in accordance with FRAP 10(b).\n\nMethod of payment: Funds CJA Form 24\ns/ Laura A. Menninger 9/10/2020\nCounsel’s Signature Date\n\nTO BE COMPLETED BY COURT REPORTER AND FORWARDED TO COURT OF APPEALS:\n\nACKNOWLEDGMENT\nDate order received: Estimated Number of Pages:\nEstimated completion date:\nCourt Reporter's Signature Date\n\nAttorney(s): Send completed form to the U.S. District Court as that court may require and send copies to the\nCourt of Appeals, U.S. Attorney’s Office, and Court Reporter.\nCourt Reporter(s): Send completed acknowledgement to the Court of Appeals Clerk.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019277\n\n", "char_count": 1657}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 8, 09/10/2020, 2927915, Page‘ of 1\nNOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR SUBSTITUTE, ADDITIONAL, OR AMICUS COUNSEL\n\nShore Te, United States of America v.Ghislaine Maxwell packer No, No. 20-8061\n\nSubstitute, Additional, or Amicus Counsel’s Contact Information is as follows:\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nName:\n\nHaddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C.\n\nFirm:\n\nAddress: 120 E. 10th Ave., Denver, CO 80203\n\nTelephone: 993-831-7364 iy, 303-832-2628\n\nEmail: amueller@hmflaw.com\n\nAppearance for; Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell\n\n(party/designation)\nSelect One:\nSubstitute counsel (replacing lead counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[__|substitute counsel (replacing other counsel: ee )\n(name/firm)\n[V |Additional counsel (cocounsel with; “aura A. Menninger/Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C. )\n(name/firm)\n[__}Amicus (in support of: )\n(party/designation)\nCERTIFICATION\n\nI certify that:\nlv |i am admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by Interim Local Rule 46.1(a)(2), have renewed\nmy admission on OR\n\n[ | applied for admission on\n\nSignature of Counsel: s/ Adam Mueller\n\nType or Print Name: Adam Mueller\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019278\n\n", "char_count": 1105}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 9, 09/10/2020, 2927924, Page‘ of 1\nNOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR SUBSTITUTE, ADDITIONAL, OR AMICUS COUNSEL\n\nShore Te, United States of America v.Ghislaine Maxwell packer No, No. 20-8061\n\nSubstitute, Additional, or Amicus Counsel’s Contact Information is as follows:\n\nTy Gee\n\nName:\n\nHaddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C.\n\nFirm:\n\nAddress: 120 E. 10th Ave., Denver, CO 80203\n\nTelephone: 993-831-7364 iy, 303-832-2628\n\nEmail. tgee@hmflaw.com\n\nAppearance for; Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell\n\n(party/designation)\nSelect One:\nSubstitute counsel (replacing lead counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[__|substitute counsel (replacing other counsel: ee )\n(name/firm)\n[V |Additional counsel (cocounsel with; “aura A. Menninger/Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C. )\n(name/firm)\n[__}Amicus (in support of: )\n(party/designation)\nCERTIFICATION\n\nI certify that:\nlv |i am admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by Interim Local Rule 46.1(a)(2), have renewed\nmy admission on OR\n\n[ | applied for admission on\n\nSignature of Counsel: s/ Ty Gee\n\nTy Gee\n\nType or Print Name:\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019279\n\n", "char_count": 1083}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 10, 09/10/2020, 2928093, Page‘ of 1\nNOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR SUBSTITUTE, ADDITIONAL, OR AMICUS COUNSEL\n\nShort Title: United States v. Maxwell Docket No.: 20-3061\n\nSubstitute, Additional, or Amicus Counsel’s Contact Information is as follows:\n\nName: Maurene Comey\n\nFirm: United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York\n\nAddress: One St. Andrew's Plaza\n\nTelephone: (212) 637-2324 Fax: (212) 637-2387\n\nE-mail. Maurene.comey@usdoj.gov\n\nAppearance for; United States of America/Appellee\n\n(party/designation)\nSelect One;\n[Substitute counsel (replacing lead counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[_]Substicute counsel (replacing other counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[Vv] Additional counsel (co-counsel with: Won S. Shin/U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York )\n(name/firm)\n[ ]Amicus (in support of : )\n(party/ designation)\nCERTIFICATION\nI certify that:\n[vl am admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by Interim Local Rule 46.1(a)(2), have renewed\nOR\n\nmy admission on N/A\n\n[It applied for admission on\n\nSignature of Counsel: /s/Maurene Comey\n\nType or Print Name: Maurene Comey\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019280\n\n", "char_count": 1144}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 11, 09/10/2020, 2928262, Page‘ of 1\nNOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR SUBSTITUTE, ADDITIONAL, OR AMICUS COUNSEL\n\nShort Title: United States v. Maxwell Docket No.: 20-3061\n\nSubstitute, Additional, or Amicus Counsel’s Contact Information is as follows:\n\nName; Lara Pomerantz\n\nFirm: United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York\n\nAddress: One St. Andrew's Plaza\n\nTelephone: (212) 637-2343 Fax:\n\nE-mail. ara.pomerantz@usdoj.gov\n\nAppearance for; United States of America/Appellee\n\n(party/designation)\nSelect One;\n[Substitute counsel (replacing lead counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[_]Substicute counsel (replacing other counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[Vv] Additional counsel (co-counsel with: Won S. Shin/U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York )\n(name/firm)\n[ ]Amicus (in support of : )\n(party/ designation)\nCERTIFICATION\nI certify that:\n[vl am admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by Interim Local Rule 46.1(a)(2), have renewed\nOR\n\nmy admission on\n\n[It applied for admission on\n\nSignature of Counsel: /s/ Lara Pomerantz\n\nType or Print Name: Lara Pomerantz\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019281\n\n", "char_count": 1129}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 16, 09/10/2020, 2928287, Page1 of 5\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500\n\nMOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT\n\nDocket Number(s): 20-3061 Caption [use short title]\nMotion for: LGave to File Unredacted Motion to United States v. Maxwell\n\nConsolidate under Seal\n\nSet forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:\n\nLeave to File Unredacted Motion to\n\nConsolidate under Seal\n\nmMovincearty: Ghislaine Maxwell opposinc party: United States of America\nPlaintiff Defendant\n[v ] Appellant/ Petitioner | Appellee/Respondent\nMovinc aTrorney: Adam Mueller opPosING ATToRNEY; Maurene Comey\n{name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]\nHaddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C. Assistant U.S. Attorney, SDNY\n150 E. 10th Ave., Denver, CO 80203 1 St. Andrew’s Plaza, New York, NY 10007\n303-831-7364 amueller@hmflaw.com 212-637-2324 Maurene.Comey@usdoj.gov\nCourt-Judge/Agency appealed from: J udge Nathan , S.D.N.Y.\nPlease check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND\nINJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:\nHas movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1): Has request for relief been made below? LK Yes H.\niv lV] ves{_ | No (explain): Has this relief been previously sought in this Court? Yes\n\nRequested return date and explanation ofemergency:\nOpposing counsel’s position on motion:\nUnopposed | lopposed [ Pon’ t Know\nDoes opposing counsel intend to file a response:\n\n[| Yes iv | te) [Don't Know\n\nIs oral argument on motion requested? [ ]yes No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)\n\nHas argument date of appeal been set? [| Yes No Ifyes, enter date:\n\nSignature of Moving Attorney:\ns/ Adam Mueller Date: 9/10/2020 Service by: Mowecr Other [Attach proof of service]\n\nForm T-1080 (rev. 12-13)\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019282\n\n", "char_count": 1897}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 16, 09/10/2020, 2928287, Page2 of 5\n\n20-3061\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for\n\nthe Second Circuit\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nPlaintiff-A ppellee,\n—against —\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 20-CR-330 (AJN)\n\nUnopposed Motion to File Unredacted Motion to Consolidate\nUnder Seal\n\nDefendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell, through her attorneys Haddon,\nMorgan and Foreman, P.C., moves unopposed for leave to file her Unredacted\nMotion to Consolidate under seal. As grounds for this request, Ms. Maxwell states:\n\nMs. Maxwell has filed with this Court a motion to consolidate two appeals:\nUnited States v. Maxwell, No. 20-3061 (the “criminal case,” Case No. 20-CR-330\n(AJN) (S.D.N.Y.)), and Gzuffre v. Maxwell, Case No. 20-2413 (the “civil case,”\n\nCase No. 15-CV-7433 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y.)). The criminal case addresses an order by\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019283\n\n", "char_count": 957}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 16, 09/10/2020, 2928287, Page3 of 5\n\nJudge Nathan refusing to modify a criminal protective order. The civil case\naddresses an order by Judge Preska unsealing certain deposition material.\n\nAmong other arguments for consolidation of the two appeals, Ms. Maxwell\ncontends that she should be permitted to share with Judge Preska critical\ninformation Ms. Maxwell learned from Judge Nathan.\n\nBut the protective order issued by Judge Nathan prevents Ms. Maxwell from\ndisclosing this information to Judge Preska or from telling this Court about the\ninformation in the civil appeal. By contrast, the protective order allows Ms.\nMaxwell to tell this Court about the information in the criminal appeal, though only\nunder seal since it is confidential and sealed in the district court criminal case.\n\nMs. Maxwell’s Unredacted Motion to Consolidate explains this situation\nand describes the critical information. But to comply with criminal protective\norder, Ms. Maxwell can file an unredacted copy of the Motion to Consolidate only\nunder seal with this Court, and then only in the criminal appeal, Case No. 20-3061.\n\nTherefore, in compliance with the criminal protective order, Ms. Maxwell\nwill publicly file on ECF a redacted copy of the Motion to Consolidate in both\nappeals along with all but one of the exhibits— Exhibit B, which was filed under seal\n\nin the district court.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019284\n\n", "char_count": 1410}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 16, 09/10/2020, 2928287, Page4 of 5\n\nIn turn, she asks for leave to file the unredacted copy of the Motion to\nConsolidate in the criminal appeal under seal with this Court, along with Exhibit B.\n\nThe government does not oppose this Motion for Leave to File under Seal,\nalthough it does oppose the Motion to Consolidate.\n\nFor these reasons, Ms. Maxwell requests leave to file her Unredacted\nMotion to Consolidate under seal.\n\nSeptember 10, 2020.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\ns/ Adam Mueller\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel 303.831.7364\n\nFax 303.832.2628\nImenninger@hfmlaw.com\ntgee@hmflaw.com\namueller@hmflaw.com\n\nCounsel for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine\nMaxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019285\n\n", "char_count": 788}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 16, 09/10/2020, 2928287, Paged of 5\n\nCertificate of Service\n\nI certify that on September 10, 2020, I filed this Unopposed Motion to File\nMotion to Consolidate under Seal with the Court via CM/ECF, which will send\nnotification of the filing to all counsel of record. I also certify that I emailed a copy\nof this motion to all counsel of record.\n\ns/ Nicole Simmons\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019286\n\n", "char_count": 405}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page of 15\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500\n\nMOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT\nDocket Number(s): 20-3061\n\nMotion for: (0 Consolidate Appeals United States v. Maxwell\n\nCaption [use short title]\n\nSet forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:\n\nRequest that this Court consolidate Giuffre v.\nMaxwell, No. 20-2413, with United States v.\nMaxwell, No. 20-3061\n\nmMovincearty: Ghislaine Maxwell opposinc party: United States of America\nPlaintiff Defendant\n[v ] Appellant/ Petitioner | Appellee/Respondent\nMovinc aTrorney: Adam Mueller opPosING ATToRNEY; Maurene Comey\n{name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]\nHaddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C. Assistant U.S. Attorney, SDNY\n150 E. 10th Ave., Denver, CO 80203 1 St. Andrew’s Plaza, New York, NY 10007\n303-831-7364 amueller@hmflaw.com 212-637-2324 Maurene.Comey@usdoj.gov\nCourt-Judge/Agency appealed from: J udge Nathan , S.D.N.Y.\nPlease check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND\nINJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:\nHas movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1): Has request for relief been made below? LK Yes H.\niv lV] ves{_ | No (explain): Has this relief been previously sought in this Court? Yes\n\nRequested return date and explanation ofemergency:\nOppose counsel’s position on motion:\n\nUnopposed [V lopposed [ Pon’t Know\nDoes opposing counsel intend to file a response:\n\nYes [No [Don't Know\n\nIs oral argument on motion requested? [ ]yes No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)\n\nHas argument date of appeal been set? [| Yes No Ifyes, enter date:\n\nSignature of Moving Attorney:\ns/ Adam Mueller Date: 9/10/2020 Service by: Mowecr Other [Attach proof of service]\n\nForm T-1080 (rev. 12-13)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019287\n\n", "char_count": 1905}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page2 of 15\n\nNos. 20-2413 &\n20-3061\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nfor the Second Circuit\n\nVIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE, On Appeal from the U.S. District\nCourt for the Southern District of\nPlaintiff-Appellee, New York\nV. No. 15-CV-7433 (LAP)\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, The Honorable Loretta A. Preska,\n\nUSS. District Judge\nDefendant- Appellant.\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, On Appeal from the U.S. District\nCourt for the Southern District of\nPlaintiff-Appellee, New York\nV. No. 20-CR-330 (AJN)\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, The Honorable Alison J. Nathan, U.S.\nDistrict Judge\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nGhislaine Maxwell’s Motion to Consolidate Appeals\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019288\n\n", "char_count": 687}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page3 of 15\n\nDefendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell moves this Court to consolidate\nUnited States v. Maxwell, No. 20-3061 (the “criminal case,” Case No. 20-CR-330\n(AJN) (S.D.N.Y.)), with the pending appeal in Giuffre v. Maxwell, Case No. 20-\n2413 (the “civil case,” Case No. 15-CV-7433 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y.)).\"\n\nBackground\n\nThese two appeals are inextricably intertwined. As Ms. Maxwell explained in\nher opening brief in the civil case, the district court unsealed the deposition\nmaterial without knowing critical new information discovered to Ms. Maxwell in\nthe criminal case bearing directly on whether the deposition material should be\n\nunsealed. Giuffre v. Maxwell, Case No. 20-2413, OB, pp 13-15.\n\n‘Since Ms. Maxwell seeks to consolidate both appeals, she is filing this\nmotion in both cases. But because of the protective order in the criminal case,\nEXHIBIT A, Ms. Maxwell can file an unredacted version of this motion in the\ncriminal appeal only. She cannot file an unredacted version of this motion in the\ncivil appeal.\n\nAccordingly, in the criminal appeal, Ms. Maxwell will file a sealed and\nunredacted copy of this motion along with a motion for leave to file under seal. She\nwill publicly file on ECF the redacted copy of this motion.\n\nIn the civil appeal, Ms. Maxwell will file on ECF the redacted copy of this\nmotion only.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019289\n\n", "char_count": 1397}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page4 of 15\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019290\n\n", "char_count": 79}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 54, "text_content": ", they repeatedly downplayed and dismissed\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019291\n\n", "char_count": 62}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page6 of 15\n\narguments made by Ms. Maxwell that material should remain sealed because of the\npotential for a criminal investigation. E.g., EXHIBIT C, p 2. For example, when Ms.\nMaxwell moved to stay discovery in Farmer v. Indyke, Case No. 19-cv-10475 (LGS-\nDCF) (S.D.N.Y.), due to the pending criminal investigation, Ms. Giuffre opposed\n\nthe motion on the grounds that Ms. Maxwell could not show the existence or scope\n\nof any such criminal investigation, [a\n\nMaxwell has provided no information about the subject matter of the\ncriminal investigation into Epstein’s co-conspirators, the status of the\ninvestigation, or even disclosed whether she herself is a target of the\nSouthern District’s investigation. When Plaintiffs counsel asked\nMaxwell’s counsel for information about the criminal investigation\nduring their meet and confer, Maxwell’s counsel refused to provide\nany details.\n\nEX. C, p 2.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019292\n\n", "char_count": 966}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page7 of 15\n\n, after the parties had briefed the\nmotion to unseal the deposition material and after Judge Preska ordered the\ndeposition material unsealed, Ms. Maxwell asked Judge Preska to briefly stay the\nunsealing process. EXHIBIT D, p 1. But because of the criminal protective order, all\nMs. Maxwell could reveal to Judge Preska was that she was aware of critical new\ninformation. EX. D, p 1. She couldn’t tell Judge Preska what that information was.\nEx. D, pp 1-2.\n\nJudge Preska declined to stay the unsealing process but said he would\nreevaluate if Judge Nathan modified the criminal protective order and allowed Ms.\nMaxwell to share with Judge Preska, under seal, all she learned as described above.\n\nEXHIBIT E, pp 1-2.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019293\n\n", "char_count": 793}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page of 15\n\n)\n\n)\n\nes\n~\nas\nes)\n4\n|\na\nc\nQ.\naq\nfay)\nZ\nry\nct\na\n©\n=)\na\n©\nn\n=)\n°\n=\nQ.\noO\n=e\n@\nQ.\nct\n=\"\n©\nct\nim\nfay)\n2\nCc\nig’\nn\nct\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019294\n\n", "char_count": 191}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, PageY of 15\n\nMs. Maxwell has appealed Judge Preska’s order unsealing the deposition\nmaterial, Giuffre v. Maxwell, Case No. 20-2413 (2d Cir.), and she is now appealing\nJudge Nathan’s order denying the motion to modify the criminal protective order,\n\nUnited States v. Maxwell, Case No. 20-3061 (2d Cir.).\n\nArgument\n\nThis Court should consolidate the appeal of Judge Preska’s order unsealing\nthe deposition material with the appeal of Judge Nathan’s order denying the\nmotion to modify the criminal protective order. Consolidation is necessary for a fair\nand efficient resolution of these appeals.\n\nFirst, unless this Court consolidates these appeals, it will find itself in the\n\nvery same position as the two district courts—one panel of this Court will be privy\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019295\n\n", "char_count": 827}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page10 of 15\n\nto relevant and material information (the panel hearing the criminal case) while the\nother panel will be in the dark (the panel hearing the civil case). This even though\ntwo panels of this Court stand on equal judicial footing.\n\nSecond, only through consolidation can this Court resolve these issues in a\nfair and consistent fashion. This Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the\n\nSouthern District of New York. The judges of that court, however, have reached\n\nme\n=)\nQ\nie)\n=)\nwh\nhme\nio]\nat\nfe)\n=)\nct\nie\nig’\nio]\nc\n=¥\nio ay\nct\nio)\nct\na\nfe)\nae}\na\n.\nCc\na.\n—e\nQ\nfe)\nie)\namr)\n© =\ncy\na\n=\nOo\n=\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019296\n\n", "char_count": 670}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page11 of 15\n\nThird, it’s essential that Ms. Maxwell be able to share with Judge Preska\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019297\n\n", "char_count": 159}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page12 of 15\n\n. The government in the criminal\ncase before Judge Nathan refused to agree to a modification of the protective order\nto allow Ms. Maxwell to inform Judge Preska of the material facts. EXHIBIT G.\nAccording to the government, even though all Ms. Maxwell sought was permission\n\nto share the requested information with other judicial officers under seal, a\n\n11\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019298\n\n", "char_count": 439}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page13 of 15\n\nmodification of the protective order would destroy the secrecy of the ongoing grand\n\njury investigation. EX. G, p 3-4. [as\n\nIn Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d at 47-\n48, this Court concluded that the right of access demanded the unsealing of the\ncivil summary judgment material. A fair and consistent application of the decision\nin Brown supports Ms. Maxwell’s request to share with Judge Preska the\ninformation she learned from Judge Nathan. There’s no reason Judge Preska\n\nshould be deprived access to material presumptively available to the public.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019299\n\n", "char_count": 628}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page14 of 15\n\nConclusion\n\nFor these reasons, this Court should consolidate United States »v. Maxwell,\nCase No. 20-3061, with Giuffre v. Maxwell, Case No. 20-2413.\nSeptember 10, 2020.\nRespectfully submitted,\n\ns/ Adam Mueller\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel 303.831.7364\n\nFax 303.832.2628\nImenninger@hmflaw.com\ntgee@hmflaw.com\namueller@hmflaw.com\n\nCounsel for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine\nMaxwell\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019300\n\n", "char_count": 554}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 17, 09/10/2020, 2928288, Page15 of 15\n\nCertificate of Service\n\nI certify that on September 10, 2020, I filed this Ghislaine Maxwell’s Motton\nto Consolidate Appeal with the Court via CM/ECF, which will send notification of\nthe filing to all counsel of record. I further certify that I emailed a copy of this\nGhislaine Maxwell’s Motion to Consolidate Appeal to all counsel of record.\n\ns/ Nicole Simmons\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019301\n\n", "char_count": 447}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 18, 09/10/2020, 2928289, Page’ of 13\n\nEXHIBIT A\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019302\n\n", "char_count": 91}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "Casmai2O0cs00330 ccm eDotinikii BR0PiledaWe2620 abegenis\n\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT pe\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATE FILED:7/30/2020_\nee ee x\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA °\n: PROTECTIVE ORDER\nWe :\n: 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, :\nDefendant. :\nee ee x\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, United States District Judge:\n\nWHEREAS the Government intends to produce to GHISLAINE\nMAXWELL, the defendant, certain documents and materials that\n(1) affect the privacy and confidentiality of individuals,\n(11) would impede, if prematurely disclosed, the Government’s\nongoing investigation; (iii) would risk prejudicial pretrial\npublicity if publicly disseminated, and (iv) is not authorized\nto be disclosed to the public or disclosed beyond that which is\nnecessary for the defense of this action, and other materials\npursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (“Rule 16”)\nand pursuant to any other disclosure obligations (collectively,\nthe “Discovery”), which contain sensitive, confidential, or\npersonal identifying information;\n\nWHEREAS, the Government seeks to protect sensitive,\nconfidential, or personal identifying information contained in\nthe materials it produces consistent with Rule 16 or other\n\ndisclosure obligations;\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019303\n\n", "char_count": 1278}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "Casmat2 00800330 cclmeDotinkil B20 Flea W262 aBagenk’ tH 12\n\nWH\n\nthis Order;\n\nBR\n\nBR\n\niBY\n\nS ORI\n\nDe\n\nattorneys\n\nfendant”)\n\n(*\n\nThe\n\nDe\n\nin this action:\n\nDe\n\ncriminal act\n\na)\n\nfense Counsel solely\n\ntion,\n\nother than\n\nthe det\n\nand no\n\nLG\n\nSha\n\nfense of\n\nb)\n\nShall\n\ntransmitted by the Defendant\n\nexcept as\n\nnot to be\n\nCounsel;\n\nform by the\n\nparagraph 1\n\nonly to the\n\nor paralegal personnel employed\n\nnecessary\n\nfor the\n\nand/or to the det\n\nfense Counsel”)\n\n11 be used by\nfor purposes of\n\nfor any civil\n\na\n\nDe\n\nfurther transmitted\n\nBAS the Government has applied\n\nERED:\n\nDiscovery disclosed to the det\n\nduring the course of\n\nthe\n\nthis action;\n\nexcept to Det\n\nfendant to\n\nfendant’s criminal def\n\nDe\n\nthe defense\n\nfor the\n\nfendant\n\n@)\n\nnot be copied or otherwis\n\nor\n\nentry of\n\nFendant\nfense\n\nproceedings\n\nher\n\nthis\n\nproceeding or any purpose\n\nrecorded or\n\ntake notes,\n\ntO anyone Ol\n\nfFense Counsel,\n\nor\n\nwhich are\n\nther than Defense\n\nc) Shall not be disclosed or distributed in any\nDefendant or her counsel except as set forth in\n(d) below;\n\nd) May be disclosed only by Defense Counsel and\n\n—\n\nfollowing persons\n\ninvestigative,\n\n(*\n\nfull-time,\n\nsecretarial,\n\nDesignated Persons”):\n\nclerical,\n\npart-time,\n\nOr as\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019304\n\n", "char_count": 1225}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "Casmat200cs00330cclmeDotinkil B20 Flea W260 agagenb t# 12\n\nindependent contractors by the dei\n\na) °\n,\n\nSta\n\nadvisor,\n\nemployed by the\n\nassisting in\n\nauthorized by Order of\n\nconsultant,\n\ntheir counsel\n\ndlagly\n\nDefendant and\n\nthe defense of\n\nExperts/Advisors”);\n\nthis cas\n\nany expert or potential expert,\n\nDefense Co\n\nFendant’s counsel\n\nDefense\n\n(*\n\nlegal\n\nor any other individual retained or\n\nunsel for the purpose of\n\n(“I\n\nfens\n\niii. such\nthe Court (“Other\ne) May be provided\n(collectively, “Potential\n\nDe\n\nother persons as hereafter may be\n\nAuthorized Persons”);\n\nto prospective witnesses and\n\nto\n\nfFense counsel,\n\nfense Witnesses”),\n\nfor trial\n\nTo the extent Discovery materials are disclosed to\n\nthey agree\n\nistributed,\n\nthat any such materials\n\nor otherwise\n\nto individuals other than the recipient Potential\n\nth xtent deemed necessary by det\npreparation.\nPotential Defense Witnesses,\nwill not be further copied, d\ntransmitted\nDefense Witnesses.\n\nZs The Defendant and\ncopy of this Order to any\ndisclose Discovery materials.\n\nmaterials to\nshall agree\n\na copy hereo\n\nterms herein,\n\nDesignated Persons,\n\nDe\n\nany such\n\nPrior to disclosure of\n\nfense Counsel shall provide a\nDesignated Persons to whom they\nDiscovery\n\nDesignated Person\n\no be subject to\n\nf and stating\n\ntha\n\nao\n\nand providing such copy to\n\nthe terms of\n\nthis Order by signing\n\nthey “Agree to be bound by the\n\nAll\n\nDefense Counsel.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019305\n\n", "char_count": 1414}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "Casmat2a0cs00330cclmeDotintil B20 Filed W262 0 agagend tH 12\n\nsuch acknowledgments shall be retained by\n\nshall be subject to in camera review by the Court if\n\nfor review\n\nnot obtain\n\nattorneys,\n\nsupport personnel\n\nrepresentation of\n\nDe\n\nThe\n\nis demonstrated. De\n\nthe def\n\nsignatures from any member of ns\n\nexperts, consultants, paralegals,\n\ninvolved in\n\nand secretarial staff\n\nt\n\nthe defendants in this case),\n\nteam\n\nfense Counsel and\ngood cause\n\nfendant and her counsel need\n\n(1.€.,\n\ninvestigators,\nthe\n\nall of whom are\n\nnonetheless bound by this Protective Order.\n\nBi. To the extent that Discovery is disseminated to\nDefense Experts/Advisors, Other Authorized Persons, or Potential\nDefense Witnesses, via means other than electronic mail, Defense\nCounsel shall encrypt and/or password protect the Discovery.\n\n4. The Government, the Defendant, Defense Counsel,\nDefense Staff, Defense Experts/Advisors, Potential Defense\nWitnesses and their counsel, and Other Authorized Persons are\nprohibited from posting or causing to be posted any of the\nDiscovery or information contained in the Discovery on the\nInternet, including any social media website or other publicly\navailable medium.\n\n5S.\n\ntheir professional\n\nThe Government\n\nthe\n\nDe\n\nobligations in this matter),\n\nDefense Co\n\nPotential\n\nAuthorized\n\nt\n\nunsel, nse Sta ns\n\nDe\n\ntheir counsel,\n\nfense Witnesses and\n\nPersons are strictly prohibited\n\n(other than in the discharge of\n\nfendant\n\n~\n\nExperts/Advisors,\nand Other\n\nfrom publicly\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019306\n\n", "char_count": 1501}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "dis\n\nwit\n\npro\n\nide\n\nCasmat200cs00330cclmeDotinkil B20 FileaWs262@ 0 agagan& tF 12\n\nclosing or disseminating the identity of any victims or\n\nnesses referenced in the Discovery.\n\nhibit Defense Counsel or Defense Staf\n\nThis Order does not\n\nfrom referencing the\n\nntities of individuals they believe may be relevant to the\n\ndef\n\nthe\n\ncas\n\ncou\n\nCou\n\nor\n\nnot\n\nense to Potential Defense Witnesses and their counsel during\n\ncourse of the investigation and preparation of the defense\n\ne at trial. Any Potential Defense Witnesses and their\n\nnsel who are provided identifying information by Defense\n\nnsel or Defense Staff are prohibi\n\nted from further disclosing\n\ndisseminating such identifying in\n\nformation. This Order does\n\nprohibit Defense Counsel from publicly referencing\n\nindividuals who have spoken by name on the public record in this\n\ncas\n\ne.\n\n6. The Defendant, Defense Counsel, Defense Staff,\n\nfense Experts/Advisors, Potential\n\nAut\n\natt\n\nof\n\nDe\n\nfense Witnesses, and Other\n\nhorized Persons are prohibited\n\nFrom\n\nfiling publicly as an\n\nachment to a filing or excerpted within a filing the identity\n\nany victims or witnesses referenced in the Discovery, who\n\nhave not spoken by name on the public record in this case,\n\nunl\n\nthe\n\ness authorized by the Government in writing or by Order of\n\nCourt. Any such filings must be\n\nfiled under seal, unless\n\nauthorized by the Government in writing or by Order of the\n\nCourt.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019307\n\n", "char_count": 1432}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "Casmat200cs00330cclmeDotinkil B20 Filed WE2620- aBagas HF 12\n\n7.\n\nCopies of\n\nby the Government in\n\nor designated as\n\nelectronic\n\nthe Government,\n\n“\n\ncon\n\nMw“\n\ncon\n\nthis action\n\nDiscovery materials designated as\n\n“\n\nbearing “con\n\nfidential” as described below,\n\n“\n\ncon\n\nincluding such materials marked as\n\nor designated as\n\nare deemed\n\nclearly mark all\n\n“Cont\n\nMw“\n\ncon\n\nfidential\n\nfidential” 3\n\nna\n\nIn\n\npages or electronic\n\nformation.\n\nao\n\nfidential”\n\nfolder or document titl\n\nThe Government shall\n\nDiscovery or other materials produced\n\nstamps,\n\nand/or\n\nfidential” by\n\nfidential” either on the documents or materials themselves,\n\ney\n\nmaterials containing\n\nConfidential Information, or folder or document titles as\nnecessary, with “confidential” designations.\n\n8. Confidential Information may contain personal\nidentification information of victims, witnesses, or other\nspecific individuals who are not parties to this action, and\nother confidential information; as well as information that\nidentifies, or could lead to the identification of, witnesses in\n\nthis matter.\n\nhas identii\n\nin this case shall\n\nThe identity of\n\nGovernment that\n\ndesignation\n\nof\n\nforma\n\nIn\n\nsuch documents or materials,\n\ntion.\n\nDe\n\nDe\n\nfied hersel\n\nno\n\nf or himselt\n\nF publicly as such\n\nfense Counsel may,\n\nbe treated as Confidential\n\nan alleged victim or witness who\n\non the record\n\nformation.\n\nIn\n\nat any time,\n\nfense Counsel does not concur in\n\nno\n\ntify the\n\nthe\n\ndocuments or other materials as Confidential\n\nDe\n\nIf the Government does not agree to de-designate\n\nfense Counsel may thereafter move\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019308\n\n", "char_count": 1595}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "the Court\n\nma\n\nma\n\nCasmat2 00800330 cclmeDotinkil B20 Flea W262 aBagent tH 12\n\ncontrary order of the Court.\n\nde\n\nDe\n\nfor an Order de-designating such documents or\nterials. The Government’s designation of such documents and\n\nterials as Confidential Information will be controlling absent\n\n10. Confidential Information disclosed to the\n\nfF proceedings in this action:\n\nfendant, or Defense Counsel, respectively, during the course\n\na) Shall be used by the Defendant or her\n\nfense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this\n\ncriminal action, and not for any civil proceeding or any purpose\n\nother than the defense of this action;\n\nb) Shall be maintained in a safe and secure\nmanner;\n\nCc) Shall be reviewed and possessed by the\nDefendant in hard copy solely in the presence of Defense\nCounsel;\n\nd) Shall be possessed in electronic format only\nby Defense Counsel and by appropriate officials of the Bureau of\n\nPrisons (“BOP”), who shall provide the defendant wit\n\naccess to the Discovery, including Confidential\n\nconsistent with the rules and regulations of the\n\nDe\n\nfendant’s review;\n\nth electronic\n\nInformation,\n\nBOP, for the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019309\n", "char_count": 1148}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Casmat200cs00330cclmeDotinkil B20 Pilea WE262 0 aBagen8 tF 12\n\ne) Shall be reviewed by the Defendant solely in\n\nthe presence of Defense Counsel or when provided access to\n\nDiscovery materials in electronic format by BOP officials;\n\nf) May be disclosed only by Defense Counsel and\n\nonly to Designated Persons;\n\ng) May be shown to, either in person, by\n\nvideoconference, or via a read-only document review platform,\n\nbut not disseminated to or provided copies of to, Potential\n\nDefense Witnesses, to th xtent deemed necessary by Defense\n\nCounsel, for trial preparation, and after such individual(s)\nhave read and signed this Order acknowledging that such\n\nindividual(s) are bound by this Order.\n\n11. Copies of Discovery or other materials produced\n\nby the Government in this action bearing “highly confidential”\n\nstamps or otherwise specifically designated as “highly\n\nconfidential,” and/or electronic Discovery materials designated\n\nas “highly confidential” by the Government, including such\n\nmaterials marked as “highly confidential” either on the\n\ndocuments or materials themselves, or designated as “highly\n\nconfidential” in an index, folder title, or document title, are\n\ndeemed “Highly Confidential Information.” To the extent any\n\nHighly Confidential Information is physically produced to the\n\nDefendant and Defense Counsel, rather than being made available\n\nto the Defendant and Defense Counsel for on-site review, the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019310\n\n", "char_count": 1444}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "CaSe sk 20 -F(W03 D2 AUN er DdeyMEMOsB0 Al etPAZBw20 aRaye gs 0612\n\nGovernment shall clearly mark a\n\nll such pages or electronic\n\nmaterials containing Highly Confidential Information with\n\n“highly confidential” stamps on\n\nthemselves.\n\nthe documents or materials\n\n12. Highly Confidential Information contains nude,\n\npartially-nude, or otherwise sexualized images, videos, or other\n\ndepictions of individuals.\n\n13. Defense Counsel may, at any time, notify the\n\nGovernment that Defense Counsel\n\ndoes not concur in the\n\ndesignation of documents or other materials as Highly\n\nConfidential Information. If the Government does not agree to\n\nde-designate such documents or materials, Defense Counsel may\n\nthereafter move the Court for an Order de-designating such\n\ndocuments or materials. The Government’s designation of such\n\ndocuments and materials as Highly Confidential Information will\n\nbe controlling absent contrary order of the Court.\n\n14. Highly Confidential Information disclosed to\n\nDefense Counsel during the course of proceedings in this action:\n\na) Shall be used by the Defendant or her\n\nDefense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this\n\ncriminal action, and not for any civil proceeding or any purpose\n\nother than the defense of this action;\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019311\n\n", "char_count": 1278}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "Caseas200sb00330cclMmeDocantait B20 Filed Ws262Pabagé 00 12\n\nb) Shall not be disseminated, transmitted, or\n\notherwise copied and provided to\n\nDefendant;\n\nDe\n\nfense Counsel or the\n\nCG) Shall be reviewed by the Defendant solely in\n\nthe presence of Defense Counsel;\n\nd) Shall not be possessed outside the presenc\n\nof Defense Counsel, or maintained, by the Defendant;\n\ne) Shall be made available for inspection by\n\nDefense Counsel and the Defendant,\n\nenforcement officers or employees;\n\nunder the protection of law\n\nand\n\n£) Shall not be copied or otherwise duplicated\n\nby Defense Counsel or the Defendant during such inspections.\n\n15. The Defendant, De\n\nDefense Experts/Advisors, Potential\n\nfen\n\nse Counsel, Defense Staff,\n\nDefense Witnesses, and Other\n\nAuthorized Persons are prohibited\n\nfrom filing publicly as an\n\nattachment to a filing or excerpted within a filing any\n\nConfidential Information or Highly Confidential Information\n\nreferenced in the Discovery, unless authorized by the Government\n\nin writing or by Order of the Court. Any such filings must be\n\nor by Order of the Court.\n\n16. The provisions of\n\nfiled under seal, unless authorized by the Government in writing\n\nthis Order shall not be\n\nconstrued as preventing disclosure of any information, with the\n\nexception of victim or witness identifying information, that is\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019312\n\n", "char_count": 1353}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "Caseat200sb00330 ccm eDocantait B20 RiledWs262Pabage oi GF 12\n\npublicly available or\n\nCounsel\n\nobtained by the\n\n17. Except for\n\nthe record of this case,\n\nGovernment or securely de\n\nincluding but not limited\n\ndays of\n\nverdict\n\ncaptioned case;\n\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255;\n\nrecord in this case; or the granting of\n\nto Con\n\nthe expiration of\n\nin the above-capt\n\nfrom any order dismissing any of\n\nbehalf o\n\nDiscovery that has been made part of\n\nfiden\n\ntial\n\nDef\n\nendant or her Defense\n\nfrom a source other than the Government.\n\nDefense Counsel shall return to the\n\nstroy or delete all Discovery,\n\nInformation, within 30\n\nthe period\n\nioned case;\n\nthe expiration of\n\nfor\n\ndirect appeal from any\n\nthe period of direct appeal\n\nthe charges in the above-\n\nfederal or state ethics rules applicable\n\ncaptioned case, whichever date is later.\n\nthe period for a petition\n\nany period of time required by the\n\nto any attorney of\n\nany motion made on\n\nthe Government dismissing any charges in the above-\n\n18. The foregoing provisions shall remain in effect\n\nunless and until either (\n\na) the Government and Defense Counsel\n\nmutually agree in writing otherwise,\n\nmodified by further order\n\nor (b) this Order is\n\nof the Court.\n\n19. The Government and Defense Counsel agree to meet\n\nfer in advance of\n\nand coni\n\nagree to any modiit\n\nany hearings or\n\nevidence at those proceedings.\n\nfications necessary\n\n11\n\ntrial to discuss and\n\nfor\n\nthe presentation of\n\nIn the absence of agreement,\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019313\n\n", "char_count": 1483}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "Caseat200sb003830 ccm eDocantait B20 RiledWe262Pabage oP GF 12\n\nfor any such modifications.\n\nSO ORDERED:\n\nDated: New York, New York\nJuly 30 , 2020\n\nNa Quali\n\nAN\n\nHONORABLE ALISON J. NATH\nUnited States District J\n12\n\nJudge\n\nDefense Counsel may make an appropriate application to the Court\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019314\n\n", "char_count": 307}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 19, 09/10/2020, 2928290, Page‘ of 1\n\nEXHIBIT B\n\nFILED UNDER SEAL ONLY\nIN CASE NO. 20-3061\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019315\n\n", "char_count": 132}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 20, 09/10/2020, 2928291, Page‘ of 4\n\nEXHIBIT C\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019316\n\n", "char_count": 89}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "Case £49% 901 6G9s..Rosusieat SoAHneH2 920, RRPES/Le720eP Age 1 of 3\n\nBSF\n\nDavid Boies\nTelephone: (914) 749-8200\nEmail: dboies@bsfllp.com\n\nMay 18, 2020\n\nVIA ECF\n\nThe Honorable Debra C. Freeman\nDaniel Patrick Moynihan\n\nUnited States Courthouse\n\n500 Pearl St.\n\nNew York, NY 10007-1312\n\nRe: Annie Farmer v. Darren K. Indyke, Richard D. Kahn, & Ghislaine Maxwell,\n19-10475-LGS-DCF\n\nDear Judge Freeman:\n\nPursuant to Individual Rule I.D, Plaintiff Annie Farmer hereby responds to Defendant\nGhislaine Maxwell’s request for a pre-motion conference in connection with her anticipated\nmotion to stay discovery in this matter. The Court should deny Maxwell’s motion for a pre-motion\nconference and deny her anticipated motion in its entirety because, as explained below, each of\nMaxwell’s reasons for staying discovery is meritless and the motion is simply another attempt to\nunjustifiably delay this litigation.\n\nFirst, a pending criminal investigation of Maxwell does not justify a stay of discovery.\n“TA] stay of a civil case to permit conclusion of a related criminal prosecution has been\ncharacterized as an extraordinary remedy.” Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d\n83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this Circuit, courts balance the\nfollowing six factors when considering whether to stay a civil case pending related criminal\nproceedings:\n\n1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented\nin the civil case; 2) the status of the case, including whether the defendants have\nbeen indicted; 3) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously\nweighed against the prejudice to plaintiffs caused by the delay; 4) the private\ninterests of and burden on the defendants; 5) the interests of the courts; and 6) the\npublic interest.\n\nId. at 99. And according to the very case Maxwell cites in support of staying this action pending\na criminal investigation: “The weight of authority in this Circuit indicates that c\n... [truncated, 2506 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/80 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=80]", "char_count": 2506}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "Case £49% 901 6G95..Rosustent SoAaneH2 920, RRPES/L8720e PAGE 2 of 3\n\nThe Honorable Debra C. Freeman\nMay 18, 2020\nPage 2\n\nFurther, Maxwell has provided no information about the subject matter of the criminal\ninvestigation into Epstein’s co-conspirators, the status of the investigation, or even disclosed\nwhether she herself is a target of the Southern District’s investigation. When Plaintiff's counsel\nasked Maxwell’s counsel for information about the criminal investigation during their meet and\nconfer, Maxwell’s counsel refused to provide any details. “A civil defendant urging such a stay\n[pending a parallel criminal prosecution] bears the burden of establishing its need.” Rex & Roberta\nLing Living Tr. v. B Comme’ns Ltd., 346 F. Supp. 3d 389, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal quotation\nmarks omitted). Maxwell therefore cannot use the existence of a criminal investigation to dodge\nher discovery obligations in this matter, particularly while at the same time refusing to provide any\ndetails or reasons as to why the investigation is a reason to stay the action under the law of this\nCircuit.'\n\nSecond, the potential claims resolution program does not justify a stay of discovery. As\nthis Court knows, the program cannot go forward due to the current criminal activity lien on Jeffrey\nEpstein’s Estate in the U.S. Virgin Islands (“USVI”). See Tr. of Feb. 11, 2020 Conf. at 36:15-18\n(“[T]he two cases where discovery has been stayed, in light of what’s happening in the Virgin\nIslands, they may end up unstayed.”). But even if the lien were lifted and the program could go\nforward tomorrow, both Epstein’s Estate (Maxwell’s co-defendant) and this Court have recognized\nthat victims would still not be required to stay discovery in their cases in order to participate in the\nprogram. Tr. of Feb 11, 2020 Conf. at 6:10—18 (Estate explaining that staying litigation is not\nrequired in order to participate in the program); Tr. of Feb 11, 2020 Conf. at 17:2-3 (Court\nrecognizing that Defendants cann\n... [truncated, 4130 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/81 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=81]", "char_count": 4130}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "Case £49%9%16495..Rosusteat HoAlineH2 720. RRPES/L8720 PAGE 3 of 3\n\nThe Honorable Debra C. Freeman\nMay 18, 2020\nPage 3\n\nGeneral’s Status Report on Voluntary Compensation Program, Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Probate\nNo. ST-19-PB-80 (Apr. 14, 2020, V.I. Super. Ct.); Notice of Joinder of Motion for Status\nConference Regarding Victim Compensation Fund, Estate of Jeffrey E. Epstein, Probate No.\nST-19-PB-80 (Apr. 29, 2020, V.I. Super. Ct.). The claims resolution program is therefore not a\nvalid basis to stay this action without Plaintiffs consent.”\n\nThird, Maxwell contends that her motion to dismiss is “strong and warrants a stay of\ndiscovery pending its resolution.” Plaintiff has already addressed the merits of Maxwell’s motion\nto dismiss in her response to Maxwell’s letter requesting a pre-motion conference on that motion.\nECF No. 48. Judge Schofield’s words at the pre-motion conference—in which she suggested that\nMaxwell’s counsel not file a motion to dismiss—speak for themselves, and demonstrate that\nMaxwell’s motion to dismiss is anything but “strong”: “I’ve reviewed the letter from defendant\nMaxwell’s counsel, and this particular motion doesn’t strike me as any more meritorious” than the\none previously contemplated by the Estate, which eventually filed an Answer in lieu of a motion\nto dismiss after a similar pre-motion conference before Judge Schofield. Tr. of Apr. 16, 2020\nConf. at 3:22—24. Further, this Court has explicitly stated that the default in this Court is that\ndispositive motions do not stay discovery, which is also consistent with Judge Schofield’s\nindividual rules. Tr. of Nov. 21, 2019 Conf. at 26:10—12; Judge Schofield’s Individual Rule II.C.2.\n(“Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court does not stay discovery or any other case\nmanagement deadlines during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.”). Maxwell’s anticipated\nmotion to dismiss should not stay discovery in this matter, just as the Estate’s motions to dismiss\nhave not stayed discovery in an\n... [truncated, 3413 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/82 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=82]", "char_count": 3413}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 21, 09/10/2020, 2928292, Page‘ of 4\n\nEXHIBIT D\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019320\n\n", "char_count": 89}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "Cas 2s 2-O7aB30l04em Bocumé 10002 Filed20e92/2agPagé 4 of 3\n\nHaddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.c\nLaura A. Menninger\n\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, Colorado 80203\n\nPH 303.831.7364 FX 303.832.2628\nwww.hmfilaw.com\nLMenninger@hmflaw.com\n\nHADDON\nMORGAN\nFOREMAN\n\nAugust 10, 2020\n\nHonorable Loretta A. Preska\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\n500 Pearl Street\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nRe: August 3, 2020 Order (Doc. 1096)\nGiuffre v. Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP)\n\nDear Judge Preska:\n\nI write in response to the Court’s Order of August 3, 2020 (Doc. 1069), the Order and\nProtocol for Unsealing Decided Motions (Doc. 1044) (“Protocol”), and to raise with the Court\nthe legal effect of new information that came to the attention of counsel for Ms. Maxwell on\nFriday, August 7, 2020.\n\nNew information: On Friday, August 7, 2020, counsel for Ms. Maxwell learned of\ncritical new information that impacts both this action and U.S. v. Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n(the “Criminal Action”). The information implicates Ms. Maxwell’s right to due process and\nfairness in this civil action and affects the Second Circuit’s review of the Court’s unsealing\norder of July 23, 2020. Additionally, the information implicates her rights as a criminal\ndefendant guaranteed under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments.\n\nCounsel makes the representations about implications of the new information as an\nofficer of this Court. At this time, counsel is not at liberty to disclose the information because\nit is subject to a protective order in the Criminal Action, which forbids its use “for any civil\nproceeding or any purpose other than the defense” of the criminal action absent “further order\nof the Court.” Protective Order, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) at 4 1(a), 18 (Exhibit A). As required by\nthat Protective Order and Judge Nathan’s Individual Practices in Criminal Cases, counsel\ninitiated a conferral with the U.S. Attorney’s Office over the weekend concerning a\nmodification of the Protective Order to sha\n... [truncated, 2365 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/84 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=84]", "char_count": 2365}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "Cass 2N-O7aB300sem Bocuim a 10002 Filed20e92/2agPagd 2 of 3\n\nHonorable Loretta A. Preska\nAugust 10, 2020\nPage 2\n\nMs. Maxwell requests a temporary stay of the unsealing process for approximately\nthree weeks until the conclusion of (a) the conferral with the U.S. Attorney’s Office to a\nmodification of the Protective Order in the Criminal Action and, if necessary, an application\nand ruling by Judge Nathan on the issue, to permit the use of the information in this Court and\nbefore the Second Circuit (under seal in both courts, if necessary), (b) an application to this\nCourt containing the new information in support of a request to stay the unsealing process\nuntil the conclusion of the Criminal Action, and (c) a ruling by this Court on the motion for\nstay.\n\nStreamlining of Unsealing Process: As directed by the Court, counsel for Ms. Maxwell\nconferred with plaintiff's counsel concerning various proposals to streamline the unsealing\nprocess. Subject to Ms. Maxwell’s request to temporarily pause the process as described\nabove, defense counsel has agreed to several potential modifications of the Protocol which we\nhope will ease the burden on the parties and the Court going forward, should the unsealing\nmove ahead. Of note, and as Plaintiff will explain to the Court, the parties have agreed to\nnotify all of the Non-Parties at once so that we can understand which Non-Parties object to the\nunsealing before deciding how to proceed with future redactions. Although this will give the\nCourt and the Original Parties more information about the scope of objectors, there are\nlimitations to the extent to which it will expedite the process. As counsel has made clear in\nthe past, it will take significant effort by the Original Parties and their staff to put together the\nexcerpts for any Non-Party who requests them because each Non-Party will be entitled to see\nhis or her own information (but not that of other Non-Parties). After receiving a request from\na Non-Party, we anticipate it will \n... [truncated, 3717 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/85 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=85]", "char_count": 3717}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "JO\" VIA plosey Jo Jesunog :99\nJosuluueyy “V eine]\n‘poymugns Aq[nyyoodsayy\n\n‘OIISOp UNOD dU} pynoys “SsurosaI0j\noy} Jo Aue ssnosIp 0} soUaJEJUOD sUOYda]9} B IOJ S[QLTIEAR ST [[J2MXPI[ “SJA[ JOF [aSuNOD\n\nOJNID VIUISITA JJUIeTg JO uoTIsodaq usdosy oO} UoNOp S.JURPUsTEGq —[¢€Z e\neusodgns ysend 0} Uoopy JoyoInyD uoreys—s{Z e\nsyUSUINIOG] PesaTIALIg-UON Jodwio,y 0} uoNopy S,JURpUdsTOq—SsS[ e\n\nUOISSTUIqnS\nBIOWILD UT JOJ poumleyyD ssa] TAlIg oy) Jo woddns ul joug s,jjnuIeTg-—6ET e\n\njynureyg 0} sosuodsay A1aAoosiq,\nJO 19S ISI S Juepuayeq 0} sasuodsoy jadurod 0} UONOpl S,jJURpUsJoq —SL e\n\nore Aoyy, “Abis 94} 0} JElqns syustNdOp Wo aonb Jo poyseye savy jou Op (q) pue sTelioyeu\n\npojoepal Jo poyeas savy (2) Jey} SUOOW paploap [edISO[OUOIYS dATJ JsIJ OY} syUasaidar\n\n1ST] SIU], ‘Ssulpeayd pojeyal Tay} puke SUOTOW paploep SATJ SULMOTI[OJ dy} 23k} peaysul pue\n\n(sUOT]OW ssoy} NoYsnosy) popyurids si uoMIsodap s,[ s0q yey} UdAIZ) ASOTOUOIYD Z pue | 90q\n\noY} WIJ aVTASP NOD ay} yey} ssodoid om ‘way Wo d}onb yey) sTeLiayew pue s}diosuey\nuorpsodap s,[ 90q] pure [JOMXRI[ “SAT SUTUIDOUOD Av}S $.JINDIID pUOddg dy} USAID\n\n-MOTAOY JOS SOLNUY JOxSOC JO J9S TXON pesodold\n\n\"poseayal SUlaq sJUSWUNIOp dy} 0} JoTId Jap1o ay}\nWO] WNIT puosag ay} Ul Jaros Joy ATdde 0} Jopso easun Aue SUIMOTIOJ SAep / UdAIS 9q ALeg\n[eUuIsUIC Jo Ayeg-UON SuTjoalqo Aue ay} JO} MOTTe LNOD 9} WY} sanbal am ‘ATTCUL\n\n“SUTTNI JO SUT} oY} ye SuTII/O1 Jo SuNdadov sI HI SUOTJOBPoT\n\nyorym Ajy1oods pynoys BUI[NI Ss .1INOD sy) sAdTTOG OM puUk BUITNI s.jINOD sy} OFUT ATINSIquie\n\nYON SMOTIL JRF OY} Jaye suoTJOepal asoy] SuLIedarg “Aydol Jo YSU oy} savy 0} Aeg\n\n-UON JO Aye [RUIBIIQ SuTDa/qQC dy} JOJ pu UOTILIOPISUOD S.1INOD SY} JO} “onsst 3e ssuIpeoyd\n\noY} JO Jes poyowpoiun pasodoid ev ssuodsoay J19y}) YM ATddns 0} Sulyessun sasodoid oym\n\nAye [eulsiig surpuodsay oy} o1mnbas 0} papuswie aq [Od0}01g 34} Jey} Jsonbal om ‘ssuljeasun\nJO pUNOL Jse] OY) SULINP Pa1INd90 jeY} SIO. OY) JO sos JsuTeSe JUSASId 0} ‘PITY,\n\n“ARYS S$ JINIIID pUOddS dy}\n... [truncated, 2277 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/86 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=86]", "char_count": 2277}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 22, 09/10/2020, 2928293, Page1 of 3\n\nEXHIBIT E\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019324\n\n", "char_count": 90}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "Cas 2s 2N-O7aBSDosRm Bucticn GW 10082 Filed20g9.2/AagPageé 3 of 2\n\nay\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nVIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nNo. 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP)\n\n-against-\nORDER\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\n\nDefendant.\n\nLORETTA A. PRESKA, Senior United States District Judge:\n\nThe Court has reviewed the parties’ letters dated August 10\n\nand August 11, 2020. (See dkt. nos. 1099-1101.) The Court writes\n\nspecifically to address Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell’s request for\n\na three-week stay of the unsealing process due to the availability\n\nof “critical new information” related both to this action and to\n\nthe pending criminal case against her, U.S. v. Maxwell, No. 20 Cr.\n\n330 (AJN). (See dkt. no. 1100 at 1-2.)!\n\nMs. Maxwell’s request is denied. Given that Ms. Maxwell is\n\nnot at liberty to disclose this new information because it is\n\nsubject to the protective order in the criminal action, (id. at\n\n1), the Court has no reasonable basis to impose a stay. And, as\n\nMs. Maxwell knows, her ipse dixit does not provide compelling\n\n' Pursuant to the Court’s Order dated August 3, 2020 [dkt. no.\n1094], the parties have also submitted to the Court for resolution\nvarious disputes related to (1) methods for streamlining the\nunsealing process, and (2) the next set of docket entries to be\nreviewed for potential unsealing. The Court will address those\ndisputes at a later date.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019325\n\n", "char_count": 1411}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "Cas 2s 2f-O7aBSLlosRm Bucticn Gt 10092 Filed20g9.2/A0agPageé 2 of 2\n\ngrounds for relief.\n\nShould the protective order in the\n\naction be modit\nto the Court,\nunsealing proc\nSO ORDERED.\n\nDated: New\nAugu\n\ncriminal\n\nFormation\n\nfF the relevant int\n\nfied to permit disclosure of\n\nMs. Maxwell may renew her\n\ness.\n\nYork, New York\nst 12, 2020\n\nrequest for a stay of the\n\nwatltalA Yule\n\nLORETTA A. PRES\nSenior United S$\n\nKA\n\ntates District Judge\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019326\n\n", "char_count": 455}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 23, 09/10/2020, 2928294, Page1 of 6\n\nEXHIBIT F\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019327\n\n", "char_count": 89}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "Casmi200cb0033D-dclm eDocintant 62 0Riled MH709/20 abaget of\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\n\nDOC #:\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DATE FILED:__ 9/2/20\n\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUnited States of America,\n\n_y_\n20-CR-330 (AJN)\nGhislaine Maxwell,\nMEMORANDUM\n\nDefendant. OPINION AND ORDER\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:\n\nOn August 17, 2020, Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell filed a sealed letter motion seeking\nan Order modifying the protective order in this case.! Specifically, she sought a Court order\nallowing her to file under seal in certain civil cases (“Civil Cases”) materials (“Documents”) that\n\nshe received in discovery from the Government in this case. She also sought permission to\n\n! This Order will not refer to any redacted or otherwise confidential information, and as a result it will not be sealed.\nThe Court will adopt the redactions to Defendant’s August 17, 2020 letter motion that the Government proposed on\nAugust 21, 2020, and it will enter that version into the public docket. The Court’s decision to adopt the\nGovernment’s proposed redactions is guided by the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v.\nPyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Under this test, the Court must: (i) determine whether the\ndocuments in question are “judicial documents;” (ii) assess the weight of the common law presumption of access to\nthe materials; and (iii) balance competing considerations against the presumption of access. /d. at 119-20. “Such\ncountervailing factors include but are not limited to ‘the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency’\nand ‘the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.’” /d. at 120 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044,\n1048 (2d Cir.1995) (“Amodeo IP’)). The Government’s proposed redactions satisfy this test. First, the Court finds\nthat the defendant’s letter motion is “relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial\nprocess,” thereby qualifying\n... [truncated, 3173 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/91 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=91]", "char_count": 3173}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "Casmat200cs00330cclMm eDozcanel GLORleADA2/ 0 agagerat 5\n\nreference, but not file, other discovery material that the Government produced in this case. For\nthe reasons that follow, Defendant’s requests are DENIED.\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), a Court may enter a protective order\nonly after it finds that good cause exists. Within this framework, the Federal Rules of Criminal\nProcedure leave it to the discretion of the Court to determine whether modification of an existing\nprotective order is warranted.” To make that decision, the Court takes into account all relevant\nfactors, including the parties’ reliance on the protective order and whether the moving party has\nsufficiently substantiated a request to deviate from the status quo in the instant matter.\n\nOn July 30, 2020, this Court entered a protective order in this case, having determined\nthat good cause existed. Dkt. No. 36. The parties agreed that a protective order was warranted.\nSee Dkt. No. 35 at 1 (“The parties have met and conferred, resolving nearly all the issues relating\nto the proposed protective order.”). The Defendant’s Proposed Protective Order included a\nprovision that stated that all discovery produced by the Government “[s]hall be used by the\nDefendant or her Defense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this criminal action, and\nnot for any civil proceeding or any purpose other than the defense of this action.” Dkt. No. 29,\nEx. A ¥ 1(a). That language was included in the Court’s July 30, 2020 protective order. See Dkt.\nNo. 36 4 1(a), 10(a), 14(a). Shortly thereafter, the Government began to produce discovery.\n\nUpon receipt of some of the discovery, the Defendant filed the instant request, which\n\nseeks modification of the protective order in order to use documents produced in the criminal\n\n? Tn the civil context, there is a “strong presumption against the modification of a protective order.” In re Teligent,\nInc., 640 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Courts\n... [truncated, 2731 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/92 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=92]", "char_count": 2731}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 93, "text_content": "Casmat200cs00330 culm eDocanteil GLORleADa2/) 0 agagebot 5\n\ncase in other civil proceedings. She bases her request on the premise that disclosure of the\nDocuments to the relevant judicial officers is allegedly necessary to ensure the fair adjudication\nof issues being litigated in those civil matters. But after fourteen single-spaced pages of heated\nrhetoric, the Defendant proffers no more than vague, speculative, and conclusory assertions as to\nwhy that is the case. She provides no coherent explanation of what argument she intends to\nmake before those courts that requires the presentation of the materials received in discovery in\nthis criminal matter under the existing terms of the protective order in this case. And she\nfurnishes no substantive explanation regarding the relevance of the Documents to decisions to be\nmade in those matters, let alone any explanation of why modifying the protective order in order\nto allow such disclosure is necessary to ensure the fair adjudication of those matters. In sum, the\narguments the Defendant presents to the Court plainly fail to establish good cause. The\nDefendant’s request is DENIED on this basis.\n\nIndeed, good cause for the requested modification of the protective order is further\nlacking because, as far as this Court can discern, the facts she is interested in conveying to the\njudicial decisionmakers in the Civil Cases are already publicly available, including in the\nGovernment’s docketed letter on this issue. See Dkt. No. 46. In the opening paragraph of her\nreply letter dated August 24, 2020, the Defendant states that she is essentially seeking to disclose\nunder seal to certain judicial officers the following factual information:\n\n1. Grand jury subpoenas were issued to an entity (“Recipient”) after the Government\nopened a grand jury investigation into Jeffrey Epstein and his possible co-\nconspirators;\n\n2. The Recipient concluded that it could not turn over materials responsive to the grand\n\njury subpoena absent a modificat\n... [truncated, 2074 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/93 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=93]", "char_count": 2074}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 94, "text_content": "Casmas200c800330 culm eDocantel GLORleADa2/0 agag@eaat 5\n\n3. In February 2019, the Government, ex parte and under seal, sought modification of\nthose civil protective orders so as to permit compliance with the criminal grand jury\nsubpoenas;\n\n4. In April 2019, one court (“Court-1”) permitted the modification and, subsequently,\nanother court (“Court-2”) did not;\n\n5. That as a result of the modification of the civil protective order by Court-1, the\nRecipient turned over to the Government certain materials that had been covered by\nthe protective order; and\n\n6. That the Defendant learned of this information (sealed by other courts) as a result of\nRule 16 discovery in this criminal matter.\n\nWith the exception of identifying the relevant judicial decision makers and specific civil\nmatters, all of the information listed above is available in the public record, including in the letter\nfiled on the public docket by the Government on this issue. See Dkt. No. 46. Although this\nCourt remains in the dark as to why this information will be relevant to those courts, so that\nthose courts can make their own determination, to the extent it would otherwise be prohibited by\nthe protective order in this matter, the Court hereby permits the defendant to provide to the\nrelevant courts under seal the above information, including the information identifying the\nrelevant judicial decision makers and civil matters.\n\nIn addition, the Government has indicated that “there is no impediment to counsel\nmaking sealed applications to Court-1 and Court-2, respectively, to unseal the relevant\nmaterials.” Dkt. No. 46 at 3 n.5. In her reply, the Defendant asserts that she is amenable to such\na solution if the Court agrees with the Government that doing so would not contravene the\n\nprotective order in this case. To the extent it would otherwise be prohibited by the protective\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019331\n\n", "char_count": 1887}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 95, "text_content": "Casmat200cs00330 culm eDoeanieil GLORleADa2/) CP agagebot 5\n\norder in this matter, the Defendant may make unsealing applications to those Courts if she\n\nwishes.\n\nSO ORDERED. AY 0 iste\n\nDated: September 2, 2020\nNew York, New York ALISON J. NATHAN\nUnited States District Judge\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019332\n\n", "char_count": 295}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 96, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 24, 09/10/2020, 2928295, Page1 of 6\n\nEXHIBIT G\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019333\n\n", "char_count": 89}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 97, "text_content": "Casmat200c800330- culm eDoedntenl 420 Flea D29R CP agaget af 5\n\nU.S. Department of Justice\n\nUnited States Attorney\nSouthern District of New York\n\nThe Silvio J. Mollo Building\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nAugust 21, 2020\nVIA ECF\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\nUnited States Courthouse\n\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nRe: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nDear Judge Nathan:\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this letter in opposition to the defendant’s letter of\nAugust 17, 2020 (the “Defense Letter’), requesting that the Court enter an order permitting the\ndefendant to file under seal in certain civil cases (the “Civil Cases”) discovery materials produced\nby the Government in the instant criminal case, and to refer to, but not file, additional other\ndiscovery materials produced by the Government in the Civil Cases. Those applications should\nbe denied.\"\n\nAs an initial matter, the Government has already produced, and will continue to produce,\nsubstantial volumes of materials in discovery consistent with its obligations. Those include\nmaterials the Government obtained via search warrant, grand jury subpoenas, or other investigative\nmethods available only to the Government. Indeed, the Government has already produced more\nthan 165,000 pages of discovery to the defense, including the materials relevant to the Defense\nLetter. Through her most recent application, the defendant seeks permission to use, in unrelated\ncivil litigation, materials produced pursuant to the protective order in this case and designated\n“Confidential” thereunder. As detailed herein, the Government’s designation is entirely\nappropriate given that the materials—court orders and applications—have been kept under seal by\nthe issuing judges, and pertain to an ongoing criminal investigation.\n\n' The Government has drafted this letter in a manner that avoids revealing the contents of sealed\nmateria\n... [truncated, 2508 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/97 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=97]", "char_count": 2508}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 98, "text_content": "Casmat200c800330-cclm eDozedntanl 420 Flea D29R Pagagerat 5\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 2\n\nIn particular, the Defense Letter seeks this Court’s authorization to use materials relating\nto applications the Government made seeking the modification of certain protective orders in other\njudicial proceedings. By way of background, the Government sought such modifications to permit\ncompliance with criminal grand jury subpoenas (the “Subpoenas”). Those Subpoenas were issued\nto a certain recipient (the “Recipient”) after the Government opened a grand jury investigation into\nJeffrey Epstein and his possible co-conspirators. For obvious reasons and in keeping with its\nstandard practice, the Government did not notify the defendant or her counsel that it had issued\nthe Subpoenas. In response to receiving the Subpoenas, the Recipient advised the Government\nthat it believed that certain existing protective orders precluded full compliance. Accordingly, in\nor about February 2019, the Government applied ex parte and under seal to each relevant court to\nrequest modification of the respective protective orders to permit compliance with the Subpoenas.\nIn or about April 2019, one court (“Court-1”’) granted the Government’s application, and permitted\nthat the Government share its order—and only that order, which itself prohibited further\ndissemination—to the Recipient. Subsequently, the second court (“Court-2”) denied the\nGovernment’s application. Because the relevant grand jury investigation remains ongoing, both\nCourt-1 and Court-2 have ordered that the filings regarding the Subpoenas remain under seal,\nexcept that both have expressly permitted the Government to produce those filings to the defendant\nas part of its discovery obligations in this criminal case. The Defense Letter now seeks to use\nthose discovery materials in the Civil Cases.\n\nAt base, the defendant’s application fundamentally misapprehends the nature and process\nof criminal proceedings, and it furthe\n... [truncated, 4011 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/98 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=98]", "char_count": 4011}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 99, "text_content": "Casmat200c800330-cclM eDoedntenl 420 Filed DI29R CP agagesot 5\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 3\n\nGovernment in discovery in this criminal case, and to which the protective order unquestionably\napplies, to litigate her Civil Cases. There is no basis to modify the Protective Order here.\n\nSecond, there is good reason why both parties proposed, and the Court ordered, a protective\norder that prevents the defendant from using materials obtained through the process of criminal\ndiscovery in any of the many civil cases in which she is, or could become, a party. To allow the\ndefendant to do so would permit the dissemination of a vast swath of materials, including those\nthat are confidential due to witness privacy interests, personal identifying information of third\nparties, and relevance in ongoing grand jury investigations. Here, the Government was particularly\nconcerned about the defendant’s interests in blurring these lines because, among other reasons, her\ncounsel in the criminal case are also her counsel in the Civil Cases. It would be grossly\ninappropriate for defense counsel to be permitted to sift through the criminal case discovery and\ncherry-pick materials they may believe could provide some advantage in their efforts to defend\nagainst accusations of abuse by victim plaintiffs, delay court-ordered disclosure of previously-\nsealed materials, or any other legal effort the defendant may be undertaking at any particular time.\nAnd yet that is what the defendant proposes.\n\nThird, the specific documents at issue pertain to ex parte applications made as part of an\nongoing grand jury investigation. Those documents were filed under seal and presently remain\nunder seal because the relevant judicial officers have ordered that all filings regarding those\nmatters, including the discovery materials referenced in the Defense Letter, remain sealed.? As\nthe U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York has stated publicly, the\ninvestigation into the c\n... [truncated, 3726 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/99 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=99]", "char_count": 3726}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 100, "text_content": "Casmat200c800330-cclm eDoedntel 420 FledADI29R Pagag@odat 5\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 4\n\ne.g., United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“As a general proposition,\ncourts have repeatedly recognized that materials, including even judicial documents which are\npresumptively accessible, can be kept from the public if their dissemination might ‘adversely affect\nlaw enforcement interests.’”) (citing United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050)); see also\nUnited States v. Park, 619 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the need to “maintain\nthe secrecy of the Government’s investigation” outweighed the public’s right of access to certain\nsentencing documents).\n\nFourth, defense counsel cites not a single case to support the argument that a criminal\ndefendant should be permitted to use criminal discovery materials in her civil cases. Nor is the\nGovernment aware of any. Though precedent on this issue appears to be somewhat sparse—\nperhaps because few defendants attempt such a maneuver—see United States v. Calderon, 15 Cr.\n025, 2017 WL 6453344, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2017) (discussing the relative lack of specific\nguidance in the context of an application to modify protective orders in criminal cases), see also\nUnited States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 721 (Sth Cir. 2015) (“[mJotions to modify protective\norders in criminal cases appear to be infrequent”), decisions that do exist have rejected the kind of\nblurring of the line between criminal and civil proceedings that the defendant attempts here. See\nCalderon, 2017 WL 6453344, at 5-6 (denying a defendant’s application for modification of a\ncriminal protective order so he could use certain discovery materials in a FOJA suit); United States\nv. DeNunzio, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2020 WL 1495880, at *2-3 (D. Mass. March 27, 2020) (denying\na defendant’s motion to modify two protective orders in his criminal case for the purpose of\npursuing claims in a civil action, even following \n... [truncated, 3747 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/100 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=100]", "char_count": 3747}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 101, "text_content": "Casmat200c800330-cclm eDoeantanl G20 Flea D29R Pagagebot 5\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 5\n\nrequested—the defendant can make such arguments, and the Government can and will vigorously\noppose them, at the appropriate stage in this case.\n\nFinally, to the extent the defendant contends that the relief requested is somehow necessary\nto her ability to bring issues to the attention of other courts, the Defense Letter completely fails to\nexplain what legal argument she wishes to make in her Civil Cases based on the discovery\nmaterials she has identified or what relevance those materials have to the litigation of the Civil\nCases. The fact that the Government issued grand jury subpoenas and obtained court authorization\nfor compliance with one of those subpoenas has no conceivable relevance to disputed issues in the\nCivil Cases. To the extent the defendant argues that the requested relief is necessary to ensure that\ncourts adjudicating the Civil Cases are aware of the existence of the documents at issue, the\ndefendant identifies no specific reason why these materials are relevant to the issues pending in\nthose cases, other than to falsely accuse the Recipient and the Government of some sort of\nmalfeasance.°\n\nIn sum, the defendant’s arguments in favor of her application offer no explanation of the\nrelevant legal theory the materials would support, not to mention a compelling reason for this Court\nto permit an end-run around the protective order and permit the use of criminal discovery to litigate\na civil case. Accordingly, the application in the Defense Letter should be denied.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS\nActing United States Attorney\n\nBy: /s\nMaurene Comey / Alison Moe / Lara Pomerantz\nAssistant United States Attorneys\nSouthern District of New York\nTel: (212) 637-2324\n\nCe: All counsel of record, via ECF\n\n° If anything, the Defense Letter suggests that the defendant intends to use criminal discovery\nmaterials to attack the Government in the Civil \n... [truncated, 2179 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/101 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=101]", "char_count": 2179}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 102, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 30, 09/15/2020, 2931477, Page‘ of 1\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\n\nDate: September 15, 2020 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 20-3061 DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nNOTICE OF CASE MANAGER CHANGE\nThe case manager assigned to this matter has been changed.\n\nInquiries regarding this case may be directed to 212-857-8514.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019339\n\n", "char_count": 598}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 103, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 31, 09/15/2020, 2931599, Page‘ of 1\n\nHaddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.c\nAdam Mueller\n\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, Colorado 80203\n\nPH 303.831.7364 Fx 303.832.2628\nwww.hmilaw.com\namueller@hmflaw.com\n\nHADDON\nMORGAN\nFOREMAN\n\nSeptember 15, 2020\n\nGerard Whidbee\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nfor the Second Circuit\n\nUnited States Courthouse\n\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10008\n\nRe: United States v. Maxwell, No. 20-3061 (2d Cir.)\n\nDear Mr. Whidbee:\n\nUnder Local Rule 31.2(a)(1)(A), Ms. Maxwell selects October 22, 2020, as the due\ndate for her opening brief, which is 42 days from the filing of Form B, which\n\nindicates that no transcript will be required or ordered for this appeal.\n\nSincerely,\n\nhehe\n\nAdam Mueller\nCounsel for Defendant-Appellant\nGhislaine Maxwell\n\nCC: All counsel of record, »za ECF\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019340\n\n", "char_count": 840}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 104, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 32, 09/15/2020, 2931626, Page‘ of 1\nNOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR SUBSTITUTE, ADDITIONAL, OR AMICUS COUNSEL\n\nShort Title: United States v. Maxwell Docket No.: 20-3061\n\nSubstitute, Additional, or Amicus Counsel’s Contact Information is as follows:\n\nName: Alison Moe\n\nFirm: United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York\n\nAddress: One St. Andrew's Plaza\n\nTelephone: (212) 637-2225 Fax:\n\nE-mail. alison.moe@usdoj.gov\n\nAppearance for; United States of America/Appellee\n\n(party/designation)\nSelect One:\n[Substitute counsel (replacing lead counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[_]Substicute counsel (replacing other counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[Vv] Additional counsel (co-counsel with: Won S. Shin/U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York )\n(name/firm)\n[ ]Amicus (in support of : )\n(party/ designation)\nCERTIFICATION\nI certify that:\n[¥ I am admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by Interim Local Rule 46.1(a)(2), have renewed\nOR\n\nmy admission on N/A\n\n[It applied for admission on\n\nSignature of Counsel: /s/ Alison Moe\n\nType or Print Name: Alison Moe\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019341\n\n", "char_count": 1119}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 105, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 36, 09/16/2020, 2932112, Page‘ of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nfor the\nSECOND CIRCUIT\n\nAta Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood\n\nMarshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of September,\ntwo thousand twenty,\n\nUnited States of America, ORDER\nDocket No: 20-3061\nAppellee,\nV.\n\nGhislaine Maxwell, AKA Sealed Defendant 1,\n\nDefendant - Appellant.\n\nCounsel for APPELLANT Ghislaine Maxwell has filed a scheduling notification pursuant to the Court's\nLocal Rule 31.2, setting October 22, 2020 as the brief filing date.\n\nIt is HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's brief must be filed on or before October 22, 2020. Ifthe\n\nbrief is not filed by that date, counsel may be subject to an order to show cause why a financial sanction should\nnot be imposed under Local Rule 27.1(h) for the default.\n\nFor The Court:\n\nCatherine O'Hagan Wolfe,\nClerk of Court\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019342\n", "char_count": 989}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 106, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page1 of 24\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500\nMOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT\n\nDocket Number(s): 20-3064 ee __Caption[use short tile] _\n\nMotion for: to Dismiss\n\nSet forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:\n\nMotion to dismiss appeal for lack of jurisdiction\n\nUnited States v. Maxwell\n\nMOVING PARTY: United States of America OPPOSING PARTY: Ghislaine Maxwell\n__ |Plaintit [Defendant\n|Appellant/Petitioner 4 |Appellee/Respondent\n\nMOVING ATTORNEY: Audrey Strauss, Acting U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York OPPOSING ATTORNEY: Adam M ueller\n\n[name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]\n\nBy: Maurene Comey, Assistant U.S. Attorney Haddon Morgan & Foreman, P.C.\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza, New York, NY 10007 150 E. 10th Ave., Denver, CO 80203\n(212) 637-2324; Email: maurene.comey@usdoj.gov (303) 831-7364 amueller@hmflaw.com\n\nCourt- Judge/ Agency appealed from: The Honorable Alison J. Nathan, United States District Judge, Southern District of New York\n\nPlease check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND\nINJUCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:\n\nHas this request for relief been made below? Les L_INo\nHas this relief been previously sought in this court? | jYes | [No\nRequested return date and explanation of emergency:\n\nHas movant notified_opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1):\n|v [Yes | __|No (explain):\n\nOpposing counsel’s position_on motion:__\n|Unopposed | ¥ |Opposed| | Don’t Know\nDoes opposing counsel intend to file a response:\n\n¥ [Yes [No | |Don’t Know\nIs oral argument on motion requested? | lYes lv INo (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)\nHas argument date of appeal been set? | /Yes lv {No Ifyes, enter date:\n\nSignature of Moving Attorney:\n\nDate; September 16, 2020 service by: |v iCM/ECF | Other [Attach proof of service]\n\nForm T-1080 (rev. 1\n... [truncated, 2025 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/106 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=106]", "char_count": 2025}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 107, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page2 of 24\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA >: AFFIRMATION\nAppellee, : Dkt. No. 20-3061\n_v.-\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\n\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nSTATE OF NEW YORK )\nCOUNTY OF NEW YORK : SS.\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _)\n\nMAURENE COMEY, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code,\nSection 1746, hereby affirms under penalty of perjury:\n\n1. I am an Assistant United States Attorney in the Office of\nAudrey Strauss, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New\nYork, and I am one of the Assistant United States Attorneys representing the\nGovernment on this appeal. Defendant-appellant Ghislaine Maxwell appeals from\na September 2, 2020 order of the District Court denying Maxwell’s motion to\nmodify the protective order regulating criminal discovery in United States v.\n\nGhislaine Maxwell, $1 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) (the “Order”). I respectfully submit this\n\naffirmation in support of the Government’s motion to dismiss Maxwell’s\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019344\n\n", "char_count": 1048}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 108, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page3 of 24\n\ninterlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Order is neither a final\njudgment nor an appealable collateral order, and in opposition to Maxwell’s\nmotion to consolidate this appeal with the appeal pending in Giuffre v. Maxwell,\nNo. 20-2413.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\n\n2. On June 29, 2020, Indictment 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) was filed under\nseal in the Southern District of New York, charging Maxwell in six counts. (Dist.\nCt. Docket Entry 1).! On July 2, 2020, Maxwell was arrested and the original\nindictment was unsealed. (Dist. Ct. Docket Entry 2). On July 8, 2020,\nSuperseding Indictment S1 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) (the “Indictment’’) was filed in the\nSouthern District of New York. (Dist. Ct. Docket Entry 17). Count One of the\nIndictment charges Maxwell with conspiracy to entice minors to travel to engage\nin illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Two charges Maxwell\nwith enticing a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18\nU.S.C. § 2422 and 2. Count Three charges Maxwell with conspiracy to transport\nminors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count\nFour charges Maxwell with transporting minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in\n\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423 and 2. Counts Five and Six charge Maxwell with\n\n' <Dist. Ct. Docket Entry” refers to the corresponding numbered entry in the\nDistrict Court’s docket for this case; “Mot.” refers to Maxwell’s motion to\nconsolidate; and “Ex.” refers to an exhibit to Maxwell’s motion to consolidate.\n\n2\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019345\n\n", "char_count": 1606}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 109, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page4 of 24\n\nperjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The matter remains pending in the\npretrial phase before the Honorable Alison J. Nathan, United States District Judge.\nMaxwell’s pretrial motions are due on December 21, 2020, and trial has been\nscheduled to commence on July 12, 2021.\n\n3. On July 30, 2020, upon the Government’s application, Judge\nNathan entered a protective order governing the parties’ disclosure of information\nproduced in discovery in the criminal case (the “Protective Order’). (Ex. A). The\nProtective Order expressly provides that any and all discovery material produced to\nMaxwell by the Government, regardless of designation, “[s|hall be used by the\nDefendant or her Defense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this\ncriminal action, and not for any civil proceeding or any purpose other than the\ndefense of this action.” (Protective Order {/] 1(a), 10(a), 14(a)). The Protective\nOrder further provides that any discovery material produced to Maxwell by the\nGovernment that is marked “confidential” may not be filed publicly or excerpted\nwithin any public filing. (/d. 415). Maxwell’s criminal defense counsel consented\nto the foregoing provisions of the Protective Order. (See Dist. Ct. Docket Entry\n29).\n\n4. On August 17, 2020, Maxwell filed a motion before Judge\nNathan seeking an order modifying the Protective Order to allow Maxwell to use\n\nconfidential criminal discovery materials, which were produced to Maxwell by the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019346\n\n", "char_count": 1533}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 110, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Paged of 24\n\nGovernment, in filings Maxwell intended to submit in separate civil litigation.\n(District Court Docket Entry 52). In particular, Maxwell’s motion sought\nauthorization to use materials relating to applications the Government previously\nmade in 2019 seeking the modification of certain protective orders in other judicial\nproceedings.\n\n5. On August 21, 2020, the Government filed an opposition to\nMaxwell’s motion to modify the Protective Order. (Dist. Ct. Docket Entry 46). In\nits opposition, the Government explained the factual background regarding the\nconfidential criminal discovery materials at issue. In particular, the Government\nexplained that those discovery materials related to the Government’s requests to\nmodify certain protective orders in civil cases to permit compliance with grand\njury subpoenas (the “Subpoenas”’). Those Subpoenas were issued to a certain\nrecipient (the “Recipient”) in connection with a grand jury investigation into\nJeffrey Epstein and his possible co-conspirators. In order to maintain the integrity\nof the grand jury investigation and in accordance with both Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 6(e) and its standard practice, the Government did not notify\nMaxwell or her counsel of the Subpoenas. In response to receiving the Subpoenas,\nthe Recipient advised the Government that it believed that certain existing\nprotective orders precluded full compliance. Accordingly, in or about February\n\n2019, the Government applied ex parte and under seal to each relevant court to\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019347\n\n", "char_count": 1590}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 111, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page6 of 24\n\nrequest modification of the respective protective orders to permit compliance with\nthe Subpoenas. In or about April 2019, one court (“Court-1”’) granted the\nGovernment’s application, and permitted the Government to share Court-1’s\norder—and only that order, which itself prohibited further dissemination—to the\nRecipient. Subsequently, the second court (“Court-2”) denied the Government’s\napplication. Because the relevant grand jury investigation remains ongoing, both\nCourt-1 and Court-2 have ordered that the filings regarding the Subpoenas remain\nunder seal, except that both have expressly permitted the Government to produce\nthose filings to Maxwell as part of its discovery obligations in this criminal case.\n6. After providing that factual background, the Government\nargued that Maxwell’s motion should be denied for failing to show good cause to\nmodify the Protective Order for several reasons. First, Maxwell had consented to\nthe portions of the Protective Order that prohibit use of criminal discovery\nmaterials produced by the Government in any civil litigation. Second, Maxwell\nhad cited no authority to support the argument that a criminal defendant should be\npermitted to use criminal discovery in civil cases. Third, Maxwell utterly failed to\nexplain how the criminal discovery materials at issue supported any legal argument\nshe wished to make in civil litigation. The Government also noted that to the\nextent Maxwell sought to challenge the process by which the Government sought\n\ncompliance with the Subpoenas and obtained certain materials that it intended to\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019348\n\n", "char_count": 1661}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 112, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page7 of 24\n\nuse in prosecuting its criminal case, she would have a full opportunity to do so in\nher pretrial motions in the criminal case before Judge Nathan.\n\n7. On August 24, 2020, Maxwell filed a reply in further support of\nher motion. (Dist. Ct. Docket Entry 54).\n\n8. On September 2, 2020, Judge Nathan issued the Order denying\nMaxwell’s motion. (Ex. F). In that Order, Judge Nathan noted that despite\n“fourteen-single spaced pages of heated rhetoric,” Maxwell had offered “no more\nthan vague, speculative, and conclusory assertions” regarding why the criminal\ndiscovery materials were necessary to fair adjudication of her civil cases. (/d. at\n3). Judge Nathan concluded that absent any “coherent explanation” of how the\ncriminal discovery materials related to any argument Maxwell intended to make in\ncivil litigation, Maxwell had “plainly” failed to establish good cause to modify the\nProtective Order. (/d.). Further, Judge Nathan noted that the basic facts Maxwell\nsought to introduce in civil litigation were already made public through the\nGovernment’s letter in opposition to her motion. (/d. at 3-4). Accordingly, even\nthough Judge Nathan “remain[ed] in the dark as to why this information will be\nrelevant” to the courts adjudicating the civil cases, Judge Nathan expressly\npermitted Maxwell to inform the tribunals overseeing her civil cases, under seal, of\nthe basic series of events set forth in paragraph 5, supra. (/d. at 4).\n\n9. On September 4, 2020, Maxwell filed a notice of appeal from\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019349\n\n", "char_count": 1577}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 113, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Pages of 24\n\nthe Order. (Dist. Ct. Docket Entry 55). On September 10, 2020, Maxwell filed the\ninstant motion to consolidate this appeal with the appeal currently pending in\nGiuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413. The Government is not a party to the appeal in\nGiuffre v. Maxwell, which concerns an order issued in a civil case unsealing\nmaterials that were previously filed under seal.\n\nARGUMENT\n\n1. THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF\nJURISDICTION\n\nA. Applicable Law\n\n1. The Collateral Order Doctrine\n\n10. Title 28, United States Code, Section 1291 expressly limits the\njurisdiction of Courts of Appeals to “final decisions of the district courts.” 28\nU.S.C. § 1291. “This final judgment rule requires that a party must ordinarily raise\nall claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits. Ina\ncriminal case[,] the rule prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition\nof sentence.” Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (internal\ncitations and quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d\n78, 81 (2d Cir. 1999). As the Supreme Court has “long held,” the “policy of\nCongress embodied in this statute is inimical to piecemeal appellate review of trial\ncourt decisions which do not terminate the litigation, and . . . this policy is at its\n\nstrongest in the field of criminal law.” United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co.,\n7\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019350\n\n", "char_count": 1465}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 114, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page9 of 24\n\n458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982) (per curiam); see also Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 270 (noting\n“overriding policies against interlocutory review in criminal cases” and that\n“exceptions to the final judgment rule in criminal cases are rare”’); United States v.\nCulbertson, 598 F.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “‘undue litigiousness\nand leaden-footed administration of justice,’ the common consequences of\npiecemeal appellate review, are ‘particularly damaging to the conduct of criminal\ncases’” (quoting Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962))).\n\n11. There is a limited exception to this rule that permits immediate\nappeal from certain collateral orders. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.\n463, 468 (1978) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541\n(1949)). To fall within the “small class” of decisions that constitute immediately\nappealable collateral orders, the decision must “(1) conclusively determine the\ndisputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the\nmerits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final\njudgment.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 522 (1988) (internal\nquotation marks and citations omitted).\n\n12. The Supreme Court has made clear that the collateral order\nexception should be “interpreted . . . with the utmost strictness in criminal cases.”\nMidland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (internal\n\nquotation marks omitted) (quoting Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265); accord United\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019351\n\n", "char_count": 1603}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 115, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page10 of 24\n\nStates v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 2007). In over 70 years since\nCohen was decided, despite “numerous opportunities” to expand the doctrine,\nMidland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799, the Supreme Court has identified only four\ntypes of pretrial orders in criminal cases as satisfying the collateral-order doctrine:\nan order denying a bond, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); an order denying a\nmotion to dismiss on Double Jeopardy grounds, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.\n651 (1977); an order denying a motion to dismiss under the Speech or Debate\nClause, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); and an order permitting the\nforced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for\ntrial, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). In contrast, the circumstances in\nwhich the Supreme Court has “refused to permit interlocutory appeals” in criminal\ncases have been “far more numerous.” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799.\n\n13. As to the third Van Cauwenberghe criterion, “[a]n order is\n‘effectively unreviewable’ where ‘the order at issue involves an asserted right the\nlegal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated\nbefore trial.’” United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lauro\nLines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1989)). “The justification for\nimmediate appeal must . . . be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of\ndeferring appeal until litigation concludes.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558\n\nU.S. 100, 107 (2009). A ruling that is burdensome to a party “in ways that are only\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019352\n\n", "char_count": 1674}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 116, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page11 of 24\n\nimperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district court judgment is not\nsufficient.” Punn, 737 F.3d at 5 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting\nMohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107). “Instead, the decisive consideration is whether\ndelaying review until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial\npublic interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order.’” Mohawk Indus., 558\nU.S. at 107 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-53 (2006)); see also\nKensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 2006). Ina\ncriminal case, the availability of post-judgment relief through reversal or vacatur of\nconviction, if warranted, will generally be sufficient to protect whatever right a\ndefendant claims was abridged by the district court’s pretrial decision. See, e.g.,\nPunn, 737 F.3d at 14 (“Punn’s claim can be adequately vindicated upon appeal\nfrom a final judgment. . . . [I]f Punn’s arguments continue to fail before the district\ncourt, purportedly ill-gotten evidence or its fruits are admitted at his trial, and\nconviction results, appellate review will be available at that point[,] .. . [and the\nCourt] may order a new trial without the use of the ill-gotten evidence, or whatever\nadditional remedies are necessary to ensure that Punn’s legitimate interests are\nfully preserved.”); United States v. Hitchcock, 992 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1993)\n(district court’s refusal to seal documents not immediately appealable because\n“TrJeversal after trial, if it is warranted, will adequately protect .. . interest[s]”\n\nasserted by defendants).\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019353\n\n", "char_count": 1676}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 117, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page12 of 24\n\n14. When applying the collateral-order doctrine, the Supreme Court\nhas “generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders.” Firestone Tire &\nRubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981). This Court likewise has\nconsistently ruled that protective orders regulating the use of documents exchanged\nby the parties during a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory appeal. See,\ne.g., United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (“We hold that this\ncollateral protective order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291... .”); United\nStates v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996) (“To the extent that the\n[protective] order imposed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of materials\nexchanged in the course of pending litigation, it is not subject to appeal.’’); see also\nHL. Hayden Co. of N.Y. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.\n1986) (“The district court’s denial of modification [of a protective order] does not\nfall within the ‘collateral order’ doctrine of Cohen.”). Because “a litigant does not\nhave ‘an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained\nthrough pretrial discovery,’” such protective orders do not amount to an\nimpermissible prior restraint under the First Amendment. Caparros, 800 F.2d at\n25 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984)). Even where a\nlitigant raises a colorable argument that a protective order violates a litigant’s right\nto release documents outside of criminal litigation, “adjudication of any such right\n\ncan await final judgment on the underlying charges” because the “purported right\n\n11\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019354\n\n", "char_count": 1700}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 118, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page13 of 24\n\nat issue is not related to any right not to stand trial.” /d. at 26.\n\n2. Appeals Involving Injunctions\n\n15. Title 28, United States Code, Section 1292(a)(1) provides that\nCourts of Appeals shall have jurisdiction over “[i|nterlocutory orders of the district\ncourts of the United States .. . or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing,\nmodifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify\ninjunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”\nOrders regulating discovery in a criminal case, even if couched “using words of\nrestraint,” are not injunctions and are therefore not appealable under § 1292(a)(1).\nSee Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798 (“Protective orders that only regulate materials\nexchanged between the parties incident to litigation, like most discovery orders, are\nneither final orders, appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, nor injunctions, appealable\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” (internal citations omitted)); Caparros, 800 F.2d at\n26.\n\nB. Discussion\n\n16. There is no dispute that the Order is not a final judgment and\nthus is not appealable unless it fits within the “small class” of decisions that\nconstitute immediately appealable collateral orders. Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S.\nat 522. Because the Order does not fall within the extremely narrow category of\n\ncollateral orders that are appealable in criminal cases, where the collateral order\n\n12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019355\n\n", "char_count": 1490}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 119, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page14 of 24\n\nrule is “interpreted . . . ‘with the utmost strictness,’” the appeal should be\ndismissed. Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799 (quoting Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265).\nAmong other things, the Order does not meet the third criterion of the standard for\nidentifying immediately appealable collateral orders, which requires that the order\nbeing appealed from be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final\njudgment.” Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 522 (internal quotation mark omitted)\n(quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468). Accordingly, this Court does not\nhave jurisdiction to review the Order, and Maxwell’s appeal should be dismissed.\n17. As an initial matter, when evaluating Maxwell’s appeal, this\nCourt cannot engage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry” based on the facts\nof this case, but instead must focus on the “entire category to which a claim\nbelongs.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting\nCoopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 473; Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct,\nInc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)). Here, like any other order regulating the use of\ndiscovery materials exchanged by the parties during litigation, Judge Nathan’s\nOrder declining to modify the Protective Order in this criminal case is not subject\nto interlocutory appeal. See Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798; Caparros, 800 F.2d at 24-26.\n18. There can be no serious suggestion that this Order falls within\nthe four categories of orders that the Supreme Court has identified as appealable\n\nprejudgment in criminal cases, as the Order does not address bail, double jeopardy,\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019356\n\n", "char_count": 1671}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 120, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page15 of 24\n\nthe Speech or Debate Clause, or the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.\nSee Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799; Sell, 539 U.S. at 176-77. The rights\nimplicated here do not meet the high threshold of expanding the collateral order\nexception in criminal cases beyond those limited categories. Rather, this Order\nfalls within the category of rulings addressing pretrial discovery, which are\ngenerally unreviewable on interlocutory appeal. See Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798;\nCaparros, 800 F.2d at 24-26. Maxwell has identified no public interest or value\nthat is “sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until\nlitigation concludes.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107.\n\n19. Maxwell seems to claim that reversal of Judge Nathan’s Order\nis necessary in order to prevent documents in a civil case from being unsealed.\nEven assuming a presentation of criminal discovery materials would affect an\nunsealing decision in a civil case — an argument that Judge Nathan found\nspeculative at best (Ex. F at 3) — a risk of unsealing is not significant enough to\nmerit interlocutory appeal. See United States v. Martoma, No. 13-4807, 2014 WL\n68119, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2014) (concluding that even though the defendant’s\n“personal interest in the privacy of embarrassing information is an interest that, as\na practical matter, cannot be vindicated after disclosure,” that interest is\ninsufficient to merit interlocutory appeal); United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d\n\n990, 998 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding no jurisdiction over defendant’s interlocutory\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019357\n\n", "char_count": 1637}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 121, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page16 of 24\n\nappeal from unsealing of competency evaluation because “any alleged incursions\non criminal defendants’ rights to privacy and a fair trial do not render the unsealing\norder effectively unreviewable on appeal”); Hitchcock, 992 F.2d at 238-39 (district\ncourt’s refusal to seal documents not immediately appealable because “‘[rJeversal\nafter trial, if it is warranted, will adequately protect . . . interest[s]” asserted by\ndefendant); cf’ Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 109 (holding that orders to disclose\nprivileged information are not immediately appealable even though they “intrude[]\non the confidentiality of attorney-client communications”).\n\n20. To the extent Maxwell complains that unsealing filings in a\ncivil case may result in unfair pretrial publicity in her criminal case, such a concern\nis not an issue that is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.\nIndeed, that very issue has been reviewed by this Court in multiple cases on post-\njudgment appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 232-34 (2d\nCir. 2010) (evaluating on post-judgment appeal whether publicity biased the\nvenire); United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 128-31 (2d Cir. 2008) (evaluating\non post-judgment appeal whether publicity biased trial jurors). Should the Court\ndetermine that the jury at Maxwell’s trial was biased based on disclosure of\nmaterial in a civil case, and that such material would not have been unsealed had\nJudge Nathan permitted modification of the Protective Order, then vacatur of the\n\ndefendant’s conviction — if warranted — will adequately vindicate the defendant’s\n\n15\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019358\n\n", "char_count": 1689}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 122, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page17/ of 24\n\nright to an impartial jury. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201-04,\n213 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating conviction where district court improperly refused to\nexcuse potential juror who admitted bias based upon knowledge of defendant’s\nprevious acquittal). Thus, the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury would\nnot “be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial,” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S.\nat 799 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435\nU.S. 850, 860 (1978)), and, as such, the Order does not meet the third criterion for\nappealability of a collateral order. See Punn, 737 F.3d at 14 (defendant’s interests\n“can be adequately vindicated upon appeal from a final judgment” through “a new\ntrial... or whatever additional remedies are necessary’).\n\n21. Simply put, the Order denying Maxwell’s motion to amend the\nProtective Order is not reviewable on interlocutory appeal. Maxwell complains\nthat if she cannot use criminal discovery materials in civil litigation then there is a\nrisk that certain filings in the civil cases may be unsealed that otherwise would\nhave remained sealed. Maxwell apparently believes such a result would risk\nprejudicing her trial rights in the criminal case. If such materials are unsealed in\nthe civil case, and if Maxwell believes that unsealing causes her prejudice at her\ncriminal trial, Maxwell will have a full opportunity to raise that issue in the\ncriminal case. To the extent Maxwell is concerned that unsealing in the civil case\n\nmight permit the Government to oppose any motion challenging the unsealing\n\n16\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019359\n\n", "char_count": 1686}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 123, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page18 of 24\n\norder it obtained during its criminal investigation on the grounds of inevitable\ndiscovery, she will have the opportunity to assert such a claim before Judge\nNathan. If she is dissatisfied with Judge Nathan’s decision on that score, she can\nraise the issue on appeal after the entry of final judgment.\n\n22. Further, given the substance of Maxwell’s motion to\nconsolidate, it is not entirely clear that all of the issues Maxwell seeks to raise in\nthis appeal have been finally resolved. Maxwell’s motion to consolidate this\nmatter with the Giuffre v. Maxwell appeal appears primarily focused on attacking\nthe legitimacy of the Government’s methods of obtaining evidence that it intends\nto use to prosecute the criminal case through the Subpoenas to the Recipient. (See\nMot. at 10-12). It thus seems readily apparent that Maxwell intends to file a\nmotion to preclude the use of such evidence at her criminal trial. Yet she seeks to\nhave this Court reach the merits of her arguments on that issue in the context of the\ncivil appeal, and before they have been properly litigated before and adjudicated by\nthe District Court in the criminal case. As Judge Nathan has not yet addressed (or\neven had the opportunity to address) that issue in the criminal case, the issues\nMaxwell raises on this appeal do not appear to be final. Any such arguments are\nproperly heard in the criminal case in the first instance by the district judge, “who\nplay[s] a ‘special role’ in managing ongoing litigation,” and who “can better\n\nexercise [his or her] responsibility [to police the preyudment tactics of litigants] if\n\n17\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019360\n\n", "char_count": 1683}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 124, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page19 of 24\n\nthe appellate courts do not repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudgment\nrulings.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 106 (alterations in original) (internal quotation\nmark omitted) (quoting Firestone, 449 at 374; Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller,\n472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985)).\n\n23. The cases cited in Maxwell’s notice of appeal do not alter this\nanalysis. All three are inapposite because they involved appeals by intervenors —\nnot parties — seeking to modify protective orders in civil cases. See Pichler v.\nUNITE, 585 F.3d 741, 745-746 (3d Cir. 2009) (third party intervernor foundation\nappealing order denying motion to modify protective order in civil litigation to\nallow third party access to discovery materials); Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity\nServs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir. 1987) (Commodity Futures Trading\nCommission (“CFTC”) acting as third party intervenor appealing order denying\nmotion to modify protective order in civil litigation to allow CFTC to obtain\ndiscovery exchanged by parties to civil case permissible because “t]he entire\ncontroversy between the CFTC and the defendants in this case was disposed of by\nthe district court’s denial of the government’s motion to modify the protective\norder”); Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2019) (third party intervenors,\nincluding members of the press, appealing order denying motion to modify\nprotective order in civil litigation to allow third parties access to sealed filings,\n\nafter parties to the litigation settled). Thus, appellate jurisdiction in those cases\n\n18\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019361\n\n", "char_count": 1621}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 125, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page20 of 24\n\nwas founded on the principle that when intervenors seek access to sealed records,\n“orders denying access are final as to the intervenors.” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of\nOnondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). By contrast,\nrulings governing the parties’ use of discovery materials — such as Judge Nathan’s\nOrder here — are not appealable in the context of a criminal prosecution until after\njudgment is entered. See Caparros, 800 F.2d at 24; Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798.\n\n24. Judge Nathan’s Order does not fall into one of the narrow\ncategories of decisions in a criminal case reviewable on interlocutory appeal.\nAccordingly, Maxwell’s appeal should be dismissed.\n\nUW. THE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE SHOULD BE DENIED\n\n25. Even if Maxwell’s appeal is not dismissed — which it should\nbe — her motion to consolidate the appeal in this criminal case with the appeal in\nthe Giuffre v. Maxwell civil case should be denied.\n\n26. Despite Maxwell’s efforts to characterize this criminal case as\nsomehow intertwined with the Giuffre civil case, the issues on appeal are factually\nand legally distinct. The civil appeal concerns Judge Preska’s order unsealing civil\nlitigation materials. The Government is not a party to the civil suit, the\nGovernment has never intervened or appeared in the civil suit, the Government has\nhad no role in the litigation that resulted in Judge Preska’s order, and the\n\nGovernment has no legal interest in the relief Maxwell seeks in the civil case. For\n\n19\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019362\n\n", "char_count": 1566}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 126, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page21 of 24\n\nthese reasons alone, the Court should deny Maxwell’s motion to consolidate these\nappeals.\n\n27. Maxwell has filed two separate appeals challenging two\ndifferent orders by two different district judges. But Maxwell’s consolidation\nmotion makes plain that her goal — in both appeals — is to ask this Court to rule\non an entirely different question: the lawfulness of the Government’s applications\nto modify certain protective orders in other judicial proceedings. Maxwell’s\nstrategy is procedurally improper, for at least two reasons. First, none of the\napplications or orders with which Maxwell takes issue are before this Court for\nreview — the civil appeal concerns Judge Preska’s unsealing order, and this\ncriminal appeal concerns Judge Nathan’s Order denying Maxwell’s request to\nmodify the Protective Order. Maxwell’s motion to consolidate offers no coherent\nexplanation of the connection between the legality of the Government’s prior\napplications and those two appeals. Indeed, as Judge Nathan found, Maxwell has\nfailed to explain, despite a high volume of “heated rhetoric,” how those\napplications could have any possible impact on Judge Preska’s decision to unseal\nfilings in the civil litigation. (Ex. F at 3). Second, if Maxwell seeks to challenge\nthe manner in which the Government gathered evidence in a criminal investigation,\nneither the civil appeal nor this interlocutory criminal appeal is the appropriate\n\nforum for her arguments on that score. Maxwell will have the opportunity to raise\n\n20\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019363\n\n", "char_count": 1590}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 127, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page22 of 24\n\nany legal objections to the Government’s evidence before Judge Nathan, who is\npresiding over the criminal case. If Maxwell is dissatisfied with Judge Nathan’s\nrulings on those matters, she will have a full opportunity to appeal those rulings\nafter entry of final judgment in her criminal case. The Court should not permit\nMaxwell to raise these issues at this juncture, before they have been fully litigated\nbefore and adjudicated by the presiding district judge.\n\n28. Moreover, Maxwell’s motion to consolidate is a transparent\nattempt to circumvent Judge Nathan’s Order without litigating the merits of this\nappeal. That Order, which is the only ruling on appeal in this case, prohibits\nMaxwell from using certain criminal discovery materials in civil litigation. If this\nCourt were to consolidate the criminal and civil appeals, the record on appeal in\nboth cases would be merged, the lines between the two cases would be blurred in\nthe manner Maxwell seeks, and the Court would effectively reverse Judge\nNathan’s Order and grant Maxwell the relief she seeks in this appeal — all without\nrequiring Maxwell to show that Judge Nathan actually abused her discretion by\ndenying Maxwell’s motion to modify the Protective Order.? Indeed, Maxwell’s\n\nmotion to consolidate does not in any way suggest that there will be anything left\n\n? Moreover, if the appeals were consolidated, the sealed filings in this criminal\nappeal would become part of the record in the civil appeal. The Government is\nconcerned that consolidating these matters would entail disseminating sensitive,\nsealed documents in a criminal case to civil litigants.\n\n21\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019364\n\n", "char_count": 1712}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 128, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page23 of 24\n\nfor this Court to adjudicate regarding Judge Nathan’s Order — the lone Order on\nappeal in this matter — if the Court were to grant Maxwell’s request to consolidate\nthese appeals. Accordingly, the motion to consolidate should be denied.\nCONCLUSION\n\n29. For the foregoing reasons, Maxwell’s appeal should be\ndismissed for lack of jurisdiction. If the appeal is not dismissed, the Government\nrespectfully requests that the Court deny Maxwell’s motion for consolidation.\nDated: New York, New York\n\nSeptember 16, 2020\n\n/s/ Maurene Comey\nMaurene Comey\nAssistant United States Attorney\nTelephone: (212) 637-2324\n\naz\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019365\n\n", "char_count": 690}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 129, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 37, 09/16/2020, 2932231, Page24 of 24\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\nPursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(g), the undersigned counsel\nhereby certifies that this motion/opposition complies with the type-volume\nlimitation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As measured by the word\nprocessing system used to prepare this motion/opposition, there are 5,099 words in\nthis motion/opposition.\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS,\nActing United States Attorney for the\nSouthern District of New York\n\nBy: MAURENE COMEY,\nAssistant United States Attorney\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019366\n\n", "char_count": 588}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 130, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page1 of 23\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA >: AFFIRMATION\nAppellee, : Dkt. No. 20-3061\n_v.-\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\n\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nSTATE OF NEW YORK )\nCOUNTY OF NEW YORK : SS.\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _)\n\nMAURENE COMEY, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code,\nSection 1746, hereby affirms under penalty of perjury:\n\n1. I am an Assistant United States Attorney in the Office of\nAudrey Strauss, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New\nYork, and I am one of the Assistant United States Attorneys representing the\nGovernment on this appeal. Defendant-appellant Ghislaine Maxwell appeals from\na September 2, 2020 order of the District Court denying Maxwell’s motion to\nmodify the protective order regulating criminal discovery in United States v.\n\nGhislaine Maxwell, $1 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) (the “Order”). I respectfully submit this\n\naffirmation in support of the Government’s motion to dismiss Maxwell’s\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019367\n\n", "char_count": 1048}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 131, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page2 of 23\n\ninterlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Order is neither a final\njudgment nor an appealable collateral order, and in opposition to Maxwell’s\nmotion to consolidate this appeal with the appeal pending in Giuffre v. Maxwell,\nNo. 20-2413.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\n\n2. On June 29, 2020, Indictment 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) was filed under\nseal in the Southern District of New York, charging Maxwell in six counts. (Dist.\nCt. Docket Entry 1).! On July 2, 2020, Maxwell was arrested and the original\nindictment was unsealed. (Dist. Ct. Docket Entry 2). On July 8, 2020,\nSuperseding Indictment S1 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) (the “Indictment’’) was filed in the\nSouthern District of New York. (Dist. Ct. Docket Entry 17). Count One of the\nIndictment charges Maxwell with conspiracy to entice minors to travel to engage\nin illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Two charges Maxwell\nwith enticing a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18\nU.S.C. § 2422 and 2. Count Three charges Maxwell with conspiracy to transport\nminors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count\nFour charges Maxwell with transporting minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in\n\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423 and 2. Counts Five and Six charge Maxwell with\n\n' <Dist. Ct. Docket Entry” refers to the corresponding numbered entry in the\nDistrict Court’s docket for this case; “Mot.” refers to Maxwell’s motion to\nconsolidate; and “Ex.” refers to an exhibit to Maxwell’s motion to consolidate.\n\n2\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019368\n\n", "char_count": 1607}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 132, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page3 of 23\n\nperjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The matter remains pending in the\npretrial phase before the Honorable Alison J. Nathan, United States District Judge.\nMaxwell’s pretrial motions are due on December 21, 2020, and trial has been\nscheduled to commence on July 12, 2021.\n\n3. On July 30, 2020, upon the Government’s application, Judge\nNathan entered a protective order governing the parties’ disclosure of information\nproduced in discovery in the criminal case (the “Protective Order’). (Ex. A). The\nProtective Order expressly provides that any and all discovery material produced to\nMaxwell by the Government, regardless of designation, “[s|hall be used by the\nDefendant or her Defense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this\ncriminal action, and not for any civil proceeding or any purpose other than the\ndefense of this action.” (Protective Order {/] 1(a), 10(a), 14(a)). The Protective\nOrder further provides that any discovery material produced to Maxwell by the\nGovernment that is marked “confidential” may not be filed publicly or excerpted\nwithin any public filing. (/d. 415). Maxwell’s criminal defense counsel consented\nto the foregoing provisions of the Protective Order. (See Dist. Ct. Docket Entry\n29).\n\n4. On August 17, 2020, Maxwell filed a motion before Judge\nNathan seeking an order modifying the Protective Order to allow Maxwell to use\n\nconfidential criminal discovery materials, which were produced to Maxwell by the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019369\n\n", "char_count": 1533}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 133, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page4 of 23\n\nGovernment, in filings Maxwell intended to submit in separate civil litigation.\n(District Court Docket Entry 52). In particular, Maxwell’s motion sought\nauthorization to use materials relating to applications the Government previously\nmade in 2019 seeking the modification of certain protective orders in other judicial\nproceedings.\n\n5. On August 21, 2020, the Government filed an opposition to\nMaxwell’s motion to modify the Protective Order. (Dist. Ct. Docket Entry 46). In\nits opposition, the Government explained the factual background regarding the\nconfidential criminal discovery materials at issue. In particular, the Government\nexplained that those discovery materials related to the Government’s requests to\nmodify certain protective orders in civil cases to permit compliance with grand\njury subpoenas (the “Subpoenas”’). Those Subpoenas were issued to a certain\nrecipient (the “Recipient”) in connection with a grand jury investigation into\nJeffrey Epstein and his possible co-conspirators. In order to maintain the integrity\nof the grand jury investigation and in accordance with both Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 6(e) and its standard practice, the Government did not notify\nMaxwell or her counsel of the Subpoenas. In response to receiving the Subpoenas,\nthe Recipient advised the Government that it believed that certain existing\nprotective orders precluded full compliance. Accordingly, in or about February\n\n2019, the Government applied ex parte and under seal to each relevant court to\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019370\n\n", "char_count": 1590}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 134, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Paged of 23\n\nrequest modification of the respective protective orders to permit compliance with\nthe Subpoenas. In or about April 2019, one court (“Court-1”’) granted the\nGovernment’s application, and permitted the Government to share Court-1’s\norder—and only that order, which itself prohibited further dissemination—to the\nRecipient. Subsequently, the second court (“Court-2”) denied the Government’s\napplication. Because the relevant grand jury investigation remains ongoing, both\nCourt-1 and Court-2 have ordered that the filings regarding the Subpoenas remain\nunder seal, except that both have expressly permitted the Government to produce\nthose filings to Maxwell as part of its discovery obligations in this criminal case.\n6. After providing that factual background, the Government\nargued that Maxwell’s motion should be denied for failing to show good cause to\nmodify the Protective Order for several reasons. First, Maxwell had consented to\nthe portions of the Protective Order that prohibit use of criminal discovery\nmaterials produced by the Government in any civil litigation. Second, Maxwell\nhad cited no authority to support the argument that a criminal defendant should be\npermitted to use criminal discovery in civil cases. Third, Maxwell utterly failed to\nexplain how the criminal discovery materials at issue supported any legal argument\nshe wished to make in civil litigation. The Government also noted that to the\nextent Maxwell sought to challenge the process by which the Government sought\n\ncompliance with the Subpoenas and obtained certain materials that it intended to\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019371\n\n", "char_count": 1661}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 135, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page6 of 23\n\nuse in prosecuting its criminal case, she would have a full opportunity to do so in\nher pretrial motions in the criminal case before Judge Nathan.\n\n7. On August 24, 2020, Maxwell filed a reply in further support of\nher motion. (Dist. Ct. Docket Entry 54).\n\n8. On September 2, 2020, Judge Nathan issued the Order denying\nMaxwell’s motion. (Ex. F). In that Order, Judge Nathan noted that despite\n“fourteen-single spaced pages of heated rhetoric,” Maxwell had offered “no more\nthan vague, speculative, and conclusory assertions” regarding why the criminal\ndiscovery materials were necessary to fair adjudication of her civil cases. (/d. at\n3). Judge Nathan concluded that absent any “coherent explanation” of how the\ncriminal discovery materials related to any argument Maxwell intended to make in\ncivil litigation, Maxwell had “plainly” failed to establish good cause to modify the\nProtective Order. (/d.). Further, Judge Nathan noted that the basic facts Maxwell\nsought to introduce in civil litigation were already made public through the\nGovernment’s letter in opposition to her motion. (/d. at 3-4). Accordingly, even\nthough Judge Nathan “remain[ed] in the dark as to why this information will be\nrelevant” to the courts adjudicating the civil cases, Judge Nathan expressly\npermitted Maxwell to inform the tribunals overseeing her civil cases, under seal, of\nthe basic series of events set forth in paragraph 5, supra. (/d. at 4).\n\n9. On September 4, 2020, Maxwell filed a notice of appeal from\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019372\n\n", "char_count": 1577}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 136, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page7 of 23\n\nthe Order. (Dist. Ct. Docket Entry 55). On September 10, 2020, Maxwell filed the\ninstant motion to consolidate this appeal with the appeal currently pending in\nGiuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413. The Government is not a party to the appeal in\nGiuffre v. Maxwell, which concerns an order issued in a civil case unsealing\nmaterials that were previously filed under seal.\n\nARGUMENT\n\n1. THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF\nJURISDICTION\n\nA. Applicable Law\n\n1. The Collateral Order Doctrine\n\n10. Title 28, United States Code, Section 1291 expressly limits the\njurisdiction of Courts of Appeals to “final decisions of the district courts.” 28\nU.S.C. § 1291. “This final judgment rule requires that a party must ordinarily raise\nall claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits. Ina\ncriminal case[,] the rule prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition\nof sentence.” Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (internal\ncitations and quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Aliotta, 199 F.3d\n78, 81 (2d Cir. 1999). As the Supreme Court has “long held,” the “policy of\nCongress embodied in this statute is inimical to piecemeal appellate review of trial\ncourt decisions which do not terminate the litigation, and . . . this policy is at its\n\nstrongest in the field of criminal law.” United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co.,\n7\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019373\n\n", "char_count": 1465}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 137, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Pages of 23\n\n458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982) (per curiam); see also Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 270 (noting\n“overriding policies against interlocutory review in criminal cases” and that\n“exceptions to the final judgment rule in criminal cases are rare”’); United States v.\nCulbertson, 598 F.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “‘undue litigiousness\nand leaden-footed administration of justice,’ the common consequences of\npiecemeal appellate review, are ‘particularly damaging to the conduct of criminal\ncases’” (quoting Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962))).\n\n11. There is a limited exception to this rule that permits immediate\nappeal from certain collateral orders. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.\n463, 468 (1978) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541\n(1949)). To fall within the “small class” of decisions that constitute immediately\nappealable collateral orders, the decision must “(1) conclusively determine the\ndisputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the\nmerits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final\njudgment.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 522 (1988) (internal\nquotation marks and citations omitted).\n\n12. The Supreme Court has made clear that the collateral order\nexception should be “interpreted . . . with the utmost strictness in criminal cases.”\nMidland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (internal\n\nquotation marks omitted) (quoting Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265); accord United\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019374\n\n", "char_count": 1604}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 138, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, PageY of 23\n\nStates v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 487, 490 (2d Cir. 2007). In over 70 years since\nCohen was decided, despite “numerous opportunities” to expand the doctrine,\nMidland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799, the Supreme Court has identified only four\ntypes of pretrial orders in criminal cases as satisfying the collateral-order doctrine:\nan order denying a bond, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); an order denying a\nmotion to dismiss on Double Jeopardy grounds, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.\n651 (1977); an order denying a motion to dismiss under the Speech or Debate\nClause, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); and an order permitting the\nforced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for\ntrial, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). In contrast, the circumstances in\nwhich the Supreme Court has “refused to permit interlocutory appeals” in criminal\ncases have been “far more numerous.” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799.\n\n13. As to the third Van Cauwenberghe criterion, “[a]n order is\n‘effectively unreviewable’ where ‘the order at issue involves an asserted right the\nlegal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated\nbefore trial.’” United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lauro\nLines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1989)). “The justification for\nimmediate appeal must . . . be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of\ndeferring appeal until litigation concludes.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558\n\nU.S. 100, 107 (2009). A ruling that is burdensome to a party “in ways that are only\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019375\n\n", "char_count": 1672}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 139, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page10 of 23\n\nimperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district court judgment is not\nsufficient.” Punn, 737 F.3d at 5 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting\nMohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107). “Instead, the decisive consideration is whether\ndelaying review until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a substantial\npublic interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order.’” Mohawk Indus., 558\nU.S. at 107 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-53 (2006)); see also\nKensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 2006). Ina\ncriminal case, the availability of post-judgment relief through reversal or vacatur of\nconviction, if warranted, will generally be sufficient to protect whatever right a\ndefendant claims was abridged by the district court’s pretrial decision. See, e.g.,\nPunn, 737 F.3d at 14 (“Punn’s claim can be adequately vindicated upon appeal\nfrom a final judgment. . . . [I]f Punn’s arguments continue to fail before the district\ncourt, purportedly ill-gotten evidence or its fruits are admitted at his trial, and\nconviction results, appellate review will be available at that point[,] .. . [and the\nCourt] may order a new trial without the use of the ill-gotten evidence, or whatever\nadditional remedies are necessary to ensure that Punn’s legitimate interests are\nfully preserved.”); United States v. Hitchcock, 992 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1993)\n(district court’s refusal to seal documents not immediately appealable because\n“TrJeversal after trial, if it is warranted, will adequately protect .. . interest[s]”\n\nasserted by defendants).\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019376\n\n", "char_count": 1677}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 140, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page11 of 23\n\n14. When applying the collateral-order doctrine, the Supreme Court\nhas “generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders.” Firestone Tire &\nRubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981). This Court likewise has\nconsistently ruled that protective orders regulating the use of documents exchanged\nby the parties during a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory appeal. See,\ne.g., United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (“We hold that this\ncollateral protective order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291... .”); United\nStates v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996) (“To the extent that the\n[protective] order imposed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of materials\nexchanged in the course of pending litigation, it is not subject to appeal.’’); see also\nHL. Hayden Co. of N.Y. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.\n1986) (“The district court’s denial of modification [of a protective order] does not\nfall within the ‘collateral order’ doctrine of Cohen.”). Because “a litigant does not\nhave ‘an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained\nthrough pretrial discovery,’” such protective orders do not amount to an\nimpermissible prior restraint under the First Amendment. Caparros, 800 F.2d at\n25 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984)). Even where a\nlitigant raises a colorable argument that a protective order violates a litigant’s right\nto release documents outside of criminal litigation, “adjudication of any such right\n\ncan await final judgment on the underlying charges” because the “purported right\n\n11\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019377\n\n", "char_count": 1700}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 141, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page12 of 23\n\nat issue is not related to any right not to stand trial.” /d. at 26.\n\n2. Appeals Involving Injunctions\n\n15. Title 28, United States Code, Section 1292(a)(1) provides that\nCourts of Appeals shall have jurisdiction over “[i|nterlocutory orders of the district\ncourts of the United States .. . or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing,\nmodifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify\ninjunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”\nOrders regulating discovery in a criminal case, even if couched “using words of\nrestraint,” are not injunctions and are therefore not appealable under § 1292(a)(1).\nSee Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798 (“Protective orders that only regulate materials\nexchanged between the parties incident to litigation, like most discovery orders, are\nneither final orders, appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, nor injunctions, appealable\nunder 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” (internal citations omitted)); Caparros, 800 F.2d at\n26.\n\nB. Discussion\n\n16. There is no dispute that the Order is not a final judgment and\nthus is not appealable unless it fits within the “small class” of decisions that\nconstitute immediately appealable collateral orders. Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S.\nat 522. Because the Order does not fall within the extremely narrow category of\n\ncollateral orders that are appealable in criminal cases, where the collateral order\n\n12\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019378\n\n", "char_count": 1491}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 142, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page13 of 23\n\nrule is “interpreted . . . ‘with the utmost strictness,’” the appeal should be\ndismissed. Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799 (quoting Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 265).\nAmong other things, the Order does not meet the third criterion of the standard for\nidentifying immediately appealable collateral orders, which requires that the order\nbeing appealed from be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final\njudgment.” Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 522 (internal quotation mark omitted)\n(quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468). Accordingly, this Court does not\nhave jurisdiction to review the Order, and Maxwell’s appeal should be dismissed.\n17. As an initial matter, when evaluating Maxwell’s appeal, this\nCourt cannot engage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry” based on the facts\nof this case, but instead must focus on the “entire category to which a claim\nbelongs.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting\nCoopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 473; Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct,\nInc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)). Here, like any other order regulating the use of\ndiscovery materials exchanged by the parties during litigation, Judge Nathan’s\nOrder declining to modify the Protective Order in this criminal case is not subject\nto interlocutory appeal. See Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798; Caparros, 800 F.2d at 24-26.\n18. There can be no serious suggestion that this Order falls within\nthe four categories of orders that the Supreme Court has identified as appealable\n\nprejudgment in criminal cases, as the Order does not address bail, double jeopardy,\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019379\n\n", "char_count": 1671}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 143, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page14 of 23\n\nthe Speech or Debate Clause, or the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs.\nSee Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799; Sell, 539 U.S. at 176-77. The rights\nimplicated here do not meet the high threshold of expanding the collateral order\nexception in criminal cases beyond those limited categories. Rather, this Order\nfalls within the category of rulings addressing pretrial discovery, which are\ngenerally unreviewable on interlocutory appeal. See Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798;\nCaparros, 800 F.2d at 24-26. Maxwell has identified no public interest or value\nthat is “sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until\nlitigation concludes.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107.\n\n19. Maxwell seems to claim that reversal of Judge Nathan’s Order\nis necessary in order to prevent documents in a civil case from being unsealed.\nEven assuming a presentation of criminal discovery materials would affect an\nunsealing decision in a civil case — an argument that Judge Nathan found\nspeculative at best (Ex. F at 3) — a risk of unsealing is not significant enough to\nmerit interlocutory appeal. See United States v. Martoma, No. 13-4807, 2014 WL\n68119, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2014) (concluding that even though the defendant’s\n“personal interest in the privacy of embarrassing information is an interest that, as\na practical matter, cannot be vindicated after disclosure,” that interest is\ninsufficient to merit interlocutory appeal); United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d\n\n990, 998 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding no jurisdiction over defendant’s interlocutory\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019380\n\n", "char_count": 1637}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 144, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page15 of 23\n\nappeal from unsealing of competency evaluation because “any alleged incursions\non criminal defendants’ rights to privacy and a fair trial do not render the unsealing\norder effectively unreviewable on appeal”); Hitchcock, 992 F.2d at 238-39 (district\ncourt’s refusal to seal documents not immediately appealable because “‘[rJeversal\nafter trial, if it is warranted, will adequately protect . . . interest[s]” asserted by\ndefendant); cf’ Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 109 (holding that orders to disclose\nprivileged information are not immediately appealable even though they “intrude[]\non the confidentiality of attorney-client communications”).\n\n20. To the extent Maxwell complains that unsealing filings in a\ncivil case may result in unfair pretrial publicity in her criminal case, such a concern\nis not an issue that is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.\nIndeed, that very issue has been reviewed by this Court in multiple cases on post-\njudgment appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 232-34 (2d\nCir. 2010) (evaluating on post-judgment appeal whether publicity biased the\nvenire); United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 128-31 (2d Cir. 2008) (evaluating\non post-judgment appeal whether publicity biased trial jurors). Should the Court\ndetermine that the jury at Maxwell’s trial was biased based on disclosure of\nmaterial in a civil case, and that such material would not have been unsealed had\nJudge Nathan permitted modification of the Protective Order, then vacatur of the\n\ndefendant’s conviction — if warranted — will adequately vindicate the defendant’s\n\n15\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019381\n\n", "char_count": 1688}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 145, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page16 of 23\n\nright to an impartial jury. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201-04,\n213 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating conviction where district court improperly refused to\nexcuse potential juror who admitted bias based upon knowledge of defendant’s\nprevious acquittal). Thus, the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury would\nnot “be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial,” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S.\nat 799 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435\nU.S. 850, 860 (1978)), and, as such, the Order does not meet the third criterion for\nappealability of a collateral order. See Punn, 737 F.3d at 14 (defendant’s interests\n“can be adequately vindicated upon appeal from a final judgment” through “a new\ntrial... or whatever additional remedies are necessary’).\n\n21. Simply put, the Order denying Maxwell’s motion to amend the\nProtective Order is not reviewable on interlocutory appeal. Maxwell complains\nthat if she cannot use criminal discovery materials in civil litigation then there is a\nrisk that certain filings in the civil cases may be unsealed that otherwise would\nhave remained sealed. Maxwell apparently believes such a result would risk\nprejudicing her trial rights in the criminal case. If such materials are unsealed in\nthe civil case, and if Maxwell believes that unsealing causes her prejudice at her\ncriminal trial, Maxwell will have a full opportunity to raise that issue in the\ncriminal case. To the extent Maxwell is concerned that unsealing in the civil case\n\nmight permit the Government to oppose any motion challenging the unsealing\n\n16\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019382\n\n", "char_count": 1686}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 146, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page17/ of 23\n\norder it obtained during its criminal investigation on the grounds of inevitable\ndiscovery, she will have the opportunity to assert such a claim before Judge\nNathan. If she is dissatisfied with Judge Nathan’s decision on that score, she can\nraise the issue on appeal after the entry of final judgment.\n\n22. Further, given the substance of Maxwell’s motion to\nconsolidate, it is not entirely clear that all of the issues Maxwell seeks to raise in\nthis appeal have been finally resolved. Maxwell’s motion to consolidate this\nmatter with the Giuffre v. Maxwell appeal appears primarily focused on attacking\nthe legitimacy of the Government’s methods of obtaining evidence that it intends\nto use to prosecute the criminal case through the Subpoenas to the Recipient. (See\nMot. at 10-12). It thus seems readily apparent that Maxwell intends to file a\nmotion to preclude the use of such evidence at her criminal trial. Yet she seeks to\nhave this Court reach the merits of her arguments on that issue in the context of the\ncivil appeal, and before they have been properly litigated before and adjudicated by\nthe District Court in the criminal case. As Judge Nathan has not yet addressed (or\neven had the opportunity to address) that issue in the criminal case, the issues\nMaxwell raises on this appeal do not appear to be final. Any such arguments are\nproperly heard in the criminal case in the first instance by the district judge, “who\nplay[s] a ‘special role’ in managing ongoing litigation,” and who “can better\n\nexercise [his or her] responsibility [to police the preyudment tactics of litigants] if\n\n17\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019383\n\n", "char_count": 1684}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 147, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page18 of 23\n\nthe appellate courts do not repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudgment\nrulings.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 106 (alterations in original) (internal quotation\nmark omitted) (quoting Firestone, 449 at 374; Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller,\n472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985)).\n\n23. The cases cited in Maxwell’s notice of appeal do not alter this\nanalysis. All three are inapposite because they involved appeals by intervenors —\nnot parties — seeking to modify protective orders in civil cases. See Pichler v.\nUNITE, 585 F.3d 741, 745-746 (3d Cir. 2009) (third party intervernor foundation\nappealing order denying motion to modify protective order in civil litigation to\nallow third party access to discovery materials); Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity\nServs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir. 1987) (Commodity Futures Trading\nCommission (“CFTC”) acting as third party intervenor appealing order denying\nmotion to modify protective order in civil litigation to allow CFTC to obtain\ndiscovery exchanged by parties to civil case permissible because “t]he entire\ncontroversy between the CFTC and the defendants in this case was disposed of by\nthe district court’s denial of the government’s motion to modify the protective\norder”); Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2019) (third party intervenors,\nincluding members of the press, appealing order denying motion to modify\nprotective order in civil litigation to allow third parties access to sealed filings,\n\nafter parties to the litigation settled). Thus, appellate jurisdiction in those cases\n\n18\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019384\n\n", "char_count": 1622}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 148, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page19 of 23\n\nwas founded on the principle that when intervenors seek access to sealed records,\n“orders denying access are final as to the intervenors.” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of\nOnondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). By contrast,\nrulings governing the parties’ use of discovery materials — such as Judge Nathan’s\nOrder here — are not appealable in the context of a criminal prosecution until after\njudgment is entered. See Caparros, 800 F.2d at 24; Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798.\n\n24. Judge Nathan’s Order does not fall into one of the narrow\ncategories of decisions in a criminal case reviewable on interlocutory appeal.\nAccordingly, Maxwell’s appeal should be dismissed.\n\nUW. THE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE SHOULD BE DENIED\n\n25. Even if Maxwell’s appeal is not dismissed — which it should\nbe — her motion to consolidate the appeal in this criminal case with the appeal in\nthe Giuffre v. Maxwell civil case should be denied.\n\n26. Despite Maxwell’s efforts to characterize this criminal case as\nsomehow intertwined with the Giuffre civil case, the issues on appeal are factually\nand legally distinct. The civil appeal concerns Judge Preska’s order unsealing civil\nlitigation materials. The Government is not a party to the civil suit, the\nGovernment has never intervened or appeared in the civil suit, the Government has\nhad no role in the litigation that resulted in Judge Preska’s order, and the\n\nGovernment has no legal interest in the relief Maxwell seeks in the civil case. For\n\n19\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019385\n\n", "char_count": 1565}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 149, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page20 of 23\n\nthese reasons alone, the Court should deny Maxwell’s motion to consolidate these\nappeals.\n\n27. Maxwell has filed two separate appeals challenging two\ndifferent orders by two different district judges. But Maxwell’s consolidation\nmotion makes plain that her goal — in both appeals — is to ask this Court to rule\non an entirely different question: the lawfulness of the Government’s applications\nto modify certain protective orders in other judicial proceedings. Maxwell’s\nstrategy is procedurally improper, for at least two reasons. First, none of the\napplications or orders with which Maxwell takes issue are before this Court for\nreview — the civil appeal concerns Judge Preska’s unsealing order, and this\ncriminal appeal concerns Judge Nathan’s Order denying Maxwell’s request to\nmodify the Protective Order. Maxwell’s motion to consolidate offers no coherent\nexplanation of the connection between the legality of the Government’s prior\napplications and those two appeals. Indeed, as Judge Nathan found, Maxwell has\nfailed to explain, despite a high volume of “heated rhetoric,” how those\napplications could have any possible impact on Judge Preska’s decision to unseal\nfilings in the civil litigation. (Ex. F at 3). Second, if Maxwell seeks to challenge\nthe manner in which the Government gathered evidence in a criminal investigation,\nneither the civil appeal nor this interlocutory criminal appeal is the appropriate\n\nforum for her arguments on that score. Maxwell will have the opportunity to raise\n\n20\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019386\n\n", "char_count": 1590}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 150, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page21 of 23\n\nany legal objections to the Government’s evidence before Judge Nathan, who is\npresiding over the criminal case. If Maxwell is dissatisfied with Judge Nathan’s\nrulings on those matters, she will have a full opportunity to appeal those rulings\nafter entry of final judgment in her criminal case. The Court should not permit\nMaxwell to raise these issues at this juncture, before they have been fully litigated\nbefore and adjudicated by the presiding district judge.\n\n28. Moreover, Maxwell’s motion to consolidate is a transparent\nattempt to circumvent Judge Nathan’s Order without litigating the merits of this\nappeal. That Order, which is the only ruling on appeal in this case, prohibits\nMaxwell from using certain criminal discovery materials in civil litigation. If this\nCourt were to consolidate the criminal and civil appeals, the record on appeal in\nboth cases would be merged, the lines between the two cases would be blurred in\nthe manner Maxwell seeks, and the Court would effectively reverse Judge\nNathan’s Order and grant Maxwell the relief she seeks in this appeal — all without\nrequiring Maxwell to show that Judge Nathan actually abused her discretion by\ndenying Maxwell’s motion to modify the Protective Order.? Indeed, Maxwell’s\n\nmotion to consolidate does not in any way suggest that there will be anything left\n\n? Moreover, if the appeals were consolidated, the sealed filings in this criminal\nappeal would become part of the record in the civil appeal. The Government is\nconcerned that consolidating these matters would entail disseminating sensitive,\nsealed documents in a criminal case to civil litigants.\n\n21\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019387\n\n", "char_count": 1711}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 151, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page22 of 23\n\nfor this Court to adjudicate regarding Judge Nathan’s Order — the lone Order on\nappeal in this matter — if the Court were to grant Maxwell’s request to consolidate\nthese appeals. Accordingly, the motion to consolidate should be denied.\nCONCLUSION\n\n29. For the foregoing reasons, Maxwell’s appeal should be\ndismissed for lack of jurisdiction. If the appeal is not dismissed, the Government\nrespectfully requests that the Court deny Maxwell’s motion for consolidation.\nDated: New York, New York\n\nSeptember 16, 2020\n\n/s/ Maurene Comey\nMaurene Comey\nAssistant United States Attorney\nTelephone: (212) 637-2324\n\naz\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019388\n\n", "char_count": 691}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 152, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 38, 09/16/2020, 2932233, Page23 of 23\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\nPursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(g), the undersigned counsel\nhereby certifies that this motion/opposition complies with the type-volume\nlimitation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As measured by the word\nprocessing system used to prepare this motion/opposition, there are 5,099 words in\nthis motion/opposition.\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS,\nActing United States Attorney for the\nSouthern District of New York\n\nBy: MAURENE COMEY,\nAssistant United States Attorney\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019389\n\n", "char_count": 587}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 153, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 43, 09/16/2020, 2932466, Page‘ of 2\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n\nFOR THE\n\nSECOND CIRCUIT\n\nAt a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at\nthe Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on\n\nthe 16\" day of September, two thousand twenty,\n\nVirginia L. Giuffre,\nPlaintiff - Appellee,\nv.\nGhislaine Maxwell,\nDefendant - Appellant,\nSharon Churcher, Jeffrey Epstein,\nRespondents,\nJulie Brown, Miami Herald Media Company, Alan M.\nDershowitz, Michael Cernovich, DBA Cernovich Media,\n\nIntervenors.\n\nUnited States of America,\nAppellee,\nVv.\nGhislaine Maxwell, AKA Sealed Defendant 1,\n\nDefendant - Appellant.\n\nORDER\nDocket No. 20-2413\n\nDocket No. 20-3061\n\nOn September 10, 2020, Appellant filed a motion for consolidation of the appeal\ndocketed under 20-2413 with the appeal docketed under 20-3061. It is hereby ORDERED that\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019390\n\n", "char_count": 939}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 154, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 43, 09/16/2020, 2932466, Page2 of 2\n\noral argument on this motion in 20-3061 will be heard on Tuesday, October 13, 2020 at 2:00 pm\nafter argument in 20-2413.\n\nIt is further ORDERED that the parties’ briefs for Docket No. 20-3061 shall be filed in\naccordance with the following schedule:\n\nAppellant’s opening brief is due September 24, 2020;\nAppellee’s response brief is due October 2, 2020;\nAppellant’s reply brief, if any, is due October 8, 2020.\n\nFor The Court:\n\nCatherine O'Hagan Wolfe,\nClerk of Court\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019391\n\n", "char_count": 547}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 155, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 53, 09/23/2020, 2937074, Page‘ of 2\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\nDate: September 23, 2020 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 20-3061 DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nNOTICE OF DEFECTIVE FILING\n\nOn September 23, 2020 the LETTER, on behalf of the APPELLANT, was submitted in the\nabove referenced case. The document does not comply with the FRAP or the Court's Local Rules\nfor the following reason(s):\n\n____ Failure to submit acknowledgment and notice of appearance (Local Rule 12.3)\n\n____ Failure to file the Record on Appeal (FRAP 10, FRAP 11)\n\n___ Missing motion information statement (7-/080 - Local Rule 27.1)\n____ Missing supporting papers for motion (e.g, affidavit/affirmation/declaration) (FRAP 27)\n____ Insufficient number of copies (Local Rules: 21.1, 27.1, 30.1, 31.1)\n\n______ Improper proof of service (FRAP 25)\n__ Missing proof of service\n_____ Served to an incorrect address\n____ Incomplete service (Anders v. California 386 U.S. 738 (1967))\n____ Failure to submit document in digital format (Local Rule 25.1)\n____ Not Text-Searchable (Local Rule 25.1, Local Rules 25.2), click here\nfor instructions on how to make PDFs text searchable\n____ Failure to file appendix on CD-ROM (Local Rule 25.1, Local Rules 25.2)\n____ Failure to file special appendix (Local Rule 32.1)\n____ Defective cover (FRAP 32)\n____ Incorrect caption (FRAP 32)\n__ Wrong color cover (FRAP 32)\n______ Docket number font too small (Local Rule 32.1)\n____ Incorrect pagination, click here for instructions on how to paginate PDFs\n(Local Rule 32.1)\n___ Incorrect font (FRAP 32)\n___ Oversized filing (FRAP 27 (motion), FRAP 32 (brief))\n____ Missing Amicus Curiae filing or motion (Local Rule 29.1)\n____ Untimely filing\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019392\n\n", "char_count": 1974}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 156, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 53, 09/23/2020, 2937074, Page2 of 2\n\nX___ Incorrect Filing Event\n\n_xX Other: Correct docket entry is SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS TO MOTION\nPlease cure the defect(s) and resubmit the document, with the required copies if\nnecessary, no later than September 25, 2020. The resubmitted documents, if compliant with\n\nFRAP and the Local Rules, will be deemed timely filed.\n\nFailure to cure the defect(s) by the date set forth above will result in the document being\nstricken. An appellant's failure to cure a defective filing may result in the dismissal of the appeal.\n\nInquiries regarding this case may be directed to 212-857-8514.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019393\n\n", "char_count": 661}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 157, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 54, 09/23/2020, 2937091, Page1 of 6\n\nNos. 20-2413 &\n20-3061\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nfor the Second Circuit\n\nVIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,\nPlaintiff-Appellee,\nv.\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\n\nDefendant- Appellant.\n\nOn Appeal from the U.S. District\nCourt for the Southern District of\nNew York\n\nNo. 15-CV-7433 (LAP)\n\nThe Honorable Loretta A. Preska,\nU.S. District Judge\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nPlaintiff-Appellee,\n\nv.\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nOn Appeal from the U.S. District\nCourt for the Southern District of\nNew York\n\nNo. 20-CR-330 (AJN)\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan, U.S.\nDistrict Judge\n\nGhislaine Maxwell’s Response to Opposition to Motion to Consolidate\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019394\n\n", "char_count": 714}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 158, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 54, 09/23/2020, 2937091, Page2 of 6\n\nThe government and Ms. Giuffre insist this case and the criminal case are\nunrelated. But that’s not so.\nThe criminal case alleges that Ms. Maxwell committed perjury in the civil\n\ncase. Two of the six counts are expressly based on the civil case.\n\n|’ s fanciful to say the two cases aren’t related.\n\nThe government says it “is not a party to the civil suit” (true), that it “has\nnever intervened or appeared in the civil suit” (also true), that it “has had no role\nin the litigation that resulted in Judge Preska’s order” (true again), and that it has\nno “legal interest in the relief Maxwell seeks in the civil case” (true and\nextraordinarily revealing). Doc. 113, ] 26.\n\nThe government has not intervened in the civil case and it does not have an\ninterest in the relief Ms. Maxwell seeks (keeping the deposition material sealed)\nbecause the government wants to argue that its violation of Martindell was harmless\nas soon as the April 2016 deposition transcript is released. After all, if the\n\ngovernment were being consistent, it would have moved to intervene in the civil\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019395\n\n", "char_count": 1153}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 159, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 54, 09/23/2020, 2937091, Page3 of 6\n\ncase and to stay the unsealing process, just as it moved to intervene and to stay\ndiscovery in Doe v. Indyke, a civil case in which Jane Doe alleges that Epstein and\nMs. Maxwell abused and exploited her as a minor. According to the government, a\nstay of that case was necessary to “preserv[e] the integrity of the criminal\nprosecution against [Ms.] Maxwell.” Doe ». Indyke et al., No. 20-cv-00484, Doc.\n81, p 4, 9/14/2020 Order Granting Motion to Stay. The court there agreed, and it\ngranted Ms. Maxwell’s motion to stay. Jd. at 12. This Court should not let the\ngovernment engage in such obvious gamesmanship.\n\nThe government insists that, in these two appeals, Ms. Maxwell is “ask[ing]\nthis Court to rule on .. . the lawfulness of the Government’s applications to modify\ncertain protective orders in other judicial proceedings.” Doc. 113, J 27. That is not\nso. The government’s contention mischaracterizes Ms. Maxwell’s argument.\n\nAs Ms. Maxwell said in her opening brief:\n\nThe civil case is not the appropriate forum to litigate the\n\ngovernment’s apparent violation of Martindell. Ms. Maxwell intends\n\nto make that argument to Judge Nathan in the criminal case. But if\n\nJudge Preska’s unsealing order is affirmed and Ms. Maxwell’s\n\ndeposition is released, her ability to make that argument before Judge\n\nNathan will be prejudiced. Keeping the deposition material sealed will\n\npreserve the status quo and protect Ms. Maxwell’s right to litigate\nMartindell and the Fifth Amendment in the criminal proceeding.\n\nDoc. 69, p 33. Only by mischaracterizing Ms. Maxwell’s argument can the\n\ngovernment contend that she is “ask[ing| this Court to rule on. . . the lawfulness of\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019396\n\n", "char_count": 1749}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 160, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 54, 09/23/2020, 2937091, Page4 of 6\n\nthe Government’s applications to modify certain protective orders in other judicial\nproceedings.” Ms. Maxwell’s point is that, unless the unsealing order is reversed,\nshe might not ever be able to litigate “the lawfulness of the Government’s\napplications.”\n\nMoreover, the motion to consolidate is not an attempt to circumvent Judge\nNathan’s order before this Court can reach the merits. The motion to consolidate\nsimply endeavors to ensure that this Court does not find itself in the same position\nas the several judges below, where only some of the judges are privy to the relevant\nfacts.\n\nThere is no merit to Ms. Giuffre’s argument that consolidation will cause\nmeaningful delay. Doc. 123, pp 4-5. This Court has scheduled oral argument in\nboth cases on the same day, as well as an argument on the motion to consolidate.\nWhether that motion is granted or not will have no effect on the dispatch with\nwhich this Court addresses the issues.\n\nThis Court should grant the motion to consolidate.\n\nSeptember 23, 2020.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019397\n\n", "char_count": 1094}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 161, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 54, 09/23/2020, 2937091, Paged of 6\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\ns/ Adam Mueller\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel 303.831.7364\n\nFax 303.832.2628\n\ntgee@hmflaw.com\namueller@hmflaw.com\n\nCounsel for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine\nMaxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019398\n\n", "char_count": 340}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 162, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 54, 09/23/2020, 2937091, Page6 of 6\n\nCertificate of Compliance with Rule 32(g)\n\nCounsel hereby certifies that this response brief complies with the type-\nvolume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(g) and it contains 670 words.\n\n5/ Adam Mueller\n\nCertificate of Service\n\nI certify that on September 23, 2020, I filed Ghzslaine Maxwell’s Response to\nOpposition to Motion to Consolidate with the Court via CM/ECF, which will send\nnotification of the filing to all counsel of record.\n\ns/ Nicole Simmons\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019399\n\n", "char_count": 537}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 163, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page1 of 58\n\n20-3061\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nfor the Second Circuit\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nPlaintiff-Appellee,\n—against—\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 20-CR-330 (AJN)\n\nGhislaine Maxwell’s Opening Brief\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel. 303.831.7364\n\nAttorneys for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019400\n\n", "char_count": 547}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 164, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page2 of 58\n\nTable of Contents\nTable of Contents ............ceeceeseesseeseeeseescesecesceneceneeeseeeeeeseeaeesaesseesaeesaenaeenaesaeeeaeeeeeaes i\nTable of Authorities ...........cceeceeseseeeeseeecesecesceeseeeeeeeeeeeeseeeseeaesseesaeeaeeacseaesaeeeeeeseees ili\nStatement of the Case and the Facts 0.00... csssesessesseseeeseeseeeesseseesessaessesaeseeenessaenaes 1\nThe indictment ...........eceesseeseseseesceseeesceeeeeeeeeeeseeeseeseessaesaeeaeeaeeuaesaeeeaeens 1\nThe Civil Case .......eeceesceeseesseeseescesscesceescescecseeeeeeseeeseeseessaeeaeeaenaeeuaeeseeeaeens 1\nTDG BEPC CTS nee: serene. sos SME NNTE HEIN ONOOE. ENON IOLA SERRE AEA RENN 2\nThe order declining to modify the criminal protective order................. 8\nDie: A Sie mes sense senso. OS SMELT HALON. ENON INLINE ORR AEA RET 9\nJurtedictiorval Sta tenet ts cones norssssonas oom cememsssmeas Lan km or Lama ARN LANKAN 10\nTesi Preeti, .: mms ccmmscanes cae .cames RNS KAAS AAG LA OO RAO A Ra A 22\nSummary of the ArgUMENt...... eee sees ceee nee ceceecesseeseseecassessessessesaseessaeeeeaaeanes 22\nATQUMENL 0... cece cceceeeeeeseeeseeseenssesseesseeseeeseseeesseesseaseesneasseuseeseussesseussesneesensonasess 23\n\nI. Judge Nathan erred in refusing to modify the protective order for the limited\npurpose of allowing Ms. Maxwell to share with Judge Preska, under seal,\n\nmaterial information [a\n\nA. Preservation and standard of review. .........:.:::sccssceeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenaeees 26\n\nB. The district court erred in declining to modify the protective order.......... 26\n\nCOmclusioN ........::ccscecsceesseesseesseesseeesnecseeeeeeeeaeecaeeesaeenaeenaceeseeesaeesaeeeeeesaessaeseeeeaeeeanes 33\n\nCertificate af Comrpliames with, Rule B21 A oncossmsasmemssrsns semi man anne soe sam Sem 35\n\nCertificate of Service......cccccccsccssccsssecseceeeeneceecsaeesanesaeeeeeesaeesaeeeeessaessaeeseseaneeanes 35\ni\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019401\n\n", "char_count": 1954}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 165, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page3 of 58\n\nATTACHMENT A, United States »v. Maxwell, No. 20-cr-330, ECF Dkt. 51, Order\nDenying Motion to Modify Protective Order\n\nATTACHMENT B, Doe v. Indyke et al., No. 20-cv-00484, ECF Dkt. 81, 9/14/2020\nOrder Granting Motion to Stay.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019402\n\n", "char_count": 305}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 166, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page4 of 58\n\nTable of Authorities\n\nCases\n\nBond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009).........sesssessesseeeeseseeeeeeseeseeseeseeeseees 20\nBrown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2019). .....cccecceceeseecceseeeeeseeseeeeeeeeees 4,5, 10, 12\nCohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)....sssesessessseeeeeseeeeeees 10\nFlanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) ...cccssccssssssscsseeeeeseeseceeeeeeeseees 12, 13, 14\nbare Cioe ny, 12, GOF F.3d 993 (2d Cir, QO VG ms sommnarmomns mcmsn some zene. seSMRASERINE Sem 20\nIn re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N. Y., 745 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2014)...........0+ 21\nInve Telpent, Ine., 640 FS 58 Coed Cire DO) ass caeseecssans mens csemscacmons cammnsccmmnas eames 3\nKoon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) .......seescesessseseesesseseeeseseeeeeesesaeseeseeseeaeeees 26\nLouis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012) ........ 28, 30\nMartindell v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.\n\nDEEP rss. oom RAR ONE OSA ONS TRS RAST AAS EAR OE A Sc passim\nMidland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794 (1989)......sssssesesesseseeseeseeeeeee 12\nMinpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1987) ..........0+ 10\nPichler v. UNITE, 585 F.3d 741 (3d Cir. 2009).........sesseessesceeeeseseeeeeseeseseeeeeeeaseees 10\n\nPuerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) ... 10\n\nSEC v. Boock, No. 09 Civ. 8261(DLC), 2010 WL 2398918 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2010)\n\nbescaeseeeseceaeeeeeseeaeecceseesenecesecaseccueceeaeseeeseseeeseeeeceseseaecseeeesanseoesesenseceeeeenesoueesseneseeeees 30\nTrs. of Plumbers & Pipefttters Nat?! Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F.\n\nSapps TERA ES DIN: FLO VS } masses: mens cams same: came eR nO AO CANORA 28\nUnited States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1986) ........sssessesseseeseeeeeeeseeeeees 15, 16\n\nill\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019403\n\n", "char_count": 1981}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 167, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Paged of 58\n\nUnited States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996) .......sesesseseseeseeeseeeees 15, 16, 17, 20\nUnited States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1993) ....sesessssscessesseeeeeeeeeseeeseaneee 17\nWilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1980) ........eseeseseeseeseeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 20\nWill v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006) ......cscssesscsseseesseesceeeeeeeeeeeeeseeseeeeeeeees 10, 13, 17, 19\nRules\n\nFreagd. Be Carter. P LEGO) conor: cscs cs iss eee ARO OO NEO KARST Ka A SE 26\nFreed. Be Cartier. Fi G0 EQ A Secs rmscacsoms mens samme Rem ASO MeN KARIN KES CARO ER 6\nFed. R. Evid. 201(C)(2). ....sesssssssscesssseecesceseesceeeeeesceaceesaeseeeeeassassessceaseaseeeseeaeeassaees 29\nStatutes\n\n28 U.S.C. § 455(D)(1)...eeeeeeseesesceeeseeceseeseseeecscseesescesesaeseeeescueesesassesaeseeeeseeasseeasseeaniees 5\n\niv\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019404\n\n", "char_count": 902}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 168, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page6 of 58\n\nStatement of the Case and the Facts\n\nThe indictment.\n\nIn a superseding indictment, the government alleges that Ms. Maxwell:\nconspired with Jeffrey Epstein to entice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts\n(Count 1); enticed a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts (Count 2);\nconspired with Epstein to transport minors with the intent to engage in criminal\nsexual activity (Count 3); transported a minor with the intent to engage in criminal\nsexual activity (Count 4); committed perjury in the April 2016 deposition in Giuffre\nyp. Maxwell, No. 15-cv-7433 (S.D.N.Y) (Count 5); and committed perjury in the July\n2016 deposition in Giuffre v. Maxwell (Count 6). App. 13-30.\n\nThe civil case.\n\nGiuffre v. Maxwell is a long-dismissed defamation case in which Virginia L.\nGiuffre alleged that Ms. Maxwell defamed her. The alleged defamation centered on\na statement from Ms. Maxwell’s attorney-hired press agent generally denying as\n“untrue” and “obvious lies” plaintiff’s numerous allegations, over the span of four\nyears, that Ms. Maxwell participated in a scheme causing her to be “sexually\nabused and trafficked” by Epstein. The case settled after discovery and before trial,\n\nand the district court dismissed the case with prejudice in May 2017.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019405\n\n", "char_count": 1337}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 169, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page7 of 58\n\nMs. Maxwell sat for two depositions during discovery in Giuffre v. Maxwell,\nthe transcripts of which were both designated “confidential” under a court-\nordered protective order. App. 154-59. The transcripts of both depositions were\nfiled with the court during the course of the case and sealed by the court under the\nterms of the protective order.\n\nIn turn, the civil protective order prohibited attorneys and parties from\nsharing confidential information, including Ms. Maxwell’s depositions, with any\nthird party, except as necessary for the preparation and trial of the case. App. 155-\n56.\n\nAs originally proposed by Ms. Giuffre’s attorneys, the protective order\nwould have allowed plaintiff to share confidential information with law\nenforcement. App. 125. Ms. Maxwell objected to this language, which was removed\nand never made part of a court order. App. 125 & n.4.\n\nThe subpoena.\n\nSo if the civil protective order did not allow plaintiff to share confidential\ninformation with law enforcement, and Ms. Maxwell did not provide the\ngovernment with her deposition transcripts (which she didn’t), how did the\ngovernment obtain them and bring a criminal indictment alleging that Ms. Maxwell\n\ncommitted perjury?\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019406\n\n", "char_count": 1293}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 170, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page of 58\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019407\n\n", "char_count": 78}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 171, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page9 of 58\n\nee uring the pendency of\n\nthe appeal in Brown v. Maxwell, No. 18-2868 (2d Cir.) before this Court, which\nchallenged an earlier order in the civil case declining Alan Dershowitz’s and\nMichael Cernovich’s motions to modify the civil protective order and denying the\nMiami Herald’s request to unseal the district court docket. Brown v. Maxwell, 929\n\nF.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2019).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019408\n\n", "char_count": 455}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 172, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page10 of 58\n\nPe judge Preska, who, after the passing of\n\nJudge Sweet, was assigned to preside over the remand from this Court in Brown to\n\ndecide what material protected by the civil protective order should remain sealed.’\n\nrepeatedly downplayed and dismissed\narguments made by Ms. Maxwell that the material should remain sealed because of\nthe potential for a criminal investigation. Doc. 17, pp 4-5; Doc. 20, p 2.” For\nexample, when Ms. Maxwell moved to stay discovery in Farmer v. Indyke, No. 19-\ncv-10475 (LGS-DCF) (S.D.N.Y.), due to the pending criminal investigation, Ms.\nGiuffre’s attorneys (who also represented plaintiff Annie Farmer) opposed the\n\nmotion on the ground that Ms. Maxwell could not show the existence or scope of\n\n* Citations to “Doc.” are to documents filed in this appeal and publicly\navailable on ECF.\n\nCitation’s to “ECF Dkt.” are to the ECF documents filed in related cases as\ndescribed in the individual citations.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019409\n\n", "char_count": 1011}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 173, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page11 of 58\n\nany such criminal investigator\n\nMaxwell has provided no information about the subject matter of the\ncriminal investigation into Epstein’s co-conspirators, the status of the\ninvestigation, or even disclosed whether she herself is a target of the\nSouthern District’s investigation. When Plaintiffs counsel asked\nMaxwell’s counsel for information about the criminal investigation\nduring their meet and confer, Maxwell’s counsel refused to provide\nany details.\n\nDoc. 20, p 2.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019410\n\n", "char_count": 553}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 174, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page12 of 58\n\nee Vis. Maxwell asked Judge Preska to briefly stay the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019411\n\n", "char_count": 136}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 175, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page13 of 58\n\nunsealing process. Doc. 17, p 6. But because of the criminal protective order issued\nby Judge Nathan, all Ms. Maxwell could reveal to Judge Preska was that she was\naware of critical new information. Doc. 17, p 6. She couldn’t tell Judge Preska what\nthat information was. Doc. 17, p 6.\n\nJudge Preska declined to stay the unsealing process but said she would\nreevaluate if Judge Nathan modified the criminal protective order and allowed Ms.\nMaxwell to share with Judge Preska, under seal, all she had learned as described\nabove. Doc. 17, p 6.\n\nThe order declining to modify the criminal protective order.\n\nAt Judge Preska’s suggestion, Ms. Maxwell filed a motion with Judge\nNathan seeking modification of the criminal protective order. App. 124-31. All the\n\nmotion asked was for permission to share with Judge Preska and with this Court,\n\nunder seal, what Ms. Maxwell had learned\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019412\n\n", "char_count": 959}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 176, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page14 of 58\n\nJudge Nathan denied the motion to modify, though she invited Ms. Maxwell\n\nto seek relief from two other judicial officers, xs\n\nPS App. 99-103.\n\nThe appeals.\n\nPending before this Court in Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413 (2d Cir.), is Ms.\nMaxwell’s appeal of Judge Preska’s order unsealing the deposition material.\n\nThis appeal is from Judge Nathan’s order denying Ms. Maxwell’s motion to\n\nmodify the criminal protective order to share with Judge Preska and this Court in\n\nGiuffre v. Maxwell, under sea, as\n\nES pp. 121\n\nMs. Maxwell has moved to consolidate both appeals. That motion remains\n\npending.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019413\n\n", "char_count": 680}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 177, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page15 of 58\n\nJurisdictional Statement\n\nThis Court has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review a\ndistrict court decision declining to modify the protective order. Pichler vy. UNITE,\n585 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have jurisdiction under the collateral\norder doctrine to review the denial of the motion to modify the Protective Order\nand the denial of the motion to reconsider.”); Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity\nServs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (denial of motion to modify protective\norder is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine) (citing Cohen ».\nBeneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949)); see also Brown ».\nMaxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2019) (appeal by intervenors challenging denial of\nmotions to modify protective order and unseal).\n\nUnder the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order is immediately\nappealable if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an\nimportant issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is\neffectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S.\n345, 349 (2006) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,\n506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)).\n\nThe district court’s order declining to modify the protective order meets all\n\nthree requirements: the court conclusively decided not to modify the protective\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019414\n\n", "char_count": 1492}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 178, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page16 of 58\n\norder, App. 99-103; the propriety of modifying the protective order is completely\nseparate from the merits of the government’s criminal allegations against Ms.\nMaxwell; and appellate review of the order will be impossible following final\njudgment because a post-judgment appeal will be moot since, by that time, Judge\nPreska’s decision unsealing the deposition material in Gzuffre v. Maxwell, Nos. 20-\n2413 (2d Cir.) /15-cv-7433 (S.D.N.Y.) will have gone into effect.\n\nThat is the very point of this appeal, after all: to share with Judge Preska\n\nwhat Ms. Maxwell learned {+o [as\n\nee WV hat’s more, all of this happened while the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019415\n\n", "char_count": 711}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 179, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page17/ of 58\n\ncivil case was on appeal and pending before this Court.* Brown v. Maxwell, No. 18-\n2868. All Ms. Maxwell asks is for permission to share, under seal, the relevant facts\nwith another Article ITI judge.\n\nThe government argues there is no jurisdiction for this Court to consider this\nappeal. Doc. 37. Quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, the government\nsays the collateral order doctrine must be interpreted “with the utmost strictness in\ncriminal cases.” 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465\nU.S. 259, 265 (1984)). Doc. 37 at 8. According to the government, in criminal cases\nthe doctrine applies only to orders denying a bond, orders denying a motion to\ndismiss on double jeopardy ground, orders denying a motion to dismiss under the\nSpeech and Debate Clause, and orders permitting the forced administration of\nantipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for trial. Doc. 37 at 9. The\ngovernment is wrong.\n\nTo be sure, this appeal does not concern one of the four types of orders\n\nidentified by the government. But that doesn’t mean the appeal isn’t proper under\n\n3 The Miami Herald filed its notice of appeal in Brown v. Maxwell, No. 18-\n2868 (2d Cir.), on September 26, 2018, and this Court issued its decision on July 3,\n2019, Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41 (2d Cir.2019).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019416\n\n", "char_count": 1402}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 180, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page18 of 58\n\nthe collateral order doctrine, particularly when there is no serious argument that it\nsatisfies each of the doctrine’s three requirements: Judge Nathan’s order (1)\nconclusively determined the disputed question, (2) it resolved an important issue\ncompletely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) it is effectively\nunreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Will, 546 U.S. at 349.\n\nIn Flanagan v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that an order\ndisqualifying criminal counsel pretrial was not immediately appealable under the\ncollateral order doctrine. 465 U.S. 259, 266 (1984). The Court explained that unlike\nan order denying a motion to reduce bail, which “becomes moot if review awaits\nconviction and sentence,” an order disqualifying counsel is fully remediable\nposttrial. Jd. Moreover, a motion to disqualify counsel is “not independent of the\nissues to be tried” because its “validity cannot be adequately reviewed until trial is\ncomplete.” /d. at 268. Finally, unlike an appeal of a bail decision, “‘an appeal of a\ndisqualification order interrupts the trial,” and any delay in a criminal case “exacts\na presumptively prohibitive price.” Jd. at 269.\n\nIn contrast to the disqualification order at issue in Flanagan, the appeal of\nJudge Nathan’s order is like the appeal of an order denying a motion to reduce bail.\nFirst, this appeal will “become[]| moot if review awaits conviction and sentence.”\n\nSee id. at 266. Unless Ms. Maxwell is permitted to share with Judge Preska what\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019417\n\n", "char_count": 1591}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 181, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page19 of 58\n\nshe learned from Judge Nathan, Judge Preska’s order unsealing the deposition\nmaterial will go into effect without Judge Preska’s having the opportunity to\nreconsider her decision in light of the new information. And once the deposition\nmaterial is unsealed, the cat is irretrievably out of the bag. That is precisely why\nthis Court stayed Judge Preska’s order pending appeal. Gzuffre ». Maxwell, No. 20-\n2413 (2d Cir.), Doc. 30.\n\nSecond, the appeal of Judge Nathan’s order is entirely “independent of the\nissues to be tried” in the criminal case and its “validity can[] be adequately\nreviewed” now. See Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 268. There is nothing about Ms.\nMaxwell’s request to share information with Judge Preska that must wait until the\ncriminal trial is over. To the contrary, waiting until the criminal trial is over will\nmoot the issue.\n\nThird, this appeal does not and will not delay the criminal case, which is\nproceeding apace notwithstanding the proceedings before this Court. See zd. at 264\n(explaining that interlocutory appeals in criminal cases are generally disfavored\n\nbecause of the “societal interest in providing a speedy trial’’).*\n\n* The fact that the criminal case is proceeding on course despite this appeal\nconfirms that this appeal involves an issue completely separate from the merits of\nthe criminal action.\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019418\n\n", "char_count": 1419}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 182, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page20 of 58\n\nThe government’s contentions to the contrary rely on two easily\ndistinguishable cases and misunderstand Ms. Maxwell’s arguments. Start with the\ntwo cases on which the government relies. Doc. 37, p 11 (citing United States v.\nCaparros, 800 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 798\n(2d Cir. 1996)). According to the government, Caparros and Pappas hold that\n“protective orders regulating the use of documents exchanged by the parties\nduring a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory appeal.” Doc. 37, p 11. That\nis not correct.\n\nIn Caparros, this Court dismissed an appeal of a protective order issued in a\ncriminal case preventing the defendant from making public certain documents\nallegedly concerning public safety. 800 F.2d at 23-24. According to the defendant,\nthe prohibition on public disclosure was an unconstitutional prior restraint of\nspeech. Jd. at 24. This Court dismissed the appeal because it did not satisfy the\nthree conditions precedent to interlocutory review, in particular the requirement\nthat the issue must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Jd.\nat 24-26. Said the Court:\n\n[The issue] will not become moot on conviction and sentence or on\n\nacquittal because the order will have continuing prohibitive effect\n\nthereafter and the purported right to publish the documents, to the\n\nextent it now exists, will also continue. This is not a situation where an\norder, to be reviewed at all, must be reviewed before the proceedings\n\n15\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019419\n\n", "char_count": 1591}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 183, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page21 of 58\n\nterminate. Nor is there any allegation of grave harm to appellant if the\norder is not immediately reviewed.\n\nId. at 26 (internal citations omitted).\n\nThis case is not like Caparros. For one thing, Ms. Maxwell does not seek to\nmake anything public. To the contrary, she seeks to provide documents to judicial\nofficers— under seal—to ensure that all the Article III decisionmakers are on the\nsame page regarding the relevant facts and that Judge Preska does not continue to\nremain in the dark. For another thing, this appeal w2// become moot if review awaits\na final judgment in the criminal case, even if the protective order continues to have\nprohibitive effect following the criminal trial. That’s because what Ms. Maxwell\nseeks is permission to share information with Judge Preska nom, information that\nshould be part of Judge Preska’s decisionmaking in the unsealing process and any\ndecision whether to stay that process. And unless Ms. Maxwell can share the\ninformation now, the request will become moot because there is no way to “re-\nseal” a document Judge Preska prematurely unseals without the benefit of knowing\nall the facts.\n\nPappas also doesn’t help the government. In Pappas, this Court dismissed in\npart an appeal challenging a protective order prohibiting the defendant from\ndisclosing classified information he obtained from the government as part of\n\ndiscovery. 94 F.3d at 797. At the same time, the Court accepted jurisdiction over the\n\n16\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019420\n\n", "char_count": 1539}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 184, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page22 of 58\n\nportion of the appeal that challenged the protective order’s bar on disclosure of\ninformation the defendant acquired from the government prior to the litigation. Jd.\nat 798. This Court distinguished the differing results based on the breadth of the\nprotective order’s ban. Jd. As this Court said, “to the extent that the order\nprohibits Pappas from disclosure of information he acquired from the Government\nprior to the litigation, the order is not a typical protective order regulating\ndiscovery documents and should be appealable because of the breadth of its\nrestraint.” Jd. (citing United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446-47 (2d Cir.\n1993)).\n\nBeyond standing for the proposition that interlocutory appeals are the\nexception and not the rule (which Ms. Maxwell doesn’t dispute), Pappas has\nnothing to add to the analysis here. Even strictly construing the three requirements\nfor collateral order jurisdiction, see Will, 546 U.S. at 349, the order here meets the\ntest.\n\nThe balance of the government’s argument against jurisdiction\nmisunderstands Ms. Maxwell’s position. For example, according to the\ngovernment, “it is not entirely clear that all of the issues Maxwell seeks to raise in\nthis appeal have been finally resolved.” Doc. 37, p 17. Ms. Maxwell’s argument,\n\nsays the government, is “primarily focused on attacking the legitimacy of the\n\n17\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019421\n\n", "char_count": 1438}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 185, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page23 of 58\n\nGovernment’s methods of obtaining evidence that it intends to use to prosecute\nthe criminal case through the Subpoenas to” MI Doc. 37, p 17. Based on\nthis understanding, the government claims that Ms. Maxwell “seeks to have this\nCourt reach the merits of her arguments on that issue in the context of the cevzl\nappeal, and before they have been properly litigated before and adjudicated by the\nDistrict Court in the criminal case.” Doc. 37, p 17 (emphasis in original). That is\nnot so.\n\nIn the civil appeal, Ms. Maxwell is not asking this Court to rule on the\npropriety of the government’s conduct in circumventing Martindell and obtaining\nher depositions in a secret ex parte proceeding without providing Ms. Maxwell\nnotice and an opportunity to be heard.\n\nRather, Ms. Maxwell’s argument in the civil appeal is that, unless this Court\nreverses Judge Preska’s order unsealing the deposition material, Ms. Maxwell may\nnever be able to challenge before Judge Nathan the government’s conduct in\nobtaining her depositions. As Ms. Maxwell said in her opening brief in the appeal of\nJudge Preska’s unsealing order:\n\nThe civil case is not the appropriate forum to litigate the\n\ngovernment’s apparent violation of Martindell. Ms. Maxwell intends\n\nto make that argument to Judge Nathan in the criminal case. But if\n\nJudge Preska’s unsealing order is affirmed and Ms. Maxwell’s\n\ndeposition is released, her ability to make that argument before Judge\nNathan will be prejudiced. Keeping the deposition material sealed will\n\n18\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019422\n\n", "char_count": 1596}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 186, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page24 of 58\n\npreserve the status quo and protect Ms. Maxwell’s right to litigate\nMartindell and the Fifth Amendment in the criminal proceeding.\n\nGiuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413, ECF Dkt. 69, p 33. Only by mischaracterizing Ms.\nMaxwell’s argument can the government contend that she “seeks to have this\nCourt reach the merits of her arguments on [the Martzndell] issue in the context of\nthe czvil appeal, and before they have been properly litigated before and adjudicated\nby the District Court in the criminal case.” See Doc. 37, p 17. Ms. Maxwell’s point\nis that, unless the unsealing order is reversed, Ms. Maxwell likely won’t be able to\n“properly litigate” the Martindell issue at all.\n\nNor is this appeal the proper forum for deciding whether the government\nimproperly circumvented Martindell. All Ms. Maxwell seeks here is an order\nallowing her to share with Judge Preska information that is essential to her decision\nto unseal the deposition material and to rule on a motion to stay, information Judge\nPreska did not know at the time and information the government insists should be\nkept from her. And that issue—whether it is proper for one Article III judge, at the\nrequest of the government, to keep secret from a co-equal judge information\nrelevant and material to the second judge’s role in deciding a matter before her —is\nproperly reviewed on an interlocutory basis because it is “an important issue\n\ncompletely separate from the merits of the action.” W2ll, 546 U.S. at 349.\n\n19\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019423\n\n", "char_count": 1562}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 187, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page25 of 58\n\nAssuming Ms. Maxwell cannot appeal Judge Nathan’s order under the\ncollateral order doctrine, this Court should exercise mandamus jurisdiction and\nissue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to modify the protective order\nas requested by Ms. Maxwell. F.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass°n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1298\n(7th Cir. 1980) (declining to decide whether the collateral order applied and instead\nissuing a writ of mandamus to vacate a district court decision declining to modify\nprotective order), superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized in Bond v. Utreras,\n585 F.3d 1061, 1068 n.4 (7th Cir. 2009); see Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798 (recognizing that\nprotective orders in criminal cases “[i]n rare instances . . . might raise issues\navailable for review via a petition for writ of mandamus”).\n\nA writ of mandamus issued under the All Writs Act “confine[s] the court\nagainst which mandamus is sought to a lawful exercise of its prescribed\njurisdiction.” In re City of NV. Y., 607 F.3d 923, 932 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal\nquotations omitted). A writ is properly issued when “exceptional circumstances\namount[]| to a...clear abuse of discretion.” /d. (internal quotations omitted).\n\nThree conditions must exist for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus:\n\n(1) the petitioner must demonstrate the right to issuance of the writ is clear and\nindisputable; (2) she must have no other adequate means to attain the relief\n\ndesired; and (3) the issuing court must be satisfied the writ is appropriate. Jn re\n\n20\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019424\n\n", "char_count": 1584}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 188, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page26 of 58\n\nRoman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., 745 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2014). All three\nconditions exist here.\n\nFirst, as elaborated below, Judge Nathan clearly abused her discretion in\ndeclining to modify the protective order.\n\nSecond, Ms. Maxwell has no other adequate means to attain the relief\n\nnecessary because her request for Judge Preska to reevaluate her unsealing order\n\nwith the benefit of knowing what everyone else knows iT\nIT «i! become moot once the deposition\n\nmaterial is unsealed (as this Court already recognized by staying the unsealing\norder pending appeal).\n\nFinally, it is appropriate for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus because,\nas explained in Ms. Maxwell’s motion to consolidate, the judges in the Southern\nDistrict of New York have reached inconsistent decisions to prejudice of Ms.\n\nMaxwell. And while there is no dispute Ms. Maxwell has the right to appeal Judge\n\nPreska’s order, [ls\n\nee And now the government is trying to prevent Ms. Maxwell from\n\n21\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019425\n\n", "char_count": 1064}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 189, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page27 of 58\n\nappealing Judge Nathan’s order. A writ of mandamus is appropriate because only\nthis Court can guarantee that all the judges below are on the same page.\nIssue Presented\nWhether Judge Nathan erred in refusing to modify the protective order for\n\nthe limited purpose of allowing Ms. Maxwell to share with Judge Preska, under\n\nsea, as\n\nSummary of the Argument\n\nThis Court has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Judge\nNathan’s order (1) completely resolved whether the criminal protective order\nshould be modified, (2) that question is an important issue completely separate\nfrom the merits of the action, and (3) it is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a\nfinal judgment. Alternatively, mandamus review is appropriate to resolve the\nconflicting decisions below.\n\nOn the merits, this Court should permit modification of the criminal order so\n\nMs. Maxwell can share with Judge Preska, under seal, just how the government\n\ncame to possess her deposition transcripts,\nee. At this point, Judge Preska is the only relevant\n\nparticipant who doesn *t know this information. If Judge Preska’s order unsealing\n\nthe deposition transcript goes into effect without Judge Preska being offered an\n\n22\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019426\n\n", "char_count": 1282}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 190, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page28 of 58\n\nopportunity to reevaluate her decision in light of this information, Ms. Maxwell\nmay never be able to challenge in the criminal case the government’s violation of\nher rights under Martindell. Likewise, if Judge Preska is asked to rule on a motion to\nstay the unsealing until the conclusion of the criminal case without knowledge that\nthe sealed materials i, Vis. Maxwell\nwill never be able to challenge that decision. A modification of the protective order\nwill not prejudice the government, which has not articulated a persuasive reason\nwhy Judge Preska should remain in the dark.\n\nArgument\n\nI. Judge Nathan erred in refusing to modify the protective order for the\nlimited purpose of allowing Ms. Maxwell to share with Judge Preska,\n\nunder seal, material information [aa\n\nThis appeal is one part of an extraordinary series of events in which six sets\nof judicial officers are trying to resolve related —sometimes inextricably\ninterrelated —legal questions involving one common party: Ghislaine Maxwell.\nThose six sets of judicial officers are four district judges\nPee 20d two panels of this Court (the panel\npresiding over Gzuffre v. Maxwell and the panel presiding over this interlocutory\n\nappeal). Yet because of Ms. Maxwell’s legal opponents’ tactical choices, no one set\n\n23\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019427\n\n", "char_count": 1361}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 191, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page29 of 58\n\nof judicial officers has before it the full picture of the facts relevant to the\n\ncontroversies it is trying to resolve.\n\n<\noO\no\n3\n=\n=\noO\n\nfa)\nSo\n-\nct\n\n<\n\n<\niq)\npa)\nLee}\njo)\nco\nian\nQa\n@\nQ\nbmie\nNn\nbeie\njo)\n=)\n=\n5\nct\n=a\n=\nN\n\n)\n\nCourt squarely holds that the government seeking access to court-protected\ndocuments in a civil case to which it is not a party must follow certain procedures\nto request those documents, yet the government here declined to follow those\nprocedures.\n\nAdding to the extraordinary, Ms. Maxwell is the only person with interests in\n\nall six of the judicial proceedings and with at least some knowledge of all of them.\n\n24\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019428\n\n", "char_count": 725}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 192, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page30 of 58\n\nShe is trying to ensure that each of the judicial officers in the active cases has the\ninformation from the related cases relevant to his or her decisions. Despite her\nefforts, she has been stymied by seal orders\nGE 2nd by the protective order in the criminal case.\n\nMs. Maxwell is in a Catch-22 situation. Judge Preska is presiding over the\n\nunsealing of materials subject to the civil protective order. She does not\n\nee J tclge Nathan’s protective order,\n\nwhich prohibits her from sharing that information with Judge Preska. Ms. Maxwell\nasked Judge Preska to stay the unseal proceedings so that Ms. Maxwell could\nsecure permission to share criminal-protective-order confidential information, but\nJudge Preska said there was no factual basis to grant a stay. Ms. Maxwell asked\nJudge Nathan for permission to share information under seal with Judge Preska, a\nco-equal Article III judge, but Judge Nathan denied the request.\n\nMeanwhile, in this Court, the Gzuffre v. Maxwell panel lacks the same\ninformation Judge Preska did not have when she issued the unseal order that is the\n\nsubject of the appeal, and the United States v. Maxwell panel lacks the context of the\n\n25\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019429\n\n", "char_count": 1251}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 193, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page31 of 58\n\nGiuffre v. Maxwell unseal proceedings, into which Ms. Maxwell seeks to introduce\ncriminal protective order-sealed information relevant to Judge Preska’s unseal\ndecisions.\n\nThis situation is fundamentally unfair to Ms. Maxwell. There is no reason all\njudicial officers presiding over any case implicating Ms. Maxwell’s interests should\nnot have access, whether under seal, 77 camera, or otherwise, to all relevant\ninformation, and there is no reason Ms. Maxwell should be barred from providing\nsuch relevant information to them.\n\nA. Preservation and standard of review.\n\nMs. Maxwell preserved this issue for appeal. App. 124-31, 293-98.\n\nThis Court reviews for an abuse of discretion an order denying a motion to\nmodify a protective order. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295. A district court by definition\nabuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.\n81, 100 (1996).\n\nB. The district court erred in declining to modify the protective order.\n\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1) authorizes district courts to\nenter or modify protective orders for good cause. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1). In this\ncase, several reasons exist for the narrow modification of the criminal protective\n\norder Ms. Maxwell proposes.\n\n26\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019430\n\n", "char_count": 1331}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 194, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page32 of 58\n\nFirst, Judge Preska might well reconsider her decision to unseal the\ndeposition material if she knew how the government obtained the material despite\nthe civil protective order.° In particular, keeping the deposition material sealed\npreserves Ms. Maxwell’s ability to litigate before Judge Nathan in the criminal case\nthe propriety of the government’s circumvention of this Court’s decision in\nMartindell, which expressly contemplates an affected party’s right to move to\nquash a grand jury subpoena seeking access to information shielded by a valid\nprotective order. Martindell, 524 F.2d at 294. If the deposition material is unsealed,\n\nJudge Preska will never have the opportunity to reconsider her decision armed with\n\nthe knowledge ee\nee\n\nAnd if the deposition material is unsealed, it may foreclose any argument from Ms.\nMaxwell to Judge Nathan that the perjury counts should be dismissed or other\n\nremedies imposed based on the government’s circumvention of Martindell. All Ms.\n\n° It’s irrelevant that Ms. Maxwell originally consented to the provision of the\ncriminal protective order that presently prevents her from sharing with Judge\nPreska\nBS App. 91-92. At the time Ms. Maxwell consented to that provision gg\n\nee VMs. Maxwell’s earlier consent to this provision in the\n\nprotective order does not bear on whether good cause exist for its modification.\n\n2d\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019431\n\n", "char_count": 1447}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 195, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page33 of 58\n\nMaxwell seeks in this appeal is the ability to make these arguments to Judge Preska\nand Judge Nathan before it’s too late.\n\nSecond, to preserve her fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial by an\nimpartial jury, Ms. Maxwell intends to move to stay the unsealing process before\nJudge Preska. Ample authority supports staying a civil case pending resolution of a\nrelated criminal matter. F.g., Louzs Vuitton Malletier S_A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d\n83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012). But Ms. Maxwell cannot fairly make her case before Judge\nPreska for a stay unless Judge Preska knows all the relevant facts.\n\nIn particular, a central consideration in deciding whether to stay a civil case\npending resolution of a criminal case is “the extent to which the issues in the\ncriminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case.” Jd. (quoting 77s. of\nPlumbers & Pipefttters Natl Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp.\n\n1134, 1139 (S.D.N.Y.1995)). Here, there is no question the two cases overlap,\nee\nee\na\nee\nee\n\neee. | he criminal protective order, therefore,\n\n28\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019432\n\n", "char_count": 1156}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 196, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page34 of 58\n\ncompromises Ms. Maxwell’s ability to seek a stay of the unsealing process and\nthereby safeguard her right to a fair trial in the criminal case.\n\nThe government can hardly dispute the merit of Ms. Maxwell’s argument\nfor a stay. After all, the government itself moved to intervene and to stay all\nproceedings in Doe v. Indyke, a civil case in which Jane Doe alleges that Epstein and\nMs. Maxwell abused and exploited her as a minor. ATTACHMENT B, p 4 (Doe ».\nIndyke et al., No. 20-cv-00484, ECF Dkt. 81, 9/14/2020 Order Granting Motion to\nStay).° According to the government, a stay of that case was necessary to\n“‘preserv[e] the integrity of the criminal prosecution against [Ms.] Maxwell.” Jd.\nThe court there agreed, and it granted Ms. Maxwell’s motion to stay. Jd. at 12.’\n\nIn contrast to Doe v. Indyke, the government has not moved to intervene in\nGiuffre v. Maxwell, to stay the unsealing process, or to keep the deposition material\nand Ms. Maxwell’s depositions under seal. This makes no principled sense if the\n\ngovernment’s opposition to modifying the criminal protective order is to be\n\n© This Court can take judicial notice of this order. See Fed. R. Evid.\n201(c)(2).\n\n“If a stay in Doe v. Indyke preserves the integrity of the criminal prosecution\nagainst Ms. Maxwell, Judge Nathan should have modified the criminal protective\norder so Judge Preska could have evaluated whether keeping the deposition\nmaterial under seal would similarly “preserve the integrity of the criminal\nprosecution against Ms. Maxwell.”\n\n29\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019433\n\n", "char_count": 1605}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 197, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page35 of 58\n\nbelieved. According to the government, xs\n\nBut if that’s true, then the government should have moved to intervene\nbefore Judge Preska to oppose the unsealing of the deposition material, since, in the\ngovernment’s view, that material is confidential. The (unprincipled) reason for the\ngovernment’s decision not to intervene is obvious: If Ms. Maxwell’s depositions\nare released to the public, the government will argue to Judge Nathan that any\nviolation of Martindell was harmless.\n\nIt’s immaterial that the court stayed Doe v. Indyke during discovery while\ndiscovery in Giuffre v. Maxwell finished in 2017. As this Court recognized in Louzs\nVuitton, “if civil defendants do not elect to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege,\nand instead fully cooperate with discovery, their ‘testimony . . . in their defense in\nthe civil action is likely to constitute admissions of criminal conduct in their\ncriminal prosecution.’” 676 F.3d at 98 (quoting SEC v. Boock, No. 09 Civ.\n8261(DLC), 2010 WL 2398918, at *2, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59498, at *5\n\n(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2010) (alteration in original)).\n\n30\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019434\n\n", "char_count": 1178}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 198, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page36 of 58\n\nIn Giuffre v. Maxwell, Ms. Maxwell elected not to invoke her Fifth\nAmendment privilege against self-incrimination in reliance on the civil protective\norder and this Court’s decision in Martindell, which guarantees, at the very least,\nnotice and an opportunity to be heard on a government motion to modify a civil\n\nprotective order to obtain a deposition transcript. Martindell, 594 F.2d at 294; App.\n\n368-69, lls\nI 1's Court should permit\n\nMs. Maxwell to tell Judge Preska what happened and let Judge Preska decide\nwhether the information weighs against unsealing the deposition material or in\nfavor of a stay.\n\nThe government insists otherwise, arguing that modification of the criminal\nprotective order would comprise the secrecy of its ongoing grand jury investigation.\nApp. 92. This contention is implausible on its face because Ms. Maxwell’s\nproposed modification of the criminal protective order doesn’t threaten to\n\ncompromise the secrecy of anything. All Ms. Maxwell seeks is permission to share\n\ninformation with Judge Preska under seal.\nee\nee\n\n31\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019435\n\n", "char_count": 1138}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 199, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page37 of 58\n\nFina y,\n\nAnd it shows that Judge Preska erred failing even to acknowledge or address Ms.\nMaxwell’s reliance argument. Giuffre v. Maxwell, Case No. 20-2413, OB, p 24. Ms.\nMaxwell declined to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-\nincrimination during her two depositions. She made that decision relying on the\ncivil protective order and this Court’s decision in Martindell, which holds that\n\nabsent a showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c)\nprotective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling\nneed, none of which appear here, a witness should be entitled to rely\nupon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties,\nincluding the Government, and that such an order should not be\nvacated or modified merely to accommodate the Government’s desire\nto inspect protected testimony for possible use in a criminal\ninvestigation, either as evidence or as the subject of a possible perjury\ncharge.\n\nSZ,\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019436\n\n", "char_count": 1034}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 200, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page38 of 58\n\nMartindell, 594 F.2d at 296. But unless Judge Nathan’s order is reversed in the\ncriminal case, Ms. Maxwell cannot share this information with Judge Preska in the\ncivil case.®\nConclusion\n\nIn the end, the government’s argument amounts to little more than this:\nJudge Preska should remain in the dark. But there’s no principled justification for\nthat position, and this Court should reject it.\n\nThis Court should reverse the district court’s order denying Ms. Maxwell’s\nmotion to modify the protective order.\n\nSeptember 24, 2020.\n\n® Nor, unless the cases are consolidated, will the panel of this Court\n\nconsidering the civil appeal know [iii\nee\nOO —“CSCSCsCis\n\n33\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019437\n\n", "char_count": 742}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 201, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page39 of 58\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\ns/ Adam Mueller\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel 303.831.7364\n\nFax 303.832.2628\n\ntgee@hmflaw.com\namueller@hmflaw.com\n\nCounsel for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine\nMaxwell\n\n34\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019438\n\n", "char_count": 346}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 202, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 60, 09/24/2020, 2938278, Page40 of 58\n\nCertificate of Compliance with Rule 32(A)\n\nThis brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App.\nP. 32(a)(7)(B). It contains 7,343 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by\nFed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(IID.\n\nThis brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App.\nP. 32(a)(5) and the typestyle requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6). It has been\nprepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14 pt.\nEquity.\n\n5/ Adam Mueller\n\nCertificate of Service\n\nI certify that on September 24, 2020, I filed Ms. Maxwell’s Opening Brief with\nthe Court via CM/ECF, which will send notification of the filing to all counsel of\nrecord.\n\ns/ Nicole Simmons\n\n35\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019439\n\n", "char_count": 787}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 203, "text_content": "Cases: 20-60603B0AuNenDotuiwAd 2D 26128 Bw Oa/ 20a gr agent Ht\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT |\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\n\nDOC #:\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DATE FILED:__ 9/2/20\n\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUnited States of America,\n\n_y_\n20-CR-330 (AJN)\nGhislaine Maxwell,\nMEMORANDUM\n\nDefendant. OPINION AND ORDER\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:\n\nOn August 17, 2020, Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell filed a sealed letter motion seeking\nan Order modifying the protective order in this case.! Specifically, she sought a Court order\nallowing her to file under seal in certain civil cases (“Civil Cases”) materials (“Documents”) that\n\nshe received in discovery from the Government in this case. She also sought permission to\n\n! This Order will not refer to any redacted or otherwise confidential information, and as a result it will not be sealed.\nThe Court will adopt the redactions to Defendant’s August 17, 2020 letter motion that the Government proposed on\nAugust 21, 2020, and it will enter that version into the public docket. The Court’s decision to adopt the\nGovernment’s proposed redactions is guided by the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v.\nPyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Under this test, the Court must: (i) determine whether the\ndocuments in question are “judicial documents;” (ii) assess the weight of the common law presumption of access to\nthe materials; and (iii) balance competing considerations against the presumption of access. /d. at 119-20. “Such\ncountervailing factors include but are not limited to ‘the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency’\nand ‘the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.’” /d. at 120 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044,\n1048 (2d Cir.1995) (“Amodeo IP’)). The Government’s proposed redactions satisfy this test. First, the Court finds\nthat the defendant’s letter motion is “relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial\nprocess,” thereby qualif\n... [truncated, 3207 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/203 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=203]", "char_count": 3207}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 204, "text_content": "C&bxs@:20-60603B0AUuhenDOCuatEAd LD 26128 BH 0a/Aage ager as 5\n\nreference, but not file, other discovery material that the Government produced in this case. For\nthe reasons that follow, Defendant’s requests are DENIED.\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), a Court may enter a protective order\nonly after it finds that good cause exists. Within this framework, the Federal Rules of Criminal\nProcedure leave it to the discretion of the Court to determine whether modification of an existing\nprotective order is warranted.” To make that decision, the Court takes into account all relevant\nfactors, including the parties’ reliance on the protective order and whether the moving party has\nsufficiently substantiated a request to deviate from the status quo in the instant matter.\n\nOn July 30, 2020, this Court entered a protective order in this case, having determined\nthat good cause existed. Dkt. No. 36. The parties agreed that a protective order was warranted.\nSee Dkt. No. 35 at 1 (“The parties have met and conferred, resolving nearly all the issues relating\nto the proposed protective order.”). The Defendant’s Proposed Protective Order included a\nprovision that stated that all discovery produced by the Government “[s]hall be used by the\nDefendant or her Defense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this criminal action, and\nnot for any civil proceeding or any purpose other than the defense of this action.” Dkt. No. 29,\nEx. A ¥ 1(a). That language was included in the Court’s July 30, 2020 protective order. See Dkt.\nNo. 36 4 1(a), 10(a), 14(a). Shortly thereafter, the Government began to produce discovery.\n\nUpon receipt of some of the discovery, the Defendant filed the instant request, which\n\nseeks modification of the protective order in order to use documents produced in the criminal\n\n? Tn the civil context, there is a “strong presumption against the modification of a protective order.” In re Teligent,\nInc., 640 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). \n... [truncated, 2737 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/204 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=204]", "char_count": 2737}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 205, "text_content": "C&bxs@:20-60603B0AuhenDOCuateAd 2D 26126 BH 0a/AageageBast 5\n\ncase in other civil proceedings. She bases her request on the premise that disclosure of the\nDocuments to the relevant judicial officers is allegedly necessary to ensure the fair adjudication\nof issues being litigated in those civil matters. But after fourteen single-spaced pages of heated\nrhetoric, the Defendant proffers no more than vague, speculative, and conclusory assertions as to\nwhy that is the case. She provides no coherent explanation of what argument she intends to\nmake before those courts that requires the presentation of the materials received in discovery in\nthis criminal matter under the existing terms of the protective order in this case. And she\nfurnishes no substantive explanation regarding the relevance of the Documents to decisions to be\nmade in those matters, let alone any explanation of why modifying the protective order in order\nto allow such disclosure is necessary to ensure the fair adjudication of those matters. In sum, the\narguments the Defendant presents to the Court plainly fail to establish good cause. The\nDefendant’s request is DENIED on this basis.\n\nIndeed, good cause for the requested modification of the protective order is further\nlacking because, as far as this Court can discern, the facts she is interested in conveying to the\njudicial decisionmakers in the Civil Cases are already publicly available, including in the\nGovernment’s docketed letter on this issue. See Dkt. No. 46. In the opening paragraph of her\nreply letter dated August 24, 2020, the Defendant states that she is essentially seeking to disclose\nunder seal to certain judicial officers the following factual information:\n\n1. Grand jury subpoenas were issued to an entity (“Recipient”) after the Government\nopened a grand jury investigation into Jeffrey Epstein and his possible co-\nconspirators;\n\n2. The Recipient concluded that it could not turn over materials responsive to the grand\n\njury subpoena absent a modific\n... [truncated, 2076 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/205 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=205]", "char_count": 2076}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 206, "text_content": "Cres @:20-60603B0AuhenDOCuatEAd 2D 26126 BH 0a/Alageage@a st 5\n\n3. In February 2019, the Government, ex parte and under seal, sought modification of\nthose civil protective orders so as to permit compliance with the criminal grand jury\nsubpoenas;\n\n4. In April 2019, one court (“Court-1”) permitted the modification and, subsequently,\nanother court (“Court-2”) did not;\n\n5. That as a result of the modification of the civil protective order by Court-1, the\nRecipient turned over to the Government certain materials that had been covered by\nthe protective order; and\n\n6. That the Defendant learned of this information (sealed by other courts) as a result of\nRule 16 discovery in this criminal matter.\n\nWith the exception of identifying the relevant judicial decision makers and specific civil\nmatters, all of the information listed above is available in the public record, including in the letter\nfiled on the public docket by the Government on this issue. See Dkt. No. 46. Although this\nCourt remains in the dark as to why this information will be relevant to those courts, so that\nthose courts can make their own determination, to the extent it would otherwise be prohibited by\nthe protective order in this matter, the Court hereby permits the defendant to provide to the\nrelevant courts under seal the above information, including the information identifying the\nrelevant judicial decision makers and civil matters.\n\nIn addition, the Government has indicated that “there is no impediment to counsel\nmaking sealed applications to Court-1 and Court-2, respectively, to unseal the relevant\nmaterials.” Dkt. No. 46 at 3 n.5. In her reply, the Defendant asserts that she is amenable to such\na solution if the Court agrees with the Government that doing so would not contravene the\n\nprotective order in this case. To the extent it would otherwise be prohibited by the protective\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019443\n\n", "char_count": 1892}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 207, "text_content": "C&bxs@:20-60603B0AuhenDOCuateAd 2D 26126 BH 0a/Aageagebas 5\n\norder in this matter, the Defendant may make unsealing applications to those Courts if she\n\nwishes.\n\nSO ORDERED. AY 0 iste\n\nDated: September 2, 2020\nNew York, New York ALISON J. NATHAN\nUnited States District Judge\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019444\n\n", "char_count": 294}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 208, "text_content": "Case C2@-G\\0-00484-DGtUDER ODoemékG, PREG DLI1 Hage 4eanfedss of 13\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nJANE DOE,\nPlaintiff 20cv00484 (JGK) (DF)\n‘ast MEMORANDUM\n~agalnst- AND ORDER\nDARREN K. INDYKE, et al.,\nDefendants.\n\nDEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge:\n\nThis civil action, in which plaintiff Jane Doe (‘Plaintiff’) has sued defendants\nDarren K. Indyke and Richard D. Kahn, in their capacities as executors of the estate of\nJeffrey E. Epstein (“Epstein”) (the “Co-Executors”), as well as defendant Ghislaine Maxwell\n(“Maxwell”), individually (collectively, “Defendants”), for alleged sexual abuse and exploitation\nwhen Plaintiff was a minor, has been referred to this Court by the Honorable John G. Koeltl,\nU.S.D.J., for general pretrial supervision. Currently before this Court is a letter motion filed by\ndefendant Maxwell, seeking a stay of these proceedings pending the resolution of the criminal\nproceedings against her. (Letter to the Court from Laura A. Menninger, Esq., dated Aug. 19,\n2020 (“8/19/20 Menninger Ltr.) (Dkt. 69).) For the reasons discussed below, Maxwell’s motion\nfor a stay is granted, and these proceedings shall be stayed in their entirety, pending further order\nof the Court.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nMaxwell has been indicted by a grand jury in this District, and she is now being held in\ncustody at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) as she awaits her criminal trial, which is\nset to begin on July 12, 2021, before the Honorable Alison J. Nathan, U.S.D.J. (See id., at 2; see\n\ngenerally United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 20cr330 (AJN) (S.D.N.Y.).) On August 19,\n\nAttachment B to Opening\nBrief\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019445\n\n", "char_count": 1679}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 209, "text_content": "Case Ce2@-Gi0-00484-DGtUDER ODobemékGA, PREG DLI1 Hage4Panfeds2 of 13\n\n2020, Maxwell filed the letter motion that is now before this Court, requesting a stay of this\naction until the conclusion of her pending criminal case. (See 8/19/20 Menninger Ltr.) In her\nmotion, Maxwell set out the factors relevant to a stay analysis, and argued that not only her own\ninterest, but also the interests of the courts, the public, and the other parties would be best served\nby the requested stay. (See generally id.)\n\nOn August 27, 2020, the Co-Executors submitted a letter consenting to the entry of a stay\nand joining in Maxwell’s request that the stay apply to the entire proceeding. (See Letter to the\nCourt from Bennet J. Moskowitz, Esq., dated Aug. 27, 2020 (“8/27/20 Moskowitz Ltr.”)\n\n(Dkt. 77).) The Co-Executors principally argued that this Court should not consider a partial stay\nof this case (7.e., a stay that would apply solely as to Plaintiff's claims against Maxwell), as a\npartial stay would unduly prejudice the Co-Executors’ ability to defend against Plaintiffs claims\nand would add unnecessary cost to the litigation. (See id., at 1-2.) The Co-Executors also\npointed out that, if this matter were stayed, Plaintiff would still be able to pursue a resolution of\nher claims through the Epstein Victims’ Compensation Program (the “Compensation Program’)\nthat has been independently instituted, and that has led numerous other plaintiffs in similar cases\nbefore the Court to seek voluntary stays of their lawsuits. (See id., at 2-3.)\n\nBy letter dated August 27, 2020, Plaintiff vigorously opposed the requested stay, arguing\nthat the relevant factors weigh against granting the requested relief. (See generally Letter to the\nCourt from Robert Glassman, Esq., dated Aug. 27, 2020 (“8/27/20 Glassman Ltr.”) (Dkt. 78).)\nIn her opposition, Plaintiff contended, inter alia, that Maxwell’s detention should pose no real\nimpediment to her defense of this action, suggesting that Maxwell, who filed her mo\n... [truncated, 2227 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/209 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=209]", "char_count": 2227}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 210, "text_content": "Case Ce2@-Gi0-00484-DGtUDER ODoemékG, PREG DGI1 H2ge4Baneds of 13\n\nhaving to divulge anything about herself or the bad conduct she is alleged to have committed.”\n(/d., at 1; see also id., at 4-5 (arguing that Maxwell had already demonstrated her ability to\nparticipate actively in this action from jail).) Plaintiff also noted that, under the terms of the\nCompensation Program, she is not required to agree to a stay of her lawsuit in order to participate\nin that program. (/d., at 2.) As for the prejudice that Plaintiff would purportedly suffer from a\nstay of these proceedings, Plaintiff asserted that, “[fJor too long[,] Jeffrey Epstein and\n\nGhislaine Maxwell skirted the consequences of their vile acts,” and that she should not have to\nwait “even longer for justice.” (/d., at 4.)\n\nMaxwell filed a reply on September 4, 2020 (see Letter to the Court from Laura A.\nMenninger, Esq., dated Sept. 4, 2020 (“9/4/20 Menninger Reply Ltr.) (Dkt. 79)), contending\nthat Plaintiff had not adequately demonstrated how the requested stay would harm her interests,\nand taking issue with Plaintiff's assertions that Maxwell could reasonably litigate this case from\nthe MDC (see id.).\n\nOn September 4, 2020, this Court additionally received a letter from Acting United States\nAttorney Audrey Strauss, on behalf of the Government, requesting leave to intervene in this\nmatter for the limited purpose of — like Maxwell — seeking a stay of this case, in its entirety,\npending the resolution of the Government’s criminal prosecution against Maxwell. (See Letter to\nthe Court from Audrey Strauss, Acting United States Attorney, by Maurene Comey, Alison Moe,\nand Lara Pomerantz, Assistant United States Attorneys, dated Sept. 4, 2020 (“9/4/20 Gov’t Ltr.”)\n(Dkt. 80).) In its letter, the Government urged this Court to stay this action on the grounds that\n“a complete stay of this civil action [would] serve the public interest of preserving the integrity\n\nof the criminal prosecution against Maxwell and [would] cons\n... [truncated, 2054 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/210 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=210]", "char_count": 2054}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 211, "text_content": "Case Ce2@-G\\0-00484-DGtuUDER ODoeHékGA, PREG DL21 Hage 4Panfed4 of 13\n\nresources; and that those interests [would] outweigh any delay or disruption caused to the\nresolution of this civil action.” (/d., at 1.)\nDISCUSSION\n\n1. THE GOVERNMENT’S REQUEST FOR INTERVENTION\n\nThe Government is not a party to this civil action against Maxwell, and therefore does not\nhave standing to move for a stay of this action. Thus, for the limited purpose of seeking a stay,\nthe Government has sought leave to intervene in the action. (See 9/4/20 Gov’t Ltr., at 1.) This\nCourt finds it unnecessary, however, to deal with the Government’s letter in an “intervention”\nframework, which would require an inquiry as to whether the Government meets the standards\nset out in Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, given that a motion for a stay\nhas already been made by Maxwell, this Court finds it appropriate, in connection with that\nmotion and in the exercise of its discretion, to treat the Government’s submission as that of an\namicus curiae. See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 288 (2010)\n\n(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (“Courts often treat amicus participation as an alternative to\nintervention.”); Washington State Inv. Bd. v. Odebrecht S.A., No. 17cv8118 (PGG), 2018 WL\n6253877, at *10 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2018) (considering company’s submission contesting\nalternative service on chief executive officer as amicus filing); In GLG Life Tech Corp. Sec.\nLitig., 287 F.R.D. 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same); see also Brenner v. Scott, 298 F.R.D. 689\n(N.D. Fla. 2014) (not allowing organization that opposed same-sex marriage to intervene in\nPlaintiffs’ actions challenging Florida’s constitutional and statutory provisions banning same-sex\nmarriage, but allowing the organization to be heard as amicus). On this basis, this Court has\n\nfully considered the views expressed by the Government in its letter.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019448\n\n", "char_count": 1953}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 212, "text_content": "Case C2@-G\\0-00484-DGtUDER ODoCeHékG, PREG DL21 HaGePaneds of 13\n\nII. MAXWELL’S MOTION FOR A STAY\nA. Applicable Legal Standards\nAlthough staying a civil action pending the completion of a criminal prosecution against\na named defendant has been characterized as an “extraordinary remedy,” Louis Vuitton Malletier\nS\\A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012), “courts will not hesitate to grant a stay\n‘when the interests of Justice seem to require’ it,” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. LaGuardia,\n435 F. Supp. 3d 616, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing Jn re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation,\nNo. 02cv3288 (DLC), 2002 WL 31729501, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2002)) (granting a stay where\nthere was overlap of issues in the civil and criminal cases and explaining that overlap of issues is\na particularly significant factor); see also Trustees of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat. Pension\nFund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Volmar Distributors,\nInc. v. New York Post Co., 152 F.R.D. 36, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (staying civil discovery pending\ncompletion of the criminal case against the defendant); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Shkreli,\nNo. 15-CV-7175 (KAM) (RML), 2016 WL 1122029, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (same).\nUltimately, the decision as to whether to issue such a stay rests in the discretion of the\ndistrict court, Louis Vuitton Malletier, 676 F.3d at 99, and each case requires a particularized\ninquiry, see id., at 98. In determining whether a civil action should be stayed in the face of a\nparallel criminal proceeding, courts in this District have generally been guided by six factors:\n(1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil\ncase; (2) the status of the criminal case, including whether the defendant has been indicted;\n(3) the private interests of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously weighed against the prejudice\nto the plaintiff caused by the delay; (4) the private interests of and burden on the defend\n... [truncated, 2126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/212 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=212]", "char_count": 2126}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 213, "text_content": "Case Ce2@-Gi0-00484-DGtUDER ODoemékGA, PREG DL21 H2GeHayfedé of 13\n\nPlumbers and Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund, 886 F. Supp. at 1139. The party seeking the stay\n“bears the burden of establishing its need,” Louis Vuitton Malletier, 676 F.3d at 97 (internal\nquotation marks and citation omitted), and this burden may be met where, on balance, the\nrelevant factors suggest that proceeding with the civil action will likely result in undue prejudice\nto the defendant, see id. (noting that “absent a showing of undue prejudice . . . there is no reason\nwhy [a] plaintiff should be delayed in its efforts to diligently proceed to sustain its claim”\n(internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted)).\n\nB. The Relevant Factors Weigh in Favor of Granting a Stay of This Action.\n\nIn this instance, as discussed below, the relevant factors support Maxell’s application for\na stay.\n\n1. Overlap Between the Civil and Criminal Cases\n\n“The strongest case for granting a stay is where a party under criminal indictment is\nrequired to defend a civil proceeding involving the same matter.” Volmar Distributors, 152\nF.R.D. at 39 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord In re Worldcom, 2002 WL 31729501,\nat *5. Denying a stay where there is significant factual overlap between the civil and criminal\ncases may “undermine a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination . . .\nexpand the rights of criminal discovery beyond the limits of Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of\nCriminal Procedure, expose the basis of the defense to the prosecution in advance of trial, or\notherwise prejudice the case.” Volmar Distributors, 152 F.R.D. at 39 (citations omitted); see also\nJohnson v. New York City Police Dep’t, No. 01cv6570 (RCC) (JCF), 2003 WL 21664882, at *2\n(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2003).\n\nAs a threshold matter, this Court finds that, in this instance, there is significant factual\n\noverlap between this civil case and the pending criminal case. For example, as Maxwell points\n\nDOJ-OGR-0001945\n... [truncated, 2003 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/213 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=213]", "char_count": 2003}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 214, "text_content": "Case Ce2@-A0-00484-DGtUDER ODobeHékGA, PREG DLI1 H2QeDRanfedss of 13\n\nout, both the Indictment in the criminal case and the Complaint in this action contain allegations\nthat Maxwell “groomed” minor victims by taking them to the movies or shopping, that Epstein\npaid for victims’ education, and that Maxwell facilitated Epstein’s abusive conduct. (See 8/19/20\nMenninger Ltr., at 3 (summarizing certain allegations made in both actions and noting that\nparticular allegations in the Indictment “are very similar in time frame and content to those in the\nComplaint’”’).) The Government, in its submission, has confirmed that the allegations pleaded in\nthis case will necessarily “touch on matters relating to the pending Indictment” (9/4/20 Gov’t\nLtr., at 2), and has also noted that “given the factual overlap between the civil and criminal cases,\nallowing the criminal matter to be resolved in the first instance may result in a narrowing of the\nfactual and legal issues before this Court” (id., at 3). Plaintiff, in her opposition, does not contest\nthat there is substantial overlap between the cases, in terms of the people involved, the relevant\nevidence, or the facts sought to be established. (See generally 8/27/20 Glassman Ltr.) Thus, this\nfactor weighs in favor of granting a stay.\n2. Status of the Criminal Case\n\nThe arguments favoring a stay are also stronger where the criminal case is not merely\nhypothetical or anticipated, but rather is actively proceeding. In fact, as Maxwell notes,\n“““'whether the defendant has been indicted has been described as “the most important factor” to\nbe considered in the balance of factors.’” (8/19/20 Menninger Ltr., at 4 (quoting Maldanado v.\nCity of New York, No. 17cv6618 (AJN), 2018 WL 2561026, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2018)); see\nalso In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Sec. Litig., 133 F.R.D. 12, 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting\nthat “[t]he weight of authority in this Circuit indicates that courts will stay a civil proceeding\n\nwhen the criminal investig\n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/214 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=214]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 215, "text_content": "Case Ce2@-G\\0-00484-DGtUDER ODobemHékG, PREG DLI1 H2Geayfeds of 13\n\nHere, Maxwell was indicted by a grand jury on June 29, 2020; she has been detained\npending her criminal trial; and her trial date has been set. (8/19/20 Menninger Ltr., at 2.) Should\ndiscovery in the civil action proceed, Maxwell would be forced to decide whether to defend\nherself by making pretrial disclosures and giving deposition testimony (which could be used\nagainst her in the criminal case) or to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-\nincrimination (which would protect her in the criminal case, but which could well result in an\nadverse inference being drawn against her in the civil case). (See id., at 4; see also Louis Vuitton\nMalletier, 676 F.3d at 97-98 (discussing the burdens to the Fifth Amendment privilege that may\nbe posed by parallel proceedings).) This legitimate concern, made more real and immediate by\nthe active posture of criminal case, militates in favor of a stay.\n\n3. The Interests of the Plaintiff\n\nPlaintiff asserts that staying this proceeding would harm her interests because, as she is\nsuffering “ongoing damaging effects” from the alleged abuse, and she should not have to wait\nany longer to hold Defendants accountable. (8/27/20 Glassman Ltr., at 4.) While, as a general\nmatter, plaintiffs have a strong interest in the expeditious resolution of their civil claims, see\nVolmar Distributors, 152 F.R.D. at 40, Plaintiff here has not advanced any particularized reason\nwhy a delay would cause her prejudice, such as a likely loss of physical evidence or witness\ntestimony during the period of a stay. (See 8/19/20 Menninger Ltr., at 1 (noting that “there is\nlittle chance that any evidence will be lost in the interim given the age of the accusations in this\ncase”); see also id., at 4.)\n\nAdditionally, although this Court is not suggesting that Plaintiff has any obligation to\nagree to a stay so as to pursue her claims through the Compensation Program (and, in fact,\n\nrecognizes th\n... [truncated, 2106 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/215 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=215]", "char_count": 2106}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 216, "text_content": "Case Ce2@-G0-00484-DGtUDER ODobeékG, PREG DLI1 H2aGe Hands of 13\n\nin her ability to seek redress for the sexual assaults and other tortious conduct on which her\nclaims are based, as, during the pendency of any stay, she would still be able to participate in that\nprogram.\n\nOverall, and despite Plaintiffs assertion that a stay would work to her disadvantage, this\nCourt finds that any generalized prejudice that she would suffer as the result of a stay is not\nsufficient to counterbalance the other factors that the Court should consider, which all heavily\nfavor a stay.\n\n4, The Interests of the Defendant\n\nThe private interests of Maxwell, and the burden that she would face in proceeding with\ndiscovery in the civil action at this time are significant. As already noted, if civil discovery were\nto proceed, Maxwell would have to make the difficult decision of whether to assert her Fifth\nAmendment privilege — a decision that could adversely impact her position in one or the other of\nthe cases she is defending. See Louis Vuitton, 676 F.3d at 97. Also, due to heightened\nrestrictions at the MDC during the COVID-19 pandemic (restrictions of which this Court takes\njudicial notice), this Court understands that counsel has had difficulty, and will likely continue to\nhave difficulty, meeting with Maxwell and arranging for her to review documents or otherwise to\nconfer for the purpose of preparing a defense to this civil case. (See 8/19/20 Menninger Ltr.,\nat 5; see also 9/4/20 Menninger Reply Ltr., at 2-3.)\n\nThis Court finds that not only the existence of the criminal prosecution against Maxwell,\nbut also the particularly (and unusually) restrictive circumstances of her current detention, would\nnecessarily make it harder for Maxwell to participate fully in the discovery process in this action,\n\nand would cause her undue prejudice, weighing strongly in favor of a stay.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019453\n\n", "char_count": 1900}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 217, "text_content": "Case Cadsec?000064, JGKDGAt DodiiiieH2s20 FilesBageAr2qeRagé 19 of 13\n\n3. The Interests of the Court\n\nAs for the interest of the Court, it appears that staying discovery in the civil case could\nconserve judicial resources. Where a criminal case can potentially streamline the related civil\ncase, this factor supports a stay. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Abraaj Inv. Mgmt. Ltd., No. 19¢v3244\n(AJN), 2019 WL 6498282, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2019). As observed by the Government, the\npending criminal case against Maxwell may resolve issues of fact common to the two actions,\nand may therefore reduce the number of issues to be decided in subsequent proceedings in this\ncase. (See 9/4/20 Gov’t Ltr., at 2.)\n\nFurther, although it should not be the decisive factor, this Court also notes that it has\nsome interest in coordinating discovery, where appropriate, among the many civil cases that have\nbeen brought in this District against the Epstein estate, and that none of those other cases are\ncurrently going forward. This Court additionally notes that tighter restrictions on discovery may\nbe imposed in the context of a criminal prosecution than in a civil litigation, and that, if this civil\ncase were to move forward, restrictions that have already been placed on Maxwell’s access to\ninformation in her criminal case could have a limiting effect on this Court’s ability to supervise\ndiscovery here. (See 9/4/20 Gov’t Ltr., at 3-4 (noting that “Maxwell’s access to information\nabout the criminal matter is under the jurisdiction of the Honorable Alison J. Nathan, who has\nentered a protective order and has issued several rulings regarding the scope of discovery that\nMaxwell is entitled to and the manner in which she may or may not use that information”); see\nalso 8/27/20 Moskowitz Ltr., at 3 (noting that Maxwell had indicated, in her initial disclosures,\nthat, due to the terms of a protective order entered in the criminal case, she would be prohibited\nfrom disclosing certain information in the civil\n... [truncated, 2112 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/217 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=217]", "char_count": 2112}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 218, "text_content": "Case Cadec?000064; JGKDGRt DodiiiieH2820 FilesBageéA4r2qebagé 14 of 13\n\n6. The Public Interest\n\nPlaintiff argues that the public interest is best served by allowing her claims to proceed.\n(8/27/20 Glassman Ltr., at 5.) Specifically, she contends that the public benefits from civil\nlitigation when that litigation furnishes the public with information on the torts and crimes of a\nwrongdoer. (/d.) Plaintiff further contends that, as her lawsuit is the only civil case currently\nbeing litigated against Maxwell (as any others have been stayed or dismissed), “the continuation\nof this last remaining civil avenue can furnish the public with critical information as to defendant\nMaxwell’s well known criminal enterprise, how it was operated and all those involved.” (/d.) It\nis a mischaracterization of this action, however, to call it the “last remaining civil avenue” for\naddressing Maxwell’s alleged misconduct, as, to the extent other civil litigation against Maxwell\nhas been stayed, it has not been terminated — just as this action, if stayed, would not be ended.\nMoreover, as the Government argues, the public interest is also served by protecting the integrity\nof criminal proceedings. (See generally 9/4/20 Gov’t Ltr.) Should civil discovery proceed, there\nis a risk that the criminal prosecution could be impaired by the premature disclosure of the\ntestimony of various witnesses or could otherwise be prejudiced. (See id., at 3 (citing Johnson,\n2003 WL 21664882, at *2).) On balance, this Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of\ngranting a stay.\n\nAccordingly, taking all of the relevant factors into account, this Court finds that Maxwell\nhas met her burden to show that a stay of this action is warranted.\n\nC. The Case Should Be Stayed in Its Entirety.\n\nThe Co-Executors, Government, and Plaintiff all agree that, should this Court grant\nMaxwell’s request for a stay, the stay should apply to the case in its entirety. Indeed, the\n\nCo-Executors take pains to argue that a partial st\n... [truncated, 2072 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/218 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=218]", "char_count": 2072}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 219, "text_content": "Case Cadec?000064;JRKDGAt Dodiiiienes20 RilesBageAr2zqePagé 12 of 13\n\nwould unduly prejudice their ability to mount their own defense. (See 8/27/20 Moskowitz Ltr.,\nat 1-2.) Where one defendant is a central figure in an action, and where that individual’s\ntestimony is of key importance, a partial stay can lead to duplicative discovery efforts. Trustees\nof Plumbers and Pipefitters Nat. Pension Fund, 886 F. Supp. at 1141. This Court is persuaded\nthat, as Maxwell is a central figure in this civil case, a stay of discovery that applies only to her\nwould prejudice the Co-Executors by requiring them to conduct discovery without having the\nopportunity to depose Maxwell or collect documents in her possession. (See 8/27/20 Moskowitz\nLtr., at 1-2.) Further, a partial stay could lead to duplicative depositions, as, once the partial stay\nis lifted, Maxwell would be entitled to question any witnesses (including Plaintiff) who may\nhave already been deposed during the pendency of the partial stay, and, once evidence is\nobtained from Maxwell, other parties might also wish to re-depose witnesses. (See id. at 2.)\nCONCLUSION\n\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, Maxwell’s motion for a stay of this action, in its entirety,\npending the completion of the criminal prosecution against her (Dkt. 69) is granted. If, however,\nthe underlying circumstances change over time in a way that could affect this Court’s balancing\nof the relevant factors, then the parties may bring the changed circumstances to this Court’s\nattention, and it will then consider whether the stay should continue or be lifted. Absent any\n\nfurther application to this Court to review the stay, the parties are directed to provide this Court\n\n12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019456\n\n", "char_count": 1727}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 220, "text_content": "Case Cadec?000064;JEKDGAt Doditiien28 20 FiesBageAr2yebagé 18 of 13\n\nwith a joint status report in no more than 90 days, and every 90 days thereafter, during the\npendency of the stay.\n\nDated: New York, New York\nSeptember 14, 2020\n\nSO ORDERED\n\nDEBRA FREEMAN\nUnited States Magistrate Judge\n\nCopies to:\n\nAll counsel (via ECF)\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019457\n\n", "char_count": 346}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 221, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 61, 09/24/2020, 2938280, Page1 of 125\n\n20-3061\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nfor the Second Circuit\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nPlaintiff-Appellee,\n— against —\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 20-CR-330 (AJN)\n\nAppendix Volume 1\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel. 303.831.7364\n\nAttorneys for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019458\n\n", "char_count": 534}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 222, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 61, 09/24/2020, 2938280, Page2 of 125\n\nTable of Contents\nDocket Sheet ...........:ccesceesceesseessceeseeesceeeeceesceesaeesaceeeeesaeeeaeeeeesnaeeeaeeeeaeenaeeeas 001-012\n017 Superseding Indictment (7.10.20).........:.sssseeeeseeseeseeseeeeeeeeeeeeaeeaseneensens 013-030\n027 Defts Ltr. Motion re. Local Criminal Rule 23.1 (7.21.20).........:sseseeeee 031-037\n028 Order re. Defts Ltr. Motion re. Local Criminal Rule 23.1 (7.23.20) ...........+ 038\n029 Defts Lit: re, Propesed, Protective on: immer: omens semen. onmans snsmons emer. sea 039-042\n029-1 Exhibit A to Defts Ltr. re. Proposed Protective Order .............. essen 043-055\n033 Govs Resp to Defts Ltr. re. Proposed Protective Order (7.28.20).......... 056-062\n\n033-1 Exhibit A to Govs Resp to Defts Ltr. re. Proposed Protective Order (7.28.20)\n\n033-1 Exhibit A to Govs Resp to Defts Ltr. re. Proposed Protective Order (7.28.20)\n\nHi RGIS RET UNION URROCING GREATER GHRERENS SNOEITENE EROEITINE aReEINE aERmENNN UNECE MeOENE emeREENS oe 075-086\n037 Memo Opinion and Order re. PO o..... eee eeeeseeseeeseeseeeseeeaeeseeeseesseeneeeaes 087-089\n046 Govs Resp to Defts Ltr. Motn. re. Modification of PO Filed Under Seal\n\n(8.21.20) vesssessssesssseessesssssessesssssessesesssessesesssessssesssessesessscssesesssessssessecsseees 090-094\n047 Govs Proposed Redactions to Defts Ltr. Motn. re. Modification of PO Filed\n\nUnder Seal (8.21.20)... eeeesessesseseessesseeseeseeseeseesseeaeeaeeseeseeeaseaeeaeeaeensens 095-098\n051 Order re. Defts Under Seal Ltr. Motn. to Modify PO (9.2.20)............... 099-103\n\n052 Defts REDACTED Ltr. Motn Reply ISO Modification of PO (9.2.20). .104-111\n\n053 Defts Proposed Redactions to Request to Modify PO (9.8.20) ............+ 112-114\n054 Defts Proposed Redactions to Ltr Motn Reply ISO Request to Modify PO\n(9.8.20) vecsscsssessssssssesssessessssssssesssessssssessssatssssssssessssssscsussstsssessesessstesseseesess 115-120\n055 Defts Notice of Appeal (9.4.20).........:ssssessessesseeeessees\n... [truncated, 2056 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/222 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=222]", "char_count": 2056}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 223, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document GbNOSKHAZEe NGser 95Ea980, Page3 of 125\nQuery’ Reports Utilities Help Log Out\n\nAPPEAL,ECF\n\nU.S. District Court\nSouthern District of New York (Foley Square)\nCRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:20-cr-00330-AJN-1\n\nCase title: USA v. Maxwell Date Filed: 06/29/2020\n\nAssigned to: Judge Alison J. Nathan\n\nDefendant (1)\n\nGhislaine Maxwell represented by Christian R. Everdell\nalso known as Cohen & Gresser LLP\nSealed Defendant 1 800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\n212-707-7268\n\nFax: 212-957-4514\n\nEmail: ceverdell@cohengresser.com\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nHaddon Morgan and Foreman\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\n(303)-83 1-7364\n\nFax: (303)-832-2628\n\nEmail: jpagliuca@hmflaw.com\nLEAD ATTORNEY\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHaddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.\n150 East Tenth Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\n(303)-831-7364\n\nFax: (303)-832-2628\n\nEmail: Imenninger@hmflaw.com\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nMark Stewart Cohen\n\nCohen & Gresser, LLP (NYC)\n\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\n\n(212) 957-7600\n\nFax: (212)957-4514\n\nEmail: mcohen@cohengresser.com\n\nApp.001\n\nhttps://ecf.nysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?347708277129655-L_1_0-1 1/12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019460\n\n", "char_count": 1241}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 224, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document GbNOSKHAZE NaGber 95Ea80, Page4 of 125\n\nPending Counts\n\n18:371.F CONSPIRACY TO ENTICE\nMINORS TO TRAVEL TO ENGAGE IN\nILLEGAL SEX ACTS\n\n(1)\n18:371.F CONSPIRACY TO ENTICE\n\nMINORS TO TRAVEL TO ENGAGE IN\nILLEGAL SEX ACTS\n\n(Is)\n18:2422.F COERCION OR ENTICEMENT\n\nOFA MINOT TO TRAVEL TO ENGAGE\nIN ILLEGAL SEX ACTS\n\n(2)\n18:2422.F COERCION OR ENTICEMENT\n\nOF MINOR TO ENGAGE IN ILLEGAL\nSEX ACTS\n\n(2s)\n18:371.F CONSPIRACY TO TRANSPORT\n\nMINORS WITH INTENT TO ENGAGE IN\nCRIMINAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY\n\n(3)\n\n18:371.F 18:371.F CONSPIRACY TO\nTRANSPORT MINORS WITH INTENT\nTO ENGAGE IN CRIMINAL SEXUAL\nACTIVITY\n\n(3s)\n\n18:2423.F COERCION OR ENTICEMENT\nOF MINOR FEMALE\n(TRANSPORTATION OF A MINOR\nWITH INTENT TO ENGAGE IN\nCRIMINAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY)\n\n(4)\n\n18:2423.F TRANSPORTATION OF A\nMINOR WITH INTENT TO ENGAGE IN\nCRIMINAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY\n\n(4s)\n\n18:1623.F FALSE DECLARATIONS\nBEFORE GRAND JURY/COURT\n(PERJURY)\n\n(5-6)\n\n18:1623.F FALSE DECLARATIONS\nBEFORE GRAND JURY/COURT\n(5s-6s)\n\nHighest Offense Level (Opening)\nFelony\n\nhttps://ecf.nysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?347708277129655-L_1_0-1\n\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nDisposition\n\nApp.002\n\n2/12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019461\n\n", "char_count": 1183}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 225, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document GbNOSKHAZE NSGser 95Ea80, Paged of 125\n\nTerminated Counts Disposition\n\nNone\n\nHighest Offense Level (Terminated)\n\nNone\n\nComplaints Disposition\n\nNone\n\nPlaintiff\n\nUSA represented by Alex Rossmiller\nU.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of\nNew York\n\n1 St. Andrew's Plaza\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\n(212)-637-2415\n\nEmail: alexander.rossmiller@usdoj.gov\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nPRO HAC VICE\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nDesignation: Assistant US Attorney\n\nAlison Gainfort Moe\n\nUnited States Attorney's Office, SDNY\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\n(212)-637-2225\n\nEmail: alison.moe@usdoj.gov\n\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nDesignation: Assistant US Attorney\n\nMaurene Ryan Comey\n\nUnited States Attorney's Office, SDNY\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\n(212)-637-2324\n\nEmail: maurene.comey@usdo].gov\nLEAD ATTORNEY\n\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\nDesignation: Assistant US Attorney\n\nLara Elizabeth Pomerantz\nUnited States Attorney's Office\nOne St. Andrew's Plaza\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n212-637-2343\n\nFax: 212-637-2527\n\nApp.003\n\nhttps://ecf.nysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?347708277129655-L_1_0-1 3/12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019462\n\n", "char_count": 1154}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 226, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document GbNOSKHAZE Nbser 95Ea80, Page6 of 125\n\nEmail: Lara.Pomerantz@usdoj.gov\nATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED\n\nDate Filed Docket Text\n\n06/29/2020 1 | SEALED INDICTMENT as to Sealed Defendant 1 (1) count(s) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-6. Gm) (Main\nDocument 1 replaced on 7/2/2020) (jm). (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\n07/02/2020 2 | Order to Unseal Indictment as to Sealed Defendant 1. (Signed by Magistrate Judge\nKatharine H. Parker on 7/2/20)(jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\n07/02/2020 a INDICTMENT UNSEALED as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\n07/02/2020 a Case Designated ECF as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\n07/02/2020 Case as to Ghislaine Maxwell ASSIGNED to Judge Alison J. Nathan. (jm) (Entered:\n07/02/2020)\n\n07/02/2020 Attorney update in case as to Ghislaine Maxwell. Attorney Alex Rossmiller,Maurene Ryan\n\nComey,Alison Gainfort Moe for USA added. (jm) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n07/02/2020 MOTION to detain defendant . Document filed by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell. (Moe,\nAlison) (Entered: 07/02/2020)\n\n07/05/2020 LETTER by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from\nAUSAs Maurene Comey, Alison Moe, and Alex Rossmiller dated July 5, 2020 re: Request\nto Schedule Initial Appearance Document filed by USA. (Comey, Maurene) (Entered:\n\n07/05/2020)\n\nRule 5(c)(3) Documents Received as to Ghislaine Maxwell from the United States District\nCourt - District of New Hampshire. (jm) (Entered: 07/06/2020)\n\n07/06/2020\n\n07/06/2020\n\n07/02/2020 Arrest of Ghislaine Maxwell in the United States District Court - District of New\nHampshire. (jm) (Entered: 07/06/2020)\n7\n\nORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. This matter has been assigned to me for all purposes. In\nits July 5, 2020 letter, the Government on behalf of the parties requested that the Court\nschedule an arraignment, initial appearance, and bail hearing in this matter in the afternoon\nof Friday, July 10. See Dkt. No. 5. In light of the COVID public health crisis, there are\nsignificant safety issues r\n... [truncated, 3506 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/226 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=226]", "char_count": 3506}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 227, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document GbNOSKHACE NaGser 95Ea80, Page7 of 125\n\n| 07/07/2020 9 | LETTER by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Alex |\nRossmiller dated July 7, 2020 re: scheduling Document filed by USA. (Rossmiller, Alex)\n(Entered: 07/07/2020)\n\n07/07/2020 10 | ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. An arraignment, initial conference, and bail hearing in\nthis matter is hereby scheduled to occur as a remote video/teleconference using an internet\nplatform on July 14, 2020 at 1 p.m. In advance of the conference, Chambers will email\ncounsel with further information on how to access the video conference. To optimize the\nquality of the video feed, only the Court, the Defendant, defense counsel, and counsel for\nthe Government will appear by video for the proceeding; all others may access the audio\nof the public proceeding by telephone. Due to the limited capacity of the internet platform\nsystem, only one attorney per party may participate by video. Co-counsel, members of the\npress, and the public may access the audio feed of the proceeding by calling a dial-in\nnumber, which the Court will provide in advance of the proceeding by subsequent order.\nGiven the high degree of public interest in this case, a video feed of the remote proceeding\nwill be available for viewing in the Jury Assembly Room located at the Daniel Patrick\nMoynihan Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY. Due to social distancing\nrequirements, seating will be extremely limited; when capacity is reached no additional\npersons will be admitted. Per the S.D.N.Y. COVID-19 Courthouse Entry Program, anyone\nwho appears at any S.D.N.Y. courthouse must complete a questionnaire on the date of the\nproceeding prior to arriving at the courthouse. All visitors must also have their temperature\ntaken when they arrive at the courthouse. Please see the instructions, attached. Completing\nthe questionnaire ahead of time will save time and effort upon entry. Only persons who\nmeet the entry requi\n... [truncated, 4751 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/227 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=227]", "char_count": 4751}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 228, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document GbNOSKHAZE Naber G5Ea80, Page’ of 125\n\nparties. See Dkt. No. 5. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 7/7/2020)\n(jbo) (Entered: 07/07/2020)\n\n07/08/2020 11 | MEMO ENDORSEMENT as to Ghislaine Maxwell on 9 LETTER by USA as to Ghislaine\nMaxwell addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Alex Rossmiller dated July 7, 2020 re:\nscheduling. ENDORSEMENT: The Court hereby sets the following briefing schedule. The\nDefense response is due by 1:00 p.m. on July 10, 2020. The Government reply is due by\n1:00 p.m. on July 13, 2020. Additionally, defense counsel is ordered to file notices of\nappearance on the docket by the end of the day today. SO ORDERED. (Responses due by\n7/10/2020. Replies due by 7/13/2020.) (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 7/8/2020)\n(Inl) (Entered: 07/08/2020)\n\n07/08/2020 12\n\nNOTICE OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Mark Stewart Cohen appearing for Ghislaine\nMaxwell. Appearance Type: Retained. (Cohen, Mark) (Entered: 07/08/2020)\n\n07/08/2020 13 | NOTICE OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Christian R. Everdell appearing for Ghislaine\nMaxwell. Appearance Type: Retained. (Everdell, Christian) (Entered: 07/08/2020)\n\n07/08/2020 NOTICE OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Laura A. Menninger appearing for Ghislaine\n\nMaxwell. Appearance Type: Retained. (Menninger, Laura) (Entered: 07/08/2020)\n07/08/2020 MOTION for Jeffrey S. Pagliuca to Appear Pro Hac Vice . Filing fee $ 200.00, receipt\n\nnumber ANYSDC-20605229. Motion and supporting papers to be reviewed by Clerk's\nOffice staff. Document filed by Ghislaine Maxwell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Declaration\nof Jeffrey S. Pagliuca, # 2 Exhibit Certificate of Good Standing, # 3 Text of Proposed\nOrder Proposed Order)(Pagliuca, Jeffrey) (Entered: 07/08/2020)\n\n07/08/2020 17\n\n(S1) SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT FILED as to Ghislaine Maxwell (1) count(s) 1s, 2s,\n3s, 4s, 5s-6s. (jm) (Entered: 07/10/2020)\n\n07/09/2020 : >>>NOTICE REGARDING PRO HAC VICE MOTION. Regarding Document No.\n\n15 MOTION for Jeffrey S. Pagliuca to Appear Pro H\n... [truncated, 4182 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/228 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=228]", "char_count": 4182}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 229, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document GbNOSKRAZE NGser 95Ea80, Page9 of 125\n\nfirst come, first serve basis and in accordance with the S.D.N.Y. COVID-19 Courthouse\nEntry Program and this Court's previous order of July 7, 2020. See Dkt. No. 10. If\nconditions change or the Court otherwise concludes that allowing for in-person viewing of\nthe video feed at the courthouse is not consistent with public health, the Court may provide\naudio access by telephone only. Any photographing, recording, or rebroadcasting of\nfederal court proceedings is prohibited by law. Violation of these prohibitions may result in\nfines or sanctions, including removal of court issued media credentials, restricted entry to\nfuture hearings, denial of entry to future hearings, or any other sanctions deemed necessary\nby the Court. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 7/9/2020)(jbo)\n(Entered: 07/09/2020)\n\n07/10/2020 18 | MEMORANDUM in Opposition by Ghislaine Maxwell re 4 MOTION to detain defendant\n.. (Cohen, Mark) (Entered: 07/10/2020)\n\n07/10/2020 19 | NOTICE OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Mark Stewart Cohen appearing for Ghislaine\nMaxwell. Appearance Type: Retained. (Cohen, Mark) (Entered: 07/10/2020)\n\n07/10/2020 20 | NOTICE OF ATTORNEY APPEARANCE: Christian R. Everdell appearing for Ghislaine\nMaxwell. Appearance Type: Retained. (Everdell, Christian) (Entered: 07/10/2020)\n\n07/10/2020 21 | WAIVER of Personal Appearance at Arraignment and Entry of Plea of Not Guilty by\nGhislaine Maxwell. (Everdell, Christian) (Entered: 07/10/2020)\n\nZl\n07/13/2020 22 | REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell re: 4\n\nMOTION to detain defendant . . (Moe, Alison) (Entered: 07/13/2020)\n07/13/2020\n07/14/2020\n\nORDER granting 15 Motion for Jeffrey Pagliuca to Appear Pro Hac Vice as to Ghislaine\nMaxwell (1). (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 7/13/2020) (kwi) (Entered:\n07/13/2020)\n\nORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. For the reasons stated on the record at today's\nproceeding, the Governments motion to detain \n... [truncated, 3980 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/229 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=229]", "char_count": 3980}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 230, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document 64pmyG7ReO2OceO@82802 Page10 of 125\n\nand messages from non-parties that purport to be related to this case. These submissions\nare either procedurally improper or irrelevant to the judicial function. Therefore, they will\nnot be considered or docketed. The Court will accord the same treatment to any similar\ncorrespondence it receives in the future. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Alison J.\nNathan on 7/21/2020) (Inl) (Entered: 07/21/2020)\n\n07/21/2020 27 | LETTER MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Jeffrey S. Pagliuca dated\nJuly 21, 2020 re: Local Criminal Rule 23.1 . Document filed by Ghislaine Maxwell.\n\n(Pagliuca, Jeffrey) (Entered: 07/21/2020)\n\n07/23/2020 28 | ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell: The Defense has moved for an order \"prohibiting the\nGovernment, its agents and counsel for witnesses from making extrajudicial statements\nconcerning this case.\" Dkt. No. 27 at 1. The Court firmly expects that counsel for all\ninvolved parties will exercise great care to ensure compliance with this Court's local rules,\nincluding Local Criminal Rule 23.1, and the rules of professional responsibility. In light of\nthis clear expectation, the Court does not believe that further action is needed at this time\nto protect the Defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Accordingly, it denies the\nDefendant's motion without prejudice. But the Court warns counsel and agents for the\nparties and counsel for potential witnesses that going forward it will not hesitate to take\n\nappropriate action in the face of violations of any relevant rules. The Court will ensure\nstrict compliance with those rules and will ensure that the Defendant's right to a fair trial\nwill be safeguarded. (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on 7/23/2020) (ap) (Entered:\n07/23/2020)\n\n07/27/2020 29 | LETTER MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated\nJuly 27, 2020 re: Proposed Protective Order . Document filed by Ghislaine Maxwell.\n(Attachments:\n... [truncated, 3970 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/230 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=230]", "char_count": 3970}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 231, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document 64pmyG7ReO2OceB@82802 Page11 of 125\n\nAlison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated July 29, 2020 re 29 LETTER MOTION\naddressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated July 27, 2020 re:\nProposed Protective Order .. (Everdell, Christian) (Entered: 07/29/2020)\n\n07/30/2020 36 | PROTECTIVE ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell...regarding procedures to be followed\nthat shall govern the handling of confidential material. SO ORDERED: (Signed by Judge\n\nAlison J. Nathan on 7/30/2020)(bw) (Entered: 07/31/2020)\n\n07/30/2020 37 | MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER as to Ghislaine Maxwell. Both parties have\nasked for the Court to enter a protective order. While they agree on most of the language,\ntwo areas of dispute have emerged. First, Ms. Maxwell seeks language allowing her to\npublicly reference alleged victims or witnesses who have spoken on the public record to\nthe media or in public fora, or in litigation relating to Ms. Maxwell or Jeffrey Epstein.\nSecond, Ms. Maxwell seeks language restricting potential Government witnesses and their\ncounsel from using discovery materials for any purpose other than preparing for the\ncriminal trial in this action. The Government has proposed contrary language on both of\nthese issues. For the following reasons, the Court adopts the Government's proposed\nprotective order Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), \"[a]t any time the\ncourt may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other\nappropriate relief.\" The good cause standard \"requires courts to balance several interests,\nincluding whether dissemination of the discovery materials inflicts hazard to others...\nwhether the imposition of the protective order would prejudice the defendant,\" and \"the\npublic's interest in the information.\" United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 522\n(S.D.N.Y. 2013). The party seeking to restrict disclosure bears the burden of showing good\ncause. Cf. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank\n... [truncated, 4817 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/231 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=231]", "char_count": 4817}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 232, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document 64pWG7ReO2OcedB@82802 Paget2 of 125\n\ncriminal matters that had related civil litigation. The Government labors under many\nrestrictions including Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Privacy\nAct of 1974, and other policies of the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's Office\nfor the Southern District of New York, all of which the Court expects the Government to\nscrupulously follow. Furthermore, the Government indicates that it will likely only provide\npotential witnesses with materials that those witnesses already have in their possession.\nSee Dkt. No. 33 at 6. And of course, those witnesses who do testify at trial would be\nsubject to examination on the record as to what materials were provided or shown to them\nby the Government. Nothing in the Defense's papers explains how its unprecedented\nproposed restriction is somehow necessary to ensure a fair trial. For the foregoing reasons,\nthe Court adopts the Government's proposed protective order, which will be entered on the\ndocket. This resolves Dkt. No. 29. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Alison J. Nathan on\n7/30/2020)(bw) (Entered: 07/31/2020)\n\n08/10/2020 38 | LETTER MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated\nAugust 10, 2020 re: Discovery Disclosure and Access . Document filed by Ghislaine\n\nMaxwell. (Everdell, Christian) (Entered: 08/10/2020)\n\n08/10/2020 39 | AFFIDAVIT of Christian R. Everdell by Ghislaine Maxwell. (Everdell, Christian)\n(Entered: 08/10/2020)\n\n08/11/2020 40 | MEMO ENDORSEMENT as to Ghislaine Maxwell on re: 38 LETTER MOTION\naddressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Christian R. Everdell dated August 10, 2020 re:\nDiscovery Disclosure and Access. ENDORSEMENT: The Government is hereby\nORDERED to respond to the Defendant's letter motion by Thursday, August 13, 2020. The\n\nDefendant's reply, if any, is due on or before Monday, August 17, 2020. (Responses due by\n8/13/2020. Replies due by 8/17/2020) (Signed by Judge Alison\n... [truncated, 4021 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/232 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=232]", "char_count": 4021}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 233, "text_content": "9/18/2020 Case 20-3061, Document 64pNyG7ReO20ceB@82802 Page13 of 125\n08/20/2020 50 | SEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault. (mhe) (Entered: 08/27/2020)\n\n08/21/2020 46\n08/21/2020 47\n08/24/2020 48\n\n08/25/2020\n\nLETTER RESPONSE in Opposition by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to Judge\nAlison J. Nathan from Maurene Comey dated August 21, 2020 re: 43 LETTER MOTION\naddressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Jeffrey S. Pagliuca dated August 17, 2020 re:\nRequest for Permission to Submit Letter Motion in Excess of Three Pages .. (Rossmiller,\nAlex) (Entered: 08/21/2020)\n\nLETTER by USA as to Ghislaine Maxwell addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from\nMaurene Comey dated August 21, 2020 re: Proposed redactions to letter briefing, in\nresponse to the Court's Order of August 18, 2020 Document filed by USA. (Rossmiller,\nAlex) (Entered: 08/21/2020)\n\nLETTER MOTION addressed to Judge Alison J. Nathan from Laura A. Menninger dated\nAugust 24, 2020 re: Request to File Under Seal: Proposed Redactions to Request to\nModify Protective Order and Reply in Support Thereof . Document filed by Ghislaine\nMaxwell. (Menninger, Laura) (Entered: 08/24/2020)\n\n49 | MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: denying without prejudice 38 LETTER\nMOTION as to Ghislaine Maxwell (1). On August 10, 2020, the Defendant filed a letter\nmotion related to two issues. Dkt. No. 38. First, the Defendant seeks an order directing the\nGovernment to disclose to defense counsel immediately the identities of the three alleged\nvictims referenced in the indictment. Second, the Defendant seeks an order directing the\nBureau of Prisons (\"BOP\") to release the Defendant into the general population and to\nprovide her with increased access to the discovery materials. For the reasons that follow,\nDefendant's requests are DENIED without prejudice....[See this Memorandum Opinion\nAnd Order]... II. Conclusion: For the reasons stated above, Defendant's requests contained\nin Dkt. No. 38 are DENIED without prejudice. Following the close of discovery, the\npa\n... [truncated, 4061 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/233 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=233]", "char_count": 4061}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 234, "text_content": "9/18/2020\n\nCase 20-3061, Document 64pWiG7ReO2OcedB@82802 Paget4 of 125\n\nReply in Support of Request to Modify Protective Order. (jbo) (Entered: 09/08/2020)\n\n09/09/2020\n\n09/09/2020\n\nTransmission of Notice of Appeal and Certified Copy of Docket Sheet as to Ghislaine\nMaxwell to US Court of Appeals re: 55 Notice of Appeal. (tp) (Entered: 09/09/2020)\n\nElectronic Files as to Ghislaine Maxwell re: 55 Notice of Appeal were transmitted to the\nU.S. Court of Appeals. (tp) (Entered: 09/09/2020)\n\nSEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault. (dn) (Entered: 09/11/2020)\nSEALED DOCUMENT placed in vault. (dn) (Entered: 09/11/2020)\n\n09/10/2020\n09/10/2020\n\ni Appeal Record Sent to USCA (Electronic File). Certified Indexed record on Appeal\n\nPACER Service Center\n\n09/18/2020 12:26:48\n\nACER Login:\nDescription:\n\nillable Pages:\n\nxempt flag:\n\nMaxwell Criminal\n1:20-cr-00330-AJN\n10\n\nINot Exempt INot Exempt\n\nhttps://ecf.nysd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?347708277129655-L_1_0-1\n\nApp.012\n\n12/12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019471\n\n", "char_count": 986}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 235, "text_content": "Cast #:28-6RGO3B80-AUNENDScuneAt LP 2 FildB WH E8/2eA IP Age! Gis\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\neee eee eRe Le ~ x\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT\n- Vv. - Sil 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant. :\noe x\nCOUNT ONE\n\n(Conspiracy to Entice Minors to Travel to Engage in\nIllegal Sex Acts)\n\nThe Grand Jury charges:\nOVERVIEW\n1. The charges set forth herein stem from the role\nof GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, in the sexual exploitation\nand abuse of multiple minor girls by Jeffrey Epstein. In\nparticular, from at least in or about 1994, up to and including\n\nat least in or about 1997, MAXWELL assisted, facilitated, and\n\ncontributed to Jeffrey Epstein’s abuse of minor girls by, among\nother things, helping Epstein to recruit, groom, and ultimately\nabuse victims known to MAXWELL and Epstein to be under the age\nof 18. The victims were as young as 14 years old when they were\ngroomed and abused by MAXWELL and Epstein, both of whom knew\nthat certain victims were in fact under the age of 18.\n\n2. As a part and in furtherance of their scheme to\nabuse minor victims, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, and\n\nJeffrey Epstein enticed and caused minor victims to travel to\n\nApp.013\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019472\n\n", "char_count": 1248}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 236, "text_content": "Cast #:28-6RGO380-AUMNPNDecuReAt LP 2 Filda HEB / AeA IP Aged Gis\n\nEpstein’s residences in different states, which MAXWELL knew and\n\nintended would result in their grooming for and subjection to\n\nsexual abuse. Moreover, in an effort to conceal her crimes,\nMAXWELL repeatedly lied when questioned about her conduct,\nincluding in relation to some of the minor victims described\nherein, when providing testimony under oath in 2016.\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND\n\n3. During the time periods charged in this\nIndictment, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, had a personal and\nprofessional relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and was among his\nclosest associates. In particular, between in or about 1994 and\nin or about 1997, MAXWELL was in an intimate relationship with\nEpstein and also was paid by Epstein to manage his various\nproperties. Over the course of their relationship, MAXWELL and\nEpstein were photographed together on multiple occasions,\n\nincluding in the below image:\n\nApp.014\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019473\n\n", "char_count": 988}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 237, "text_content": "Cast #:28-éRGO3B80-AUNPNDScuneAt LP 2 FildB WH E8/2eA Pages Gis\n\n4. Beginning in at least 1994, GHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nthe defendant, enticed and groomed multiple minor girls to\nengage in sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, through a variety of\nmeans and methods, including but not limited to the following:\n\na. MAXWELL first attempted to befriend some of\nEpstein’s minor victims prior to their abuse, including by\nasking the victims about their lives, their schools, and their\nfamilies. MAXWELL and Epstein would spend time building\nfriendships with minor victims by, for example, taking minor\nvictims to the movies or shopping. Some of these outings would\ninvolve MAXWELL and Epstein spending time together with a minor\nvictim, while some would involve MAXWELL or Epstein spending\ntime alone with a minor victim.\n\nBs Having developed a rapport with a victim,\nMAXWELL would try to normalize sexual abuse for a minor victim\nby, among other things, discussing sexual topics, undressing in\nfront of the victim, being present when a minor victim was\nundressed, and/or being present for sex acts involving the minor\nvictim and Epstein.\n\nCe MAXWELL’S presence during minor victims’\ninteractions with Epstein, including interactions where the\nminor victim was undressed or that involved sex acts with\nEpstein, helped put the victims at ease because an adult woman\n\nwas present. For example, in some instances, MAXWELL would\n\nApp.015\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019474\n\n", "char_count": 1437}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 238, "text_content": "Cast #:28-6RGO380-AUNPNDScuneAt LP 2 Filda HEB /2eA Pag ek Gis\n\nmassage Epstein in front of a minor victim. In other instances,\nMAXWELL encouraged minor victims to provide massages to Epstein,\nincluding sexualized massages during which a minor victim would\nbe fully or partially nude. Many of those massages resulted in\nEpstein sexually abusing the minor victims.\n\nd. In addition, Epstein offered to help some\nminor victims by paying for travel and/or educational\n\nopportunities, and MAXWELL encouraged certain victims to accept\n\nEpstein’s assistance. As a result, victims were made to feel\nindebted and believed that MAXWELL and Epstein were trying to\nhelp them.\n\ne. Through this process, MAXWELL and Epstein\nenticed victims to engage in sexual activity with Epstein. In\nsome instances, MAXWELL was present for and participated in the\nsexual abuse of minor victims. Some such incidents occurred in\nthe context of massages, which developed into sexual encounters.\n\nBs GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, facilitated\nJeffrey Epstein’s access to minor victims knowing that he had a\nsexual preference for underage girls and that he intended to\nengage in sexual activity with those victims. Epstein’s\nresulting abuse of minor victims included, among other things,\n\ntouching a victim’s breast, touching a victim’s genitals,\n\nlacing a sex toy such as a vibrator on a victim’s genitals,\np g\n\nApp.016\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019475\n\n", "char_count": 1410}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 239, "text_content": "Cast #:28-6RGO380-AUNPNDScuneAt LP 2 FildB WH E8/2eA IP aged Gis\n\ndirecting a victim to touch Epstein while he masturbated, and\ndirecting a victim to touch Epstein’s genitals.\nMAXWELL AND EPSTEIN’S VICTIMS\n\n6. Between approximately in or about 1994 and in or\n\nabout 1997, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, facilitated\n\nJeffrey Epstein’s access to minor victims by, among other\nthings, inducing and enticing, and aiding and abetting the\ninducement and enticement of, multiple minor victims. Victims\nwere grote and/or abused at multiple locations, including the\nfollowing:\n\na. A a multi-story private residence on the\nUpper East Side of Manhattan, New York owned by Epstein (the\n“New York Residence”), which is depicted in the following\n\nphotograph:\n\nApp.017\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019476\n\n", "char_count": 776}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 240, "text_content": "CastSE:26-ENOO3BO-AUNE DOcuReAL LP 2 Filde VHE8/zeIPAgeé vias\n\nlop An estate in Palm Beach, Florida owned by\nEpstein (the “Palm Beach Residence”), which is depicted in the\n\nfollowing photograph:\n\nc. A ranch in Santa Fe, New Mexico owned by\nEpstein (the “New Mexico Residence”), which is depicted in the\n\nfollowing photograph:\n\nApp.018\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019477\n\n", "char_count": 354}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 241, "text_content": "Cast #:28-6RGO3B80-AUNPNDScuAeAt LP 2 FildB HEB /2eR IP Age’ Gis\n\nd. MAXWELL’s personal residence in London,\n\nEngland.\n\n‘- Among the victims induced or enticed by GHISLAINE\nMAXWELL, the defendant, were minor victims identified herein as\nMinor Victim-1, Minor Victim-2, and Minor Victim-3. In\nparticular, and during time periods relevant to this Indictment,\nMAXWELL engaged in the following acts, among others, with\nrespect to minor victims:\n\na. MAXWELL met Minor Victim-1 when Minor\n\nVictim-l was approximately 14 years old. MAXWELL subsequently\ninteracted with Minor Victim-1 on multiple occasions at\nEpstein’s residences, knowing that Minor Victim-1 was under the\nage of 18 at the time. During these interactions, which took\nplace between approximately 1994 and 1997, MAXWELL groomed Minor\nVictim-1 to engage in sexual acts with Epstein through multiple\nmeans. First, MAXWELL and Epstein attempted to befriend Minor\nVictim-1, taking her to the movies and on shopping trips.\nMAXWELL also asked Minor Victim-1l about school, her classes, her\nfamily, and other aspects of her life. MAXWELL then sought to\nnormalize inappropriate and abusive conduct by, among other\nthings, undressing in front of Minor Victim-1 and being present\nwhen Minor Victim-1 undressed in front of Epstein. Within the\nfirst year after MAXWELL and Epstein met Minor Victim-1, Epstein\n\nbegan sexually abusing Minor Victim-1. MAXWELL was present for\n\nApp.019\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019478\n\n", "char_count": 1447}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 242, "text_content": "CastS¢:28-éRGbeB0-AUMNENDScuAeAt LP 2 FildB HEB / zee IP Ages Gis\n\nand involved in some of this abuse. In particular, MAXWELL\n\ninvolved Minor Victim-1 in group sexualized massages of Epstein.\nDuring those group sexualized massages, MAXWELL and/or Minor\nVictim-1 would engage in sex acts with Epstein. Epstein and\nMAXWELL both encouraged Minor Victim-1 to travel to Epstein’s\nresidences in both New York and Florida. As a result, Minor\nVictim-1 was sexually abused by Epstein in both New York and\nFlorida. Minor Victim-l was enticed to travel across state\nlines for the purpose of sexual encounters with Epstein, and\nMAXWELL was aware that Epstein engaged in sexual activity with\nMinor Victim-1 after Minor-Victim-1 traveled to Epstein’s\nproperties, including in the context of a sexualized massage.\n\nb. MAXWELL interacted with Minor Victim-2 on at\nleast one occasion in or about 1996 at Epstein’s residence in\nNew Mexico when Minor Victim-2 was under the age of 18. Minor\nVictim-2 had flown into New Mexico from out of state at\nEpstein’s invitation for the purpose of being groomed for and/or\nsubjected to acts of sexual abuse. MAXWELL knew that Minor\nVictim-2 was under the age of 18 at the time. While in New\nMexico, MAXWELL and Epstein took Minor Victim-2 to a movie and\nMAXWELL took Minor Victim-2 shopping. MAXWELL also discussed\nMinor Victim-2's school, classes, and family with Minor Victim-\n2. In New Mexico, MAXWELL began her efforts to groom Minor\n\nVictim-2 for abuse by Epstein by, among other things, providing\n\nApp.020\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019479\n\n", "char_count": 1551}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 243, "text_content": "Cast ¢:28-6RGO380-AUNPNDScuReAt LP 2 FildB tH E8/2eA IP Ages Gis\n\nan unsolicited massage to Minor Victim-2, during which Minor\nVictim-2 was topless. MAXWELL also encouraged Minor Victim-2 to\nmassage Epstein.\nCs MAXWELL groomed and befriended Minor\nVictim-3 in London, England between approximately 1994 and 1995,\nincluding during a period of time in which MAXWELL knew that\nMinor Victim-3 was under the age of 18. Among other things,\nMAXWELL discussed Minor Victim-3’s life and family with Minor\nVictim-3. MAXWELL introduced Minor Victim-3 to Epstein and\narranged for multiple interactions between Minor Victim-3 and\nEpstein. During those interactions, MAXWELL encouraged Minor\nVictim-3 to massage Epstein, knowing that Epstein would engage\nin sex acts with Minor Victim-3 during those massages. Minor\nVictim-3 provided Epstein with the requested massages, and\nduring those massages, Epstein sexually abused Minor Victim-3.\nMAXWELL was aware that Epstein engaged in sexual activity with\nMinor Victim-3 on multiple occasions, including at times when\nMinor Victim-3 was under the age of 18, including in the context\nof a sexualized massage.\nMAXWELL’ S EFFORTS TO CONCEAL HER CONDUCT\n\n8. In or around 2016, in the context of a deposition\nas part of civil litigation, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant,\nrepeatedly provided false and perjurious statements, under oath,\n\nregarding, among other subjects, her role in facilitating the\n\nApp.021\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019480\n\n", "char_count": 1454}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 244, "text_content": "Casese Ai cHQGISSOOAUN ES GourMArtA1 70 iAP PAB) 20 ageye ail dP18\n\nabuse of minor victims by Jeffrey Epstein, including some of the\nspecific events and acts of abuse detailed above.\nSTATUTORY ALLEGATIONS\n\n9. From at least in or about 1994, up to and\nincluding in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York\nand elsewhere, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey\nEpstein, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly\ndid combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with\neach other to commit an offense against the United States, to\nwit, enticement, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,\nSection 2422.\n\n10. %It was a part and object of the conspiracy that\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, and others\nknown and unknown, would and did knowingly persuade, induce,\nentice, and coerce one and more individuals to travel in\ninterstate and foreign commerce, to engage in sexual activity\nfor which a person can be charged with a criminal offense, in\nviolation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422.\n\nOvert Acts\n\n11. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect\nthe illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among\nothers, were committed in the Southern District of New York and\n\nelsewhere:\n\n10\nApp.022\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019481\n\n", "char_count": 1285}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 245, "text_content": "Casese Acer QGISSOOAUN eS GourMAri41 70 APP AH) 20 agegeE aT! 6P18\n\na. Between in or about 1994 and in or about\n1997, when Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL\nparticipated in multiple group sexual encounters with Epstein\nand Minor Victim-1 in New York and Florida.\n\nb. In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-1 was\nunder the age of 18, Minor Victim-1 was enticed to travel from\nFlorida to New York for purposes of sexually abusing her at the\nNew York Residence, in violation of New York Penal Law, Section\n13065D«\n\nCi In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-2 was\nunder the age of 18, MAXWELL provided Minor Victim-2 with an\nunsolicited massage in New Mexico, during which Minor Victim-2\nwas topless.\n\nd. Between in or about 1994 and in or about\n1995, when Minor Victim-3 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL\nencouraged Minor Victim-3 to provide massages to Epstein in\nLondon, England, knowing that Epstein intended to sexually abuse\nMinor Victim-3 during those massages.\n\n(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)\n\nCOUNT TWO\n(Enticement of a Minor to Travel to Engage in Illegal Sex Acts)\n\nThe Grand Jury further charges:\n12. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1\nthrough 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if\n\nfully set forth within.\n\nsla\nApp.023\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019482\n\n", "char_count": 1292}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 246, "text_content": "Case SP Aer WGISseraynle Dd GduMeSri170 AieePS PAK) 20 agayeaa dP18\n\n13. From at least in or about 1994, up to and\nincluding in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York\nand elsewhere, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, knowingly did\npersuade, induce, entice, and coerce an individual to travel in\ninterstate and foreign commerce to engage in sexual activity for\nwhich a person can be charged with a criminal offense, and\nattempted to do the same, and aided and abetted the same, to\nwit, MAXWELL persuaded, induced, enticed, and coerced Minor\nVictim-1 to travel from Florida to New York, New York on\nmultiple occasions with the intention that Minor Victim-1 would\nengage in one or more sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, in\nviolation of New York Penal Law, Section 130.55.\n\n(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2422 and 2.)\nCOUNT THREE\n(Conspiracy to Transport Minors with Intent to\nEngage in Criminal Sexual Activity)\n\nThe Grand Jury further charges:\n\n14. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1\nthrough 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if\nfully set forth within.\n\n15. From at least in or about 1994, up to and\nincluding in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York\nand elsewhere, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey\nEpstein, and others known and unknown, willfully and knowingly\ndid combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together and with\n\neach other to commit an offense against the United States, to\n\nae\nApp.024\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019483\n\n", "char_count": 1483}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 247, "text_content": "Casese Aci QhISSOOAUN eS GourMArt41 70 APP AB) 20 ageyeAs 6P18\n\nwit, transportation of minors, in violation of Title 18, United\nStates Code, Section 2423(a).\n\n16. It was a part and object of the conspiracy that\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, and others\nknown and unknown, would and did, knowingly transport an\nindividual who had not attained the age of 18 in interstate and\nforeign commerce, with intent that the individual engage in\nsexual activity for which a person can be charged with a\ncriminal offense, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,\nSection 2423 (a).\n\nOvert Acts\n\n17. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect\nthe illegal object thereof, the following overt acts, among\nothers, were committed in the Southern District of New York and\nelsewhere:\n\na. Between in or about 1994 and in or about\n1997, when Minor Victim-1 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL\nparticipated in multiple group sexual encounters with EPSTEIN\nand Minor Victim-1l in New York and Florida.\nb. In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-1 was\n\nunder the age of 18, Minor Victim-1l was enticed to travel from\n\nFlorida to New York for purposes of sexually abusing her at the\n\n13\nApp.025\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019484\n\n", "char_count": 1209}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 248, "text_content": "Caeser QGISSOAUN eS GouMAriA1 70 iAP PAH) 20 agate aid 6P18\n\nNew York Residence, in violation of New York Penal Law, Section\n130.55.\nrom In or about 1996, when Minor Victim-2 was\nunder the age of 18, MAXWELL provided Minor Victim-2 with an\nunsolicited massage in New Mexico, during which Minor Victim-2\nwas topless.\nd. Between in or about 1994 and in or about\n1995, when Minor Victim-3 was under the age of 18, MAXWELL\nencouraged Minor Victim-3 to provide massages to Epstein in\nLondon, England, knowing that Epstein intended to sexually abuse\nMinor Victim-3 during those massages.\n(Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.)\nCOUNT FOUR\n(Transportation of a Minor with Intent to\nEngage in Criminal Sexual Activity)\nThe Grand Jury further charges:\n18. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1\nthrough 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if\nfully set forth within.\n\n19. From at least in or about 1994, up to and\n\nincluding in or about 1997, in the Southern District of New York\nand elsewhere, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, knowingly did\ntransport an individual who had not attained the age of 18 in\n\ninterstate and foreign commerce, with the intent that the\n\nindividual engage in sexual activity for which a person can be\n\ncharged with a criminal offense, and attempted to do so, and\n14\nApp.026\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019485\n\n", "char_count": 1333}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 249, "text_content": "Casese Ace QHISSOOAUN ES GourMArA170 APPA) 26 agefe ais) 6P18\n\naided and abetted the same, to wit, MAXWELL arranged for Minor\n\nVictim-l1 to be transported from Florida to New York, New York on\n\nmultiple occasions with the intention that Minor Victim-1 would\nengage in one or more sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein, in\nviolation of New York Penal Law, Section 130.55.\n\n(Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2423(a) and 2.)\n\nCOUNT FIVE\n(Perjury)\n\nThe Grand Jury further charges:\n\n20. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1\nthrough 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if\nfully set forth within.\n\n21. On or about April 22, 2016, in the Southern\nDistrict of New York, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, having\ntaken an oath to testify truthfully in a deposition in\nconnection with a case then pending before the United States\nDistrict Court for the Southern District of New York under\ndocket number 15 Civ. 7433, knowingly made false material\ndeclarations, to wit, MAXWELL gave the following underlined\nfalse testimony:\n\nQ. Did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit\nunderage girls for sexual massages? If you know.\n\nA. I don’t know what you’re talking about.\n\n3\nApp.027\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019486\n\n", "char_count": 1202}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 250, "text_content": "Casese A cHQGISSOOAUN ES GourMArtA1 70 Al P PAB) 26 agate aie dP18\n\nO. List all the people under the age of 18 that you\ninteracted with at any of Jeffrey’s properties?\n\nA. I’m not aware of anybody that I interacted with,\nother than obviously [the plaintiff] who was 17\nat this point.\n\n(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1623.)\n\nCOUNT SIX\n(Perjury)\n\nThe Grand Jury further charges:\n\n22. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1\n\nthrough 8 of this Indictment are repeated and realleged as if\n\nfully set forth within.\n\n23. On or about July 22, 2016, in the Southern\nDistrict of New York, GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, having\ntaken an oath to testify truthfully in a deposition in\nconnection with a case then pending before the United States\nDistrict Court for the Southern District of New York under\ndocket number 15 Civ. 7433, knowingly made false material\ndeclarations, to wit, MAXWELL gave the following underlined\nfalse testimony:\n\nQ: Were you aware of the presence of sex toys or\n\ndevices used in sexual activities in Mr.\nEpstein's Palm Beach house?\n\nA: No, not that I recall.\n\nQO: Do you know whether Mr. Epstein possessed sex\ntoys or devices used in sexual activities?\n\nA. No.\n\n16\n\nApp.028\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019487\n\n", "char_count": 1222}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 251, "text_content": "Casese Ace QGISSOAUN ES GourMArA1 70 APP AIH) 20 agayea 7 6P18\n\nEvie\n\nOther than yourself and the blond and brunette\nthat you have identified as having been involved\nin three-way sexual activities, with whom did Mr.\nEpstein have sexual activities?\n\nI wasn’t aware that he was having sexual\nactivities with anyone when I was with him other\n\nthan myself.\n\nI want to be sure that I’m clear. Is it your\ntestimony that in the 1990s and 2000s, you were\nnot aware that Mr. Epstein was having sexual\nactivities with anyone other than yourself and\nthe blond and brunette on those few occasions\nwhen they were involved with you?\n\nThat is my testimony, that is correct.\n\nIs it your testimony that you’ve never given\nanybody a massage?\n\nI have not given anyone a massage.\n\nYou never gave Mr. Epstein a massage, is that\nyour testimony?\n\nThat is my testimony.\n\nYou never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage is your\ntestimony?\n\nI never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage.\n\n(Title 18, United States Code, Section 1623.)\n\nFO PERSON\n\nAUDREY RAUSS\nActing Mnited States Attorney\n\n17\nApp.029\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019488\n\n", "char_count": 1084}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 252, "text_content": "Casese Acer QGISSOOAUN eS GourMArA1 70 APP AIB) 20 agate aid 6P18\n\nForm No. USA-33s-274 (Ed. 9-25-58)\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nVv.\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\n\nDefendant.\n\nSUPERSEDING INDICTMENT\nS1 20 Cr. 330 (AUN)\n\n(18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1623, 2422, 2423(a),\nand 2)\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS\nActing United States Attorney\n\nForeperson\n\n18\nApp.030\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019489\n\n", "char_count": 404}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 253, "text_content": "Casedl ADAP SROs ATE (ide MR Et/ 202 Ci 6280 /Pag éeyefil 867\n\nMy Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.c\nJeffrey Pagliuca\n\nHADDON\n\nMOORS 150 East 10th Avenue\nFOREMAN Denver, Colorado 80203\nPH 303.831.7364 Fx 303.832.2628\n\nwww.hmflaw.com\n\njpagliuca@hmfilaw.com\n\nJuly 21, 2020\nVIA ECF\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouther District of New York\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nRe: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, Case No. 20 Cr. 330 (AJN), Local Criminal Rule 23.1\nDear Judge Nathan,\n\nOn behalf of our client, Ghislaine Maxwell, we write to request that the Court enter an\norder prohibiting the Government, its agents and counsel for witnesses from making extrajudicial\nstatements concerning this case. Although Ms. Maxwell is presumed innocent, the Government,\nits agents, witnesses and their lawyers have made, and continue to make, statements prejudicial\nto a fair trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the\nright to an impartial jury. This fundamental guarantee is part of a criminal defendant’s basic right\nto a fair trial, which requires that a defendant must be judged by a jury of her peers based on\nevidence presented at trial, not in the media. The Court, to safeguard the due process rights of the\naccused, has “an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial\npublicity.” Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979). This District has given effect\nto this Sixth Amendment right through Local Criminal Rule 23.1. Accordingly, Ms. Maxwell\nrequests that the Court exercise its express power under Local Criminal Rule 23.1(h) and enter\nan Order requiring compliance with that rule to prevent further unwarranted and prejudicial\npretrial publicity by the Government, its agents, and lawyers for alleged witnesses.\n\nLegal Standard\n\nMore than fifty years ago, warning of the danger of pretrial publicity to fair trials, the\nSupreme Court directed trial judges to take “such steps\n... [truncated, 2384 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/253 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=253]", "char_count": 2384}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 254, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SROs ATE tide MH Ert/ 202 Ci 6280) /Pag éaxyget2l 867\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 21, 2020\nPage 2\n\nIn an effort to protect the trial process from “prejudicial outside interferences,” this Court\npromulgated Local Criminal Rule 23.1(a) which provides, in relevant part, that:\n\nIt is the duty of the lawyer or law firm, ... and government agents\nand police officers, not to release or authorize the release of non-\npublic information or opinion which a reasonable person would\nexpect to be disseminated by means of public communication, in\nconnection with pending or imminent criminal litigation with\nwhich they are associated, if there is a substantial likelihood that\nsuch dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise\nprejudice the due administration of justice.\n\nTo avoid any confusion this Court identified seven “subject matters” that “presumptively\ninvolve a substantial likelihood that their public dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or\notherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.” /d. at (d). Accordingly, lawyers for parties\nand witnesses and their agents are prohibited from publicly disseminating information\nconcerming:\n\n(1) The prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments or other charges of crime), or\nthe character or reputation of the accused...;\n\n(2) The existence or contents of any confession, admission or statement given by the\naccused, or the refusal or failure of the accused to make any statement;\n\n(3) The performance of any examinations or tests or the accused’s refusal or failure to\nsubmit to an examination or test;\n\n(4) The identity, testimony or credibility of prospective witnesses, except that the lawyer\nor law firm may announce the identity of the victim if the announcement is not otherwise\nprohibited by law;\n\n(5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or a lesser offense;\n\n(6) Information the lawyer or law firm knows is likely to be inadmissible at trial and\nwould if disclo\n... [truncated, 2255 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/254 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=254]", "char_count": 2255}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 255, "text_content": "Casecl ZDAKCOSB0s Aden tide MWR Eit/ 202 CIR 6280) /Pag &etygef3l 267\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 21, 2020\nPage 3\n\nRecent Prejudicial Public Statements by the Government, its Agents and Counsel to\nProspective Witnesses\n\nRecent public statements by the Government, its agents and counsel for prospective\nwitnesses have included presumptively prejudicial information.\n\nOn July 2, 2020 Ms. Maxwell was arrested without notice to her lawyers who had been in\nactive communication with the Government for one year. Because plain vanilla surrenders lack\nthe fanfare and attendant media coverage afforded to secret, armed, raids at dawn, the\nGovernment chose to invade Ms. Maxwell’s New Hampshire residence, arrest her, and stage a\nmedia presentation that included numerous statements that prejudice Ms. Maxwell’s right to a\nfair trial.\n\nImmediately following Ms. Maxwell’s arrest, Acting U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss held\na press conference in which she commented on Ms. Maxwell’s credibility and her incorrect\nopinions concerning “guilt or innocence or as to the merits of the case or the evidence in the\ncase” in violation of Local Rule 23.1(d)(1), (4) and (7):\n\nPer the New York Law Journal:\n\n‘Maxwell lied because the truth, as alleged, was almost unspeakable,’ Strauss said\nat a press conference announcing the charges. ‘Maxwell enticed minor girls, got\nthem to trust her and then delivered them into the trap that that she and Epstein\nhad set for them. She pretended to be a woman they could trust, all the while she\nwas setting them up to be sexually abused by Epstein and, in some cases, by\nMaxwell herself.”!\n\nAs reported in the Washington Post,\n\nStrauss, the acting U.S. attorney in Manhattan, said the socialite told that lie and\nothers in deposition because the truth ‘was almost unspeakable.’\n\nActing U.S. Attorney Audrey Strauss called the sex abuse described in the\nMaxwell case ‘the prequel’ to the charges they lodged against Epstein....\n\nMaxwell played a critical role in helping \n... [truncated, 2475 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/255 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=255]", "char_count": 2475}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 256, "text_content": "Casecl ZDAKAO SROs ATE (ide MH Et/ 202 Ci 6280) /Pag éatyet4l 867\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 21, 2020\nPage 4\n\nAlthough Ms. Strauss sprinkled her comments with the phrase “as alleged,” she presented\ncertain of her statements as fact.? Regardless, after Ms. Strauss’s remarks, FBI Special Agent\nWilliam Sweeney went even further, calling Ms. Maxwell “one of the villains in this\ninvestigation” and compared her to a snake that “slithered away to a gorgeous property in New\nHampshire.” Thus, Mr. Sweeney offers the Government’s, again flatly wrong, opinions about\ncharacter and guilt while, at the same time, invoking a semi-biblical reference involving a snake\nslithering away to a garden in New Hampshire. These types of comments, which serve no\ncompelling law enforcement or investigatory purpose, are prohibited by the local rules of this\nDistrict.\n\nNew York attorney David Boies and his partner Sigrid McCawley, who represent several\nwitnesses in this matter, have also made public and presumptively prejudicial statements in\nrecent days, notwithstanding the fact that such conduct is prohibited by Local Rule 23.1, which\napplies to lawyers practicing in this District, generally, and lawyers for witnesses, specifically.\nSee Rule 23.1(a) and (b).\n\nAs reported by the Washington Post, Mr. Boies expressed his views on the prohibited\nsubject of “the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or a lesser offense” in\nviolation of sections (d)(5) and (7) of the Rule:\n\nBoies said he thinks Maxwell will be ‘under tremendous pressure to cooperate’ as\nshe looks for ways to shave time off what may be a significant prison sentence.\nMaxwell could potentially help prosecutors shed light on Epstein’s dealings with\nother wealthy and influential people who may have had encounters with\nunderaged victims, he said, adding ‘There were a lot of people with a lot of public\nstature who were involved with Epstein.”4\n\nMs. McCawley echoed Mr. Boies, saying that, “The pain [Maxwell] has ca\n... [truncated, 2923 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/256 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=256]", "char_count": 2923}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 257, "text_content": "Casedl ADAH SROs Aden (ide MWR Et/ 202 Ci 62801 /Pag eagets! 267\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 21, 2020\nPage 5\n\nSo to cooperate in the way that that kind of rumors out there would mean that\nshe’s cooperating downwards. She’d be cooperating with people who are much\nless culpable than her. Will she name names to try to shave years off of what\nwould be a lengthy prison sentence maybe, I think you should probably expect\nthat if she’s going to share information that’s going to actually help her, it’s\nprobably gonna be about unrelated crimes that she may be aware about because\nwith respect to this particular operation, in terms of living people, she’s as high as\nit gets. ... I think like most of my clients would really hope that she does\ncooperate, at least shares the information that she has. I mean I know that it\nwould only be to help herself but the public deserves to know who was involved\nbesides her and Jeffrey Epstein, and only she knows that.\n\nThe violations of Rule 23.1 did not stop after Ms. Maxwell’s arrest and detention.\nFollowing the detention hearing on July 14, 2020, Mr. Boies, counsel for one of the accusers\nwho spoke at the hearing, commented on the content of the hearing. As reported by Bloomberg,\nMr. Boies offered his gratuitous critique of defense counsel, commented on the credibility of Ms.\nMaxwell and his client, and commented on what Mr. Boies considers “evidence” in this case, all\nin violation of subsections (1), (4), (6), and (7) of the Rule:\n\nThat’s a dangerous tactic that might backfire at trial, said David Boies, who\nrepresents Farmer and several other women who say they were sexually abused\nby Epstein and Maxwell. ... It’s “a tone-deaf argument” that cost Maxwell her\ncredibility, said Boies, who listened to the hearing remotely.\n\n‘To mount a ‘blame the victim’ defense, particularly in today’s world and trying\nto blame these girls for what happened is so contrary to the evidence, is so\ncontrary to people’s normal sense of morality,’ Boies\n... [truncated, 2952 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/257 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=257]", "char_count": 2952}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 258, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SROs ATTEN (ide MH Ert/ 202 Ci 6280 /Peg eetyet6l 267\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 21, 2020\nPage 6\n\nMr. Boies and Ms. McCawley gave on-air interviews with ABC News following Ms.\nMaxwell’s detention that contained repeated, presumptively prejudicial quotes, including: ’\n\nBoies: Remember these girls were abused twice, once sexually years ago and then\na second time when Epstein and Maxwell and all their enablers began these\nvicious attacks on their credibility. ... No question about it. Maxwell knows\nwhere a lot of the bodies are buried. If I was somebody who had participated in\ntheir sex trafficking, um, I would not be sleeping easily tonight.\n\nBoies: I think that [the accusers] want to see her go to trial. On the other hand,\nthe arrest and conviction that would come from a plea deal is an enormous step\nand I think they also recognize that Jeffrey Epstein and Maxwell did not act alone.\nThere are lots of other people that need to be brought to justice.\n\nMcCawley: I think that the prosecutors in the Southern District of New York have\ndone an incredible job and they’re being very meticulous, they want to make sure\nthat the Indictments stick. ...They took a lot of time to be very careful and\nthoughtful and that gives me a lot of hope that she will remain in prison for the\nremainder of her life. ... This morning was a very joyful and tearful filled\nmorning, it was a wonderful moment in my journey with these survivors, to be\nable to call them and tell them that the one person’s who’s been out in the public\nwithout being held accountable was finally in prison....She was really, Ghislaine\nwas really the central figure, so she worked hand-in-hand with Jeffrey Epstein to\nbe able to facilitate these crimes over the course of more than two decades; and\nshe was the main person who assisted him and allowed him to be able to\nperpetrate so many crimes against young females.\n\nThese comments violate subsections (6) and (7) of the Rule.\n\nIt appears that given any opp\n... [truncated, 2706 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/258 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=258]", "char_count": 2706}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 259, "text_content": "Casecl ZDAKCOSB0s ATTEN (dc MWR Eit/ 202 Ci 6280) /Pag éetyef7l 867\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 21, 2020\nPage 7\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nce:\nAlex Rossmiller\n\nAllison Moe\n\nMaurene Comey\n\nU.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York\n\nMark Cohen\nChristian Everdell\nCohen & Gresser LLP\n\nLaura A. Menninger\nHaddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C.\n\nApp.037\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019496\n\n", "char_count": 408}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 260, "text_content": "Cdsedl ADAP FSBOs tid MAGt/ 262 F iRABOZAB/ POF Uae\nDOCUMENT\n\nELECTRONICALLY FILED |\n\nDOC #: ;\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DATE FILED:7/23/2020\n\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUnited States of America,\n\n_y_\n20-CR-330 (AJN)\nGhislaine Maxwell,\nORDER\nDefendant.\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:\n\nThe Defense has moved for an order “prohibiting the Government, its agents and counsel\nfor witnesses from making extrajudicial statements concerning this case.” Dkt. No. 27 at 1.\n\nThe Court firmly expects that counsel for all involved parties will exercise great care to\nensure compliance with this Court’s local rules, including Local Criminal Rule 23.1, and the\nrules of professional responsibility. In light of this clear expectation, the Court does not believe\nthat further action is needed at this time to protect the Defendant’s right to a fair trial by an\nimpartial jury. Accordingly, it denies the Defendant’s motion without prejudice. But the Court\nwarns counsel and agents for the parties and counsel for potential witnesses that going forward it\nwill not hesitate to take appropriate action in the face of violations of any relevant rules. The\nCourt will ensure strict compliance with those rules and will ensure that the Defendant’s right to\n\na fair trial will be safeguarded.\nSO ORDERED.\nDated: July 23, 2020 A ig\nNew York, New York ¢\n\nALISON J. NATHAN\nUnited States District Judge\n\nApp.038\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019497\n\n", "char_count": 1419}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 261, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SB0s ATE (ido MH Gt/ 202 (iRAB6ZEY/PagPigefil ab4\n\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n\nMark S. Cohen\n+1 (212) 957-7600\n\nmcohen@cohengtesset.com\n\nChristian R. Everdell\n+1 (212) 957-7600\nceverdell@cohengtesset.com\n\nJuly 27, 2020\nVIA ECF\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\nUnited States Courthouse\n\nAO Foley Square\n\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nRe: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nDear Judge Nathan:\n\nOn behalf of our client, Ghislaine Maxwell, we respectfully request that the Court enter a\nprotective order in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A.\n\nThe government has indicated that it requires the entry of a protective order before\nproducing any discovery material to Ms. Maxwell. On July 9, 2020, the government provided\ndefense counsel with an initial draft of a proposed protective order. Since that time, the parties\nhave conferred several times on conference calls and by email, and have been able to reach\nagreement on almost all of the provisions of the proposed protective order.\n\nTwo key disputes remain, however, which require the Court’s guidance. First, the\ndefense believes that potential government witnesses and their counsel should be subject to the\nsame restrictions as the defense concerning appropriate use of the discovery materials—namely,\nif these individuals are given access to discovery materials during trial preparation, they may not\nuse those materials for any purpose other than preparing for trial in the criminal case, and may\nnot post those materials on the Internet. Second, the defense believes it should not be restricted\nfrom publicly disclosing or disseminating the identity of any alleged victims or potential\nwitnesses referenced in the discovery materials who have already identified themselves by\nspeaking on the public record.\n\nAs set forth below, we believe that the proposed protective order contains appropriate\nrestrictions that are no broader than necessary to protect the privac\n... [truncated, 2056 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/261 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=261]", "char_count": 2056}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 262, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SROs ATE (ido MB Gt/ 202 (iRAB6Z2EY/PagPeyef2l ab4\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 27, 2020\nPage 2\n\nreferenced in the discovery and guard against prejudicial pretrial publicity, while still ensuring\nthat Ms. Maxwell and defense counsel may adequately prepare and present a full defense at trial.\n\nLegal Standard\n\nWhere the government seeks to curtail the use of pretrial discovery, Rule 16(d)(1) of the\nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that it “show good cause for the issuance of a\nprotective order.” United States v. Annabi, No. 10 Cr. 7 (CM), 2010 WL 1253221, at *1\n(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010). To establish that good cause exists for proposed restrictions in a\nprotective order, the government must show that disclosure will cause “a clearly defined and\nserious injury.” United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). A finding of harm\n“must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory\nstatements.” United States v. Gangi, 1998 WL 226196, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1998) (citations\nand internal quotations omitted). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific\nexamples or articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing.” Wecht, 484 F.3d at\n211.\n\nCourts must be careful not to impose a protective order that is “broader than is necessary”\nto accomplish its goals. United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739, 742 (E.D. Va. 2002)\n(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, courts are instructed to “weigh the\nimpact” of requested protections and their extent against a defendant’s “due process right to\nprepare and present a full defense at trial.” Jd.\n\nDiscussion\n\n1. Restrictions on Use of Discovery Materials\n\nThe government and the defense agree that the protective order should include a\nrestriction prohibiting Ms. Maxwell and defense counsel from (i) using discovery materials “for\nany civil proceeding or any purpose” other than defending or preparing for this criminal action;\nor\n... [truncated, 3079 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/262 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=262]", "char_count": 3079}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 263, "text_content": "Casedl ADAP SB0s ATE (ido WH At/ 202 CF iRAB6ZEY/PagPeyefsi ab4\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 27, 2020\nPage 3\n\nMaxwell with respect to using the criminal discovery material solely for the purpose of this\ncriminal case.\n\nDy, Victim/Witness Identities\n\nMs. Maxwell’s proposed protective order prohibits Ms. Maxwell, defense counsel, and\nothers on the defense team from disclosing or disseminating the identity of any alleged victim or\npotential witness referenced in the discovery materials, but does not prohibit defense counsel\nfrom publicly referencing individuals “who have spoken on the public record to the media or in\npublic fora, or in litigation—criminal or otherwise—relating to Jeffrey Epstein or Ghislaine\nMaxwell.” Jd. § 6. This language, which is nearly identical in all material respects to the\nlanguage in the protective order approved in the government’s criminal prosecution of Mr.\nEpstein, see United States v. Epstein, 19-CR-00490-RMB (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2019), ensures\nappropriate privacy protections for alleged victims and should be approved here.\n\nIn contrast to the more permissive language it agreed to with respect to Mr. Epstein, the\ngovernment has taken the position that Ms. Maxwell’s defense counsel should only be allowed to\ndisclose the identity of alleged victims or potential witnesses who have spoken by name on the\npublic record “in this case.” The government’s proposal, however, advances no compelling\nprivacy protections, and instead prevents the defense from making reference to individuals who\nhave already voluntarily publicly disclosed their identities by, among other things, pursuing civil\nsuits in their own name against Ms. Maxwell and/or Mr. Epstein; speaking by name in the public\nrecord in Mr. Epstein’s criminal proceedings; participating in on-the-record media interviews; or\nposting comments under their own names on social media. The government’s proposed\nrestriction is therefore “broader than necessary” to protect the privacy interests of\n... [truncated, 2236 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/263 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=263]", "char_count": 2236}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 264, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SB0s Aden (ido MH At/202 CF iRAB6 ZA /PagPayei4l ab4\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 27, 2020\nPage 4\n\nFor the reasons set forth above, we respectfully submit that the Court should enter Ms.\nMaxwell’s proposed protective order.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Christian R. Everdell\nMark S. Cohen\nChristian R. Everdell\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n800 Third Avenue, 21st Floor\nNew York, New York 10022\n(212) 957-7600\n\ncc: All counsel of record (via ECF)\n\nApp.042\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019501\n\n", "char_count": 486}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 265, "text_content": "CaGede220eB MOBI ake Dot Men? 29-42 OF RSS 07827 28g Hagel 1125 13\n\nExhibit A\n\nApp.043\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019502\n\n", "char_count": 106}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 266, "text_content": "CaGede22Q0eBOOBI0o8UNe Dot Mer? 29-42 OF R88 07827 289 Fagef 4 2 13\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\note tt\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA [PROPOSED ]\nPROTECTIVE ORDER\n_y.-\n20 Cr. 330 (AUN)\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant.\n~ 22 e et LLL LL\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, United States District Judge:\n\nWHEREAS the Government intends to produce to GHISLAINE\n\nMAXWELL, the defendant, certain documents and materials that\n\n(i) affect the privacy and confidentiality of individuals,\n\n(ii) would impede, if prematurely disclosed, the Government’s\n\nongoing investigation; (i111) would risk prejudicial pretrial\n\npublicity if publicly disseminated, and (iv) is not authorized\n\nto be disclosed to the public or disclosed beyond that which is\n\nnecessary for the defense of this action, and other materials\n\npursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (“Rule 16”)\n\nand pursuant to any other disclosure obligations (collectively,\n\nthe “Discovery”), which contain sensitive, confidential, or\n\npersonal identifying information;\n\nWHEREAS, the Government seeks to protect sensitive,\n\nconfidential, or personal identifying information contained in\n\nthe materials it produces consistent with Rule 16 or other\n\ndisclosure obligations;\n\nApp.044\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019503\n\n", "char_count": 1257}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 267, "text_content": "CaGede22Q0eB OBI ose Dict Men? 29-42 OF 88S 87827 20g Fagef 3H 13\n\nWHEREAS the defendant, through her counsel, consents\n\nto the entry of this Order;\n\nT HEREBY IS ORDERED:\n\nThe Discovery disclosed to the defendant\n\n(“Defendant”) and/or to the defendant’s criminal defense\n\nattorneys (“Defense Counsel”) during the course of proceedings\n\nin this action:\n\ncriminal act\n\na) Shall be used by the Defendant or her\n\nDefense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this\n\ntion, and not for any civil proceeding or any purpose\n\nother than\n\ntransmitted\n\nthe defense of this action;\n\nb) Shall not be copied or otherwise recorded or\n\nby the Defendant except to Defense Counsel, or\n\nexcept as necessary for the Defendant to take notes, which are\n\nnot to be further transmitted to anyone other than Defense\n\nCounsel;\n\nform by the\n\nparagraph 1\n\nonly to the\n\nc) Shall not be disclosed or distributed in any\nDefendant or her counsel except as set forth in\n(d) below;\n\nd) May be disclosed only by Defense Counsel and\n\nfollowing persons (“Designated Persons”):\n\n1. investigative, secretarial, clerical,\n\nor paralegal personnel employed full-time, part-time, or as\n\nindependent\n\nStaff”);\n\ncontractors by the defendant’s counsel (“Defense\n\n= App.045\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019504\n\n", "char_count": 1253}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 268, "text_content": "CaGede22Q0eBOOBI0o8UNe Dot Men? 29-42 OF R83 07827 20g Hagel 4 26 13\n\nadvisor,\n\nemployed by the\n\nassisting in the defense of\n\nauthorized by Order of\n\ntheir counsel\n\nconsultant,\n\nil.\n\nExperts/Advisors”);\n\nany expert or potential expert,\n\nor any other individual retained or\n\nDefendant and Defense Counsel\nthis case (“Defens\naii. such other persons as hereafter\n\ne) May be prov\n\n(collectively,\n\nth\n\npreparation.\n\nPotential De\n\nfense Witnesses,\n\nxtent deemed necessary by del\n\nTo the extent\n\nwill not be\n\ntransmitted\n\nDefense\n\ncopy of\n\ndisclose\nmaterials to\n\nshall agree\n\na copy hereof\n\nterms herein,\n\nsuch acknowledgments shall be retained by\n\nshall be subject to in camera review by the Court if\n\nthis Order\n\nDiscovery\n\nto be subject\n\nau\n\nfor review is demonstrated.\n\nthe Court\n\n(*O\n\nided\n\n“Potential\n\nDiscovery mat\nthey agree\n\nfurther copied, distributed,\n\nDe\n\nfense counsel\n\nWitnesses.\n\nThe\n\nDe\n\nto any\n\nmaterials.\n\nDesignated Persons,\n\nfendant and\n\nDesignat\n\nDe\n\nPrior to disclosure of\n\nany\n\nCO\n\nthe terms of\n\ntha\n\nand stating\n\nand providing such copy to\n\nThe\n\nDe\n\nsuch\n\nDe\n\nDe\n\nterial\n\nfense Witnesses”),\n\nSs are disc]l\n\nor otherwise\n\nfense Counsel.\n\nfense Counsel\n\nfor the purpose of\n\nfor trial\n\nlegal\n\nmay be\n\nther Authorized Persons”);\n\nto prospective witnesses and\n\nto\n\nlosed to\n\nthat any such materials\n\nto individuals other than the recipient Potential\n\nfense Counsel shall provide a\nted Persons to whom they\nDiscovery\nDesignated Person\n\nthis Order by signing\n\nthey “Agree to be bound by the\n\nAll\n\nand\n\ngood cause\n\nfendant and her counsel need\n\nApp.046\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019505\n\n", "char_count": 1581}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 269, "text_content": "CaGede22Q0eB OBI ose Dot Men? 29-42 OF RSS 07827 209 Hagel 5 O65 13\n\nnot obtain signatures from any member of the defense team (i.e.,\nattorneys, experts, consultants, paralegals, investigators,\nsupport personnel, and secretarial staff involved in the\nrepresentation of the defendants in this case), all of whom are\n\nnonetheless bound by this Protectiv\n\n3. To the ex\n\nthe Government\n\nH-\n\nthe course of\n\nto prospect\n\nts investigation and preparation of\n\nGovernment’s case at trial\n\ntent that\n\nOrder.\n\nDiscovery is disseminated by\nLive witnesses and their counsel during\nthe\n\n(“Potential Government Witnesses”),\n\nthe Discovery shall be used by such Potential Government Witnesses\n\nand their counsel solely\n\nof this criminal action,\n\nGovernment Witnesses or their counsel\n\nor any purpose other than preparing\n\nand shall not be used by such Potential\n\nfor purposes of preparing\n\nfo\n\nfor any civil p\n\nfor the trial of\n\nr the trial\n\nroceeding\n\nthis\n\ncriminal action.\n\n4, To the extent that Discovery is disseminated to\nDefense Experts/Advisors, Other Authorized Persons, or Potential\nDefense Witnesses, via means other than electronic mail, Defense\nCounsel shall encrypt and/or password protect the Discovery.\n\n5. The Government, the Defendant, Defense Counsel,\nDefense Staff, Defense Experts/Advisors, Potential Defense\n\nWi\n\ntheir counsel,\n\nposting or causing to be posted any of\n\nin\n\ntnesses and their counsel,\n\nformation contained in the\n\nPotential Government Wit\n\nand Other Authorized Persons are prohibited\n\nthe\n\nDiscovery\n\non the Interne\n\nDiscovery\n\nnesses and\n\nfrom\nor\n\nt,\n\nApp.047\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019506\n\n", "char_count": 1601}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 270, "text_content": "CaSede22Q0eB OBI ose Dict Men? 29-42 OF RSS 07827 20g Bagel 6 Hb 13\n\nincluding any social media website or other publicly available\n\nmedium.\n6. The Governmen\n\nfessional\n\ntheir prot obligatio\n\nt (other than in the discharge\n\nthe\n\nDe\n\nns in this matter),\n\nDe\n\nfense Counsel, Sta\n\nPo\n\ntential Defense Witnesses\n\nAuthorized Persons are stric\n\ndisclosing or disseminating\n\nwitnesses r\n\nrenced in the\n\nDe\n\nnse Experts/Advisors,\n\ni\n\nand their counsel, and Other\n\ntly prohibited from publicly\n\nthe identity of any victims or\n\nDiscovery. This Order does not\n\nDe\n\nSta\n\nprohibit fense Counsel,\n\nExperts/Advisors,\n\nvictims or w\n\nthe identity of\n\nWitnesses and their counsel\n\ninvestigation and preparatio\n\nDel\n\ndoes this Order prohibit\n\nre\n\nferencing individuals who\n\nthe\n\nmedia or in public fora,\n\noth\n\nrwis to Je\n\nor Other Aut\n\nns\n\n, fense\n\nthorized Persons from disclos\n\nDefense\n\nitnesses to Potential\n\nthe\n\nduring the course of\n\nthe def\n\nn of at trial\n\nns Cas\n\nense Counsel\n\nfrom publicly\n\nhave spoken on the public reco\n\ncriminal o\n\nor in litigation\n\n- relating\n\nrey Epstein or Gh\n\n7. The De\n\nfendan\n\nfense Experts/Advisors, Po\n\nthorized Persons are prohi\n\nfendant\n\nof\n\n<7\n\ning\n\nNor\n\nrd to\n\nr\n\nislaine Maxwell.\n\nDe\n\nfense Counsel, Sta\n\na\n\nDe\n\ntential fense Witnesses, and\n\nbited\n\nFrom\n\nattachment to a filing or ex\n\nof any victims or witnesses\n\nFiling publicly as\n\ncerpted within a\n\nrenced in the\n\nref\n\nied themselv\n\nhave not identif\n\nDiscovery,\n\nunless\n\nauthorized by the Government\n\ns publicly as such,\n\nthe\n\nin writing or by Order of\n\na\n\nOther\n\nan\n\nfiling the identity\n\nwho\n\nApp.048\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019507\n", "char_count": 1596}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 271, "text_content": "CaGede22Q0eBOOBI0o8UNe Dict umMen? 29-42 OF RSS 07827 20g ded gef 71H 13\n\nCourt. Any such\n\nauthorized by the Government in writing or by Order of\n\nCourt.\n\n8. Copies of\n\nby the Government in\n\nor designated as\n\nelectronic\n\nthe Government,\n\n“con\n\nMw“\n\ncon\n\nDiscovery materials designated as\n\nor designated as\n\n“Confidential\n\n“\n\nfilings much be\n\nthis action bearing\n\nfidential”\n\nfiled under seal,\n\n“con\n\nMw“\n\ncon\n\nincluding such materials marked as\n\nina\n\ncon\n\nIn\n\nare deemed\n\nclearly mark all\n\npages\n\nConfidential In\n\nnecessary, with\n\n9. Con\n\nidentification\n\nforma\n\nMw“\n\nin\n\ntion, or\n\ncon\n\nformation.\n\nor electronic\n\nfidential\n\nfidential\n\nIn\n\n“ designations.\n\nformation of\n\nspecific individuals who are not parties\n\nother confidential\n\ninforma\n\nidentifies,\n\nthis matter.\n\nhas identi\n\ntreated as Confidential\n\nor could\n\nfied herself\n\nlead to\n\ntion;\n\nThe identity of\n\nor himselt\n\nvictims, witnesses,\n\nmaterials cont\n\nfolder or document tit\n\nfidential”\n\nfidential” as described below,\n\nfolder or document titl\n\n“ The Government shall\n\nunl\n\ness\n\nthe\n\nDiscovery or other materials produced\n\nstamps,\n\nand/or\n\nfidential” by\n\nfidential” either on the documents or materials themselves,\n\ney\n\ntaining\n\ntles as\n\nformation may contain personal\n\nor other\n\nto this action,\n\nand\n\nthe\n\nidentification of\n\nas well as information that\n\nwitnesses in\n\na\n\nan alleged victim or witness who\n\nIn\n\n10.\n\nGovernment that\n\ndesignation of\n\nDe\n\nDe\n\nfense Counsel may,\n\nformation.\n\nat any time,\n\nfense Counsel does not concur in\n\ndocuments or other materials as Cont\n\nno\n\nF publicly as such shall not be\n\ntify the\n\nthe\n\nFidential\n\nApp.049\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019508\n\n", "char_count": 1623}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 272, "text_content": "CaGede22Q0eBOOBI0o8UNe Dot Mer? 29-42 OF R88 07827 Zag Rage 3 Ob 13\n\nformation.\n\nIn\n\nsuch documents or materials,\n\nthe Court\n\nmaterials.\n\nma\n\nterials as Confidential\n\nDe\n\nThe Government’s designation of\n\nIn\n\ncontrary order of\n\n11. Con\n\nfidential\n\nthe Court.\n\nIn\n\nde\n\nDe\n\nfendant, or\n\nfF proceedings\n\na) Sha\n\nDefense Counsel solely\n\ncriminal action, and no\n\nother than\n\nb)\n\nmanner;\n\nCG)\n\nDe\n\nCounsel;\n\nd)\n\nDe\n\nby\n\nPrisons (“BOP”),\n\nthe\n\naccess to\n\nconsistent with the rules and regulations of\n\nDe\n\nfendant’s review;\n\nfense Counsel,\n\nin this action:\n\n11 be used by\n\nthe defense of\n\nShall\n\nfense Counsel and by appropria\nwho shall provide\n\nDiscovery,\n\nfor purposes of\n\nfor any civil\n\nthe\n\nthis action;\n\nrespectively,\n\nDe\n\nthe defense of\n\nbe maintained in a sai\n\nfendant in hard copy solely in the presence of\n\nincluding Con\n\nIf the Government does not agree to de-designate\n\nfense Counsel may thereafter move\n\nfor an Order de-designating such documents or\n\nsuch documents and\n\nfendant or\n\nDe\n\nShall be possessed in electronic\n\nformation will be controlling absent\n\nformation disclosed to the\n\nduring the course\n\nher\n\nthis\n\nproceeding or any purpose\n\nfe and secure\n\nShall be reviewed and possessed by the\n\nfense\n\nformat only\n\nte officials of the Bureau of\nthe defendant with electronic\nFidential Information,\nthe BOP, for the\nApp.050\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019509\n\n", "char_count": 1349}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 273, "text_content": "CaGede22Q0eB OB I0o8UNe Dict Men? 29-42 OF RSS 07827 2ag Pagel 9 Ob 13\n\nonly to Designated Persons;\n\nvideoconference,\n\ne) Shall be reviewed by the Defendant solely in\n\ng) May be shown to,\n\nDiscovery materials in electronic\n\nthe presence of Defense Counsel or when provided access to\n\nformat by BOP officials;\n\nf) May be disclosed only by Defense Counsel and\n\neither in person, by\n\nor via a read-only document review platform,\n\nbut not disseminated to or provided copies of to, Potential\n\nCounsel,\n\nDefense Witnesses, to th\n\nxtent deemed necessary by Defense\n\nfor trial preparation, and after such individual(s)\n\nhave read and signed this Order acknowledging that such\n\nindividual (s)\n\nare bound by this Order.\n\n12. Copies of Discovery or other materials produced\n\nby the Government in this action bearing “highly confidential”\n\nstamps or\n\nconfidential,” and/or electronic\n\nas “highly cont\n\notherwise specifically designated as “highly\n\nmaterials marked as “highly confidential”\n\ndocuments or materials themsel\n\nconfidential” in an index,\n\ndeemed “Highly Confidential\n\nDefendant\n\nto the De\n\nfol\n\nIn\n\nDiscovery materials designated\n\nfFidential” by the Government, including such\n\neither on the\n\nves, or des\n\nder title,\n\nformation.”\n\nand Defense Counsel,\n\nGovernment\n\nignated as “highly\nor document title, are\n\nTo the extent any\n\nHighly Confidential Information is physically produced to the\n\nrather than being made available\n\nfendant and Defense Counsel for\n\non-site review, the\n\nt shall clearly mark all such pages or electronic\n\nApp.051\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019510\n\n", "char_count": 1556}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 274, "text_content": "Caséabe 26130633 049Nn edd GU meMAg2 0 2 Fileee6ZQ7/Pag Pagel Wof 13\n\nmaterials containing Highly Confidential Information with\n\n“highly confidential” stamps on the documents or materials\n\nthemselves.\n\n13. Highly Confidential Information contains nude,\n\npartially-nude, or otherwise sexualized images, videos, or other\n\ndepictions of individuals.\n\n14. Defense Counsel may, at any time, notify the\n\nGovernment that Defense Counsel does not concur in the\n\ndesignation of documents or other materials as Highly\n\nConfidential Information. If the Government does not agree to\n\nde-designate such documents or materials, Defense Counsel may\n\nthereafter move the Court for an Order de-designating such\n\ndocuments or materials. The Government’s designation of such\n\ndocuments and materials as Highly Confidential Information will\n\nbe controlling absent contrary order of the Court.\n\n15. Highly Confidential Information disclosed to\n\nDefense Counsel during the course of proceedings in this action:\n\na) Shall be used by the Defendant or her\n\nDefense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this\n\ncriminal action, and not for any civil proceeding or any purpose\n\nother than the defense of this action;\n\nb) Shall not be disseminated, transmitted, or\n\notherwise copied and provided to Defense Counsel or the\n\nDefendant;\n\nApp.052\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019511\n\n", "char_count": 1341}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 275, "text_content": "Caséabe 2613063 3049Nn ed 6d mene4g2 0 2 FileeeeZQ7/PagPagefl12of 13\n\nc) Shall be reviewed by the Defendant solely in\n\nthe presence of Defense Counsel;\n\nd) Shall not be possessed outside the presenc\n\nof Defense Counsel, or maintained, by the Defendant;\n\ne) Shall be made available for inspection by\n\nDefense Counsel and the Defendant, under the protection of law\n\nenforcement officers or employees; and\n\n£) Shall not be copied or otherwise duplicated\n\nby Defense Counsel or the Defendant during such inspections.\n\n16. The Defendant, Defense Counsel, Defense Staff,\n\nDefense Experts/Advisors, Potential Defense Witnesses, and Other\n\nAuthorized Persons are prohibited from filing publicly as an\n\nattachment to a filing or excerpted within a filing any\n\nConfidential Information or Highly Confidential Information\n\nreferenced in the Discovery, unless authorized by the Government\n\nin writing or by Order of the Court. Any such filings much be\n\nfiled under seal, unless authorized by the Government in writing\n\nor by Order of the Court.\n\n17. The provisions of this Order shall not be\n\nconstrued as preventing disclosure of any information that is\n\npublicly available or obtained by the Defendant or her Defense\n\nCounsel from a source other than the Government.\n\n18. Except for Discovery that has been made part of\n\nthe record of this case, Defense Counsel shall return to the\n\nGovernment or securely destroy or delete all Discovery,\n\n10 App.053\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019512\n\n", "char_count": 1460}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 276, "text_content": "Caséabe 26130633 049Nn edd GU meMnAg2 0 2 FilegeeZQ7/Pag Pagel Lof 13\n\nincluding but not\n\ndays of\n\nverdict\n\ncaptioned case;\n\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255;\n\nrecord in\n\nbehalf\n\noO\n\ncaptioned case,\n\n19%\n\nunless and until either\n\nmutually agree in\n\nmodified by\n\n20.\n\nand confer in advance of\n\nagree to any modi\nevidence at those\n\nDe\n\nfor any such modiit\n\nthe expiration of\n\nfrom any order dismissing any of\n\nthe expiration of\n\nthis case;\n\nThe\n\nfurther order of\n\nThe Government and\n\nlimited\n\nto Con\n\nfidential\n\nWithin 30\n\nInformation,\n\nthe period\n\nin the above-captioned case;\n\nfederal or state ethics rules applicabl\n\nor the granting\n\n(a)\n\nwriting otherwise,\n\nDe\n\nfications necessary\n\nproceedings.\n\nfications.\n\n11\n\nfor\n\nhe\n\nthe period\n\nany period of\n\ne\n\nof\n\nwhichever date is later.\nforegoing provisions shall remain in ef\n\nthe Government and\n\nor\n\nthe Court.\n\nfens\n\nfF any hearings or\n\ndirect appeal from any\n\nperiod of direct appeal\n\nthe charges in the above-\n\nfor a petition\n\ntime required by the\n\nto\n\nany attorney of\n\nany motion made on\n\nthe Government dismissing any charges in the above-\n\nect\n\nDefense Counsel\n\n(bo) this Order is\n\ne Counsel agree to meet\n\ntrial to discuss and\n\nfor\n\nIn the absence of\n\nthe presentation of\n\nagreement,\n\nfense Counsel may make an appropriate application to the Court\n\nApp.054\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019513\n\n", "char_count": 1327}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 277, "text_content": "Caséabe 2613063 30-49Nn eOGU MeMAg2 0 2 FilekeeeZQ7/Pag Pagel Bef 13\n\nSO ORDERED:\n\nDated: New York, New York\nJuly , 2020\n\nHONORABLE ALISON J. NATHAN\nUnited States District Judge\n\nAGREED AND CONSENTED TO:\n\nDated: July , 2020\nNew York, New York\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS\nActing United States Attorney\n\nSouthern District of New York\n\nBy:\nAlison Moe / Alex Rossmiller / Maurene Comey\nAssistant United States Attorneys\nDated: July , 2020\nNew York, New York\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL\nBy:\n\nMark Cohen, Esq.\n\nChristian Everdell, Esq.\n\nJeffrey Pagliuca, Esq.\n\nLaura Menninger, Esq.\n\nCounsel for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nte App.055\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019514\n\n", "char_count": 617}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 278, "text_content": "Casecl 2ZDAPAO SROs ATEN (dc MH Ert/ 362 Ci 6 2A18/Peg Retyefil 867\n\nU.S. Department of Justice\n\nUnited States Attorney\nSouthern District of New York\nThe Silvio J. Mollo Building\n\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nJuly 28, 2020\nVIA ECF\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\nUnited States Courthouse\n\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nRe: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nDear Judge Nathan:\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this letter with respect to the protective order to be\nentered in the above-captioned case, and to respond to the defendant’s letter and submission of\nJuly 27, 2020 (the “Defendant Letter” or “Def. Ltr.”) (Dkt. 29). The Government and defense\ncounsel have conferred regarding a protective order several times via telephone and email between\nJuly 9, 2020, and today, including as recently as this morning. The Government and defense\ncounsel have come to an agreement on much of the proposed protective order. However, the\nparties disagree as to two inclusions sought by the defendant which the Government objects to and\nfor which, as detailed herein, the Government submits there is no legal basis. Accordingly, the\nGovernment respectfully requests that the Court enter its proposed protective order (the\n“Government Proposed Order”), which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and which differs from the\ndefendant’s proposed order in those two respects, as further described below.\n\nA. The Defendant’s Request to be Permitted to Publicly Name and Identify Victims\n\nAs detailed herein, the Government seeks to protect the identities of victims, consistent\nwith their significant privacy interests and the well-established law in this Circuit, and proposes a\nprotective order consistent with those very significant interests. In contrast, the defendant insists\nthat the protective order be modified such that she and her counsel would be permitted to “publicly\nreferenc[e]” indivi\n... [truncated, 2697 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/278 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=278]", "char_count": 2697}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 279, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SROs ATEN (ide MH Et/ 362 Ci 6 2818/Peg Retyet2l 267\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 2\n\nThe defendant’s demand that she and her counsel be permitted to name any individuals who have\never publicly identified themselves as a victim of either Epstein or the defendant in any “public\nfora,” and at any time, without limitation, is extraordinarily broad, unnecessary, and inappropriate,\nand should be denied.\n\nAs an initial matter, there can be no serious question that there are significant privacy and\nvictim interests at issue here, which the Government Proposed Order seeks to protect. Particularly\nin the context of victim witnesses, there are compelling reasons to limit public disclosure of victim\nidentities and other sensitive information. Indeed, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. §\n3771, requires district courts to implement procedures to ensure that crime victims are accorded,\namong other rights, “[t]he right to be reasonably protected from the accused,” in addition to “[t]he\nright to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.” Id. 88\n(a)(1), (a)(8) (emphasis added). Moreover, “the public generally has a strong interest in protecting\nthe identities of . . . victims so that other victims will not be deterred from reporting such crimes.”\nUnited States v. Paris, 2007 WL 1484974, at *2 (D. Conn. May 18, 2007).\n\nMoreover, and consistent with those interests, courts in this Circuit have routinely\nacknowledged the need to protect victim-witness identities. See, e.g., United States v. Corley,\n13 Cr. 48 (AJN), 2016 WL 9022508, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016) (“Because Corley’s minor\nvictims have significant privacy and safety interests at stake, while Corley’s interests are minimal,\nthe Court finds good cause to modify the protective order in this case to prevent Corley from\nlearning the surnames of the minor victims.”); United States v. Kelly, 07 Cr. 374 (SJ), 2008 WL\n5068820, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 200\n... [truncated, 3998 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/279 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=279]", "char_count": 3998}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 280, "text_content": "Casecl ZDAPAO SROs ATE (ide MH Ert/ 362 CiRAB62818/Peg Kalyei3i 267\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 3\n\nspeak—by name on the public record in this case, as one victim has already chosen to do, because\nthose victims, and only those victims, have affirmatively chosen to be publicly identified in\nconnection with this case. These proposals are reasonable, narrowly tailored, and not broader than\nnecessary to protect victims’ privacy interests, safety, and well-being, to avoid potential\nharassment of witnesses by the press and others, and to prevent undue embarrassment and other\nadverse consequences. At this stage in the case, permitting defense counsel to refer to witnesses\nby name in sealed filings, to refer to witnesses by name in the course of private conversations\nduring their investigation, and to refer by name to individuals who have made the affirmative\nchoice to be identified by name in connection with this criminal case is more than enough to enable\nthe defendant ability to vigorously pursue her defense.\n\nThe defendant has rejected this proposal because, as noted above, she believes that she and\nher counsel should be permitted to “publicly referenc[e]’ individuals, by name, who have “spoken\non the public record to the media or in public fora, or in litigation — criminal or otherwise — relating\nto Jeffrey Epstein or Ghislaine Maxwell.” In support of the defendant’s application for such\nsweeping ability to publicly name any such individuals, defense counsel provides only the\nconclusory assertion that an inability to publicly reference the names of victims, in court\nproceedings and beyond, will hinder their ability to investigate, prepare witnesses for trial, and\nadvocate on the defendant’s behalf. The Government has repeatedly asked defense counsel to\nexplain how or why it would need to publicly name victims of sexual abuse to prepare for trial,\nand the defense repeatedly has declined to do so, presumably because the argument borders on the\nabsur\n... [truncated, 3850 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/280 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=280]", "char_count": 3850}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 281, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SROs ATEN (ide MH ert/ 362 Ci 6 2818/Peg Raiget4l 867\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 4\n\nMoreover, the defendant is able, at any time, to apply to the Court for a modification of the\nprotective order should she be able to identify a particularized need to publicly name victims who\nhave not yet identified themselves on the record in this case—as opposed to redacting their names\nfrom court filings, or referring to them in an anonymized fashion. As noted, to date, defense\ncounsel has declined to identify to the Court or to the Government any example of why doing so\nwould be necessary or helpful to the defense, or even under what circumstances the defense might\nwant to do so.\n\nThe defendant’s proposal is also extraordinarily broad, and without any temporal or subject\nmatter limitation as to the phrase “public fora.” Adopting the defendant’s proposal would mean\nthat any individual who has ever self-identified as a victim of Jeffrey Epstein or Ghislaine Maxwell\npublicly in any capacity would be subject to public identification by the defendant and her counsel\nin connection with this case. This would include, as hypothetical examples, someone who spoke\nto a journalist for a local story in 1997, or posted on a MySpace page followed by a handful of\nfriends in 2005, or made a statement on a small podcast in 2009, or posted on Twitter to a handful\nof followers in 2013. But none of these examples of ventures into the “public fora” can possibly\nbe construed as efforts by hypothetical victims to consent or choose “‘to self-identify,” Def. Ltr.\nat 3, in a future criminal case against Ghislaine Maxwell subject to extraordinary public attention\nand scrutiny.\n\nAdditionally, while some individuals have identified themselves as victims without\nproviding any details or additional information about their abuse, the defense contemplates no\nlimitation of publicly associating those individuals with the details of their abuse in public defense\nstatements or fil\n... [truncated, 3766 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/281 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=281]", "char_count": 3766}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 282, "text_content": "Casedl ADAH SROs ATE (ide WH Eit/ 362 CIR 6 2A18/Peg KtyeiS| 867\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 5\n\na provision stating that it did not prohibit defense counsel from publicly referencing individuals\nwho had spoken on the public record in /itigation relating to Jeffrey Epstein. Jd. 74. Here, defense\ncounsel seeks permission to publicly identify any individuals who have self-identified as victims\nof either the defendant or Epstein “to the media or in public fora, or in litigation”—a vastly broader\nallowance. Indeed, as a comparison, none of the hypothetical examples described above would\nhave been subject to public naming and identification under the Epstein protective order, but every\nsingle one would be under the defendant’s proposed order in this case.\n\nAdditionally, beyond the differences in the language itself, there are two significant\ndifferences between the circumstances of the Epstein prosecution and this case. First, at the time\nthe Epstein protective order was entered, there were exceptionally few victims who had identified\nthemselves by name in litigation. Accordingly, the practical application of that provision was\nextremely limited. Second, and related, in the time between when the Epstein protective order was\nentered and the indictment in this case, many more victims have made public statements about\ntheir victimization at the hands of Epstein, and the defendant, on their own terms and in their own\nways, including by exercising their rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act in the context of\nthe dismissal of the indictment against Jeffrey Epstein following his suicide. Those victims could\nnot possibly have predicted, much less chosen, that their names would be publicly broadcast by\ndefense counsel in connection with a subsequent criminal case. Victims should be able to continue\nto come forward, in the ways and in the venues they themselves choose, without fear of reprisal,\nshaming, or other consequence arising from having their iden\n... [truncated, 3603 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/282 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=282]", "char_count": 3603}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 283, "text_content": "Casecl 2ADAHAO SROs ATEN (ide WH ert/ 362 Ci 6 2A18/Peg Ketyet6l 867\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 6\n\nGovernment.’ The defendant cites not a single example in any district court in the country where\nsuch a restriction has been imposed in a protective order. Indeed, it is nonsensical for a protective\norder to require limitations of the Government in its use of material already in its possession so\nthat the Government may provide a defendant with discovery. The defendant’s attempt to refuse\nto agree to receive discovery unless the Government agrees to additional restrictions upon the use\nof its own materials should be rejected.\n\nAs an initial matter, the Government’s use of materials it has gathered through its\ninvestigation, including through the grand jury process, search warrants, interviews, and voluntary\ndisclosures, is already subject to a wide range of restrictions, including Rule 6(e) of the Federal\nRules of Criminal Procedure, the Privacy Act of 1974, and other policies of the Department of\nJustice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. In this case,\nconsistent with the Government’s customary practice, and as the Government has informed\ndefense counsel, the Government has no intention of providing witnesses, victims or their counsel\nwith the entirety of discovery produced to the defendant, nor anything even close to that. Indeed,\nconsistent with its standard practice, the Government rarely provides any third party, including a\nwitness, with any material they did not already possess. While the Government does more\ncommonly show a witness materials in connection with proffers or trial preparation, the\nGovernment rarely if ever shows a_ witness material she has not already seen, does not have\npersonal knowledge of, or would not have some specific reason to opine upon. Practically\nspeaking, therefore, the concerns defense counsel raises about future use in civil litigation are not\nlikely to occur.\n\nNevertheless,\n... [truncated, 3881 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/283 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=283]", "char_count": 3881}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 284, "text_content": "Casedl ZDAKCO SROs ATE (Tide WH Eit/ 362 CIR 62A18/Peg &axyger7l B67\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 28, 2020\nPage 7\n\nof such materials provided by the defendant to the Government. But there is no basis to add\nadditional restrictions upon the Government’s use of materials gathered by the Government itself.\n\nThe defendant’s only counter-argument, as noted—that this Court should put third parties\n“on equal footing with the defense”’—is both unlikely to be relevant given the Government’s\nstandard practice, as described above, and, the Government submits, an irrelevant consideration in\nthe context of a criminal protective order. Indeed, the Government respectfully submits that\nneither it nor this Court is well-positioned to, or should, become the arbiter of what is appropriate\nor permissible in civil cases.\n\nIn sum, the defendant’s attempt to restrict the Government and to restrict third parties in\nthis way appears to be unprecedented, and is without legal basis, and should be denied.\n\nAccordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court should enter the Government’s\nproposed protective order, which is enclosed, and deny the defendant’s motion.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS\nActing United States Attorney\n\nBy:\nAlex Rossmiller / Alison Moe / Maurene Comey\nAssistant United States Attorneys\nSouthern District of New York\nTel: (212) 637-2415\n\nCe: All counsel of record (via ECF)\n\nApp.062\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019521\n\n", "char_count": 1437}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 285, "text_content": "CaGede22Q0eBOOBI0oAUINe Dict uM Ori? B2-42 OF RES O7E28/209 Rage 1 Ob 12\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\neee eee ere rete yg\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n~v.-\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant.\n\neee eee eee LLL\n\n[ PROPOSED ]\nPROTECTIVE ORDER\n\n20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, United States District Judge:\n\nWHEREAS the Government intends to produce to GHISLAINE\n\nMAXWELL, the defendant, certain documents and materials that\n\n(i) affect the privacy and con\n\nfFidentiality of individuals,\n\n(ii) would impede, if prematurely disclosed, the Government’s\n\nongoing investigation; (i111) would risk prejudicial pretrial\n\npublicity if\n\npublicly disseminated, and (iv) is not authorized\n\nto be disclosed to the public or disclosed beyond that which is\n\nnecessary for the del\n\npursuant to\n\nfFense of this action, and other materials\n\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (“Rule 16”)\n\nand pursuant to any other disclosure obligations (collectively,\n\nthe “Discovery”),\n\npersonal identifying information;\n\nWHEREAS, the Government\n\nconfidential\n\nwhich contain sensitive, confidential, or\n\nseeks to protect sensitive,\n\n, or personal identif\n\nying information contained in\n\nthe material\n\nls it produces consist\n\ndisclosure obligations;\n\nent with Rule 16 or other\n\nApp.063\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019522\n\n", "char_count": 1298}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 286, "text_content": "CaGede220eBOOBI0o4UNe Dict Mri? B2-42 OF RES O7E28/20g Rage 4 Ob 12\n\nWHER\n\nthis Order;\n\nFAS the Government has applied for the entry of\n\nBRE\n\nBY IS ORDERED:\n\n(“Defendant”)\n\nattorneys (“De\n\nin this action\n\ncriminal actio\n\nThe Discovery disclosed to the defendant\n\nand/or to the defendant’s criminal defense\n\na)\n\nn,\n\nfense Counsel”) during the course of proceedings\n\nShall be used by the Defendant or her\n\nDefense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this\n\nand not for any civil proceeding or any purpose\n\nother than the defense of this action;\n\nb)\n\nShall not be copied or otherwise recorded or\n\ntransmitted by the Defendant, except to Defense Counsel, or\n\nexcept as necessary for the Defendant to take notes, which are\n\nnot to be further transmitted to anyone other than Defense\n\nCounsel;\n\nform by the De\n\nparagraph 1 (d)\n\nG)\n\nShall not be disclosed or distributed in any\n\nfendant or her counsel except as set forth in\n\nbelow;\n\nd)\n\nMay be disclosed only by Defense Counsel and\n\nonly to the following persons (“Designated Persons”):\n\ni. investigative, secretarial, clerical,\n\nor paralegal personnel employed full-time, part-time, or as\n\n= App.064\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019523\n\n", "char_count": 1173}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 287, "text_content": "CaGede220eBOOB I0oaUNe Dict Mri? B2-42 OF RES O7828/209 Rage 3 Ob 12\n\nindependent contractors by the dei\n\nfF”) .\nr\n\nSta\n\nadvisor,\n\nemployed by the\n\nassisting in the defense of\n\nauthorized by Order of\n\nth\n\nconsultant,\n\ntheir counsel\n\ndlagly\n\nDefendant and\n\nExperts/Advisors”);\n\nthis cas\n\nany expert or potential expert,\n\nDefense Co\n\nFendant’s counsel\n\nDefense\n\n(*\n\nlegal\n\nor any other individual retained or\n\nunsel for the purpose of\n\n(“I\n\nfens\n\niii. such\nthe Court (“Other\ne) May be provided\n(collectively, “Potential\n\nxtent deemed necessary by det\n\npreparati\n\nPotential\n\non.\n\nDe\n\nDe\n\nother persons as hereafter may be\n\nAuthorized Persons”);\n\nto prospective witnesses and\n\nto\n\nfFense counsel,\n\nfense Witnesses”),\n\nfor trial\n\nTo the extent Discovery materials are disclosed to\n\nfense Witnesses,\n\nwill no\n\nbe\n\nfurther copied, d\n\nthey agree\n\nistributed,\n\ntransmitt\n\ned\n\nthat any such materials\n\nor otherwise\n\nto individuals other than the recipient Potential\n\nDe\n\nfense\n\nWitnesses.\n\nthis\n\ncopy of\n\ndisclose\nmaterials to\nshall agree\n\na copy hereo\n\nterms herein,\n\nDiscovery\n\nto be subject\n\nThe\n\nDefendant and\n\nOrder\n\nto any\n\nmaterials.\n\nDesignated Persons,\n\nDe\n\nany such\n\nto the\n\nf and stating\n\ntha\n\nao\n\nand providing such copy to\n\nterms of\n\nDe\n\nPrior to disclosure of\n\nfense Counsel.\n\nfense Counsel shall provide a\nDesignated Persons to whom they\nDiscovery\nDesignated Person\n\nthis Order by signing\n\nthey “Agree to be bound by the\n\nAll\n\nApp.065\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019524\n\n", "char_count": 1459}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 288, "text_content": "CaGede22Q0eBOOBI0o4UNe Dict Mr? B2-42 OF RES O7E28/209 Paget 4 Ob 12\n\nsuch acknowledgments shall be retained by\n\nshall be subject to in camera review by the Court if\n\nfor review\n\nnot obtain\n\nattorneys,\n\nsupport personnel\n\nrepresentation of\n\nDe\n\nThe\n\nis demonstrated. De\n\nthe def\n\nsignatures from any member of ns\n\nexperts, consultants, paralegals,\n\ninvolved in\n\nand secretarial staff\n\nt\n\nthe defendants in this case),\n\nteam\n\nfense Counsel and\ngood cause\n\nfendant and her counsel need\n\n(1.€.,\n\ninvestigators,\nthe\n\nall of whom are\n\nnonetheless bound by this Protective Order.\n\nBi. To the extent that Discovery is disseminated to\nDefense Experts/Advisors, Other Authorized Persons, or Potential\nDefense Witnesses, via means other than electronic mail, Defense\nCounsel shall encrypt and/or password protect the Discovery.\n\n4. The Government, the Defendant, Defense Counsel,\nDefense Staff, Defense Experts/Advisors, Potential Defense\nWitnesses and their counsel, and Other Authorized Persons are\nprohibited from posting or causing to be posted any of the\nDiscovery or information contained in the Discovery on the\nInternet, including any social media website or other publicly\navailable medium.\n\n5S.\n\ntheir professional\n\nThe Government\n\nthe\n\nDe\n\nobligations in this matter),\n\nDefense Co\n\nPotential\n\nAuthorized\n\nt\n\nunsel, nse Sta ns\n\nDe\n\ntheir counsel,\n\nfense Witnesses and\n\nPersons are strictly prohibited\n\n(other than in the discharge of\n\nfendant\n\n~\n\nExperts/Advisors,\nand Other\n\nfrom publicly\n\nApp.066\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019525\n\n", "char_count": 1518}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 289, "text_content": "dis\n\nwit\n\npro\n\nide\n\nCaSede220eBOOB F004 e Dict Mri? B2-42 OF RES O7E28/20g eagef 5 Ob 12\n\nclosing or disseminating the identity of any victims or\n\nnesses referenced in the Discovery.\n\nhibit Defense Counsel or Defense Staf\n\nThis Order does not\n\nfrom referencing the\n\nntities of individuals they believe may be relevant to the\n\ndef\n\nthe\n\ncas\n\ncou\n\nCou\n\nor\n\nnot\n\nense to Potential Defense Witnesses and their counsel during\n\ncourse of the investigation and preparation of the defense\n\ne at trial. Any Potential Defense Witnesses and their\n\nnsel who are provided identifying information by Defense\n\nnsel or Defense Staff are prohibi\n\nted from further disclosing\n\ndisseminating such identifying in\n\nformation. This Order does\n\nprohibit Defense Counsel from publicly referencing\n\nindividuals who have spoken by name on the public record in this\n\ncas\n\ne.\n\n6. The Defendant, Defense Counsel, Defense Staff,\n\nfense Experts/Advisors, Potential\n\nAut\n\natt\n\nof\n\nDe\n\nfense Witnesses, and Other\n\nhorized Persons are prohibited\n\nFrom\n\nfiling publicly as an\n\nachment to a filing or excerpted within a filing the identity\n\nany victims or witnesses referenced in the Discovery, who\n\nhave not spoken by name on the public record in this case,\n\nunl\n\nthe\n\ness authorized by the Government in writing or by Order of\n\nCourt. Any such filings must be\n\nfiled under seal, unless\n\nauthorized by the Government in writing or by Order of the\n\nCourt.\n\nApp.067\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019526\n\n", "char_count": 1448}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 290, "text_content": "CaGede220eBOOBI0oAUINe Dict Mn? B2-42 OF RES O7E28/209 Page 6 Ob 12\n\n7.\n\nby the Government in\n\nor designated as\n\nelectronic\n\nthe Government,\n\n“\n\ncon\n\nCopies of\n\nMw“\n\nDiscovery materials designated as\n\ncon\n\n“\n\nthis action bearing “con\n\nfidential” as described below,\n\n“\n\ncon\n\nincluding such materials marked as\n\nor designated as\n\nare deemed “Con\n\nclearly mark al\n\nIn\n\nConfidential\n\nMw“\n\ncon\n\nfidential\n\nfidential” in\n\na\n\nao\n\nformation.\n\nIn\n\nl pages or electronic\n\nnecessary, with\n\nidentification\n\nMw“\n\nCon\n\nin\n\nspecific individuals who are not parties\n\nforma\n\ncon\n\nfidential\n\ntion, or\n\nfidential” designations.\n\nInformation may contain\n\nformation of\n\nvictims, witnesses,\n\nother confident\n\nial\n\nfidential”\n\nfolder or document titl\n\nThe Government shall\n\nto this action,\n\nDiscovery or other materials produced\n\nstamps,\n\nand/or\n\nfidential” by\n\nfidential” either on the documents or materials themselves,\n\ney\n\nmaterials containing\n\nfolder or document titles as\n\npersonal\n\nor other\n\nand\n\ninformation;\n\nidentifies,\n\nthis matter.\n\nhas identii\n\nin this case sh\n\nGovernment that\n\ndesignation of\n\nformation.\n\nIn\n\nor could\nThe identity of\n\nfied herself\n\nall\n\nDe\n\nDe\n\ndocuments or other materials as Cont\n\nsuch documents or materials,\n\nto the\n\nlead identification of,\n\nas well as information that\n\nwitnesses in\n\nfense Counsel may,\n\nor himself publicl\n\nnot be treated as Confidential\n\nIn\n\nan alleged victim or witness who\n\ny as such on the record\n\nformation.\n\nat any time, no\n\nfense Counsel does not concur in\n\nDe\n\ntify the\n\nthe\nFidential\n\nIf the Government does not agree to de-designate\n\nfense Counsel may thereafter move\n\nApp.068\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019527\n\n", "char_count": 1638}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 291, "text_content": "CaGede220eB OB I0o4UINe Dict Mr? B2-42 OF RES O7828/209 Paget 7 Ob 12\n\nthe Court\n\nmaterials.\n\nmaterials\n\ncontrary o\n\nde\n\nfendant,\n\nDe\n\ncriminal a\n\nof proceedings\n\nThe Government’s designation of\n\nas Confidential In\n\nrder of the Court.\n10. Confidential In\nor Defense Counsel,\n\na)\n\nfense Counsel solely\n\nother than\n\nmanner;\n\nDe\n\nCounsel;\n\nby De\n\n(*\n\nPrisons\n\naccess to\n\nSha\n\nction, and not\nthe defense of\nb) Shall\nCc)\n\nd)\n\nBOP”),\n\nthe\n\nDiscovery,\n\nin this action:\n11 be used by\nfor purposes of\nfor any civil\nthis act\n\nbe maint\n\nrespectively,\n\nthe De\n\ntion;\n\ntained in a Safi\n\nthe dei\n\nfor an Order de-designating such documents or\n\nsuch documents and\n\nduring\n\nfendant or\n\nfense of\n\nformation will be controlling absent\n\nformation disclosed to the\n\nthe course\n\nher\n\nthis\n\nproceeding or any purpose\n\nfe and secure\n\nShall be reviewed and possessed by the\n\nShall be possessed in electronic\n\nfense Counsel and by appropria\nwho shall provide\n\nincluding Con\n\nfendant in hard copy solely in the presence of\n\nte of\n\nficials of\n\nDe\n\nfense\n\nformat only\n\nthe defendant wit\n\nconsistent with the rules and regulations o\n\nDe\n\nfendant’s review;\n\nthe\n\nBureau of\n\nth electronic\n\nFidential Information,\nf the BOP, for the\nApp.069\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019528\n\n", "char_count": 1228}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 292, "text_content": "CaGede220eBOOBI0AUNe Dict Mri? B2-42 OF RES 07828 /209 Pagel 8 Ob 12\n\ne) Shall be reviewed by the Defendant solely in\n\nthe presence of Defense Counsel or when provided access to\n\nDiscovery materials in electronic format by BOP officials;\n\nf) May be disclosed only by Defense Counsel and\n\nonly to Designated Persons;\n\ng) May be shown to, either in person, by\n\nvideoconference, or via a read-only document review platform,\n\nbut not disseminated to or provided copies of to, Potential\n\nDefense Witnesses, to th xtent deemed necessary by Defense\n\nCounsel, for trial preparation, and after such individual(s)\nhave read and signed this Order acknowledging that such\n\nindividual(s) are bound by this Order.\n\n11. Copies of Discovery or other materials produced\n\nby the Government in this action bearing “highly confidential”\n\nstamps or otherwise specifically designated as “highly\n\nconfidential,” and/or electronic Discovery materials designated\n\nas “highly confidential” by the Government, including such\n\nmaterials marked as “highly confidential” either on the\n\ndocuments or materials themselves, or designated as “highly\n\nconfidential” in an index, folder title, or document title, are\n\ndeemed “Highly Confidential Information.” To the extent any\n\nHighly Confidential Information is physically produced to the\n\nDefendant and Defense Counsel, rather than being made available\n\nto the Defendant and Defense Counsel for on-site review, the\n\nApp.070\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019529\n\n", "char_count": 1460}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 293, "text_content": "CaGede220eBOOB I c4UNe Dict Mri? B2-42 OF RES 07828 /209 Pagel 9 Ob 12\n\nGovernment shall clearly mark a\n\nmaterials containing Highly Confidential\n\n“highly confidential” stamps on the document\n\nthemselves.\n12.\n\npartially-nude,\n\ndepictions of j\n\nHighly Confidential\n\nIn\n\nIn\n\nor otherwise sexualized images,\n\nndividuals.\n\n13.\nGovernment that\n\ndesignation of\n\nConfidential In\n\nDe\n\nDe\n\ndocuments or\n\nformation.\n\nde-designate su\n\nthereafter move\n\ndocuments or ma\n\ndocuments and materials as Highly Cont\n\nbe controlling\n\n14.\n\nDe\n\nDefense Counsel\n\ncriminal action\n\nother than the\n\nch documents\n\nthe Court\n\nterials.\n\nabsent contrary order of\n\nHighly Confidential\n\nfense Counsel may,\n\nat any time,\n\nfense Counsel does not concur in\n\nll such pages or electronic\nformation with\n\nts or materials\n\nformation contains nude,\n\nvideos, or other\nnotify the\nthe\n\nother materials as Highly\n\nor materials,\n\nDe\n\nThe Government’s designation of\n\nfFidential\n\nIf the Government does not agree to\n\nfense Counsel may\n\nfor an Order de-designating such\n\nsuch\n\nformation will\n\nIn\n\nIn\n\nfense Counsel during the course of\n\na) Sha\n\nsolely\n\n, and not\n\ndefense of\n\n11 be used by\nfor purposes of\n\nfor any civil\n\nthe\n\nthis action;\n\nDe\n\nf proceedings\n\nthe defense of\n\nthe Court.\n\nformation disclosed to\n\nin this action:\n\nfendant or her\n\nthis\n\nproceeding or any purpose\n\nApp.071\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019530\n\n", "char_count": 1358}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 294, "text_content": "Caséabe 26130633 0-49Nn edd 6d meMn2a320 2 Fikee6223/Pag Paget of 12\n\nb) Shall not be disseminated, transmitted, or\n\notherwise copied and provided to\n\nDefendant;\n\nDe\n\nfense Counsel or the\n\nCG) Shall be reviewed by the Defendant solely in\n\nthe presence of Defense Counsel;\n\nd) Shall not be possessed outside the presenc\n\nof Defense Counsel, or maintained, by the Defendant;\n\ne) Shall be made available for inspection by\n\nDefense Counsel and the Defendant,\n\nenforcement officers or employees;\n\nunder the protection of law\n\nand\n\n£) Shall not be copied or otherwise duplicated\n\nby Defense Counsel or the Defendant during such inspections.\n\n15. The Defendant, De\n\nDefense Experts/Advisors, Potential\n\nfen\n\nse Counsel, Defense Staff,\n\nDefense Witnesses, and Other\n\nAuthorized Persons are prohibited\n\nfrom filing publicly as an\n\nattachment to a filing or excerpted within a filing any\n\nConfidential Information or Highly Confidential Information\n\nreferenced in the Discovery, unless authorized by the Government\n\nin writing or by Order of the Court. Any such filings must be\n\nor by Order of the Court.\n\n16. The provisions of\n\nfiled under seal, unless authorized by the Government in writing\n\nthis Order shall not be\n\nconstrued as preventing disclosure of any information, with the\n\nexception of victim or witness identifying information, that is\n\n10\n\nApp.072\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019531\n\n", "char_count": 1371}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 295, "text_content": "Caséabe 2613063 30-49Nn edd 6d meM24320 2 Fileee6223/Pag PagetliZof 12\n\npublicly available or obt\n\nDefendant\n\nained by the\n\noth\n\nCounsel from a source\n\n17.\n\nfor\n\nExcept\n\nthe record of this case,\n\nGovernment or securely de\n\nincluding but not limited\n\ner than the Government.\n\nDiscovery that has been\n\ndays of the expiration of\n\nverdict in the above-capt\n\nfrom any order dismissing\n\nthe period\n\nijoned case; the period of\n\nany of\n\nor her\n\nfor direct appeal\n\nDefense\n\nmade part of\n\nDefense Counsel shall return to the\nstroy or delete all Discovery,\nto Confidential Information, within 30\n\nfrom any\n\nfF direct appeal\n\nthe charges in the above-\n\ncaptioned case;\n\nthe expiration of\n\nthe period\n\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255;\n\nany period of\n\nfor a petition\n\ntime required by the\n\nrecord in\n\nthis case;\n\nfederal or state ethics rules applicabl\n\nor the granting of\n\ne\n\nto\n\nany attorney of\n\nany motion made on\n\nbehalf of the Government dismissing any charges in the above-\ncaptioned case, whichever date is later.\n18. The foregoing provisions shall remain in eff\n\nunless and until either\n\nmutually agree in writing ot\n\nmodified by\n\n(a)\n\nfurther order o\n\n19. The Government and\n\nherwise,\n\nDe\n\nthe Government and\n\nor\n\nthe Court.\n\nDe\n\n(bo) this Order is\n\nect\n\nfense Counsel\n\nfense Counsel agree to meet\n\nand confer in advance of\n\nagree to any modification\n\nevidence at those proceed\n\nany hearings or trial to\n\ns necessary for\n\nings. In the absence of\n\n11\n\nthe presentation of\n\ndiscuss and\n\nagreement,\n\nApp.073\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019532\n\n", "char_count": 1517}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 296, "text_content": "Caséabe 2613063 30-49.Nn edd 6d meMn24320 2 Fileee6223/Pag Paget kof 12\n\nfor any such modifications.\n\nAN\n\nSO ORDERED:\nDated: New York, New York\n, 2020\nHONORABLE ALISON J. NATH\nUnited States District J\n12\n\nJudge\n\nDefense Counsel may make an appropriate application to the Court\n\nApp.074\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019533\n\n", "char_count": 305}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 297, "text_content": "C&bxs@:20-60603B0-AuNenDotunteAd B® 2 Fila 2878 0/a0a ge Agent its\n\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT pe\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATE FILED:7/30/2020_\nee ee x\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA °\n: PROTECTIVE ORDER\nee :\n: 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, :\nDefendant. :\nee ee x\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, United States District Judge:\n\nWHEREAS the Government intends to produce to GHISLAINE\nMAXWELL, the defendant, certain documents and materials that\n(1) affect the privacy and confidentiality of individuals,\n(11) would impede, if prematurely disclosed, the Government’s\nongoing investigation; (iii) would risk prejudicial pretrial\npublicity if publicly disseminated, and (iv) is not authorized\nto be disclosed to the public or disclosed beyond that which is\nnecessary for the defense of this action, and other materials\npursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (“Rule 16”)\nand pursuant to any other disclosure obligations (collectively,\nthe “Discovery”), which contain sensitive, confidential, or\npersonal identifying information;\n\nWHEREAS, the Government seeks to protect sensitive,\nconfidential, or personal identifying information contained in\nthe materials it produces consistent with Rule 16 or other\n\ndisclosure obligations;\n\n1 App.075\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019534\n\n", "char_count": 1299}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 298, "text_content": "Ces @:20-60603B0-AuNenDOtuntEAd B® 2 Fil2A A780/a0age ager W12\n\nWHER\n\nthis Order;\n\nFAS the Government has applied for the entry of\n\nBRE\n\nBY IS ORDERED:\n\n(“Defendant”)\n\nattorneys (“De\n\nin this action\n\ncriminal actio\n\nThe Discovery disclosed to the defendant\n\nand/or to the defendant’s criminal defense\n\na)\n\nn,\n\nfense Counsel”) during the course of proceedings\n\nShall be used by the Defendant or her\n\nDefense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this\n\nand not for any civil proceeding or any purpose\n\nother than the defense of this action;\n\nb)\n\nShall not be copied or otherwise recorded or\n\ntransmitted by the Defendant, except to Defense Counsel, or\n\nexcept as necessary for the Defendant to take notes, which are\n\nnot to be further transmitted to anyone other than Defense\n\nCounsel;\n\nform by the De\n\nparagraph 1 (d)\n\nG)\n\nShall not be disclosed or distributed in any\n\nfendant or her counsel except as set forth in\n\nbelow;\n\nd)\n\nMay be disclosed only by Defense Counsel and\n\nonly to the following persons (“Designated Persons”):\n\ni. investigative, secretarial, clerical,\n\nor paralegal personnel employed full-time, part-time, or as\n\n= App.076\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019535\n\n", "char_count": 1168}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 299, "text_content": "Css @:20-60603B0-AuNenDOtunteAd B® 2 Fil2@ B78 0/a0ageaga8 HiA2\n\nindependent contractors by the dei\n\nfF”) .\nr\n\nSta\n\nadvisor,\n\nemployed by the\n\nassisting in the defense of\n\nauthorized by Order of\n\nth\n\nconsultant,\n\ntheir counsel\n\ndlagly\n\nDefendant and\n\nExperts/Advisors”);\n\nthis cas\n\nany expert or potential expert,\n\nDefense Co\n\nFendant’s counsel\n\nDefense\n\n(*\n\nlegal\n\nor any other individual retained or\n\nunsel for the purpose of\n\n(“I\n\nfens\n\niii. such\nthe Court (“Other\ne) May be provided\n(collectively, “Potential\n\nxtent deemed necessary by det\n\npreparati\n\nPotential\n\non.\n\nDe\n\nDe\n\nother persons as hereafter may be\n\nAuthorized Persons”);\n\nto prospective witnesses and\n\nto\n\nfFense counsel,\n\nfense Witnesses”),\n\nfor trial\n\nTo the extent Discovery materials are disclosed to\n\nfense Witnesses,\n\nwill no\n\nbe\n\nfurther copied, d\n\nthey agree\n\nistributed,\n\ntransmitt\n\ned\n\nthat any such materials\n\nor otherwise\n\nto individuals other than the recipient Potential\n\nDe\n\nfense\n\nWitnesses.\n\nthis\n\ncopy of\n\ndisclose\nmaterials to\nshall agree\n\na copy hereo\n\nterms herein,\n\nDiscovery\n\nto be subject\n\nThe\n\nDefendant and\n\nOrder\n\nto any\n\nmaterials.\n\nDesignated Persons,\n\nDe\n\nany such\n\nto the\n\nf and stating\n\ntha\n\nao\n\nand providing such copy to\n\nterms of\n\nDe\n\nPrior to disclosure of\n\nfense Counsel.\n\nfense Counsel shall provide a\nDesignated Persons to whom they\nDiscovery\nDesignated Person\n\nthis Order by signing\n\nthey “Agree to be bound by the\n\nAll\n\nApp.077\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019536\n\n", "char_count": 1454}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 300, "text_content": "Cres @:20-60603B0-AuNenDOtuntEAd B® 2 F128 B78 0/a0age aged 2.2\n\nsuch acknowledgments shall be retained by\n\nshall be subject to in camera review by the Court if\n\nfor review\n\nnot obtain\n\nattorneys,\n\nsupport personnel\n\nrepresentation of\n\nDe\n\nThe\n\nis demonstrated. De\n\nthe def\n\nsignatures from any member of ns\n\nexperts, consultants, paralegals,\n\ninvolved in\n\nand secretarial staff\n\nt\n\nthe defendants in this case),\n\nteam\n\nfense Counsel and\ngood cause\n\nfendant and her counsel need\n\n(1.€.,\n\ninvestigators,\nthe\n\nall of whom are\n\nnonetheless bound by this Protective Order.\n\nBi. To the extent that Discovery is disseminated to\nDefense Experts/Advisors, Other Authorized Persons, or Potential\nDefense Witnesses, via means other than electronic mail, Defense\nCounsel shall encrypt and/or password protect the Discovery.\n\n4. The Government, the Defendant, Defense Counsel,\nDefense Staff, Defense Experts/Advisors, Potential Defense\nWitnesses and their counsel, and Other Authorized Persons are\nprohibited from posting or causing to be posted any of the\nDiscovery or information contained in the Discovery on the\nInternet, including any social media website or other publicly\navailable medium.\n\n5S.\n\ntheir professional\n\nThe Government\n\nthe\n\nDe\n\nobligations in this matter),\n\nDefense Co\n\nPotential\n\nAuthorized\n\nt\n\nunsel, nse Sta ns\n\nDe\n\ntheir counsel,\n\nfense Witnesses and\n\nPersons are strictly prohibited\n\n(other than in the discharge of\n\nfendant\n\n~\n\nExperts/Advisors,\nand Other\n\nfrom publicly\n\nApp.078\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019537\n\n", "char_count": 1513}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 301, "text_content": "dis\n\nwit\n\npro\n\nide\n\nCres @:20-60603B0AuNenDOtunteAd B® 2 Fil2@ A718 0/A0ageaged iA2\n\nclosing or disseminating the identity of any victims or\n\nnesses referenced in the Discovery.\n\nhibit Defense Counsel or Defense Staf\n\nThis Order does not\n\nfrom referencing the\n\nntities of individuals they believe may be relevant to the\n\ndef\n\nthe\n\ncas\n\ncou\n\nCou\n\nor\n\nnot\n\nense to Potential Defense Witnesses and their counsel during\n\ncourse of the investigation and preparation of the defense\n\ne at trial. Any Potential Defense Witnesses and their\n\nnsel who are provided identifying information by Defense\n\nnsel or Defense Staff are prohibi\n\nted from further disclosing\n\ndisseminating such identifying in\n\nformation. This Order does\n\nprohibit Defense Counsel from publicly referencing\n\nindividuals who have spoken by name on the public record in this\n\ncas\n\ne.\n\n6. The Defendant, Defense Counsel, Defense Staff,\n\nfense Experts/Advisors, Potential\n\nAut\n\natt\n\nof\n\nDe\n\nfense Witnesses, and Other\n\nhorized Persons are prohibited\n\nFrom\n\nfiling publicly as an\n\nachment to a filing or excerpted within a filing the identity\n\nany victims or witnesses referenced in the Discovery, who\n\nhave not spoken by name on the public record in this case,\n\nunl\n\nthe\n\ness authorized by the Government in writing or by Order of\n\nCourt. Any such filings must be\n\nfiled under seal, unless\n\nauthorized by the Government in writing or by Order of the\n\nCourt.\n\nApp.079\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019538\n\n", "char_count": 1444}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 302, "text_content": "Css @:20-60603B0-AuNenDOtunteAd B® 2 Fil2e B78 0/a0ageageb Hi12\n\n7.\n\nby the Government in\n\nor designated as\n\nelectronic\n\nthe Government,\n\n“\n\ncon\n\nCopies of\n\nMw“\n\nDiscovery materials designated as\n\ncon\n\n“\n\nthis action bearing “con\n\nfidential” as described below,\n\n“\n\ncon\n\nincluding such materials marked as\n\nor designated as\n\nare deemed “Con\n\nclearly mark al\n\nIn\n\nConfidential\n\nMw“\n\ncon\n\nfidential\n\nfidential” in\n\na\n\nao\n\nformation.\n\nIn\n\nl pages or electronic\n\nnecessary, with\n\nidentification\n\nMw“\n\nCon\n\nin\n\nspecific individuals who are not parties\n\nforma\n\ncon\n\nfidential\n\ntion, or\n\nfidential” designations.\n\nInformation may contain\n\nformation of\n\nvictims, witnesses,\n\nother confident\n\nial\n\nfidential”\n\nfolder or document titl\n\nThe Government shall\n\nto this action,\n\nDiscovery or other materials produced\n\nstamps,\n\nand/or\n\nfidential” by\n\nfidential” either on the documents or materials themselves,\n\ney\n\nmaterials containing\n\nfolder or document titles as\n\npersonal\n\nor other\n\nand\n\ninformation;\n\nidentifies,\n\nthis matter.\n\nhas identii\n\nin this case sh\n\nGovernment that\n\ndesignation of\n\nformation.\n\nIn\n\nor could\nThe identity of\n\nfied herself\n\nall\n\nDe\n\nDe\n\ndocuments or other materials as Cont\n\nsuch documents or materials,\n\nto the\n\nlead identification of,\n\nas well as information that\n\nwitnesses in\n\nfense Counsel may,\n\nor himself publicl\n\nnot be treated as Confidential\n\nIn\n\nan alleged victim or witness who\n\ny as such on the record\n\nformation.\n\nat any time, no\n\nfense Counsel does not concur in\n\nDe\n\ntify the\n\nthe\nFidential\n\nIf the Government does not agree to de-designate\n\nfense Counsel may thereafter move\n\nApp.080\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019539\n\n", "char_count": 1634}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 303, "text_content": "C&rxs@:20-60603B0AuhenDOtuatAd Go 2 F128 2R780/Alageage’ 22\n\nthe Court\n\nmaterials.\n\nmaterials\n\ncontrary o\n\nde\n\nfendant,\n\nDe\n\ncriminal a\n\nof proceedings\n\nThe Government’s designation of\n\nas Confidential In\n\nrder of the Court.\n10. Confidential In\nor Defense Counsel,\n\na)\n\nfense Counsel solely\n\nother than\n\nmanner;\n\nDe\n\nCounsel;\n\nby De\n\n(*\n\nPrisons\n\naccess to\n\nSha\n\nction, and not\nthe defense of\nb) Shall\nCc)\n\nd)\n\nBOP”),\n\nthe\n\nDiscovery,\n\nin this action:\n11 be used by\nfor purposes of\nfor any civil\nthis act\n\nbe maint\n\nrespectively,\n\nthe De\n\ntion;\n\ntained in a Safi\n\nthe dei\n\nfor an Order de-designating such documents or\n\nsuch documents and\n\nduring\n\nfendant or\n\nfense of\n\nformation will be controlling absent\n\nformation disclosed to the\n\nthe course\n\nher\n\nthis\n\nproceeding or any purpose\n\nfe and secure\n\nShall be reviewed and possessed by the\n\nShall be possessed in electronic\n\nfense Counsel and by appropria\nwho shall provide\n\nincluding Con\n\nfendant in hard copy solely in the presence of\n\nte of\n\nficials of\n\nDe\n\nfense\n\nformat only\n\nthe defendant wit\n\nconsistent with the rules and regulations o\n\nDe\n\nfendant’s review;\n\nthe\n\nBureau of\n\nth electronic\n\nFidential Information,\nf the BOP, for the\nApp.081\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019540\n\n", "char_count": 1218}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 304, "text_content": "Ces @:20-60603B0AuNenDOtuntAd B® 2 F128 BA780/Alageage8 4.2\n\ne) Shall be reviewed by the Defendant solely in\n\nthe presence of Defense Counsel or when provided access to\n\nDiscovery materials in electronic format by BOP officials;\n\nf) May be disclosed only by Defense Counsel and\n\nonly to Designated Persons;\n\ng) May be shown to, either in person, by\n\nvideoconference, or via a read-only document review platform,\n\nbut not disseminated to or provided copies of to, Potential\n\nDefense Witnesses, to th xtent deemed necessary by Defense\n\nCounsel, for trial preparation, and after such individual(s)\nhave read and signed this Order acknowledging that such\n\nindividual(s) are bound by this Order.\n\n11. Copies of Discovery or other materials produced\n\nby the Government in this action bearing “highly confidential”\n\nstamps or otherwise specifically designated as “highly\n\nconfidential,” and/or electronic Discovery materials designated\n\nas “highly confidential” by the Government, including such\n\nmaterials marked as “highly confidential” either on the\n\ndocuments or materials themselves, or designated as “highly\n\nconfidential” in an index, folder title, or document title, are\n\ndeemed “Highly Confidential Information.” To the extent any\n\nHighly Confidential Information is physically produced to the\n\nDefendant and Defense Counsel, rather than being made available\n\nto the Defendant and Defense Counsel for on-site review, the\n\nApp.082\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019541\n\n", "char_count": 1451}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 305, "text_content": "C&bes@:20-60603B0AuhenDOtuateAd 2 2 F128 BR780/a0age aged 4.2\n\nGovernment shall clearly mark a\n\nmaterials containing Highly Confidential\n\n“highly confidential” stamps on the document\n\nthemselves.\n12.\n\npartially-nude,\n\ndepictions of j\n\nHighly Confidential\n\nIn\n\nIn\n\nor otherwise sexualized images,\n\nndividuals.\n\n13.\nGovernment that\n\ndesignation of\n\nConfidential In\n\nDe\n\nDe\n\ndocuments or\n\nformation.\n\nde-designate su\n\nthereafter move\n\ndocuments or ma\n\ndocuments and materials as Highly Cont\n\nbe controlling\n\n14.\n\nDe\n\nDefense Counsel\n\ncriminal action\n\nother than the\n\nch documents\n\nthe Court\n\nterials.\n\nabsent contrary order of\n\nHighly Confidential\n\nfense Counsel may,\n\nat any time,\n\nfense Counsel does not concur in\n\nll such pages or electronic\nformation with\n\nts or materials\n\nformation contains nude,\n\nvideos, or other\nnotify the\nthe\n\nother materials as Highly\n\nor materials,\n\nDe\n\nThe Government’s designation of\n\nfFidential\n\nIf the Government does not agree to\n\nfense Counsel may\n\nfor an Order de-designating such\n\nsuch\n\nformation will\n\nIn\n\nIn\n\nfense Counsel during the course of\n\na) Sha\n\nsolely\n\n, and not\n\ndefense of\n\n11 be used by\nfor purposes of\n\nfor any civil\n\nthe\n\nthis action;\n\nDe\n\nf proceedings\n\nthe defense of\n\nthe Court.\n\nformation disclosed to\n\nin this action:\n\nfendant or her\n\nthis\n\nproceeding or any purpose\n\nApp.083\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019542\n\n", "char_count": 1349}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 306, "text_content": "CaSeskh# ZS O003 202 AUN erD Gu Si24380 Ail tO 3230)2 0 aRetfe dil 2612\n\nb) Shall not be disseminated, transmitted, or\n\notherwise copied and provided to\n\nDefendant;\n\nDe\n\nfense Counsel or the\n\nCG) Shall be reviewed by the Defendant solely in\n\nthe presence of Defense Counsel;\n\nd) Shall not be possessed outside the presenc\n\nof Defense Counsel, or maintained, by the Defendant;\n\ne) Shall be made available for inspection by\n\nDefense Counsel and the Defendant,\n\nenforcement officers or employees;\n\nunder the protection of law\n\nand\n\n£) Shall not be copied or otherwise duplicated\n\nby Defense Counsel or the Defendant during such inspections.\n\n15. The Defendant, De\n\nDefense Experts/Advisors, Potential\n\nfen\n\nse Counsel, Defense Staff,\n\nDefense Witnesses, and Other\n\nAuthorized Persons are prohibited\n\nfrom filing publicly as an\n\nattachment to a filing or excerpted within a filing any\n\nConfidential Information or Highly Confidential Information\n\nreferenced in the Discovery, unless authorized by the Government\n\nin writing or by Order of the Court. Any such filings must be\n\nor by Order of the Court.\n\n16. The provisions of\n\nfiled under seal, unless authorized by the Government in writing\n\nthis Order shall not be\n\nconstrued as preventing disclosure of any information, with the\n\nexception of victim or witness identifying information, that is\n\n10\n\nApp.084\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019543\n\n", "char_count": 1374}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 307, "text_content": "CaSeskh# ZS O03 202 AN erD Gu Si243B0 Al O32) 20 aReyediil 2612\n\npublicly available or obt\n\nDefendant\n\nained by the\n\noth\n\nCounsel from a source\n\n17.\n\nfor\n\nExcept\n\nthe record of this case,\n\nGovernment or securely de\n\nincluding but not limited\n\ner than the Government.\n\nDiscovery that has been\n\ndays of the expiration of\n\nverdict in the above-capt\n\nfrom any order dismissing\n\nthe period\n\nijoned case; the period of\n\nany of\n\nor her\n\nfor direct appeal\n\nDefense\n\nmade part of\n\nDefense Counsel shall return to the\nstroy or delete all Discovery,\nto Confidential Information, within 30\n\nfrom any\n\nfF direct appeal\n\nthe charges in the above-\n\ncaptioned case;\n\nthe expiration of\n\nthe period\n\npursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255;\n\nany period of\n\nfor a petition\n\ntime required by the\n\nrecord in\n\nthis case;\n\nfederal or state ethics rules applicabl\n\nor the granting of\n\ne\n\nto\n\nany attorney of\n\nany motion made on\n\nbehalf of the Government dismissing any charges in the above-\ncaptioned case, whichever date is later.\n18. The foregoing provisions shall remain in eff\n\nunless and until either\n\nmutually agree in writing ot\n\nmodified by\n\n(a)\n\nfurther order o\n\n19. The Government and\n\nherwise,\n\nDe\n\nthe Government and\n\nor\n\nthe Court.\n\nDe\n\n(bo) this Order is\n\nect\n\nfense Counsel\n\nfense Counsel agree to meet\n\nand confer in advance of\n\nagree to any modification\n\nevidence at those proceed\n\nany hearings or trial to\n\ns necessary for\n\nings. In the absence of\n\n11\n\nthe presentation of\n\ndiscuss and\n\nagreement,\n\nApp.085\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019544\n\n", "char_count": 1509}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 308, "text_content": "CaSeskh# ZS O03 202 AUN erD Gaur Si243B0 Ail tO 3230)2 8 a Rehfe di2l 8612\n\nfor any such modifications.\n\nSO ORDERED:\n\nDated: New York, New York\nJuly 30 , 2020\n\nNa Quali\n\nAN\n\nHONORABLE ALISON J. NATH\nUnited States District J\n12\n\nJudge\n\nDefense Counsel may make an appropriate application to the Court\n\nApp.086\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019545\n\n", "char_count": 328}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 309, "text_content": "Cased ADAH SB0s Aden dc WHE 302 FiRABb2A80/PageewelilBa2\n\nUSDC SDNY\n\nDOCUMENT\n\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Shit ieee 9.9, 7 eae\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATE FILED://30/2020__\n\nUnited States of America,\n\n_y_\n20-CR-330 (AJN)\nGhislaine Maxwell,\nMEMORANDUM\n\nDefendant. OPINION & ORDER\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:\n\nBoth parties have asked for the Court to enter a protective order. While they agree on\nmost of the language, two areas of dispute have emerged. First, Ms. Maxwell seeks language\nallowing her to publicly reference alleged victims or witnesses who have spoken on the public\nrecord to the media or in public fora, or in litigation relating to Ms. Maxwell or Jeffrey Epstein.\nSecond, Ms. Maxwell seeks language restricting potential Government witnesses and their\ncounsel from using discovery materials for any purpose other than preparing for the criminal trial\nin this action. The Government has proposed contrary language on both of these issues. For the\nfollowing reasons, the Court adopts the Government’s proposed protective order.\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), “[a]t any time the court may, for\ngood cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.”\nThe good cause standard “requires courts to balance several interests, including whether\ndissemination of the discovery materials inflicts hazard to others . . . whether the imposition of\nthe protective order would prejudice the defendant,” and “the public’s interest in the\ninformation.” United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The party\nseeking to restrict disclosure bears the burden of showing good cause. Cf Gambale v. Deutsche\n\nBank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004).\n\nApp.087\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019546\n\n", "char_count": 1794}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 310, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SB0s ATE (ido MH Gt/ 302 CF iRAB6ZE8D/ Pag éeatyef2l ab3\n\nFirst, the Court finds that the Government has met its burden of showing good cause with\nregard to restricting the ability of Ms. Maxwell to publicly reference alleged victims and\nwitnesses other than those who have publicly identified themselves in this litigation. As a\ngeneral matter, it is undisputed that there is a strong and specific interest in protecting the\nprivacy of alleged victims and witnesses in this case that supports restricting the disclosure of\ntheir identities. Dkt. No. 29 at 3 (acknowledging that as a baseline the protective order should\n“prohibit[] Ms. Maxwell, defense counsel, and others on the defense team from disclosing or\ndisseminating the identity of any alleged victim or potential witness referenced in the discovery\nmaterials’); see also United States v. Corley, No. 13-cr-48, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194426, at\n*11(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016). The Defense argues this interest is significantly diminished for\nindividuals who have spoken on the public record about Ms. Maxwell or Jeffrey Epstein, because\nthey have voluntarily chosen to identify themselves. But not all accusations or public statements\nare equal. Deciding to participate in or contribute to a criminal investigation or prosecution is a\nfar different matter than simply making a public statement “relating to” Ms. Maxwell or Jeffrey\nEpstein, particularly since such a statement might have occurred decades ago and have no\nrelevance to the charges in this case. These individuals still maintain a significant privacy\ninterest that must be safeguarded. The exception the Defense seeks is too broad and risks\nundermining the protections of the privacy of witnesses and alleged victims that is required by\nlaw. In contrast, the Government’s proffered language would allow Ms. Maxwell to publicly\nreference individuals who have spoken by name on the record in this case. It also allows the\nDefense to “referenc[e] the identities of indivi\n... [truncated, 2276 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/310 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=310]", "char_count": 2276}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 311, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SB0s Aden (ido MH Gt/ 302 CF iRAB6ZE8D/ Pag eeigef3l ab3\n\nstake. And as the Government’s letter notes, see Dkt. No. 33 at 4, to the extent that the Defense\nneeds an exception to the protective order for a specific investigative purpose, they can make\napplications to the Court on a case-by-case basis.\n\nSecond, restrictions on the ability of potential witnesses and their counsel to use\ndiscovery materials for purposes other than preparing for trial in this case are unwarranted. The\nrequest appears unprecedented despite the fact that there have been many high-profile criminal\nmatters that had related civil litigation. The Government labors under many restrictions\nincluding Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Privacy Act of 1974, and\nother policies of the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of New York, all of which the Court expects the Government to scrupulously follow.\nFurthermore, the Government indicates that it will likely only provide potential witnesses with\nmaterials that those witnesses already have in their possession. See Dkt. No. 33 at 6. And of\ncourse, those witnesses who do testify at trial would be subject to examination on the record as to\nwhat materials were provided or shown to them by the Government. Nothing in the Defense’s\npapers explains how its unprecedented proposed restriction is somehow necessary to ensure a\nfair trial.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts the Government’s proposed protective order,\nwhich will be entered on the docket.\n\nThis resolves Dkt. No. 29.\nSO ORDERED.\nDated: July 30, 2020 MM ig\nNew York, New York ¢\n\nALISON J. NATHAN\nUnited States District Judge\n\nApp.089\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019548\n\n", "char_count": 1731}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 312, "text_content": "Casedl ADAP SB0s ATE (dc MH Gt/ 462 CF iRAB68AOL/Pagéeeiyefil abs\n\nU.S. Department of Justice\n\nUnited States Attorney\nSouthern District of New York\n\nThe Silvio J. Mollo Building\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nAugust 21, 2020\n\nVIA ECF\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\nUnited States Courthouse\n\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nRe: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nDear Judge Nathan:\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this letter in opposition to the defendant’s letter of\nAugust 17, 2020 (the “Defense Letter’), requesting that the Court enter an order permitting the\ndefendant to file under seal in certain civil cases (the “Civil Cases”) discovery materials produced\nby the Government in the instant criminal case, and to refer to, but not file, additional other\ndiscovery materials produced by the Government in the Civil Cases. Those applications should\nbe denied.\"\n\nAs an initial matter, the Government has already produced, and will continue to produce,\nsubstantial volumes of materials in discovery consistent with its obligations. Those include\nmaterials the Government obtained via search warrant, grand jury subpoenas, or other investigative\nmethods available only to the Government. Indeed, the Government has already produced more\nthan 165,000 pages of discovery to the defense, including the materials relevant to the Defense\nLetter. Through her most recent application, the defendant seeks permission to use, in unrelated\ncivil litigation, materials produced pursuant to the protective order in this case and designated\n“Confidential” thereunder. As detailed herein, the Government’s designation is entirely\nappropriate given that the materials—court orders and applications—have been kept under seal by\nthe issuing judges, and pertain to an ongoing criminal investigation.\n\n' The Government has drafted this letter in a manner that avoids revealing the contents of sealed\nmat\n... [truncated, 2520 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/312 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=312]", "char_count": 2520}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 313, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SB0s ATE (ido MH Gt/ 4262 CiRAB68A01/Pagéeijef2l ab5\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 2\n\nIn particular, the Defense Letter seeks this Court’s authorization to use materials relating\nto applications the Government made seeking the modification of certain protective orders in other\njudicial proceedings. By way of background, the Government sought such modifications to permit\ncompliance with criminal grand jury subpoenas (the “Subpoenas”). Those Subpoenas were issued\nto a certain recipient (the “Recipient”) after the Government opened a grand jury investigation into\nJeffrey Epstein and his possible co-conspirators. For obvious reasons and in keeping with its\nstandard practice, the Government did not notify the defendant or her counsel that it had issued\nthe Subpoenas. In response to receiving the Subpoenas, the Recipient advised the Government\nthat it believed that certain existing protective orders precluded full compliance. Accordingly, in\nor about February 2019, the Government applied ex parte and under seal to each relevant court to\nrequest modification of the respective protective orders to permit compliance with the Subpoenas.\nIn or about April 2019, one court (“Court-1’’) granted the Government’s application, and permitted\nthat the Government share its order—and only that order, which itself prohibited further\ndissemination—to the Recipient. Subsequently, the second court (“Court-2”) denied the\nGovernment’s application. Because the relevant grand jury investigation remains ongoing, both\nCourt-1 and Court-2 have ordered that the filings regarding the Subpoenas remain under seal,\nexcept that both have expressly permitted the Government to produce those filings to the defendant\nas part of its discovery obligations in this criminal case. The Defense Letter now seeks to use\nthose discovery materials in the Civil Cases.\n\nAt base, the defendant’s application fundamentally misapprehends the nature and process\nof criminal proceedings, and it f\n... [truncated, 4025 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/313 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=313]", "char_count": 4025}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 314, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SB0s ATE (ido MH ert/ 4262 CF iRAB68A01/ Pag éayefsl a2b5\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 3\n\nGovernment in discovery in this criminal case, and to which the protective order unquestionably\napplies, to litigate her Civil Cases. There is no basis to modify the Protective Order here.\n\nSecond, there is good reason why both parties proposed, and the Court ordered, a protective\norder that prevents the defendant from using materials obtained through the process of criminal\ndiscovery in any of the many civil cases in which she is, or could become, a party. To allow the\ndefendant to do so would permit the dissemination of a vast swath of materials, including those\nthat are confidential due to witness privacy interests, personal identifying information of third\nparties, and relevance in ongoing grand jury investigations. Here, the Government was particularly\nconcerned about the defendant’s interests in blurring these lines because, among other reasons, her\ncounsel in the criminal case are also her counsel in the Civil Cases. It would be grossly\ninappropriate for defense counsel to be permitted to sift through the criminal case discovery and\ncherry-pick materials they may believe could provide some advantage in their efforts to defend\nagainst accusations of abuse by victim plaintiffs, delay court-ordered disclosure of previously-\nsealed materials, or any other legal effort the defendant may be undertaking at any particular time.\nAnd yet that is what the defendant proposes.\n\nThird, the specific documents at issue pertain to ex parte applications made as part of an\nongoing grand jury investigation. Those documents were filed under seal and presently remain\nunder seal because the relevant judicial officers have ordered that all filings regarding those\nmatters, including the discovery materials referenced in the Defense Letter, remain sealed.? As\nthe U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York has stated publicly, the\ninvestigation int\n... [truncated, 3741 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/314 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=314]", "char_count": 3741}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 315, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SB0s ATE (dc MH Gt/ 462 CiRAB68A01/ Pag éeigei4l ab5\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 4\n\ne.g., United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“As a general proposition,\ncourts have repeatedly recognized that materials, including even judicial documents which are\npresumptively accessible, can be kept from the public if their dissemination might ‘adversely affect\nlaw enforcement interests.’”) (citing United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050)); see also\nUnited States v. Park, 619 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the need to “maintain\nthe secrecy of the Government’s investigation” outweighed the public’s right of access to certain\nsentencing documents).\n\nFourth, defense counsel cites not a single case to support the argument that a criminal\ndefendant should be permitted to use criminal discovery materials in her civil cases. Nor is the\nGovernment aware of any. Though precedent on this issue appears to be somewhat sparse—\nperhaps because few defendants attempt such a maneuver—see United States v. Calderon, 15 Cr.\n025, 2017 WL 6453344, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2017) (discussing the relative lack of specific\nguidance in the context of an application to modify protective orders in criminal cases), see also\nUnited States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 721 (Sth Cir. 2015) (“[mJotions to modify protective\norders in criminal cases appear to be infrequent”), decisions that do exist have rejected the kind of\nblurring of the line between criminal and civil proceedings that the defendant attempts here. See\nCalderon, 2017 WL 6453344, at 5-6 (denying a defendant’s application for modification of a\ncriminal protective order so he could use certain discovery materials in a FOJA suit); United States\nv. DeNunzio, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2020 WL 1495880, at *2-3 (D. Mass. March 27, 2020) (denying\na defendant’s motion to modify two protective orders in his criminal case for the purpose of\npursuing claims in a civil action, even follo\n... [truncated, 3760 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/315 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=315]", "char_count": 3760}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 316, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SB0s ATE (dc MH Gt/ 462 CF iRAB68A0L/Pagéetyjefs! ab5\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 5\n\nrequested—the defendant can make such arguments, and the Government can and will vigorously\noppose them, at the appropriate stage in this case.\n\nFinally, to the extent the defendant contends that the relief requested is somehow necessary\nto her ability to bring issues to the attention of other courts, the Defense Letter completely fails to\nexplain what legal argument she wishes to make in her Civil Cases based on the discovery\nmaterials she has identified or what relevance those materials have to the litigation of the Civil\nCases. The fact that the Government issued grand jury subpoenas and obtained court authorization\nfor compliance with one of those subpoenas has no conceivable relevance to disputed issues in the\nCivil Cases. To the extent the defendant argues that the requested relief is necessary to ensure that\ncourts adjudicating the Civil Cases are aware of the existence of the documents at issue, the\ndefendant identifies no specific reason why these materials are relevant to the issues pending in\nthose cases, other than to falsely accuse the Recipient and the Government of some sort of\nmalfeasance.°\n\nIn sum, the defendant’s arguments in favor of her application offer no explanation of the\nrelevant legal theory the materials would support, not to mention a compelling reason for this Court\nto permit an end-run around the protective order and permit the use of criminal discovery to litigate\na civil case. Accordingly, the application in the Defense Letter should be denied.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS\nActing United States Attorney\n\nBy: /s\nMaurene Comey / Alison Moe / Lara Pomerantz\nAssistant United States Attorneys\nSouthern District of New York\nTel: (212) 637-2324\n\nCe: All counsel of record, via ECF\n\n° If anything, the Defense Letter suggests that the defendant intends to use criminal discovery\nmaterials to attack the Government in the\n... [truncated, 2194 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/316 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=316]", "char_count": 2194}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 317, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SB0s ATE (ido MB Gt/ 402 CF iRAB68AOL/Pageagefil ab4\n\nU.S. Department of Justice\n\nUnited States Attorney\nSouthern District of New York\nThe Silvio J. Mollo Building\n\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nAugust 21, 2020\nTO BE FILED PARTIALLY UNDER SEAL\nBY ECF & ELECTRONIC MAIL\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\nUnited States Courthouse\n\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nRe: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nDear Judge Nathan:\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this letter to propose certain redactions to the\ndefendant’s letter of August 17, 2020 (the “Defense Letter”) and to request that the exhibits\nattached to the Defense Letter be filed under seal during the pendency of an ongoing grand jury\ninvestigation. For the reasons set forth below, the Government respectfully requests that the Court\npermit the filing of the Defense Letter with the proposed redactions contained in Exhibit A hereto\n(which itself will be submitted to the Court under seal), and that the Court permit all of the exhibits\nto the Defense Letter to be filed under seal. The Government does not object to the public filing\nof the affidavit attached to the Defense Letter in unredacted form. Additionally, the Government\nwill file a redacted version of this letter on the public docket, and separately will submit an\nunreduced version to the Court.\n\nAs an initial matter, the proposed redactions, and the request that the exhibits be filed under\nseal, are consistent with the Government’s designation of the underlying material as “Confidential”\nwithin the meaning of the Protective Order in this case. See Protective Order 4 15 (Dkt. 36).\nMoreover, as detailed more fully in the Government’s companion submission, that designation is\nappropriate given the nature of the documents at issue, all of which pertain to the Government’s\npending grand jury investigation.! That alone strongly weighs in favor of per\n... [truncated, 2451 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/317 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=317]", "char_count": 2451}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 318, "text_content": "Casecl ADAP SBOs ATE (ido MB et/ 402 CiRAB68ANL/ Pag éeijef2l ab4\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 2\n\nthat “[r]ecords, orders, and subpoenas relating to grand-jury proceedings must be kept under seal\nto the extent and as long as necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter occurring\nbefore a grand jury.”\n\nRelatedly, the exhibits at issue—all of which pertain to several ex parte applications made\nby the Government—have previously been ordered to kept under seal by the relevant judicial\nofficers, who have made the requisite findings to warrant sealing. The requested redactions and\nsealing would thus be necessary to ensure compliance with those sealing orders and is justified\nbased upon them.” Cf Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.9 (1979)\n(“Since the 17th century, grand jury proceedings have been closed to the public; and records of\nsuch proceedings have been kept from the public eye. The rule of grand jury secrecy ... is an\nintegral part of our criminal justice system.”).\n\nAssuming without agreeing that these materials constitute “judicial documents” within the\nmeaning of First Amendment right-of-access jurisprudence, such a determination would not be\ndispositive. The First Amendment presumptive right of access applies to civil and criminal\nproceedings and “protects the public against the government’s arbitrary interference with access\nto important information.” N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. (“NYCTA”), 684\nF.3d 286, 298 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Circuit has applied two\ndifferent approaches when deciding whether the First Amendment right applies to particular\nmaterial. The “experience-and-logic” approach asks “both whether the documents have\nhistorically been open to the press and general public and whether public access plays a significant\npositive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of\nOnondaga, 435 F.3d 110\n... [truncated, 3690 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/318 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=318]", "char_count": 3690}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 319, "text_content": "Cased ZB af 320s ANTE (hdc Wher 402 FIER ES AOL /Pagéetgefsl ab4\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 3\n\nHere, even assuming the materials at issue constitute judicial documents, any presumption\nin favor of access is overcome because of the nature of the documents themselves, namely\nmaterials related to a grand jury investigation.\n\nAs described above, the grand jury investigation 1s active and ongoing, and resulted in new\ncharges being brought just last month in this case.\n\nIn sum, the Government respectfully submits that the exhibits to the Defense Letter, which\nconsist entirely of filings that have been ordered sealed by other judicial officers, should similarly\nbe filed under seal in this case while the grand jury investigation remains ongoing. For the same\n\nreasons, the Government proposes redacting any portions of the Defense Letter that\n\nAccordingly, the Government respectfully requests that the Court permit the redactions to\nthe Defense Letter proposed in Exhibit A hereto and that both the unredacted Defense Letter and\nthe exhibits thereto remain under seal until further order of the Court. Additionally, because the\ninstant letter discusses the Government’s ongoing investigation and references\n\nthe Government also respectiully requests that it be permitted to\nfile a redacted version of this letter on the public docket and that the unredacted version of this\nletter as well as Exhibit A to this letter be filed under seal.\n\nApp.097\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019556\n\n", "char_count": 1491}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 320, "text_content": "Case PAB CE O0BSOANeNt DocORehi202 0 FHEG S32 1 ager aged ia\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 21, 2020\nPage 4\n\nFinally, the Government respectfully proposes that the Court set a date approximately 180\ndays from now, or as soon thereafter as the Court believes would be appropriate, for the\nGovernment to update the Court on its position regarding sealing in connection with this matter.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS\nActing United States Attorney\n\nBy: /s\nMaurene Comey / Alison Moe / Lara Pomerantz\nAssistant United States Attorneys\nSouthern District of New York\nTel: (212) 637-2324\n\nCe: All counsel of record, by email\n\nApp.098\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019557\n\n", "char_count": 661}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 321, "text_content": "Case 2OBO6 O0B30AdeNt DobcORAhA? 0 FxCaD02 Rag eh Agel iS\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT |\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\n\nDOC #:\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DATE FILED:__ 9/2/20\n\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUnited States of America,\n\n_y_\n20-CR-330 (AJN)\nGhislaine Maxwell,\nMEMORANDUM\n\nDefendant. OPINION AND ORDER\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:\n\nOn August 17, 2020, Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell filed a sealed letter motion seeking\nan Order modifying the protective order in this case.! Specifically, she sought a Court order\nallowing her to file under seal in certain civil cases (“Civil Cases”) materials (“Documents”) that\n\nshe received in discovery from the Government in this case. She also sought permission to\n\n! This Order will not refer to any redacted or otherwise confidential information, and as a result it will not be sealed.\nThe Court will adopt the redactions to Defendant’s August 17, 2020 letter motion that the Government proposed on\nAugust 21, 2020, and it will enter that version into the public docket. The Court’s decision to adopt the\nGovernment’s proposed redactions is guided by the three-part test articulated by the Second Circuit in Lugosch v.\nPyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). Under this test, the Court must: (i) determine whether the\ndocuments in question are “judicial documents;” (ii) assess the weight of the common law presumption of access to\nthe materials; and (iii) balance competing considerations against the presumption of access. /d. at 119-20. “Such\ncountervailing factors include but are not limited to ‘the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency’\nand ‘the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.’” /d. at 120 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044,\n1048 (2d Cir.1995) (“Amodeo IP’)). The Government’s proposed redactions satisfy this test. First, the Court finds\nthat the defendant’s letter motion is “relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial\nprocess,” thereby qualifying \n... [truncated, 3180 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/321 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=321]", "char_count": 3180}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 322, "text_content": "Case POEL ONBSOudEeNt DocOReAIAD? 0 FROG S902 ag eh ager HS\n\nreference, but not file, other discovery material that the Government produced in this case. For\nthe reasons that follow, Defendant’s requests are DENIED.\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), a Court may enter a protective order\nonly after it finds that good cause exists. Within this framework, the Federal Rules of Criminal\nProcedure leave it to the discretion of the Court to determine whether modification of an existing\nprotective order is warranted.” To make that decision, the Court takes into account all relevant\nfactors, including the parties’ reliance on the protective order and whether the moving party has\nsufficiently substantiated a request to deviate from the status quo in the instant matter.\n\nOn July 30, 2020, this Court entered a protective order in this case, having determined\nthat good cause existed. Dkt. No. 36. The parties agreed that a protective order was warranted.\nSee Dkt. No. 35 at 1 (“The parties have met and conferred, resolving nearly all the issues relating\nto the proposed protective order.”). The Defendant’s Proposed Protective Order included a\nprovision that stated that all discovery produced by the Government “[s]hall be used by the\nDefendant or her Defense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this criminal action, and\nnot for any civil proceeding or any purpose other than the defense of this action.” Dkt. No. 29,\nEx. A ¥ 1(a). That language was included in the Court’s July 30, 2020 protective order. See Dkt.\nNo. 36 §f 1(a), 10(a), 14(a). Shortly thereafter, the Government began to produce discovery.\n\nUpon receipt of some of the discovery, the Defendant filed the instant request, which\n\nseeks modification of the protective order in order to use documents produced in the criminal\n\n? Tn the civil context, there is a “strong presumption against the modification of a protective order.” In re Teligent,\nInc., 640 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Co\n... [truncated, 2744 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/322 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=322]", "char_count": 2744}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 323, "text_content": "Came PACE ODBSOuEeNt DocOReA ADP 0 Fued S902 ag ehageB HS\n\ncase in other civil proceedings. She bases her request on the premise that disclosure of the\nDocuments to the relevant judicial officers is allegedly necessary to ensure the fair adjudication\nof issues being litigated in those civil matters. But after fourteen single-spaced pages of heated\nrhetoric, the Defendant proffers no more than vague, speculative, and conclusory assertions as to\nwhy that is the case. She provides no coherent explanation of what argument she intends to\nmake before those courts that requires the presentation of the materials received in discovery in\nthis criminal matter under the existing terms of the protective order in this case. And she\nfurnishes no substantive explanation regarding the relevance of the Documents to decisions to be\nmade in those matters, let alone any explanation of why modifying the protective order in order\nto allow such disclosure is necessary to ensure the fair adjudication of those matters. In sum, the\narguments the Defendant presents to the Court plainly fail to establish good cause. The\nDefendant’s request is DENIED on this basis.\n\nIndeed, good cause for the requested modification of the protective order is further\nlacking because, as far as this Court can discern, the facts she is interested in conveying to the\njudicial decisionmakers in the Civil Cases are already publicly available, including in the\nGovernment’s docketed letter on this issue. See Dkt. No. 46. In the opening paragraph of her\nreply letter dated August 24, 2020, the Defendant states that she is essentially seeking to disclose\nunder seal to certain judicial officers the following factual information:\n\n1. Grand jury subpoenas were issued to an entity (“Recipient”) after the Government\nopened a grand jury investigation into Jeffrey Epstein and his possible co-\nconspirators;\n\n2. The Recipient concluded that it could not turn over materials responsive to the grand\n\njury subpoena absent a modificati\n... [truncated, 2082 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/323 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=323]", "char_count": 2082}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 324, "text_content": "Came POEL ONBSOueNt DocOReALAD? 0 FxeG S902 ag eh Aged iS\n\n3. In February 2019, the Government, ex parte and under seal, sought modification of\nthose civil protective orders so as to permit compliance with the criminal grand jury\nsubpoenas;\n\n4. In April 2019, one court (“Court-1”) permitted the modification and, subsequently,\nanother court (“Court-2”) did not;\n\n5. That as a result of the modification of the civil protective order by Court-1, the\nRecipient turned over to the Government certain materials that had been covered by\nthe protective order; and\n\n6. That the Defendant learned of this information (sealed by other courts) as a result of\nRule 16 discovery in this criminal matter.\n\nWith the exception of identifying the relevant judicial decision makers and specific civil\nmatters, all of the information listed above is available in the public record, including in the letter\nfiled on the public docket by the Government on this issue. See Dkt. No. 46. Although this\nCourt remains in the dark as to why this information will be relevant to those courts, so that\nthose courts can make their own determination, to the extent it would otherwise be prohibited by\nthe protective order in this matter, the Court hereby permits the defendant to provide to the\nrelevant courts under seal the above information, including the information identifying the\nrelevant judicial decision makers and civil matters.\n\nIn addition, the Government has indicated that “there is no impediment to counsel\nmaking sealed applications to Court-1 and Court-2, respectively, to unseal the relevant\nmaterials.” Dkt. No. 46 at 3 n.5. In her reply, the Defendant asserts that she is amenable to such\na solution if the Court agrees with the Government that doing so would not contravene the\n\nprotective order in this case. To the extent it would otherwise be prohibited by the protective\n\nApp.102\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019561\n\n", "char_count": 1896}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 325, "text_content": "Came PACE O0BS0uANIeNt DocOR eA AD? 0 FueG S902 ag eh AGeb HS\n\norder in this matter, the Defendant may make unsealing applications to those Courts if she\n\nwishes.\n\nSO ORDERED. AY 0 iste\n\nDated: September 2, 2020\nNew York, New York ALISON J. NATHAN\nUnited States District Judge\n\nApp.103\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019562\n\n", "char_count": 305}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 326, "text_content": "Came POEL ONBSOuAeNt DocOR eA 0 FROG S902 ag ehagenl 3B\n\nUSDC SDNY\n\nDOCUMENT\n\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\n\nDOC #;\n\nDATE FILED: 9/2/20 Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.c\n\nJeffrey Pagliuca\n\nHADDON\nMORGA = 150 East 10th Avenue\nFOREMAN Denver, Colorado 80203\n\nPH 303.831.7364 Fx 303.832.2628\nwww.hmflaw.com\njpagliuca@hmflaw.com\n\nAugust 17, 2020\nVIA EMAIL\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nRe: Request to Modify Protective Order (UNDER SEAL)!\nUnited States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nDear Judge Nathan,\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell, pursuant to paragraph 18 of this Court’s Protective Order (Doc.\n# 36), requests that the Court enter an Order allowing her to refer to and file under seal in yyy\n\nWM (the “Other Matters”), certain discovery materials produced by the government on August\n5, 2020. She also seeks to refer to (but not file) discovery materials produced by the government\n\non August 13, 2020, specifica! [I\n\nDisclosure to the judicial officers in the Other Matters is necessary for fair determination of\n\nimportant iste [ll\n\n' Ms. Maxwell seeks leave to file this Letter Motion under seal because it relates and refers to\ndiscovery materials deemed Confidential under the terms of the Protective Order in this case.\n\n|\n\nApp.104\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019563\n\n", "char_count": 1352}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 327, "text_content": "Case 2002 06 00BB0AUEht DoOcUMeATA 0 Fuld DS02 Rag eR ager Hs\n\nPage 2\n\n> The items to be referred to (and not filed) are confidential:\naccordingly, referring to them under seal in the Other Matters will not prejudice the government.\n\nRelevant Facts and Procedural History\n\n> The Materials to be filed are attached, under seal, as exhibits ggg. Although marked by the\ngovernment as “Confidential,” the Materials are not “Confidential” as that term has been defined by the\nSecond Circuit. They consist of|\n\nMS | be Second Circuit has characterized these types of documents as “judicial documents” with\na presumptive right of public access. See Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2019). Ms. Maxwell\nobjected to the government’s Confidential designation, under paragraph 9 of the Protective Order, and\nrequested that the government withdraw the designation. The Court does not need to decide the issue of\nwhether the Material is confidential at this time given that Ms. Maxwell seeks only to provide the\nMaterial to judicial officers under seal as information necessary to fairly decide pending issues in those\ncases.\n\nApp.105\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019564\n\n", "char_count": 1150}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 328, "text_content": "Came 2002 06 00BB0AUEht DocUMeAA 0 Fed DS302RageRheGn8 ots\n\nee » the government served Jj with a subpoena to produce yy\nES. Ms. Maxwell was not served with\n\nApp.106\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019565\n\n", "char_count": 184}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 329, "text_content": "Case PACE O0BS0uANeNt DocOReAiAa 0 FE S15302)289 eh AGA 1B\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 17, 2020\nPage 4\n\nany Subp0cr. |\n\nIn or about February 28, 2019 the government first applied to gg for relic. Jy\n\nDuring these ex parte proceedings, the government made numerous\nunchallenged factual assertions. To Ms. Maxwell’s knowledge, no one disclosed the pendency of\n\nthese applications {c [Ill\nCertainly, no one -- not the government, any court, or J -- disclosed to Ms.\n\nMax Wc!\n\ngovernment arrested Ms. Maxwell. On July 8, the government filed a superseding indictment\nalleging that Ms. Maxwell “assisted, facilitated, and contributed” to Epstein’s abuse of minors.\nthe indictment alleges that in 2016 Ms. Maxwell made “efforts to\nconceal her conduct” by “repeatedly provid[ing] false and perjurious statements” in deposition\ntestimony. Superseding Indictment, Doc. # 17 at 29 8.\n\naS NS\nEEE. On the two applications referenced abovc ll\nRe tc two SDNY courts rendered a split decision. yyy\na 22nicd the cx\n\n° The first batch of discovery was provided by the government to NY counsel on August 5, 2020\nin the late afternoon on a hard disk. Due to the time upload and securely transfer files, undersigned\ncounsel for Ms. Maxwell (also counsel for her in the Giuffre case) only received these materials at 11:38\na.m. on Friday, August 7, 2020.\n\nApp.107\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019566\n\n", "char_count": 1373}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 330, "text_content": "Cae PACE ODBSOANENt DocOReALAa 0 Fed S15902 28g eh aged iB\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 17, 2020\nPage 5\n\nparte application.\n\nCounsel for Ms. Maxwell then |carr¢(, [i\n\ndenied the application. iy\n\nThe pressing issue that necessitates the filing of this request concerns\n\nThese issues, in turn, impact her rights as the accused in this matter, constitutionally presumed\ninnocent unless and until the government proves her guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.\n\nThe Protective Order in this case\n\nThe Protective Order in this case prohibits the use of the discovery materials or confidential-\ndesignated materials “for any civil proceeding or any purpose other than the defense of this\naction” absent mutual agreement in writing between the government and defense counsel or if\n“modified by further order of the Court.” Doc. # 36 at J 1(a), 10(a), 18. Ms. Maxwell agreed to\nthat limitation after assurances by the government, consistent with their representation to this\nCourt, that “the Government rarely provides any third party, including a witness, with any\nmaterial they did not already possess,” and therefore “concerns defense counsel raises about\nfuture use in civil litigation are not likely to occur.” Letter of Alex Rossmiller at 6 (Doc. # 33)\n(July 28, 2020). This Court relied on that representation in its ruling that government witnesses\nshould not be limited in their use of materials gained from the government in any related civil\nlitigation. Memorandum Op’n & Order at 3 (July 30, 2020). Yet as described above, the\n\ngovernment must have given a copy of the sealed order to\n\nParagraph 18 of the Protective Order permits modification by the Court. Further, any concerns\nthat the government may raise concerning their on-going grand jury investigation will be\nobviated by submission of these materials under seal in the other matters.\n\nThe reasons this Court should grant the request\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019567\n\n", "char_count": 1923}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 331, "text_content": "Cane 2002 06 00BB0AUEht DoOcUmMeATAAY 0 Filed DS02 Rag eR agenb ots\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 17, 2020\nPage 6\n\nThere are at least three compelling reasons to modify the Protective Order. First,\n\nThe partial secrecy surrounding the Material has also fundamentally undermined the fairness of\nthe adversarial process. Although the grand jury subpoena and government investigation were\n\n=\n8\ni)\n=\n5\nat\ncS\n\nRn | | be rule does not impose any obligation of secrecy on\nwitnesses.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6, Advisory Committee Note to Subdivision 6(c)2. [xy\n\nToo many questions remain unanswered\nincluding exactly what was said between the government and jg, when was it said, and\nprecisely what was turned over.\n\nWithout the ability to use the\nMaterial in the very limited fashion proposed Ms. Maxwell she is unfairly disadvantaged Jy\n\nBE Moreover, instead of candidly revealing the fact of the subpocna\n\nd,\n\nSecon\n\nApp.109\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019568\n\n", "char_count": 942}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 332, "text_content": "Came PACE O0BS0ANeNt DocOReA A 0 FXEG S02 Rag eh age? 1B\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 17, 2020\nPage 7\n\nFurther, and as this Court knows, ample Second Circuit authority supports staying a civil case\npending the resolution of a related criminal case. See SEC v. Blaszezak, No. 17-CV-3919 (AJN),\n2018 WL 301091, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2018) (granting motion to stay civil case and holding\nthat “[a] district court may stay civil proceedings when related criminal proceedings are\nimminent or pending, and it will sometimes be prudential to do so” (quoting Louis Vuitton\nMalletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2012))). Among other things, the stay\nvindicates the Fifth Amendment and guards against witnesses learning information in the civil\ncase and then “conforming” their testimony in the criminal case to what was disclosed in the\n\ncivil case. This concern is all the more real whet DI I D7 7 7 _\n\nMs. Maxwell further anticipates the very immediate need to disclose the Materials to\n\nNotably, the Material at issue is not accuser-related or sensitive in any regard. These ex parte\npleadings, hearings, and rulings are already known to ggg. These materials, absent\nsealing, would enjoy a presumptive right of public access as judicial documents. Given that the\nMaterial has been disclosed in this case by the government under the terms of this Court’s\nOrder, and without any application to the sealing courts, the government has conceded that this\nCourt has the authority to authorize use of the Material under the terms of this Court’s Protective\nOrder. And, the government has previously agreed that the appropriate forum to consider issues\nrelated to the civil Protective Order is in the civil litigation, positing the opinion “that neither it\nnor this Court is well-positioned to, or should, become the arbiter of what is appropriate or\npermissible in civil cases.” Doc. # 33 at 7. What Ms. Maxwell asks is that she be allowed to\n\ndisclose, under seal, the Material so \n... [truncated, 2194 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/332 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=332]", "char_count": 2194}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 333, "text_content": "Came PACE ONBSOANENt DocOReAIAa 0 FXG S530 2289 eh age8 iB\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 17, 2020\nPage 8\n\nConclusion\nMs. Maxwell requests that this Court modify the Protective Order to allow her to refer to and file\nunder seal in\n\nee 3° Material at issue in this letter motion.\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nCC: Counsel of Record (via Email)\n\nApp.111\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019570\n\n", "char_count": 396}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 334, "text_content": "Case PACE O0BS0ANENt DocOmeh Ae 0 Fued 08 2agehagenl 3\n\nMy Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.c\nJeffrey Pagliuca\n\nHADDON\n\ntener Loctite 150 East 10th Avenue\nFOREMAN Denver, Colorado 80203\nPH 303.831.7364 Fx 303.832.2628\n\nwww.hmflaw.com\n\njpagliuca@hmflaw.com\n\nAugust 24, 2020\nVIA EMAIL\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nRe: Proposed Redactions to Request to Modify Protective Order (Under Seal)\nUnited States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nDear Judge Nathan,\n\nIn accordance with this Court’s Order of August 18, 2020 (Doc. 44), Ms. Maxwell hereby\nrespectfully submits under seal her proposed redactions to her Request to Modify Protective\nOrder (“Request”), filed under seal on August 17, 2020. Ms. Maxwell also has filed her Reply\nunder seal and contemporaneously submits her proposed redactions to that pleading.!\n\nMs. Maxwell has no opposition to keeping under seal, and redacting from her Request and\nReply, the contents, description and discussion of the sealed materials themselves; because the\ngovernment has marked them Confidential, the Protective Order requires as much. See Doc. 36,\n7 15.\n\nThe government’s proposed redactions, however, go further and propose to redact\n. The government would\n\nhave this Court redact\n\non the premise that it would “risk jeopardizing the\n\ngovernment’s investigation.”\n\n1 To the extent this Court believes this letter also should be filed publicly, counsel also has indicated her proposed\nredactions to this letter.\n\nApp.112\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019571\n\n", "char_count": 1583}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 335, "text_content": "Case 2ABCE ONBSOuAENt DocOReA Ae 0 Fued 908289 eh agen? 3\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 24, 2020\nPage 2\n\nMoreover, the government has made repeated, highly public statements, including at the press\nconference following Ms. Maxwell’s indictment,” in the press conference following Mr.\nEpstein’s indictment,’ in a press conference convened at the doorstep of Mr. Epstein’s former\nNew York mansion,’ and in other publicly-released statements> that its investigation into\nassociates of Mr. Epstein is ongoing and active.\n\n. The process to evaluate whether a\njudicial document should remain under seal is clear. Once a determination is made that the\nmaterials are judicial documents the Court is required to determine whether any countervailing\ninterests outweigh the presumptive right to public access. Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 49-50\n(2d Cir. 2019).\n\nFrankly, Ms. Maxwell does not believe that the government has established a countervailing\ninterest compelling enough to justify continued sealing of the documents.\n\nIt is also likely that these same documents\n\nee\nwill be the subject of future motion practice in this Court, x\n\nHowever, Ms. Maxwell has no interest in additional pretrial publicity related to any of these\ndocuments and submits that protecting her right to a fair trial is the countervailing interest that,\nat this point, requires her proposed redactions and the continued sealing of the materials with the\n\nexception of her limited request to file the materials under scal\n\n> “These charges to be announced today, are the latest result of our investigation into Epstein, and the people\naround him who facilitated his abuse of minor victims. That investigation remains ongoing.”\n\n(https://www rev.conyblog/transcripts/announcement-transcript-of-charges-against-ghislaine-maxwell-in-new-york-\njeffrey-epstein-associate-arrested).\n\n3 “This in no way is over, OK. There's going to be more investigative steps they're going to take place and the FBI\nwith the U.S. attorney her\n... [truncated, 2556 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/335 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=335]", "char_count": 2556}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 336, "text_content": "Came LACE O0BS0ANeNt DocOReA Ae 0 ued 908289 eh agen8 3\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 24, 2020\nPage 3\n\nRespectfully Submitted,\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nCC: Counsel of Record (via Email)\n\nApp.114\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019573\n\n", "char_count": 220}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 337, "text_content": "Case PACE O0BSOANeNt DocORehi 22 0 Fuad 908 agehagenl HS\n\nMy Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.c\nJeffrey Pagliuca\n\nHADDON\n\ntener Loctite 150 East 10th Avenue\nFOREMAN Denver, Colorado 80203\nPH 303.831.7364 Fx 303.832.2628\n\nwww.hmflaw.com\n\njpagliuca@hmflaw.com\n\nAugust 24, 2020\nVIA EMAIL\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nRe: Reply in Support of Request to Modify Protective Order (Under Seal)!\nUnited States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nDear Judge Nathan,\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell filed a simple request: that she be permitted to disclose under seal\nto (the “Civil\n\nee\nLitigation”) the fact that her adversary ys already handed\n\nover\n\nee\nMl. to the U.S. Attorney’s Office pursuant to a subpoena 9\na\n\nThe government proposes to keep JJ in the dark about the fact and method of the\ndisclosure. They claim the civil litigation 1s “unrelated,” that issuance of the subpoena was\n“standard practice,” and that disclosure will jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation and\n“permit dissemination of a vast swath of materials.” Each of the government’s arguments lack\nmerit.\n\nThe Civil Litigation\nFirst, the government claims the civil action is Resp. at 1. The assertion is\nfivo10U.\n\n' Ms. Maxwell has filed a letter motion which seeks leave to file this reply under seal, while\nproviding the unredacted version to the government and the Court. This reply describes and discusses\nsealed materials and materials subject to the Protective Order in this case. Ms. Maxwell also\nsimultaneously files under separate cover her proposed redactions to her Request to Modify Protective\nOrder (Aug. 17, 2020), and this Reply, in accordance with the Court’s Order of August 18, 2020 (Doc.\n44).\n\nApp.115\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019574\n\n", "char_count": 1809}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 338, "text_content": "Case 2202 06 00BB0AUEht DocUmeAIADL 0 Fuld DS08R89 eR aGeor tis\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 24, 2020\nPage 2\n\n>\noO\n\ngovernment’s ad hominem suggestion that Ms. Maxwell has “cherry-pick[ed] materials” to seek\nan “advantage in their efforts to defend against accusations of abuse” or “delay court-ordered\ndisclosure of previously sealed materials” reveals a fundamental (or feigned) lack of\n\nunderstanding i |. It also begs the question, to be fleshed out\nat a later tir, il\n\nMs. Maxwell simply seeks to alert the judicial officers in the related Civil Litigation to facts\nabout which her adversary is already aware.\n\nIssuance of the Subpoenas Not “Standard Practice”:\nSecond, the government tries to normalize, without citation to authority, its conduct as “standard\n\npractice.” Resp. at 2. To the contrary, the controlling case in this Circuit, Martindell v. Int’]\nTelephone & Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 293 (2d Cir. 1979), mandates a wholly different\nprocedure: the use of a non-ex parte subpoena with an opportunity for the aggrieved party to\nmove to quash. Similar cases in this district demonstrate the “non-standard” nature of the\ngovernment’s conduct regarding these subpoenas. For example, Judge Koeltl observed when\nconsidering whether to release a single deposition transcript to the government: “the Second\nCircuit has made clear that the Government may not use its ‘awesome’ investigative powers to\nseek modification of a protective order merely to compare the fruits of the plaintiff's discovery in\na civil action with the results of a prosecutorial investigation in a criminal action.” Botha v. Don\nKing Prods., Inc., No. 97 CIV. 7587 (JGK), 1998 WL 88745, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1998)\n(citing Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1987) and\n\nMartindell, 594 F.2d at 297).\n\nApp.116\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019575\n\n", "char_count": 1864}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 339, "text_content": "Case 2202 06 00BB0AUEht DoOcUmeAIADL 0 Fuld DS308289 eR aGos8 ois\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 24, 2020\nPage 3\n\na 820 0/80 Palmieri\nv. State of New York, 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1987); Abbott Laboratories v. Adelphia Supply USA,\nCase 2015-cv-5826 (CBA) (MDG), 2016 WL 11613256 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2016) (“In the\nSecond Circuit, there is a presumption in favor of enforcing protective orders against grand jury\nsubpoenas.”); United States v. Kerik, 07 CR 1027, 2014 WL 12710346 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014).\nIt seems that a majority of courts in this district have rejected the claimed “standard practice”\narguments made by the Government J. A notable difference is that the\nother applications were not conducted ex parte.\n\nMs. Maxwell is not\n\nasking this Court to decide that question today.\n\nBut Ms. Maxwell is seeking\n\nThe Government Does Not Explain How Any “Secret” Investigation Will be Compromised.\nThird, the government claims that the materials at issue are “Confidential” because the “full\nscope and details” of their very-public proclamations of an ongoing criminal investigation “have\nnot been made public.” Resp. at 3. This argument too is nonsensical: the sealed materials that\nMs. Maxwell seeks to file, under seal,\n\nCertainly the subpoena recipient, otherwise known as counsel for the adverse\nparty to the Civil Litigation, knows the two things that Ms. Maxwell seeks to file under seal in\n\nApp.117\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019576\n\n", "char_count": 1436}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 340, "text_content": "Case PACE ONBSOuANENt DocO Reh? 0 Fued 908289 eh aged iS\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 24, 2020\nPage 4\n\nthat mattcr: A\n\n2\n\nThe government does not explain, because they cannot, how it will harm an ongoing criminal\ninvestigation to reveal the sealed materials under seal to two arbiters: 3x\nClearly those judicial officers are fully\ncapable of maintaining files under seal and confidences. Nor is there any support for the\nargument that this limited request will “permit dissemination of a vast swath of materials.”\nResp. at 3. The slippery slope contention is belied by the limited nature of Ms. Maxwell’s\nrequest. The sealed materials are a discrete set of judicial documents, not a “vast swath of\nmaterials,” and Ms. Maxwell seeks to file them under seal for those Courts to use in their\ndeterminations. Hyperbole aside, the request is appropriately limited.\n\nFurther, the government’s suggestion that “there is no impediment to counsel making sealed\napplications to Court-1 and Court-2, respectively, to unseal the relevant materials” is, at best,\nbaffling. Resp. at 3n.5. Such a “sealed application” in furtherance of her Civil Litigation would\nbe “using” the materials for the civil case, exactly the conduct proscribed by the Protective Order\nhere. If the Court disagrees, Ms. Maxwell is more than happy to make such sealed applications\nto those judicial officers. The government does not explain its thinking, nor did the government\nsuggest this course of action during the conferral process.\n\nThe Sealed Materials Are Important to\n\nFourth, the government decries the sealed materials’ lack of relevance to\n\n2 Ms. Maxwell strenuously opposes the government’s suggestion that it “further elaborate on the nature of the\nongoing grand jury investigation” in a supplemental ex parte and sealed pleading. This Court is overseeing the\ncriminal case pertaining to Ms. Maxwell and any ex parte pleading concerning this case to this judicial officer is\ninappropriate. See Standard 3-3.3 Relati\n... [truncated, 2364 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/340 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=340]", "char_count": 2364}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 341, "text_content": "Case PACE O0BB0ANeNt DocO Reni 22 0 Fed 908289 ehaged iS\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 24, 2020\nPage 5\n\nProtective Orders May Be Modified As Circumstances Change\n\nFinally, the government suggests in a myriad of ways without directly arguing that this\nProtective Order cannot be modified, that Ms. Maxwell somehow waived her ability to seek\nmodification by agreeing to a Protective Order before she knew what was contained in the\ncriminal discovery, or that there is no precedent for such a modification. These suggestions are\ndisingenuous. Of course, the Government ignores that the Protective Order itself provides that it\nmay be modified “by further order of the Court.” Jd,  18(b).\n\nThere is no precedence for this case. That is true because the Second Circuit has outlined a\nprocess for the government to seek civil materials subject to protective orders for use in grand\njury investigations, a process the government circumvented. It also is true because typically, the\ngovernment is the party to intervene in civil cases and seek a stay where materials the\ngovernment has marked “Confidential” may be disclosed publicly or where the government\ncontends the rules of criminal discovery will be circumvented. Finally, there is no other case that\n\ndefense counsel has located Wher\n\nThat Ms. Maxwell did not know what was in the sealed materials before she signed the\nProtective Order, or proposed a draft, is self-evident. That a Court can modify a protective order\nat any time is likewise well-established. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) authorizes the Court to\nregulate discovery through protective orders and modification of those orders. See Smith Kline\nBeecham Corp. v. Synthon Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., 210 F.R.D. 163, 166 (M.D.N.C. 2002)\n(“[c]ourts have the inherent power to modify protective orders, including protective orders\narising from a stipulation by the parties”); see also United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1211\nn.15 (Sth Cir. 1977) (trial court's decisions as to which do\n... [truncated, 2661 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/341 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=341]", "char_count": 2661}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 342, "text_content": "Came 2A CE O0B80Adent DocORehi 2 0 Fuad 908 2a ehagent HS\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 24, 2020\nPage 6\n\ndocuments, that is, documents that are ‘relevant to the performance of the judicial function and\nuseful in the judicial process.’” Kerik, 2014 WL 12710346, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014),\n(quoting United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995)).\n\nThe Materials that Ms. Maxwell seeks to disclose (to judicial officers under seal) are, without\n\nquestion, judicial documents.\n\nAnd, at a minimum, Ms. Maxwell’s opponent in the Civil Litigation knows both that\n\nthe Government obtained an ex parte order to subpoena the information and what was produced.\nAccordingly, the argument that somehow grand jury secrecy will be compromised by disclosure,\nunder seal to judicial officers reviewing the very material at issue, is absurd. Ms. Maxwell has\n\ndemonstrated good cause for her very limited request to present a discrete set of sealed materials\n\nunder sca 0\n\nWe Phe government has not articulated a cogent reason for that information to be kept from\nthe other judicial officers.\n\nSincerely,\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nCC: Counsel of Record (via ECF)\n\nApp.120\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019579\n\n", "char_count": 1193}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 343, "text_content": "Case DARESOOBSONIENt DocOMAALSR0 FACE I04 0g Pagoitid . ;\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n|\nSEP 04 2020\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nPlaintiff, S.D.N.Y. - APPEALS\nVv.\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, SCRSSt (SIN)\n\nDefendant. :\n——EEEE—— X\n\nNOTICE OF APPEAL\n\nPLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Ghislaine Maxwell, Defendant in the above-captioned\ncase, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from the\ndistrict court’s September 2, 2020, Memorandum Opinion and Order denying her motion to\nmodify the protective order. Pichler v. UNITE, 585 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have\njurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the denial of the motion to modify the\nProtective Order and the denial of the motion to reconsider.”); Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity\nServs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (denial of motion to modify protective order is\nimmediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial\nLoan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949)); see also Brown vy. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir.\n2019) (appeal by intervenors challenging denial of motions to modify protective order and\nunseal).\n\nDated: September 3, 2020.\n\nApp.121\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019580\n\n", "char_count": 1255}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 344, "text_content": "Case PACE O0BS0ANeNt DocOmehtAte 0 Fea 0A Ragehagek HD\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nura A. Menninger (LM-1374)\neffrey S. Pagliuca (pro hac vice)\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN,\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nPhone: 303.831.7364\n\nFax: 303.832.2628\nImenninger@hmflaw.com\njpagliuca@hmflaw.com\n\nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nApp.122\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019581\n\n", "char_count": 353}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 345, "text_content": "Case PACE ONBSOANeNt DocOmMentAe 0 Fea 70ARagehagen8 aD '\n\nCERTIFICATE OF SERVICE\n\nI certify that on September 3, 2020, I filed this Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of Court\nby mail pursuant to Section 17 of the. CM/ ECF Rules and served all parties of record by email.\n\n/s/ Nicole Simmons\n\nApp.123\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019582\n\n", "char_count": 319}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 346, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 62, 09/24/2020, 2938281, Page‘ of 2\n\n20-3061\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nfor the Second Circuit\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nPlaintiff-Appellee,\n— against —\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 20-CR-330 (AJN)\n\nAppendix Volume 2\n(Filed Under Seal)\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel. 303.831.7364\n\nAttorneys for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019583\n\n", "char_count": 551}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 347, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 62, 09/24/2020, 2938281, Page2 of 2\n\nTable of Contents\n2020.08.17 JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order................:.00 124-131\n2020.08.17 JSP Rule 16.1 Affidavit .............eeceeseceesceeeceeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeesaeeeeeeeeeees 132-133\nEx. 1 to JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order ...........ceeeeeeeees 134-140\nEx. 2 to JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order... cece 141-147\nEx. 3 to JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order ............ceeeeeeeeeeee 148-161\nEx. 4 to JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order... eee eeeeeeee 162-175\nEx. 5 to JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Ordet ...........ceeeeeeeeeeeee 176-198\nEx. 6 to JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order ..............seseeeeees 199-202\nEx. 7 to JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Ordet. ..............eeseeeee 203-205\nEx. 8 to JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order... eeeeeeeeees 206-237\nEx. 9 to JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order .............ceseseeseees 238-264\nEx. 10 to JSP Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order .............ceseeseee 265-272\n\n2020.08.21, SEALED, letter to Judge Nathan re proposed redactions and sealing\nbeseeeeceececeeseeceeeeeeeeeeseeeeeeceeseeseeceseceesseseeseseeseeseeeeeeeseeeeseeneseeseeseeseseeseuseeeens 273-285\n\n2020.08.21, letter to Judge Nathan re proposed redactions and sealing (docketed)\n\nbeseseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeesesseeeseeeeaaeeeeusssseeeseeeeaaaeeeeussseeeesseeeeaeeeeessseeeeeseseeseeeeueaseeeeeeees 286-289\n2020.08.24 JSP Ltr. Submitting Proposed Redactions Under Seal.............. 290-292\n2020.08.24 JSP Reply Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order ............ 293-298\nEx. A 2020.08.17 JSP Proposed Redactions to Ltr. re. Modification of the\n\nProtective Order ...........eecescceeseeesceesceeesceeseeecessaeeeaeeeaeeeaeeeaeeeseeenaeeeseees 299-307\n\nEx. B 2020.08.24 JSP Reply Ltr. re. Modification of the Protective Order...... 308-\n314\n\nDOJ-O\n... [truncated, 2013 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/347 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=347]", "char_count": 2013}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 348, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 63, 09/24/2020, 2938282, Page1 of 6\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500\n\nMOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT\n\nDocket Number(s): 20-3061 Caption [use short title]\n\nMotion for: 'eave to file under seal and to be excused United States v. Maxwell\n\nfrom filing redacted version of Appendix Volume\n2\n\nSet forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:\n\nSeeking: (1) leave to file under seal; (a) the unredacted version of\n\nthe opening brief; (b) Appendix Volume 2; and (c) the unredacted\n\nversion of Ms. Maxwell's response to the government's opposition\n\nto the motion to consolidate; and (2) leave not to file a redacted\n\nversion of Appendix Volume 2 on ECF because it contains only\n\nconfidential/sealed material\n\nmMovincearty: Ghislaine Maxwell opposinc party: United States of America\nPlaintiff Defendant\n[v ] Appellant/ Petitioner | Appellee/Respondent\nMovinc aTrorney: Adam Mueller opPosING ATToRNEY; Maurene Comey\n{name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]\nHaddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C. Assistant U.S. Attorney, SDNY\n150 E. 10th Ave., Denver, CO 80203 1 St. Andrew’s Plaza, New York, NY 10007\n303-831-7364 amueller@hmflaw.com 212-637-2324 Maurene.Comey@usdoj.gov\nCourt-Judge/Agency appealed from: J udge Nathan , S.D.N.Y.\nPlease check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND\nINJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:\nHas movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1): Has request for relief been made below? LK Yes H.\niv lV] ves{_ | No (explain): Has this relief been previously sought in this Court? Yes\n\nRequested return date and explanation ofemergency:\nOpposing counsel’s position on motion:\nUnopposed | lopposed [ Pon’ t Know\nDoes opposing counsel intend to file a response:\n\n[| Yes iv | te) [Don't Know\n\nIs oral argument on motion requested? [] ses No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be gr\n... [truncated, 2253 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/348 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=348]", "char_count": 2253}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 349, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 63, 09/24/2020, 2938282, Page2 of 6\n\n20-3061\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for\n\nthe Second Circuit\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nPlaintiff-A ppellee,\n—against —\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 20-CR-330 (AJN)\n\nUnopposed Motion for Leave to File under Seal and to be\nExcused from Filing Redacted Version of Appendix Volume 2\nDefendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell, through her attorneys Haddon,\nMorgan and Foreman, P.C., moves unopposed under Federal Rule of Appellate\nProcedure 25(a)(5) and Second Circuit Local Rule 25.1(j)(2) for leave to make\nthree filings under seal: (1) the unredacted version of her opening brief (filed\ntoday); (2) Appendix Volume 2 (filed today); and (3) the unredacted version of\n\nher response to the government’s opposition to the motion to consolidate (filed\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019586\n\n", "char_count": 922}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 350, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 63, 09/24/2020, 2938282, Page3 of 6\n\nyesterday). Ms. Maxwell also requests leave to be excused from publicly filing a\nredacted version of Appendix Volume 2 on ECF. As grounds for this request,\nMs. Maxwell states:\n\nThis appeal addresses an order by Judge Nathan declining to modify a\ncriminal protective order. A related case, Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413,\naddresses an order by Judge Preska unsealing certain deposition material. Ms.\nMaxwell has filed a motion to consolidate both appeals. Oral argument in both\nappeals is scheduled for October 13.\n\n1) The unredacted opening brief references material currently under seal\nand/or shielded by the criminal protective order.\n\n2) Appendix Volume 2 includes all the relevant district court material that\nis sealed/confidential under the criminal protective.\n\n3) The unredacted version of Ms. Maxwell’s response to the government’s\nopposition to the motion to consolidate makes brief reference to\nconfidential/sealed information.\n\nTo comply with the criminal protective order, Ms. Maxwell can file\nunredacted versions of this material o/y under seal with this Court.\n\nIn compliance with the criminal protective order, Ms. Maxwell will\n\npublicly file on ECF a redacted copy of her opening brief. She already filed a\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019587\n\n", "char_count": 1305}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 351, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 63, 09/24/2020, 2938282, Page4 of 6\n\nredacted copy of her response to the government’s opposition to the motion to\nconsolidate.\n\nAppendix Volume 2, however, cannot be redacted since the entirety of the\nmaterial therein is sealed/confidential.\n\nTherefore, Ms. Maxwell seeks leave to file under seal (1) the unredacted\nversion of her opening brief (filed today); (2) Appendix Volume 2 (filed today);\nand (3) the unredacted version of her response to the government’s opposition to\nthe motion to consolidate (filed yesterday). Ms. Maxwell also requests leave to be\nexcused from publicly filing a redacted version of Appendix Volume 2 on ECF.\n\nCounsel for Ms. Maxwell conferred with the government regarding this\nmotion. The government does not oppose this motion.\n\nSeptember 24, 2020.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019588\n\n", "char_count": 824}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 352, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 63, 09/24/2020, 2938282, Paged of 6\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\ns/ Adam Mueller\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel 303.831.7364\n\nFax 303.832.2628\n\ntgee@hmflaw.com\namueller@hmflaw.com\n\nCounsel for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine\nMaxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019589\n\n", "char_count": 339}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 353, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 63, 09/24/2020, 2938282, Page6 of 6\n\nCertificate of Compliance\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(g) and Rule 27(d)(2)(A), the\nundersigned counsel hereby certifies that this motion complies with the type-\nvolume limitation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As measured by the\nword processing system used to prepare this motion, there are 367 words in this\nmotion.\n\ns/ Adam Mueller\n\nCertificate of Service\n\nI certify that on September 24, 2020, I filed this Unopposed Motion for Leave\nto File under Seal and to be Excused from Filing Redacted Version of Appendix Volume 2\nwith the Court via CM/ECF, which will send notification of the filing to all counsel\nof record. I also certify that I emailed a copy of this motion to all counsel of record.\n\ns/ Nicole Simmons\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019590\n\n", "char_count": 828}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 354, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 68, 09/28/2020, 2940170, Page‘ of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE\nSECOND CIRCUIT\n\nAt a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the\nThurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 28\"\nday of September, two thousand twenty.\n\nUnited States of America,\nORDER\n\nAppellee, Docket No. 20-3061\nVv.\n\nGhislaine Maxwell, AKA Sealed Defendant 1,\n\nDefendant - Appellant.\n\nAppellant moves for leave to file three documents under seal; the unredacted version of\nthe opening brief, volume 2 of the appendix, and the reply in support of the motion to\nconsolidate appeals. Appellant also requests to be excused from publicly filing a redacted version\nof volume 2 of the appendix.\n\nIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, upon consent and absent\nobjection.\n\nFor the Court:\nCatherine O’ Hagan Wolfe,\nClerk of Court\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019591\n\n", "char_count": 942}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 355, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page’ of 15\n\n20-3061\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for\n\nthe Second Circuit\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nPlaintiff-Appellee,\n—against—\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 20-CR-330 (AJN)\n\nMs. Maxwell’s Response to the Government’s\nMotion to Dismiss Appeal\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel. 303.831.7364\n\nAttorneys for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019592\n\n", "char_count": 581}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 356, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page2 of 15\n\nBackground\n\nThis appeal challenges the district court’s order denying Ms. Maxwell’s\nmotion to modify the protective order. Ms. Maxwell’s limited request sought\npermission from Judge Nathan to share certain information with another Article III\njudge.\n\nThe government contends this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Judge\nNathan’s order. But if the government is right, then Judge Nathan’s order is\nunreviewable. The collateral order doctrine is not so rigid.\n\nWhile an interlocutory appeal is the exception and not the rule, all the\nconditions required to satisfy the collateral order doctrine exist here. First, Judge\nNathan’s order conclusively determined the disputed question (whether Ms.\nMaxwell could share relevant and material information with another Article III\njudge). Second, Judge Nathan’s order resolved an important issue completely\nseparate from the merits of the action (whether it is proper for one Article III judge,\nat the request of the government, to keep secret from a co-equal judge information\nrelevant and material to the second judge’s role in deciding a matter before her).\nAnd third, Judge Nathan’s order is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final\njudgment (by the time of a final judgment, Judge Preska’s order unsealing the\n\ndeposition material will have gone into effect and Judge Preska will have ruled on\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019593\n\n", "char_count": 1427}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 357, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page3 of 15\n\nother unsealing requests and Ms. Maxwell’s intended motion to stay the unsealing\nprocess, all without the benefit of knowing information relevant to those decisions).\n\nFinally, the exercise of jurisdiction here adheres to the purposes of the\ncollateral order doctrine. The validity of the order can be assessed now without\nwaiting until the trial is complete, and nothing about this appeal delays the criminal\ncase.\n\nAlternatively, for the reasons given below, this Court can exercise\nmandamus jurisdiction to correct the district court’s clear abuse of discretion.\n\nArgument\n\nI. This Court has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.\n\nThis Court has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review a\ndistrict court decision declining to modify the protective order. Pichler vy. UNITE,\n585 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have jurisdiction under the collateral\norder doctrine to review the denial of the motion to modify the Protective Order\nand the denial of the motion to reconsider.” ); Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity\nServs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1987) (denial of motion to modify protective\norder is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine) (citing Cohen ».\n\nBeneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949)); see also Brown ».\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019594\n\n", "char_count": 1379}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 358, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page4 of 15\n\nMaxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2019) (appeal by intervenors challenging denial of\nmotions to modify protective order and unseal).\n\nUnder the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order is immediately\nappealable if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an\nimportant issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) is\neffectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. W2/l ». Hallock, 546 U.S.\n345, 349 (2006) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,\n506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)).\n\nThe district court’s order declining to modify the protective order meets all\nthree requirements: the court conclusively decided not to modify the protective\norder, App. 99-103; the propriety of modifying the protective order is completely\nseparate from the merits of the government’s criminal allegations against Ms.\nMaxwell; and appellate review of the order will be impossible following final\njudgment because a post-judgment appeal will be moot since, by that time, Judge\nPreska’s decision unsealing the deposition material in Giuffre v. Maxwell, Nos. 20-\n2413 (2d Cir.)/15-cv-7433 (S.D.N.Y.) will have gone into effect.\n\nThat is the very point of this appeal, after all: to share with Judge Preska the\n\ncritical new information Ms. Maxwell has learned before it’s too late. All\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019595\n\n", "char_count": 1430}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 359, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Paged of 15\n\nMs. Maxwell asks is for permission to share, under seal, the relevant facts with\nanother Article III judge.\n\nThe government argues there is no jurisdiction for this Court to consider this\nappeal. Doc. 37. Quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. »v. United States, the government\nsays the collateral order doctrine must be interpreted “with the utmost strictness in\ncriminal cases.” 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465\nU.S. 259, 265 (1984)). Doc. 37 at 8. According to the government, in criminal cases\nthe doctrine applies only to orders denying a bond, orders denying a motion to\ndismiss on double jeopardy ground, orders denying a motion to dismiss under the\nSpeech and Debate Clause, and orders permitting the forced administration of\nantipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent for trial. Doc. 37 at 9. The\ngovernment is wrong.\n\nTo be sure, this appeal does not concern one of the four types of orders\nidentified by the government. But that doesn’t mean the appeal isn’t proper under\nthe collateral order doctrine, particularly when there is no serious argument that it\nsatisfies each of the doctrine’s three requirements: Judge Nathan’s order\n(1) conclusively determined the disputed question, (2) it resolved an important\nissue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) it is effectively\n\nunreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See Will, 546 U.S. at 349.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019596\n\n", "char_count": 1492}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 360, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page6 of 15\n\nIn Flanagan vy. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that an order\ndisqualifying criminal counsel pretrial was not immediately appealable under the\ncollateral order doctrine. 465 U.S. 259, 266 (1984). The Court explained that unlike\nan order denying a motion to reduce bail, which “becomes moot if review awaits\nconviction and sentence,” an order disqualifying counsel is fully remediable\nposttrial. Jd. Moreover, a motion to disqualify counsel is “not independent of the\nissues to be tried” because its “validity cannot be adequately reviewed until trial is\ncomplete.” Jd. at 268. Finally, unlike an appeal of a bail decision, “an appeal of a\ndisqualification order interrupts the trial,” and any delay in a criminal case “exacts\na presumptively prohibitive price.” Jd. at 269.\n\nUnlike the disqualification order at issue in Flanagan, the appeal of Judge\nNathan’s order is like the appeal of an order denying a motion to reduce bail. First,\nthis appeal will “become[] moot if review awaits conviction and sentence.” See zd.\nat 266. Unless Ms. Maxwell can share with Judge Preska what she learned from\nJudge Nathan, Judge Preska’s order unsealing the deposition material will go into\neffect without Judge Preska’s getting the chance to reconsider her decision in light\nof the new information. And once the deposition material is unsealed, the cat is\nirretrievably out of the bag. That is precisely why this Court stayed Judge Preska’s\n\norder pending appeal. Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413 (2d Cir.), Doc. 30.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019597\n\n", "char_count": 1592}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 361, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page? of 15\n\nSecond, the appeal of Judge Nathan’s order is entirely “independent of the\nissues to be tried” in the criminal case and its “validity can[] be adequately\nreviewed” now. See Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 268. There is nothing about\nMs. Maxwell’s request to share information with Judge Preska that must wait until\nthe criminal trial is over. To the contrary, waiting until the criminal trial is over will\nmoot the issue.\n\nThird, this appeal does not and will not delay the criminal case, which is\nproceeding apace despite the proceedings before this Court. See zd. at 264\n(explaining that interlocutory appeals in criminal cases are generally disfavored\nbecause of the “societal interest in providing a speedy trial”).\n\nThe government’s contentions to the contrary rely on two easily\ndistinguishable cases and misunderstand Ms. Maxwell’s arguments on the merits.\nStart with the two cases on which the government relies. Doc. 37, p 11 (citing\nUnited States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Pappas,\n94 F.3d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996)). According to the government, Caparros and\n\nPappas hold that “protective orders regulating the use of documents exchanged by\n\n‘ That the criminal case is proceeding on course despite this appeal confirms\nthat this appeal involves an issue completely separate from the merits of the\ncriminal action.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019598\n\n", "char_count": 1430}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 362, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page8 of 15\n\nthe parties during a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory appeal.” Doc. 37,\np 11. That is not correct.\n\nIn Caparros, this Court dismissed an appeal of a protective order issued in a\ncriminal case preventing the defendant from making public certain documents\nallegedly concerning public safety. 800 F.2d at 23-24. According to the defendant,\nthe prohibition on public disclosure was an unconstitutional prior restraint of\nspeech. Jd. at 24. This Court dismissed the appeal because it did not satisfy the\nthree conditions precedent to interlocutory review, in particular the requirement\nthat the issue must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Jd.\nat 24-26. Said the Court:\n\n[The issue] will not become moot on conviction and sentence or on\n\nacquittal because the order will have continuing prohibitive effect\n\nthereafter and the purported right to publish the documents, to the\n\nextent it now exists, will also continue. This is not a situation where an\n\norder, to be reviewed at all, must be reviewed before the proceedings\n\nterminate. Nor is there any allegation of grave harm to appellant if the\norder is not immediately reviewed.\n\nId. at 26 (internal citations omitted).\n\nThis case is not like Caparros. For one thing, Ms. Maxwell does not seek to\nmake anything public. To the contrary, she seeks to provide documents to judicial\nofficers—under seal—to ensure that all the Article III decisionmakers are on the\n\nsame page about the relevant facts and that Judge Preska does not continue to\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019599\n\n", "char_count": 1607}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 363, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page of 15\n\nremain in the dark. For another thing, this appeal mz// become moot if review awaits\na final judgment in the criminal case, even if the protective order continues to have\nprohibitive effect following the criminal trial. That’s because what Ms. Maxwell\nseeks is permission to share information with Judge Preska now, information that\nshould be part of Judge Preska’s decisionmaking in the unsealing process and any\ndecision whether to stay that process. And unless Ms. Maxwell can share the\ninformation now, the request will become moot because there is no way to “re-\nseal” a document Judge Preska prematurely unseals without the benefit of knowing\nall the facts.\n\nPappas also doesn’t help the government. In Pappas, this Court dismissed in\npart an appeal challenging a protective order prohibiting the defendant from\ndisclosing classified information he obtained from the government as part of\ndiscovery. 94 F.3d at 797. At the same time, the Court accepted jurisdiction over the\nportion of the appeal that challenged the protective order’s bar on disclosure of\ninformation the defendant acquired from the government before the litigation. Jd.\nat 798. This Court distinguished the differing results based on the breadth of the\nprotective order’s ban. /d. As this Court said, “to the extent that the order\nprohibits Pappas from disclosure of information he acquired from the Government\n\nprior to the litigation, the order is not a typical protective order regulating\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019600\n\n", "char_count": 1546}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 364, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page10 of 15\n\ndiscovery documents and should be appealable because of the breadth of its\nrestraint.” Jd. (citing United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 446-47 (2d Cir.\n1993)).\n\nBeyond standing for the proposition that interlocutory appeals are the\nexception and not the rule (which Ms. Maxwell doesn’t dispute), Pappas has\nnothing to add to the analysis here. Even strictly construing the three requirements\nfor collateral order jurisdiction, see Will, 546 U.S. at 349, the order here meets the\ntest.\n\nThe balance of the government’s argument against jurisdiction\nmisunderstands Ms. Maxwell’s position. For example, according to the\ngovernment, “it is not entirely clear that all of the issues Maxwell seeks to raise in\nthis appeal have been finally resolved.” Doc. 37, p 17. Ms. Maxwell’s argument,\nsays the government, is “primarily focused on attacking the legitimacy of the\nGovernment’s methods of obtaining evidence that it intends to use to prosecute\nthe criminal case through the Subpoenas to” the recipient. Doc. 37, p 17. Based on\nthis understanding, the government claims that Ms. Maxwell “seeks to have this\nCourt reach the merits of her arguments on that issue in the context of the cvz/\n\nappeal, and before they have been properly litigated before and adjudicated by the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019601\n\n", "char_count": 1352}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 365, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page11 of 15\n\nDistrict Court in the criminal case.” Doc. 37, p 17 (emphasis in original). That is\nnot so.\n\nIn the civil appeal, Ms. Maxwell is not asking this Court to rule on the\npropriety of the government’s conduct in circumventing Martindell. Rather, Ms.\nMaxwell’s argument in the civil appeal is that, unless this Court reverses Judge\nPreska’s order unsealing the deposition material, Ms. Maxwell may never be able to\nchallenge before Judge Nathan the government’s conduct in obtaining her\ndepositions. As Ms. Maxwell said in her opening brief in the appeal of Judge\nPreska’s unsealing order:\n\nThe civil case is not the appropriate forum to litigate the\n\ngovernment’s apparent violation of Martindell. Ms. Maxwell intends\n\nto make that argument to Judge Nathan in the criminal case. But if\n\nJudge Preska’s unsealing order is affirmed and Ms. Maxwell’s\n\ndeposition is released, her ability to make that argument before Judge\n\nNathan will be prejudiced. Keeping the deposition material sealed will\n\npreserve the status quo and protect Ms. Maxwell’s right to litigate\nMartindell and the Fifth Amendment in the criminal proceeding.\n\nGiuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413, ECF Dkt. 69, p 33. Only by mischaracterizing\n\nMs. Maxwell’s argument can the government contend that she “seeks to have this\n\nCourt reach the merits of her arguments on [the Martindell] issue in the context of\n\nthe czval appeal, and before they have been properly litigated before and adjudicated\n\nby the District Court in the criminal case.” See Doc. 37, p 17. Ms. Maxwell’s point\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019602\n\n", "char_count": 1620}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 366, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page12 of 15\n\nis that, unless the unsealing order is reversed, she likely won’t be able to “properly\nlitigate” the Martindell issue at all.\n\nNor is this appeal the proper forum for deciding whether the government\nimproperly circumvented Martindell. All Ms. Maxwell seeks here is an order\nallowing her to share with Judge Preska information that is essential to her decision\nto unseal the deposition material and to rule on a motion to stay, information Judge\nPreska did not know at the time and information the government insists should be\nkept from her. And that issue—whether it is proper for one Article III judge, at the\nrequest of the government, to keep secret from a co-equal judge information\nrelevant and material to the second judge’s role in deciding a matter before her—is\nproperly reviewed on an interlocutory basis because it is ““an important issue\ncompletely separate from the merits of the action.” Will, 546 U.S. at 349.\n\nII. Alternatively, this Court can exercise mandamus jurisdiction.\n\nAssuming Ms. Maxwell cannot appeal Judge Nathan’s order under the\ncollateral order doctrine, this Court should exercise mandamus jurisdiction and\nissue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to modify the protective order\nas requested by Ms. Maxwell. E.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass°n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1298\n(7th Cir. 1980) (declining to decide whether the collateral order applied and instead\n\nissuing a writ of mandamus to vacate a district court decision declining to modify\n\n11\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019603\n\n", "char_count": 1558}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 367, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page13 of 15\n\nprotective order), superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized in Bond v. Utreras,\n585 F.3d 1061, 1068 n.4 (7th Cir. 2009); see Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798 (recognizing that\nprotective orders in criminal cases “[i]n rare instances . . . might raise issues\navailable for review via a petition for writ of mandamus”).\n\nA writ of mandamus issued under the All Writs Act “confine[s] the court\nagainst which mandamus is sought to a lawful exercise of its prescribed\njurisdiction.” Jn re City of N.Y., 607 F.3d 923, 932 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal\nquotations omitted). A writ is properly issued when “exceptional circumstances\namount] toa...clear abuse of discretion.” /d. (internal quotations omitted).\n\nThree conditions must exist for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus:\n\n(1) the petitioner must demonstrate the right to issuance of the writ is clear and\nindisputable; (2) she must have no other adequate means to attain the relief\ndesired; and (3) the issuing court must be satisfied the writ is appropriate. In re\nRoman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., 745 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2014). All three\nconditions exist here.\n\nFirst, as explained in her opening brief, Judge Nathan clearly abused her\ndiscretion in declining to modify the protective order. Doc. 60, pp 23-33.\n\nSecond, Ms. Maxwell has no other adequate means to attain the relief\n\nnecessary because her request for Judge Preska to reevaluate her unsealing order\n\n12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019604\n\n", "char_count": 1506}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 368, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page14 of 15\n\nwith the benefit of knowing what everyone else knows will become moot once the\ndeposition material is unsealed (as this Court already recognized by staying the\nunsealing order pending appeal).\n\nFinally, it is appropriate for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus because,\nas explained in Ms. Maxwell’s motion to consolidate, the judges in the Southern\nDistrict of New York have reached inconsistent decisions to prejudice of Ms.\nMaxwell. A writ of mandamus is appropriate because only this Court can guarantee\n\nthat all the judges below are on the same page.\n\nConclusion\n\nFor these reasons, as well as those given in the opening brief, Doc. 60, pp 10-\n22, this Court should deny the government’s motion to dismiss the appeal.\n\nSeptember 28, 2020.\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019605\n\n", "char_count": 833}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 369, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 69, 09/28/2020, 2940206, Page15 of 15\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\ns/ Adam Mueller\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel 303.831.7364\n\nFax 303.832.2628\n\ntgee@hmflaw.com\namueller@hmflaw.com\n\nCounsel for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine\nMaxwell\n\nCertificate of Compliance\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(g) and Rule 27(d)(2)(A), the\nundersigned counsel hereby certifies that this response complies with the type-\nvolume limitation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As measured by the\nword processing system used to prepare this response, there are 2,842 words in this\nresponse.\n\n5/ Adam Mueller\n\nCertificate of Service\n\nI certify that on September 28, 2020, I filed this Ms. Maxwell’s Response to the\nGovernment’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Court via CM/ECF, which will\nsend notification of the filing to all counsel of record. I also certify that I emailed a\ncopy of this motion to all counsel of record.\n\ns/ Nicole Simmons\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019606\n\n", "char_count": 1057}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 370, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 77, 09/30/2020, 2941292, Page‘ of 1\nNOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR SUBSTITUTE, ADDITIONAL, OR AMICUS COUNSEL\n\nShort Title: United States v. Maxwell Docket No.: 20-3061\n\nSubstitute, Additional, or Amicus Counsel’s Contact Information is as follows:\n\nName: Karl Metzner\n\nFirm: United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York\n\nAddress: One St. Andrew's Plaza\n\nTelephone:(212) 637-2476 Fax (212) 637-2605\n\nE-mail. Karl. Metzner@usdoj.gov\n\nAppearance for; United States of America/Appellee\n\n(party/designation)\nSelect One;\n[Substitute counsel (replacing lead counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[_]Substicute counsel (replacing other counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[Vv] Additional counsel (co-counsel with: Won Shin/U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York )\n(name/firm)\n[ ]Amicus (in support of : )\n(party/ designation)\nCERTIFICATION\nI certify that:\n[vl am admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by Interim Local Rule 46.1(a)(2), have renewed\nmy admission on December 9, 2019 OR\n\n[It applied for admission on\n\nSignature of Counsel: Is\n\nType or Print Name: Karl Metzner\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019607\n\n", "char_count": 1135}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 371, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page’ of 37\n\n20-3061\n\nTo Be Argued By:\nLARA POMERANTZ\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nDocket No. 20-3061\n\n——sa-+-¢- +=\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nAppellee,\n\n—_—V.—_\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, also known as Sealed Defendant 1,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nBRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS,\n\nActing United States Attorney for\nthe Southern District of New York,\nAttorney for the United States\n\nof America.\nLARA POMERANTZ, One St. Andrew’s Plaza\nMAURENE COMEY, New York, New York 10007\nALISON MOE, (212) 637-2200\n\nKARL METZNER,\nAssistant United States Attorneys,\nOf Counsel.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019608\n\n", "char_count": 756}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 372, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page2 of 37\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nPAGE\n\nPreliminary Statement ....................0.. 1\nStatement of Facts...........0 00000 eee 2\nA. The Indictment.....................-- Z\n\nB. The Protective Order .................. 3\n\nC. The District Court Litigation............ 4\n\nD. Judge Nathan’s Order ................. 7\n\nE. Maxwell’s Appeal of the Order........... 7\n\nARGUMENT:\n\nPoINT I—This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Hear\n\nThis Appeal ........000..0..00 0... 000008. 8\nA. Applicable Law..........0......0.0.... 8\nB. Discussion ............0.00.. 00000000 ee 12\n\nPoINT I]—The District Court Did Not Abuse Its\nDiscretion in Denying Maxwell’s Motion to\n\nModify the Protective Order............... 21\nA. Applicable Law...................0.. yal\nB. Discussion ................000020 0055 23\nCONCLUSION .... 0.0.2.0... cece eee ene 30\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019609\n\n", "char_count": 890}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 373, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page3 of 37\n\nPAGE\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCases:\nAbney v. United States,\n\n431 U.S. 651 (1977)... 0. eee 10\nBrown v. Maxwell,\n\n929 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2019) .................. 14\nCheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia,\n\n542 U.S. 367 (2004)... 0.2.0.0... ......0000. 20\nCohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,\n\n3387 U.S. 541 (1949)... 0. eee 9\nCoopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,\n\n437 U.S. 463 (1978)... ee 9\nFirestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,\n\n449 U.S. 368 (1981)... 00.0.0... 00.00.0000. 11\nFlanagan v. United States,\n\n465 U.S. 259 (1984)... .....0.00....0....0.. 9,17\nFrontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer.\n\nRepublic,\n\n582 F.3d 3938 (2d Cir. 2009) ............0.0.. 26\nHL. Hayden Co. of N.Y. v. Siemens Medical Sys.,\n\nIne.,\n\n797 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1986) .................. 12\nHelstoski v. Meanor,\n\n442 U.S. 500 (1979)... 0. eee 10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019610\n\n", "char_count": 917}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 374, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page4 of 37\n\nil\n\nPAGE\n\nIn re City of N-Y.,\n\n607 F.3d 923 (2d Cir. 2010) .......00000.. 20, 21\nInre S.E.C. ex rel. Glotzer,\n\n374 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2004)... 2.2... 20\nIn re Teligent, Inc.,\n\n640 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2011)... 2... ee. 22\nKensington Int Ltd. v. Republic of Congo,\n\n461 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2006) ................. 11\nLugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga,\n\n435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) ......0..0.02000.. 14\nMidland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,\n\n489 U.S. 794 (1989)... 0.20.2... ee. 10,13\nMinpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc.,\n\n832 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1987) ................. 13\nMohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,\n\n558 U.S. 100 (2009).............. 10, 11, 16, 18\nPichler v. UNITE,\n\n585 F.3d 741 (8d Cir. 2009) ................. 13\nS.E.C. v. The Street.com,\n\n273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001) ..........0.0.0.. 22\nSell v. United States,\n\n539 U.S. 166 (2003)... ..........0.. 00020000. 10\nStack v. Boyle,\n\n3842 U.S.1(1951)........0 000... ee. 10\nUnited States v. Aliotta,\n\n199 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 1999) .. 2... ee 9\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019611\n\n", "char_count": 1081}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 375, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Paged of 37\n\n1V\nPAGE\n\nUnited States v. Calderon,\n\nNo. 15 Cr. 25 (JCH), 2017 WL 6453344\n\n(D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2017)...........000...004. 22\nUnited States v. Caparros,\n\n800 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1986) .............. passim\nUnited States v. Culbertson,\n\n598 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2010)... 2... eee. 9\nUnited States v. Elfgeeh,\n\n515 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2008) ........0000000.0. 15\nUnited States v. Guerrero,\n\n693 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012) ................ 17\nUnited States v. Hitchcock,\n\n992 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1993) ............. 11,17\nUnited States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co.,\n\n458 U.S. 263 (1982)......00...00..0....0000. 9\nUnited States v. Kerik,\n\nNo. 07 Cr. 1027 (LAP), 2014 WL 12710346\n\n(S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014).........0.......... 22\nUnited States v. Longueuil,\n\n567 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2014) .....0..0..0.... 21\nUnited States v. Martoma,\n\nNo. 13-4807, 2014 WL 68119\n\n(2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2014) ...................... 17\nUnited States v. Morales,\n\n807 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2015) ... 20.0.0. 000.0. 22\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019612\n\n", "char_count": 1050}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 376, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page6 of 37\n\nVv\nPAGE\n\nUnited States v. Nelson,\n\n277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002) .......0.002000.0. 16\nUnited States v. Pappas,\n\n94 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996) .........0.... passim\nUnited States v. Punn,\n\n737 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 2018) .....0..000.0... 10, 11\nUnited States v. Robinson,\n\n473 F.3d 487 (2d Cir. 2007) ............0.... 10\nUnited States v. Sabhnani,\n\n599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2010) .. 2.2.0... 15\nUnited States v. Wecht,\n\n484 F.3d 194 (8rd Cir. 2007) .........0.0.0.. 23\nVan Cauwenberghe v. Biard,\n\n486 U.S. 517 (1988). ............... 8, 9, 12, 16\nStatutes, Rules & Other Authorities:\n28 U.S.C. § 1291.0... 0000000000 cee 8, 16\n28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 2. eee 16, 19\nFed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)........0.000........00.. 22\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019613\n\n", "char_count": 782}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 377, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page? of 37\n\nGnited States Court of Appeals\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nDocket No. 20-3061\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nAppellee,\n\n—_—V.—\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, also known as Sealed\nDefendant 1,\n\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nBRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\nPreliminary Statement\n\nGhislaine Maxwell appeals from an order entered\non September 2, 2020, in the United States District\nCourt for the Southern District of New York, by the\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan, United States District\nJudge, denying her motion to modify a protective order\nentered by Judge Nathan.\n\nSuperseding Indictment $1 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) (the\n“Indictment”) was filed on July 8, 2020 charging Max-\nwell in six counts. The Indictment alleges that be-\ntween in or about 1994 and in or about 1997, Maxwell\nassisted, facilitated, and contributed to Jeffrey Ep-\nstein’s sexual exploitation and abuse of multiple minor\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019614\n\n", "char_count": 939}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 378, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Pages of 37\n\ngirls by, among other things, helping Epstein to re-\ncruit, groom, and ultimately abuse minor victims. The\nIndictment further alleges that in or about 2016, Max-\nwell attempted to cover up her crimes by lying under\noath about her role in Epstein’s scheme.\n\nOn July 30, 2020, upon the Government’s applica-\ntion, Judge Nathan entered a protective order govern-\ning the parties’ disclosure of information produced to\nMaxwell by the Government in discovery in the crimi-\nnal case (the “Protective Order’). The Protective Or-\nder, among other things, prohibits the use of criminal\ndiscovery materials in civil litigation. Three weeks\nlater, Maxwell moved to modify the Protective Order\nto allow Maxwell to use confidential criminal discovery\nmaterials, which were produced to Maxwell by the\nGovernment, in filings Maxwell intended to submit in\nseparate civil litigation.\n\nJudge Nathan denied Maxwell’s motion on Septem-\nber 2, 2020, holding, among other things, that Maxwell\nhad failed to establish good cause to modify the Protec-\ntive Order and failed to coherently explain how the\ncriminal discovery materials related to any argument\nMaxwell intended to make in the civil litigation.\n\nMaxwell filed a notice of appeal on September 4,\n2020.\n\nStatement of Facts\n\nA. The Indictment\n\nOn June 29, 2020, Indictment 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) was\nfiled under seal in the Southern District of New York,\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019615\n\n", "char_count": 1464}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 379, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page of 37\n\ncharging Maxwell in six counts. (A. 4).! On July 2,\n2020, Maxwell was arrested and the original indict-\nment was unsealed. (A. 4). On July 8, 2020, Supersed-\ning Indictment $1 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) was filed in the\nSouthern District of New York. (A. 6). Count One of\nthe Indictment charges Maxwell with conspiracy to en-\ntice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Two charges Max-\nwell with enticing a minor to travel to engage in illegal\nsex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 and 2. Count\nThree charges Maxwell with conspiracy to transport\nminors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Four charges Maxwell with\ntransporting minors to participate in illegal sex acts,\nin violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423 and 2. Counts Five and\nSix charge Maxwell with perjury, in violation of 18\nU.S.C. § 1623. The matter remains pending in the pre-\ntrial phase before Judge Nathan. Maxwell’s pretrial\nmotions are due on December 21, 2020, and trial has\nbeen scheduled to commence on July 12, 2021.\n\nB. The Protective Order\n\nOn July 30, 2020, upon the Government’s applica-\ntion, Judge Nathan entered the Protective Order gov-\nerning the parties’ disclosure of information produced\n\n1 “2d Cir. Dkt.” refers to an entry in this Court’s\ndocket for this case; “Br.” refers to Maxwell’s brief on\nappeal; and “A.” refers to the appendix filed with Max-\nwell’s brief. Unless otherwise noted, all case quota-\ntions omit citations, internal quotations, and previous\nalterations.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019616\n\n", "char_count": 1616}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 380, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page10 of 37\n\nin discovery in the criminal case. (A. 75-86). The Pro-\ntective Order expressly provides that any and all dis-\ncovery material produced to Maxwell by the Govern-\nment, regardless of designation, “[s]hall be used by the\nDefendant or her Defense Counsel solely for purposes\nof the defense of this criminal action, and not for any\ncivil proceeding or any purpose other than the defense\nof this action.” (Protective Order 4 1(a), 10(a), 14(a)).\nThe Protective Order further provides that any discov-\nery material produced to Maxwell by the Government\nthat is marked “confidential” may not be filed publicly\nor excerpted within any public filing. (Protective Order\n{| 15). Maxwell’s criminal defense counsel consented to\nthe foregoing provisions of the Protective Order. (See\nA. 40, 44-55).\n\nC. The District Court Litigation\n\nDespite having agreed to the prohibition on using\nthe discovery materials in civil cases, on August 17,\n2020, Maxwell asked Judge Nathan to modify the Pro-\ntective Order to allow her to do exactly that. (A. 124-\n31). In particular, Maxwell’s motion sought authoriza-\ntion to use materials relating to applications the Gov-\nernment previously made in 2019 seeking the modifi-\ncation of certain protective orders in other judicial pro-\nceedings.\n\nOn August 21, 2020, the Government filed an oppo-\nsition to Maxwell’s motion to modify the Protective Or-\nder. (A. 90-94). In its opposition, the Government ex-\nplained the factual background regarding the confi-\ndential criminal discovery materials at issue. In par-\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019617\n\n", "char_count": 1615}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 381, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page11 of 37\n\nticular, the Government explained that those discov-\nery materials related to the Government’s requests to\nmodify certain protective orders in civil cases to permit\ncompliance with grand jury subpoenas (the “Subpoe-\nnas’). (A. 91). Those Subpoenas were issued to a cer-\ntain recipient (the “Recipient”) in connection with a\ngrand jury investigation into Jeffrey Epstein and his\npossible co-conspirators. (A. 91). To maintain the in-\ntegrity of the grand jury investigation and in accord-\nance with both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\n6(e) and its standard practice, the Government did not\nnotify Maxwell or her counsel of the Subpoenas.\n(A. 91). In response to receiving the Subpoenas, the\nRecipient advised the Government that it believed\nthat certain existing protective orders precluded full\ncompliance. (A. 91). Accordingly, in or about February\n2019, the Government applied ex parte and under seal\nto each relevant court to request modification of the\nrespective protective orders to permit compliance with\nthe Subpoenas. (A. 91). In or about April 2019, one\ncourt (“Court-1”) granted the Government’s applica-\ntion, and permitted the Government to share Court-1’s\norder—and only that order, which itself prohibited fur-\nther dissemination—to the Recipient.? (A. 91). Subse-\n\n2 The Government notes that this entire litiga-\ntion took place months before Judge Preska was as-\nsigned to handle Giuffre v. Maxwell on July 9, 2019.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019618\n\n", "char_count": 1518}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 382, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page12 of 37\n\nquently, the second court (“Court-2”) denied the Gov-\nernment’s application. (A. 91). Because the relevant\ngrand jury investigation remains ongoing, both Court-\n1 and Court-2 have ordered that the filings regarding\nthe Subpoenas remain under seal, except that both\nhave expressly permitted the Government to produce\nthose filings to Maxwell as part of its discovery obliga-\ntions in this criminal case. (A. 91).\n\nAfter providing that factual background, the Gov-\nernment argued that Maxwell’s motion should be de-\nnied for failing to show good cause to modify the Pro-\ntective Order for several reasons. First, Maxwell had\nconsented to the portions of the Protective Order that\nprohibit use of criminal discovery materials produced\nby the Government in any civil litigation. (A. 91-92).\nSecond, Maxwell had cited no authority to support the\nargument that a criminal defendant should be permit-\nted to use criminal discovery in civil cases. (A. 98).\nThird, Maxwell utterly failed to explain how the crim-\ninal discovery materials at issue supported any legal\nargument she wished to make in civil litigation.\n(A. 94). The Government also noted that to the extent\nMaxwell sought to challenge the process by which the\nGovernment sought compliance with the Subpoenas\nand obtained certain materials that it intended to use\nin prosecuting its criminal case, she would have a full\n\n3 The Government notes that Court-1 granted the\nGovernment’s application first, and then the Govern-\nment provided a copy of Court-1’s decision to Court-2.\nCourt-2 then denied the Government’s application.\n(A. 207-37).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019619\n\n", "char_count": 1674}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 383, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page13 of 37\n\nopportunity to do so in her pretrial motions in the\ncriminal case before Judge Nathan. (A. 93-94).\n\nD. Judge Nathan’s Order\n\nOn September 2, 2020, Judge Nathan issued the\nOrder denying Maxwell’s motion. (A. 99-103). In that\nOrder, Judge Nathan noted that despite “fourteen-sin-\ngle spaced pages of heated rhetoric,” Maxwell had of-\nfered “no more than vague, speculative, and conclusory\nassertions” regarding why the criminal discovery ma-\nterials were necessary to fair adjudication of her civil\ncases. (A. 101). Judge Nathan concluded that absent\nany “coherent explanation” of how the criminal discov-\nery materials related to any argument Maxwell in-\ntended to make in civil litigation, Maxwell had\n“plainly” failed to establish good cause to modify the\nProtective Order. (A. 101). Further, Judge Nathan\nnoted that the basic facts Maxwell sought to introduce\nin civil litigation were already made public through\nthe Government’s letter in opposition to her motion.\n(A. 101-02). Accordingly, even though Judge Nathan\n“remain|[ed] in the dark as to why this information will\nbe relevant” to the courts adjudicating the civil cases,\nJudge Nathan expressly permitted Maxwell to inform\nthe tribunals overseeing her civil cases, under seal, of\nthe basic factual background regarding the confiden-\ntial criminal discovery materials at issue. (A. 101-02).\n\nE. Maxwell’s Appeal of the Order\n\nOn September 4, 2020, Maxwell filed a notice of ap-\npeal from the Order. (A. 121-23). On September 10,\n2020, Maxwell filed a motion to consolidate this appeal\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019620\n\n", "char_count": 1626}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 384, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page14 of 37\n\nwith the appeal currently pending in Giuffre v. Max-\nwell, No. 20-2418. (2d Cir. Dkt. 17). The Government\nis not a party to the appeal in Giuffre v. Maxwell,\nwhich concerns an order issued in a civil case unseal-\ning materials that were previously filed under seal. On\nSeptember 16, 2020, the Government filed a motion to\ndismiss Maxwell’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and\nrequested that this Court deny Maxwell’s motion for\nconsolidation (the “Motion to Dismiss’). (2d Cir. Dkt.\n37).\n\nARGUMENT\nPOINT |\n\nThis Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Hear This Appeal\n\nAs explained in the Government’s Motion to Dis-\nmiss, the final judgment rule precludes jurisdiction\nover Maxwell’s appeal of the Order. See 28 U.S.C.\n§ 1291. Maxwell fails to explain how the Order falls\nwithin the “small class” of decisions that constitute im-\nmediately appealable collateral orders. See Van Cau-\nwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 522 (1988). Accord-\ningly, this Court should dismiss Maxwell’s appeal for\nlack of appellate jurisdiction.\n\nA. Applicable Law\n\nTitle 28, United States Code, Section 1291 ex-\npressly limits the jurisdiction of Courts of Appeals to\n“final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\n“This final judgment rule requires that a party must\nordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019621\n\n", "char_count": 1386}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 385, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page15 of 37\n\nfollowing final judgment on the merits. In a criminal\ncase[,] the rule prohibits appellate review until convic-\ntion and imposition of sentence.” Flanagan v. United\nStates, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984); accord United States\nv. Aliotta, 199 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 1999). As the Su-\npreme Court has “long held,” the “policy of Congress\nembodied in this statute is inimical to piecemeal ap-\npellate review of trial court decisions which do not ter-\nminate the litigation, and ... this policy is at its\nstrongest in the field of criminal law.” United States v.\nHollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 268, 265 (1982); see\nalso Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 270 (noting “overriding pol-\nicles against interlocutory review in criminal cases”\nand that “exceptions to the final judgment rule in crim-\ninal cases are rare”); United States v. Culbertson, 598\nF.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “undue li-\ntigiousness and leaden-footed administration of jus-\ntice, the common consequences of piecemeal appellate\nreview, are particularly damaging to the conduct of\ncriminal cases’).\n\nThere is a limited exception to this rule that per-\nmits immediate appeal from certain collateral orders.\nSee Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467-\n68 (1978) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan\nCorp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)). To fall within the “small\nclass” of decisions that constitute immediately appeal-\nable collateral orders, the decision must “(1) conclu-\nsively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an\nimportant issue completely separate from the merits\nof the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on ap-\npeal from a final judgment.” Van Cauwenberghe, 486\nUSS. at 522.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019622\n\n", "char_count": 1747}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 386, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page16 of 37\n\n10\n\nThe Supreme Court has made clear that the collat-\neral order exception should be “interpreted ... with the\nutmost strictness in criminal cases.” Midland Asphalt\nCorp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989); accord\nUnited States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 487, 490 (2d Cir.\n2007). In over 70 years since Cohen was decided, de-\nspite “numerous opportunities” to expand the doctrine,\nMidland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799, the Supreme Court\nhas identified only four types of pretrial orders in crim-\ninal cases as satisfying the collateral-order doctrine:\nan order denying a bond, see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1\n(1951); an order denying a motion to dismiss on Double\nJeopardy grounds, see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.\n651 (1977); an order denying a motion to dismiss under\nthe Speech or Debate Clause, see Helstoski v. Meanor,\n442 U.S. 500 (1979); and an order permitting the\nforced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render\na defendant competent for trial, see Sell v. United\nStates, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). In contrast, the circum-\nstances in which the Supreme Court has “refused to\npermit interlocutory appeals” in criminal cases have\nbeen “far more numerous.” Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S.\nat 799.\n\nAs to the third Van Cauwenberghe criterion, “[a]n\norder is effectively unreviewable where the order at is-\nsue involves an asserted right the legal and practical\nvalue of which would be destroyed if it were not vindi-\ncated before trial.” United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1,\n5 (2d Cir. 2013). “The justification for immediate ap-\npeal must ... be sufficiently strong to overcome the\nusual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation con-\ncludes.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S.\n100, 107 (2009). A ruling that is burdensome to a party\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019623\n\n", "char_count": 1829}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 387, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page17 of 37\n\n11\n\n“in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appel-\nlate reversal of a final district court judgment is not\nsufficient.” Punn, 737 F.3d at 5. “Instead, the decisive\nconsideration is whether delaying review until the en-\ntry of final judgment would imperil a substantial pub-\nlic interest or some particular value of a high order.”\nMohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107; see also Kensington\nIntl Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 241 (2d\nCir. 2006). In a criminal case, the availability of post-\njudgment relief through reversal or vacatur of convic-\ntion, if warranted, will generally be sufficient to pro-\ntect whatever right a defendant claims was abridged\nby the district court’s pretrial decision. See, e.g., Punn,\n737 F.3d at 14 “Punn’s claim can be adequately vindi-\ncated upon appeal from a final judgment.... [I]f\nPunn’s arguments continue to fail before the district\ncourt, purportedly ill-gotten evidence or its fruits are\nadmitted at his trial, and conviction results, appellate\nreview will be available at that point[,] ... [and the\nCourt] may order a new trial without the use of the ill-\ngotten evidence, or whatever additional remedies are\nnecessary to ensure that Punn’s legitimate interests\nare fully preserved.”); United States v. Hitchcock, 992\nF.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1993) (district court’s refusal to\nseal documents not immediately appealable because\n“Irjeversal after trial, if it is warranted, will ade-\nquately protect ... interest[s]” asserted by defend-\nants).\n\nWhen applying the collateral order doctrine, the\nSupreme Court has “generally denied review of pre-\ntrial discovery orders.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.\nRisjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981). This Court likewise\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019624\n\n", "char_count": 1788}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 388, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page18 of 37\n\n12\n\nhas consistently ruled that protective orders regulat-\ning the use of documents exchanged by the parties dur-\ning a criminal case are not subject to interlocutory ap-\npeal. See, e.g., United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23,\n24 (2d Cir. 1986) (“We hold that this collateral protec-\ntive order is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291\n.... ); United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 798 (2d\nCir. 1996) (“To the extent that the [protective] order\nimposed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of mate-\nrials exchanged in the course of pending litigation, it\nis not subject to appeal.”); see also H.L. Hayden Co. of\nN.Y. v. Siemens Medical Sys., Inc., 797 F.2d 85, 90 (2d\nCir. 1986) (‘The district court’s denial of modification\n[of a protective order] does not fall within the ‘collat-\neral order’ doctrine of Cohen.”). Because “a litigant\ndoes not have an unrestrained right to disseminate in-\nformation that has been obtained through pretrial dis-\ncovery,” such protective orders do not amount to an im-\npermissible prior restraint under the First Amend-\nment. Caparros, 800 F.2d at 25. Even where a litigant\nraises a colorable argument that a protective order vi-\nolates a litigant’s right to release documents outside of\ncriminal litigation, “adjudication of any such right can\nawait final judgment on the underlying charges” be-\ncause the “purported right at issue is not related to any\nright not to stand trial.” Jd. at 26.\n\nB. Discussion\n\nMaxwell’s jurisdictional arguments run afoul of\nthis Circuit’s precedent and offer no justification for\nincluding the Order in the “small class” of decisions\nthat constitute immediately appealable collateral or-\nders. See Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 522. In her\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019625\n\n", "char_count": 1792}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 389, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page19 of 37\n\n13\n\nopening brief, Maxwell concedes that her appeal of the\nOrder does not concern one of the four types of pretrial\norders that the Supreme Court has identified as satis-\nfying the collateral order doctrine in criminal cases,\nbut she fails to offer a basis for expanding those cate-\ngories to embrace her claim here. (Br. 12.) The rights\nimplicated by the Order—namely, the use of pretrial\ndiscovery materials—do not justify expanding the lim-\nited collateral order exception, which is “interpreted\n... with the utmost strictness.” Midland Asphalt, 489\nU.S. at 799.\n\nMaxwell relies principally on three cases in seeking\nto overcome decades of Supreme Court precedent nar-\nrowly construing the exception to the requirement that\nappeals in criminal cases be from the final judgment\nof conviction. As discussed in the Government’s Motion\nto Dismiss, the cases Maxwell cites do not support the\nexistence of an exception here. All three cases involved\nappeals by intervenors—not parties—seeking to mod-\nify protective orders in civil cases. Pichler v. UNITE,\n585 F.3d 741, 745-746 (3d Cir. 2009) (third party inter-\nvenor foundation appealing order denying motion to\nmodify protective order in civil litigation to allow third\nparty access to discovery materials); Minpeco S.A. v.\nConticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir.\n1987) (Commodity Futures Trading Commission\n(“CFTC”) acting as third party intervenor appealing\norder denying motion to modify protective order in\ncivil litigation to allow CFTC to obtain discovery ex-\nchanged by parties to civil case permissible because\n“(t]he entire controversy between the CFTC and the\ndefendants in this case was disposed of by the district\ncourt’s denial of the government’s motion to modify the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019626\n\n", "char_count": 1830}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 390, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page20 of 37\n\n14\n\nprotective order’); Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46\n(2d Cir. 2019) (third party intervenors, including mem-\nbers of the press, appealing order denying motion to\nmodify protective order in civil litigation to allow third\nparties access to sealed filings, after parties to the lit-\nigation settled). Thus, appellate jurisdiction in those\ncases was founded on the principle that when interve-\nnors seek access to sealed records, “orders denying ac-\ncess are final as to the intervenors.” Lugosch v. Pyra-\nmid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2006)\n(emphasis added). Once the courts in those cases de-\nnied the intervenors’ motions to modify protective or-\nders, there was nothing left for those intervenors to lit-\nigate. Here, by contrast, Judge Nathan’s Order did not\nend the entire litigation as to Maxwell. To the con-\ntrary, Maxwell is scheduled to file pretrial motions in\nDecember 2020 and to proceed to trial in July 2021.\n\nWhen considering interlocutory appeals from rul-\nings on protective orders governing a criminal defend-\nant’s use of discovery materials, by contrast, this Court\nhas concluded it lacks jurisdiction. See Caparros, 800\nF.2d at 24; Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798. Maxwell cites no\ncase in which this Court has found jurisdiction over an\ninterlocutory appeal of an order regulating the use of\nmaterials a criminal defendant received during litiga-\ntion, and her efforts to distinguish Pappas and Capar-\nros fall short. Pappas concluded that where a protec-\ntive order “prohibits... disclosure of information [a de-\nfendant] acquired from the Government prior to the\nlitigation, the order is not a typical protective order\nregulating discovery documents and should be appeal-\nable because of the breadth of its restraint.” Pappas,\n94 F.3d at 798 (emphasis added). But that is not the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019627\n\n", "char_count": 1898}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 391, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page21 of 37\n\n15\n\ntype of protective order at issue here. To the contrary,\nthe Protective Order in this case expressly provides\nthat its provisions “shall not be construed as prevent-\ning disclosure of any information, with the exception\nof victim or witness identifying information, that is\npublicly available or obtained by the Defendant or her\nDefense Counsel form a source other than the Govern-\nment.” (A. 84-85). Instead, the Protective Order “im-\nposed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of materi-\nals exchanged in the course of pending litigation” and,\nlike the similar provision in the Pappas protective or-\nder, is therefore “not subject to appeal” prior to entry\nof final judgment. Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798.\n\nCaparros is similarly analogous. That case declined\nto find jurisdiction over a similar order for several rea-\nsons, including because “[t]he purported right at issue\nis not related to any right to stand trial.” Caparros, 800\nF.2d at 26. The Court also concluded that the protec-\ntive order in that case would be reviewable on appeal\nafter final judgment and emphasized that the defend-\nant would not suffer any “grave harm ... if the order\nis not immediately reviewed.” Jd. So too here. Maxwell\nhas not articulated any serious injury she will suffer if\nthis Court dismisses her appeal. The only theoretical\nharm might be prejudicial pretrial publicity arising\nfrom the unsealing of filings in a civil case. Should any\nprejudicial publicity arise, though, Maxwell will be\nfully able to raise that issue on appeal after the entry\nof final judgment in her criminal case. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 232-34 (2d Cir. 2010)\n(evaluating on post-judgment appeal whether public-\nity biased the venire); United States v. Elfgeeh, 515\nF.3d 100, 128-31 (2d Cir. 2008) (evaluating on post-\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019628\n\n", "char_count": 1893}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 392, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page22 of 37\n\n16\n\njudgment appeal whether publicity biased trial ju-\nrors); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201-04,\n213 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating conviction where district\ncourt improperly refused to excuse potential juror who\nadmitted bias based upon knowledge of defendant’s\nprevious acquittal). Accordingly, like the protective or-\nder in Caparros, the Order here will still be reviewable\non appeal after entry of final judgment.\n\nIn evaluating Maxwell’s appeal, the Court should\n“not engage in an individualized jurisdictional in-\nquiry,” but instead focus “on the entire category to\nwhich a claim belongs.” Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107. The\nOrder declining to modify the Protective Order is not\nsubject to interlocutory appeal as “[p]rotective orders\nthat only regulate materials exchanged between the\nparties incident to litigation, like most discovery or-\nders, are neither final orders, appealable under 28\nU.S.C. § 1291, nor injunctions, appealable under 28\nU.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798.\n\nMaxwell nevertheless asks this Court to engage in\nan individualized jurisdictional inquiry to justify her\nimmediate appeal. Contrary to Maxwell’s claims, the\nOrder does not meet the third criterion of the standard\nfor identifying immediately appealable collateral or-\nders, which requires that the order being appealed\nfrom be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a fi-\nnal judgment.” Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 522.\nShe likens her claim here to an appeal of an order\ndenying a motion to reduce bail, arguing that her ap-\npeal “will become moot if review awaits conviction and\nsentence.” (Br. 13 (quotation omitted)). But that is not\nso. In an order denying a motion to reduce bail, the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019629\n\n", "char_count": 1776}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 393, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page23 of 37\n\n17\n\n“issue is finally resolved and is independent of the is-\nsues to be tried, and the order becomes moot if review\nawaits conviction and sentence.” Flanagan, 465 U.S.\nat 266. Unlike a request for bail reduction, however,\nan order denying modification of a protective order\ndoes not become moot upon conviction and sentence.\n\n“The standard for review set forth in Flanagan is\nnot easily met,” and Maxwell has not done so here. Ca-\nparros, 800 F.2d at 25. To the extent Maxwell still\nwishes to use materials she obtained through criminal\ndiscovery for other purposes after entry of final judg-\nment in the criminal case, she can seek authorization\nfrom this Court to do so then. If Maxwell complains\nthat her inability to use criminal discovery materials\nin civil matters may result in premature unsealing or\nprejudicial pretrial publicity, she can likewise raise\nthose claims before this Court on appeal after entry of\nfinal judgment in her criminal case. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Martoma, No. 13-4807, 2014 WL 68119, at *1\n(2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2014) (concluding that even though the\ndefendant’s “personal interest in the privacy of embar-\nrassing information is an interest that, as a practical\nmatter, cannot be vindicated after disclosure,” that in-\nterest is insufficient to merit interlocutory appeal);\nUnited States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 998 (9th Cir.\n2012) (finding no jurisdiction over defendant’s inter-\nlocutory appeal from unsealing of competency evalua-\ntion because “any alleged incursions on criminal de-\nfendants’ rights to privacy and a fair trial do not ren-\nder the unsealing order effectively unreviewable on ap-\npeal”); Hitchcock, 992 F.2d at 238-39 (district court’s\nrefusal to seal documents not immediately appealable\nbecause “[rJeversal after trial, if it is warranted, will\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019630\n\n", "char_count": 1884}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 394, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page24 of 37\n\n18\n\nadequately protect ... interest[s]” asserted by defend-\nant); cf. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 109 (holding that\norders to disclose privileged information are not imme-\ndiately appealable even though they “intrude[ ] on the\nconfidentiality of attorney-client communications’). If\nMaxwell is concerned that unsealing will open up an\ninevitable discovery argument for the Government,\nshe can explain to Judge Nathan when making a sup-\npression motion how an unsealing decision would have\nbeen altered by revelation of criminal discovery mate-\nrials to the unsealing court.‘ If Maxwell is dissatisfied\nwith the result of that suppression motion, she can\nraise the issue on appeal following final judgement. In\nshort, because Judge Nathan’s Order is not effectively\nunreviewable on appeal after final judgment, Maxwell\ncannot satisfy the third prong of the collateral order\ndoctrine. ®\n\n4 Notably, though, Maxwell has not explained\nhow her desire to prevent the Government from mak-\ning an inevitable discovery argument has any bearing\non Judge Preska’s analysis of whether the First\nAmendment requires unsealing of judicial documents\nin a civil case. She offers no case law to support such\nan argument and does not articulate how her desire to\nprevent the Government from making an inevitable\ndiscovery argument impacts the unsealing analysis in\na civil case.\n\n5 In support of her argument in favor of expand-\ning the collateral order doctrine to embrace her inter-\nlocutory appeal here, Maxwell suggests that this ap-\npeal has not and will not delay the criminal case.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019631\n\n", "char_count": 1650}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 395, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page25 of 37\n\n19\n\nMaxwell nevertheless argues that reversal of the\nOrder is necessary to prevent documents in a civil case\nfrom being unsealed. As further described below, Max-\nwell fails to explain how the way the Government ob-\ntained the confidential criminal discovery materials at\nissue has any bearing on or in any way affects First\nAmendment principles governing unsealing decisions\nin a civil case. Second, and as further described below,\nMaxwell is already able to share the essential facts she\nwishes to convey under Judge Nathan’s Order. As\nsuch, she has not shown how the Order damages her\nin any way. See Caparros, 800 F.2d at 26 (without a\nshowing of serious harm, “review cannot be granted\nunder section 1292(a)(1)”).6\n\n(Br. 14). That remains to be seen. In the meantime, the\nlitigation of this appeal undoubtedly consumes the re-\nsources of the parties, who must now litigate an issue\ntwice in the middle of a pending criminal case—once\nbefore the District Court and a second time before this\nCourt. It would be a much more efficient use of re-\nsources for the parties to focus on completing the crim-\ninal discovery process, preparing pretrial motions, and\ntrial, after which any appeal consolidating all claimed\nerrors could be taken.\n\n6 As noted in the Government’s Motion to Dis-\nmiss, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) provides that Courts of\nAppeals shall have jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory\norders of the district courts of the United States ... or\nof the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying,\nrefusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dis-\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019632\n\n", "char_count": 1644}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 396, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page26 of 37\n\n20\n\nIn an attempt to sidestep the jurisdictional issue,\nMaxwell suggests that this Court should exercise man-\ndamus jurisdiction and issue the extraordinary relief\nof a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to\nmodify the Protective Order if Maxwell “cannot ap-\npeal” the Order under the collateral order doctrine.\n(Br. 20). The Supreme Court has described this as “a\ndrastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really\nextraordinary causes.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for\nDist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). This Court\nhas made clear that it “issue[s] a writ of mandamus\nonly in exceptional circumstances amounting to a judi-\ncial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion.”\nIn re City of N.Y., 607 F.3d 923, 932 (2d Cir. 2010).\n\n“Pretrial discovery orders ... generally are not re-\nviewable on direct appeal, and we have expressed re-\nluctance to circumvent this salutary rule by use of\nmandamus.” Jn re S.E.C. ex rel. Glotzer, 374 F.3d 184,\n187 (2d Cir. 2004). “Nevertheless, mandamus may be\navailable where a discovery question is of extraordi-\nnary significance or there is extreme need for reversal\nof the district court’s mandate before the case goes to\njudgment.” Jd. “To determine whether mandamus is\nappropriate in the context of a discovery ruling, we\n\nsolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct re-\nview may be had in the Supreme Court.” Orders regu-\nlating discovery in a criminal case, even if couched us-\ning “words of restraint,” are not injunctions and are\ntherefore not appealable under § 1292(a)(1). See Pap-\npas, 94 F.3d at 798; Caparros, 800 F.2d at 26.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019633\n\n", "char_count": 1691}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 397, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page27 of 37\n\n21\n\nlook primarily for the presence of a novel and signifi-\ncant question of law... and... the presence of a legal\nissue whose resolution will aid in the administration\nof justice.” In re City of N.Y., 607 F.3d at 939.\n\nAs described below, the District Court did not\nabuse its discretion in issuing the Order. This Court\nshould not issue a writ of mandamus and should in-\nstead follow its “normal practice ... to decline to treat\nimprovident appeals as mandamus petitions.” Capar-\nros, 800 F.2d at 26. This case does not raise the rare\nand exceptional circumstance in which the Court\nshould depart from its practice.\n\nPOINT Il\n\nThe District Court Did Not Abuse Its\nDiscretion in Denying Maxwell’s Motion\nto Modify the Protective Order\n\nEven if this Court had jurisdiction to hear Max-\nwell’s appeal, the Order should be summarily affirmed\nbecause the District Court did not abuse its discretion.\nThe Order—which was issued after receiving briefing\nfrom the parties—carefully evaluated Maxwell’s re-\nquest and reached a conclusion indisputably within\nthe bounds of permissible discretion.\n\nA. Applicable Law\n\nThis Court reviews a district court’s decision deny-\ning modification of a protective order for abuse of dis-\ncretion. See, e.g., United States v. Longueuil, 567 F.\nAppx 18, 16 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that the district\ncourt did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019634\n\n", "char_count": 1464}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 398, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page28 of 37\n\npee\n\nto vacate a protective order); S.E.C. v. The Street.com,\n273 F.3d 222, 228-29 (2d Cir. 2001) (reviewing the dis-\ntrict court’s order lifting its protective order covering\ndeposition testimony for abuse of discretion). “A dis-\ntrict court abuses or exceeds the discretion accorded to\nit when (1) its decision rests on an error of law (such\nas application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly\nerroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision—though\nnot necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly\nerroneous factual finding—cannot be located within\nthe range of permissible decisions.” Id.\n\nUnder the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,\nthe District Court is vested with broad discretion to\noversee the criminal discovery process, including en-\ntering protective orders “for good cause [that] deny, re-\nstrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other\nappropriate relief.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d). Courts over-\nseeing criminal cases in this Circuit have borrowed\nfrom the standard governing modification of protective\norders in civil cases, in which there is a “strong pre-\nsumption against the modification of a protective or-\nder.” In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2011).\nSee, e.g., United States v. Kerik, No. 07 Cr. 1027 (LAP),\n2014 WL 12710346, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (ap-\nplying civil standard for modification of protective or-\nder in criminal case and holding that modification of\nRule 16 protective order is “‘presumptively unfair’ ”\nwhere a party reasonably relied upon the order); see\nalso United States v. Calderon, No. 15 Cr. 25 (JCH),\n2017 WL 6453344, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2017);\nUnited States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir.\n2015) (borrowing from the standard for “good cause”\nunder Fed. R. Civ. P 26(c) when evaluating whether to\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019635\n\n", "char_count": 1884}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 399, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page29 of 37\n\n23\n\nmodify a protective order entered in a criminal case);\nUnited States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 211 (8rd Cir.\n2007) (same).\n\nB. Discussion\n\nJudge Nathan did not abuse her discretion when\nentering the challenged Order. In reaching her deci-\nsion, Judge Nathan applied the correct legal standard,\nevaluated Maxwell’s argument that she needed to dis-\nclose certain criminal discovery materials to the rele-\nvant judicial officers to “ensure the fair adjudication of\nissues being litigated in those civil matter,” found that\nMaxwell’s proffered reasons for the request were\n“vague, speculative, and conclusory,” and concluded\nthat Maxwell’s arguments “plainly fail to establish\ngood cause.” (A. 101). At no point did Judge Nathan\nfail to apply established law, and it cannot be said that\nher careful review of the parties’ arguments was not\nwithin the bounds of permissible discretion.\n\nFirst, Maxwell still fails to articulate any legal ba-\nsis for the use of discovery material received from the\nGovernment in a criminal case to litigate a separate\ncivil case. Maxwell expressly consented to the entry of\na Protective Order prohibiting her from using criminal\ndiscovery materials in civil litigation.7 In her motion\nto modify that Protective Order, Maxwell cited no legal\nauthority for the use of criminal discovery in civil liti-\ngation. Her appeal points to no such authority, and she\n\n7 Maxwell did so knowing that the Government\nhad charged her with perjury in connection with civil\ncases.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019636\n\n", "char_count": 1575}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 400, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page30 of 37\n\n24\n\ndoes not suggest that Judge Nathan committed legal\nerror when issuing the Order denying her motion.\n\nSecond, Judge Nathan did not abuse her discretion\nwhen determining that Maxwell had offered no basis\nfor determining that good cause justified a modifica-\ntion of the Protective Order. In her briefing before the\nDistrict Court, Maxwell offered no coherent explana-\ntion of how the criminal discovery materials could\nhave any conceivable impact on the issues pending in\ncivil litigation. She cited no case law suggesting that,\nfor example, the possibility of an inevitable discovery\nargument by the Government should foreclose unseal-\ning in a civil case, or that unsealing analysis should be\naffected by a concern about pretrial publicity in a sep-\narate criminal case. In the absence of any such expla-\nnation, Judge Nathan’s Order declining to modify the\nProtective Order did not amount to an abuse of her\nbroad discretion when overseeing an ongoing criminal\ncase.\n\nEven on this appeal, Maxwell still fails to explain\nwhy she needs to use materials relating to the Govern-\nment’s applications seeking the modification of certain\nprotective orders in other judicial proceedings. As far\nas the Government is aware, the only issue pending in\nthe civil litigation in which Maxwell seeks to use those\ncriminal discovery materials involves whether the\nFirst Amendment requires that certain filings in those\ncases be made available on the public docket. Maxwell\ncannot explain why certain criminal discovery materi-\nals are relevant to the issues pending in those cases or\nhow the manner in which the Government obtained\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019637\n\n", "char_count": 1702}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 401, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page31 of 37\n\n25\n\ncertain discovery materials would impact the unseal-\ning analysis under First Amendment principles in a\ncivil matter. Even if Maxwell were correct that the way\nin which the Government obtained the materials was\nimproper—and she is not—that fact would have no\nbearing on the analysis of whether materials in certain\ncivil cases should be unsealed. Maxwell cites not a sin-\ngle case to support the conclusion that her desire to\nprevent the Government from raising an inevitable\ndiscovery argument in suppression litigation should\nimpact the unsealing analysis in a civil case. She offers\nno coherent argument for how the criminal discovery\nmaterials would impact any decision in a civil case.\n\nAt bottom, it remains unclear what legal argument\nMaxwell wishes to make in her civil cases based on the\ncriminal discovery materials she has identified or\nwhat relevance those materials have to the litigation\nof those civil matters. Accordingly, Judge Nathan did\nnot abuse her discretion when concluding that Max-\nwell “furnishe[d] no substantive explanation regarding\nthe relevance of the Documents to decisions to be made\nin those matters, let alone any explanation of why\nmodifying the protective order in order to allow such\ndisclosure is necessary to ensure the fair adjudication\nof those matters.” (A. 101).\n\nIn pressing for a different result here, Maxwell ar-\ngues that “if the deposition material is unsealed, it\nmay foreclose” any of her arguments to Judge Nathan\nabout the perjury counts or other remedies available\nto Maxwell based on the Government’s alleged circum-\nvention of Second Circuit law. (Br. 27). Maxwell claims\nthat “all [she] seeks in this appeal is the ability to\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019638\n\n", "char_count": 1770}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 402, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page32 of 37\n\n26\n\nmake these arguments to Judge Preska and Judge Na-\nthan before it’s too late.” (Br. 27-28). To the extent\nMaxwell seeks to challenge the manner in which the\nGovernment obtained the materials at issue—a chal-\nlenge that itself would not justify the relief presently\nrequested—Maxwell can make such arguments before\nJudge Nathan, and the Government can and will vig-\norously oppose them, at the appropriate stage in the\ncase.\n\nIf anything, this appeal appears to be a thinly\nveiled attempt to have this Court weigh in on the Gov-\nernment’s investigative methods. Her briefing is filled\nwith accusations of impropriety on the part of the Gov-\nernment but with virtually no explanation of how that\nsupposed impropriety relates to any civil case. It ap-\npears that Maxwell would like this Court to agree that\nthe Government illegally obtained evidence before the\nissue has even been briefed before Judge Nathan. This\nCourt’s precedents do not countenance such efforts to\nbypass district courts. See, e.g., Frontera Res. Azer.\nCorp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d\n393, 401 (2d Cir. 2009) (because issue “ha[d] not been\ndecided” by district court, “it would be premature for\nus to address this question without hearing first from\nthe court below”). Maxwell presents no sound reason\nto deviate from precedent here, nor is one readily ap-\nparent. Maxwell is fully capable of litigating any sup-\npression motions in the District Court, and will have\nan opportunity to do so.\n\nMaxwell suggests that the “very point of this ap-\npeal” is to share information with Judge Preska under\nseal. (Br. 11). She asks that this Court permit her to\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019639\n\n", "char_count": 1728}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 403, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page33 of 37\n\n27\n\n“tell Judge Preska what happened and let Judge\nPreska decide whether the information weighs against\nunsealing the deposition material or in favor of a stay.”\n(Br. 31). To the extent Maxwell seeks to inform Judge\nPreska—or any other judicial officer—of the basic facts\nsurrounding the criminal prosecution and the criminal\ndiscovery materials at issue, the District Court has al-\nready granted Maxwell the supposed relief she seeks\nfrom this Court. Although the District Court did not\nmodify the Protective Order, Judge Nathan authorized\nMaxwell to convey, under seal, to the appropriate ju-\ndicial officer the fact that the Government obtained an\norder from Court-1 permitting the Recipient to comply\nwith a subpoena for materials covered by a protective\norder, that Court-2 subsequently denied similar relief\nin another case, and that Maxwell “learned of this in-\nformation (sealed by other courts) as a result of Rule\n16 discovery in this criminal matter.” (A. 101-02). If\nthe “very point” of Maxwell’s request to seek a modifi-\ncation of the Protective Order was to share infor-\nmation and not to challenge the legality of the Govern-\nment’s investigative techniques, then her appeal is\nmoot because Judge Nathan has already granted her\npermission to do so. Maxwell does not explain why\nthose facts are not enough.\n\nDespite those available avenues, Maxwell still ar-\ngues that she cannot move to stay the unsealing pro-\ncess before Judge Preska and “thereby safeguard her\nright to a fair trial in the criminal case.” (Br. 29). As\nalready noted, though, it is a matter of public record\nthat the charges against Maxwell include allegations\nof perjury in civil cases. (A. 27-29). Without relying on\nany materials she received through criminal discovery,\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019640\n\n", "char_count": 1839}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 404, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page34 of 37\n\n28\n\nMaxwell can argue on the public record that unsealing\nthe materials would have a prejudicial effect on her\nright to a fair trial. To the extent Maxwell complains\nthat unsealing filings in a civil case may result in un-\nfair pretrial publicity in her criminal case, she will\nhave the opportunity to request that the District Court\nestablish practices to help ensure she gets a fair and\nimpartial jury.’ If she is displeased with those efforts,\n\n8 Maxwell makes much of the Government hav-\ning moved to intervene and stay the proceedings in Doe\nvu. Indyke, noting that the Government has not moved\nto intervene in Giuffre v. Maxwell, to stay the unseal-\ning process. (Br. 29). Maxwell suggests that the Gov-\nernment’s decision to not do so is motivated by “un-\nprincipled” reasons. (Br. 29-30). Setting Maxwell’s\nconspiracy theories aside, Doe v. Indyke and Giuffre v.\nMaxwell are in completely different procedural pos-\ntures, which implicate different concerns regarding a\npending criminal case. The latter was resolved in 2017\nand the determination of what material should remain\nsealed remains the only open issue. Accordingly, there\nis no more discovery to be conducted in the Giuffre case\nand no possible concern to the Government that, for\nexample, its trial witnesses in the criminal case might\nbe deposed in that civil case. Additionally, the fact that\na document may be unsealed through an independent\nprocess before Judge Preska would not reveal the Gov-\nernment’s investigative focus or techniques.\n\nIn Doe v. Indyke, on the other hand, discovery was\njust beginning, and if discovery were to have pro-\nceeded, multiple witnesses or potential witnesses at\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019641\n\n", "char_count": 1750}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 405, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page35 of 37\n\n29\n\nshe can appeal to this Court following the entry of final\njudgment in the criminal case.\n\nMaxwell presented Judge Nathan with no coherent\nreason—not to mention good cause—to modify the\nduly entered Protective Order in this criminal case. In\nthe absence of any explanation of Maxwell’s need to\nuse criminal discovery materials to litigate a civil case,\nJudge Nathan was well within her discretion when de-\ntermining that Maxwell’s arguments “plainly fail to es-\ntablish good cause.” (A. 101). Judge Nathan’s Order\nfalls comfortably within the range of permissible deci-\nsions on a motion to modify a protective order, and so\nshe did not abuse her discretion in so ruling.\n\nthe criminal trial would likely have been subject to\ndeposition. That concern, among others, raised a sig-\nnificant risk that proceeding with the civil matter\nwould adversely affect the ongoing criminal prosecu-\ntion against Maxwell. Moreover, the interests of judi-\ncial economy and the public interest in enforcement of\nthe criminal law were served by a stay in the Doe case\nbecause the outcome of the criminal case could resolve\ndisputed issues in the Doe case. Such concerns are not\npresent in Giuffre v. Maxwell.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019642\n\n", "char_count": 1275}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 406, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page36 of 37\n\n30\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nThe District Court’s order denying Maxwell’s\nmotion to modify the Protective Order should be\n\naffirmed.\n\nDated: |New York, New York\nOctober 2, 2020\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS,\nActing United States Attorney for the\nSouthern District of New York,\nAttorney for the United States\n\nof America.\n\nLARA POMERANTZ,\nMAURENE COMEY,\nALISON MOE,\nKARL METZNER,\nAssistant United States Attorneys,\nOf Counsel.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019643\n\n", "char_count": 505}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 407, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page37 of 37\n\nCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\n\nPursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure\n32(g), the undersigned counsel hereby certifies that\nthis brief complies with the type-volume limitation of\nthe Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and this\nCourt’s Local Rules. As measured by the word pro-\ncessing system used to prepare this brief, there are\n7,287 words in this brief.\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS,\nActing United States Attorney for the\nSouthern District of New York\n\nBy: KARL METZNER,\nAssistant United States Attorney\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019644\n\n", "char_count": 581}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 408, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 83, 10/02/2020, 2944305, Page1 of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\nORAL ARGUMENT STATEMENT (Local Rule 34.1(a))\n\nTO REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT, FILL OUT THIS FORM AND FILE IT WITH THE CLERK\nWITHIN 14 DAYS AFTER THE FILING OF THE LAST APPELLEE BRIEF.\nIF THIS FORM IS NOT TIMELY FILED, YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO ARGUE IN PERSON.\n\nShort Title of Case: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell Docket No.: 20-3061\n\nName of Party: United States of America\n\nStatus of Party (e.g., appellant, cross-appellee, etc.): Appellee\n\nCheck one of the three options below:\n\n| want oral argument. An attorney whose preference depends on whether other\n\nY attorneys will argue should consider conferring before\n| want oral argument only if requesting argument. After the appeal has been\nat least one other party does. scheduled for oral argument, a motion by counsel to forgo\noral argument, even on consent, may be denied.\n\n| do not want oral argument.\n\nIf no party wants oral argument, the case will be decided on the basis of the written briefs. If you want oral\nargument, you must appear in Court on the date set by the Court for oral argument.\n\nThe Court may determine to decide a case without oral argument even if the parties request it.\n\nIf you want oral argument, state the name of the person who will argue:\n\nName: Lara Pomerantz\n\n(An attorney must be admitted to practice before the Court in accordance with Local Rule 46.1.)\n\nIf you want oral argument, list any dates (including religious holidays), that fall in the interval from 6 to 20 weeks\nafter the due date of this form, that the person who will argue is not available to appear in Court:\n\nANYONE WHO WANTS TO ARGUE MUST UPDATE THE COURT IN WRITING OF ANY CHANGE IN\nAVAILABILITY. THE COURT MAY CONSIDER A FAILURE TO UPDATE ABOUT AVAILABILITY WHEN\nDECIDING A MOTION TO POSTPONE A SET ARGUMENT DATE.\n\nFiled by:\nLara Pomerantz Date: 10/2/2020\n\nPrint Name:\n\nSignature: s/ Lara Pomerantz\n\n(Revised December 2011)\n\nDO\n... [truncated, 2016 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/408 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=408]", "char_count": 2016}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 409, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 91, 10/07/2020, 2947381, Page‘ of 1\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, NY 10007\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\nDate: October 07, 2020 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 20-3061er DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nNOTICE OF MOTION PLACED ON THE CALENDAR\n\nA motion for consolidation filed in the above-referenced case has been added as an argued case\nto the substantive motions calendar for Tuesday, October 13, 2020 at 2:00pm (Via\nTeleconference). The argument will be held in the Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse, New\nYork, NY 10007, 17\" floor, Room 1703.\n\nInquiries regarding this case may be directed to 212-857-8595.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019646\n\n", "char_count": 852}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 410, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page’ of 23\n\n20-3061\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nfor the Second Circuit\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\nPlaintiff-Appellee,\n\n— against —\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\n\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 20-CR-330 (AJN)\n\nGhislaine Maxwell’s Reply Brief\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel. 303.831.7364\n\nAttorneys for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019647\n\n", "char_count": 550}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 411, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page2 of 23\n\nTable of Contents\nTable of Contents ...........c:ccccsccssssecsseeessseeesseecsneeesaeeesaeessnesesaeeesaeessueeesaeeesanessaeeesgs i\nTable of Authorities .............c:ccccsccssscesssrecsseeessseecsaeecsacecesaeeesaneceaeeessaeeesanessaneeseaeensas il\nTintrOduction..........cccccsscccesceeesceesseecssnecssceeesaeecsaceseaeeesenecsacesesaeeesanessaeeseeaeessaueseaeeeesas 1\n[ere THAN, nen. emcees omens MONS SIMA NON RRL OL SES ESOT SMEAR RE EE 2\nPPB UMCN bisncenss scsasrs soma. sonnei sania nRGIOR SRRRAS STR SI RR SRNR ARE HON aN 13\nG ATG eee nas. ARNE LA KAS A RA RS AOR RO AOR RA AK 18\nCertificate of Compliance with Rule 32(A) ..........ssseseseseeeseeeeeeeeneeeeeeseeaeeseenes 20\nCertificate of Service.........cccccccscessssecsssecsssceesnecsseeeeseeecsacecesaeeesaeecsaneesseeeseenessaneees 20\ni\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019648\n\n", "char_count": 888}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 412, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page3 of 23\n\nTable of Authorities\nCases\nBrown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2019) ........sessessesseeseeseeeeeeeeseeeeeeeeeeseneens 8, 16\nIn re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2011).........:esesseseeeeseeseeseeseeseeeessaeeseeaeeneees 1\n\nMartindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979)\n\nsesseeaceseessesseeaeeseeseessessesaeeaeeseesseseeaeaeeseeseesseeaeeaeeaeeseeseeeseaeeaeeseeaeesaseaeeaseneees passim\nNixon v. Warner Commens, 435 U.S. 589 (1978) ....ecscsessssesseseesesssssssessesseeseesseanes 16\nPuerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993)..... 2\nUnited States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1986).........csssssssscesseseeeeeeeeeseeseeseeeee 5\nUnited States v. Sells Engg, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983) ......cscccscescesseeeceeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 14\nLGA ee SIAN, BAG LIB BAR TOG) corns sence: sees SORCS BHOETRST SRO THREE SEO SEE 2,7\nStatutes\n\nDAB Joos VDI sss comcast KARO AN KARR LAE KAS LAN AS CA EO x 3\nRules\n\nFed. R. Crim. P. 6(€)...... ce eeessesessessesseesceseeseeesesseeseeseeseeseseaeeaeeseeseeseseaeeaeeaeeneees 13, 14\n\nConstitutional Provisions\nU.S. CONST. amend. V......eeeecceesceeseeeeceeeseeeseeesceeaeeeaeeeseeeaeesaeeeseeseaeesaeeenneesae® 9,16\n\nU.S. CONST. amend. VI ou.....eccceeeececccccssseecccccesseecccccusseccccceuseecccccucescccseaseesceesauseess 16\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019649\n\n", "char_count": 1433}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 413, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page4 of 23\n\nIntroduction\n\nThe government’s brief suffers from two fundamental flaws. It obscures the\nrelief Ms. Maxwell actually seeks, and it confuses the arguments she actually\nmakes.\n\nAs to the relief she seeks, Ms. Maxwell’s request is specific and narrow: She\nseeks permission to share relevant information, under seal, with other Article III\njudicial officers, specifically Judge Preska and the panel of this Court deciding the\nappeal of Judge Preska’s order unsealing the civil deposition material, Gruffre v.\nMaxwell, No. 20-2413. Only by obscuring what Ms. Maxwell actually seeks can the\ngovernment claim with a straight face that this appeal won’t be moot if this Court\ndeclines to exercise jurisdiction now.\n\nAs to the arguments she makes, there are several (fairly obvious) reasons\nwhy Judge Preska and this Court should know just how prosecutors obtained the\ndeposition material and who turned it over to them. If Judge Preska knew this\ninformation, she might very well decline to unseal Ms. Maxwell’s deposition\ntranscripts to protect Ms. Maxwell’s ability in the criminal case to litigate the\ngovernment’s violation of Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,\n594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), cited with approval in In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 58\n\n(2d Cir. 2011). She might also reconsider whether Ms. Maxwell reasonably relied\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019650\n\n", "char_count": 1430}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 414, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Paged of 23\n\non the civil protective order’s guarantee of confidentiality in declining to invoke\nher Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.\nInstead of fairly addressing these arguments, however, the government\n\nretreats to the claim that Ms. Maxwell “does not articulate” or “does not explain”\n\nwhy Judge Preska and this Court need to know\nB15 0.4 &\n\n27. But just because the government lacks a persuasive response does not mean Ms.\nMaxwell hasn’t explained or articulated herself.\n\nThe question then is what could justify keeping Judge Preska and this Court\nin the dark about the relevant facts. And if that’s the question, the government’s\nbrief provides no answer.\n\nJurisdiction\n\nThere are three conditions to seeking interlocutory review under the\ncollateral order doctrine: The order on appeal must (1) conclusively determine the\ndisputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the\nmerits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final\njudgment. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct &\n\nSewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)). The government\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019651\n\n", "char_count": 1226}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 415, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page6 of 23\n\ndoes not appear to dispute that Judge Nathan’s order satisfies the first two\nconditions.\"\n\nInstead, the government focuses on the third condition, arguing that Ms.\nMaxwell can appeal Judge Nathan’s order after her criminal jury trial. Ans.Br. 16.\nBut the government can make this argument only by obscuring the relief Ms.\nMaxwell actually seeks.\n\nTo be clear, Ms. Maxwell seeks permission to share with Judge Preska and\n\nthis Court, under seal, just what the government obtained iy\n\n‘ Perhaps suggesting that Judge Nathan’s order is not “final,” the\ngovernment notes that the order “did not end the entire litigation as to [Ms.]\nMaxwell. To the contrary, [Ms.] Maxwell is scheduled to file pretrial motions in\nDecember 2020 and to proceed to trial in July 2021.” Ans.Br. 14.\n\nThis is just a truism, as no one disputes that “Judge Nathan’s Order did not\nend the entire litigation.” If it had, Ms. Maxwell would have invoked this Court’s\njurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\n\nBut it is because “Judge Nathan’s Order did not end the entire litigation”\nthat Ms. Maxwell invokes the collateral order doctrine as a basis for this Court’s\njurisdiction. And in evaluating the applicability of that doctrine, the government\ndoes not appear to dispute that Judge Nathan’s order “conclusively determined\nthe disputed question”: Whether the criminal protective order should be modified.\nThat is all “finality” requires in the collateral order context.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019652\n\n", "char_count": 1520}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 416, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page? of 23\n\nes 201! how it obtained it (by circumventing\n\nthis Court’s decision in Martindell).\n\nJudge Preska needs that information now, not later, because her order\nunsealing the deposition material is about to go into effect and because she is poised\nto decide whether and to what extent to keep unsealing the sealed material in the\ncivil case. Che panel of this Court reviewing\nJudge Preska’s order needs that information now, not later, because it is poised to\nreview Judge Preska’s order unsealing the deposition material without the benefit\nof knowing all the relevant information. And unless this Court is privy to the\nrelevant information, it won’t be able to decide whether Judge Preska should\nreconsider her order given ee. Vis.\nMaxwell simply asks this Court to review these issues now, before it’s too late.\n\nA post-trial appeal will be too late. By that time, if this Court affirms Judge\nPreska’s unsealing order without the benefit of knowing all the facts, Ms.\nMaxwell’s April 2016 deposition will be publicly released. By that time, Judge\nPreska will have largely if not entirely decided what other material from the civil\ncase should be unsealed. By that time, it will be too late for Ms. Maxwell to seek a\nstay of the unsealing process and fairly explain why a stay is appropriate. And by\n\nthat time, there won’t be a way to “re-seal” material prematurely released to the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019653\n\n", "char_count": 1459}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 417, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Pages of 23\n\npublic.* Op.Br. 16. (distinguishing United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23 (2d Cir.\n1986)).\n\nThe government argues that Ms. Maxwell can wait until after the criminal\ntrial to challenge whether, for example, Judge Preska’s unsealing decisions produce\nunfair pretrial publicity in the criminal case. But a panel of this Court considering\nan appeal in the criminal case presided over by Judge Nathan won’t have any\njurisdiction to review orders entered by Judge Preska in the civil case. The time for\nreviewing Judge Preska’s unsealing order in the civil case is right now in the appeal\nof Judge Preska’s order, Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413.\n\nThe government also argues that, in a post-trial appeal, Ms. Maxwell can\nchallenge the government’s conduct in obtaining Ms. Maxwell’s deposition\n\ntranscripts and the use of those transcripts as a basis for two perjury counts.\n\n* This Court should accordingly reject the government’s argument that “[t]o\nthe extent Maxwell still wishes to use materials she obtained through criminal\ndiscovery for other purposes after entry of final judgment in the criminal case, she\ncan seek authorization from this Court to do so then.” Ans.Br. 17.\n\nSimilarly, the government misunderstands the relief Ms. Maxwell seeks\nwhen it contends that “[i]f Maxwell complains that her inability to use criminal\ndiscovery materials in civil matters may result in premature unsealing ..., she\ncan... raise [that] claim[] before this Court on appeal after entry of final judgment\nin her criminal case.” Ans.Br. 17. A post-final-judgment appeal will do no good\nbecause there is no way to “re-seal” material already unsealed and no way to\nretroactively stay an unsealing process that is largely if not entirely complete.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019654\n\n", "char_count": 1815}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 418, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page of 23\n\nAns.Br. 18. But as Ms. Maxwell explained in her opening brief, if Judge Preska\norders the deposition transcripts unsealed, the government will invoke Judge\nPreska’s order as a shield against its improper conduct. Op.Br. 27-28, 30. The\ngovernment will argue that it would have inevitably discovered Ms. Maxwell’s\ndeposition transcripts or that any improper conduct on its part was ultimately\nharmless. Op.Br. 30. Conspicuously, the government in the answer brief never\ndenies that it will make such an argument. Ans.Br. 18 & n.4.\n\nThe government responds that if Ms. Maxwell “is concerned that unsealing\nwill open up an inevitable discovery argument for the Government, she can explain\nto Judge Nathan when making a suppression motion how an unsealing decision\nwould have been altered by revelation of criminal discovery materials to the\nunsealing court.” Ans.Br. 18. This is fanciful thinking.\n\nIf this Court affirms Judge Preska’s decision unsealing the deposition\nmaterial, Judge Nathan likely will not (cannot?) reject an inevitable discovery\nargument from the government. Judge Nathan is not going to second-guess Judge\nPreska’s decision to unseal the deposition material if this Court affirms its release.\nThis, of course, explains why the government has not moved to intervene in Giuffre\nyp. Maxwell, No. 15-cv-7433 (S.D.N.Y.), to stay the unsealing process, or to oppose\n\nthe unsealing of the deposition material. Because Judge Preska and the panel of this\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019655\n\n", "char_count": 1543}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 419, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page10 of 23\n\nCourt reviewing Judge Preska’s decision deserve to know nov (iii\n\n, a post-trial appeal is insufficient.\n\nThis Court, therefore, has jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, because\nJudge Nathan’s order is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.\nSee Will, 546 U.S. at 349.\n\nIn its final argument, the government says Ms. Maxwell “fails to explain how\nthe way the Government obtained the confidential criminal discovery materials at\nissue has any bearing on or in any way affects First Amendment principles\ngoverning unsealing decisions in a civil case.” Ans.Br. 19. The government also\nclaims that Ms. Maxwell “is already able to share the essential facts she wishes to\nconvey under Judge Nathan’s Order.” Ans.Br. 19. Neither contention has merit.\n\nThe first contention is a retread of the government’s response to Ms.\nMaxwell’s motion to consolidate, in which the government professed not to\n\nunderstand the relationship between the two cases. Doc. 39, pp 19-21, {J 26-27.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019656\n\n", "char_count": 1082}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 420, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page11 of 23\n\nES An Ms. Maxwell’s\n\ndeposition testimony in the civil case provides the substantive basis for two of the\nsix charges she faces. App. 27-29.\n\nAs explained in Ms. Maxwell’s opening brief, Doc. 60, her motion to\n\nconsolidate, Doc. 17, and the reply in support, Doc. 54, i\n\nFor example, in balancing the qualified First Amendment presumption of access (a\npresumption that is significantly less as applied to the deposition material than the\nsummary judgment material this Court released in Brown v. Maxwell), Judge Preska\nand this Court must evaluate countervailing considerations including, most\nprominently, Ms. Maxwell’s reliance on the civil protective order. Giuffre v.\nMaxwell, No. 20-2413, Doc. 40, pp 21-23.\nee \\\\s. Giuffre’s attorneys repeatedly used the existence of the\ncivil protective order to deflect Ms. Maxwell’s arguments about her right to\nprivacy, her right against self-incrimination, and her concern that Ms. Giuffre\nwould use documents in the civil action to support a criminal investigation. Gzuffre\nvy. Maxwell, No. 20-2413, Doc. 111, p 20. Ms. Maxwell then did not invoke her Fifth\n\nAmendment right to remain silent and instead testified at two depositions. Jd.\n\nMs. Gin fire’ s attorneys\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019657\n\n", "char_count": 1292}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 421, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page12 of 23\n\nrepeatedly downplayed the risk of a criminal investigation iii\n\nES Ms. M2xwell’s reliance on the\n\nprotective order, an unquestionably valid factor weighing against unsealing, is all\n\nthe more apparent once it is evaluated in its full context. That context now\n\nincludes: the grand jury investigation; as\n\nThe information Ms. Maxwell wants to share with Judge Preska and this\nCourt is also relevant to show how the government bypassed Martindell. While this\nCourt (in either appeal) need not pass on the propriety of the government’s\nconduct, preserving Ms. Maxwell’s right to litigate that issue before Judge Nathan\n\nis essential to her due process right to a fair trial. U.S. CONST. amend. V. If the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019658\n\n", "char_count": 782}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 422, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page13 of 23\n\ndeposition material is prematurely released, as the government so clearly desires,\nMs. Maxwell’s ability to make the Martindell argument will be compromised.*\nThird, Ms. Maxwell intends to move Judge Preska to stay future unsealing\n\npending the outcome of the criminal case. But she cannot fairly make her case to\n\nJudge Preska unless Judge Preska knows\nee Judge Preska and the panel\n\nof this Court deciding the unsealing appeal are the only relevant actors who don’t\nknow the relevant facts.\n\nThe government’s second contention—that Ms. Maxwell can already share\nthe “basic facts” with Judge Preska—misunderstands what Ms. Maxwell seeks to\nshare (under seal and not publicly) and what Judge Nathan’s order permits (not\nvery much). According to the government, Ms. Maxwell is free to share the\nidentity of “Court-1” and “Court-2” and\n\nthe fact that the Government obtained an order from Court-1\n\npermitting the Recipient to comply with a subpoena for materials\n\n3 Surely due process does not contemplate a scenario in which Ms. Maxwell\nis never permitted to challenge\nee. But that’s apparently the government’s position. Ms. Maxwell\n\ndid not know of the JM proceeding before I, so she\ncouldn’t argue against i. Vis. Maxwell did not\nknow when [iii so she couldn’t appeal\n\nAnd if Judge Preska’s unsealing order goes into effect, the government will seek to\ndeny Ms. Maxwell the right to challenge its conduct before Judge Nathan.\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019659\n\n", "char_count": 1513}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 423, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page14 of 23\n\ncovered by a protective order, that Court-2 subsequently denied\nsimilar relief in another case, and that Maxwell “learned of this\ninformation (sealed by other courts) as a result of Rule 16 discovery in\nthis criminal matter.”\n\nAns.Br. 27 (quoting App. 101-02). If only it were so simple.\nWhat the government doesn’t acknowledge is that, under the protective\n\norder and Judge Nathan’s decision declining to modify it, Ms. Maxwell cannot:\n\n¢ Disclose who the “Recipient” is is\nee:\n\ne Disclose what material the government obtained iy\nSCC;\n\ne Disclose that the bulk of the government’s criminal case against\nMs. Max! s\nSC\n\ne Disclose why MY (Court-2) declined the government’s\nSS ct es\nSC\n\n11\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019660\n\n", "char_count": 771}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 424, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page15 of 23\n\ne Disclose why iE (Court-1) granted the government’s\nES «<<:\neS\n\nThe “basic facts” Ms. Maxwell is allowed to share thus do not include the\n“material facts.”\nXK ok\n\nThe collateral order doctrine is, admittedly, the exception and not the rule.\nIts purpose is to avoid delay and piecemeal appeals.* But it’s not as inflexible as the\ngovernment suggests, and its application is not oblivious to reality. It is a practical\ndoctrine that exists for those few cases in which a post-trial appeal is inadequate to\nthe task and the issue for immediate appeal is separable from the merits. This\n\nappeal, novel as it is, falls within those parameters.°\n\n* Although the government says it “remains to be seen” whether this appeal\nwill delay the criminal case, it offers no specifics or even speculation about how\nsuch a delay might be occasioned. Ans.Br. 19 n.5. To be clear, this appeal has\nnothing to do with the merits of the government’s allegations against Ms. Maxwell,\nand it will not delay the criminal trial.\n\n> As for Ms. Maxwell’s alternative request that this Court exercise\nmandamus jurisdiction, the government’s brief denies that Judge Nathan abused\nher discretion but doesn’t otherwise contend that this Court may exercise\nmandamus jurisdiction. Ans.Br. 20-21. Because, as explained below, Judge Nathan\nabused her discretion, this Court should issue a writ of mandamus if it concludes\nthat it lacks jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.\n\n12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019661\n\n", "char_count": 1536}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 425, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page16 of 23\n\nArgument\n\nApart from obscuring the relief Ms. Maxwell actually seeks, the other major\nfeature of the government’s brief is its confusion of the arguments Ms. Maxwell\nactually makes on the merits. And nothing is more illustrative of the government’s\nconfusion than this fact: The answer brief doesn’t even cite this Court’s decision in\nMartindell.\n\nThe closest the government comes to acknowledging Ms. Maxwell’s\nargument is to say this: “To maintain the integrity of the grand jury investigation\nand in accordance with both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) and its\nstandard practice, the Government did not notify Maxwell or her counsel of the\nSubpoenas.” Ans.Br. 5. But standard practice doesn’t justify circumventing a\nthirty-year-old decision of this Court, which required notice to Ms. Maxwell.\nMartindell, 594 F.2d at 294; App. 368-69\n\nMoreover, nothing in Rule 6(e) relieved the government of its burden to\ncomply with Martindell by seeking to intervene in the civil case or by otherwise\ngiving Ms. Maxwell notice of the subpoena and an opportunity to move to quash.\n\n»D «\n\nRule 6(e)(2)(vi) says that “an attorney for the government” “must not disclose a\n\nmatter occurring before the grand jury.” The\n\nee «Was not a “matter occurring before the grand jury.” And\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019662\n\n", "char_count": 1361}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 426, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page17 of 23\n\nnothing prohibited MT from informing Judge Preska and Ms. Maxwell\nabout the subpoena; Rule 6(e) does not apply to grand jury witnesses. United States\nvy. Sells Eng’s, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 425 (1983).\n\nDespite the government’s attempt (once again) to mischaracterize Ms.\nMaxwell’s argument,’ this Court need not in this case wade into the propriety of\nthe government’s conduct. All Ms. Maxwell seeks is the preservation of her ability\nto challenge the government’s conduct before Judge Nathan. This Court should\npermit Ms. Maxwell a fair opportunity to persuade Judge Preska and the panel of\nthis Court reviewing her order that the status quo should be preserved.\n\nThe government again implies that because Ms. Maxwell consented to the\nprotective order she can’t now complain that it should be modified. Ans.Br. 23-\n\n24.’ The government points out that, at the time of her consent, Ms. Maxwell knew\n\n© The government says that Ms. Maxwell’s brief “appears to be a thinly\nveiled attempt to have this Court weigh in on the Government’s investigative\nmethods.” Ans.Br. 26. That is not so. All Ms. Maxwell seeks is the ability to fairly\nchallenge before Judge Nathan the government’s “investigative methods.” As the\ngovernment does not dispute, that challenge will be compromised unless the\ndeposition material remains sealed. But Judge Preska and the panel of this Court\nreviewing Judge Preska don’t know that, and the government wants to keep it that\nway.\n\n” Moreover, the purpose of the criminal protective order’s prohibition on\nusing criminal discovery in a civil case is to prevent the introduction of new\ninformation in a civil case to gain an advantage. Ms. Maxwell’s requested\n\n—footnote cont’d on next page —\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019663\n\n", "char_count": 1798}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 427, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page18 of 23\n\n“the Government had charged her with perjury in connection with civil cases.”\n\nAns.Br. 23 n.7. But knowing that the government had copies of her depositions is a\n\nfar cry from knowing [es\neee Vis. Maxwell’s original consent to the\n\ncriminal protective order is irrelevant to this appeal.\n\nThe government next argues that Ms. Maxwell has not offered a “coherent\nexplanation of how the criminal discovery materials could have any conceivable\nimpact on the issues pending in civil litigation.” Ans.Br. 24. To the contrary, Ms.\nMaxwell has repeatedly explained why the criminal discovery is relevant to Judge\nPreska and the panel of this Court reviewing Judge Preska’s order. Op.Br. 26-33.\n\nIn addition to the reasons identified above, This Brief, supra at 7-10, Judge\nPreska simply never had before her the full picture when deciding whether to\nunseal the deposition material. So Judge Preska never considered the government’s\nposition that the sealed material should not be released because it might prejudice\n\nthe ongoing investigation. Nor did she consider Judge Nathan’s view, embodied in\n\nmodification of the criminal protective order is fully consistent with that purpose,\nbecause she seeks only: (1) to share relevant information with Judge Preska; (2)\n\nunder seal; (3) iS ; and (4) to facilitate Judge\n\nPreska in performing a non-merits task assigned to her by this Court.\n\n15\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019664\n\n", "char_count": 1463}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 428, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page19 of 23\n\nthe criminal protective order, that J should not be used except in\nthe criminal case and therefore should not be released publicly.®\n\nThis Court tasked Judge Preska with evaluating whether and to what extent\nthe civil case filings should be unsealed considering the totality of the\n\ncircumstances. Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 47 & n.13 (2d Cir. 2019). Judge\n\nPreska is performing this task ignorant of the fact that\nes Unless the criminal\n\nprotective order is modified, Judge Preska will remain in the dark, and she will\nnever be given the opportunity to consider the circumstances in their totality.\n\nThe government appears to have abandoned the argument it made to Judge\nNathan that modifying the protective order threatens the secrecy of the ongoing\ngrand jury investigation. Op.Br. 31-32. And for good reason. Ms. Maxwell has\nnever sought to make public material the criminal protective order shields from\n\ndisclosure. All she seeks is permission to share, under seal, information aaa\n\n® The government’s view that | should not be released,\nand Judge Nathan’s order to that effect, also lend support to Ms. Maxwell’s\ncontention that the release of the deposition material by Judge Preska\nwill unfairly prejudice her right to a fair\ntrial by an impartial jury. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; Vixon ». Warner\nComme?ns, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).\n\n16\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019665\n\n", "char_count": 1435}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 429, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page20 of 23\n\nPe 2:{fre v. Maxwell but kept secret from Judge Preska and this\nCourt.\n\nFinally, the government offers a halfhearted defense of its decision to\nintervene in Doe v. Indyke, No. 20-cv-00484 (S.D.N.Y.), while choosing to remain\non the sidelines of Giuffre v. Maxwell. Ans.Br. 28-29 n.8. According to the\ngovernment, there is no need to intervene in Giuffre v. Maxwell because discovery\nwas already completed while discovery in Doe v. Indyke was just beginning. But this\n\ndistinction ignores the government’s position on the confidentiality of the criminal\n\ndiscovery material in this case. Again, [as\nIn the criminal case, the government insists iii\nes, SO secret in fact\n\nthat Ms. Maxwell must not be allowed to share their contents with Judge Preska or\n\nthis Court, even under seal. But if that’s right, then the government should oppose\n\nunsealing any filings from Giuffre . Mann] —Ex-—-——————————e\nIS 1 goverment, of course,\n\nhasn’t done that, and its answer brief offers o explanation why. The reason,\n\n17\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019666\n\n", "char_count": 1089}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 430, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page21 of 23\n\nthough, is obvious: The government wants to shield itself from Ms. Maxwell’s\nforthcoming motion before Judge Nathan challenging its circumvention of\nMartindell. This Court should not prejudge the Martindell issue as the government\nseeks.\nConclusion\n\nAt bottom, when asked to justify why Judge Preska and this Court should\nremain in the dark, the government offers little more than this: because the\nprotective order says so. But in the face of all the reasons why the relevant judicial\ndecision makers should have all the relevant information, the government’s answer\nis not good enough.\n\nThis Court should reverse the district court’s order denying Ms. Maxwell’s\nmotion to modify the protective order.\n\nOctober 8, 2020.\n\n18\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019667\n\n", "char_count": 806}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 431, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page22 of 23\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\ns/ Adam Mueller\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel 303.831.7364\n\nFax 303.832.2628\n\ntgee@hmflaw.com\namueller@hmflaw.com\n\nCounsel for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine\nMaxwell\n\n19\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00019668\n\n", "char_count": 346}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 432, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 94, 10/08/2020, 2948481, Page23 of 23\n\nCertificate of Compliance with Rule 32(A)\n\nThis brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App.\nP. 32(a)(7)(B). It contains 4,096 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted\nby Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(III).\n\nThis brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App.\nP. 32(a)(5) and the typestyle requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6). It has been\nprepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14 pt.\nEquity.\n\n5/ Adam Mueller\n\nCertificate of Service\n\nI certify that on October 8, 2020, I filed Ms. Maxwell’s Reply Brief with the\nCourt via CM/ECF, which will send notification of the filing to all counsel of\nrecord.\n\ns/ Nicole Simmons\n\n20\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019669\n\n", "char_count": 783}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 433, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 95, 10/08/2020, 2948488, Page1 of 5\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500\n\nMOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT\n\nDocket Number(s): 20-3061 Caption [use short title]\n\nLeave to File Unredacted Reply Brief Under Seal United States v. Maxwell\n\nMotion for:\n\nSet forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:\n\nSeeking leave to file under seal Ms. Maxwell's\n\nreply brief. The brief references materials\n\ncurrently under seal and/or shielded by the\n\ncriminal protective order.\n\nmMovincearty: Ghislaine Maxwell opposinc party: United States of America\nPlaintiff Defendant\n[v ] Appellant/ Petitioner | Appellee/Respondent\nMovinc aTrorney: Adam Mueller opposinc aTTorney: Lara Pomerantz\n{name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]\nHaddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C. Assistant U.S. Attorney, SDNY\n150 E. 10th Ave., Denver, CO 80203 1 St. Andrew’s Plaza, New York, NY 10007\n303-831-7364 amueller@hmflaw.com 212-637-2324 Lara.Pomerantz@usdoj.gov\nCourt-Judge/Agency appealed from: J udge Nathan , S.D.N.Y.\nPlease check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND\nINJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:\nHas movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1): Has request for relief been made below? LK Yes H.\niv lV] ves{_ | No (explain): Has this relief been previously sought in this Court? Yes\n\nRequested return date and explanation ofemergency:\nOpposing counsel’s position on motion:\nUnopposed | lopposed [ Pon’ t Know\nDoes opposing counsel intend to file a response:\n\n[| Yes iv | te) [Don't Know\n\nIs oral argument on motion requested? [ ]yes No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)\n\nHas argument date of appeal been set? [| Yes No Ifyes, enter date:\n\nSignature of Moving Attorney:\ns/ Adam Mueller Date: 10/08/2020 Service by: MVlowecr Lotner [ Attach proof of service]\n\nForm T-1080 (rev. 12-13)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019670\n\n", "char_count": 2000}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 434, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 95, 10/08/2020, 2948488, Page2 of 5\n\n20-3061\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for\n\nthe Second Circuit\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nPlaintiff-A ppellee,\n—against —\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 20-CR-330 (AJN)\n\nUnopposed Motion for Leave to File Unredacted Reply Brief\nunder Seal\nDefendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell, through her attorneys Haddon,\nMorgan and Foreman, P.C., moves unopposed for leave to file her unredacted\nreply brief under seal. As grounds for this request, Ms. Maxwell states:\nThis appeal addresses an order by Judge Nathan declining to modify a\n\ncriminal protective order. A related case, Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413,\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019671\n\n", "char_count": 778}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 435, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 95, 10/08/2020, 2948488, Page3 of 5\n\naddresses an order by Judge Preska unsealing certain deposition material. Ms.\nMaxwell has filed a motion to consolidate both appeals.\n\nThe unredacted reply brief references material currently under seal and/or\nshielded by the criminal protective order.\n\nTo comply with the criminal protective order, Ms. Maxwell can file the\nunredacted version of the reply only under seal with this Court.\n\nIn compliance with the criminal protective order, Ms. Maxwell will\npublicly file on ECF a redacted copy of her reply brief.\n\nCounsel for Ms. Maxwell conferred with the government regarding this\nmotion. The government does not oppose this motion.\n\nFor these reasons, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests leave to file her\nunredacted reply brief under seal.\n\nOctober 8, 2020.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019672\n\n", "char_count": 841}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 436, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 95, 10/08/2020, 2948488, Page4 of 5\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\ns/ Adam Mueller\n\nTy Gee\n\nAdam Mueller\n\nHADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nTel 303.831.7364\n\nFax 303.832.2628\n\ntgee@hmflaw.com\namueller@hmflaw.com\n\nCounsel for Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine\nMaxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019673\n\n", "char_count": 339}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 437, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 95, 10/08/2020, 2948488, Paged of 5\n\nCertificate of Compliance\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(g) and Rule 27(d)(2)(A), the\nundersigned counsel hereby certifies that this motion complies with the type-\nvolume limitation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As measured by the\nword processing system used to prepare this motion, there are 168 words in this\nmotion.\n\ns/ Adam Mueller\n\nCertificate of Service\n\nI certify that on October 8, 2020, I filed this Unopposed Motion for Leave to\nFile Unredacted Reply Brief under Seal with the Court via CM/ECF, which will send\nnotification of the filing to all counsel of record. I also certify that I emailed a copy\nof this motion to all counsel of record.\n\ns/ Nicole Simmons\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019674\n\n", "char_count": 780}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 438, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 96, 10/08/2020, 2948491, Page‘ of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\nORAL ARGUMENT STATEMENT (Local Rule 34.1(a))\n\nTO REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT, FILL OUT THIS FORM AND FILE IT WITH THE CLERK\nWITHIN 14 DAYS AFTER THE FILING OF THE LAST APPELLEE BRIEF.\nIF THIS FORM IS NOT TIMELY FILED, YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO ARGUE IN PERSON.\n\nShort Title of Case: United Statesv.Maxwell Docket No.: 20-3061\n\nStatus of Party (e.g., appellant, cross-appellee, etc.): Appellant\n\nCheck one of the three options below:\n\nae | want oral argument. An attorney whose preference depends on whether other\nattorneys will argue should consider conferring before\n| want oral argument only if requesting argument. After the appeal has been\nat least one other party does. scheduled for oral argument, a motion by counsel to forgo\n\noral argument, even on consent, may be denied.\n\n| do not want oral argument.\n\nIf no party wants oral argument, the case will be decided on the basis of the written briefs. If you want oral\nargument, you must appear in Court on the date set by the Court for oral argument.\n\nThe Court may determine to decide a case without oral argument even if the parties request it.\n\nIf you want oral argument, state the name of the person who will argue:\nName: Adam Mueller\n(An attorney must be admitted to practice before the Court in accordance with Local Rule 46.1.)\n\nIf you want oral argument, list any dates (including religious holidays), that fall in the interval from 6 to 20 weeks\nafter the due date of this form, that the person who will argue is not available to appear in Court:\n\nANYONE WHO WANTS TO ARGUE MUST UPDATE THE COURT IN WRITING OF ANY CHANGE IN\nAVAILABILITY. THE COURT MAY CONSIDER A FAILURE TO UPDATE ABOUT AVAILABILITY WHEN\nDECIDING A MOTION TO POSTPONE A SET ARGUMENT DATE.\n\nFiled by:\nPrint Name: Adam Mueller pate: 10/08/2020\nSignature: s/ Adam Mueller\n\n(Revised December 2011)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019675\n\n", "char_count": 1956}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 439, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 99, 10/09/2020, 2948846, Page‘ of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE\nSECOND CIRCUIT\n\nAt a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at\nthe Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on\nthe 9\" day of October, two thousand nineteen,\n\nUnited States of America, ORDER\nDocket No. 20-3061\nAppellee,\nV.\n\nGhislaine Maxwell, AKA Sealed Defendant 1,\n\nDefendant - Appellant.\n\nIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion by Appellant for leave to file the unredacted\nreply brief under seal is GRANTED without prejudice to review by the panel in due course.\n\nFor The Court:\n\nCatherine O'Hagan Wolfe,\nClerk of Court\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019676\n", "char_count": 723}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 440, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 104-1, 10/19/2020, 2955206, Page‘ of 4\n\n20-3061\nUmited States v. Marcell\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\nSUMMARY ORDER\n\nRulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed\non or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate\nProcedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a\ndocument filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an\nelectronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order\nmust serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.\n\nAt a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at\nthe Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,\non the 19\" day of October, two thousand twenty.\n\nPRESENT: Jose A. CABRANES,\nROSEMARY S. POOLER,\nREENA RAGGI,\nCircuit Judges.\n\nUNITED STATES,\n\nAppellee, 20-3061-cr\nVv.\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\nFOR APPELLEE: LARA POMERANTZ, Assistant United\n\nStates Attorney (Maurene Comey, Alison\nMoe, and Karl Metzner, Assistant United\nStates Attorneys, on the brief), for Audrey\nStrauss, Acting United States Attorney,\nSouthern District of New York, New\nYork, NY.\n\nFOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: ADAM MUELLER (Ty Gee, on the brie)),\n\nHaddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.,\nDenver, CO.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019677\n\n", "char_count": 1437}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 441, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 104-1, 10/19/2020, 2955206, Page2 of 4\n\nAppeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New\nYork (Alison J. Nathan, Judge).\n\nUPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,\nADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to consolidate is DENIED and the appeal is\nDISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.\n\nDefendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell seeks interlocutory relief from a September 2, 2020\ndenial of her motion to modify a protective order entered on July 30, 2020. In the alternative, she\nargues that this Court should issue a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to modify the\nprotective order. She also moves to consolidate the instant appeal with the appeal pending in Gzuffre\nv. Maxwell, No. 20-2413. Meanwhile, the Government moves this Court to dismiss the appeal for\nlack of jurisdiction and opposes Maxwell’s motion to consolidate on the grounds that the issues\npresented on appeal are both factually and legally distinct. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the\nunderlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.\n\nThis Court has jurisdiction over the “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\n“Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure.”\nCobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940). The “final judgment rule requires that a party\nmust ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits.”\nFlanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This\ninsistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue litigiousness and leaden-\nfooted administration of justice, particularly damaging to the conduct of criminal cases.” D7 Bella v.\nUnited States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962) (citing Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 324-26). The final judgment rule\nis therefore “at its strongest in the field of criminal law.” United Stat\n... [truncated, 3257 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/441 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=441]", "char_count": 3257}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 442, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 104-1, 10/19/2020, 2955206, Page3 of 4\n\nunreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013)\n\n(internal quotation marks omitted).\n\nThus far, the Supreme Court has identified just four circumstances in criminal cases that\ncome within this exception: motions to dismiss invoking double jeopardy, motions to reduce bail,\nmotions to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause, and the forced administration of\nantipsychotic medication. See Se// v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (holding that an order\npermitting the forced administration of antipsychotic medication is immediately appealable), see a/so\nMidland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799 (listing the recognized exceptions). Maxwell does not appeal from\nan order falling within one of these categories. Instead, she appeals from a denial of her motion to\nmodify a protective order, which we have held does not fall within the collateral order exception. See\nMohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107-08 (2009) (holding that pretrial discovery orders are not\nimmediately appealable absent a showing that “delaying review until the entry of a final judgment\nwould imperil a substantial public interest or some particular value of a high order” (internal\nquotation marks omitted)); S.E.C. ». Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the\nCourt lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory “discovery orders allegedly adverse to a claim of\nprivilege or privacy”); United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the Court\nlacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory protective orders governing “the right of a criminal\ndefendant to disclose information given to [her] in discovery”). We decline to exercise jurisdiction\n\nwhere we have none, and accordingly dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\n\nIn the alternative, Maxwell asks that this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the\nDistrict Court to modify the protective order. This C\n... [truncated, 3654 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/442 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=442]", "char_count": 3654}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 443, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 104-1, 10/19/2020, 2955206, Page4 of 4\n\nappeal concerns an unsealing order. Further, as the District Court correctly noted, Maxwell\n“provide[s] no coherent explanation” connecting the discovery materials at issue in the criminal case\n\nto the civil litigation.\nCONCLUSION\n\nWe have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Defendant-Appellant Maxwell on appeal\nand find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED and the\nmotion to consolidate is DENIED as moot.\n\nAny appeal in this criminal case shall be referred to another panel in the ordinary course.\n\nFOR THE COURT:\nCatherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019680\n\n", "char_count": 675}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 444, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 104-2, 10/19/2020, 2955206, Page1 of 1\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\nDate: October 19, 2020 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 20-3061 cr DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nBILL OF COSTS INSTRUCTIONS\n\nThe requirements for filing a bill of costs are set forth in FRAP 39. A form for filing a bill of\ncosts is on the Court's website.\n\nThe bill of costs must:\n\nbe filed within 14 days after the entry of judgment;\n\nbe verified;\n\nbe served on all adversaries;\n\nnot include charges for postage, delivery, service, overtime and the filers edits;\n\nidentify the number of copies which comprise the printer's unit;\n\ninclude the printer's bills, which must state the minimum charge per printer's unit for a page, a\ncover, foot lines by the line, and an index and table of cases by the page;\n\n* state only the number of necessary copies inserted in enclosed form;\n\n* state actual costs at rates not higher than those generally charged for printing services in New\nYork, New York; excessive charges are subject to reduction;\n\n* be filed via CM/ECF or if counsel is exempted with the original and two copies.\n\n* *+ * * * *\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019681\n\n", "char_count": 1385}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 445, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 104-3, 10/19/2020, 2955206, Page1 of 1\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\nDate: October 19, 2020 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 20-3061 cr DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nVERIFIED ITEMIZED BILL OF COSTS\n\nCounsel for\n\nrespectfully submits, pursuant to FRAP 39 (c) the within bill of costs and requests the Clerk to\nprepare an itemized statement of costs taxed against the\n\nand in favor of\n\nfor insertion in the mandate.\n\nDocketing Fee\n\nCosts of printing appendix (necessary copies )\nCosts of printing brief (necessary copies )\nCosts of printing reply brief (necessary copies )\n(VERIFICATION HERE)\n\nSignature\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019682\n\n", "char_count": 884}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 446, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 105, 10/19/2020, 2955220, Page’ of 4\n\n20-3061\nUmited States v. Marcell\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\nSUMMARY ORDER\n\nRulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed\non or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate\nProcedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a\ndocument filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an\nelectronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order\nmust serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.\n\nAt a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at\nthe Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,\non the 19\" day of October, two thousand twenty.\n\nPRESENT: Jose A. CABRANES,\nROSEMARY S. POOLER,\nREENA RAGGI,\nCircuit Judges.\n\nUNITED STATES,\n\nAppellee, 20-3061-cr\nVv.\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\nFOR APPELLEE: LARA POMERANTZ, Assistant United\n\nStates Attorney (Maurene Comey, Alison\nMoe, and Karl Metzner, Assistant United\nStates Attorneys, on the brief), for Audrey\nStrauss, Acting United States Attorney,\nSouthern District of New York, New\nYork, NY.\n\nFOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: ADAM MUELLER (Ty Gee, on the brie)),\n\nHaddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.,\nDenver, CO.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019683\n\n", "char_count": 1435}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 447, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 105, 10/19/2020, 2955220, Page2 of 4\n\nAppeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New\nYork (Alison J. Nathan, Judge).\n\nUPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,\nADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to consolidate is DENIED and the appeal is\nDISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.\n\nDefendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell seeks interlocutory relief from a September 2, 2020\ndenial of her motion to modify a protective order entered on July 30, 2020. In the alternative, she\nargues that this Court should issue a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to modify the\nprotective order. She also moves to consolidate the instant appeal with the appeal pending in Gzuffre\nv. Maxwell, No. 20-2413. Meanwhile, the Government moves this Court to dismiss the appeal for\nlack of jurisdiction and opposes Maxwell’s motion to consolidate on the grounds that the issues\npresented on appeal are both factually and legally distinct. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the\nunderlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.\n\nThis Court has jurisdiction over the “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\n“Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure.”\nCobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940). The “final judgment rule requires that a party\nmust ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits.”\nFlanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This\ninsistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue litigiousness and leaden-\nfooted administration of justice, particularly damaging to the conduct of criminal cases.” D7 Bella v.\nUnited States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962) (citing Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 324-26). The final judgment rule\nis therefore “at its strongest in the field of criminal law.” United States\n... [truncated, 3255 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/447 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=447]", "char_count": 3255}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 448, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 105, 10/19/2020, 2955220, Page3 of 4\n\nunreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013)\n\n(internal quotation marks omitted).\n\nThus far, the Supreme Court has identified just four circumstances in criminal cases that\ncome within this exception: motions to dismiss invoking double jeopardy, motions to reduce bail,\nmotions to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause, and the forced administration of\nantipsychotic medication. See Se// v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (holding that an order\npermitting the forced administration of antipsychotic medication is immediately appealable), see a/so\nMidland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799 (listing the recognized exceptions). Maxwell does not appeal from\nan order falling within one of these categories. Instead, she appeals from a denial of her motion to\nmodify a protective order, which we have held does not fall within the collateral order exception. See\nMohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107-08 (2009) (holding that pretrial discovery orders are not\nimmediately appealable absent a showing that “delaying review until the entry of a final judgment\nwould imperil a substantial public interest or some particular value of a high order” (internal\nquotation marks omitted)); S.E.C. ». Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the\nCourt lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory “discovery orders allegedly adverse to a claim of\nprivilege or privacy”); United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the Court\nlacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory protective orders governing “the right of a criminal\ndefendant to disclose information given to [her] in discovery”). We decline to exercise jurisdiction\n\nwhere we have none, and accordingly dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\n\nIn the alternative, Maxwell asks that this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the\nDistrict Court to modify the protective order. This Cou\n... [truncated, 3652 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/448 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=448]", "char_count": 3652}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 449, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 105, 10/19/2020, 2955220, Page4 of 4\n\nappeal concerns an unsealing order. Further, as the District Court correctly noted, Maxwell\n“provide[s] no coherent explanation” connecting the discovery materials at issue in the criminal case\n\nto the civil litigation.\nCONCLUSION\n\nWe have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Defendant-Appellant Maxwell on appeal\nand find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED and the\nmotion to consolidate is DENIED as moot.\n\nAny appeal in this criminal case shall be referred to another panel in the ordinary course.\n\nFOR THE COURT:\nCatherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019686\n\n", "char_count": 673}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 450, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 106, 10/19/2020, 2955223, Page‘ of 1\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\n\nDate: October 19, 2020 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 20-3061 cr DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nNOTICE OF CASE MANAGER CHANGE\nThe case manager assigned to this matter has been changed.\n\nInquiries regarding this case may be directed to 212-857-8541.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019687\n\n", "char_count": 600}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 451, "text_content": "\\] NDA TE 1/09/2020, 2970926, Page of 4\n\n20-3061\nUmited States v. Marcell\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\nSUMMARY ORDER\n\nRulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed\non or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate\nProcedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a\ndocument filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an\nelectronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order\nmust serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.\n\nAt a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at\nthe Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,\non the 19\" day of October, two thousand twenty.\n\nPRESENT: Jose A. CABRANES,\nROSEMARY S. POOLER,\n\nREENA RAGGI,\nCircuit Judges.\nUNITED STATES,\nAppellee, 20-3061-cr\nv.\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant.\nFOR APPELLEE: LARA POMERANTZ, Assistant United\nStates Attorney (Maurene Comey, Alison\nMoe, and Karl Metzner, Assistant United\nStates Attorneys, on the brief), for Audrey\nStrauss, Acting United States Attorney,\nSouthern District of New York, New\nYork, NY.\nFOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: ADAM MUELLER (Ty Gee, on the brie)),\nHaddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C.,\nDenver, CO.\n\nMANDATE ISSUED ON 11/09/2020\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019688\n\n", "char_count": 1440}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 452, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 109, 11/09/2020, 2970926, Page2 of 4\n\nAppeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New\nYork (Alison J. Nathan, Judge).\n\nUPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,\nADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to consolidate is DENIED and the appeal is\nDISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.\n\nDefendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell seeks interlocutory relief from a September 2, 2020\ndenial of her motion to modify a protective order entered on July 30, 2020. In the alternative, she\nargues that this Court should issue a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to modify the\nprotective order. She also moves to consolidate the instant appeal with the appeal pending in Gzuffre\nv. Maxwell, No. 20-2413. Meanwhile, the Government moves this Court to dismiss the appeal for\nlack of jurisdiction and opposes Maxwell’s motion to consolidate on the grounds that the issues\npresented on appeal are both factually and legally distinct. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the\nunderlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.\n\nThis Court has jurisdiction over the “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.\n“Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure.”\nCobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940). The “final judgment rule requires that a party\nmust ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits.”\nFlanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This\ninsistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue litigiousness and leaden-\nfooted administration of justice, particularly damaging to the conduct of criminal cases.” D7 Bella v.\nUnited States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962) (citing Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 324-26). The final judgment rule\nis therefore “at its strongest in the field of criminal law.” United States\n... [truncated, 3255 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/452 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=452]", "char_count": 3255}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 453, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 109, 11/09/2020, 2970926, Page3 of 4\n\nunreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013)\n\n(internal quotation marks omitted).\n\nThus far, the Supreme Court has identified just four circumstances in criminal cases that\ncome within this exception: motions to dismiss invoking double jeopardy, motions to reduce bail,\nmotions to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause, and the forced administration of\nantipsychotic medication. See Se// v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (holding that an order\npermitting the forced administration of antipsychotic medication is immediately appealable), see a/so\nMidland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799 (listing the recognized exceptions). Maxwell does not appeal from\nan order falling within one of these categories. Instead, she appeals from a denial of her motion to\nmodify a protective order, which we have held does not fall within the collateral order exception. See\nMohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107-08 (2009) (holding that pretrial discovery orders are not\nimmediately appealable absent a showing that “delaying review until the entry of a final judgment\nwould imperil a substantial public interest or some particular value of a high order” (internal\nquotation marks omitted)); S.E.C. ». Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the\nCourt lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory “discovery orders allegedly adverse to a claim of\nprivilege or privacy”); United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the Court\nlacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory protective orders governing “the right of a criminal\ndefendant to disclose information given to [her] in discovery”). We decline to exercise jurisdiction\n\nwhere we have none, and accordingly dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\n\nIn the alternative, Maxwell asks that this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the\nDistrict Court to modify the protective order. This Cou\n... [truncated, 3652 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00019237/453 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00019237&page=453]", "char_count": 3652}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00019237", "page_number": 454, "text_content": "Case 20-3061, Document 109, 11/09/2020, 2970926, Page4 of 4\n\nappeal concerns an unsealing order. Further, as the District Court correctly noted, Maxwell\n“provide[s] no coherent explanation” connecting the discovery materials at issue in the criminal case\n\nto the civil litigation.\nCONCLUSION\n\nWe have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Defendant-Appellant Maxwell on appeal\nand find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED and the\nmotion to consolidate is DENIED as moot.\n\nAny appeal in this criminal case shall be referred to another panel in the ordinary course.\n\nFOR THE COURT:\nCatherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk\n\nA True Copy\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019691\n\n", "char_count": 686}]}