{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_count": 25, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00011424", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/DOJ-OGR-00011424.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Pagei1of25\n\nHaddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nMy) 150 East 10th Avenue\nDenver, Colorado 80203\n\nPH 303.831.7364\nFX 303.832.2628\n\nwww.hmflaw.com\njoagliuca@hmflaw.com\n\nHADDON\nMORGAN\nFOREMAN\n\nNovember 22, 2021\n\nVIA EMAIL\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\n\nUnited States District Court\n\nSouthern District of New York\n\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nRe: — United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nDear Judge Nathan,\n\nI write in response to the motions to quash Ms. Maxwell’s Rule 17(c) subpoena to the\nEpstein Victims’ Compensation Program (EVCP). Four motions to quash were filed, one each by\nthe government,! the administrator of the EVCP, Accuser-2, and Witness-3. Neither Accuser-1\nnor Accuser-4 moved to quash. As explained below, the arguments against enforcement of Ms.\n\nMaxwell’s subpoena lack merit, and this Court should deny the motions to quash.\n\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND\nOn November 15, this Court issued a Rule 17(c) subpoena to the EVCP at the request of\n\nMs. Maxwell. The subpoena is narrow, specific, and targeted. It seeks just four categories of\n\n' There is significant doubt whether the government has standing to move to quash, cither\nin its own capacity or on behalf of the accusers. See United States v. Nachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d\n552, 558-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (recognizing a common “misunderstanding of the concept of\nstanding to quash a Rule 17(c) subpoena” and concluding the government lacked standing to\nmove to quash in its own capacity or on behalf of the third parties). Even so, because the\nadministrator of the EVCP and two of the accusers moved to quash, Ms. Maxwell will respond to\nall the arguments made in opposition to her subpoena, even the government’s.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011424\n\n", "char_count": 1784}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page2of25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 2\n\ndocuments, all known to exist and all relevant and admissible in support of Ms. Maxwell’s\nconstitutional rights to present a defense and to confront her accusers—Accuser-1, Accuser-2,\nWitness-3, and Accuser-4. Each of these individuals (the accusers) filed claims with the EVCP,\nand each received multi-million-dollar payouts. Accuser-1 has told the government that she\nreceived $5,000,000; Accuser-2 has told the government that she received $1,500,000; Witness-3\nhas told the government that she received $3,250,000; and Accuser-4 has told the government\nshe received $3,500,000.\n\nMs. Maxwell, however, does not have the payment records and cannot verify whether\nthese figures are accurate. Nor does she have all the releases the accusers signed, and therefore\nno way to evaluate what consideration was offered and what the accusers gave up in exchange\nfor the payouts. Finally, Ms. Maxwell does not have the accusers’ submissions to the EVCP or\ncommunications between the accusers and the EVCP. As a result, and even though the accusers’\nclaims were based in part on the same conduct Ms. Maxwell is now criminally charged with\ncommitting, Ms. Maxwell does not know how the accusers explained their entitlement to\ncompensation from the EVCP and how, if at all, they alleged Ms. Maxwell was involved in the\nabuse.\n\nLeft in the dark about these critical issues, Ms. Maxwell requested a subpoena to the\nEVCP seeking production of:\n\n(1) Any and all EVCP material submitted by each accuser, not limited to claims forms\n\nand supporting submissions made by each accuser.\n\n(2) Communications between the EVCP to each of the accusers and/or their attorneys;\n\n(3) Copies of any payments to the accusers and their attorneys; and\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011425\n\n", "char_count": 1858}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page3of25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 3\n\n(4) Any and all releases executed by the accusers.\nDef. Mot. for Sub, Attachment A.\n\nMs. Maxwell filed a motion for issuance of the subpoena, explaining how her subpoena\nsatisfied Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) and the standard set forth in United States v.\nNixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Unlike Ms. Maxwell’s earlier subpoena to Boies Schiller & Flexner\n(BSF), which the Court declined to issue, Dkt. Nos. 252, 298, the Court here authorized and\nissued Ms. Maxwell’s subpoena to the EVCP, concluding (preliminarily and correctly) that it\nwas proper under Rule 17(c). See Nachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (“As the Supreme Court has\nexplained, it is the responsibility of the court, not the opposing party, to ensure that a subpoena\nsecured under Rule 17(c) is for a proper purpose.” (citing United States v. Tomison, 969 F. Supp.\n587, 594 (E.D. Cal. 1997))). Ms. Maxwell’s subpoena seeks production at trial (not pretrial), and\nit also requests that before the responsive material is produced to her for inspection, this Court\nconduct an in camera review. Combined with the narrowness of her request, Ms. Maxwell has\nsuggested careful procedures to balance her need for the material and the accusers’ interests in\nconfidentiality.\n\nEveryone agrees that Ms. Maxwell’s subpoena specifically identifies the requested\nmaterial, and there is no meaningful dispute that the material she seeks is both relevant and not\notherwise procurable. (The government and Accuser-2 offer cursory arguments about relevance,\nwhich are easily dismissed.) Instead, the disagreement concerns whether the material is\nadmissible and whether enforcement of the subpoena would be unreasonable and oppressive.\n\nConsidering Ms. Maxwell’s constitutional rights to present a defense and to confront her\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011426\n\n", "char_count": 1916}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page4of25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 4\n\naccusers, this Court should resolve each of these disagreements in favor of Ms. Maxwell and\ndeny the motions to quash.\n\nARGUMENT\nThis Court evaluates a Rule 17(c) subpoena under Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699-700. See\n\nUnited States v. Pena, No. 15-CR-551 (AJN), 2016 WL 8735699, at * 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12,\n2016).* Under Nixon, Ms. Maxwell “must make a preponderance showing that the materials\nrequested are relevant, specifically identified, admissible, and not otherwise procurable by the\nexercise of due diligence.” Pena, 2006 WL 8735699, at *2 (quoting Barnes, 560 Fed. Appx. at\n39-40). If Ms. Maxwell satisfies this standard, the Court may quash the subpoena only “if\n\ncompliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c).\n\n* In United States v. Pena, this Court declined to follow the more liberal standard for\ndefense subpoenas to third parties articulated in United States v. Tucker, 249 F.R.D. 58\n(S.D.N.Y. 2008). The Second Circuit has not resolved this debate. See United States v. Barnes,\n560 Fed. Appx. 36, 40 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (declining to address the defendant’s\nargument that the court “forego the Nixon standard for the more permissive standard employed in\n[ Tucker’).\n\nMs. Maxwell contends that Tucker articulates the correct standard. See Nachamie, 91 F.\nSupp. 2d at 562-63 (“A real question remains as to whether it makes sense to require a\ndefendant’s use of Rule 17(c) to obtain material from a non-party to meet [the Nixon] standard.\nUnlike the Government, the defendant has not had an earlier opportunity to obtain material by\nmeans of a grand jury subpoena. Because the Rule states only that a court may quash a subpoena\n‘if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive,’ the judicial gloss that the material sought\nmust be evidentiary—defined as relevant, admissible and specific—may be inappropriate in the\ncontext of a defe\n... [truncated, 2358 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00011424/3 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00011424&page=3]", "char_count": 2358}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page5of25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 5\n\nA. The constitutional backdrop.\n\n“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause... , or in the Compulsory Process or\nConfrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants\na meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690\n(1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see U.S. Const. amends. V,\nVI. A court violates a defendant’s right to present a defense when it excludes competent and\nreliable evidence that is central to the defense. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The exclusion of such\nevidence “deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor’s case encounter and\n‘survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.’” /d. at 690-91 (quoting United States v.\nCronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).\n\nThe Constitution also affords Ms. Maxwell the right to confront her accusers. U.S.\namend. VI; Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988). “[A] criminal defendant states a\nviolation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that [she] was prohibited from engaging in\notherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part\nof the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors .. . could\nappropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” Delaware v. Van\nArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). “Cross-\nexamination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of [her]\ntestimony are tested.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. The importance of cross-examination cannot be\noverstated where, as here, the government’s proof depends almost entirely on the uncorroborated\ntestimony of the accusers. Poventud v. City of New York, No. 07 CIV. 3998 DAB, 2015 WL\n\n1062186, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2015) (“S\n... [truncated, 2075 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00011424/4 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00011424&page=4]", "char_count": 2075}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page6of25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 6\n\nimpeachment evidence constitutes exculpatory evidence that must be disclosed. The disclosure\nof impeachment evidence, where ‘the [g]overnment’s case depended almost entirely on [the\nvictim’s] testimony,’ goes to the heart of Brady and Giglio.” (quoting Giglio v. United States,\n405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972))).?\n\nLastly, Ms. Maxwell has a constitutional right to compulsory process, U.S. Const. amend.\nVI, which includes the ability to compel production of relevant documents. See Nixon, 418 U.S.\nat 711.\n\nB. The materials requested are relevant.\n\nThe standard for relevance is “very low,” United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 246 (2d\nCir. 2012) (explaining that Rule 401 prescribes a “very low standard”), and the definition of\nrelevance is “very broad,” United States v. Certified Envil. Servs., Inc., 753 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir.\n2014). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than\nit would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”\nFed. R. Evid. 401. “To be relevant, evidence need not be sufficient by itself to prove a fact in\nissue... .” United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 132 (2d Cir. 2010).\n\nMoreover, materials don’t magically lose their relevance simply because other evidence\n\nmight also be relevant to the same issue. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179 (1997)\n\n3 See also United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (explaining that\nimpeachment evidence of uncorroborated testimony is material where the witness “whose\ncredibility was at issue supplied the only evidence linking the defendant[] to the crime”); Grant\nv. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding Brady violation occurred where the\nprosecution did not disclose that a witness identified someone other than the accused); United\nStates v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir\n... [truncated, 2230 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00011424/5 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00011424&page=5]", "char_count": 2230}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page/7 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 7\n\n(“Nor was its evidentiary relevance under Rule 401 affected by the availability of alternative\nproofs of the element to which it went... . If, then, relevant evidence is inadmissible in the\npresence of other evidence related to it, its exclusion must rest not on the ground that the other\nevidence has rendered it ‘irrelevant.’” (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401, 1972 Advisory Committee\nNotes)). Evidence is either relevant or it isn’t, and “unless an exception applies, all ‘relevant\nevidence is admissible.’” White, 692 F.3d at 246.\n\nUnder this “very low” standard and “very broad” definition, the materials Ms. Maxwell\nseeks are relevant. Of the four motions to quash, only the government and Accuser-2 dispute the\nrelevance of the requested materials. Govt. Mot. at 3-8; Accuser-2 Mot. at 3.\n\nFor her part, Accuser-2’s argument is both undeveloped and misplaced. Accuser-2 Mot.\nat 3. Accuser-2 relies on this Court’s earlier orders declining to issue a twelve-request subpoena\ndirected to BSF. That decision has no bearing on the motions to quash filed here.\n\nHere, the subpoena is directed to the custodian of the relevant documents (the EVCP) and\nnot to a different third party. The subpoena is also more narrowly tailored, including just four\nrequests rather than twelve. In addition, the subpoena is returnable at trial, not pretrial. And most\nsignificantly, now unlike then, the Court isswed the requested subpoena after considering Ms.\nMaxwell’s brief in support. Because a Court “must be satisfied that the subpoena complies with\nthe requirements of the Rule” before the Court “issues a Rule 17(c) subpoena,” the Court has\nalready (if preliminarily) determined that Ms. Maxwell’s subpoena to be proper. Nachamie, 91 F.\nSupp. 2d at 561 (citing Tomison, 969 F. Supp. at 594 (“As the Supreme Court has explained, it is\nthe responsibility of the court, not the opposing party, t\n... [truncated, 2137 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00011424/6 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00011424&page=6]", "char_count": 2137}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page8of25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 8\n\nAs explained below, the government’s relevance arguments also fall short.\n1. Payment Records.\n\nThe payment records are relevant for an obvious reason: They show how much money\neach accuser was paid in relation to their claims against Mr. Epstein based on his conduct or the\nconduct of his employees, the very claims for which Ms. Maxwell now stands criminally\naccused. Ms. Maxwell is charged with conspiring with Mr. Epstein. The payments the accusers\nreceived from the EVCP are relevant to their motive and bias in implicating Ms. Maxwell, an\nalleged conspirator and employee of Mr. Epstein.\n\n2. Claim Release Forms.\n\nDespite the government’s professed inability to conjure a theory of relevance, Gov. Mot.\nat 3, the claim release forms are relevant to the accusers’ motive and bias because Ms. Maxwell\nand the jury have a right to know what the accusers gave up in exchange for the millions of\ndollars they received from the EVCP based on the very allegations at issue in this criminal case.\n\n3, Materials Submitted to the EVCP.\n\nThe government also claims not to understand the relevance of the submissions the\naccusers made to the EVCP. Gov. at 4-6. (The administrator of the EVCP has no such difficulty,\nand she does not dispute the relevance of these materials.) The relevance is obvious.\n\nUnder the EVCP protocol, alleged victims of Mr. Epstein had to explain their entitlement\nto payments by providing, among other things, documentation, corroboration, or other\ncircumstantial evidence “regarding the nature and extent of the abuse, the frequency, location\nand other details of the abuse, and the age of the victim at the time of the abuse.” EVCP\nProtocol, p 5. The accusers’ explanations are relevant because this case is about the very same\n\nconduct forming the basis of the accusers’ claimed entitlement to payments from the EVCP. Ms.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011431\n\n", "char_count": 1984}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page9of25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 9\n\nMaxwell and the jury have a right to know to what extent, if any, the accusers claimed that Ms.\nMaxwell was involved in the alleged abuse. As this Court well knows, the accusers have been\nanything but consistent on this front.\n\nAccuser-4, for example, was first interviewed by the FBI about Epstein in 2007. At that\ntime, she told the agents that she was recruited to provide massages to Mr. Epstein by Virginia\nGiuffre, f/k/a Roberts, not Ms. Maxwell. She did not describe any grooming by Ms. Maxwell or\neven any participation by Ms. Maxwell in any crime. In this interview, Accuser-4 describes Ms.\nGiuffre as the person who showed her what to do with Epstein and relates that Ms. Giuffre had\nsex with Mr. Epstein while Accuser-4 watched. Sarah Kellen was her contact person and the\nperson who took naked photos of Accuser-4 in exchange for $500. Ms. Maxwell’s name does not\nappear in the FBI 302.\n\nShortly after this interview Accuser-4 sued Epstein and Kellen, not Maxwell. The first\ncomplaint, filed in Florida state court does not mention Ms. Maxwell. The complaint was\namended and removed to U.S. District Court and in over 200 paragraphs Ms. Maxwell’s name\nappears not once. In her answers to written discovery and in deposition testimony Accuser-4\ndoes not accuse Ms. Maxwell of any misconduct, but instead affirms that she has told the entire\nstory which, according to Accuser-4 (then), began in 2002 and ended in 2003.\n\nThese claims were settled by Accuser-4 for a substantial amount of money and a release\nwas executed for all claims against Epstein, Kellen, and related individuals or entities. It was not\nuntil after Epstein died and one month after the EVCF was created that the lawyers for Accuser-4\ncontacted the government to say that Accuser-4 wanted to meet. The lawyers were helpful\n\nenough to provide to the government a new list of “persons” and “topics” for \n... [truncated, 2036 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00011424/8 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00011424&page=8]", "char_count": 2036}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page10of25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 10\n\ninterview on July 17, 2020. See 3500 material at 3505-067. Of course, this is the first time that\nMs. Maxwell’s name surfaces. The economic incentives here are obvious—having settled her\nclaims in 2009, Accuser-4 needed new, more sensational information to get more money. The\nEVCP materials thus directly contradict the “motive theory” that will be advanced by the\nprosecution at trial—that Ms. Maxwell was the procurer of underaged women for Epstein. See\nMendez v. Artuz, 303 F.3d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 2002) (information relevant and “exculpatory . . .\nwhen it directly contradicts the motive theory testified to by prosecution witnesses”).\n\nAs this Court has already ruled, Witness-3 cannot be called a “victim” of the charged\nconduct because she was not a minor. Even so, this Court ruled that “some of the anticipated\ntestimony [from Witness-3] can serve as direct evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the\nalleged conduct as to [her] was not illegal for the purpose of the charges in this case.” Ms.\nMaxwell and the jury have a right to know what Witness-3 said the EVCP about the alleged\nabuse she suffered, including how old she claimed to be when she was abused. If Witness-3\nmisrepresented her age to the EVCP, just as the government was misled by Witness-3 into\nportraying her as a minor to the grand jury and this Court, that fact bears directly on her\ncredibility. Again, it is no coincidence that, after receiving money from the fund, Witness-3 is\nnow telling the government that if asked at trial about “specific dates when things occurred, the\nanswer might be she doesn’t know.” See 3500 material at 3513-059. Only when we see how\nWitness-3 described how old she was to the fund will we know the truth.\n\nIn last-ditch effort to preclude enforcement, the government says that Ms. Maxwell\n\n“already has the information relevant this argument.” Gov. Mot at 4. But eve\n... [truncated, 2042 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00011424/9 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00011424&page=9]", "char_count": 2042}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page11of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 11\n\ndoesn’t mean the materials submitted to the EVCP are irrelevant. The relevance of evidence\ndoes not depend on theoretical evidentiary alternatives. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 179.\n\n4. Communications.\n\nThe government denies the relevance of the accusers’ communications with the EVCP,\nsaying there is “no reason to believe” the accusers would make substantive statements or\ninconsistent statements in their communications. Gov. Mot. at 7. Not so.\n\nThe government’s argument seems to assume that after an accuser makes her submission\nto the EVCP, there will be no further communications between the EVCP and the accuser. But as\nthe Protocol makes clear, after the initial submission, “[a]dditional documentation may be\nrequested at the discretion of the Administrator’ and the Claimant “will be afforded the\nopportunity to submit to the Administrator any information deemed relevant to the\nAdministrator’s evaluation and determination of the claim.” Protocol, p 5. Moreover, if a\nClaimant submits “an incomplete or deficient claim, the Administrator will notify the Claimant,\nexplain the additional information that is needed, and work with the Claimant or the Claimant’s\nLegal Representative (where applicable) to assist in submitting a complete claim.” /d. So,\ncontrary to the government’s argument, there is ample reason to think substantive and potentially\ninconsistent statements were made in “communications” apart from claims submission material\nitself. These communications are relevant.\n\nC. The materials requested are specifically identified.\n\nNo motion challenges the specificity of Ms. Maxwell’s subpoena. This Nixon factor is\n\nsatisfied.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011434\n\n", "char_count": 1786}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page12 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 12\n\nD. The materials requested are admissible.\n\nThe government does not dispute the admissibility of the payment records, the claims\nrelease forms, or the communications. Gov. Mot. at 3-8. According to the government, however,\nthe submissions to the EVCP are inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Gov. Mot. at\n6-7.\n\nNeither Accuser-1 nor Witness-3 dispute the admissibility of any of the materials.\n\nFor its part, the EVCP argues that all the materials Ms. Maxwell seeks are inadmissible\nunder Federal Rule of Evidence 408. As elaborated below, neither Rule 403 nor Rule 408\nrenders the materials inadmissible.\n\nWe begin with the government’s Rule 403 argument. To start, the government’s 403\nargument is premature because the Court has not yet reviewed the subpoenaed material in\ncamera. In any event, it’s of no moment that the government says it would have to\n“contextualize” the accusers’ statements to the EVCP to argue the statements are not inconsistent\nwith their trial testimony. Gov. Mot. at 6-7. That is always the case with prior inconsistent\nstatements; the proponent of the evidence asks the jury to disbelieve the trial testimony because\nthe witness said something different on an earlier occasion, while the opponent tries to minimize\nor explain away any inconsistency. That is not a reason to exclude the statements themselves, nor\nis the government’s vague complaint that this process is a “waste of time.” The accusers’ ever-\nevolving allegations are central to this case.\n\nThe EVCP’s Rule 408 argument next. Rule 408 says:\n\n(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible--on behalf of any\n\nparty--either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to\nimpeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction:\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011435\n\n", "char_count": 1923}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page13 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 13\n\n(1) furnishing, promising, or offering--or accepting, promising to accept, or\noffering to accept--a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting\nto compromise the claim; and\n(2) conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the\nclaim--except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations\nrelated to a claim by a public office in the exercise of its regulatory,\ninvestigative, or enforcement authority.\n\n(b) Exceptions. The court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as\n\nproving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or\nproving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.\n\nFed. R. Evid. 408. For at least three reasons, Rule 408 does not apply here.\n\nFirst, the Rule only prohibits evidence of compromise when the disputed claim is the\nsame claim that was compromised. As the Second Circuit has held, “Evidence of an offer to\ncompromise, though otherwise barred by Rule 408, can fall outside the Rule if it is offered for\n‘another purpose,’ i.e., for a purpose other than to prove or disprove the validity of the claims\nthat the offers were meant to settle.” Trebor Sportswear Co. v. The Ltd. Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d\n506, 510 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added); Carr v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, Inc.,\nNo. 99 CIV. 3706 (NRB), 2001 WL 563722, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2001) (“[Rule 408] is not\na blanket rule of inadmissibility for any and all statements in the settlement context. If evidence\nis ‘offered for another purpose’ apart from liability for (or damages resulting from) the claim\nunder settlement discussion, that evidence may be admitted.” (emphasis added)); see also Equal\nEmp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Karenkim, Inc., No. 5:08-CV-1019 (NAM/DEP), 2011 WL\n13352967, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011) (“But when settlement-related evidence is related to a\nclaim not \n... [truncated, 2197 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00011424/12 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00011424&page=12]", "char_count": 2197}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page14of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 14\n\nThis is clear from the language of the Rule. “The claim” to which subsections (a)(1) and\n(a)(2) refer is the “disputed claim” referenced in subsection (a). When the “disputed claim” is\ndifferent from “the claim” compromised, the Rule’s prohibitions do not apply. Vulcan Hart\nCorp. v. N.L.R.B., 718 F.2d 269, 277 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Rule 408 excludes evidence of settlement\noffers only if such evidence is offered to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim under\nnegotiation.” (emphasis added)).\n\nHere, the “disputed claim” is government’s claim that Ms. Maxwell trafficked the\naccusers, facilitated their abuse, and conspired to do the same. “The claim” each accuser\ncompromised with the EVCP was “the claim” that they were entitled to money for the abuse\nperpetrated by Mr. Epstein. Because Ms. Maxwell will use the materials for a “purpose other\nthan to prove or disprove the validity of the claims that the offers were meant to settle,” Trebor\nSportswear, 865 F.2d at 510, Rule 408 does not apply.\n\nSecond, even if Rule 408 did apply, it would not bar admission of the evidence because\nevidence of compromise is admissible to prove a witness’s bias and prejudice, a traditional\nobject of cross-examination. Fed. R. Evid. 408(b). Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680 (defendants have\na constitutional right to engage in “cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of\nbias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors...\n\n999\n\ncould appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” (quoting Davis,\n415 US. at 318)). There is no dispute that the accusers’ settlement of their claims against Mr.\nEpstein for vast sums of money is relevant to their bias and motive in both cooperating with the\n\ngovernment to secure prosecutorial credit, a factor in the EVCF’s protocol, and testifying against\n\nMs.\n... [truncated, 2029 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00011424/13 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00011424&page=13]", "char_count": 2029}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page15of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 15\n\nFinally, “evidence that a party lied during settlement negations may be admissible to\nimpeach that party under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) when she later testifies at trial,”\nWright & Miller, 23 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid., § 5305 Scope—Impeachment by Prior\nInconsistent Statement or Contradiction, (2d ed., Apr. 2021 update), despite the language in Rule\n408(a) saying compromise evidence is generally inadmissible to impeach by a prior inconsistent\nstatement or contradiction. As Wright & Miller recognize,\n\nevidence of false statement during compromise negotiations would not be barred\n\nby Rule 408(a)(2) if offered to impeach on the theory it is a specific instance of\n\nconduct probative of a witness’ character for untruthfulness and, thus, potentially\n\nadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b). This is consistent with the\nlanguage of Rule 408(b), which permits admission of false statements made in\nnegotiations so long as offered for a purpose other than that addressed by Rule\n\n408(a).\n\nWight & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid., § 5310.\n\nConspicuously, the government does not assert that Rule 408 is an impediment to\nadmissibility. As just explained, that is for good reason.\n\nE. The materials requested are not otherwise procurable.\n\n1. Payment Records.\n\nThe government does not claim the payment records are “otherwise procurable.” Gov.\nMot. at 3. Instead, the government elides the proper inquiry, saying that the information in the\npayment records is otherwise procurable. /d. But that’s not the question, and even if it were, the\ngovernment is wrong.\n\nAccording to the government, the 3500 material includes statements from the accusers\nattesting to the amounts of money they received. /d. But the constitution does not require Ms.\n\nMaxwell to take her accusers’ words for it. U.S. Const. amend. VI. She has a right to know\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011438\n\n", "char_count": 1989}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page16 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 16\n\nwhether they are telling the truth, and if they aren’t, she is allowed to impeach them. Fed. R.\nEvid. 613(b) (allowing proof of inconsistent statement by extrinsic evidence).\n\nThe government’s position is classic gamesmanship. The government says that whatever\nthe accusers told the government is good enough, and we should trust the accusers’ accounts,\nfiltered by their lawyers. But the government also knows that it “is under no obligation to turn\nover that which it does not have,” United States v. Upton, 856 F. Supp. 727, 746 (E.D.N.Y.\n1994), which is why it has not obtained the material. This is why Ms. Maxwell needs the Court’s\nassistance.\n\nMs. Maxwell is also allowed to present as trial exhibits documents that prove the amount\nthat the accusers were paid. A visual image can have in some cases more of an impact on the\njury, and Ms. Maxwell should be permitted to present her defense in whatever format she\nchooses, not the format of the government’s choosing.\n\nBecause Ms. Maxwell does not have the payment records, and because the records are\nnot otherwise procurable, this Court should reject the government’s argument.*\n\n2. Claim Release Forms.\n\nThe claim release forms are not otherwise procurable, and this Nixon factor is satisfied.\nThe EVCP partially disagrees with this argument: “at least two courts in this district have\n\nordered plaintiffs to produce their EVCP releases to Maxwell (in one case with the amount\n\n* The government’s alternative request that the EVCP produce the records to the Court\nfor in camera review is bizarre, Govt. Mot. at 3, for that is exactly what Ms. Maxwell requested\nin her motion. Mot. at 1 (“The document should be returned to this Court for an in camera\nreview and, subject to this Court’s review, disclosed to the defense to be used for impeachment\nof the witnesses at trial.’’).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011439\n\n", "char_count": 1979}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page17 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 17\n\nredacted), so she is already aware of the content of the EVCP’s general release.”” EVCP Mot. at\n11-12. As is implicit in this argument, however, Ms. Maxwell does not have all or even complete\nreleases from each accuser.\n\nMs. Maxwell has a redacted release from Accuser-2 and a release from Accuser-1.° But\nshe does not have releases from either Witness-3 or Accuser-4. Nor does Ms. Maxwell know if\nthose releases are identical to Accuser-1’s redacted release or Accuser-2’s release.\nConspicuously, the EVCP makes no representation that the content of the releases is identical.\nEVCP Mot. at 12. Ms. Maxwell thus cannot assess what her accusers gave up in exchange for\nmillions of dollars and whether they might even have released claims against Ms. Maxwell\nherself. Nor can she use the releases she does not have (and the one she does) as trial exhibits in\nthis case.\n\n3. Materials Submitted to the EVCP.\n\nNo one disputes that the submitted materials are not otherwise procurable. This Nixon\n\nfactor is satisfied.\n4, Communications.\nNo one disputes that the communications are not otherwise procurable. This Nixon factor\n\nis satisfied.\n\n> For the release from Accuser-1, it was produced under restriction, and to use it during\n\nthis‘,\na\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011440\n\n", "char_count": 1379}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page18 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 18\n\nF. Compliance with the subpoena would not be unreasonable or oppressive.\n\nThree of the motions argue that compliance with the subpoena would be unreasonable\nand oppressive because the accusers were guaranteed confidentiality under the EVCP Protocol.\nEVCP Mot. at 9-12; Accuser-2 Mot. at 4-6; Witness-3 Mot. at 2-3. The government does not\nmake such an argument. Gov. Mot. at 1-6. Some motions even imply that the confidentiality of\nthe materials is reason enough to quash the subpoena. Accuser-2 Mot. at 4-6; Witness-3 Mot. at\n2-3.\n\nFirst, even if the materials are confidential, this Court cannot quash the subpoena on that\nbasis alone. Rule 17 addresses the process for subpoenaing “personal or confidential information\nabout a victim.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(3). If confidential materials couldn’t be subpoenaed, Rule\n17(c)(3) would be superfluous.\n\nIn fact, under the express language of Rule 17, the only difference between a subpoena\nfor confidential information and a subpoena for non-confidential information is that the former\ncan be issued “‘only by court order” with notice to the victim. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(3). The\nterms of Rule 17 do not require a heightened justification before a defendant can subpoena\nconfidential information, and they do not demand special treatment for motions to quash when\n\nconfidential information is at issue. /d.°\n\n® Courts in this district have even authorized defense subpoenas when the information\nsought is arguably privileged. E.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, 753 F. Supp. 2d 317, 324-25\n(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying motion to quash defense subpoena for tax returns even though the\nreturns might be privileged, saying “cases demonstrate . . . a potential exception to the tax return\nprivilege where, as here, the interests in truth and a criminal defendant’s rights are both\nimplicated’’).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011441\n\n", "char_count": 1980}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page19 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 19\n\nIn any case, there are several reasons that concerns about confidentiality should not\nweigh heavily here. First, the EVCP imposes no confidentiality requirement on the accusers, who\nare free to discuss their submissions to and communications with the EVCP. Protocol, p 9\n(“Individual claimants are not bound through the Program by any rules of confidentiality.”). In\nturn, because Ms. Maxwell can compel her accusers to testify about their submissions to and\ncommunications with the EVCP, see U.S. Const. amend. VI, there is no reason to prevent Ms.\nMaxwell from subpoenaing the submissions and communications themselves. Again, Ms.\nMaxwell is not required to accept her accusers’ assurances that the story they are telling the jury\nis the same they told to the EVCP.\n\nMore to the point, the accusers have repeatedly exercised their freedom to discuss the\nalleged abuse. Three of the four have filed public lawsuits against Mr. Epstein and/or Ms.\nMaxwell, and they have repeatedly publicized their claims. The accusers cannot with a straight\n\nface claim this information is confidential. There’s no putting the horse back in the barn.\n\nFor examp |, [i\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011442\n\n", "char_count": 1294}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page 20 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 20\n\nAnnie Farmer (Accuser-2) has eschewed confidentiality at every opportunity. She sued in\nher own name in this court against Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell. See Dkt. No. 1, Annie Farmer\nv. Indyke, Case No. 19-cv-10475 (LGS) (Nov. 12, 2019). She spoke publicly and using her real\nname at the Epstein bail hearing and case dismissal hearings, even though she was not a named\nvictim in that case. Dkt. No. 36, United States v. Epstein, Case No. 19-cr-490 (RMB) (July 15,\n2019). She has appeared (with her face in full view) in the Nesflix documentary using her real\nname, on Dateline, 20/20, and many podcasts. All of these public statements reflect the same\nfacts and circumstances alleged in this criminal case. She is represented by David Boies and\nSigrid McCawley, who also represent Ms. Giuffre and numerous other Epstein-accusers. Mr.\nBoies and Ms. McCawley have been prime advocates for the unsealing of all the filings in the\nGiuffre v. Maxwell litigation before Judge Preska. See generally Dkt. Nos. 945 et seq., Giuffre v.\n\nMaxwell, Case No. 15-cv-7433 (LAP).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011443\n\n", "char_count": 1205}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page 21 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 21\n\n=\na\n5\noO\nfa\n\nOo\nee\nn\n\nFinally, Accuser-4 has widely publicized her account of being abused by Mr. Epstein, an\naccount that only very recently came to include Ms. Maxwell. Accuser-4 was first contacted by\nthe FBI in 2007. She was interviewed on August 7, 2007, by Special Agents Nesbitt Kuyrkendall\nand Jason Richards and asked the alleged abuse. According to Accuser-4, during that interview,\nshe was recruited to perform sex acts with Mr. Epstein by Ms. Giuffre in the 2002-2003\ntimeframe. Accuser-4 did not identify Ms. Maxwell as someone who recruited her, groomed her,\nor otherwise interacted with her in Palm Beach, Florida, or any other location. Accuser-4\nidentified Sarah Kellen as someone she interacted with and who took nude photographs of her at\nMr. Epstein’s direction. She advised the agents that she became pregnant in 2003 and moved to\n\nGeorgia.\n\nAfter her FBI intervicw, [i\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011444\n\n", "char_count": 1034}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page 22 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 22\n\nES She cic not identify Ms. Maxwell as\n\nhaving had any role in any alleged sexual abuse or trafficking.\n\nACCU 4\n\nAccuscr-4 !. i\n\nLike the other accusers, Accuscr-<4”s [a\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011445\n\n", "char_count": 313}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page 23 of 25\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 23\na\na\n\nDe (cy cannot reasonably claim an entitlement to\n\nconfidentiality when that entitlement must be balanced against the truth-seeking function of a\ncriminal trial, Ms. Maxwell’s constitutional rights to present a defense and to confrontation, and\nthe stakes involved should Ms. Maxwell be convicted.\n\nThis Court need not consider whether other claimants have stronger claims to\nconfidentiality than the accusers in this case. Ms. Maxwell does not seek production of materials\nrelated to other claimants, and there is no reason to think that production of the materials related\nto Ms. Maxwell’s accusers—who have not acted to keep confidential their claims against Mr.\nEpstein and Ms. Maxwell—will somehow impair the functioning of the EVCP in working with\nothers. Indeed, the EVCP is now closed and there is no more work to be done—the cut-off for\nclaims has passed, the money has been paid, and the fund is closed.\n\nMoreover, the lack of an objection by either Accuser-1 or Accuser-4 belies the argument\nthat compliance with Ms. Maxwell’s subpoena would be unreasonable or oppressive, at least as\nto them. See Nachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (concluding compliance would not be\nunreasonable or oppressive, even though the government moved to quash, given “the absence of\nobjections from all but one doctor’).\n\nFinally, Ms. Maxwell’s due process right to equal treatment would be violated were she\nnot entitled to inspect the materials simply because they are “confidential.” U.S. Const. amend.\nV. The judicial promise of confidentiality Ms. Maxwell received in Giuffre v. Maxwell turned\n\nout to be illusory after the government secured an ex parte modification of the protective order\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011446\n\n", "char_count": 1829}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page 24 of 25\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 24\n\nbehind Ms. Maxwell’s back and under the nose of the presiding judge. This Court and Chief\nJudge McMahon concluded that Ms. Maxwell could not have reasonably relied on the protective\norder’s promise of confidentiality because the order was subject to modification and because of\nthe overriding interest in the “truth-seeking function of the judicial process.” June 25, 2021\nOrder, p 13, 17-18.\n\nIf that is true, then it’s equally true that Ms. Maxwell’s accusers cannot reasonably expect\ntheir submissions to and communications with the EVCP to remain confidential for all time and\nfor all purposes. The EVCP Protocol expressly provides that its confidentiality guarantee is\n“subject to law, regulation and judicial process.” And in view of the “truth-seeking function of\nthe judicial process” and Ms. Maxwell’s constitutional rights to present a defense and confront\nher accuses, any remaining interest in confidentiality must give way.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nMs. Maxwell’s subpoena is narrow, specific, and targeted. It seeks only that evidence\nwhich is relevant to her defense and admissible at trial. Although the concerns about\nconfidentiality are overblown, Ms. Maxwell nevertheless has asked that this Court review the\nmaterial in camera before turning it over to the defense. That in camera review would provide\nanother layer of protection, even as there is no reason to think that Ms. Maxwell is on a fishing\nexpedition.\n\nAccordingly, and for the reasons given above, Ms. Maxwell requests that this Court deny\n\nthe motions to quash.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011447\n\n", "char_count": 1674}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00011424", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 25\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nPhone: 303-831-7364\n\nChristian R. Everdell\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\nPhone: 212-957-7600\n\nBobbi C. Sternheim\n\nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim\n225 Broadway, Suite 715\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nPhone: 212-243-1100\n\nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\ncc: Counsel of record (by email)\n\nPage 25 of 25\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011448\n\n", "char_count": 587}]}