{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_count": 21, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00010692", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/DOJ-OGR-00010692.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675- Filed 06/25/22 Page1of21\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nveoecenennneennnnnnnennennnnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnnnenennnnnnennnnennnnneee )\n)\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )\n)\n\n-v— ) Case No. 20—CR—330 (AJN)\n)\n)\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, )\n)\nDefendant. )\nnoneeeeneneneenneennnennnnnnnnnennnennnnennnennenennnnennnnnnnennennene )\n\nMEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF CRIME VICTIMS SARAH RANSOME’S\nAND ELIZABETH STEIN’S MOTION TO BE ALLOWED TO DELIVER\nORAL VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS AT MAXWELL’S SENTENCING\n\nSarah Ransome and Elizabeth Stein, through undersigned counsel, Robert Y. Lewis and\nMargaret E. Mabie of the Marsh Law Firm PLLC, hereby submits this memorandum of law in\nsupport of their motion to be allowed to deliver oral victim impact statements (“VIS”) at the\nsentencing of Ghislaine Maxwell on June 28, 2022. (Dkt. 666).\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nAs the Court is aware, this case involves what is likely the most extensive known worldwide\nsex trafficking operation in recent history. At the trial of the defendant, Ghislaine Maxwell, the\nGovernment chose to prosecute a narrow sliver of the crimes that it believed Maxwell had\ncommitted. A jury found Maxwell guilty of five sex trafficking counts — Nos. 1 and 3-6 of the\ngovernment’s second superseding indictment.\n\nNow, at sentencing, the Court has the power and the freedom to consider the full scope of\n\nthe harm that Maxwell’s crimes caused. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“no limitation shall be placed on the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010692\n\n", "char_count": 1514}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 Filed 06/25/22 Page 2of21\n\ninformation concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense\nwhich a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an\nappropriate sentence.”). Two of Maxwell’s victims, Sarah Ransome and Elizabeth Stein, seek to assist\nthe Court in exercising this authority by providing oral VISs at sentencing. The Court should allow\nthese victims to present their statements detailing the impact of Maxwell’s crimes on them to\nadvance the cause of justice.\n\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND\n\nAs the extensive evidence at trial has revealed, Maxwell was involved in a far-reaching long—\nrunning sex traficking conspiracy. As the Court recently explained, Maxwell was found guilty after a\nlengthy jury trial of a “decade-long unlawful agreement with the Defendant’s continuous\ncoconspirator, Jeffrey Epstein. The overarching conspiracy—which, as the Government argued and\nproved at trial, employed a single ‘playbook’ to groom and sexually abuse underage girls—constitutes\na single conspiracy offense with multiple victims.” (Dkt. 657 at 2-3).\n\nNow, Maxwell is to be sentenced for her criminal involvement in this expansive conspiracy.\nThe victims clearly have a right to be heard as part of this process.\n\nBoth moving victims, Sarah and Elizabeth, came to New York as young women seeking to\nmatriculate at the Fashion Institute of Technology and then work in the fashion industry. Both\nbecame targets of Epstein and Maxwell who preyed on their vulnerabilities including their desire to\nadvance in the competitive fashion industry, their relative youth, and naiveté. Epstein and Maxwell\npromised them that they would use their connections in the fashion industry to advance the victims’\n\neducations and careers. But there was a cruel catch. For every favor or promise of a favor, sexual\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010693\n\n", "char_count": 1909}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675- Filed 06/25/22 Page3of21\n\nactivity was demanded in return. And soon the sex overcame everything else. Sarah described the\nEpstein/Maxwell quid pro quo as the “Hotel California;” you can check-out any time you like, but\nyou can never leave.\n\nBoth VISs provide relevant background information regarding Maxwell’s character and\nconduct. Both statements further describe that for many years after finally extricating themselves\nphysically from the Epstein/Maxwell trap, they suffered serious mental and physical illnesses.\nElizabeth discusses numerous hospitalizations for mental breakdowns and being unable to hold\ndown a job. After being a victim of Maxwell’s conspiracy crimes, Sarah attempted suicide twice, both\ntimes ending up in the hospital with serious physical injuries.\n\nBoth Sarah and Elizabeth have submitted VISs to the probation office for inclusion in the\nPresentence Investigation Report. See Declaration of Robert Y. Lewis, dated June 23, 2022.\n\nFor the reasons set forth below, the Court should allow Sarah and Elizabeth to read their\nvictim impact statements at Maxwell’s sentencing hearing.\n\nARGUMENT\nI. These Victims Have a Statutory Right to be Heard Under the Crime Victim’s Rights Act\n\nThe Crime Victim’s Rights Act (““CVRA”) defines the term “crime victim” as a “person\ndirectly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense....” 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3771(e). This definition was based on earlier restitution statutes which “all demonstrate a clarion\ncongressional intent to provide restitution to as many victims and in as many cases as possible.”\nUnited States v. Martin, 128 F.3d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoted in United States v. Kamuvaka,\n\n719 ESupp.2d 469, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2010)). In relying on these far-reaching statutes to craft the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010694\n\n", "char_count": 1840}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 Filed 06/25/22 Page4of21\n\nCVRA, Congress used “an intentionally broad definition because all victims of crime deserve to have\ntheir rights protected.” 150 Cong. Rec. $4270 (Apr. 22, 2004) (emphasis added) (statement of Sen.\nKyl, agreed to by Sen. Feinstein). Congress understood that it was extending rights to “literally\nmillions of people”—victims who were being denied rights in the federal criminal justice system.\n\n150 Cong. Rec. $42604 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). “The wisdom of Congress’\naction...is not within our province to second guess.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).\n\nUnder the CVRAs plain language, “a party may qualify as a victim, even though [she] may\nnot have been the target of the crime, as long as [she] suffers harm as a result of the crime’s\ncommission.” Jn re Fisher, 640 E3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Fisher I”). Thus, the CVRA\n“instructs the district court to look at the offense itself only to determine the harmful effects the\noffense has on parties.” /n re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014).\nBecause of this requirement to identify an offense’s “harmful effects,” numerous CVRA cases look\nbeyond the narrow “record” of the charges themselves. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 649 E3d 401, 403-04\n(5th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases) (“Fisher IT”).\n\nOne instructive case comes from the D.C. Circuit which reversed a district court decision\ndenying victim status in a drug trafficking case. The Circuit explained that in determining whether a\ndecedent's family had CVRA victim status, the district court erred by “limit[ing] its evaluation to the\nindictment and the statement of facts submitted by [the defendant] as part of his negotiated plea\nagreement.” Jn re de Henriquez, No. 15-3054, 2015 WL 10692637, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The\nCircuit noted that “[u]nder the CVRA, victims may participate in proceedings even when there has\n\nbeen no formal charge.” /d. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771(\n... [truncated, 2069 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00010692/3 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00010692&page=3]", "char_count": 2069}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675_ Filed 06/25/22 Page5of21\n\na deferred prosecution agreement)) “Congress crafted the CVRA to recognize the harm and\nanguish suffered by victims of crime. This is why Congress made the statutory rights under the\nCVRA permissively accessible. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3).” Id. Moreover, “[b]ecause victim status can\nbe argued for even prior to the filing of an indictment, it is clear that Congress intended courts to\nlook beyond the four corners of an indictment or plea agreement. For example, in the context of the\n[drug trafficking] conspiracy here, neither the indictment nor the statement of facts included in the\nplea agreement mention violence of any kind. And yet, logic allows for the inference...that [the\ndefendant’s] paramilitary organization...employed violence and force as part of its method of\noperation.” Jd.\n\nIt is also important to understand that this case has now moved to a different phase than the\ntrial phase where, of course, a defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence and is protected\nby the requirement that the government prove guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But, in\ndetermining the “crime victim” issue at sentencing, the relevant standard of proof is the conventional\nstandard for proceedings in criminal cases outside of trial—preponderance of the evidence. See\nUnited States v. Giraldo-Serna, 118 FSupp.3d 377, 382 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Purported victims under\nthe CVRA must prove their victim status by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing Jn re\nMcNulty, 597 E3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612\nFSupp.2d 453, 486, 495, 508 (D.N.J. 2009)); see also United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 195\n(2d Cir. 2013) (applying preponderance of the evidence standard to victim restitution issue); United\n\nStates v. Kim, 988 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 2021)(same).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010696\n\n", "char_count": 1899}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675- Filed 06/25/22 Page6of21\n\nAgainst this backdrop, Sarah and Elizabeth are categorial “victims” who should be allowed. to\nspeak at sentencing. Sexual abusers frequently use their actual or perceived power to manipulate and\ncoerce victims during their abuse or trafficking. Jill Laurie Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholdt,\nLawyers Manual on Human Trafficking, NY State Jud. Comm. on Women in the Court 169-76\n(2013). The scheme Sarah and Elizabeth both describe in their victim impact statements is the same\nscheme Maxwell is being sentenced for and it involves the same defendant and co-conspirators as the\nconspiratorial scheme proven at trial.\n\nMoreover, these victim statements reflect Sarah’s and Elizabeth’s personal knowledge of\nMaxwell’s character and actions in furtherance of the scheme. Maxwell’s argument that Sarah and\nElizabeth do not qualify as real victims because they were not minors at the time of the trafficking\nand therefore are not victims within the counts of conviction is of no moment. The allegations in the\nsecond superseding indictment easily encompasses these non—minor victims. For example, in\nparagraph 4(e) of the second superseding indictment, which is a sub-part of a count for which there\nwas a conviction, alleges that “through this process, Maxwell and Epstein enticed victims to engage\nin sexual activity with Epstein.” Likewise, paragraph 9 of the second superseding indictment alleges\nthat “among the victims induced or enticed by GHISLAINE MAXWELL, the defendant, were\nminor victims identified herein as Minor Victim—1, Minor Victim—2, Minor Victim—3 and Minor\nVictim—4.” A fair reading of the indictment is that although it emphasizes minor victims, the sex\n\ntrafficking conspiracy—as alleged—encompassed non—minor victims like Sarah and Elizabeth.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010697\n\n", "char_count": 1839}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 _ Filed 06/25/22 Page7of21\n\nSo too, one of the victim witnesses present at trial was not a minor under the law of the place\nwhere she was abused. Nonetheless, the Court allowed her to testify with a limiting instruction.\nMaxwell’s offense conduct was not limited to minor victims.\n\nSarah and Elizabeth have the right to deliver an in—court statement at Maxwell’s sentencing.\nThe CVRA guarantees all crime victims the right to be “reasonably heard at any public proceeding in\nthe district court involving...sentencing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (a)(4). This is the right of any victim to\ngive what is commonly referred to as a “victim impact statement.” See generally United States v.\nDegenhardt, 405 F.Supp.2d 1341 (D. Utah 2005). Various courts have held that the CVRA’s right to\nbe reasonably heard guarantees victims the right to make an in—court statement. As one court\nexplained: “At a sentencing hearing, the other participants will speak directly to the judge. Read\nagainst this backdrop, the CVRA commands that a victim should be treated equally with the\ndefendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor, rather than turned into a ‘faceless stranger.” /d. at\n1348, quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). The Ninth Circuit has reached an\nidentical conclusion. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal. 435 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th Cir.\n2006). These holdings are consistent with the intentions of the CVRA’s drafters. As Senator Kyl\nexplained, “the very purpose of this section is to allow the victim to appear personally and directly\naddress the court.” 150 CONG. REC. S10, 911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl),\nquoted in Degenhardt, 405 FSupp.2d at 1346.\n\nFurther, victim impact evidence is probative of the offense conduct because an “assessment of\nthe harm caused by the defendant has long been an important factor in determining the appropriate\n\npunishment, and victim impact evidence is simply another method of informing the sente\n... [truncated, 2025 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00010692/6 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00010692&page=6]", "char_count": 2025}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 Filed 06/25/22 Page 8of21\n\nauthority about such harm.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 808 (1991). Speaking directly to\nMaxwell in this case is particularly important for these victims. Crime victims often want to speak\n“to regain a sense of dignity and respect rather than feeling powerless and ashamed.” Degenhardt, 405\nESupp.2d at 1348 (internal quotation omitted). Here, Sarah and Elizabeth believe it is important\nthat they be given an opportunity to speak as part of the process of overcoming the horrific impact of\nMaxwell’s sex trafficking conspiracy on them and others.\n\nII. Regardless of Whether Sarah and Elizabeth are CVRA “Victims,” the Court Undoubtedly\nPossesses Discretion to Hear from them at Sentencing Under 18 U.S.C. § 3661\n\nFor all the reasons just explained, Sarah and Elizabeth have the right to speak at Maxwell's\nsentencing under the CVRA. Additionally, this Court also possesses broad discretionary power,\nderived from statute and common law, to hear from them when determining the appropriate\nsentence for Maxwell’s crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see alo Degenhardt, 405 FSupp.2d at 1343\n(discussing the court’s discretionary powers to hear from victims).\n\nThe Court’s discretion in this case is important not only because it provides an alternative\nbasis for considering Sarah’s and Elizabeth's victim impact, but also because the Court may have\nother requests to speak at Maxwell’s sentencing. Some of these other victims may not be able to\nafford legal counsel to present their arguments to this Court.' Federal courts have wide discretion to\ngather information at sentencing subject to only a few constitutional or statutory restrictions. See\n\nUnited States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (“[A] judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry\n\n\" Under the CVRA, the Justice Department is obligated to use its “best efforts” to protect the\nrights of “crime victims.” 18 U.S.C § 3771(c)(1). We trust that the Department will present fa\n... [truncated, 2094 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00010692/7 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00010692&page=7]", "char_count": 2094}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 _ Filed 06/25/22 Page9of21\n\n[at sentencing] broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may\nconsider, or the source from which it may come come.”); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247\n(explaining that in order to determine an “appropriate sentence” judges need “the fullest information\npossible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.”), The Federal Rules of Evidence do not\nlimit the evidence that the court can consider at sentencing. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3); United\nStates v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1240 (D. Utah 2004); United States v. Fennel, 65 E.3d 812,\n813 (10th Cir. 1995). See also United States v. Cofield, No. 17-CR-610, 2019 WL 4879331, at *2\n(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2019). The information relied on post-conviction must only have “some minimal\nindicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” United States v. Shine, No. 17-CR-28-FPG-JJM,\n2020 WL 32937, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2020) quoting United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 701\n(2d Cir. 2007).\n\nOf particular importance in confirming the expansive power of federal courts at sentencing is\na broad federal provision—18 U.S.C. § 3661—which establishes that “xo limitation shall be placed\non the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an\noffense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an\nappropriate sentence” (emphasis added). The critical words, “no limitation,” grant a sentencing court\nextremely broad discretionary authority to consider wide-ranging unlimited information about\nMaxwell’s “background, character, and conduct”—crucial information clearly possessed by Sarah and\nElizabeth.\n\nThe Second Circuit has recognized the broad scope of this provision. In United States v.\n\nMorrison, 778 F.3d 396, 400-01 (2d Cir. 2015), the Second Circuit noted that section 3661\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010700\n\n", "char_count": 1945}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675_ Filed 06/25/22 Page10of21\n\ncontains “emphatic language” which “preclude|s] categorical proscriptions on any factor concerning\nthe background, character, and conduct of the defendant, with the exception of invidious\n\nfactors.” /d. (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008)\n(en banc)).\n\nAdditionally, there is nothing in section 3661 limiting sentencing information to individuals\nwho meet the CVRA’s definition of being directly and proximately harmed by the offense. See\nDegenhardt, 405 FSupp.2d 1341, 1343 (D. Utah 2005). Federal judges have broad discretion to\nallow “affected individuals to present information to the court at sentencing.” United States v,\nGamma Tech Industries, Inc., 265 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2001). See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.\n241, 245 (1949).\n\nAt least one federal court of appeals has considered the situation where a person provided\ninformation to the sentencing court even though the defendant objected that the individual did not\nmeet the CVRA’s definition of victim. In United States v. Leach, 206 Fed. Appx. 432, 2006 WL\n3203746 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished), the court, while sentencing the defendant to felon-in-\npossession of a firearm, allowed the defendant’s estranged wife to be heard. She told the court that\nthe defendant was a dangerous man who had threatened to kill her. The Sixth Circuit held that the\nsentencing court possessed discretion to hear from the wife under section 3661. The Court explained\nthat the CVRA “did not alter (or, more importantly, limit) a district court’s traditional broad\ndiscretion to consider a wide variety of factors at sentencing.” /d. at 434.\n\nThese authorities clearly support the principle that this Court has broad unlimited discretion\n\nin sentencing Maxwell to hear from anyone it believes will have relevant information. Sarah and\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010701\n\n", "char_count": 1925}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675_ Filed 06/25/22 Page11of21\n\nElizabeth respectfully submit that hearing their unique “information concerning the background,\ncharacter, and conduct” of Maxwell will assist the Court in imposing a fair and just sentence.\n\nA good illustration of these principles comes from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United\nStates v. Salutric, 775 F.3d 948, 951-52 (7th Cir. 2015). In that case, the Seventh Circuit observed\nthat “[i]n arriving at an appropriate sentence, a sentencing judge necessarily must consider not only\nthe offense of conviction but the defendant's broader criminal record and history.” /d@. at 951. This\npoint follows from the rationale that “[u]ncharged criminal acts (and the injuries inflicted upon the\nvictims of those acts) have a bearing on whether the offense of conviction was an aberration or part\nof a larger pattern of criminal behavior, the likelihood of the defendant re-offending, and the need\nfor specific deterrence.” /d., See also United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2012). The\nSeventh Circuit explained that the federal “Criminal Code makes clear that ‘[n]o limitation shall be\nplaced on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted\nof an offense, which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of\nimposing an appropriate sentence’.” 775 at 952 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3661).\n\nThis Court should follow the same approach and hear from all victims of Maxwell’s long—\nrunning and wide-ranging sex trafficking conspiracy. See also United States v. Goss, 325 F. Supp. 3d\n932, 936 (E.D. Wis. 2018) (affirming the court’s consideration of information at sentencing that was\nnot, strictly speaking, a “victim” impact statement because the “court can consider information from\na variety of sources” when imposing sentence). Matters of social welfare directly impact decisions\nregarding the appropriateness of a criminal sentence. Krebs v. New York State D\n... [truncated, 2138 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00010692/10 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00010692&page=10]", "char_count": 2138}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 _ Filed 06/25/22 Page12 of 21\n\na late—filed victim impact statement, finding that the parole board may waive one or more\nrequirements in order to further its policy of ensuring that crime victims are treated with fairness,\nsensitivity and dignity).\n\nIl. The Court Should Exercise Its Discretionary Authority to Consider the Victim Impact on\nWomen Who have Suffered from the Most Notorious Long-running Sex Trafficking\nOperation in Modern American History\n\nIn this case especially, the Court should exercise its broad discretion to hear and consider all\ninformation relevant to sentencing. First, allowing women who were sexually abused and trafficked\nby Maxwell’s conspiracy to speak will have an important cathartic benefit not only for the victims\nspeaking, but for those who are unable to speak as well. Second, in this case in particular, too many\nunanswered questions remain about the scope and participants in this long-running wide-ranging sex\ntrafficking conspiracy — leading many Americans to believe that authorities continue to hide the\ncomplete truth about what happened. Allowing all victims who wish to speak to do so publicly will\npromote transparency and help to dispel some of those concerns.\n\nA. Prohibiting Maxwell’s Victims from Speaking Unfairly Denies Victims Important\nCathartic Bene Tts\n\nAllowing crime victims to speak at a defendant's sentencing can have significant\npsychological and emotional benefits for those victims. See generally Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of\nVictim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 611, 621—23 (2009). As one federal district\ncourt explained, “[E]ven if a victim has nothing to say that would directly alter the court’s sentence, a\nchance to speak still serves important purposes... [Victim] allocution is both a rite and a right.”\n\nUnited States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1349 (D. Utah. 2005) (quoting United States v.\n\nDe Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994)).\n\n[2\n\nDOJ-OGR-000107\n... [truncated, 2004 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00010692/11 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00010692&page=11]", "char_count": 2004}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 _ Filed 06/25/22 Page13 of 21\n\nGiving victims a chance to participate in the rite of allocution has important benefits for the\nvictim. Professor Mary Giannini observes that by delivering a victim impact statement in court, “the\nvictim gains access to a forum that directly and individually acknowledges her victimhood. The\nmoment of sentencing is among the most public, formalized, and ritualistic parts of a criminal case.\nBy giving victims a clear and uninterrupted voice at this moment on par with that of defendants and\nprosecutors, a right to allocute signals both society's recognition of victims’ suffering and their\nimportance to the criminal process.” Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?: Victim\nAllocution, Defendant Allocution, and the Crime Victims Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL’y REV. 431,\n452 (2008); Richard A. Bierschbach, Allocution and the Purposes of Victim Participation Under the\nCVRA, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 44, 46-47 (2006)).\n\nThese healing effects are not unusual. One thorough assessment of the literature on victim\nparticipation explained: “The cumulative knowledge acquired from research in various jurisdictions,\nin countries with different legal systems, suggests that victims often benefit from participation and\ninput. With proper safeguards, the overall experience of providing input can be positive and\nempowering.” Edna Erez, Whos Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim\nEmpowerment and Enhancement of Justice, CRIM. L. REV., July 1999, at 545, 550-51. Thus, the\nconsensus is that victim impact statements allow the victim “to regain a sense of dignity and respect\nrather than feeling powerless and ashamed.” Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal., 435 E3d 1011,\n1016 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77\n\nNotTRE DaMeE L. REV. 39, 41 (2001).\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010704\n\n", "char_count": 1926}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 _ Filed 06/25/22 Page14of21\n\nIt is well known that being a crime victim inflicts numerous immediate psychological\ntraumas on victims as well as those close to them. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) is\ncommonly diagnosed in victims of violent crime. See Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, Zhe Impact of\nCriminal Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 182, 182 (2010).\nPTSD can afflict not only the direct victims of violent crime, but also those who experience its\nprofound repercussions more indirectly, such as family members and friends. Dean G. Kilpatrick &\nRon Acierno, Mental Health Needs of Crime Victims: Epidemiology and Outcomes, 16 J. TRAUMATIC\nSTRESS 119, 119, 125-27 (2003). PTSD is far from the only injury that violent crime can inflict on\nvictims. Depression, substance abuse, panic disorder, and suicide are common victim impacts. See\nParsons & Bergin, supra, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS at 182.\n\nEmpirical research continues to demonstrate the importance of hearing from crime victims\nduring sentencing—particularly victims of sexual offenses. Among the most recent research on the\nsubject was conducted in Australia, where Rhiannon Davies and Lorana Bartels closely examined the\nperspectives of six adult female victims and fifteen justice professionals, supplemented by analysis of\none hundred sentencing statements. See Rhiannon Davies and Lorana Bartels, THE USE OF VICTIM\nIMPACT STATEMENTS IN SENTENCING OF SEXUAL OFFENSES: STORIES OF STRENGTH (2021). The\nbook-length study found that victim impact statements have the potential to give victims voice,\nvalidation, and vindication, which can be an important step in recovering from the trauma inflicted\nby a defendant’s sexual crime.\n\nSarah’s and Elizabeth’s victim impact statement demonstrate that they both have already\n\nbenefitted from knowing that Maxwell has been prosecuted, found guilty, and that they were allowed\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010705\n\n", "char_count": 1980}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 _ Filed 06/25/22 Page15of21\n\nto attend the trial. Being given an opportunity to speak at Maxwell’s sentencing will further advance\ntheir recovery from the injuries caused by being sexually trafficked. [Sarah’s VIS (“Last year I\ntravelled to New York from England...to attend Maxwell’s trial. It was therapeutic to hear the\ntestimony of the four brave victim—witnesses, whose experience paralleled my own, to know that I\nwas not alone and that our story was finally being told for the world to hear. I am grateful that the\njury believed the victims and returned a guilty verdict. I look forward to attending the sentencing\nand watching Ms. Maxwell stand as her sentence is delivered in open court.”); Elizabeth’s VIS (“The\narrests of Epstein and Maxwell in 2019 and 2020 respectively helped me immensely. For the first\ntime, I was finally able to disclose their abuse to close friends and medical providers. Twenty-five\nyears after meeting them, my experience was validated. I could finally see the possibility of closure.\nThis past November and December, I commuted almost every day from my home in Philadelphia to\nattend Ghislaine Maxwell’s trial in Manhattan. For weeks I sat in the courtroom anonymously, only\nrevealing my identity the day before the verdict. I had to see justice for myself. At the age of 48, I feel\nas if I’m just starting my life. All those things I assumed I would have in life, the things that my\nsiblings and friends have achieved: a career, success, a partner, family, a home, a legacy to be proud of\nleaving behind were jeopardized for more than two and a half decades.”)].\n\nB. Allowing Victims to Speak Is Particularly Important in this Case Where Many\nMysteries Abound About the Breadth of Maxwell’s Conspiracy\n\nIn addition to the benefits that will inure to the individual women who speak at Maxwell’s\nsentencing, a public airing of victim impact statements will serve the broader public interest of\nbuilding confidence in the crimina\n... [truncated, 2185 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00010692/14 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00010692&page=14]", "char_count": 2185}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675- Filed 06/25/22 Page16of21\n\nrole in the New York crimes of an expansive long-running sex traficking conspiracy, Maxwell's\ncriminal prosecution does not stand in a vacuum. Maxwell’s recent prosecution in this district\nfollowed the non—prosecution of her co-conspirator Jeffrey Epstein, Maxwell, and other unknown\nco-conspirators in the Southern District of Florida under highly unusual circumstances. As the\nEleventh Circuit en banc recently stated, the facts involving the non—prosecution of Epstein,\nMaxwell, and other un—named and un—known co-conspirators in Florida “are beyond scandalous—\nthey tell a tale of national disgrace.” In re Wild, 994 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied\nsub nom. Wild v. United States Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Fla., 142 S. Ct. 1188 (2022).\n\nIn this Court, Maxwell will now be sentenced for conspiring with “one of this era’s most\ninfamous child predators.” In re Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1247 (11th Cir. 2020), reg en banc granted,\nopinion vacated, 967 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2020). But many questions remain about how and why\nthe innumerable co-conspirators in an extensive international child sex trafficking operation have\nescaped justice for so long. In the Southern District of Florida, Epstein, Maxwell, and other co—\nconspirators arranged a secret non—prosecution deal that allowed Epstein to, in effect, take the fall\nfor all involved and then to serve most of his prison time on “work release’ —while the other co—\nconspirators (such as Maxwell) escaped prosecution entirely. See generally Jeffrey Epstein’s Wealth\nAllowed Him Many Perks While Serving Jail Time in Florida, WASH. POST (July 19, 2019). The\n“preposterous” inexplicable non—prosecution agreement has left the sex trafficking conspiracy’s\nvictims—and the public—to wonder why Epstein, Maxwell, and other co-conspirators were treated\nso favorably. Tung Yin, Learning from the Jeffrey Epstein Mess: Its Time to Add a Cause of Action for\n\nDamages to the Crime\n... [truncated, 2098 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00010692/15 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00010692&page=15]", "char_count": 2098}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675_ Filed 06/25/22 Page17 of 21\n\nJudge Hull observed, “[ml]ysteries remain about how Epstein escaped federal prosecution....” /n re\nWild, 994 F.3d at 1327 (11th Cir. en banc 2021) (Hull, J., dissenting).\n\n‘These “mysteries” about this controversial non—prosecution deal have led to skepticism from\nall quarters. For example, Senator Ben Sasse, then—Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Oversight\nSubcommittee, wrote to Attorney General William Barr that “[t]he idea that wealth and connections\ncan buy injustice...is wholly and completely inconsistent with the basic notions of fairness and\nequality that undergird the rule of law enshrined in our Constitution.” Letter from Sen. Sasse to\nAttorney General Barr (Aug. 13, 2019).?\n\nThe sad reality is that the shocking lack of accountability for the Epstein and Maxwell\ncriminal conspiracy has “ignited a crisis of public trust in the Department [of Justice] and\nexacerbated the erosion of trust that the American people have in our institutions of republican self—\ngovernment more broadly.” Letter from Senators Sasse, Blumenthal, Cruz, and Blackburn to\nInspector General Horowitz (Dec. 2, 2019).°\n\nThe favorable treatment that Epstein, Maxwell, and their other wealthy co-conspirators\nreceived has created a public view that, so long as a defendant is powerful enough, he can manipulate\nthe federal criminal justice system. See generally Marc Fisher et al., The Pressure on a Prosecutor: How\nEpstein’s Wealth and Power Steered Acosta Toward Lenient Deal, WASH. POST (July 12, 2019). Indeed,\n\nthe treatment of the conspirators has caused the public to believe that there is “an entirely different\n\n* Available at https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/8/sasse-to-doj-rip-up-\n\nepstein-deal-go-after-coconspirators.\n3 Available at https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/cb719d31-2a1f-45ad-a701-\n\n3fc3c7b73417/12-02-19-dojigepstein.pdf\n\n17\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010708\n\n", "char_count": 1955}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675- Filed 06/25/22 Page18 of 21\n\njustice system for crime victims of wealthy defendants.” Jn re Wild, 994 F.3d at 1327 (11th Cir. en\nbanc 2021) (Hull, J., dissenting). And Epstein’s escape from conviction through apparent suicide in\ncircumstances where federal authorities should have been more vigilant has created a widely spread\nmeme that “Epstein didn’t kill himself.”\n\nAgainst this backdrop, if Maxwell’s victims are prevented from speaking at her sentencing, it\nwill compound the public perception that the conspiracy’s victims are being silenced and that co—\nconspirators continue to receive favorable treatment. The best way to dispel this public perception is\nfor the Court to broadly permit a// Maxwell’s victims who wish to be heard at sentencing to speak.\n\nJudge Berman of this Court wisely recognized these realities in allowing all of Epstein’s\nvictims to speak at the court hearing where Epstein’s criminal charges were dismissed after his death.\nSee U.S. v. Epstein, Case No. 19-cr-490-RMB (S.D.N.Y. hearing transcript Aug. 27, 2019). As Judge\nBerman explained: “Public hearings are exactly what judges do. Hearings promote transparency and\nthey provide the court with insights and information which the court may not otherwise be aware of.\nThe victims have been included in the proceeding today both because of their relevant experiences\nand because they should always be involved before rather than after the fact.” Aug. 27, 2019, Hrng.\nTrans. at 5. See generally Paul G. Cassell & Bradley J. Edwards, Hearing on Dismissing Epstein Charges\nwas not “Drama” but Proper Respect for Victims, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28, 2019.?\n\nOf course, exactly the same point about the need to promote “transparency” can be made in\n\nthis case—particularly since the Justice Department has yet to announce any other indictments of\n\n* See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epstein_didn%27t_ kill himself.\n> https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/28/hearing-on-dismissing-epste\n... [truncated, 2081 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00010692/17 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00010692&page=17]", "char_count": 2081}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675- Filed 06/25/22 Page19 of 21\n\nthe dozens and dozens of other co—conspirators who were an essential part of the Maxwell/Epstein\nconspiracy to sexually abuse dozens and dozens of young women and girls.\n\nSarah and Elizabeth are entitled to read aloud their victim impact statements at Maxwell’s\ncriminal sentencing. Victim impact statements can help the Court understand the “effect of the\noffense on the victim and the victim's family, and may include oral testimony|.|” See United States v,\nWilson, 493 F. Supp. 2d 364, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). Courts have\nallowed sentencing determinations to consider “oral or written testimony from close family members\nregarding victims and the direct impact” of the harm. Kelly v. California, 555 U.S. 1020 (2008)\nquoting Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 Cornell L.Rev. 257,\n271-272 (2003) (collecting cases). Courts have also considered poems, photographs, hand-crafted\nitems, and even multimedia video presentations. /d. Sarah’s and Elizabeth’s request to provide oral\ntestimony should not be denied.\n\nAllowing Maxwell’s victims to speak will cause no unfair prejudice to Maxwell. As explained\nabove, this Court clearly possesses the authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3661 to obtain any information\nthat may be relevant to sentencing. Maxwell will have an opportunity to respond through her\ncounsel to any information the victims provide.® The Court can then sift through all the information\n\nto determine what is relevant in imposing Maxwell’s sentence. The Court should err on the side of\n\n° Maxwell’s response cannot include cross—examining the victims. See Paul G. Cassell & Edna\nErez, Victim Impact Statements and Ancillary Harm: The American Perspective, 15 CANADIAN CRIM. L.\nREV. 150, 169-70 (2011) (“Federal courts have consistently held that full confrontation rights do\nnot extend to sentencing, a ruling that would implicitly block cross—examination of victim\n... [truncated, 2060 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00010692/18 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00010692&page=18]", "char_count": 2060}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675 _ Filed 06/25/22 Page 20 of 21\n\nreceiving the most information possible in making its sentencing decision and allow all the victims of\nall Maxwell’s sex trafficking crimes to speak.\n\nIV. If the Court Does Not Believe that Sarah and Elizabeth Are Entitled to be Heard at\nSentencing, They Should Be Given Additional Time to Brief and Argue the Issue\n\nFor all the reasons just explained, Sarah and Elizabeth believe that they have established\nentitlement to deliver their victim impact statements at Maxwell’s sentencing. But if, for any reason,\nthe Court has doubts about this issue, Sarah and Elizabeth respectfully request additional time to\ndevelop factual and legal arguments in support of their position. Sarah and Elizabeth have had just\n48 hours to respond to the Court’s June 21* order setting out procedures for briefing this issue. Such\na short time frame has deprived them of an opportunity to develop both factual and legal arguments\nsupporting their position. The Court should give them additional time to develop their position.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nFor all these reasons, the Court should allow Sarah and Elizabeth to orally deliver their\nvictim impact statements at Maxwell’s sentencing or, in the alternative, provide them with additional\ntime to further brief this issue.\n\nDated: June 23, 2022\nNew York, New York\n\n20\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010711\n\n", "char_count": 1379}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00010692", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document675_ Filed 06/25/22 Page 21 of 21\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nMARSH LAW FIRM PLLC\n\n/s/\nRobert Y. Lewis\n31 Hudson Yards, 11 Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\nPhone: 212-372-3030\nEmail: robertlewis@marsh.law\n\n/s/\nMargaret E. Mabie\n31 Hudson Yards, 11% Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\nPhone: 212-372-3030\n\nEmail: margaretmabie@marsh.law\n\n21\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010712\n\n", "char_count": 382}]}