{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_count": 66, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00009002", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/DOJ-OGR-00009002.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 1 of 66\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n--------- +--+ x\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\ny 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\n\nDefendant.\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nPhone: 303-831-7364\n\nChristian R. Everdell\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\nPhone: 212-957-7600\n\nBobbi C. Sternheim\n\nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim\n225 Broadway, Suite 715\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nPhone: 212-243-1100\n\nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009002\n\n", "char_count": 669}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 2 of 66\n\nTable of Contents\n\nRL L eS AT EACLE Scum cos.cen.smemomaronmn ans. 205 nme a NRO SOON 85 NES a il\neG LS ASST ACETATES « cn zensmemmaronne ens. emetew a. RO UR 88 AO SR iV\nTe exe. coemrnnns eosem.comnsromen a. SENNA AERA RN NON 1\nFarell], BO wes sns.snrsn..ces wes sn soa. wa a0 a AA AS AD ASE Ta SORA AS SE HET AAA BAS ORISA 2\nDT Fan pF SRST ces emsrrcs esses cos sn. scns ams wea a 204s MAS ASE Ta AN SAA AS SEL EWA ALAS RIL AT 2\nBroo “TES JOE QUOTES, ces ses sas esses wars a 8.05.08 OAD ASE Ta STAAL AS ER EWA ALAS RA 2\nB. Juror No. 50’s questionnaire. 00.0.0... eeeceeeceeeseceseceeeeecsaceeseeesssecsscersneecsasenseeessaeeneees 5\nC. Juror No. 5078 VOIP dire... ceecceeeeeeescceseceensecenecesncecssecesneecsaecssceesnsecsaseesaeessaeensneeesaeeeees 6\nD. The final composition of the JULY. 00.0.0... cece eececeeeceeneeceseeeseeeenseceeeesneecsasenseeeesaeeneeee 9\nII. Juror No. 50’s admissions that he wasn’t truthful with the Coutt......0...00. eee 11\nA. Juror No. 50’s statements to the media... eee eeeceeneeceeeceeneeenceceeersaeeceaeeeseeees 12\n\n1. The interview with the Independent. ...0.0..... eee eee eeeeceeeeecneceeneesneeceseeeeneerses 12\n\n2. The interview with the Daily Mal. .0..... eee eeeeeeeeceseeeeeecesecesneeenseceseersneerees 13\n\n3. The interview with Reuters... eee eeeessecesceesceceseceeneesssecescersneecsaseesaeessaeceees 14\n\n4. The partial video of the interview with the Daily Mail... eee eeeeeeeee eee 14\n\nB. Juror No. 50’s social media activity. ....... cece eeeeseeceseeeesseceeceesaceceseeesneecsaeeeeneees 15\n\nC. A second juror admits to disclosing during deliberations that they were a victim of\nSOXUAL ASSAUIE. oo. ele eete cee cneecsecsaecsaecsaecsaeessesneesseesseesseesseesseesseeseeetseesserseenseenes 21\n\nApplicable Law..........eeceescceescecssccessceessecesneesscecsaeeesaeecsacceseeecsaecssceeensecsasensaeessaseeseeeenaeensee® 21\n\nI. Juror No. 50’s misconduct deprived Ms. Maxwell of h\n... [truncated, 2441 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00009002/1 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00009002&page=1]", "char_count": 2441}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 3 of 66\n\nB. An intentionally false answer during voir dire is not a prerequisite to obtaining a\n\nNOW trial. oo... eee eee eeeeeeccccesecccccesceccccsssececccssscecccssncececssaesccccssescescessseeccessuresessuensecess 23\nPACT ORIRROIEAL 5 ses, sa svn... 500 sa. 00.1.5. SU STR SAND OSE ASAE ORT. 2A HORA SAAN. AAD SIBLE A AAR ES A 28\nI. Ms. Maxwell is entitled to a new trial. oo... eee eceeseececceeeeccccccessecccssneeccccseeeescees 28\n\nA. Juror No. 50 did not truthfully answer material questions during voir dire,\n\nTreleclrers Chast 2S GEL AR eres concen. cxmomen wxsemememenon 2 ONO i ARAN 28\n\nB. Had Juror No. 50 answered Questions 25 and 48 truthfully, his answers would\nhave provided a valid basis for a challenge for CaUSE. ............ceeceeeeeeeeceeeeeeneeeeeeee 29\n1. Irphied Dias, oe ce eeeeeseeceseeeeeeecsseceseeeesaecescersseecsseeesaeecsasenseerensecasereneersas 30\nSCO.) 37\nBee ARO) TRIS, cnc ccrsestsons smssenomsestoenes ss. umsaneauRtns Sati SEMRURRIURIRE Un I SEHURRSURIRS HI AT SURARURERG HBAS. 38\nC. Juror No. 50’s answers to Questions 25 and 48 were intentionally false............... 39\n\nD. Had Juror No. 50 answered Questions 25 and 48 truthfully, the parties and the\n\nCourt would have explored whether his other answers were false...............:::008 43\n\nE. The scope of any evidentiary hearing. .............ceeeeessseceeececnseceereesneeceseeesneessaeeseneees 48\n\n1. Pre-hearing disCOVETY. ........... ec eeeeseeeeeeseceseeecsccesneessceceseeesneecsaeessneeessecnseereneerses 48\n\n2. The hearing itself... eee eeeeeeeeecsseceseeecnsecesneesneecsseeesaeecsaeceseeessaecseereaeersas 49\n\nTL Jane Ne. 30 Tse no Tht te MSPS, on. coxommnms enem.eneamnonen exscmnemeamenmy emma eemame aman. 51\nAq AO io, SO Teche SUG cercmmonos amc cemammnim wasememmmetenn ais.ctmmeTONNE i. RENN 51\n\nThis Court should refuse Juror No. 50’s discovery request because Juror No. 50 is\nunder investigation and the release of the information \n... [truncated, 2523 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00009002/2 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00009002&page=2]", "char_count": 2523}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 Filed 02/24/22 Page 4 of 66\n\nTable of Authorities\nCases\nAdams v. Texds, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) 0... eecceescecesecesececnscceeneesseecsssersneecsaccesneeenaeseseeeeneerees 28\nArizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) ...cceeceesesssccseeeescecsseeesaeecsaeceseeeensessseeeeneeenes 22\nBrown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2019) 0... ee eeeeceeseceseeeseeeeeeceseeesscecsaceeseeeenseeeees 54\nBurton v. Jolson, 948 F.20.11350 (10th Cir, 1991) cscs seassesses sncovssmmnsses smamsonsumawnns es 29, 30\nClark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) wu... cesses cssecssecseeeneeseesseesseesaeeseeeseeesevseeseeseenes 27\n\nCunningham v. Shoop, _ F. 4th __, 2022 WL 92594 (6th Cir. Nos. 11-3005/20-3429,\nJan. 10, 2022)... eeeeecesesseesecsscceesecsccseesecssecseesecssecsevseessecseescessecseeseensecsevseenaesseeseensesues 50\n\nDavis v. Bombardier Recreational Prod., Inc., No. 3:11CV236-TSL-MTP, 2012 WL\n\n112202 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 12, 2012) wo. ceesecssecseesecssecseesecsecseeseessecseeseensesseeeeeseenes 52\nDyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (Oth Cir.1998) oo... cece ceecseecnsecnsecseecneeeseesnessaeesaes 27, 30\nGonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d. 978 (lOth Cit, 1996), cxcocssensncs oncmnomsusswess msonesmunsmnns osmosis 36\nHunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1992) oo... eee eseeseeeseesneesneeseeeseerseeeseenseenes 29\nIn re Guee, 126 F.3d S86 0G, Car, 997) wes ces susan cos sessmnnana0es Sas seh RAIS SR SORA SAAS EROS aOR 52\n\nIn re Sealed Search Warrants Issued June 4 & 5, 2008, No. O83-M-—208 (DRH),\n\n2008 WL 5667021 (N.D.N.Y. July 14, 2008) oe eee eeecseeseceeceeeseesseceeeseesesseeseesaeenee 55\nJohn Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146 (1989)... cee ceeceeecnsecnsecnsecsecaeeneees 52\nLinda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) ve eeesecescesecesecesecnsecnsecnseesecsaecnaesnaesnaees 51\nLugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) ..... cece eee ceeeeneees 54\n\nMazzeo v. Gibbons, No. 2:08-CV-01387-RLH-PA, 2010 WL 3910072\n\n(D. Nev. Sept\n... [truncated, 2126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00009002/3 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00009002&page=3]", "char_count": 2126}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page5 of 66\n\nMcDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984)... passim\nMetzger v. Hussman, 682 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Nev. 1988)... eeeeeeecessseceeeeeenseeeeereneeees 53\n\nMurphy v. Adm'r E. Jersey State Prison, No. 18-2825, 2021 WL 2822179\n\nGe, Cer, TORT ig SOE Pi comenasnes sec seems ak AEM HEE SOE SORENSEN OSE SERERNERINS ZED. HEE eH 46\nMurphy v. Nogam, No. CV 14-4268 (KM), 2018 WL 278735 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2018) ...... 46\nNeder v. United States, S27 TS. 1 (1999) wes sessssas smcescunssnsas omt.swssensan5.s0s se smn ass as mes te a 28\nPena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) wc ee eeesseseseeessesseesseeseeeseeeseeeseenseenes 50\nRosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981)... cece ese cseeeneecneeseeesneeeneesnes 38, 45\nRussell v. Untied States, 141 5. CE. ZB011 (202 laces ssescmesmmsens sareneecenens oMORASSRTROERS mRSORATORS 47\nSEC v. The Street.Com, 273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir.2001) 0. eee eeseesneeseeeseeeseeeseeeseeeeenseenes 53\nSkaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511 (1Oth Cir. 1998)... eee ceee cee cnee cee 29, 35\nSmith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) oo. eeeeseeeseeeseeeseceseeesecnsecnseonsecnsecnaeonaeenaesnaees 21, 25\nSime v. Ashfar, 196 AcSd OB (SEL: QOLB ) cssessessns.s ss... ms te an. So. RA Ss Sm 33, 41\nState v. Scher, 278 N.J. Super. 249, 263, 650 A.2d 1012 (App. Div. 1994)... 45, 46\nState v. Thompson, 142 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 1976) oe eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeseeeseeeseeeseenes 46\nState v. Williams, 190 N.J.Super. 111 (App. Div. 1983)............s:esssesnsesseoncosseesneesneenneens 46\n\nUnited States v. All Right, Title & Int. in Prop., Appurtenances, & Improvements Known\n\nas 479 Tamarind Drive, Hallendale, Fla., No. 98 CIV. 2279 DLC,\n\n2011 WL 1045095 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011)... eee ceeeceeeeeceecseesecsecneeseesecseeseenaeenes 52\nUnited States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1995)... cesses cseecneecneeceesneesneseneesnes 53\nUnited States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2008)..\n... [truncated, 2180 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00009002/4 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00009002&page=4]", "char_count": 2180}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 6 of 66\n\nUnited States v. Collins, 2013 WL 4780927 (E.D. Wis. 2013)........seseeseeeecseeereeeeeeneeenes 51\nUnited States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1989) oo... cece cesecsecseecneecseecseesseeeneennes 27\nUnited States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) oe eee eee eee passim\nUnited Staies v. Hubunks, 591 F.2d 313 (8th Cite 1979) eccssssss snssessememmss amsans.ssmususes amans.cees 30\nUnited States v. French, 904 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2018)... eee ceecseecneeceesneesneesneesaes 47\nUnited States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2002) ......... see ssesesesesesenseonsoonsensssenseonsonne 36\nUnited States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980 (2d Cir. 1968)... cee cece ceeecnecneecnseeaeenaees 29, 38\nUnited States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65(2d Cir. 1993)... ceeceseesecesecnsecnsecnsecnaeenaees 23, 26\nUnited States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000) ......... se sesecsecseecneeseeeeseeeseeeeeeeees 22\nUnited States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002)... ce ceeeceecssecneeceecneeeseeeneeeneeeaes 21\nUnited Staies vp. Parse, T80 F.3d 83 (20 Car, 2013), casssssmsesmenas enssesssmemmuss amsans.semususes amans.cces 21\nUnited States v. RMI Co., 599 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1979) oo. ceeescseecsecssecneesseeeseeeseeeneesnes 51\nUnited States v. Sampson, 820 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D. Mass. 2011)... eee eee eee ereee passim\nUnited States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)... cece cseeeseeereeeeeeeneeenee 53\nUnited States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006)... cee ceecesecsseceecnsecnseenseenaes passim\nCuited Siaies v, Sigerr, 699 F.3d. 271 (30 Cir. 20 12) scenes exmesecnanes msseaseausenes mneeesons 51\nUnited States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) occ eeeeesecesecnsecnsecneeenaeenaees 28, 35\nUnited States v. Porres, 128 F.3d 38 2d Cir. 1997) assessnsessenos sosssumsemnas sxsacsemmemmus as passim\nUnited States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936)... eee ceecesecnsscnsecnecnsecnsecsecnaecsaeonaeenaees 29, 37\nWainwri\n... [truncated, 2352 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00009002/5 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00009002&page=5]", "char_count": 2352}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 7 of 66\n\nConstitutional Provisions\n\nUS. Amend. VI ou eee eeeceeeeeeseceseeeeseecaceeseeecnsecsseeesseecsaecesceecnaecsseeesnsecasensneeensessaee® 21, 22\n\nRules\n\nFed. R. Civ. Po 12... cee eeeeeeeseceececnsccesneesseeceseeesneecsaccnsneecsaecsseeesseecsaeeesneecsaserseeeensesnaees 53, 54\n\nFed. R. Crim, P. 24 cece eeeceeneeensecesneesseeceaecesseecsaecssneesssecsaeeesneecsaeessneeeasecsaeersaeecasensneees 45\n\nFed. R. Crim. P. 33 cee eeeeeesceeseessseceseeecscceceesncecseeesneecaceeseeessaecssceesseecaeeeseeesaeeneneees 1,21\n\nFed. R. Evid. 606(D) ..... cee eeeesecceeceeceeeceseeesececsaeeesceecsaecsseeessaecsseeesneecaeenseeeesseseee® 49, 50\nVil\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009008\n\n", "char_count": 726}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 8 of 66\n\nGhislaine Maxwell moves under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 for a new\ntrial.\n\nIntroduction\n\nJuror No. 50 says he was a victim of sexual assault and sexual abuse as a child.\nWhen he told his fellow jurors of this abuse during deliberations, “[t]he room went dead\nsilent.” Juror No. 50 has told several media outlets that he drew on his personal\nexperience as a victim to persuade fellow jurors to believe Ms. Maxwell’s accusers,\ndespite the inconsistencies and holes in their stories, even though they delayed disclosing\ntheir allegations against Ms. Maxwell, and in spite of expert testimony from Dr. Elizabeth\nLoftus casting significant doubt on the reliability of their claimed memories.\n\nThis was unfair and prejudicial to Ms. Maxwell, and it all would have been\navoided if Juror No. 50 had told the truth during voir dire. But he didn’t. To the contrary,\nJuror No. 50 repeatedly and unequivocally denied having been the victim of sexual\nabuse, and he denied having any experience that would affect his ability to serve fairly\nand impartially as a juror. Had Juror No. 50 told the truth, he would have been\nchallenged, and excluded, for cause.\n\nThe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees trial by jury.\nFundamental to that guarantee is the promise that the jury will be comprised of twelve\ndispassionate individuals who will fairly and impartially decide, based on the evidence or\nlack of evidence and not on their personal predilections and biases, whether the\n\ngovernment has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Voir dire plays an essential\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009009\n\n", "char_count": 1667}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 9 of 66\n\nrole in this process, and it depends on potential jurors to truthfully answer material\nquestions put to them by the Court and the parties.\n\nThat did not happen here. Juror No. 50 did not truthfully respond to perhaps the\nmost important question put to potential jurors about their personal experiences — a\nquestion that pertained directly to the core allegations against Ms. Maxwell: Whether\nthey had been a victim of sexual assault or abuse. Juror No. 50’s false answer\nundermined voir dire, resulted in a jury that was not fair and impartial, and deprived Ms.\nMaxwell of her constitutional right to trial by jury.\n\nThis Court should vacate the judgment and order a new trial.\n\nFactual Background\nI. Jury Selection\n\nA. The jury questionnaire\n\nThis Court summoned about seven hundred potential jurors, providing each of\nthem with a 22-page questionnaire containing 50 questions. Groups of 100 or more jurors\nwere gathered in the courthouse in morning and afternoon sessions over the course of\nthree days. They were given as much time as needed to complete the questionnaires.\nPotential jurors signed the questionnaires and swore to the accuracy of their responses\nunder penalty of perjury.\n\nThe questionnaire’s purpose was to provide the parties with information about\npotential jurors and to discern whether any potential juror could not be fair and impartial.\nThe Court assured the parties that any affirmative answers to questions would be the\n\nsubject of follow up questioning during the oral voir dire.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009010\n\n", "char_count": 1592}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 10 of 66\n\nThe questionnaire began with a summary of the indictment and the allegations\nagainst Ms. Maxwell, including allegations of sexual trafficking, enticement, and\ntransportation.\n\nGiven the accusations and the sensitivity of sexual assault, sexual abuse, or sexual\nharassment, and the powerful effects such assault, abuse, and harassment can have, the\nquestionnaire included several questions designed to elicit whether a potential juror had\never been abused, assaulted, or harassed, and how that might affect their ability to be an\nunbiased fact finder.\n\nFor example, Question No. 13 asked potential jurors if they could decide the case\npurely the evidence or lack of evidence and not based on any biases, sympathies, or\nprejudices.\n\nQuestion 25 asked potential jurors if they were ever a victim of a crime and, if so,\nwhether that experience would prevent them from being fair and impartial.\n\nQuestions 42-50 asked jurors about their feelings and experiences with the types\nof alleged conduct at issue in the case, including sexual assault, sexual abuse, and sexual\nharassment.\n\nQuestion 42 asked whether the nature of the allegations against Ms. Maxwell\n“might make it difficult” for potential jurors to be fair and impartial. Question 43 asked\npotential jurors if they had views about the laws concerning the age of consent and if\nthose views would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. Question 44 asked potential\njurors if they had views about the laws governing sex trafficking and sex crimes against\n\nminors and if those views would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. Question 47\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009011\n\n", "char_count": 1691}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 11 of 66\n\nasked potential jurors if they would have any difficulty assessing the credibility of\nalleged victims of sexual assault or abuse just as they would assess the credibility of any\nother witness.\n\nPrior to finalizing the questionnaire, Ms. Maxwell proposed specific questions to\nidentify potential jurors who had been victims of sexual assault, sexual abuse, or sexual\nharassment. The defense proposed to ask potential jurors: (1) “Whether reported or not,\nhave you, any family member or anyone close to you, including a child/minor, ever been\nthe victim of any form of sexual abuse? (This includes actual or attempted sexual assault\nor other unwanted sexual advance, including by a stranger, acquaintance, supervisor,\nteacher, or family member;” and (2) “Whether reported or not, have you, or anyone close\nto you, including a child/minor, ever felt in danger of being sexually assaulted by another\nperson, including a stranger, acquaintance, supervisor, teacher, or family member?” Doc.\n367, p 21. The government objected to Ms. Maxwell’s proposed questions. /d. The Court\npartially agreed with the prosecution, asking a single question about whether potential\njurors had been actual victims of sexual assault, sexual abuse, or sexual harassment.\n\nSpecifically, Question 48 asked:\n\nHave you or a friend or family member ever been the victim of sexual\n\nharassment, sexual abuse, or sexual assault? (This includes actual or\n\nattempted sexual assault or other unwanted sexual advance, including by a\nstranger, acquaintance, supervisor, teacher, or family member.)\n\nThe questionnaire offered three answers: “Yes (self),” “Yes (friend or family member),”\n\nand “No.”\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009012\n\n", "char_count": 1744}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 12 of 66\n\nIf a potential juror selected either “yes” option, the questionnaire asked individuals\nto explain their answer in writing, to state whether having been a victim of sexual assault,\nsexual abuse, or sexual harassment would affect their ability to serve fairly and\nimpartially, and if so, to explain why.\n\nFinally, Question 50 asked potential jurors if there was any experience that they\nhad that might affect their ability to serve fairly and impartial as a juror.\n\nSix-hundred and ninety-four individuals answered the questionnaire.\n\nB. Juror No. 50’s questionnaire\n\nJuror No. 50’s questionnaire is attached as EXHIBIT 1. Under the penalty of\nperjury, Juror. No. 50 answered these questions as follows:\n\ne Question 13: “Yes,” Juror No. 50 could decide the case solely based on the\nevidence or lack of evidence and not based on bias, sympathy, or prejudice.\n\ne Question 25: “No,” Juror No. 50 had never been the victim of a crime.\n\ne Question 42: “No,” there was nothing about the nature of the allegations\nagainst Ms. Maxwell that “might make it difficult” for Juror No. 50 to be\nfair and impartial.\n\ne Question 43: “No,” Juror No. 50 did not have any views about laws\nconcerning the age of consent that would affect his ability to be fair and\nimpartial.\n\ne Question 44: “No,” Juror No. 50 did not have any views about the laws\ngoverning sex trafficking and sex crimes against minors that would affect\n\nhis ability to be fair and impartial.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009013\n\n", "char_count": 1525}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 13 of 66\n\ne Question 47, “No,” Juror No. 50 would not have any difficulty assessing\nthe credibility of alleged victims of sexual assault or abuse just as he would\nassess the credibility of any other witness.\n\ne Finally, and most importantly, Juror No. 50 answered “no” when asked in\nQuestion 48 if he had ever been the victim of victim of sexual harassment,\nsexual abuse, or sexual assault, including actual or attempted sexual assault\nor other unwanted sexual advance, including by a stranger, acquaintance,\nsupervisor, teacher, or family member.\n\nC. Juror No. 50’s voir dire\n\nPrior to trial, defense counsel moved the Court to permit limited, attorney-\nconducted voir dire of potential jurors. Doc. 342. Defense counsel explained that given\nthe nature of the allegations, the stakes involved, and the omnipresent media coverage,\nattorney-conducted voir dire to supplement the Court’s voir dire was necessary to ensure\na fair and impartial jury. /d. at 7-15. Defense counsel pointed specifically to the potential\nthat certain jurors could not be fair if they had been a victim of sexual assault or sexual\nabuse. /d. at 9-10. The Court declined to permit attorney-conducted voir dire. TR\n10/21/2021, p 8.\n\nPrior to trial, defense counsel also proposed that the Court individually ask each\njuror in person several questions including \"Have you or anyone close to you ever been\nthe victim of a crime?\" and \"Have you or has anyone close to you ever been the victim of\na sexual crime?\" Doc. 367-1 at 14. The government objected that the questions were\n\n\"duplicative of questions included in the proposed voir dire\" and should not be asked\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009014\n\n", "char_count": 1710}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 14 of 66\n\nagain. /d. at 13. The defense responded in part that \"asking the questions live when the\njurors' reactions, hesitations, explanations can be explored by the Court and observed by\nthe parties will aid in the selection of an impartial and fair jury.\" Jd. The Court denied\nthe defense's request.\n\nJuror No. 50 appeared for his voir dire on November 16. Because Juror No. 50\nanswered “no” to all the relevant questions about sexual abuse, sexual assault, sexual\nharassment and being the victim of a crime, his voir dire was very brief, spanning just\nseven pages of transcript. TR 11/6/2021, pp 128-34; EXHIBIT 2. The Court did not ask\nJuror No. 50 whether the abuse he suffered would make it difficult to be a fair and\nimpartial juror, whether he would be biased against Ms. Maxwell, whether he could set\naside any bias he might have, or whether he could fairly and impartially evaluate Ms.\nMaxwell’s defense, which challenged, in part, the reliability of her accusers’ memories.\n\nAs to the questions the Court did ask (most of which addressed his personal\n\n>\n\noO\npet]\nQ\n=\nite)\n—\nie)\nc\n=)\nQ.\nNa\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009015\n\n", "char_count": 1176}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 15 of 66\n\nAt the end of the very brief voir dire examination, the Court asked Juror No. 50 if\nhe had “[a]ny doubt about [his] ability to” be fair to both sides. /d. at 134. Juror No. 50\nsaid, “no.” /d. The Court concluded: “Other than what I have asked you, do you have any\nreason to think that you can’t be fair and impartial here?” /d. Juror No. 50 responded, “I\ndo not.” Id.\n\nThe Court inquired whether the parties had any follow-up questions. Because\nJuror No. 50 denied any bias or inability to be fair and impartial, and because his answers\nto the questionnaire did not raise any red flags about his ability to serve as a fair and\nimpartial juror 1n a case involving alleged sexual assault and sexual abuse, Ms.\n\nMaxwell’s attorneys did not propose any follow-up questions.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009016\n\n", "char_count": 855}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 16 of 66\n\nD. The final composition of the jury\n\nSix-hundred and ninety-four potential jurors answered the 50-question\n\nquestionnaire.\n\nNe\n\n> The parties submitted this joint list before reviewing the second round of\nquestionnaires.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009017\n\n", "char_count": 308}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page17 of 66\n\nies)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009018\n\n", "char_count": 89}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "e Ofthe 5 jurors seated as alternates, none disclosed on their questionnaires\nthat they were victims of sexual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual\nharassment.*\n\ne Of the 12 deliberating jurors, none disclosed on their questionnaires that\nthey were victims of sexual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual harassment.\n\nAs we now know, however, Juror No. 50 was not telling the truth when he denied being a\nvictim of a crime or being a victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual harassment.\nAnd as explained below, it appears a second deliberating juror was also untruthful when\n\nthey denied being a victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual harassment.\n\nIl. Juror No. 50’s admissions that he wasn’t truthful with the Court\n\n* The court originally seated 6 alternates, but one alternate became a deliberating\njuror when an original juror was excused due to a family commitment. None of the 18\nindividuals selected for service as a deliberating or alternate juror answered “yes” when\nasked if they were a victim of sexual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual harassment.\n\n11\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009019\n", "char_count": 1092}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 19 of 66\n\nA. Juror No. 50’s statements to the media\n1. The interview with The Independent\n\nOn January 4, 2022, less than one week after the jury returned its verdict, Lucia\nOsborne-Crowley of The Independent published an article based on an interview with\nJuror No. 50.° Going by the name Scotty David, Juror No. 50 told Ms. Osborne-Crowley\nthat “[t]his verdict is for all the victims” and “shows that you can be found guilty no\nmatter your status.” Juror No. 50 admitted to being a victim of sexual assault and abuse,\ntelling Ms. Osborne-Crowley that he revealed the abuse to the jury and that his story was\nfundamental to the jury’s verdict. According to Juror No. 50, the “jury room went dead\nsilent when he shared his story.”\n\nJuror No. 50 explained to Ms. Osborne-Crowley how his own experience helped\nthe jury come to believe the alleged victims despite the holes and inconsistencies in their\nstories. “I know what happened when I was sexually abused. I remember the colour of\nthe carpet, the walls. Some of it can be replayed like a video.”\n\nRelying on his own experiences, Juror No. 50 refused to credit the testimony of\nDr. Elizabeth Loftus, Ms. Maxwell’s expert witness on memory. None of Dr. Loftus’s\ntestimony, said Juror No. 50, “relate[d]to traumatic memory.” Juror No. 50 explained all\nof this to the jury. Ms. Maxwell’s accusers “were all believable,” Juror No. 50 said.\n“Nothing they said felt to me like a lie.” Sometimes, he said, you can misremember\n\ntrivial details of a traumatic event without every doubting the core of the memory.\n\n> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/maxwell-juror-account-\nabuse-b1986478.html\n\nlz\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009020\n\n", "char_count": 1730}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 20 of 66\n\nJuror No. 50 also explained, again based on his personal experience, why it was\nimmaterial to him and the jury that the alleged victims did not disclose Ms. Maxwell’s\nalleged involvement until very recently, some twenty years after the alleged abuse. “I\ndidn’t disclose my abuse until I was in high school,” he said.\n\nJuror No. 50 also had an excuse for why the alleged victims in this case kept going\nback to Mr. Epstein and Ms. Maxwell and accepting help from them even after they had\nbeen abused. The alleged victims’ conduct, explained Juror No. 50, was irrelevant to their\ncredibility. In Juror No. 50’s view, Ms. Maxwell’s defense team was continually\nattacking the alleged victims and trying to get the jury to judge them for their decisions,\nas opposed to arguing that their stories were not worthy of belief.\n\n2. The interview with the Daily Mail\n\nOn January 5, the Daily Mail published an article based on its interview with Juror\nNo. 50,° in which he described Ms. Maxwell as a “predator.” Juror No. 50 also shared\nthat he helped other members of the jury understand things from a victim’s point of view\nand explained how “you can’t remember all the details” of traumatic memories: “there\nare some things that run together.” When Juror No. 50 told his fellow jurors of the abuse\nhe suffered, the room “went silent.” Although he couldn’t remember every detail, there\nwere others that stuck with him: “I know what happened when I was sexually abused. I\nremember the color of the carpet, the walls. Some of it can be replayed like a video.”\n\nJuror No. 50 said the verdict was for “all the victims.”\n\n° https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10370193/Ghislaine-Maxwell-juror-\nsays-evidence-convinced-panel-predator.html\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009021\n\n", "char_count": 1819}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 21 of 66\n\n3. Theinterview with Reuters\n\nThe same day the Daily Mail published its article, Reuters also published a story\nbased on an interview Juror No. 50 provided to journalist Luc Cohen.’ In the Reuters\ninterview, Juror No. 50 elaborated about the purpose and effect of his disclosing to the\njury that he was a victim of sexual assault. According to Juror No. 50, coming to a\nunanimous verdict “wasn’t easy, to be honest.” In fact, several jurors doubted the\ncredibility of Jane and Carolyn. “When I shared that [I had been sexually abused],”\nrecounted Juror No. 50, the jurors who had doubts “were able to sort of come around on,\nthey were able to come around on the memory aspect of the sexual abuse.”\n\n4. The partial video of the interview with the Daily Mail\n\nOn January 7, the Daily Mail published a video of a portion of the interview with\nJuror No. 50. This video is submitted to the Court as EXHIBIT 3. The video shows the\nmoment when the interviewer confronts Juror No. 50 about whether he disclosed to the\nCourt and the parties that he was a victim of sexual assault. The interviewer asks whether\nJuror No. 50’s history of being sexually abused was “something that [he’d] said yes to in\nthe questionnaire” such that it “was something people were aware of when [he was]\nselected as a juror.”\n\nJuror No. 50 denied being asked such a question, saying, “No, they don’t ask your\n\nsexual abuse history. They didn’t ask it in the questionnaire.”\n\nT https://www.reuters.com/world/us/some-ghislaine-maxwell-jurors-initially-\ndoubted-accusers-juror-says-2022-01-05/\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009022\n\n", "char_count": 1650}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 22 of 66\n\nThe interviewer challenges Juror No. 50 on this response, saying, “I thought in the\nquestionnaire, there was a question that asked 1f you were a victim or if you were a friend\nor a relative of a victim.” “Pretty sure it was number 48,” the interviewer concludes.\n\n“Interesting,” Juror No. 50 responds, his face turning red.\n\nThe interviewer notices that Juror No. 50’s face is flushing, saying, “You’re not\nout in the sun right now [inaudible].”\n\nJuror No. 50 stumbles to respond: “No, No! I know my face is red because I can\nfeel the blood but, I honestly—that’s why I answered it that way. I don’t remember it\nbeing there but. Um... I did answer, I definitely remember a family or relative or\nsomething but—being sexually abused. I was honest on all my questions.”\n\nB. Juror No. 50’s social media activity\n\nOn January 4, after Ms. Osborne-Crawley first published her interview with Juror\nNo. 50, Annie Farmer quote-Tweeted a Tweet from Ms. Osborne-Crawley, linking to the\n\ninterview. Ms. Farmer said:\n\n15\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009023\n\n", "char_count": 1092}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 23 of 66\n\nannie farmer @anniefarmer - 9h\n\n== | Reading this | was overwhelmed with a\nsense of gratitude- for this juror who was\nbrave enough to disclose his own trauma to\nhelp others understand the experience, for\nthe other women who testified, & for my\nsister all the other survivors who spoke out\nand kept pushing for justice\n\n@ Lucia Osborne-Crowley @ - 13h\n\nWORLDWIDE EXCLUSIVE: | secured\nthe first ever interview with a member\nof the jury in the\n#GhislaineMaxwellTrial. I'm so grateful\nto Scotty for talking to me about why...\n\nShow this thread\nOQ 8 TQ 43 © 162 iT,\n\nA short time later, Juror No. 50 “liked” Ms. Farmer’s Tweet. Juror No. 50 then Tweeted\n\ndirectly to Ms. Farmer in response:\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009024\n\n", "char_count": 772}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 24 of 66\n\nScotty David\n\n1 Tweet\n\n39 Following 1 Follower\n\nNot followed by anyone you're following\n\nTweets Tweets & replies Media Likes\n\nannie farmer @anniefarmer - 8h\n\nts Reading this | was overwhelmed with a\nsense of gratitude- for this juror who was\nbrave enough to disclose his own trauma to\nhelp others understand the experience, for\nthe other women who testified, & for my\nsister all the other survivors who spoke out\nand kept pushing for justice\n\n@ Lucia Osborne-Crowley @- 13h\nWORLDWIDE EXCLUSIVE: | secured\nthe first ever interview with a member\nof the jury in the\n#GhislaineMaxwellTrial. I'm so grateful\nto Scotty for talking to me about why...\n\nShow this thread\nQO 9 Tt 43 © 161 it;\nScotty David @ScottyDavidNYC - 4h\nThanks for being brave enough to stand up\nand share your experience. Your story was\n\ncritical in how we reached our verdict in\nthat jury room. Thanks for sharing my story\n\n) 4 O's t\n\nG9 Q@  w% 4 U\n\nJuror No. 50 also “liked” Ms. Osborne-Crawley’s Tweet linking to his interview.\nAt the time Juror No. 50 Tweeted to Ms. Farmer, his Twitter handle was the same\n\nname he used in his press interviews: “@ScottyDavidNYC.”\n\n17\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009025\n\n", "char_count": 1222}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22\n\nve\n\nScotty David\n@ScottyDavidNYC\n\n© Manhattan, NY Joined April 2021\n39 Following 1 Follower\n\nNot followed by anyone you're following\n\nTweets Tweets & replies Media Likes\n\nannie farmer @anniefarmer - 8h\n\nts Reading this | was overwhelmed with a\nsense of gratitude- for this juror who was\nbrave enough to disclose his own trauma to\nhelp others understand the experience, for\nthe other women who testified, & for my\nsister all the other survivors who spoke out\nand kept pushing for justice\n\n@ Lucia Osborne-Crowley @ - 13h\nWORLDWIDE EXCLUSIVE: | secured\nthe first ever interview with a member\nof the jury in the\n#GhislaineMaxwellTrial. I'm so grateful\nto Scotty for talking to me about why...\nShow this thread\n\nQO 9 1) 48 © 161 ©\n\ni 7 EE Yo ee Oe ee | Lo\n\noe Q 0,0 a a\n\nPage 25 of 66\n\nShortly after Tweeting Ms. Farmer, however, Juror No. 50 changed his Twitter handle to\n\n“@NycSsddd.” He also attempted to delete his Tweet to Ms. Farmer.\n\n18\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009026\n\n", "char_count": 1012}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 26 of 66\n\n9:317\n\n< Outlook\n\n*)\na\n\n< Tweet\n\nS\na @NycSsddd\n\nReplying to @anniefarmer\n\nThanks for being brave enough to\nstand up and share your experience.\nYour story was critical in how we\nreached our verdict in that jury room.\nThanks for sharing my story &\n\n4:07 PM - 1/4/22 - Twitter for iPhone\n\n1 Retweet 3 Likes\n\nO ja) g\n\n[>\n\nThis Tweet has been deleted.\n\nJuror No. 50 did not “unlike” Ms. Farmer’s Tweet, or the Tweet by Ms. Osborne-\n\nCrawley linking to his interview.\nIn early January, Juror No. 50 also posted about his jury service on his Instagram\n\nCC OU ,\n\n19\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009027\n\n", "char_count": 643}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 27 of 66\n\n« ?\n\nTHISBEARTRAVELS\n\nPosts thisbeartraveis (©\n\nthisbeartravels _\nNew York City, NY 364 987 825\n7 Posts Followers Following\n\nScotty David\nTraveling around the world G as much as | can\n\nMessage\n\nQV\n590 likes\n\nthisbeartraveis | can now tell everyone that | was\n@ juror on the Ghislaine Maxwell trial. Been an\nincredible, surreal experience and an\n\nthisbeartravels @rutter. gram the state does\nnot offer therapy, unfortunately. But | see a\ntherapist regularly so have had some help\ndealing with the stress from this case\nnicolejcornes We thank you from around the\nworld for your brillant service\n\nthisbeartravels\nManhattan, New York\n\na AQ Ff Ff\n\nShortly thereafter, Juror No. 50 predictably deleted his Twitter account and his\n\nInstagram account. He also appears to have deleted his Facebook and LinkedIn accounts.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009028\n\n", "char_count": 898}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 28 of 66\n\nC. A second juror admits to disclosing during deliberations that they were\na victim of sexual assault\n\nDuring his press tour, Juror No. 50 revealed in interviews that he was not alone in\nrevealing to jurors that he was a victim of sexual assault, describing to reporter that a\nsecond juror also disclosed that they were a victim of sexual abuse.* On January 5, the\nNew York Times published an article confirming Juror No. 50’s statement, reporting that\n“a second juror described in an interview . . . having been sexually abused as a child.’””\n“This juror, who requested anonymity, said that they, too, had discussed the experience\nduring deliberations and that the revelation had appeared to help shape the jury’s\n\ndiscussions.” To date, this juror has not publicly revealed their identity, and Ms. Maxwell\n\ndoes not know who it is.!°\n\nApplicable Law\n\nI. Juror No. 50’s misconduct deprived Ms. Maxwell of her constitutional right\nto a fair trial by an impartial jury.\n\nA. A party alleging unfairness based on undisclosed juror bias must\ndemonstrate first, that the juror’s voir dire response was false and\n\n8 https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10379445/Ghislaine-Maxwells-\nlawyers-fought-ask-jurors-detailed-questions-sexual-abuse.html\n\n* https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/05/nyregion/maxwell-trial-jury-inquiry.html\n\n—\no\n\nN\n—\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009029\n", "char_count": 1416}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 29 of 66\n\nsecond, that the correct response would have provided a valid basis for\na challenge for cause.\n\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that, “[uJpon the defendant’s\nmotion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice\nso requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a).\n\nThe Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a trial by an\nimpartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI. In McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v.\nGreenwood, the Supreme Court recognized that “[o]ne touchstone of a fair trial 1s an\nimpartial trier of fact—‘a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the\nevidence before it.’” 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,\n217 (1982)). “The right to trial before an impartial trier of fact—be it a jury or a judge—\ntherefore implicates Due Process as well as Sixth Amendment rights.” United States v.\nNelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201 (2d Cir. 2002).\n\nIn turn, “/v/oir dire plays an essential role in protecting the right to trial by an\nimpartial jury.” United States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)\n(granting new trial to three defendants based on juror dishonesty during voir dire and\nconcluding one defendant, Parse, waived his new trial motion), vacated and remanded\nsub nom. United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2015) (reversing district court’s\nconclusion that the defendant Parse waived his new trial motion). It is bedrock\nconstitutional law that defendants have a right to “a full and fair opportunity to expose\nbias or prejudice on the part of veniremen” and that “there must be sufficient information\n\nelicited on voir dire to permit a defendant to intelligently exercise not only his challenges\n\n2a\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009030\n\n", "char_count": 1814}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 30 of 66\n\nfor cause, but also his peremptory challenges.” United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121,\n139 (2d Cir. 1979) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “A juror’s dishonesty\nduring voir dire undermines a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp.\n2d at 468; U.S. Const. amend. VI.\n\n“TA] party alleging unfairness based on undisclosed juror bias must demonstrate\nfirst, that the juror’s voir dire response was false and second, that the correct response\nwould have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” United States v. Stewart,\n433 F.3d 273, 303 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556).\n\nA defendant need not demonstrate prejudice when a juror gives a false answer to a\nmaterial question during voir dire if the juror would have been subject to a challenge for\ncause if he had answered honestly. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304,\n\n99 66\n\n316 (2000) (the “seating of any juror who should have been dismissed for cause” “would\nrequire reversal”). When a biased juror deliberates on a jury, structural error occurs, and a\nnew trial is required without a showing of actual prejudice. See Arizona v. Fulminante,\n\n499 U.S. 279, 307-10 (1991).\n\nB. An intentionally false answer during voir dire is not a prerequisite to\nobtaining a new trial.\n\n“Intentionally false” juror answers are not a prerequisite to a finding that a\ndefendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury have been violated.\nMcDonough, 464 U.S. at 553-56; id. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 557-59\n(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). So long as a truthful answer would have subjected\n\nthe juror to a challenge for cause based on bias, an inadvertent false answer is just as\n\nae\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009031\n\n", "char_count": 1813}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 31 of 66\n\ninvidious as an intentionally false answer. United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 68 (2d\nCir. 1993).'! As the Second Circuit held in Langford:\n\nWe read [McDonough] multi-part test as governing not only inadvertent\nnondisclosures but also nondisclosures or misstatements that were deliberate,\nfor though the McDonough Court began with the inadvertent response before\nit, 1t stated that the further showing of cause must be made even after a juror’s\n“failure to answer honestly,” and it hypothesized that there could be various\n“motives for concealing.” Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan\nsimilarly stated that a second element—bias—should be required even if the\njuror’s erroneous response was deliberate. Thus, he stated that the\n\nproper focus when ruling on a motion for new trial in this\nsituation should be on the bias of the juror and the resulting\nprejudice to the litigant. . .\n\n... Whether the juror answered a particular question on voir\ndire honestly or dishonestly, or whether an inaccurate answer\nwas inadvertent or intentional, are simply factors to be\nconsidered in th[e] . . . determination of actual bias.\n\nLangford, 990 F.2d at 68 (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 557-58 (Brennan, J.,\nconcurring in judgment)).\n\nThe seminal case addressing a juror’s false answers during voir dire 1s\nMcDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood. McDonough was a products liability\naction in which Juror Payton remained silent when the district court asked, “how many of\nyou [potential jurors] have yourself or any members of your immediate family sustained\nany severe injury [in] an accident at home, or on the farm or at work that result in any\n\ndisability or prolonged pain and suffering?” 464 U.S. at 550. After trial, it was discovered\n\n'l This caselaw uses “deliberate” and “intentional” interchangeably.\n\n24\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009032\n\n", "char_count": 1910}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 32 of 66\n\nthat Juror Payton’s son had been injured in an explosion of a fire truck. /d. at 551. The\ndistrict court denied a motion for a new trial without holding a hearing. J/d.\n\nThe court of appeals reversed, ordering a new trial instead of remanding for a\nhearing. /d. at 551-52. The court of appeals held that if “an average prospective juror\nwould have disclosed the information, and that information would have been significant\nand cogent evidence of the juror’s probable bias, a new trial 1s required to rectify the\nfailure to disclose it.” Jd. at 552. “Good faith,” said the court, was “irrelevant to the\ninquiry.” Id.\n\nThe Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that it employed the\nwrong standard and erred in reaching the merits instead of remanding the case to the\ndistrict court for an evidentiary hearing. /d. at 556. As for the correct legal standard, the\nCourt said that\n\nto obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a\n\njuror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then\n\nfurther show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a\nchallenge for cause.\n\nId. The Court remanded to the court of appeals to consider any outstanding issues and,\nassuming the judgment wasn’t reversed for other reasons, to remand to the district court\nfor an evidentiary hearing applying the new legal standard. /d.\n\nThe court emphasized that “/v/oir dire examination serves to protect [the fair trial]\nright by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential\njurors” and that the “necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if [voir dire] is to\n\nserve its purpose is obvious.” /d. at 554. The Court did not expressly disavow the court of\n\n2a\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009033\n\n", "char_count": 1840}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 33 of 66\n\nappeals’ statement that the good faith of a potential juror was “irrelevant” to the inquiry.\nId. at 553-56.\n\nThere were two concurring opinions in McDonough, joined by a total of five\njustices, which make clear that an intentionally false answer is not a prerequisite to\nobtaining a new trial. Writing for himself and Justices Stevens and O’Connor, Justice\nBlackmun said:\n\nI agree with the Court that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the\n\ndefendant had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact. I also agree that, in\n\nmost cases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror’s response is the best initial\nindicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial. I therefore join the\n\nCourt’s opinion, but J write separately to state that I understand the Court’s\n\nholding not to foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who\n\nis asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. Thus,\n\nregardless of whether a juror’s answer is honest or dishonest, 1t remains\n\nwithin a trial court’s option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to\norder a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to\ndemonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are\n\nsuch that bias is to be inferred. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-16\n(O’Connor, J., concurring).\n\nId. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring (emphasis added)). This was the entirety of\nJustice Blackmun’s dissent. /d.\n\nFor his part, Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall recognized that “the bias\nof a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, ‘partly because the juror may have\nan interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of\nit.’” Jd. at 558 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting majority opinion).\n“Necessarily,” then, Justice Brennan explained, bias “must be inferred from surrounding\nfacts and circumstances.” Jd. “Whether the juror answered a \n... [truncated, 2134 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00009002/32 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00009002&page=32]", "char_count": 2134}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 34 of 66\n\nintentional, are simply factors to be considered in this latter determination of actual bias.”\nId. “One easily can imagine cases in which a prospective juror provides what he\nsubjectively believes to be an honest answer, yet that same answer is objectively incorrect\nand therefore suggests that the individual would be a biased juror in the particular case.”\nId. at 559.\n\nThe Second Circuit adopted this reading of McDonough, endorsing the view\nexpressed by Justice Brennan (and shared by Justice Blackmun) that an intentionally false\nanswer 1s not a prerequisite to obtaining a new trial. United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d\n65, 68 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We read this multi-part test as governing not only inadvertent\nnondisclosures but also nondisclosures or misstatements that were deliberate.”); id. at 68\n(adopting Justice Brennan’s reasoning). Accordingly, in the Second Circuit, “a party\nalleging unfairness based on undisclosed juror bias must demonstrate first, that the juror’s\nvoir dire response was false and second, that the correct response would have provided a\nvalid basis for a challenge for cause.” United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 303 (2d\nCir. 2006).\n\nOf course, individuals cannot be allowed to lie their way onto a jury. Writing for a\nunanimous Supreme Court, Justice Cardozo concluded: “If the answers to the questions\n[during voir dire] are willfully evasive or knowingly untrue, the talesman, when\naccepted, 1s a juror in name only .. . His relation to the court and to the parties is tainted\nin its origin; it is a mere pretense and sham.” Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11\n(1933). “[A] juror who lies [his] way onto a jury is not really a juror at all; []he is an\n\ninterloper akin ‘to a stranger who sneaks into the jury room.’” Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp.\n\n2d\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009035\n\n", "char_count": 1874}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 35 of 66\n\n2d at 468 (quoting Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc)).\n“TC]ourts cannot administer justice in circumstances in which a juror can commit a\nfederal crime in order to serve as a juror in a criminal case and do so with no fear of\nsanction so long as a conviction results.” United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149, 152\n(2d Cir. 1989).\n\nArgument\n\nI. Ms. Maxwell is entitled to a new trial.\n\nThis Court must order a new trial if Ms. Maxwell can make two showings: First,\nthat Juror No. 50’s voir dire response was false and second, that the correct response\nwould have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. Stewart, 433 F.3d at 303.\nEven without an evidentiary hearing, Ms. Maxwell has made that showing here.\n\nA. Juror No. 50 did not truthfully answer material questions during voir\ndire, including Questions 25 and 48.\n\nThere is no reasonable dispute that Juror No. 50’s voir dire responses were false.\nJuror No. 50 has told several media outlets that he was a victim of sexual assault and\nsexual abuse as a child. Necessarily, then, Juror No. 50 did not provide truthful answers\nwhen he denied being the victim of a crime (Question 25) or being a victim of sexual\nharassment, sexual abuse, or sexual assault (Question 48).\n\nAnd because being a victim of sexual assault or sexual abuse is material to an\nindividual’s ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror in a case about sexual assault and\nsexual abuse, Ms. Maxwell has satisfied the first prong of the McDonough test. See\n\nUnited States v. Sampson, 820 F. Supp. 2d 151, 172 (D. Mass. 2011) (“[A] matter is\n\n28\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009036\n\n", "char_count": 1689}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 36 of 66\n\nmaterial if it has a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the judge\nwho must decide whether to excuse a juror for cause.” (citing Neder v. United States, 527\nU.S. 1, 16 (1999) (giving general definition of materiality))).\n\nB. Had Juror No. 50 answered Questions 25 and 48 truthfully, his answers\nwould have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.\n\nThe second question is whether truthful responses from Juror No. 50 would have\nprovided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. See Stewart, 433 F.3d at 303. “[T]he test\nis not whether the true facts would compel the Court to remove a juror for cause, but\nrather whether a truthful response ‘would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for\ncause.’” Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556).\n\n“An impartial jury is one in which every juror is ‘capable and willing to decide the\ncase solely on the evidence before [him].’” /d. (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 554).\n“Jurors are instructed that they are to decide the question of a defendant’s guilt based\nsolely on the evidence presented.” /d. (citing United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616-\n17 n.10 (2d Cir. 1997). A juror is biased—i.e., not impartial—if his experiences “would\n‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance\nwith his instructions and his oath.’” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)\n(quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)); see also United States v. Torres, 128\nF.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997) Guror who structured financial transactions properly excused\n\nfor cause in case involving structuring of cash deposits).\n\nay\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009037\n\n", "char_count": 1747}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 37 of 66\n\nChallenges for cause can be based on implied bias, inferable bias, or actual basis.\nSee Torres, 128 F.3d at 43; see also Sampson, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 162—67 (discussing at\nlength each type of bias).\n\n1. Implied bias\n\n“Implied or presumed bias is ‘bias conclusively presumed as a matter of law.””\nTorres, 128 F.3d at 45 (quoting Wood, 299 U.S. at 133). “It is attributed to a prospective\njuror regardless of actual partiality.” Jd. “In contrast to the inquiry for actual bias, which\nfocuses on whether the record at voir dire supports a finding that the juror was in fact\npartial, the issue for implied bias is whether an average person in the position of the juror\nin controversy would be prejudiced.” /d. (citing Haynes, 398 F.2d at 984). “And in\ndetermining whether a prospective juror is impliedly biased, ‘his statements upon voir\ndire [about his ability to be impartial] are totally irrelevant.” /d. (quoting Haynes, 398\nF.2d at 984).\n\nAs 1s relevant here, there are two ways in which courts imply bias. First, “[c]Jourts\nimply bias ‘when there are similarities between the personal experiences of the juror and\nthe issues being litigated.’” Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 472 (quoting Sampson, 820 F.\nSupp. 2d at 163-64); see also Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 517 (10th Cir.\n1998) (collecting cases where bias was implied based on the juror’s experiences); see,\ne.g., Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding, in a case\ncharging murder in the course of a burglary, that bias should be implied where two jurors\nwere the victims of similar burglaries during deliberations); Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d\n\n1150, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding, in murder case in which the defendant presented a\n\n30\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009038\n\n", "char_count": 1821}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 38 of 66\n\ndefense based on having suffered domestic violence at the hands of the victim, that a\njuror living in similarly abusive circumstances at the time of trial, and who gave\ndishonest answers regarding that subject at voir dire, was impliedly biased); United\nStates v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (implying bias where,\nin a trial for participation in a heroin distribution conspiracy, a juror failed to disclose at\nvoir dire that he had two sons who were serving long prison sentences for heroin-related\ncrimes).\n\nSecond, courts imply bias when “repeated lies in voir dire imply that the juror\nconcealed material facts in order to secure a spot on the particular jury.” Daugerdas, 867\nF. Supp. 2d at 472 (quotation omitted). “A juror... who lies materially and repeatedly in\nresponse to legitimate inquiries about her background introduces destructive uncertainties\ninto the process.” Dyer, 151 F.3d at 983.\n\nUnder both theories, Juror No. 50 was impliedly biased. First, bias should be\nimplied because this is a case 1n which “there are similarities between the personal\nexperiences of the juror and the issues being litigated.’” Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at\n472. “When a juror has life experiences that correspond with evidence presented during\nthe trial, that congruence raises obvious concerns about the juror’s possible bias.”\nSampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 167 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Torres, 128 F.3d at\n47-48; Burton, 948 F.2d at 1158-59). “In such a situation, the juror may have enormous\ndifficulty separating her own life experiences from evidence in the case.” /d. The First\n\nCircuit has commented, for example, that “it would be natural for a juror who had been\n\n31\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009039\n\n", "char_count": 1797}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 39 of 66\n\nthe victim of a home invasion to harbor bias against a defendant accused of such a\ncrime.” Id.\n\nThe same is true here: “It would be natural for a juror who had been the victim of\n[sexual assault and sexual abuse] to harbor bias against a defendant accused of such a\ncrime.” See id. Like Jane, Carolyn, Kate, and Annie Farmer, Juror No. 50 claims to be a\nvictim of child sexual abuse. Like Jane, Carolyn, Kate, and Annie Farmer, Juror No. 50\ndelayed disclosing the abuse he suffered. Like Jane, Carolyn, Kate, and Annie Farmer,\nJuror No. 50 says the memories of the abuse he suffered can be “replayed like a video.”\nAnd like Jane, who described Mr. Epstein’s New York apartment and said it had a “red\nmood,” TR at 320, Juror No. 50 says he can remember the “color of the carpet, [of] the\nwalls” in the room where he was abused.\n\nThese similarities are profound because they bear on the principal argument Ms.\nMaxwell made against her accusers’ claimed memories: They were corrupted and\nunreliable. Juror No. 50’s claim that the memory of his abuse can be “replayed like a\nvideo” is perhaps most significant, because it directly contradicts Dr. Loftus’s expert\ntestimony:\n\nQ. Memory has been termed a constructive process; correct?\n\nA. Yes.\n\nQ. Could you explain what that means to the jury.\n\nA. What we mean by that is as I testified earlier, we don’t just record events\nand play it back later like a recording device would work, like a video\nmachine, but rather, we are actually constructing our memories when we\nretrieve memories. We often take bits and pieces of experience sometimes\n\nan\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009040\n\n", "char_count": 1675}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 40 of 66\n\nthat occurred at different times and places, bring it together, and construct\nwhat feels like a recollection.\n\nTR at 2427. Given Juror No. 50’s personal experience and belief about memory and its\nreliability, there was no way he could fairly evaluate Ms. Maxwell’s challenge to the\ncredibility of her accusers’ memories or the expert testimony of Dr. Loftus.'*\n\nSeveral decisions support this conclusion. In Sampson v. United States, for\nexample, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to order a new penalty-\nphase hearing in a death penalty case after a juror falsely denied, among other things,\nhaving been a victim of a crime. 724 F.3d at 154, 162. In fact, however, the juror\nrepeatedly had been menaced by her husband with a shotgun. /d. at 168. But because the\njuror had not told the truth during voir dire, she was seated on a jury 1n a case involving a\nbank robbery in which the defendant threatened bank tellers at gunpoint. /d. “These\nparallels,” the Court said, “raise a serious concern as to whether an ordinary person in\n[the juror’s] shoes would be able to disregard her own experiences in evaluating the\nevidence.” Jd.\n\nTo be sure, the juror in Sampson did not limit her false answers to a single\nquestion. She also answered falsely to several other questions during voir dire, some\nmaterial and some not. /d. at 162-63, 166. A combination of factors led the First Circuit\n\nto affirm the order for a new penalty-phase hearing. /d. at 168. Here, Juror No. 50’s false\n\nJuror No. 50’s confidence in his memory is not necessarily a predictor of the\nmemory’s reliability. As Dr. Loftus testified, “when you have post-event suggestion or\nintervention, people get very confident about their wrong answers, and you can see that\neven wrong answers or false information, false memories can be expressed with a high\ndegree of confidence.” TR at 2430.\n\n33\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009041\n\n", "char_count": 1964}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 41 of 66\n\nanswers to Questions 25 and 48 are reason enough to order a new trial because they relate\nto the core allegations against Ms. Maxwell. Moreover, if this Court orders an evidentiary\nhearing, it is likely additional false answers will come to light, further supporting the\nconclusion that Ms. Maxwell is entitled to a new trial.\n\nIn State v. Ashfar, the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault based\non the allegation that he touched the genitals of his 12-year-old client during a therapy\nsession. 196 A.3d 93, 94 (N.H. 2018).!? The empaneled jury, however, included an\nindividual who had been sexually assaulted by a babysitter when he was five or six years\nold. /d. at 95. The juror had not disclosed this during voir dire and had, instead, answered\n“no” when asked if “[he] or a close member of your family or a close friend ever been a\nvictim of a crime?” Jd. at 95. The trial court ordered a new trial, relying both on the\njuror’s false answer during voir dire but also his post-verdict conduct, which included\ncommunications with a female victim of sexual assault who wrote a book on the subject\nand the juror’s self-identification as “an advocate for people.” Jd. at 96. The New\nHampshire Supreme Court affirmed.\n\nThe decisions in Sampson and Ashfar support a new trial here. Like those cases,\nJuror No. 50 falsely denied having a personal experience strikingly similar to the conduct\n\nat issue in the criminal case. Juror No. 50’s experience as a sexual assault victim “raise[s |\n\n'3 Because state courts are more often the venue for prosecution of crimes\ninvolving sexual assault, state court decisions are particularly helpful. The New\nHampshire Supreme Court “assum[ed] without deciding that McDonough provides the\napplicable analytical framework” and concluded that the trial court “sustainably exercised\nits discretion in finding the juror “was not impartial.” 196 A.3d at 97.\n\n34\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009042\n\n", "char_count": 1992}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 42 of 66\n\na serious concern as to whether an ordinary person in [Juror No. 50’s] shoes would be\nable to disregard [his] own experiences in evaluating the evidence.” /d. Moreover, like\nthe juror in Ashfar, Juror No. 50’s post-trial conduct further supports a finding of implied\nbias. The juror in Ashfar communicated with a victim of sexual assault; here, Juror No.\n50 communicated with Annie Famer. The juror in Ashfar viewed himself as “advocate for\npeople;” here, Juror No. 50 proclaimed that the verdict against Ms. Maxwell was a\nverdict “for all the victims.”\n\nThe bias of Juror No. 50 should be implied for another reason: “[R]epeated lies in\n\nvoir dire imply that the juror concealed material facts in order to secure a spot on the\n\nparticular jury.” Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 472. xs\n\nCrucially, “[e]ven when prospective jurors are dishonest for reasons other than a\ndesire to secure a seat on the jury, dishonest answers to voir dire questions indicate that a\n\njuror 1s unwilling or unable ‘to apply the law as instructed by the court to the evidence\n\n35\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009043\n\n", "char_count": 1143}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 43 of 66\n\npresented by the parties’ and, therefore, are indicative of a lack of impartiality because a\nfundamental instruction in every federal case is that a juror must render a verdict ‘solely\non the evidence presented at trial.’” Sampson, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (quoting Thomas,\n116 F.3d at 617 & n.10 (citing The Federal Judicial Center’s Benchbook for U.S. District\nCourt Judges)). Therefore, dishonest answers are a factor that can contribute to a finding\nof implied bias. See Skaggs, 164 F.3d at 517.\n\nThe false answers Ms. Maxwell knows about so far, by themselves, provide a\n\nbasis for a new trial because, 1f they had been exposed during voir dire, this Court would\n\nhave treated Juror No. 50 just as it treated Juror No. [j.\nOO —“CSCSCSCsCs\nOO —“CSCSCSCSC‘(Ciés\n\nee\nSS «13 hc\nalso did much more, falsely denying that he had been a victim of sexual assault or sexual\nab SC,\na\n\nThis Court should treat Juror No. 50 just as it treated Juror No. J, and on that\nground order a mew trials\nSS\n\n36\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009044\n\n", "char_count": 1077}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 44 of 66\n\n2. Inferable bias\n\n““Inferable’ or ‘inferred’ bias exists ‘when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a\nrisk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to\nexcuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.’”\nDaugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (quoting United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171\n(2d Cir. 2002)). A court should dismiss a potential juror for inferable bias “after having\nreceived responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would\nnot be able to decide the matter objectively.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 47. “[T]his is so even\nthough the juror need not be asked the specific question of whether he or she could\ndecide the case impartially.” Jd.\n\n“Moreover, once facts are elicited that permit a finding of inferable bias, then, just\nas in the situation of implied bias, the juror’s statements as to his or her ability to be\nimpartial become irrelevant.” /d. “The crux of the implied bias analysis 1n a case like this\none is found in an examination of the similarities between the juror’s experiences and the\nincident giving rise to the trial.” Zorres, 128 F.3d at 48 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 99\nF.3d 978, 989 (10th Cir. 1996)). Assuming this Court does not imply bias, it should\nnevertheless infer bias.\n\nIn United States v. Torres, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to launder\nthe proceeds of a heroin trafficking scheme by structuring financial transactions. 128 F.3d\nat 41. Over the defense’s objection, the district court (Judge Preska) dismissed for cause a\npotential juror who admitted that she “had at one time engaged in the ‘structuring’ of\n\ncash transactions.” /d. at 42. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the\n\n37\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009045\n\n", "char_count": 1864}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 45 of 66\n\ndistrict court did not err in inferring bias. /d. at 47-48. “Given the similarity of Juror No.\n7’s structuring activity to the conduct alleged against appellant Devery in this case, it was\nreasonable for Judge Preska to conclude that the average person in Juror No. 7’s position\nmight have felt personally threatened.” Jd. at 48. Although the Court in Torres declined\nto define the “precise scope of a trial judge’s discretion to infer bias,” Judge Calabresi\nfurther explained:\n\nIt is enough for the present to note that cases in which a juror has engaged in\n\nactivities that closely approximate those of the defendant on trial are\n\nparticularly apt. The exercise of the trial judge’s discretion to grant\n\nchallenges for cause on the basis of inferred bias is especially appropriate\nin such situations.\n\nId. at 47 (emphasis added).\n\nJust as it is “especially appropriate” for a court to infer bias when a potential juror\nhas engaged in “activities that closely approximate those of the defendant on trial,” so too\nis it “especially appropriate” for a court to infer bias when a potential juror has been\nsubject to conduct “that closely approximate[d] [that] of the defendant on trial.” See id. In\nsuch a case, there 1s just too great a risk that such a juror will not be able to decide the\ncase purely based on the applicable law and the evidence or lack of evidence, even\nthough that inability may be unconscious. This is one such case.\n\n3. Actual bias\n\n“Actual bias is ‘bias in fact’—the existence of a state of mind that leads to an\ninference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 43\n(citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936)). “A juror is found by the judge\n\nto be partial either because the juror admits partiality, or the judge finds actual partiality\n\n38\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009046\n\n", "char_count": 1899}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 46 of 66\n\nbased upon the juror’s voir dire answers.” /d. (citing United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d\n980, 984 (2d Cir. 1968) (actual bias 1s “based upon express proof, e.g., by a voir dire\nadmission by the prospective juror of a state of mind prejudicial to a party’s interest’’);\nRosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“Without\nan adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who\nwill not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence\ncannot be fulfilled.’’)).\n\nThis Court need not decide whether Juror No. 50 was actually biased, since this\nCourt can and should imply and infer bias. Assuming this Court holds an evidentiary\nhearing at which Juror No. 50 is compelled to give truthful answers to the questions he\nwould have been asked if he had not falsely responded to the questionnaire, Ms. Maxwell\nreserves the right to argue that Juror No. 50 was actually biased.\n\nC. Juror No. 50’s answers to Questions 25 and 48 were intentionally false.\n\nMs. Maxwell does not need to prove that Juror No. 50’s voir dire answers were\nintentionally false. As explained above, she need only prove “first, that the juror’s voir\ndire response was false and second, that the correct response would have provided a valid\nbasis for a challenge for cause.” Stewart, 433 F.3d at 303. Nevertheless, assuming this\nCourt concludes that Ms. Maxwell must prove Juror No. 50 intentionally misled the\nCourt in falsely answering Questions 25 and 48, Ms. Maxwell has easily met that burden.\n\nThere are at least six reasons to believe Juror No. 50 acted intentionally. First, this\nCourt need only watch the video of Juror No. 50 being confronted with his false answers\n\nto appreciate that he acted intentionally. Juror No. 50’s face immediately flushed and\n\nay\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009047\n\n", "char_count": 1916}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 47 of 66\n\nturned red, and he grasped for words when the Daily Mail reporter told him about\nQuestion 48. “Interesting,” Juror No. 50 said, struggling for an explanation. Unable to\ncredibly explain away his false answer, Juror No. 50 eventually put together a\nnonsensical response: “No, No! I know my face 1s red because I can feel the blood but, I\nhonestly—that’s why I answered it that way.”\n\nSecond, Juror No. 50’s attempt to justify his false answer by claiming he “flew\nthrough” the questionnaire is not worthy of belief. The questionnaire instructed potential\njurors to “carefully” compete it. No time limitation was imposed for completion of the\nquestionnaire. It emphasized that only the parties and the Court would know the identities\nof the jurors. It advised that there are no “right or wrong” answers, “only truthful\nanswers.” And it assured jurors that their privacy would be respected and that if an\nanswer to any question was embarrassing or caused the juror particular concern, they\ncould alert the Court. The Court must presume Juror No. 50 heeded these instructions.\nIndeed, there is compelling evidence that Juror No. 50 carefully followed these\n\ninstructions and did not “fly through” the questionnaire, as he now claims. yy\n\nThird, it is simply not credible that Juror No. 50\n\n40\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009048\n\n", "char_count": 1376}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 48 of 66\n\nRen x. 1, p 3 “The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine\n\nwhether prospective jurors can decide this case impartially based upon the evidence\npresented at trial and the legal instructions given by the presiding judge.”). The\nquestionnaire also told potential jurors that it would ask personal questions. /d.\n(“Although some of the questions may appear to be of a personal nature, please\nunderstand that the Court and the parties must learn enough information about each\n\njuror’s background and experience to select a fair and impartial jury.”).\n\nFourth, Juror No. 50’s post-verdict conduct shows his false answers to the\nquestionnaire were intentional. Juror No. 50 went on a media press to promote himself,\n\nhis experience as a victim, and his role on the jury. He has given multiple interviews to\n\n41\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009049\n\n", "char_count": 896}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 49 of 66\n\nseveral different news outlets (some of which he was likely paid for) '*, and he sat for an\ninterview as part of an hour-long “documentary” called “Ghislaine, Prince Andrew and\nthe Paedophile,” which aired on the British channel ITV. He has engaged on Twitter with\nthe journalist who wrote about him, and he has communicated directly with Annie\nFarmer. See Ashfar, 196 A.3d at 95-96 (relying on juror’s post-trial conduct as a basis for\nconcluding juror was biased and new trial was required because juror falsely answered\nmaterial question during voir dire). Juror No. 50’s publicity tour appears to have stopped\n(at least temporarily) only because the government publicly filed a letter asking this\nCourt to inquire into Juror No. 50’s truthfulness and suggesting that he needed a lawyer.\n\nThe clear message from the government to Juror No. 50 was to stop talking.!°\n\n‘4 Tt is common for the British press to pay for crime victims’ stories. See, e.g,\nhttps://www.miurror.co.uk/sell-my-story/; https://trianglenews.co.uk/sell-my-story-to-the-\ndaily-mail/; https://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/contactus/index.html\n\n'S Juror No. 50 was clearly enjoying his fifteen minutes of fame in early January\n2022, giving multiple interviews in which he congratulated himself as the person who\npersuaded the other jurors to adopt his biased view of the evidence and to vote to convict\nMs. Maxwell.\n\nThe government recognized that Juror No. 50 had dug a very deep hole—a hole\nthat looked to be getting deeper. Without conferring as to either the submission of the\nletter or any redactions, the government publicly filed Docket No. 568. This letter\ncommunicated to Juror No. 50, and the media, that Juror No. 50 had done something\nwrong, that his conduct would be subject to scrutiny, and that the conduct was serious\nenough to warrant appointment of a lawyer, free of charge if necessary.\n\nHad Ms. Maxwell been asked, she would have objected to the \n... [truncated, 2479 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00009002/48 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00009002&page=48]", "char_count": 2479}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 50 of 66\n\nFifth, Juror No. 50’s false answer to question 48 was not a one-off mistake. He\n\nalso falsely answered question 2°. [lll\nSS\nSS\nSS\n\nFinally, this case is not like other cases in which a juror may have given a false\nanswer to avoid embarrassment,. Juror No. 50 has spoken to numerous media outlets\nabout his service as a juror, has freely admitted that he is the victim of sexual abuse and\nsexual assault, and has done the bare minimum to conceal his identity, allowing himself\nto be identified by his first name while posing for pictures and being video recorded.\nJuror No. 50 has not shunned the limelight. He has reveled 1n it.\n\nD. Had Juror No. 50 answered Questions 25 and 48 truthfully, the parties\n\nand the Court would have explored whether his other answers were\nfalse.\n\nRegardless of whether Juror No. 50’s answers were intentional lies or inadvertent\n\nmisstatements, his false answers to Questions 25 and 43\neee\nSS\n\nAt the October 21 hearing, this Court emphasized the importance of voir dire, and\n\nit expressed confidence that it could “smoke out” jurors who did not tell the truth:\n\nletter was written by the government with full knowledge that it would be published by\nthe media and effectively silence Juror No. 50. The submission of the letter was an end\nrun around this Court’s orders regarding Local Rule 23.1 and Rule 3.6 of the Rules of\nProfessional Conduct.\n\n43\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009051\n\n", "char_count": 1465}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 51 of 66\n\nI will individually, one-on-one, question[] the jurors, and with the parties\npresent, I feel confident that I can discern any clear dishonesty. This is not\njust going to be a summary voir dire; it will be probing. .. . Ifa juror’s going\nto lie and be dishonest, we will smoke that out.\n\nTR 10/21/2021, p 25-26. Because Juror No. 50 did not honestly answer these material\nquestions, however, the Court and the defense were not alerted to probe these issues and\ninstead relied on Juror No. 50’s claim that he could be fair and impartial. In hindsight,\nthat claim is not credible.\n\nThis is not speculation. Rather, based on what Juror No. 50 has said to the media,\nit’s clear he was not fair and impartial because his personal experiences “prevent[ed] or\nsubstantially impair[ed] the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his\ninstructions and his oath.” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424. If Juror No. 50 had truthfully\ndisclosed that he was a victim of sexual assault and sexual abuse as a child, the Court and\nparties would have probed, among other things, whether he was able (1) to assess the\ncredibility of alleged sex assault victim like all other witnesses; (2) to fairly evaluate the\ntestimony of Dr. Loftus; (3) to impartially assess Ms. Maxwell’s defense that her\naccusers’ memories were unreliable and tainted by money and manipulation; and (4) set\naside his own traumatic experience when evaluating whether the government met its\nburden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\nJuror No. 50’s failure to disclose that he was a victim of sexual abuse (Question\n48) was further compounded by his failure to disclose that he was merely a victim of a\ncrime (Question 25). Disclosing that he was a crime victim would have invited inquiry\n\nby counsel and the Court regarding the nature of the crime and would have provided a\n\n44\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009052\n\n", "char_count": 1927}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 52 of 66\n\nbasis for a cause challenge or a peremptory challenge. Juror No. 50’s false answers to\nboth questions deprived the Court of any basis for any meaningful inquiry on a topic\n\nbearing directly on his ability to serve impartially and the basis for a cause challenge. Jj\n\n° —_\na\n\nTruthful answers from Juror No. 50 would have led the Court and the parties to\nprobe much more deeply into his biases and prejudices, both known and unknown.'’ Had\n\nthat happened, the record shows that he would have been removed as a potential juror.\n\n‘6 Juror No. 50 continues his media exploits despite being the subject of this\nMotion and represented by counsel. On January 18, 2022, he appeared in a documentary\n\nproduced by ITV. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SvnwRuDfrdM at timestamps\n01:53, 02:32, 04:10, 05:10, 34:36, 38:41, 39:15.\n\n'’ This follow-up questioning would not have been a mere formality.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009053\n\n", "char_count": 975}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 53 of 66\n\nE. Juror 50’s material misstatements (and those of the second unidentified\njuror) prevented Ms. Maxwell from exercising her peremptory\nchallenges, denying her a fair trial.\n\nProper voir dire plays a vital role in assuring a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right\nto an impartial jury. Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge's responsibility to\nremove prospective jurors who may not be able impartially serve cannot be fulfilled.\n“Similarly, lack of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremptory\nchallenges where provided by statute or rule, as it is in the federal courts.” Rosales-Lopez\nv. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (citation omitted).\n\nThe role of peremptory challenges in a criminal trial cannot be overstated:\n\nPeremptory challenges have been an integral aspect of criminal trial\n\nprocedure for over six hundred years and continue to be universally\n\nemployed throughout the country. The underlying thesis is that, with the\nexception of challenges for cause, the suitability of a particular juror is\ncounsel's decision and not the court's. Consistent with that thesis and subject\n\nto constitutional strictures, a peremptory challenge can rest on a good reason,\n\na bad reason, or no reason at all.\n\nState v. Scher, 278 N.J. Super. 249, 263, 650 A.2d 1012, 1019 (App. Div. 1994)\n(cleaned up).\n\nFed. R. Crim. P. 24 entitles a number of peremptory challenges to prospective\njurors. Here, Ms. Maxwell exercised all of her peremptory challenges and, whether for\ncause or peremptory, would not have knowing allowed a juror who: (1) claimed to be a\nvictim of sexual abuse; or (2) neglected to disclose that the juror had been a victim of\nsexual abusc; (3 lll\nWg. Had Juror 50 disclosed any of these issues, Ms. Maxwell would have used a\n\nperemptory challenge against this juror and not as to any of the other remaining jurors.\n\n46\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009054\n\n", "char_count": 1953}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 54 of 66\n\nAs discussed in Murphy v. Nogam, No. CV 14-4268 (KM), 2018 WL 278735, at\n*25 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Murphy v. Adm'r E. Jersey State Prison, No. 18-\n2825, 2021 WL 2822179 (3d Cir. July 7, 2021), New Jersey courts have repeatedly\n\ninvalidated judgments where a juror's inaccurate answer to a question\n\npropounded in the jury voir dire precluded a litigant from exercising a\n\nperemptory challenge. State v. Scher, 278 NJ. Super. 249, 263\n\n(App.Div.1994), cert. denied, 140 NJ. 276 (1995) (citing Wright v.\n\nBernstein, 23 N.J. 284 (1957); State v. Williams, 190 N.J.Super. 111 (App.\n\nDiv. 1983); State v. Thompson, 142 N.J. Super. 274 (App. Div. 1976)).\n\nOf course, the material omissions by Juror 50 were not made in New Jersey. The\nprejudice to Ms. Maxwell and the concept of fundamental fairness, however, are the same\nregardless of which side of the Hudson the misstatements occurred. In a very close,\ncontested trial where the only real issue was the credibility of the accusers, the failure of\nJuror 50 to disclose his claimed victim status in jury selection cheated Ms. Maxwell of\nher ability to intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges and robbed her of a fair\ntrial. In this case truthful responses would have revealed Juror 50’s claimed victim status.\nHe would have been excused for cause on that basis alone and would never answered any\nquestions in person.\n\nEven if Juror 50 had claimed on the questionnaire that he could be fair, despite his\nvictim status, the result would have been the same. He would have been asked to describe\nto the Court and the parties, under oath, what he claimed happened to him, when it\nhappened, the impact on him, and how he could still be fair. Had Juror 50 revealed to the\n\nCourt, as he did to the media, that he believed that his memory “was like a video” and\n\nthat he would advocate that the alleged victims here were credible, based on his own\n\n47\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009055\n\n", "char_count": 1999}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 55 of 66\n\nexperiences, he would have been excused, if not for cause, then as a defense peremptory\nstrike.\n\nII. The scope of any evidentiary hearing\n\nMs. Maxwell does not believe an evidentiary hearing is required because the\nundisputed evidence shows (1) that Juror No. 50 falsely answered a material question\nduring voir dire and (2) that, had he answered truthfully, he would have been subject to a\nchallenge for cause. If this Court disagrees, however, a formal evidentiary hearing is\nappropriate.\n\nWhen, as here, there is a plausible claim of juror misconduct, “an unflagging duty\nfalls to the district court to investigate the claim.” United States v. French, 904 F.3d 111,\n117 (st Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). “[A] formal evidentiary hearing [is] the gold\nstandard for an inquiry into alleged juror misconduct.” United States v. French, 977 F.3d\n114, 122 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2601 (2021), cert. denied sub nom.\nRussell v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2601 (2021).\n\nA. Pre-hearing discovery\n\nMs. Maxwell requests that the Court authorize subpoenas to:\n1. Juror No. 50 to produce:\na. Emails or other written communications between Juror No. 50 and any\nalleged victim or witness in this case;\nb. Emails or other written communications between Juror No. 50 and any\n\nother juror in this case;\n\n48\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009056\n\n", "char_count": 1394}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 56 of 66\n\nc. Non-privileged emails or other written communications between Juror\nNo. 50 and any other person, including any news or media organization\nabout Juror No. 50’s service as a juror in this case;\n\nd. Any record of payments to Juror No. 50 in exchange for any interview\nor information about his service as a juror in this case;\n\n2. Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, or other social media networking\nplatforms identified by the parties, to produce:\n\na. All communications to and from Juror No. 50 regarding his service as a\njuror in this case;\n\nb. All posts, comments, or photographs posted by Juror No. 50 regarding\nhis service as a juror in this case.\n\nc. All documents reflecting dates on which Juror No. 50 opened or closed\nhis accounts.\n\nB. The hearing itself\n\nThe misconduct identified potentially implicates all 12 jurors who rendered a\nverdict here. According to Juror No. 50 and the New York Times, one other juror did not\ndisclose that he or she was the victim of sexual abuse as a child. Nevertheless, that juror’s\nexperiences were discussed apparently in support of Juror No. 50’s position. What these\ntwo jurors disclosed to the (presumably) ten jurors who responded to the questionnaire\ntruthfully will be relevant to determine the identity of the second juror and what Juror No.\n\n50 said to the other jurors.\n\n49\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009057\n\n", "char_count": 1416}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 5/7 of 66\n\nMs. Maxwell requests that any hearing begin with the questioning of Juror No. 50.\nMs. Maxwell requests that the Court first advise Juror No. 50 about the nature of the\nhearing and then allow defense counsel to question Juror No. 50 followed by questioning\nfrom the government, re-cross examination by defense counsel, followed by any\nquestions from the Court and any additional questions from counsel based on the Court’s\nquestions.\n\nIf, after this examination further inquiry is required, Ms. Maxwell suggests that the\nsecond juror be summoned to Court for an identical process. If necessary, this process\nshould be repeated as to all remaining jurors.\n\nAfter the examination of the jurors the parties should be afforded a period of time\nto conduct any further investigation warranted by the information presented at the hearing\nfollowed by post-hearing arguments, either oral or written.\n\nFederal Rule of Evidence 606(b) does not prohibit this inquiry, because Ms.\nMaxwell does not seek to impeach the verdict based on the content of deliberations. Cf\nFed. R. Evid. 606(b) (providing that, with certain exceptions, “a juror may not testify\nabout any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations”\nduring ‘“‘an inquiry into the validity of a verdict”). Instead, she intends to show that her\njury was not fair and impartial as required by the Sixth Amendment because at least two\njurors gave false answers during voir dire to material questions that, if answered\ntruthfully, would have subject them to a challenge for cause.\n\nTo the extent Rule 606 might apply to certain questions asked at the hearing, Ms.\n\nMaxwell need not inquire into the content of deliberations to establish her jury bias\n\n50\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009058\n\n", "char_count": 1813}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 58 of 66\n\nclaim. See Cunningham v. Shoop, _ F.4th _, 2022 WL 92594, at *14-15 (6th Cir. Nos.\n11-3005/20-3429, Jan. 10, 2022) (granting habeas relief as to juror bias claim because it\nis “possible for Cunningham to prove that [the juror] was actually biased without relying\non juror testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)”); compare Pena-\nRodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (“Where a juror makes a clear statement\nindicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal\ndefendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order\nto permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting\ndenial of the jury trial guarantee.”). Without relying on juror testimony, it is already clear\nthat Juror No. 50 did not truthfully answer the questionnaire; Juror No. 50 has publicly\nadmitted he is a victim of sexual assault and sexual abuse.\n\nAs for identifying the other juror who was also a victim of sexual assault and\nabuse, the Court and parties can identify the juror without eliciting testimony about what\nwas said during deliberations. The remaining eleven jurors can be asked, under oath,\nwhether their answer to question 48 is correct and whether they have been a victim of\nsexual assault or abuse. Presumably the second juror will self-identify.\n\nII. Juror No. 50 has no right to intervene.\nA. Juror No. 50 lacks standing.\n\nJuror No. 50 seeks to intervene suggesting that “it is indisputable that precedent\nsupports intervention by interested third parties in criminal matters....”” Memo. at 8. This\nclaim is not supported by “the long line of precedent hold[ing] that a non-party lacks a\n\njudicially cognizable interest in a defendant’s prosecution.” United States v. Stoerr, 695\n\n51\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009059\n\n", "char_count": 1883}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 59 of 66\n\nF.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2012). Juror No. 50 is not a party here and there is no legal basis\nfor Juror No. 50 to intervene in this matter. This 1s not a request by a journalist to\nintervene for public access. See United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2008)\n(motion to intervene to assert the public’s First Amendment right of access to criminal\nproceedings is proper). Nor is the request from a subpoena respondent. See United States\nv. RMI Co., 599 F.2d 1183, 1186 (3d Cir. 1979) (persons affected by the disclosure of\nallegedly privileged materials may intervene in pending criminal proceedings and seek\nprotective orders). Although Juror No. 50 has expressed a questionable interest in the\noutcome of this case, that does not afford him standing to intervene. Notably, the Federal\nRules of Criminal Procedure make no reference to a motion to intervene in a criminal\ncase. This is a recognition of the general rule that “a private citizen lacks a judicially\ncognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v.\nRichard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). And as one court has noted, “[e]ven crime victims,\nwho enjoy various statutory rights of participation, have no right to intervene 1n the\ndistrict court in a criminal case.” United States v. Collins, 2013 WL 4780927, at *1 (E.D.\nWis. 2013).\n\nB. This Court should refuse Juror No. 50’s discovery request because\n\nJuror No. 50 is under investigation and the release of the information\nrequested would prejudice that investigation.\n\nIt is the conduct of Juror No. 50 that is under investigation here. Like many\nsuspects, Juror No. 50 would like to learn as much information about the investigation so\nthat he can tailor responses to any potential questions and change the focus of the\n\ninvestigation. Once he was thoroughly tipped off by the government, Juror No. 50 has\n\n52\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009060\n\n", "char_count": 1947}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 60 of 66\n\nsought to distance himself from his original statements, attempted to destroy evidence,\nand tried to flee from the media.\n\nUnder analogous circumstances courts have refused discovery to individuals or\nentities under investigation. See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146,\n(1989) (recipient of a grand jury subpoena for certain records relating to a cost allocation\nappropriately denied access to records pursuant to a FOJA request).\n\nAny advance disclosure to Juror No. 50 of the questionnaire will undoubtably\ncolor Juror No. 50’s testimony and allow him to place himself in the best possible\nposture. Although there may come a time when Juror No. 50 1s entitled to this\ndiscovery—if he is charged with perjury, criminal contempt, or some other crime, for\nexample—the time is not now.\n\nC. Juror No. 50’s filings should be stricken or, alternatively, remain under\nseal.\n\nWhether a claimant has standing is “the threshold question 1n every federal case,\ndetermining the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Jn re Gucci, 126 F.3d 380, 387—\n88 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, (1975)). Striking the\npleading of a putative litigant is appropriate where the litigant lacks standing. United\nStates v. All Right, Title & Int. in Prop., Appurtenances, & Improvements Known as 479\nTamarind Drive, Hallendale, Fla., No. 98 CIV. 2279 DLC, 2011 WL 1045095, at *2\n(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011). A stricken pleading 1s a nullity with no legal effect. Davis v.\nBombardier Recreational Prod., Inc., No. 3:\\.1CV236-TSL-MTP, 2012 WL 112202, at\n\n*3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 12, 2012) (stricken amended complaint deemed a nullity and of\n\n53\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009061\n\n", "char_count": 1737}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 61 of 66\n\nno legal effect). Although Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure references\n\n29 66\n\n“pleadings,” “a district court has the inherent power to strike a party's submissions other\nthan pleadings.” Mazzeo v. Gibbons, No. 2:08-CV-01387-RLH-PA, 2010 WL 3910072,\nat *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2010); see also Metzger v. Hussman, 682 F. Supp. 1109, 1110\n(D. Nev. 1988) (motion to strike granted and motion in opposition not considered by the\ncourt). This Court should strike all the filings made by Juror No. 50.\n\nAlternatively, Ms. Maxwell requests that the “Memorandum of Law in Support of\nMotion to Intervene and for Release of Sealed Jury Questionnaire and Transcript, on\nBehalf of Proposed Intervenor, Juror 50” and its companion Motion remain under seal, at\nleast until a resolution of Ms. Maxwell’s motion for new trial based on this Juror’s failure\nto answer truthfully during jury selection. Juror No. 50’s Motion and accompanying\nMemorandum are an attempt to obtain discovery by a non-party to this criminal case,\nmade by someone who lacks standing to participate in this prosecution. Accordingly,\nthese pleadings are not “judicial documents” and are afforded no presumption of public\naccess. United States v. Smith, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“experience\nand logic show that there is no right of access to discovery materials”). See SEC v. The\nStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir.2001) (rejecting claim that deposition testimony\nbecame a “judicial document” “because the Court reviewed it 1n order to decide whether\nor not to enter [a] protective order”).\n\nThe fact that Juror No. 50 filed these pleadings does not make them “judicial\n\ndocuments.” United States v. Amodeo (“Amodeo I”), 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995)\n\n(“We think that the mere filing of a paper or document with the court is insufficient to\n\n54\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009062\n\n", "char_count": 1925}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 _ Filed 02/24/22 Page 62 of 66\n\nrender that paper a judicial document subject to the right of public access. We think that\nthe item filed must be relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in\nthe judicial process in order for it to be designated a judicial document.”’). Moreover, if\nstricken, the documents enjoy no presumption of public access. Brown v. Maxwell, 929\nF.3d 41, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2019) ([under Civil Rule 12], “the district court may strike such\nmaterial from the filings on the grounds that it is “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or\nscandalous.” Because such rejected or stricken material is not “relevant to the\nperformance of the judicial function” it would not be considered a “judicial document”\nand would enjoy no presumption of public access.”).\n\nThe Second Circuit established a framework in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of\nOnondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) for courts to utilize in determining when the\npublic has a right of access to particular documents. The Court of Appeals held that\n“Tb]efore any such common law right can attach, however, a court must first conclude\nthat the documents at issue are indeed ‘judicial documents.’” Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119.\n“Once the court has determined that the documents are judicial documents and that\ntherefore a common law presumption of access attaches, it must determine the weight of\nthat presumption.” /d. “Finally, after determining the weight of the presumption of\naccess, the court must ‘balance competing considerations against it.’” Jd. at 120.\n\nThere exists no compelling reason to release Juror No. 50’s pleadings. Any public\nrelease of the documents will set off another round of publicity, speculation, and\ncommentary, all of which 1s prejudicial to the truth finding process and Ms. Maxwell’s\n\nrights to fair and impartial proceedings.\n\n55\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009063\n\n", "char_count": 1896}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 63 of 66\n\nThe submissions by Juror No. 50 have questionable merit, have not been ruled\nupon, and implicate an ongoing investigation by the parties and the Court into juror\nmisconduct. Certainly, at least at this stage of the proceedings, the submissons are not\n“Judicial documents” and until the issues around Juror No. 50’s motion for intervention\nand discovery have been resolved they should remain sealed. If the Court believes Juror\nNo. 50’s requests merit judicial document status the seal should remain. The requests\nwould be afforded the lowest presumption of public access and compelling reasons to\nmaintain the sealed status exist.\n\nJuror No. 50 has demonstrated a lack of reliability and an appetite for publicity.\nShould the documents be released the sotto voce comments regarding Juror No. 50’s\nintent, state of mind, and actions will be fodder for the media and may influence the\nmemories of other potential witnesses. Documents regularly remain sealed where public\nrelease would “compromis|[¢] the interest in the integrity and security of [an]\ninvestigation,” /n re Sealed Search Warrants Issued June 4 & 5, 2008, No. 08—M-—208\n(DRH), 2008 WL 5667021, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 14, 2008).\n\nConclusion\n\nThe purpose of voir dire is “to expose bias or prejudice on the part of veniremen,”\nand there “there must be sufficient information elicited on voir dire to permit a defendant\nto intelligently exercise not only his challenges for cause, but also his peremptory\nchallenges.” Barnes, 604 F.2d at 139. “Voir dire [thus] plays an essential role in\n\nprotecting the right to trial by an impartial jury.” Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 468.\n\n56\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00009064\n\n", "char_count": 1725}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 64 of 66\n\nFor its part, this Court expressed “confidence” that its voir dire process would\n“smoke out” a juror who was dishonest. Ms. Maxwell relied on the Court’s process. And\nthe Court and the parties relied on the presumption to which everyone is entitled: that\npotential jurors would carefully and honestly engage in voir dire.\n\nUnfortunately, we now know that Juror No. 50 (and at least one other juror) did\nnot honor their obligations to give “only truthful answers.” Ex. 1, p 3. They are no longer\nentitled to the presumption of honesty.\n\nBecause Ms. Maxwell’s jury was not the fair and impartial one guaranteed her by\nthe United States Constitution, this Court should vacate the jury’s verdict and order a new\ntrial. In the alternative, this Court should hold an evidentiary hearing and examine all\ntwelve jurors.\n\nDated: January 19, 2022\n\n57\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009065\n\n", "char_count": 926}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613_ Filed 02/24/22 Page 65 of 66\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\ns/ Jeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nPhone: 303-831-7364\n\nChristian R. Everdell\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\nPhone: 212-957-7600\n\nBobbi C. Sternheim\n\nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim\n225 Broadway, Suite 715\n\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nPhone: 212-243-1100\n\nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\n58\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009066\n\n", "char_count": 522}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00009002", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document613 Filed 02/24/22 Page 66 of 66\n\nCertificate of Service\n\nI hereby certify that on January 19, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing\nGhislaine Maxwell’s Motion for a New Trial, with the Court and counsel for the\ngovernment:\n\nAlison Moe\n\nMaurene Comey\n\nAndrew Rohrbach\n\nLara Pomerantz\n\nU.S. Attorney’s Office\n\nSDNY One Saint Andrew’s Plaza\nNew York, NY 10007\nAlison.moe@usdo}.gov\nMaurene.comey@usdo}.gov\nAndrew.Rohrbach@usdoj.gov\nLara.Pomerantz@usdoj.gov\n\ns/ Nicole Simmons\n\n59\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009067\n\n", "char_count": 532}]}