{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00008303", "page_count": 8, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00008303", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/DOJ-OGR-00008303.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00008303", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` exhibit and that he recognized “many, many, many, many names” amongst the entries, including some of the entries that were for “massage in Palm Beach.” Id. at 851. The Defense first objects that Mr. Alessi has no personal knowledge about the creation of this particular directory and is thus incapable of authenticating the exhibit. Mr. Alessi acknowledged that GX 52 was a different version than the directories he was familiar with because GX 52 was not as thick as those versions, and his name and his wife’s name were in the version he observed, but neither his name nor his wife’s name was in GX 52. Id. at 853, 865. But a document may be admitted under 901(b)(4) even when no witness saw the creation of the document or the particular copy admitted at trial. For example, in United States v. Al Farekh, 810 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2020), the court affirmed the district court’s authentication of handwritten letters even though no testifying witness confirmed they had previously examined the letters. Instead, testimony that the “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics” of the letters were consistent with other letters previously observed was sufficient to satisfy Rule 901. Id. at 24-25. Similarly, in Tin Yat Chin, the Second Circuit affirmed the admission of copies of credit card receipts despite uncertainty about who signed the receipts and when. 371 F.3d at 38; see also United States v. Gordon, 634 F.2d 639, 643-44 (1st Cir. 1980) (referring to authenticated documents as “parallel documents” with distinctive characteristics such as being printed on the “same stationary,” to “indicate a common authorship”). Finally, cases have allowed a witness to authenticate emails under Rule 901(b)(4), even if they were not a recipient of the specific email being admitted, when the witness had a history and familiarity with the defendant’s email communication tendencies. See, e.g., United States v. Bertram, 259 F. Supp. 3d 638 (E.D. Ky. 2017); see also United States v. Gasperini, 16-CR-441 (NGG), 2017 WL ``` | OBJECTS: The image contains text only, with no visible objects. | SETTING: The image appears to be a legal document, specifically a page from a court case or legal proceeding. It is formatted like a standard legal document with page numbers, case number, and filing date. | ACTIVITY: The activity depicted is the reading and analysis of a legal document, likely related to a court case involving Mr. Alessi and the creation of a directory. | NOTABLE: The text discusses the defense's objection to Mr. Alessi's ability to authenticate a particular directory due to lack of personal knowledge about its creation. It references previous court cases where documents were admitted under Rule 901(b)(4) despite no witness seeing the creation of the document or the particular copy admitted at trial.", "char_count": 2937}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00008303", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` remaining questions as to the reliability of the letters go to their evidentiary weight, not their admissibility.\"). Mr. Alessi’s testimony sufficiently surmounts Rule 901’s “minimal” bar. The Defense’s objection on authentication grounds is accordingly overruled. The Court also overrules the Defense’s objection on hearsay grounds. The directory does not constitute hearsay because it is not being offered for the truth that the names listed identify a particular individual or that the phone numbers listed next to the names are correct. The Second Circuit has affirmed the admission of documents that provide names and contact information for the non-hearsay purpose of linking the individual that possessed that document to that name or phone number, rather than for the truth of that contact information. For example, in United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2008), the defense objected on hearsay grounds to the admission of two address books that belonged to mujahidin fighters that listed the defendant’s name and a phone number. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the address books were not hearsay because they were not admitted to establish that the phone number next to defendant’s name “was, in fact, his phone number.” Id. at 176. Rather, it was relevant alone that his “name and contact information appeared in the address books of two men identified as mujahidin fighters.” Id. In an analogous line of cases, the Second Circuit has regularly admitted for non-hearsay purposes documents that contain a name for the fact that a person claiming to have that name took a particular action. For example, in United States v. Londono, 175 F. App’x 370, 373 (2d Cir. 2006), the Second Circuit affirmed the admission of Western Union wire receipts to prove that a person that claimed to have the defendant’s name completed wire orders. The Government also admitted other circumstantial evidence to permit the jury to infer that the receipts were “linked to” the defendant. Id. at 374; see also United States v. Zapata, 356 F. Supp. 2d 323, ``` | OBJECTS: - Text document | SETTING: - The image appears to be a page from a legal document, specifically a court ruling or decision, given the formal language and references to legal precedents. | ACTIVITY: - The activity depicted is the transcription and analysis of a legal document, likely related to a court case involving evidence admissibility and hearsay objections. | NOTABLE: - The document discusses the admissibility of certain types of evidence, such as directories and address books, under the rules of evidence, particularly Rule 901 and the hearsay rule. It references specific court cases to support its arguments.", "char_count": 2774}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00008303", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Similarly, in United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit affirmed admission of a hotel guest card for the non-hearsay purpose that a person claiming to have the name of a coconspirator registered at the hotel. The Government then admitted \"other evidence . . . from which the jury could infer that the hotel card spoke the truth.\" Id. at 101. Last, in Tin Yat Chin, the Second Circuit concluded that credit card receipts were admissible because they \"tended to show that a person referring to himself as [the defendant] signed receipts on the dates and times in question.\" 371 F.3d at 39. Other courts have taken a similar approach to the Second Circuit. See e.g., United States v. Chavez, 229 F.3d 946, 953-54 (10th Cir. 2000) (scrap of paper containing a phone number admissible \"for the non-hearsay purpose of linking the co-conspirators,\" but \"the number could not have been submitted for the truth of the matter asserted\"); United States v. Munguia, 273 F. App'x 517, 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming admission of \"cell-phone contact lists . . . for the non-hearsay purpose of linking [the defendant] to his co-conspirators\"); United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d 577, 591 (6th Cir. 1998) (\"The government offered the numbers and addresses to demonstrate, in conjunction with other evidence, that members of the conspiracy associated with each other for business purposes. . . . These documents are not offered to prove the information they contained and therefore, may not be excluded as hearsay\"). Here, the jury could conclude based on the testimony of Mr. Alessi and GX 606 that Ms. Maxwell regularly used this telephone directory, versions of which were maintained over the years at the Palm Beach residence. See Trial Tr. at 849; GX 606 at 7, 10. The directory is thus relevant for the non-hearsay purpose that it tends to show a link between Ms. Maxwell and the names and phone numbers listed, as well as how the information was organized. It is not offered to establish that any of the information contained within the book, such as the listed phone ``` | OBJECTS: - Text document - Page number: 7 | SETTING: - Indoor setting - Likely a legal or judicial document | ACTIVITY: - Document analysis related to legal proceedings | NOTABLE: - The text discusses various court cases and legal precedents regarding the admissibility of certain types of evidence, particularly those involving hearsay and non-hearsay purposes.", "char_count": 2563}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00008303", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document535 Filed 12/09/21 Page4of8\n\nexhibit and that he recognized “many, many, many, many names” amongst the entries, including\nsome of the entries that were for “massage in Palm Beach.” /d. at 851.\n\nThe Defense first objects that Mr. Alessi has no personal knowledge about the creation of\nthis particular directory and is thus incapable of authenticating the exhibit. Mr. Alessi\nacknowledged that GX 52 was a different version than the directories he was familiar with\nbecause GX 52 was not as thick as those versions, and his name and his wife’s name were in the\nversion he observed, but neither his name nor his wife’s name was in GX 52. Id. at 853, 865.\nBut a document may be admitted under 901(b)(4) even when no witness saw the creation of the\ndocument or the particular copy admitted at trial.\n\nFor example, in United States v. Al Farekh, 810 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2020), the court\naffirmed the district court’s authentication of handwritten letters even though no testifying\nwitness confirmed they had previously examined the letters. Instead, testimony that the\n“appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics” of the\nletters were consistent with other letters previously observed was sufficient to satisfy Rule 901.\nId. at 24-25. Similarly, in Tin Yat Chin, the Second Circuit affirmed the admission of copies of\ncredit card receipts despite uncertainty about who signed the receipts and when. 371 F.3d at 38;\nsee also United States v. Gordon, 634 F.2d 639, 643-44 (1st Cir. 1980) (referring to\nauthenticated documents as “parallel documents” with distinctive characteristics such as being\nprinted on the “same stationary,” to “indicate a common authorship”). Finally, cases have\nallowed a witness to authenticate emails under Rule 901(b)(4), even if they were not a recipient\nof the specific email being admitted, when the witness had a history and familiarity with the\ndefendant’s email communication tendencies. See, e.g., United States v. Bertram, 259 F. Supp.\n\n3d 638 (E.D. Ky. 2017); see also United States v. Gasperini, 16-CR-441 (NGG), 2017 WL\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00008306\n\n", "char_count": 2148}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00008303", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "[NO_IMAGE] No rendered image was available for this page; previous OCR-error string was scrubbed.", "char_count": 97}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00008303", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document535 Filed 12/09/21 Page6éof8\n\nremaining questions as to the reliability of the letters go to their evidentiary weight, not their\nadmissibility.”). Mr. Alessi’s testimony sufficiently surmounts Rule 901’s “minimal” bar. The\nDefense’s objection on authentication grounds is accordingly overruled.\n\nThe Court also overrules the Defense’s objection on hearsay grounds. The directory does\nnot constitute hearsay because it is not being offered for the truth that the names listed identify a\nparticular individual or that the phone numbers listed next to the names are correct. The Second\nCircuit has affirmed the admission of documents that provide names and contact information for\nthe non-hearsay purpose of linking the individual that possessed that document to that name or\nphone number, rather than for the truth of that contact information. For example, in United\nStates v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2008), the defense objected on hearsay grounds to\nthe admission of two address books that belonged to mujahidin fighters that listed the\ndefendant’s name and a phone number. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the address\nbooks were not hearsay because they were not admitted to establish that the phone number next\nto defendant’s name “was, in fact, his phone number.” /d. at 176. Rather, it was relevant alone\nthat his “name and contact information appeared in the address books of two men identified as\nmujahidin fighters.” Jd.\n\nIn an analogous line of cases, the Second Circuit has regularly admitted for non-hearsay\npurposes documents that contain a name for the fact that a person claiming to have that name\ntook a particular action. For example, in United States v. Londono, 175 F. App’x 370, 373 (2d\nCir. 2006), the Second Circuit affirmed the admission of Western Union wire receipts to prove\nthat a person that claimed to have the defendant’s name completed wire orders. The Government\nalso admitted other circumstantial evidence to permit the jury to infer that the receipts were\n\n“linked to” the defendant. /d. at 374; see also United States v. Zapata, 356 F. Supp. 2d 323,\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00008308\n\n", "char_count": 2149}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00008303", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document535 Filed 12/09/21 Page7of8\n\n330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Similarly, in United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1980),\nthe Second Circuit affirmed admission of a hotel guest card for the non-hearsay purpose that a\nperson claiming to have the name of a coconspirator registered at the hotel. The Government\nthen admitted “other evidence . . . from which the jury could infer that the hotel card spoke the\ntruth.” Jd. at 101. Last, in Tin Yat Chin, the Second Circuit concluded that credit card receipts\nwere admissible because they “tended to show that a person referring to himself as [the\ndefendant] signed receipts on the dates and times in question.” 371 F.3d at 39. Other courts\nhave taken a similar approach to the Second Circuit. See e.g., United States v. Chavez, 229 F.3d\n946, 953-54 (10th Cir. 2000) (scrap of paper containing a phone number admissible “for the non-\nhearsay purpose of linking the co-conspirators,” but “the number could not have been submitted\nfor the truth of the matter asserted”); United States v. Munguia, 273 F. App’x 517, 521 (6th Cir.\n2008) (affirming admission of “cell-phone contact lists . . . for the non-hearsay purpose of\nlinking [the defendant] to his co-conspirators”); United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d 577,\n591 (6th Cir. 1998) (“The government offered the numbers and addresses to demonstrate, in\nconjunction with other evidence, that members of the conspiracy associated with each other for\nbusiness purposes. . . . These documents are not offered to prove the information they contained\nand therefore, may not be excluded as hearsay.”).\n\nHere, the jury could conclude based on the testimony of Mr. Alessi and GX 606 that Ms.\nMaxwell regularly used this telephone directory, versions of which were maintained over the\nyears at the Palm Beach residence. See Trial Tr. at 849; GX 606 at 7, 10. The directory is thus\nrelevant for the non-hearsay purpose that it tends to show a link between Ms. Maxwell and the\nnames and phone numbers listed, as well as how the information was organized. It is not offered\n\nto establish that any of the information contained within the book, such as the listed phone\n\nDOJ-OGR-00008309\n\n", "char_count": 2205}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00008303", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "[NO_IMAGE] No rendered image was available for this page; previous OCR-error string was scrubbed.", "char_count": 97}]}