{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_count": 22, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00002233", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/DOJ-OGR-00002233.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 13 of 22 extradition from Israel (or any other country) would be, at best, a difficult and lengthy process and, at worst, impossible.\"). Having carefully reviewed the experts' reports and the cases cited by the Defendant,2 the Court's analysis of the relationship between the Defendant's French citizenship and the risk of flight remains fundamentally unchanged. Its reasoning is guided in part by the substantial legal questions regarding the legal weight of anticipatory extradition waivers and the likelihood that any extradition would be a difficult and lengthy process (including, for instance, the likelihood that the Defendant would contest the validity of those waivers and the duration it would take to resolve those legal disputes). The likelihood that the Defendant would be able to frustrate any extradition requests—even if she were correct that she would be unable to stop extradition entirely—weighs strongly in favor of detention. In addition, the Defendant's extraordinary financial resources also continue to provide her the means to flee the country and to do so undetected. To be sure, this factor alone does not by itself justify continued detention. But as the Court noted at the initial bail hearing, the Defendant's financial resources, in combination with her substantial international ties and foreign connections and her experience avoiding detection (whether from the government, the press, or otherwise), do bear significantly on the flight risk analysis. See Tr. at 88:6–88:23 (distinguishing this case from United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), 2 The Defendant also argues that \"a defendant's waiver of the right to appeal an extradition order has been recognized as an indication of the defendant's intent not to flee.\" Def. Mot. at 27 (citing United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). \n... [truncated, 3288 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/0 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=0]", "char_count": 3288}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 16 of 22 was the result of the Defendant’s misestimation rather than misdirection. And while the Defendant’s concerns regarding her spouse’s privacy are not insignificant, she fails to furnish any explanation as to why those concerns led her to misrepresent key facts to Pretrial Services and, by extension, the Court. In sum, the evidence of a lack of candor is, if anything, stronger now than in July 2020, as it is clear to the Court that the Defendant’s representations to Pretrial Services were woefully incomplete. That lack of candor raises significant concerns as to whether the Court has now been provided a full and accurate picture of her finances and as to the Defendant’s willingness to abide by any set of conditions of release. For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the third factor continues to weigh in favor of detention. C. Pretrial detention continues to be warranted In light of the reasons stated above, the Government has again met its burden of persuasion by “a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight.” English, 629 F.3d at 319 (quoting Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436). Taking the § 3142(g) factors into account, the Court concludes that the presumption in favor of detention, the nature and characteristics of the charged offenses, the weight of the evidence, and the history and characteristics of the Defendant all weigh in favor of detention. Along similar lines, the Government has also shown, and the Court concludes for the reasons outlined below, that the Defendant’s proposed bail package cannot reasonably assure her appearance. Thus, the Court’s original conclusion that the Defendant poses a flight risk and that no set of conditions can reasonably assure her future appearance remains unaltered. As already noted, the Defendant now proposes a $28.5 million bail package, which includes \n... [truncated, 3077 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/1 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=1]", "char_count": 3077}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 18 of 22 millions of dollars and other assets that she could sell in order to support herself. See Gov't Opp'n at 23. Furthermore, the proposed bond is only partially secured. Taking into account the vast amounts of wealth left relatively unrestrained by the bail package, that amount, standing alone, cannot reasonably assure that she would appear before the Court. Nor is the Court's conclusion altered by the fact that a number of third parties have pledged to support her bond; the amount of wealth that she would retain were she to flee, in addition to contingent assets and future income streams that are not accounted for in the bail package, would plausibly enable her to compensate them, in part or in full, for their losses. And while the Defendant argues that she has procured \"significant loans on the basis of a negative pledge\" over a property and that $4 million is invested in an \"illiquid hedge fund that could only be liquidated with considerable difficulty,\" see Def. Reply at 6, these arguments do not alter the Court's ultimate conclusion that the financial package does not meaningfully mitigate the possibility of flight. The proposed conditions also provide that the Defendant would be released to the custody of a family member, who would serve as the Defendant's third-party custodian under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i); that the Defendant would be placed in home confinement with GPS monitoring and that her travel would be restricted to the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York and would be limited to appearances in Court, meetings with counsel, medical visits, and upon approval by the Court or Pretrial Services; that she would be under the strict supervision of Pretrial Services; and that she would surrender all travel documents. Id. at 2-3. Furthermore, the Defendant would have on-premises security guards who would prevent her f\n... [truncated, 3089 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/2 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=2]", "char_count": 3089}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` None of these conditions would reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance. Here, too, the Court’s original determination applies with equal force. As the Court noted at the original hearing, the Defendant has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to evade detection, “[e]ven in the face of what the Defense has acknowledged to be extreme and unusual efforts to locate her.” Tr. at 87:4–87:19. Indeed, regardless of whether the Defendant sought to evade the press, rather than law enforcement, in the months leading up to her arrest, her sophistication in evading detection reveals the futility of relying on any conditions, including GPS monitoring, restrictive home confinement, and private security guards, to secure her appearance. See Tr. at 87:4–88:2. As other courts have observed, “home detention with electronic monitoring does not prevent flight; at best, it limits a fleeing defendant’s head start.” United States v. Zarger, No. 00-CR-773-S-1 (JG), 2000 WL 1134364, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000). Furthermore, while the Defendant now represents that she would be released to the custody of a family member, who would serve as the Defendant’s third-party custodian under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i), and that she secured a residence in the Eastern District of New York, see Def. Mot. at 3, that does not outweigh the other significant factors weighing in favor of detention. And finally, the Defendant’s argument that private security guards could ensure her appearance at future proceedings runs afoul of the Bail Reform Act, which the Second Circuit has held “does not permit a two-tiered bail system in which defendants of lesser means are detained pending trial while wealthy defendants are released to self-funded private jails.” United States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019). As in Boustani, the Defendant in the present case would be detained regardless of her wealth, and “if a similarly situat\n... [truncated, 2973 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/3 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=3]", "char_count": 2973}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` In light of the above, the Court again concludes that the Government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight and that the Defendant’s proposed conditions are insufficient to reasonably assure her appearance. The presumption in favor of detention, the weight of the evidence, and the history and characteristics of the Defendant all support that conclusion, and none of Defendant’s new arguments change the Court’s original determination. D. The Defendant’s conditions of confinement do not justify release Lastly, the Court is unpersuaded by the Defendant’s argument that the conditions of her confinement are uniquely onerous, interfere with her ability to participate in her defense, and thus justify release. See Def. Mot. at 35-38. Indeed, the Defendant does not meaningfully dispute that she has received “more time than any other inmate at the MDC to review her discovery and as much, if not more, time to communicate with her attorneys.” Gov’t Opp’n at 29. To the extent that the Defendant has concerns regarding some of the measures taken by BOP, including a recent lockdown due to COVID-19 that curtailed in-person legal visitations, the Defendant provides no authority to conclude that this, standing alone, violates her constitutional right to participate in her defense. And while the Court acknowledges the Defendant’s concerns regarding the conditions of her confinement, the Defendant has failed to provide any basis to conclude that release is warranted on those grounds—even after the Court has determined that she continues to pose a flight risk.3 3 The Court will continue to ensure that the Defendant has the ability to speak and meet regularly with her attorneys and to review all necessary discovery materials to prepare for her defense. Defense counsel shall confer with the Government on any specific requests. To the extent they are not reasonably acco\n... [truncated, 3410 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/4 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=4]", "char_count": 3410}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` Finally, as the Court expressed at the initial bail hearing, it has deep concerns about the spread of COVID-19 at BOP facilities, including at the MDC. Indeed, in recent weeks, the incidence of COVID-19 among the inmate population where the Defendant is housed is truly alarming. See COVID-19: Coronavirus, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (noting that the MDC currently has 99 inmates and 11 staff members who have tested positive for COVID-19). It could be argued that in the face of this, only those defendants who pose a danger to the community ought to be detained pending trial. If that were the law and in light of the increasing positivity rate, the Court would not hesitate to reopen the detention hearing and release the Defendant on bail since the Government rests none of its arguments on dangerousness. But that is not the law. Moreover, as the Court found at the initial bail hearing, the Defendant has no underlying health conditions that put her at heightened risk of health impacts were she to contract COVID. The pandemic, including increasing positivity numbers in the MDC, is not a basis for release in this case where the Court finds that the Defendant poses a substantial and actual risk of flight and that no combination of conditions could reasonably assure her appearance. E. A hearing is unnecessary Having carefully reviewed the parties' arguments, the Court determines that a hearing is unnecessary and that it can resolve the motion on the papers. The briefing from both sides comprehensively lays out the parties' respective arguments For the reasons stated above, none of the new information has a material bearing on the Court's determination that the Defendant poses a flight risk. Indeed, many of the reasons that the Court provided at the July 14, 2020 hearing continue to apply with equal, if not greater, force. The Court need not hold a\n... [truncated, 2743 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/5 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=5]", "char_count": 2743}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: ``` Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 22 of 22 hearing to evaluate Maxwell’s motion, and it declines to do so. See United States v. Raniere, No. 18-CR-2041 (NGG) (VMS), 2018 WL 6344202, at *2 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2018). IV. Conclusion Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell’s renewed motion for release on bail, Dkt. No. 97, is DENIED. SO ORDERED. Dated: December 28, 2020 New York, New York ALISON J. NATHAN United States District Judge ``` | OBJECTS: - A document with text - Signature of the judge - Date stamp indicating December 28, 2020 - Location stamp indicating New York, New York | SETTING: - The document appears to be a legal or judicial document, likely from a court case. - It is a formal document with a signature and official stamps. | ACTIVITY: - The activity depicted is the denial of a motion for release on bail by Ghislaine Maxwell, as indicated by the text \"Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell’s renewed motion for release on bail, Dkt. No. 97, is DENIED.\" | NOTABLE: - The document is a legal ruling from a United States District Court. - The judge's name is Alison J. Nathan. - The date of the ruling is December 28, 2020. - The location is New York, New York.", "char_count": 1257}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "[NO_IMAGE] No rendered image was available for this page; previous OCR-error string was scrubbed.", "char_count": 97}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "[NO_IMAGE] No rendered image was available for this page; previous OCR-error string was scrubbed.", "char_count": 97}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "[NO_IMAGE] No rendered image was available for this page; previous OCR-error string was scrubbed.", "char_count": 97}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "[NO_IMAGE] No rendered image was available for this page; previous OCR-error string was scrubbed.", "char_count": 97}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "[NO_IMAGE] No rendered image was available for this page; previous OCR-error string was scrubbed.", "char_count": 97}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 13 of 22\n\nextradition from Israel (or any other country) would be, at best, a difficult and lengthy process\nand, at worst, impossible.”).\n\nHaving carefully reviewed the experts’ reports and the cases cited by the Defendant,” the\nCourt’s analysis of the relationship between the Defendant’s French citizenship and the risk of\nflight remains fundamentally unchanged. Its reasoning is guided in part by the substantial legal\nquestions regarding the legal weight of anticipatory extradition waivers and the likelihood that\nany extradition would be a difficult and lengthy process (including, for instance, the likelihood\nthat the Defendant would contest the validity of those waivers and the duration it would take to\nresolve those legal disputes). The likelihood that the Defendant would be able to frustrate any\nextradition requests—even if she were correct that she would be unable to stop extradition\nentirely—weighs strongly in favor of detention.\n\nIn addition, the Defendant’s extraordinary financial resources also continue to provide\nher the means to flee the country and to do so undetected. To be sure, this factor alone does not\nby itself justify continued detention. But as the Court noted at the initial bail hearing, the\nDefendant’s financial resources, in combination with her substantial international ties and\nforeign connections and her experience avoiding detection (whether from the government, the\npress, or otherwise), do bear significantly on the flight risk analysis. See Tr. at 88:6-88:23\n\n(distinguishing this case from United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018),\n\n* The Defendant also argues that “a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal an extradition order\nhas been recognized as an indication of the defendant’s intent not to flee.” Def. Mot. at 27\n(citing United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). The Court places\nlittle weight on this argument. Under the Defendant\n... [truncated, 2204 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/12 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=12]", "char_count": 2204}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "[NO_IMAGE] No rendered image was available for this page; previous OCR-error string was scrubbed.", "char_count": 97}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "[NO_IMAGE] No rendered image was available for this page; previous OCR-error string was scrubbed.", "char_count": 97}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 16 of 22\n\nwas the result of the Defendant’s misestimation rather than misdirection. And while the\nDefendant’s concerns regarding her spouse’s privacy are not insignificant, she fails to furnish\nany explanation as to why those concerns led her to misrepresent key facts to Pretrial Services\nand, by extension, the Court. In sum, the evidence of a lack of candor is, if anything, stronger\nnow than in July 2020, as it is clear to the Court that the Defendant’s representations to Pretrial\nServices were woefully incomplete. That lack of candor raises significant concerns as to\nwhether the Court has now been provided a full and accurate picture of her finances and as to the\nDefendant’s willingness to abide by any set of conditions of release.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the third factor continues to weigh\nin favor of detention.\n\nC. Pretrial detention continues to be warranted\n\nIn light of the reasons stated above, the Government has again met its burden of\npersuasion by “a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight.”\nEnglish, 629 F.3d at 319 (quoting Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436). Taking the § 3142(g) factors into\naccount, the Court concludes that the presumption in favor of detention, the nature and\ncharacteristics of the charged offenses, the weight of the evidence, and the history and\ncharacteristics of the Defendant all weigh in favor of detention. Along similar lines, the\nGovernment has also shown, and the Court concludes for the reasons outlined below, that the\nDefendant’s proposed bail package cannot reasonably assure her appearance. Thus, the Court’s\noriginal conclusion that the Defendant poses a flight risk and that no set of conditions can\nreasonably assure her future appearance remains unaltered.\n\nAs already noted, the Defendant now proposes a $28.5 million bail package, which\n\nincludes a $22.5 million personal recognizance bond co-signed by the Defenda\n... [truncated, 2042 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/15 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=15]", "char_count": 2042}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "[NO_IMAGE] No rendered image was available for this page; previous OCR-error string was scrubbed.", "char_count": 97}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 18 of 22\n\nmillions of dollars and other assets that she could sell in order to support herself. See Gov’t\nOpp’n at 23. Furthermore, the proposed bond is only partially secured. Taking into account the\nvast amounts of wealth left relatively unrestrained by the bail package, that amount, standing\nalone, cannot reasonably assure that she would appear before the Court. Nor is the Court’s\nconclusion altered by the fact that a number of third parties have pledged to support her bond;\nthe amount of wealth that she would retain were she to flee, in addition to contingent assets and\nfuture income streams that are not accounted for in the bail package, would plausibly enable her\nto compensate them, in part or in full, for their losses. And while the Defendant argues that she\nhas procured “significant loans on the basis of a negative pledge” over a property and that $4\nmillion is invested in an “illiquid hedge fund that could only be liquidated with considerable\ndifficulty,” see Def. Reply at 6, these arguments do not alter the Court’s ultimate conclusion\nthat the financial package does not meaningfully mitigate the possibility of flight.\n\nThe proposed conditions also provide that the Defendant would be released to the\ncustody of a family member, who would serve as the Defendant’s third-party custodian under 18\nU.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(); that the Defendant would be placed in home confinement with GPS\nmonitoring and that her travel would be restricted to the Southern and Eastern Districts of New\nYork and would be limited to appearances in Court, meetings with counsel, medical visits, and\nupon approval by the Court or Pretrial Services; that she would be under the strict supervision of\nPretrial Services; and that she would surrender all travel documents. /d. at 2-3. Furthermore,\nthe Defendant would have on-premises security guards who would prevent her from leaving the\nresidence at any time without prior approval by the Cour\n... [truncated, 2115 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/17 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=17]", "char_count": 2115}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 19 of 22\n\nNone of these conditions would reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance. Here,\ntoo, the Court’s original determination applies with equal force. As the Court noted at the\noriginal hearing, the Defendant has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to evade detection,\n“Te}ven in the face of what the Defense has acknowledged to be extreme and unusual efforts to\nlocate her.” Tr. at 87:4-87:19. Indeed, regardless of whether the Defendant sought to evade the\npress, rather than law enforcement, in the months leading up to her arrest, her sophistication in\nevading detection reveals the futility of relying on any conditions, including GPS monitoring,\nrestrictive home confinement, and private security guards, to secure her appearance. See Tr. at\n87:4—88:2. As other courts have observed, “home detention with electronic monitoring does not\nprevent flight; at best, it limits a fleeing defendant’s head start.” United States v. Zarger, No. 00-\nCR-773-S-1 (JG), 2000 WL 1134364, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000). Furthermore, while the\nDefendant now represents that she would be released to the custody of a family member, who\nwould serve as the Defendant’s third-party custodian under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(@), and\nthat she secured a residence in the Eastern District of New York, see Def. Mot. at 3, that does not\noutweigh the other significant factors weighing in favor of detention. And finally, the\nDefendant’s argument that private security guards could ensure her appearance at future\nproceedings runs afoul of the Bail Reform Act, which the Second Circuit has held “does not\npermit a two-tiered bail system in which defendants of lesser means are detained pending trial\nwhile wealthy defendants are released to self-funded private jails.” United States v. Boustani,\n932 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019). As in Boustani, the Defendant in the present case would be\ndetained regardless of her wealth, and “if a similarly situated def\n... [truncated, 2177 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/18 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=18]", "char_count": 2177}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 20 of 22\n\nIn light of the above, the Court again concludes that the Government has shown by a\npreponderance of the evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight and that the\nDefendant’s proposed conditions are insufficient to reasonably assure her appearance. The\npresumption in favor of detention, the weight of the evidence, and the history and characteristics\nof the Defendant all support that conclusion, and none of Defendant’s new arguments change the\nCourt’s original determination.\n\nD. The Defendant’s conditions of confinement do not justify release\n\nLastly, the Court is unpersuaded by the Defendant’s argument that the conditions of her\nconfinement are uniquely onerous, interfere with her ability to participate in her defense, and\nthus justify release. See Def. Mot. at 35-38. Indeed, the Defendant does not meaningfully\ndispute that she has received “more time than any other inmate at the MDC to review her\ndiscovery and as much, if not more, time to communicate with her attorneys.” Gov’t Opp’n at\n29. To the extent that the Defendant has concerns regarding some of the measures taken by\nBOP, including a recent lockdown due to COVID-19 that curtailed in-person legal visitations,\nthe Defendant provides no authority to conclude that this, standing alone, violates her\nconstitutional right to participate in her defense. And while the Court acknowledges the\nDefendant’s concerns regarding the conditions of her confinement, the Defendant has failed to\nprovide any basis to conclude that release is warranted on those grounds—even after the Court\n\nhas determined that she continues to pose a flight risk.?\n\n3 The Court will continue to ensure that the Defendant has the ability to speak and meet regularly\nwith her attorneys and to review all necessary discovery materials to prepare for her defense.\nDefense counsel shall confer with the Government on any specific requests. To the extent they\nare not reasonably accommo\n... [truncated, 2071 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/19 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=19]", "char_count": 2071}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 21 of 22\n\nFinally, as the Court expressed at the initial bail hearing, it has deep concerns about the\nspread of COVID-19 at BOP facilities, including at the MDC. Indeed, in recent weeks, the\nincidence of COVID-19 among the inmate population where the Defendant is housed is truly\nalarming. See COVID-19: Coronavirus, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/\ncoronavirus/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (noting that the MDC currently has 99 inmates and 11\nstaff members who have tested positive for COVID-19). It could be argued that in the face of\nthis, only those defendants who pose a danger to the community ought to be detained pending\ntrial. If that were the law and in light of the increasing positivity rate, the Court would not\nhesitate to reopen the detention hearing and release the Defendant on bail since the Government\nrests none of its arguments on dangerousness. But that is not the law. Moreover, as the Court\nfound at the initial bail hearing, the Defendant has no underlying health conditions that put her at\nheightened risk of health impacts were she to contract COVID. The pandemic, including\nincreasing positivity numbers in the MDC, is not a basis for release in this case where the Court\nfinds that the Defendant poses a substantial and actual risk of flight and that no combination of\nconditions could reasonably assure her appearance.\n\nE. A hearing is unnecessary\n\nHaving carefully reviewed the parties’ arguments, the Court determines that a hearing is\nunnecessary and that it can resolve the motion on the papers. The briefing from both sides\ncomprehensively lays out the parties’ respective arguments For the reasons stated above, none\nof the new information has a material bearing on the Court’s determination that the Defendant\nposes a flight risk. Indeed, many of the reasons that the Court provided at the July 14, 2020\n\nhearing continue to apply with equal, if not greater, force. The Court need not hold anot\n... [truncated, 2027 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00002233/20 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00002233&page=20]", "char_count": 2027}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00002233", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 22 of 22\n\nhearing to evaluate Maxwell’s motion, and it declines to do so. See United States v. Raniere, No.\n18-CR-2041 (NGG) (VMS), 2018 WL 6344202, at *2 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2018).\nIV. Conclusion\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell’s renewed motion for release on bail, Dkt. No. 97, is\n\nDENIED.\n\nSO ORDERED. AN 0) i} f\n\nDated: December 28, 2020\nNew York, New York ALISON J. NATHAN\nUnited States District Judge\n\n22\n\nDOJ-OGR-00002254\n\n", "char_count": 484}]}