{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_count": 176, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00001142", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/DOJ-OGR-00001142.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 20-3, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page1 of 165\n\nExhibit F\n\nDoc. 100\nThe Government’s Memorandum in Support to the Defendant’s Renewed\nMotion for Release\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001142\n\n", "char_count": 187}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "CaGede20t er-ODI30cAUNt n Dittcimeh01 G00 2F led 62408) 26adeagef 1 Ob 36\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nARR RE RR me x\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n-V.- i 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant.\nnc ES RR RSE RR TERR ERE x\n\nTHE GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION\nTO THE DEFENDANT’S RENEWED MOTION FOR RELEASE\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS\n\nActing United States Attorney\n\nSouthern District of New York\n\nAttorney for the United States of America\n\nMaurene Comey\n\nAlison Moe\n\nLara Pomerantz\n\nAssistant United States Attorneys\n- Of Counsel -\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001143\n\n", "char_count": 578}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD F30cAUNt n Dittcmeh01 G00 2F led 62408) 26a deagef a Ob 36\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nTHE GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANT’S\n\nRENEWED MOTION FOR RELEASE ..........ccccccccesecececesecsnecanscecansnacananananavananananacansnensnanananenananaes 1\nBACKGROUND 000... eece cece ccccccccccccccccccecececcececccecccccceceececsesceceecescecscsceecesesesceeececseseseeceseeseesececeeseeeeescs 2\nAPPLICABLE LAW .........cccccccscsccenccecensncnensnesenenenscenenenensnsnananananansnanacananananansnanananansnanansnananscananenaea 6\nDISCUSSION .......cccccccccccccccececccececececececeeceececececeeccscsceeseccscsceceesesescsceesceeceseseeeeesesessecsesesesesseeseeeseseres 8\nA. The Nature and Circumstances of the OffeNSE 000.0... lees eeeececeeceeeveececcceceacenssessesceeenaeenees 8\nB. Thi Sireneeht GF THe FVICeH Ce arr cxscemmcaserms sxmmarmesscenn AamaemReIENE LeReRRENTIRLENN SaNSSMRNNORERED AcromNO 9\nC. The Characteristics of the Defendant... eee cece cc csnsssssesceccceceecensesscescecceceunvenserseeseeens 12\nD. Conditions of ConfineMent.............cceeececceecceccccenseecceccccnecenssssseecsseuscenvsssseseseceeauavssserseesesens 29\nCOON) OES) (0) ee 33\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001144\n\n", "char_count": 1209}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD S30cAUNt n Dittcmeh01 G00 2F led 62408) 26adeagef 3 Ob 36\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nJackson v. Goord, 664 F. Supp. 2d 307 (S.D.N-Y. 2009)... ccccceccccecceneeeeeeeeeccecaeeseeeseeeeeeeneeeeeesceecaeecaeecaeenaesneeeaneseeenes 27\nUnited States v. Abdullahu, 488 F. Supp. 2d 433 (D.N.J. 2007) .....cecccecceccceeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeae cae saeesaeeseeeneeeneeeeeeserenerens 19\nUnited States v. Banki, 10 Cr. 008 (JFK), Dkt. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2010), aff'd, 369 F. App’x 152 (2d Cir. 2010).26\nUnited States v. Benatar, No. 02 Cr. 099 (JG), 2002 WL 31410262 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) oe eerie 26\nUnited States v. Bodmer, No. 03 Cr. 947 (SAS), 2004 WL 169790 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004) oo. eee neereeneeeeees 28\nUnited States v. Bohn, 330 F. Supp. 2d 960 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) 2.0... cceeccecccceceeeeeeeeceeeceeeseceseeeseeeneeeneeeneeseeeeirenieenarenaees 15\nUnited States v. Botero, 604 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Fla. 1985) oo... ccceccceeceeecece cece eeeeeeeeceeeeaeeseeeseeeeeeeneeeeeeserenerenieeneeenaees 15\nUnited States v. Boustani, 356 F. Supp. 3d 246 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, No. 19-344, 2019 WL 2070656 (2d Cir. Mar. 7,\n2OL9) ee ccesececeneeseeereseeeecaeceeeaecaeeaecaevercnaeseveecnaeseceaecaesaeeaeseecsaeeeaaesaesaecaeserenaeeeeaesaessegeeseeaeseeesaeseseaesateateneserenaeeeteateas 28\nUnited States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d. 79 (2d Cir. 2019) .....cccceccccssccssreecsseeseeeessesseeesseesseeesneesseeessaessseeesneesseeeees 6, 25, 26\nUnited States v. Chen, 820 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 1992)... ececcccececeeeeeceeeceeeseceseeeseeeeneeneeeeeeserenirenieenerenaees 15\nUnited States v. Cilins, No. 13 Cr. 315 (WHP), 2013 WL 3802012 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2013) eee 16, 19\nUnited States v. Cirillo, No. 99-1514, 1999 WL 1456536 (3d Cir. July 13, 1999) oe eee ceeeneeeeenteneeerenaeeeeeaeeas 15\nUnited States v. Cohen, No. C 10-00547, 2010 WL 5387757 n.11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010)... ee eceeneeeeeeteees 15\nUnited States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N-Y. 2009)... .ccccecccecececeeeceee\n... [truncated, 4828 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/3 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=3]", "char_count": 4828}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "CaGede20t er IZ 0cAINt n Dittcameh01 G00 2F led 62408) 26a deagef 4 Ob 36\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\npenne eee x\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n-V.- i 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant.\nARR RE RR me x\n\nTHE GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANT’S\nRENEWED MOTION FOR RELEASE\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s\nrenewed motion for release on bail, dated December 8, 2020 (the “Renewed Bail Motion”). Five\nmonths ago, after thorough briefing and a nearly two-hour hearing, this Court concluded that the\ndefendant posed a serious flight risk and that no condition or combination of conditions could\nensure her appearance in court. The defense now asks this Court to reverse that finding by\nessentially repackaging its prior arguments and presenting a more specific bail package. However,\nat the July 14, 2020 bail hearing in this case, this Court rejected the defendant’s request to keep\nthe record open to allow the defendant to do precisely what she has done here—namely, present\nmore detailed information about her finances and a more concrete package—determining that\nfurther information about her financial picture would be irrelevant because no combination of\nconditions could ensure this defendant’s appearance. The Court’s conclusion was plainly correct,\nand the Renewed Bail Motion does nothing to undermine it. The offense conduct outlined in the\nIndictment remains incredibly serious, the evidence against the defendant remains strong, and the\n\ndefendant continues to have extensive financial resources and foreign ties, as well as the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001146\n\n", "char_count": 1668}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "CaGede20t er SZ 0cAUNt n Ditticimeh01 G00 2F led 62408) 26 a deagef 5 Ob 36\n\ndemonstrated ability to live in hiding for the long term. In short, the defendant poses an extreme\nflight risk, no condition or combination of conditions can reasonably ensure her appearance in this\n\nDistrict, and the Court should not alter its prior finding to that effect.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nAs detailed in the Indictment, the defendant is charged with facilitating the sexual abuse of\nmultiple minor victims by Jeffrey Epstein between approximately 1994 and 1997. The defendant\nplayed a critical role in the scheme by helping to identify, entice, and groom minor girls to engage\nin sex acts with Epstein. The defendant’s presence as an adult woman normalized Epstein’s\nabusive behavior, and she even took part in at least some acts of sexual abuse. Together, the\ndefendant and Epstein conspired to entice and cause minor victims to travel to Epstein’s residences\nin different states, which the defendant knew and intended would result in their grooming for and\nsubjection to sexual abuse. Then, in an effort to cover up her crimes, the defendant lied under oath\nduring a civil deposition, including when asked about her interactions with minor girls.\n\nBased on that conduct, the Indictment charges the defendant in six counts. Count One\ncharges the defendant with conspiring with Epstein and others to entice minors to travel to engage\nin illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Two charges the defendant with enticing\na minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2. Count\nThree charges the defendant with conspiring with Epstein and others to transport minors to\nparticipate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Four charges the defendant\nwith transporting minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423 and 2.\n\nCounts Five and Six charge the defendant with perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.\n\nDOJ-OGR-000\n... [truncated, 2007 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/5 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=5]", "char_count": 2007}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "CaSede20t er-O0 30cAdNt n DYeGmen01000 7Filed 4268/26 aceagef d Gb 36\n\nOn July 2, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) arrested the defendant.\nFollowing extensive briefing, on July 14, 2020, the Court held a lengthy bail hearing. In its written\nand oral submissions, the defense urged the Court to release the defendant on bail.\n\nAmong other things, the defense emphasized the defendant’s family ties and residence in\nthe United States (Dkt. 18 at 2, 3, 12), offered to hire a private security company to monitor the\ndefendant (/d. at 20), noted that the defendant remained in the country and was in touch with the\nGovernment through counsel following Epstein’s arrest (Dkt. 18 at 12-13; Tr. 49, 52-55), argued\nthat the defendant went into hiding to avoid a media frenzy (Dkt. 18 at 14-16; Tr. 55-56), and\nargued that detention would hamper the ability to prepare a defense (Tr. 42, 67-69). Responding\nto the Government’s concerns about the lack of transparency about the defendant’s finances and\nsix proposed co-signers, the defense specifically asked the Court to keep the proceedings open if\nthe Court believed additional information or a more fulsome bond would be useful to the bail\ndetermination. (Tr. 52 (“And if the court determines that the conditions that we have proffered are\ninsufficient or need further verification, as long as we can have some assurance of safety and\nconfidentiality, we would recommend that the court keep the proceeding open, and we should be\nable to get whatever the court needs to satisfy it.”); Tr. 59 (“Even if the court were to assume for\npurposes of today’s proceeding that she has the means that the government claims she does, it does\nnot affect the analysis. That is to be addressed in conditions, to be addressed if the court requires\nit, through verifications and further proceedings before the court.”); Tr. 66 (“If the court desires to\nleave the proceeding open for a week and allow us to come back, if the court has concerns about\nthe numb\n... [truncated, 2309 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/6 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=6]", "char_count": 2309}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "CaGede20t erODI30cAaNt n Dittcmeh01 G00 2Filed 62408) 26a deaget 71 Ob 36\n\nfrom us, we would respectfully request that the court leave the proceeding open for a week so that\nwe can try to satisfy the court because we want to.”)).\n\nThe Court declined the defense’s request and instead concluded that the defendant posed a\nserious flight risk and that no combination of conditions could ensure her appearance. First, the\nCourt found that “the nature and circumstances of the offense here weigh in favor of detention,”\ngiven the statutory presumption of detention triggered by charges involving minor victims and the\npotential penalties those charges carry. (Tr. 82). Second, the Court determined that “[t]he\ngovernment’s evidence at this early juncture of the case appears strong” based on the “multiple\nvictims who provided detailed accounts of Ms. Maxwell’s involvement in serious crimes,” as well\nas corroboration in the form of “significant contemporaneous documentary evidence.” (d.).\nThird, the Court found that the defendant’s history and characteristics demonstrate that the\ndefendant poses a risk of flight. (Tr. 83).\n\nIn addressing that third factor, the Court emphasized the defendant’s “substantial\ninternational ties,’ which “could facilitate living abroad,” including “multiple foreign\ncitizenships,” “familial and personal connections abroad,” and “at least one foreign property of\nsignificant value.” (Tr. 83). The Court also noted that the defendant “is a citizen of France, a\nnation that does not appear to extradite its citizens.” (/d.). The Court further found that the\ndefendant “possesses extraordinary financial resources” and that “the representations made to\nPretrial Services regarding the defendant’s finances likely do not provide a complete and candid\npicture of the resources available.” (Tr. 83-84).\n\nAlthough the Court recognized that the defendant “does have some family and personal\nconnections to the United States,” the Court highlighted “the absence of any dependen\n... [truncated, 2126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/7 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=7]", "char_count": 2126}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "CaGede20t erODI30cAGNt n Dittcimeh01 G00 2F led 62408) 26a deaygef 3 Ob 36\n\nwould not pose an insurmountable burden for her.” (Tr. 84). The Court recognized the defense\narguments that the defendant did not leave the United States after Epstein’s arrest and was in\ncontact with the Government through counsel, but emphasized that the defendant may have\nexpected that she would not be prosecuted. (Tr. 84-85). The Court also noted that the defendant\n“did not provide the government with her whereabouts,” and that the “[c]ircumstances of her arrest\n... may cast some doubt on the claim that she was not hiding from the government, a claim that\nshe makes throughout the papers and here today, but even if true, the reality that Ms. Maxwell may\nface such serious charges herself may not have set in until she was actually indicted.” (Tr. 85).\nBased on all of those factors, the Court found that the Government had carried its burden of\ndemonstrating that the defendant “poses a substantial actual risk of flight.” (Tr. 86).\n\nThe Court then concluded that “even the most restrictive conditions of release would be\ninsufficient” to ensure the defendant’s appearance. (/d.). Acknowledging that the defense’s initial\nbail package represented only a fraction of the defendant’s assets, the Court found that “even a\nsubstantially larger package would be insufficient.” (d.). Although the defendant “apparently\nfailed to submit a full accounting or even close to full accounting of her financial situation,” the\nCourt implicitly rejected the defense’s offer to provide additional information by determining that\n“/e/ven if the picture of her financial resources were not opaque, as it is, detention would still be\nappropriate.” (Tr. 86-87 (emphasis added)). That conclusion was informed not only by the\ndefendant’s “significant financial resources,” but also her “demonstrated sophistication in hiding\nthose resources and herself.” (Tr. 87). “Even assuming that Ms. Maxwell only wanted to hide\nfrom the press an\n... [truncated, 2290 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/8 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=8]", "char_count": 2290}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Casest:20-cr/008BGAGRNt B6cumMent 1002 Filed6R248/2thgPageb1Gh36\n\nthe Court concluded that electronic monitoring and home security guards “would be insufficient”\nbecause the defendant could remove the monitor and evade security guards. (Tr. 87-88). Finally,\nthe Court rejected the defense’s arguments about the risks of COVID-19 and the difficulty of\npreparing a defense with an incarcerated client. In so doing, the Court noted that the defendant\nhas no underlying conditions that place her at heightened risk of complications from COVID-19\nand emphasized that the defendant had many months to prepare for trial. (Tr. 89-90).\n\nViewing all of these factors together, the Court ordered the defendant detained pending\n\ntrial. (Tr. 91).\n\nAPPLICABLE LAW\n\nUnder the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq., federal courts are empowered to\norder a defendant detained pending trial upon a determination that the defendant poses a risk of\nflight. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). When seeking detention on this ground, “[t]he Government bears the\nburden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence both that the defendant ‘presents an actual\nrisk of flight’ and that ‘no condition or combination of conditions could be imposed on the\ndefendant that would reasonably assure his presence in court.’” United States v. Boustani, 932\nF.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Sabhani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007)). The\nBail Reform Act lists three factors to be considered in the detention analysis when the Government\nseeks detention based on flight risk: (1) the nature and circumstances of the crimes charged; (2)\nthe weight of the evidence against the person; and (3) the history and characteristics of the\ndefendant, including the person’s “character . . . [and] financial resources.” See 18 U.S.C. §\n3142(g). Ifa judicial officer concludes that “no condition or combination of conditions will\nreasonably assure the appearance of the person as required . . . such judicial officer shall order the\n\ndete\n... [truncated, 2078 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/9 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=9]", "char_count": 2078}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD F30cAaNt n DitbGmeh01 G00 2Ailed G2AL8/26acRagect 0 Gb 36\n\nAdditionally, where, as here, a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving\na minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, it shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal, that no\ncondition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as\nrequired and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). In such a case, “the\ndefendant ‘bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion—to rebut\nthat presumption by coming forward with evidence that he does not pose . . . a risk of flight.’”\nUnited States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mercedes,\n254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)). The act of producing such evidence, however, “does not\neliminate the presumption favoring detention.” /d. Rather, the presumption “remains a factor to\nbe considered among those weighed by the district court,’ while the Government retains the\nultimate burden of demonstrating that the defendant presents a risk of flight. Mercedes, 254 F.3d\nat 436.\n\nWhen the Court has already issued a detention order, the Bail Reform Act provides that the\ndetention hearing “may be reopened . . . if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was\nnot known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue of\nwhether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance” of the\ndefendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Accordingly, “[a] court may properly reject an attempt to reopen\na detention hearing where the new information presented is immaterial to the issue of flight risk.”\nUnited States v. Petrov, 15 Cr. 66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26,\n2015). Although courts in this Circuit have recognized that “a release order may be reconsidered\neven where the evidence proffered on reconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the\noriginal hearing,” United Sta\n... [truncated, 2170 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/10 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=10]", "char_count": 2170}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAdNt n DibGmeh01 G00 2A iled G2AL8/26aRadgeot 1 Gb 36\n\nreconsideration” by, for example, demonstrating “that the court overlooked information or\nincorrectly applied the law,” or that failure to reconsider “would constitute manifest injustice.”\n\nPetrov, 2015 WL 1102286 at *3.\n\nDISCUSSION\n\nHaving already raised numerous arguments in its briefing and oral argument at the initial\nbail hearing in this case, the defense now asks this Court to reverse itself based on virtually the\nsame arguments it already rejected. The Renewed Bail Application largely reiterates the same\nclaims regarding the defendant’s ties to the United States and her behavior after Epstein’s arrest\nthat the Court already found unpersuasive. To the extent the Renewed Bail Application presents\nnew information, it consists primarily of financial data that was certainly known to the defendant\nat the time of her initial bail application and that the Court already assumed could be made\navailable (and thus rejected as immaterial) when ordering detention. Ultimately, nothing in the\nRenewed Bail Application alters the analysis that led this Court to conclude that the defendant\n“poses a substantial actual risk of flight,” and that no combination of conditions could assure her\nappearance. (Tr. 86). All three of the relevant Bail Reform Act factors still weigh heavily in favor\nof detention, and the defense claims to the contrary do not warrant a revisiting of this Court’s well-\nreasoned and thorough prior decision.\n\nA. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense\n\nThe first Bail Reform Act factor indisputably weighs in favor of detention in this case. The\negregious conduct charged in the Indictment gives rise to a statutory presumption of detention, and\nthe Renewed Bail Motion makes no effort to challenge this Court’s prior conclusion that the nature\nand circumstances of the offense support detention. The charges in the Indictment describe\n\nhorrendous conduct involving the sexual abuse of multip\n... [truncated, 2055 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/11 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=11]", "char_count": 2055}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAdNtn DibGmehH01 G00 2Ailed G2AL8/26acRdgect J Gb 36\n\ndefendant faces up to 35 years of incarceration, and may very well spend the remainder of her\nnatural life in prison. The seriousness of the offenses make such a steep penalty a real possibility\nupon conviction, thereby giving the defendant an overwhelming incentive to flee if given the\nchance.\n\nIn light of that strong incentive to flee, all three of the victims listed in the Indictment have\nasked the Government to convey to the Court that they continue to seek the defendant’s detention.\nAdditionally, pursuant to the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, one of the victims has provided a written\nstatement urging the Court to deny bail, which is attached as Exhibit A hereto. That unanimous\nview of the victims reflects three related reasons that this factor weighs so heavily in favor of\ndetention. First, the victims sincerely fear that if the defendant is released, she will be able to\nevade justice. Second, the pain that the victims still feel to this day as a result of the defendant’s\nconduct supports the conclusion that this offense is especially serious and may result in a lengthy\nsentence. Third, as discussed further below, the victims’ attention to this case and willingness to\nconvey their views reflects their commitment to take the stand and testify at the defendant’s trial,\ndemonstrating the strength of the Government’s case.\n\nIn short, this factor offers no reason to reverse the prior detention order.\n\nB. The Strength of the Evidence\n\nFurther incentivizing the defendant to flee, the Government’s evidence remains strong. As\nthe Court recognized when analyzing this factor at the July 14, 2020 hearing, the central evidence\nin the Government’s case will come from the detailed testimony of three different victims, who\nwill each independently describe how the defendant groomed and enticed them to engage in sexual\nactivity with Jeffrey Epstein. (Tr. 82). The Indictment itself contains a description of the\n... [truncated, 2124 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/12 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=12]", "char_count": 2124}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAaNtn DiibGmeh01 G00 2Ailed G2AL8/26aagect 3 Gb 36\n\nFurther, and as set forth below, those victims’ accounts are corroborated by other evidence,\nincluding contemporary documents and other witnesses.\n\nIn challenging this factor, the defense essentially restates its prior arguments on this score.\nAt the original hearing, the defense argued that the Government’s case was weak because it rested\nheavily on witness testimony regarding events from 25 years ago. (See Dkt. 18 at 19; Tr. 64-65).\nHaving received and reviewed the discovery, the defense now contends the Government’s\ncorroborating evidence—some of which the Motion itself identifies—is insufficient and reiterates\ndefense complaints that the discovery does not include other types of evidence.' (See Mot. at 30-\n33).\n\nNone of the defense arguments on this score changes the calculus for this factor. Three\ndifferent victims are prepared to provide detailed testimony describing the defendant’s role in\nEpstein’s criminal scheme to sexually abuse them as minors. As demonstrated by the information\noutlined in the Indictment, these accounts corroborate each other by independently describing the\nsame techniques used by the defendant and Epstein to groom and entice minor girls to engage in\nsex acts. Each victim will describe how the defendant befriended her, asked detailed questions\nabout her life, and then normalized sexual activity around Epstein. Each victim will describe the\nuse of massage as a technique to transition into sexual activity. Each victim will describe how the\npresence of an adult woman manipulated her into entering an abusive situation. In other words,\nthis is a case that involves multiple witnesses describing the same course of conduct, substantially\n\ncorroborating each other.\n\n' At the initial bail hearing, the defendant also raised a series of legal challenges she intended to\nmake on the face of the Indictment, all of which she contended weighed in favor of granting bail.\nAfter receivi\n... [truncated, 2151 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/13 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=13]", "char_count": 2151}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "CaSede20ter-O0F320cAINt n DGcGmMen0100) 7Filed G2hL8)26aceagect 4 66 36\n\nIn addition to corroborating each other, these victims’ accounts are further corroborated by\nother witnesses and by documentary evidence, which has been produced in discovery. That\n\nevidence will make it virtually indisputable that these victims in fact met and interacted with both\n\nthe defendant and Jeffrey Epstein at the times and locations they describe.\n\nBeyond this documentary\n\nevidence, additional witnesses will confirm that both the defendant and Epstein knew and\ninteracted with certain minor victims when those victims were minors. In other words, the\nGovernment’s evidence strongly corroborates the victims’ testimony that they met and interacted\nwith the defendant and Epstein at particular times and in particular places.\n\nIn the instant motion, the defendant complains that the documentary evidence relevant to\n\nthe three victims identified in the Indictment and produced to date is not sufficiently voluminous\n\n? Tn its Renewed Bail Motion, the defense complains\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001156\n\n", "char_count": 1073}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAdNtn DiibGmenH01 G20 2Ailed G2AL8/26aRadgect 5 Gb 36\n\nand that certain of the corroborating documentary evidence does not specifically name Maxwell.\nLeaving aside the fact that volume is not a reliable proxy for quality, by its very nature, abusive\n\nsexual contact is not the type of crime that leaves extensive documentary evidence. But, as\n\ndescribed «bo,\n\ncorroborative documents refer only to Epstein, they still support these victims’ testimony, which\nwill detail their interactions with both the defendant and her co-conspirator, Epstein. In other\nwords, documentary evidence does exist, and as the Court has already found, the combination of\nmultiple victims describing the same scheme, together with documents and other witnesses\nconfirming that those victims did indeed interact with the defendant and Epstein at the times and\nplaces they say they did, makes this a strong case. (Tr. 82).\n\nTaken together, this evidence confirms that the Government’s case remains as strong as it\nwas at the time of the defendant’s arrest. Accordingly, this factor continues to weigh heavily in\nfavor of detention.\n\nC. The Characteristics of the Defendant\n\nThe defendant’s history and characteristics include significant foreign ties, millions of\ndollars in cash that she largely transferred to her spouse in the last five years, among other assets,\nand a demonstrated willingness and sophisticated ability to live in hiding. The bulk of the\narguments in the Renewed Bail Motion focus on this factor in a manner that largely rehashes claims\nthat this Court already considered at the July 14, 2020 hearing. Any new information provided\nwas either known by the defense at the time of the initial hearing, assumed to be the case when the\n\nCourt analyzed this factor at the initial hearing, or, in the case of the defense report regarding\n\n12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001157\n\n", "char_count": 1871}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAdNt n Dube h01 G00 2Ailed G2AL8/26acRadgect 6 Gb 36\n\nFrench law, is simply incorrect. Accordingly, the defendant’s foreign ties, wealth, and skill at\navoiding detection continue to weigh in favor of detention.\n\nFirst, there can be no serious dispute that the defendant has foreign ties. She is a citizen\nof three countries and holds three passports. As was already noted at the original hearing and is\nagain evidenced in the Renewed Bail Application, the defendant has close relatives and friends\nwho live abroad, as well as a multi-million dollar foreign property and at least one foreign bank\naccount. (Tr. 83). In an attempt to minimize the defendant’s foreign ties, the defense emphasizes\nthe defendant’s relatives and friends in the United States, history of residence in the United States,\nand United States citizenship. But the Court was already aware of those factors when making its\noriginal detention decision. (See Tr. 84; Dkt. 18 at 2, 12). The letters and documentation included\nin the Renewed Bail Motion simply prove points that were not in dispute. What that\ndocumentation does not do, however, is suggest that the defendant has the kind of ties to this\ncountry that come with any employment in the United States or any dependents living here.\nIndeed, as noted in the Pretrial Services Report, the defendant stated in July that she has no children\nand has no current employment. (Pretrial Services Report at 3).\n\nThe Renewed Bail Motion fails to establish sufficiently strong ties to the United States that\nwould prevent her from fleeing. Although the defendant now claims her marriage would keep her\nin the United States, her motion does not address the plainly inconsistent statements she made to\nPretrial Services at the time of her arrest, when, as documented in the Pretrial Services Report, the\ndefendant said she was “in the process of divorcing her husband.” (/d.). On this point, it bears\nnoting that the defendant’s motion asks that she be permitted to \n... [truncated, 2245 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/16 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=16]", "char_count": 2245}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD F30cAdNtn DiibGmeh01 G00 2Ailed G2AL8/ 26a adgeot 71 Gb 36\n\ntime of her arrest. While a friend’s desire to avoid publicity may be understandable, a spouse’s\ndesire to distance himself in that manner—particularly when coupled with the defendant’s\ninconsistent statements about the state of their relationship—undermine her assertion that her\nmarriage is a tie that would keep her in the United States. As for the defendant’s asserted\nrelationships with a and other relatives in the United States, the defendant did not\nappear to have an issue living alone without these relatives while she was in hiding in New\nHampshire, which undercuts any suggestion that these ties would keep her in the United States. In\nany event, the defendant could easily receive visits from her family members while living abroad,\nand, as noted, the defendant has multiple family members and friends who live abroad.\n\nIn addition to those foreign connections and ample means to flee discussed further below,\nthe defendant will have the ability, once gone, to frustrate any potential extradition. Attempting\nto downplay that concern, the defense relies on two legal opinions to claim that the defendant can\nirrevocably waive her extradition rights with respect to both the United Kingdom and France.\n(Mot. at 25; Def. Ex. U; Def. Ex. V). But the defendant’s offer to sign a so-called “irrevocable\nwaiver of her extradition rights” is ultimately meaningless: it provides no additional reassurance\nwhatsoever and, with respect to France, is based on an erroneous assessment of France’s position\non the extradition of its nationals. (Mot. at 25).\n\nAs an initial matter, the Government would need to seek the arrest of the defendant before\nsuch a waiver would even come into play. Even assuming the defendant could be located and\n\napprehended—which is quite an assumption given the defendant’s access to substantial wealth and\n\n> Adding to this confusion, bank records reflect that when the defendant and her spous\n... [truncated, 2480 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/17 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=17]", "char_count": 2480}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAdNt n DiibGmenH01 G00 2Ailed G2AL8/ 26a Radgect 8 Gb 36\n\ndemonstrated ability to live in hiding—numerous courts have recognized that purported waivers\nof extradition are unenforceable and effectively meaningless. See, e.g., United States v. Epstein,\n425 F. Supp. 3d 306, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The Defense proposal to give advance consent to\nextradition and waiver of extradition rights is, in the Court’s view, an empty gesture. And, it comes\ninto [play] only after [the defendant] has fled the Court’s jurisdiction.”); United States v. Morrison,\nNo. 16-MR-118, 2016 WL 7421924, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2016); United States v. Kazeem,\nNo. 15 Cr. 172, 2015 WL 4645357, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 3, 2015); United States v. Young, Nos. 12\nCr. 502, 12 Cr. 645, 2013 WL 12131300, at *7 (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2013); United States v. Cohen,\nNo. C 10-00547, 2010 WL 5387757, at *9 n.11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010); United States v. Bohn,\n330 F. Supp. 2d 960, 961 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); United States v. Stroh, No. 396 Cr. 139, 2000 WL\n1832956, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 3, 2000); United States v. Botero, 604 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (S.D.\nFla. 1985).4 For very good reason: Any defendant who signs such a purported waiver and then\n\nflees will assuredly contest the validity and/or voluntariness of the waiver, and will get to do so in\n\n4 The defense argues that several courts “have addressed concerns about a defendant’s ties to a\nforeign state that enforces extradition waiver by requiring the defendant to execute such a waiver\nas a condition of release.” (Mot. at 26). In the cases cited by the defendant, the courts approved\nthe release of the defendants based on the particular facts, but did not address at all the question of\nwhether a waiver of extradition is enforceable. See United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048,\n1050-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting, among other things, that the Government’s case was “novel,”\nand presented an “untried theory of liability” and that the defendant not only waived \n... [truncated, 3141 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/18 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=18]", "char_count": 3141}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAant n DiibGmeh01 G20 2Ailed G2AL8)26acRageot F Ob 36\n\nthe jurisdiction of her choosing (i.e., the one to which she chose to flee). The Department of\nJustice’s Office of International Affairs (“OIA”) is unaware of any country anywhere in the world\nthat would consider an anticipatory extradition waiver binding. Indeed, the defendant’s own\nexperts’ conclusion—that “because of these waivers and other factors, it is highly unlikely that she\nwould be able to resist extradition successfully,” (Mot. at 27)—leaves open the possibility that she\ncould avoid extradition.\n\nSuch an outcome is virtually a certainty as to France, a country of which the defendant is\na citizen and which does not extradite its citizens to the United States. To confirm this fact, after\nreceiving the Renewed Bail Motion, the Government, through OIA, contacted the French Ministry\nof Justice (““MOJ”) to clarify whether there is any circumstance under which France would\nextradite a French citizen to the United States. In response, the MOJ provided the Government\nwith a letter setting forth the relevant law and conclusively stating that France does not extradite\nits citizens to the United States. That letter in its original French, as well as an English translation\nof the letter, are attached hereto as Exhibit B. In that letter, the MOJ makes clear that France does\nnot extradite its nationals outside the European Union (regardless of the existence of dual\ncitizenship), including to the United States, and has never derogated from that principle outside\nthe European Union. See Ex. B; see also United States v. Cilins, No. 13 Cr. 315 (WHP), 2013 WL\n3802012, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2013) (“Because France refuses to extradite its citizens, Cilins\ncan avoid prosecution on this Indictment if he can reach French soil.”).\n\nIn other words, even assuming the Government could locate the defendant, if she flees to\nFrance, her citizenship in that country will completely bar her extradition. Any purpo\n... [truncated, 2231 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/19 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=19]", "char_count": 2231}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "CaSede20t er WD I30cAIN n DUE Gmeh01000 2A ile@ 42508) 26adeageckd Ob 36\n\nto other countries outside of the European Union, including the United States. As set forth in\nExhibit B, according to the MOJ, the French Code of Criminal Procedure “absolutely prohibits the\nextradition of a person who had French nationality at the time of the commission of the acts for\nwhich extradition is requested.” (Ex. B at 3). That the defendant is a citizen of multiple countries\nis of no moment. (See id.). In applying the Bilateral Extradition Treaty between the United States\nand France and the “general principle of non-extradition of nationals under French law, France\nsystematically refuses to grant the extradition of French nationals to the American judicial\nauthorities.” (/d. at 4). Thus, contrary to the suggestion of the defense submission, any\nanticipatory waiver of extradition would not be effective under French law, and would not be\nrecognizable by French courts in any extradition process, or otherwise enforceable.\n\nThe defendant’s expert writes that “[i]n the recent past,” he is “not aware that the French\nauthorities would have had to address the situation in which the United States sought extradition\nof a French citizen who was also a United States citizen. Thus, there is no precedent to draw from\nin that regard.” (Def. Ex. V. at 2). That is not so. France has previously rejected such a request.\nFor example, in 2006, Hans Peterson, an American citizen and French national, turned himself in\nto French authorities in Guadeloupe and confessed to committing a murder in the United States.\nDespite turning himself in to French authorities, Peterson remained beyond the reach of U.S. law\nenforcement despite the repeated requests of OJA and U.S. officials. See Durbin, Schakowsky,\nEmanuel Urge French Justice Minister To Ensure Justice Is Done During Hans Peterson Retrial\n(Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-schakowsky-\nemanuel-urge-french-justice-m\n... [truncated, 2243 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/20 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=20]", "char_count": 2243}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD F30cAdNtn DGGE G20 2Ailed G2AL8/ 26a Rageck 1 Gb 36\n\nJustice on August 22, 2007 which provides that the “Ministry of Justice considers the American-\nborn, U.S. citizen Peterson to also be a French national and that the extradition request has been\ndenied”). Indeed, the Government is unaware of any instance in which France has ever extradited\na French citizen to the United States. (See Ex. B at 4 (“[T]he principle of non-extradition of\nnationals is a principle of extradition law from which France has never deviated outside the\nframework of the European Union.”)). Simply put, the Court was correct when it determined at\nthe initial bail hearing that France does not appear to extradite its own citizens. (Tr. 83).\n\nThe defendant’s supposed waiver of her extradition rights with respect to the United\nKingdom should similarly be afforded no weight. Although an anticipatory waiver of extradition\nmay be admissible in extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom, such a waiver is by no means\nbinding, authoritative, or enforceable. See United States v. Stanton, No. 91 Cr. 889 (CHS), 1992\nWL 27130, at *2 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1992) (denying modification of defendant’s bail where\ndefendant indicated willingness to waive extradition proceeding by providing extradition waivers,\nas British authorities advised that extradition waivers were possible only in cases where the\nfugitive actually appeared before a British magistrate after the filing of an extradition request, and\nconcluding that such a waiver was not an “enforceable undertaking”). Under the United\nKingdom’s Extradition Act of 2003, consent to extradition is permitted, “if (and only if) [a person]\nhas the assistance of counsel or a solicitor to represent him in the proceedings before the\nappropriate judge.” Extradition Act 2003, § 127(9), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/\n2003/41. As such, a judge in the United Kingdom must independently evaluate any waiver of\nextradition in real time, thereby necessar\n... [truncated, 2179 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/21 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=21]", "char_count": 2179}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAaNtn DibGmeh01 G20 2Ailed G2AL8/26aRageck A Ob 36\n\nto authorities in the United States would not be binding in the United Kingdom, and the defendant\ncould easily decide not to consent to extradition once found abroad.\n\nFurther, a judge in the United Kingdom must make an independent decision on extradition\nbased on the circumstances at the time the defendant is before the court, including the passage of\ntime, forum, and considerations of the individual’s mental or physical condition. See, e.g., id. at\n§§ 82, 83A, & 91. Even if a final order of extradition has been entered by a court, the Secretary\nof State still has the discretion to deny extradition. See id. at § 93. The Government understands\nfrom OIA that extradition from the United Kingdom is frequently extensively litigated, uncertain,\nand subject to multiple levels of appeal. Moreover, even where the process is ultimately\nsuccessful, it is lengthy and time-consuming.\n\nUltimately, although the defendant purports to be willing to waive her right to challenge\nbeing extradited to the United States, she simply cannot do so under the laws of France and the\nUnited Kingdom, and she would be free to fight extradition once in those countries. And, of\ncourse, the defendant could choose to flee to another jurisdiction altogether, including one with\nwhich the United States does not have an extradition treaty. The defendant’s written waivers of\nextradition from France and the United Kingdom certainly provide no guarantee that the defendant\nwill not flee to a third country from which, even if she can be located, extradition may be\nimpossible. Courts have recognized that lack of an effective means of extradition can increase a\ndefendant’s flight risk, and have cited such facts as a relevant consideration in detaining defendants\npending trial. See, e.g., United States v. Namer, 238 F.3d 425, 2000 WL 1872012, at *2 (6th Cir.\nDec. 12, 2000); Cilins, 2013 WL 3802012 at *2; United States v. Abdullahu, 488 F. Su\n... [truncated, 2215 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/22 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=22]", "char_count": 2215}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAGNt n DibGmeH01 G20 2Ailed G2AL8) 26a Ragec? 3 Ob 36\n\ncomplicated, and expensive process, which would provide no measure of justice to the victims\nwho would be forced to wait years for the defendant’s return. The strong possibility that the\ndefendant could successfully resist extradition only heightens the defendant’s incentive to flee.\n\nSecond, the defendant’s behavior in the year leading up to her arrest demonstrates her\nsophistication in hiding and her ability to avoid detection. The Court noted as much in denying\nbail, and the Renewed Bail Application also does nothing to change that conclusion. (Tr. 87).\nIndeed, the defendant’s time in isolation in the year leading up to her arrest makes clear that, even\nto the extent she has loved ones and property in this country, she has proven her willingness to cut\nherself off entirely from them and her ability to live in hiding. She did so by purchasing a home\nusing a trust in another name and introducing herself to the real estate agent under an alias, placing\nher assets into accounts held under other names, registering cellphones and at least one credit card\nunder other names, and living in near total isolation away from her loved ones.\n\nThe Renewed Bail Application again tries to cast those steps as efforts to avoid the media\nfrenzy that followed Epstein’s death. (Tr. 44, 56-57). However, as the Court already recognized,\nregardless of the defendant’s reasons for taking these steps, that course of conduct clearly\nestablishes her expertise at remaining hidden and her willingness to cut herself off from her family\nand friends in order to avoid detection. (Tr. 87). Rare is the case when a defendant has already\ndemonstrated an aptitude for assuming another identity and concealing her assets, including when\npurchasing property, registering cellphones, and managing finances. Here, the defendant has\nindisputably taken all of those steps. She was able to do so because of both her finances and her\nwillingnes\n... [truncated, 2209 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/23 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=23]", "char_count": 2209}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAdNt n DibGmeh01 G20 2Ailed G2AL8/26aRagec? 4 Ob 36\n\nthe media even when a bounty was offered for her location and when numerous media outlets were\nsearching for her.\n\nThe charts, graphs, and affidavits proffered by the defense do not undercut the defendant’s\nskill at evading detection, and do nothing more than restate the justification for those actions that\nthe defense already made at the prior hearing. (See Dkt. 18 at 14-16). That said, there is still\nreason to believe that the defendant was hiding not just from the press, but also from law\nenforcement. It is undisputed that defense counsel, even while in contact with the Government,\nnever disclosed the defendant’s location or offered her surrender if she were to be charged. (Tr.\n53-54). The Court already inquired about defense counsel’s interactions with the Government in\nthe year leading up to the defendant’s arrest, and the Renewed Bail Application offers nothing new\non that score. (/d.). Defense counsel contacted the Government when the FBI attempted to serve\nthe defendant with a subpoena, but were unable to locate her, on July 7, 2019. Prior to her arrest,\nthe Government and defense counsel communicated on multiple occasions between July and\nOctober of 2019, and communicated briefly on two additional occasions, most recently in March\nof 2020. At no point did defense counsel disclose the defendant’s location, offer to surrender the\ndefendant, or offer to bring the defendant in to be interviewed.\n\nMoreover it is undisputed that when the FBI located the defendant, she ignored their\ndirectives and ran away from the arresting agents. Although the defense has submitted an affidavit\nfrom the defendant’s private security team, nothing in that affidavit should alter the Court’s\ndetermination that detention is appropriate here. The defense already informed the Court at the\nJuly 14, 2020 bail hearing that the defendant’s security protocol was to move to an inner room if\nher security was breached. (T\n... [truncated, 2193 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/24 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=24]", "char_count": 2193}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAaNt n DiibGmeh01 G00 2Ailed G2AL8/ 26a Rageck F Ob 36\n\n(Def. Ex. S § 12). Moreover, the FBI announced themselves as federal agents to the defendant\nwhen they first approached her. Thus, even if the defendant was following her private security’s\nprotocol when she fled, she did so knowing that she was disobeying the directives of FBI agents,\nnot members of the media or general public. Those actions raise the very real concern, particularly\nin light of the terms of her proposed package, that the defendant would prioritize the directives of\nher private security guards over the directives of federal law enforcement. Further, the act of\nwrapping a cellphone in tin foil has no conceivable relevance to concerns about the press. The\ndefense argues that the defendant only took those measures because that particular phone number\nhad been released to the public, but that just suggests the defendant believed that was the only\nnumber of which law enforcement was aware. In other words, there is still reason to believe, as\nthe Court previously found, that in the year leading up to her arrest, the defendant sought to evade\nnot only the press, but also law enforcement. (Tr. 87).\n\nThird, the defendant has access to significant wealth. At the initial bail hearing, the\nGovernment expressed doubt that the defendant’s assets were limited to the approximately $3.8\nmillion she reported to Pretrial Services, and noted that it appeared the defendant was less than\ncandid with Pretrial Services regarding the assets in her control. (Tr. 28-30, 72-73). The finances\noutlined in the defense submission confirm the Government’s suspicion that the defendant has\naccess to far more than $3.8 million, confirm that the defendant was less than candid with Pretrial\nServices (and, by extension, the Court) during her interview, and confirm that the defendant is a\n\nperson of substantial means with vast resources.” The defendant’s apparent willingness to deceive\n\n> As noted above, the Court\n... [truncated, 2391 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/25 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=25]", "char_count": 2391}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "CaSede20t er WD I30cAdNt n DUEGmeh01000 2A ile@ 4258/26 adeagec? 4 Ob 36\n\nthis Court already weighed in favor of detention, and confirmation of that deception only\nreemphasizes that this defendant cannot be trusted to comply with bail conditions.\n\nNow, the defense has submitted a financial report that reflects the defendant has\napproximately $22 million in assets—far more than the figure she initially reported to Pretrial\nServices. (Def. Ex. O). Accepting the financial report at face value, it is clear that the defense’s\nproposed bail package would leave the defendant with substantial resources to flee the country.\nNot only would she have millions of dollars in unrestrained assets at her disposal,° but she would\nalso have a $2 million townhouse in London, which she could live in or sell to support herself. In\nother words, even with the proposed bond—which is only partially secured—the defendant would\nstill have millions of dollars at her disposal. She could absolutely afford to leave her friends and\nfamily to lose whatever they may pledge to support her bond, and then repay them much of their\nlosses. In fact, the defendant could transfer money to her proposed co-signers immediately\nfollowing her release,’ given the large sums of money that would be left unrestrained by her\nproposed bail package.\n\nMoreover, the schedule provided by the defense is notably silent regarding any future\nrevenue streams to which the defendant may have access. The financial report only addresses the\ndefendant’s assets without detailing her income at all. The defendant has similarly provided the\n\nCourt with no information about what resources her spouse might have access to on a prospective\n\n® In particular, according to the report, the defendant would have more than $4 million in\nunrestrained funds in accounts, in addition to hundreds of thousands of dollars of jewelry and other\nitems. Moreover, the Government presumes the defendant has not yet spent all $7 million of the\nretainer paid to h\n... [truncated, 2462 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/26 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=26]", "char_count": 2462}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAaNtn DibGmeh01 G20 2Ailed G2AL8) 26a eageck? 71 Ob 36\n\nbasis, in addition to their substantial assets. The financial report submitted by the defense is also\ncareful to note that it does not account for any possible income from inheritances. (Def. Ex. O at\n5, as\na\n\nThe financial report further shows that the defendant apparently spent the last five years\nmoving the majority of her assets out of her name by funneling them through trusts to her spouse.\nThat pattern suggests the defendant has used the process of transferring assets as a means to hide\nher true wealth. As the Renewed Bail Application points out, the defendant currently has\napproximately $3.4 million worth of assets held in her own name, which is close to the amount of\nwealth she told Pretrial Services she possessed in July 2020. Importantly, though, that number\nomits the millions of dollars of assets that she has transferred from her name through trust accounts\nto her spouse, including funds that were used to purchase the New Hampshire property where the\ndefendant was residing when she was arrested. This confirms that the Government was right to\nbe concerned that the defendant had refused to identify her spouse or his assets to Pretrial Services.\nThat practice further demonstrates the defendant’s sophistication in hiding her assets and\nmaintaining assets that are under her control in other names.\n\nIn this vein, the financial report suggests that the defendant originally brought more than\n$20 million to her marriage, but that her husband brought only $200,000.? (See Def. Ex. O at 10).\n8 On this score, it bears noting that that defendant told Pretrial Services that the property was owned\nby a corporation, and that she was “just able to stay there.” (Pretrial Services Report at 2). The\ndefendant’s lack of candor does not inspire confidence that she can be trusted to comply with bail\nconditions.\n\n° The Government has not been able to verify this financial information—in part because the\nd\n... [truncated, 2116 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/27 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=27]", "char_count": 2116}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAdNt n DibGmehO01 G00 2Ailed G2AL8/ 26a Rageck 8 Ob 36\n\nSetting aside whether the defendant’s spouse has additional assets beyond those included in the\nfinancial report, the vast majority of the assets contained in the report itself apparently originated\nwith the defendant. (See Def. Ex. O at 10). Based on the report, it seems clear that the defendant\nslowly funneled the majority of her wealth to trusts and into her husband’s name over the last five\nyears. As a result, if the Court were to grant the defendant’s proposed bail package and the\ndefendant were to flee, her spouse would primarily lose the money that the defendant gave him\nrather than his own independent assets. In other words, were the defendant to flee, she would\nlargely be sacrificing her own money and assets, thereby limiting the moral suasion of her spouse\nco-signing the bond. In sum, the defendant’s submission does not change the Government’s\nposition at the original bail hearing that the defendant has considerable financial resources, and\ncould live a comfortable life as a fugitive.\n\nThe combination of all these factors, including the defendant’s foreign ties, demonstrated\nability to live in hiding, and financial resources, confirm that the defendant’s characteristics\ncontinue to weigh in favor of detention. Given the multiplicity of factors supporting detention,\nthis is not one of the rare cases in which a private security company could conceivably be\nconsidered as a bail condition. See United States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019). The\nSecond Circuit has squarely held that “the Bail Reform Act does not permit a two-tiered bail\n\nsystem in which defendants of lesser means are detained pending trial while wealthy defendants\n\nare released to self-funded private jails,” and that “a defendant may be released on such a condition\n\nThe\nCourt need not resolve this question, however, because regardless of whether the defendant’s\nhusband may have additional undisclosed assets, \n... [truncated, 2284 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/28 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=28]", "char_count": 2284}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAGNen DibGmehHO01 G20 2Ailed G2AL8/ 26a caged? A Ob 36\n\nonly where, but for his wealth, he would not have been detained.” /d. Here, detention is warranted\nnot only because of the defendant’s financial means, but also her foreign ties, her skill at and\nwillingness to live in hiding, the nature of the offense resulting in a presumption of detention, and\nthe strength of the evidence, among other factors. The defense suggestion that the defendant’s\nprivate security guards should post cash in support of a bond does not change this calculus. There\nis no reason to believe that the defendant would be at all troubled by a security company in which\nshe has no personal stake losing $1 million, especially if that sacrifice meant she could escape\nconviction and sentencing. Accordingly, release to the equivalent of a “privately funded jail” is\nnot warranted here. /d. at 83.\n\nRelatedly, as the Court previously recognized (Tr. 87-88), a GPS monitoring bracelet offers\nlittle value for a defendant who poses such a significant flight risk because it is does nothing to\nprevent the defendant’s flight once it has been removed. At best, home confinement and electronic\nmonitoring would reduce a defendant’s head start after cutting the bracelet. See United States v.\nBanki, 10 Cr. 008 (JFK), Dkt. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2010) (denying bail to a naturalized citizen\nwho was native to Iran, who was single and childless and who faced a statutory maximum of 20\nyears’ imprisonment, and noting that electronic monitoring is “hardly foolproof.”), aff'd, 369 F.\nApp’x 152 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Zarger, No. 00 Cr. 773 (JG), 2000 WL 1134364, at *1\n(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000) (rejecting defendant’s application for bail in part because home detention\nwith electronic monitoring “at best . . . limits a fleeing defendant’s head start”); United States v.\nBenatar, No. 02 Cr. 099 (JG), 2002 WL 31410262, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (same). Simply\nput, no bail conditions, including those \n... [truncated, 2129 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/29 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=29]", "char_count": 2129}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAdntn DibGmeh01 G00 2Ailed G2AL8/26aRagec8O Ob 36\n\nIn urging a different conclusion, the defense again cites the same cases discussed in its\ninitial briefing and at the July 14, 2020 hearing to argue that the proposed bail conditions are\nconsistent with or exceed those approved by courts in this Circuit for “high-profile defendants with\nfinancial means and foreign citizenship.” (Mot. at 34; see Dkt. 18 at 16, 21; Tr. 48-51). The Court\nshould reject the defense’s efforts to raise the same precedent that the Court already took into\nconsideration when denying bail. ““A motion for reconsideration may not be used . . . as a vehicle\nfor relitigating issues already decided by the Court.” Jackson v. Goord, 664 F. Supp. 2d 307, 313\n(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court already considered and rejected\nthe defendant’s efforts to liken her case to other “serious and high-profile prosecutions where the\ncourts, over the government’s objection, granted bail to defendants with significant financial\nresources.” (Tr. 88). Noting “crucial factual differences,” the Court described those cases,\nincluding United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), United States v. Dreier,\n596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), and United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y.\n2009), as “not on point and not persuasive,” and distinguished the defendant for a number of\nreasons, including the defendant’s “significant foreign connections.” (Tr. 88; see id.\n(distinguishing Esposito where the risk of flight appeared to “have been based on the resources\navailable to defendant, not foreign connections or experience and a record of hiding from being\nfound”); id. (distinguishing Madoff where “the defendant had already been released on a bail\npackage agreed to by the parties for a considerable period of time before the government sought\ndetention”)).\n\nThe Court already engaged in a fact-specific analysis in ordering the defendant detained.\nAmong\n... [truncated, 2209 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/30 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=30]", "char_count": 2209}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAdNtn Dube G20 2A ile@ G2AL8) 26a eagecs 11 Ob 36\n\n(Tr. 87). Following the analysis the Court has already conducted, several of the cases cited by the\ndefendant are readily distinguishable. See, e.g., United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048,\n1050-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (in ordering defendant released pending trial, noting, among other\nthings, that the defendant not only waived his right to appeal extradition in Switzerland, but that\nhe traveled immediately to the United States for arraignment, and that his country’s Government\ncommitted to ensuring his appearance at trial); United States v. Bodmer, No. 03 Cr. 947 (SAS),\n2004 WL 169790, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2004) (setting conditions of bail where defendant\narrested abroad had already consented to extradition to the United States and finding that the\nGovernment—whose argument was “based, in large part, on speculation” as to the defendant’s\nfinancial resources—had “failed to meet its burden”). And there is support in the case law for\ndetaining individuals in comparable situations to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v.\nBoustani, 356 F. Supp. 3d 246, 252-55 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, No. 19-344, 2019 WL 2070656 (2d Cir.\nMar. 7, 2019) (ordering defendant detained pending trial and finding that defendant posed a risk\nof flight based on several factors, including seriousness of the charged offenses, lengthy possible\nsentence, strength of Government’s evidence, access to substantial financial resources, frequent\ninternational travel, “minimal” ties to the United States, and “extensive ties to foreign countries\nwithout extradition”); United States v. Patrick Ho, 17 Cr. 779 (KBF), Dkt. 49 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,\n2018) (ordering defendant detained based on defendant’s risk of flight and citing the strength of\nthe Government’s evidence, lack of meaningful community ties, and “potential ties in foreign\njurisdictions”); United States v. Epstein, 155 F. Supp. 2d 323, 324-326 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding\nthat defe\n... [truncated, 2303 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/31 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=31]", "char_count": 2303}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAdNtn DibGmehH01 G00 2Aile@ G2AL8/ 26a Ragec’ A Ob 36\n\nUnited States). Further, unlike those cases and the cases cited by the defendant, the crimes charged\nhere involving minor victims trigger a statutory presumption in favor of detention, weighing\nfurther in favor of detention. See Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436.\n\n“Each bail package in each case is considered and evaluated on its individual merits by the\nCourt.” Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 326. Unlike the cases cited by the defense, the Government\nseeks detention not solely on the basis that the defendant is of financial means and has foreign\ncitizenship. Rather, detention is warranted because the defendant is a citizen of multiple foreign\ncountries, including one that does not extradite its nationals, with “substantial international ties,”\n“familial and personal connections abroad,” and “substantial financial resources,” (Tr. 83-84), with\na demonstrated sophistication in hiding herself and her assets, who, for the myriad reasons\ndiscussed herein and identified at the original hearing—including the seriousness of the offense,\nthe strength of the Government’s evidence, and the potential length of sentence—presents a\nsubstantial flight risk. (Tr. 82-91). The defendant continues to pose an extreme risk of flight, and\nthe defense has not offered any new information sufficient to justify reversal of the Court’s prior\nfinding that no combination of conditions could ensure her appearance.\n\nD. Conditions of Confinement\n\nFinally, the Renewed Bail Application reiterates the same argument about the potential\nharms of detention on the defendant that this Court rejected at the initial bail hearing. (Tr. 42, 68-\n69). As was the case in July, these complaints do not warrant the defendant’s release.\n\nThe defendant continues to have more time than any other inmate at the MDC to review\nher discovery and as much, if not more, time to communicate with her attorneys. Specifically, the\ndefendant currently has thirteen hou\n... [truncated, 2186 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/32 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=32]", "char_count": 2186}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAdNt n DibGmehH01 G20 2Ailed G2AL8) 26a Ragec8 3 Gb 36\n\ncounsel, and when visiting is available depending on pandemic-related conditions, the defendant\nhas access to legal visits. Due to the recently implemented lockdown at the MDC, visitation is not\ncurrently available, but MDC legal counsel is arranging for the defendant to receive a VTC call\nwith legal counsel three hours per day every weekday, starting this Friday. Defense counsel will\nalso be able to schedule legal calls on weekends as needed. Given those facts, the defense\nargument essentially suggests that no defendant could prepare for trial while housed at the MDC—\na patently incorrect claim.\n\nThe defendant is able to review her discovery using hard drives provided by the\nGovernment, discs that defense counsel can send containing any copies of discovery material\ndefense counsel chooses within the confines of the protective order, or hard copy documents\nprovided by defense counsel. The Government has taken multiple steps to address technical\ndifficulties the defendant has encountered when reviewing her hard drives. These steps included\nmodifying and reproducing productions in new formats, asking MDC IT staff to assist the\ndefendant in viewing her hard drives on the MDC computer, and then purchasing and providing a\nlaptop for the defendant’s exclusive use.!° Even when the defendant was temporarily unable to\nreview some files from some hard drives, she was always able to review other portions of her\n\ndiscovery.\n\n© The Government understands from MDC legal counsel that the defendant has access to the\nlaptop thirteen hours per day during weekdays and has access to the MDC desktop computer\nthirteen hours per day seven days per week. The use of the laptop is limited to weekdays because\nthe MDC restricts the number of employees who carry the key to the secure location where the\nlaptop is kept, and the employees with that key do not work regularly on weekends. The MDC\npreviously accommodated an e\n... [truncated, 2362 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/33 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=33]", "char_count": 2362}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD F30cAaNt n Dice G00 2Ailed G2AL8/ 26a Ragec84 Ob 36\n\nAs to the defense’s most recent complaints, the malfunctioning of the sixth production that\nthe defense complains of resulted from the defendant herself dropping the hard drive onto the\nground, and that drive has been replaced. When the defense informed the Government that the\ndrive containing the seventh production may be malfunctioning, the Government offered to have\nIT staff review the drive. In response, the defense indicated the drive was in fact still viewable\nand declined to have IT staff review it. Accordingly, it is the Government’s understanding that\nthe defendant currently has a full, readable set of discovery at the MDC. At the defense’s request,\nthe Government is preparing yet another copy containing all productions to date on a single drive\nso that the defendant will have a backup copy of discovery materials at the MDC.'! Throughout\nthe defendant’s pretrial detention, the Government has been responsive to the defense’s concerns\nregarding access to discovery and counsel. The Government will continue to work with MDC\nlegal counsel to ensure that the defendant is able to review her discovery and to communicate with\ndefense counsel over the seven months still remaining before trial.\n\nAs to the defense complaints regarding the defendant’s conditions of confinement, the\ndefense notably does not suggest that the defendant should be housed in general population.\nIndeed, the defense appears to agree that the best way to ensure the defendant’s safety while\ndetained is to be away from general population. Unlike other inmates in protective custody,\nhowever, the defendant is released from her isolation cell for thirteen hours per day, has her own\nshower, has exclusive use of two different computers, has her own phone to use, and has her own\n\ntelevision. Those conditions set her far apart from general population inmates, not to mention\n\n'! On this score, the Government notes the tension between the\n... [truncated, 2447 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/34 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=34]", "char_count": 2447}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAdNtn DibGmehH01 G20 2Aile@ G2AL8/26aceagec8S Ob 36\n\nother inmates in protective custody. Additionally, psychology and medical staff check on the\ndefendant daily, MDC legal staff are highly attuned to any complaints the defendant has raised,\nand following initial complaints about the defendant’s diet early in her incarceration, the MDC has\nensured that the defendant receives three full meals per day and has access to commissary from\nwhich she can supplement her diet.\n\nThe MDC has taken numerous steps to strike the balance between the security of the\ninstitution and providing the defendant with adequate time and resources to prepare her defense.\nIn that vein, many of the searches the defendant complains of—such as searches after every visit,\nsearches of her cell, pat downs when she is moved, and directing her to open her mouth for visual\ninspection (while the searching staff member is wearing a mask)—are the same searches to which\nevery other inmate is subjected for the security of the institution. MDC legal counsel has assured\nthe Government that MDC staff does not record or listen to the substance of the defendant’s calls\nand visits with legal counsel. To the extent MDC staff conducts additional searches or monitoring\nof the defendant, MDC legal counsel has indicated that those steps are necessary to maintain the\nsecurity of the institution and the defendant.\n\nWith respect to the defense concerns regarding COVID-19, the Government recognizes, as\nit did in its initial bail briefing, that the virus presents a challenge at any jail facility. At least for\nthis defendant, the MDC’s precautionary measures appear to have worked. When the defendant\nwas potentially exposed to the virus, she was placed in quarantine, remained asymptomatic, tested\nnegative, and then was released from quarantine. As the Court found at the initial bail hearing, the\ndefendant has no underlying health conditions that would place her at greater risk of complications\nfrom COVID-\n... [truncated, 2157 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/35 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=35]", "char_count": 2157}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "CaGede20t er OD FZ0cAdNen DibGmehH01 G20 2Ailed G2AL8) 26a Rage’ é Gb 36\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nAs this Court previously found, the defendant “poses a substantial actual risk of flight.”\n\n(Tr. 86). Nothing in the defense submission justifies altering the Court’s prior conclusion that\n\nthere are no conditions of bail that would assure the defendant’s presence in court proceedings in\n\nthis case. Accordingly, the Renewed Bail Motion should be denied.\n\nDated: New York, New York\nDecember 16, 2020\n\nBy:\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nAUDREY STRAUSS\nActing United States Attorney\n\n. Se.\n= :\na Ee ee\npe eee —\n\nMaurene Comey\n\nAlison Moe\n\nLara Pomerantz\n\nAssistant United States Attorneys\n(212) 637-2324\n\n33\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001178\n\n", "char_count": 707}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "CaSese Z0-ef 00 220s Aste nt lhideB neh) 10021 , iRGB 5201 9720 e Ragé 166f 2\n\nBOIES\nSCHILLER\nRew. FLEXNER\n\nSigrid S. McCawley\nTelephone: (954) 377-4223\nEmail: smecawley@bsfllp.com\n\nDecember 15, 2020\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouthern District of New York\nUnited States Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nRe: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nDear Judge Nathan:\n\nAnnie Farmer submits the following statement in opposition to the Defendant’s renewed\nmotion for bail.\n\n3s 2K 3\n\nI appreciate the opportunity to again be heard by the Court in this matter and once more\nrequest that Ghislaine Maxwell not be released prior to her trial. I write this not only on behalf of\nmyself, but all of the other girls and young women who were victimized by Maxwell. Ghislaine\nMaxwell sexually abused me as a child and the government has the responsibility to make sure\nthat she stands trial for her crimes. I do not believe that will happen or that any of the women she\nexploited will see justice if she is released on bail. She has lived a life of privilege, abusing her\nposition of power to live beyond the rules. Fleeing the country in order to escape once more would\nfit with her long history of anti-social behavior.\n\nDrawing on my personal experience with Maxwell and what I have learned of how she has\nlived since that time, I believe that she is a psychopath. Her abuse of me and many other children\nand young women is evidence of her disregard for and violation of the rights of others. She has\ndemonstrated a complete failure to accept to responsibility in any way for her actions and\ndemonstrated a complete lack of remorse for her central role in procuring girls for Epstein to abuse.\nShe was both charming and manipulative with me during the grooming process, consistent with\nwhat many of the women she abused have described. She has frequently lied to others, including\nrepeatedly lying about me and my family. Maxwell has for dec\n... [truncated, 2947 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/37 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=37]", "char_count": 2947}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "CaSese Z0-ef 00 S20s Aste thide Bnei) 10021 , FIRB 520, 9720 e Page Hof 2\n\nimportant to her than being connected. Even more concerning, is if she is let out she has the ability\nto once again abuse children and the painful consequences of that type of trauma can last a lifetime.\nI implore the Court to make sure that Ghislaine Maxwell does not escape justice by keeping her\nincarcerated until her trial.\n\n3s 2 3\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley\n\nSigrid S. McCawley, Esq.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001180\n\n", "char_count": 506}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "CaSese 20-ef U0 220cAsten (hdc ntehi0 10021 , FiRB 20,8729 eRageé T66f 4\n\nMINISTERE oo _ ;\nDE LA JUSTICE Direction des affaires criminelles et des graces\nLiberté\n\nEgatité\n\nFraternité\n\nSous-direction de la justice pénale spécialisée\nBureau de l’entraide pénale internationale\n\nParis, le 11 décembre 2020\n\nMonsieur le garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice\na\n\nDepartment of Justice (D.OJ)\n\nPar lintermédiaire d’ Andrew FINKELMAN, magistrat de latson\nAmbassade des Etats-Unis d \"Amérique a Paris\n\nJ'ai 'honneur de vous informer de ce que article 696-2 du code de procédure pénale francais\nprévoit que la France peut extrader « toute personne n’ayant pas la nationalité francaise », tant précisé que la\n\nnationalité s’apprécie au jour de la commission des faits pour lesquels lextradition est demandée\n(article 696-4 1°).\n\nLe code de procédure pénale frangais proscrit donc de maniéte absolue extradition\nPextradition d'une personne qui avait la nationalité francaise au moment de la commission des faits\npout lesquels l’extradition est demandée.\n\nLa loi pénale étant d’interprétation stricte, il n’y a pas lieu de discriminer entre les nationaux\net les binationaux. A partir du moment ot elle était francaise au moment des faits, la petsonne réclamée\nest inextradable, peu importe qu’elle soit titulaire d’une ou de plusieurs autres nationalités.\n\nLorsque le refus d’extrader est fondé sur la nationalité de la personne réclamée, la France\napplique le principe « aut tradere, aut judicare » selon lequel Etat qui refuse la remise doit juger la\npetsonne. Ainsi, Particle 113-6 du code pénal donne compétence aux juridictions frangaises pour juger\ndes faits commis a l’étranger par un auteur de nationalité francaise.\n\nCertains Etats, en général de droit anglo-saxon, acceptent d’extrader leurs nationaux et n’ont\nen tevanche pas compétence pour juger les faits commis par leurs ressortissants sur un territoire\nétranger. C’est notamment le cas des Etats-Unis d’ Amérique.\n\n13, place Vend6éme - 75042 Pa\n... [truncated, 2080 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/39 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=39]", "char_count": 2080}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "CaSesk20--6f 00S20sAdTe ni DGcantehd 16021 , FilB520,8729ePage Hof 4\n\nLarticle 3 du Traité bilatéral d’extradition signé le 23 avril 1996 entre les Etats-Unis\nd’Amérique et la France stipule que «/’E“at requis nest pas tenu d’accorder lextradition de l'un de ses\nressortissants, mais le Pouvoir extcutif des Etats-Unis a la Jaculté de ie faire, discrétionnairement, s'il le juge\n\napproprié ».\n\nEn application de ce Traité et du principe général de non-extradition des nationaux en droit\nfrancais, la France refuse systématiquement d’accorder Vextradition de ressortissants francais aux\nautorités judiciaires américaines tandis que les autorités américaines acceptent regulhiérement d’extrader\nleurs ressortissants vets la France.\n\nIl convient de faite observer que le ptincipe de non-extradition des nationaux vaut non\nseulement a l’égard des Etats-Unis mais également de tous les autres Etats a Pexception des Etats-\nmembres de PUnion européenne, aux termes de la loi du 9 mars 2004 transposant la décision-cadre\ndu 13 juin 2002 sur le mandat d’arrét européen qui prévoit que la remise de la personne réclamée ne\npourra pas étre refusée au seul motif de sa nationalité francaise.\n\nCe tempérament au ptincipe de non-extradition des nationaux s’inscrit dans le contexte\npatticulier de la construction de espace judiciaire européen qui s’inscrit lui-méme dans un processus\n@intégration politique trés spécifique entre les Etats-membres de Union européenne. Ce haut niveau\nd’intégration politique existant entre les Etats membres de ’Union européenne va de pair avec une\ncertaine homogénéité, au sein de ces Etats, en matiére d’échelle des peines ainsi qu’en ce qui concerne\nles modalités d’aménagement de peine, les Etats membres étant liés par les mémes obligations\ninternationales (notamment les obligations découlant de la convention européenne de sauvegarde des\ndroits de Phomme et des libertés fondamentales et de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des\ndroits de ’homme).\n\nEn tout état de caus\n... [truncated, 2184 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/40 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=40]", "char_count": 2184}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "CaSeseZ0-of 0 320s Aste nic nie 16021 , ARB 120, 3729 eRage Of 4\n\n[logo]\n\nMINISTRY\n\nOF JUSTICE\n\nLiberty Directorate of Criminal Affairs and Pardons\nEquality\n\nFraternity\n\nSpecialized Criminal Justice Sub-Directorate\nOffice for the International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters\n\nParis, December 11, 2020\nMr. Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice\nto\nDepartment of Justice (DOJ)\n\nThrough Andrew FINKELMAN, Liaison Magistrate\nEmbassy of the United States of America in Paris\n\nI have the honor to inform you that Article 696-2 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure\nprovides that France can extradite \"any person not having French nationality,” it being specified that\nnationality is assessed on the day of the commission of the acts for which extradition is requested\n(Article 696-4 1°).\n\nThe French Code of Criminal Procedure therefore absolutely prohibits the extradition of a\nperson who had French nationality at the time of the commission of the acts for which extradition is\nrequested.\n\nThe penal law being of strict interpretation, there is no reason to discriminate between\nnationals and binationals. From the moment they were French at the time of the facts, the person\nclaimed is inextradible, regardless of whether they hold one or more nationalities.\n\nWhen the refusal to extradite is based on the nationality of the requested person, France\napplies the principle \"aut tradere, aut judicar\" according to which the State which refuses the\nsurrender must judge the person. Thus, Article 113-6 of the Penal Code gives competence to the\nFrench courts to judge acts committed abroad by a person of French nationality.\n\nSome countries, generally under Anglo-Saxon law, agree to extradite their nationals and, at the\nsame time, have no jurisdiction to judge acts committed by their nationals on foreign territory. This is\nparticularly the case of the United States of America.\n\n13, place Vendéme - 75042 Paris Cedex 01\nTelephone: 01 44 77 60 60\nwww.justice-gouv.fr\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001183\n\n", "char_count": 1994}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "CaSeseZ0-of (0 320s Aden it DhGcO nie 16021 , ARB 120, 8729 eRageé WO 4\n\nArticle 3 of the Bilateral Extradition Treaty signed on April 23, 1996 between the United\nStates of America and France stipulates that “The requested State is not bound to grant the extradition\nof any of its nationals, but the Executive Power of the United States has the right to do so at its\ndiscretion if it deems it appropriate.”\n\nIn application of this Treaty and of the general principle of non-extradition of nationals under\nFrench law, France systematically refuses to grant the extradition of French nationals to the American\njudicial authorities, while the American authorities regularly agree to extradite their nationals to\nFrance.\n\nIt should be noted that the principle of non-extradition of nationals applies not only to the\nUnited States but also to all other States except the Member States of the European Union under the\nterms of the Law of March 9, 2004 transposing the framework decision of June 13, 2002 on the\nEuropean arrest warrant, which provides that the surrender of the requested person may not be refused\non the sole ground of his French nationality.\n\nThis principle of non-extradition of nationals fits into the context of the construction of the\nEuropean judicial area which itself is part of a very specific process of political integration between\nthe Member States of the European Union. This high level of political integration existing between the\nMember States of the European Union goes hand in hand with a certain homogeneity within these\nStates in terms of the scale of penalties as well as in terms of adjustment of penalty methods; the\nmember states being bound by the same international obligations (in particular the obligations arising\nfrom the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and\nfrom the case law of the European Court of Human Rights).\n\nIn any event, the principle of non-extradition of nationals is a principle of extradition law \n... [truncated, 2198 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/42 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=42]", "char_count": 2198}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 20-3, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page44 of 165\n\nExhibit G\n\nDoe. 103\nReply Memorandum of Ghislaine Maxwell in Support of Her Renewed\nMotion for Bail\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001185\n\n", "char_count": 183}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "Cases: 20-cr/00 88 GAN BOEwMErt 108 2 Filedeh2/23/PagPagetl1Gh15\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\neen nn nn on nn nn no nn nn on nn on nn oo on ne ee ee = = == Xx\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nv.\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\n\nDefendant.\n\nREPLY MEMORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL\nIN SUPPORT OF HER RENEWED MOTION FOR BAIL\n\nMark S. Cohen\n\nChristian R. Everdell\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\nPhone: 212-957-7600\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nPhone: 303-831-7364\n\nBobbi C. Sternheim\n\nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim\n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor\nNew York, NY 10011\n\nPhone: 212-243-1100\n\nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001186\n\n", "char_count": 776}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "Cases: 20-cr/00B8G1AUNt BOEwMErt 108 2 FiledeR2/23/RagPage?1Gh15\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nPage\n\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT o........cccccccecceceescsesecsseeseesecseeuecueesecuaeeeenaceaeeaecaeesesseeecnasesenseeateneens 1\n\nARGUMENT ...0..cc cece cececccesceseeseesesaecssenecusssecnsseesasseaesaecaessesaeesecsssseesacesesaeeaseaecaeesesaseeenasesessseseeatens 2\nI. The Government Concedes that Its Case Relies Almost Exclusively on the\n\nTestimony of Three Witnesses ..........0cccccccccccccccecseeceseceseeenseecseecuseceseeenseecsesensesnseeesseessaee 2\n\nII. The Government Has Not Carried Its Burden... eceeecccesececeeeeeeeeeeeeseenseeeeeseeneees 4\n\nA. The Government Asks the Court to Ignore Ms. Maxwell’s Substantial\nTies to the United States, Including Her Spouse P etueceesseeeseee 4\n\nB. Ms. Maxwell Has Thoroughly Disclosed Her Finances and Pledged All\n\nof Her and Her Spouse’s Assets in Support of Her Bond .......0.0.00. ee 5\nC. The Government’s Assertion that Ms. Maxwell Is “Adept” at Hiding and\nTherefore a Flight Risk Is Specious «20.0.0... .ccccecccecccececcceseceneeeeeeecuseenseeenseenseeenseens 7\nD. Refusal of Extradition from France or the United Kingdom Is Highly\nUnlikely ooo... cccc cece cece ceneceseeecusecuseceseceseecsueensecesseecsaecsseesesenseecesesseesseeenseessaes 8\nE. The Recent COVID Surge at MDC Further Justifies Bail... 10\nCONCLUSION. 00... .ccccccccceccescceeeseeseeaseseeecuesecuaeseesseesesaecaeenecueesecsasseesascsesaecaeeneseesesnasenenaseseeasenees 10\ni\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001187\n\n", "char_count": 1510}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "Cases: 20-cr/0088GAUNt BOEwuMErt 108 2 FiledeR2/23/RagPageB1Gho15\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nPage(s)\nCases\nUnited States v. Chen,\nig ee Eo RL): ee ee een ee eee aren 10\nUnited States v. Orta,\nNSE RR i, TE issn sts ipsa 1\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001188\n\n", "char_count": 235}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "Cases: 20-cr/0088G1AUNt BOEwuMErt 1082 Filedeh2/23/PagPagek1G515\n\nTABLE OF EXHIBITS\n\nExhibit A. Julié Addendum Opinion (France)\nExhibit B. Perry Addendum Opinion (U.K.)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001189\n\n", "char_count": 188}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "Cases: 20-cr/00 88 GAN BOEwuMert 108 2 Filedeh2/23/PagPageb1Gh15\n\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\nThe only issue before the Court is whether conditions exist that can reasonably assure\nMs. Maxwell’s appearance during this case. On this renewed application, Ms. Maxwell has put\nbefore the Court a significant bail package, supported by detailed submissions, which warrant\nher release on strict conditions. She and her spouse have committed to signing a bond in the full\namount of their net worth, regardless of the ownership of the underlying assets. She has\nproffered seven additional sureties, consisting of her family and close friends, many of whom are\nUSS. citizens and long-time residents, who have come forward at great personal risk and have\npledged meaningful assets. The government does not challenge the good faith and bona fides of\nthese proposed sureties. She has provided a detailed report from a respected accounting firm,\nwhich was further reviewed by a former IRS special agent, setting forth a statement of her\nfinancial condition, supported by voluminous documentation. The government does not\nchallenge the report’s findings, nor its underlying documentation. She has agreed, in writing, to\ngive up any right she has or could have to contest extradition and submit to all other standard\n\ntravel restrictions. And she has noted that a key representation made by the government at the\ninitial bail hearing as to the strength of its evidence is simply not accurate hit\n\nPO and there is no “significant contemporaneous documentary\n\nevidence” that corroborates its case.\n\nWith regard to any other defendant, this record would readily support release on strict\nbail conditions, perhaps even on consent. But this is Ghislaine Maxwell, the apparent substitute\nfor Jeffrey Epstein. So, instead, in its response the government urges the Court to disregard the\nsignificant additional evidence proffered to the Court and further argues that a defendant cannot\nbe eligible for bail (apparently on any co\n... [truncated, 2177 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/48 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=48]", "char_count": 2177}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "Cases: 20-cr/0088 GAN BOEwuMErt 1082 Filed6R2/23/2agPageb1G515\n\n892-93 (8th Cir. 1985) (“The legal standard required by the [Bail Reform] Act is one of reasonable\nassurances, not absolute guarantees.”). Under, the Bail Reform Act, a defendant must be released\nunless there are “no conditions” that would reasonably assure her presence. Here, the proposed\npackage satisfies the actual governing standard, and the Court should grant bail.\n\nARGUMENT\n\nIL. The Government Concedes that Its Case Relies Almost Exclusively on the\nTestimony of Three Witnesses\n\nIn evaluating the strength of the government’s case in its prior ruling, the Court relied on\nthe government’s proffer that the testimony of the three accusers would be corroborated by\n“significant contemporaneous documentary evidence.” (Tr. 82 (emphasis added)). The\ngovernment now expressly retreats from this position. It is abundantly clear from the\ngovernment’s response that it has no “significant contemporaneous documentary evidence”—in\nfact, it has virtually no documentary corroboration at all—and that its case against Ms. Maxwell\nis based almost exclusively on the recollections of the three accusers, who remain unidentified,\nconcerning events that took place over 25 years ago. Moreover, the government offers no\nspecificity about when within the four-year period of the charged conspiracy the alleged\nincidents of abuse took place. This, alone, is grounds for the Court to reconsider its prior ruling.\n\nThe few examples of documentary corroboration referenced by the government—which\n\nare the same examples that the government touted at the initial bail hearing—pertain to Epstein,\n\nnot Ms. Maxwell. The government concedes tha\nI 0. Men. 11 (emphasis added), The\ngovernment futher tes\neS\n\n(emphasis added)). The strength of the government’s case against Jeffrey Epstein is not at issue\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001191\n", "char_count": 1871}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "Cases: 20-cdr/00B8 GAN BOEwMErt 1082 FiledeR2/23/PagPaget71Gh15\n\nhere. Whether or not the accusers’ recollections as to Epstein are corroborated is irrelevant to\nthe strength of the evidence against Ms. Maxwell.\nThe only purported corroboration that pertains in any way to Ms. Maxwell is of marginal\n\nvalue. The government references\n\nS| (Id. at 11). But even the government concedes that, at best,\n\nIt is clear that the only evidence that Ms. Maxwell allegedly “groomed” the accusers or\nknowingly facilitated or participated in Epstein’s sexual abuse of minors will come solely from\nthe testimony of the three accusers. The government’s case against Ms. Maxwell therefore rests\nentirely on the credibility and reliability of these three witnesses.? Moreover, the substantive\ncounts (Counts Two and Four) are based on the testimony of only one witness, Minor Victim-1.\nIt is also telling that the government does not even attempt to rebut the defense’s assertion that it\ndid not begin issuing subpoenas for documents related to Ms. Maxwell until just after the death\n\nof Jeffrey Epstein. This confirms that the case against Ms. Maxwell was assembled after the fact\n\n' The government also proffers that they will have “additional witnesses.” (Gov. Mem. at 11). But these are not\n“outcry” witnesses who will corroborate a contemporaneous account of abuse from one or more of the accusers.\nInstead, they will testify only that “both [Ms. Maxwell] and Epstein knew and interacted with certain minor victims\nwhen those victims were minors.” (/d.). Again, the fact that Ms. Maxwell may have “met and interacted with”\nsomeone when they were a minor proves absolutely nothing.\n\n* One of the witnesses has submitted a letter to the Court. While the CVRA permits the right to be heard, the letter\nshould be given no legal weight in the Court’s bail analysis. See United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 331-\n32 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001192\n\n", "char_count": 1942}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "Cases: 20-cr/00B8 GAN BOEwMErt 1082 Filed6h2/23/RagPageB1Gh15\n\nas a substitute for its prosecution of Epstein.*> The government’s case is not what it represented\nto the Court at the initial bail hearing, which should weigh heavily in favor of granting bail.*\nIl. The Government Has Not Carried Its Burden\n\nA. The Government Asks the Court to Ignore Ms. Maxwell’s Substantial\nTies to the United States, Including Her Spouse\n\nThe government incorrectly argues that the renewed bail application offers no new\ninformation and that the Court was “already aware of” the defendant’s friends and family in\nthe United States. (Gov. Mem. at 13). The government ignores that, since the initial bail\nhearing, Ms. Maxwell’s spouse has come forward as a co-signor and has submitted a\ndetailed letter describing his committed relationship with Ms. Maxwell for over four years\nand the important role she has played, and continues to play, Po\n|| It also ignores that several of Ms. Maxwell’s closest friends and family, many of\nwhom are U.S. citizens and residents, have also come forward, at considerable personal risk,\nto support her bond with pledges of assets or letters of support. This information, which\nwas not available to the Court at the time of the initial hearing, demonstrates Ms. Maxwell’s\nstrong ties to this country and weighs heavily in favor of bail.\n\nRather than address the merits, the government attempts to dismiss the significance\nof Ms. Maxwell’s relationship with her spouse, noting that Ms. Maxwell told Pretrial\nServices that she was in the process of getting a divorce and that her spouse did not step\n\nforward as a co-signer at the initial bail hearing. (/d. at 13-14). The government is entirely\n\n3 Moreover, the government failure to request is regardless of whether it was legally obligated to\n\ndo so, shows that the government has accepted the accusers’ accounts without serious scrutiny. Given the\ngovernment’s ongoing Brady obligations, it is unsettling that the government would s\n... [truncated, 2364 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/51 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=51]", "char_count": 2364}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "Cases: 20-cr/0088 GAN BOEwMErt 108 2 Filedeh2/23/RagPagel1Gh15\n\nmistaken. Prior to her arrest, Ms. Maxwell and her spouse had discussed the idea of getting\na divorce as an additional way to create distance between Ms. Maxwell and her spouse to\n\nprotect im | from the terrible consequences of being associated with her.\n\nNevertheless, in the weeks following the initial bail hearing, ee\nPO She and her spouse therefore had no reason to continue\n\ndiscussing divorce, which neither of them wanted in the first place. Nor was there any\nreason for her spouse to refrain from stepping forward as a co-signer. In sum, the\ngovernment has offered nothing but unsupported innuendo to suggest that Ms. Maxwell’s\n\nrelationship with her spousc is not a powerful tie to this country.\n\nThe government’s assertion that Ms. Maxwell must not have a close relationship\n\nIs p2cicularly callous\nand belied by the facts. (Gov. Mem. at 14). As her spouse explains, PO\n512).\n\nB. Ms. Maxwell Has Thoroughly Disclosed Her Finances and Pledged All of\nHer and Her Spouse’s Assets in Support of Her Bond\n\nThe government’s attempts to rebut the financial condition report are unavailing.\nSignificantly, the government does not contest the accuracy of the report, nor the\nvoluminous supporting documentation. In fact, the government has proffered nothing that\ncalls into question the report’s detailed account of Ms. Maxwell and her spouse’s assets for\nthe last five years, which addresses one of the Court’s principal reasons for denying bail.\n\nRather than question the report itself, the government attempts to argue that Ms.\n\nMaxwell deceived the Court and Pretrial Services about her assets. (Gov. Mem. at 22-23).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001194\n\n", "char_count": 1706}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAaNe n DiibGmeH01020 2Ailed G2A28)26aceagect 0 Gb 15\n\nThe report shows nothing of the sort. Ms. Maxwell, who was sitting in a jail cell at the time,\nwas asked by Pretrial Services to estimate her assets. Accordingly, she gave her best\nestimate of the assets she held in her own name, which the government concedes she did\nwith remarkable accuracy considering that she had not reviewed her financial statements.”\n\nThe government’s arguments further confirm that it has lost all objectivity and will\nview at any fact involving Ms. Maxwell in the worst possible light. For example, the\ngovernment asserts that Ms. Maxwell has demonstrated “sophistication in hiding her assets”\nand characterizes her transfers to a trust as ““funneling” assets to her spouse to “hide her true\nwealth.” (/d. at 24). There is nothing unusual, let alone nefarious or even particularly\nsophisticated about transferring assets into a trust or a spouse. Indeed, Ms. Maxwell fully\ndisclosed these transactions on her joint tax returns. More importantly, all of the assets\ndisclosed in the financial report, whether they are owned by Ms. Maxwell or her spouse, are\nincluded in the bond amount and are subject to forfeiture if she flees.\n\nThe government further argues that the financial condition report shows that Ms.\nMaxwell has access to millions of dollars of “unrestrained funds” that she could use to flee\nthe country and reimburse any of her sureties for the loss of their security. (/d. at 23). That\ncharacterization is simply untrue. First, as disclosed in the financial report, Ms. Maxwell\nhas procured significant loans on the basis of a negative pledge over her London property.\nSecond, the $4 million controlled by her spouse Pe\ncould only be liquidated with considerable difficulty.\n\nThe government also faults Ms. Maxwell for not including a valuation of future\n\ncontingent assets and income that may never materialize. (/d. at 23-24). For example, ||\n\n° Moreover, for the reasons discussed in \n... [truncated, 2191 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/53 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=53]", "char_count": 2191}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAantn DitbGmeh01 G20 2Ailed G2A28)26aceagect 1 6b 15\n\nee Similarly, the financial report does not include\n\na future income stream for Ms. Maxwell or her spouse because it presents only historical\n\nand current assets. Even so, Ms. Maxwell has no certain future income stream. Her spouse\n\n|| and has had to liquidate his existing investments to help Ms. Maxwell. Finally, the\n\nreference iii is gratuitous. Ms. Maxwell had no knowledge of P|\n\nBut the larger point is this: Ms. Maxwell has proposed a substantial bail package\nwith multiple co-signers and significant security. She and her spouse have pledged all of\ntheir assets in support of the bond. Ms. Maxwell’s wealth is not a reason to deny her bail. It\nis a reason to set appropriately strict conditions that will result in significant financial\nconsequences to Ms. Maxwell and her friends and family if she leaves the country. The\nproposed bail package does exactly that.°\n\ncS The Government’s Assertion that Ms. Maxwell Is “Adept” at Hiding and\nTherefore a Flight Risk Is Specious\n\nThe government continues to assert the sinister narrative that Ms. Maxwell had “an\n\nexpertise at remaining hidden,” and that it would therefore be easy for her to become a fugitive.\n\n° The government’s argument that her spouse’s moral suasion is diminished because Ms. Maxwell brought the\nmajority of assets to the relationship is nonsensical. (/d. at 24-25). Regardless of whose money it was to begin with,\nall of the assets of Ms. Maxwell and her spouse will be forfeited if she flees and her ay will be\nleft with nothing. Furthermore, the government’s assertion that they could not verify the spouse’s financial\ninformation because Ms. Maxwell did not provide his current banking information is false. (/d. at 24 n.9). The\ndefense provided the spouse’s current banking records and only redacted the name of the bank.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001196\n\n", "char_count": 1897}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAahtn DitbGmehH01 G20 2Ailed G2A28)26aceageot A Ob 15\n\n(Gov. Mem. at 20). The government suggests that purchasing a home using a trust and providing\na pseudonym to a real estate broker are indicative of her willingness and ability to live in hiding\nand somehow forecast Ms. Maxwell’s intention to flee. V/d.). These arguments are just further\nevidence that the government will frame every fact about Ms. Maxwell in the worst possible\nlight. As the defense has already argued extensively in its initial brief, these steps were borne\nout of necessity to protect Ms. Maxwell and her family from harassment and physical threats.\nMoreover, they are not predictive of flight. There is simply no basis to conclude, based on the\nmeasures that Ms. Maxwell was forced to take to protect herself and her family, that she would\nthen willingly abandon that family to become a fugitive from justice. To the contrary, she\nremained in the country precisely to remain close to them and to defend her case.\n\nD. Refusal of Extradition from France or the United Kingdom Is Highly\nUnlikely\n\nThe government dismisses Ms. Maxwell’s willingness to waive her extradition rights as\nto France and the United Kingdom as “meaningless” because Ms. Maxwell cannot guarantee\nwith absolute certainty that either country will enforce the waiver. (Gov. Mem. at 14). The\ngovernment misses the point: Ms. Maxwell’s willingness to do everything she can to eliminate\nher ability to refuse extradition to the fullest extent possible demonstrates her firm commitment\nto remain in this country to face the charges against her and, as Ms. Maxwell’s French and U.K.\nexperts confirm, there is every reason to believe that both authorities would consider the waiver\nas part of any extradition request.\n\nIn an attempt to counter William Julié’s expert report stating it is “highly unlikely” that\nthe French government would refuse to extradite Ms. Maxwell (Def. Mem., Ex. V at 2), the\ngovernment attaches a letter from the Fren\n... [truncated, 2261 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/55 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=55]", "char_count": 2261}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "CaSede20t er WD F30cAdNt n DUE Gmeh01020 2A ile@ 42738) 26adeagect 3 Ob 15\n\nas Mr. Julié’s accompanying rebuttal report explains (see Ex. A), the MOJ letter ignores that the\nextradition provisions in French Code of Criminal Procedure apply only in the absence of an\ninternational agreement providing otherwise. (Id. at 1). This rule is necessitated by the French\nConstitution, which requires that international agreements prevail over national legislation. (/d.).\nThus, extradition of a French national to the United States is legally permissible if the extradition\ntreaty between the United States and France provides for it—which it does. (/d. at 3).\n\nThe government’s reliance on a 2006 case—in which France refused to extradite a\nFrench national who was also a U.S. citizen—provides no precedent as to how a French court\nwould rule on an extradition request regarding Ms. Maxwell because, as Mr. Julié notes, the\nUnited States did not challenge the refusal in the French courts. (/d. at 2-3). Nor does it\nundermine Mr. Julié’s opinion that, in the unusual circumstance where a citizen of both countries\nhas executed an extradition waiver and then fled to France in violation of bail conditions set by a\nU.S. court, it is “highly unlikely” that an extradition decree would not be issued. (/d. at 3).\n\nThe government offers no rebuttal to the opinion of Ms. Maxwell’s U.K. extradition\nexpert, David Perry. Nor does it dispute Mr. Perry’s opinion that Ms. Maxwell would be “highly\nunlikely” to successfully resist extradition from the United Kingdom, that her waiver would be\nadmissible in any extradition proceeding, and that—contrary to the government’s representation\nat the initial bail hearing (Tr. 27)—bail would be “extremely unlikely.” (See Def. Mem. Ex. U at\n439). Mr. Perry’s addendum opinion (attached as Ex. B) reiterates these points, opining that the\nwaiver would be “a highly relevant factor” in the U.K. proceeding, both to the likelihood of\n\nextradition and to the likelihood of bai\n... [truncated, 2393 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/56 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=56]", "char_count": 2393}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAdNtn DiibGmeh01G20 2Ailed G2A28)26aceageot 4 Ob 15\n\nFinally, the government’s argument that Ms. Maxwell could always flee to some country\nother than the United Kingdom and France holds her—and any defendant—to an impossible\nstandard, which is not the standard under the Bail Reform Act. (See Gov. Mem. at 19). By the\ngovernment’s reasoning, no defendant with financial means to travel could be granted bail,\nbecause there would always be a possibility that they could flee to another country (even if they\nhad no ties there), and there could never be an assurance that any extradition waiver would be\nenforced. However, “Section 3142 does not seek ironclad guarantees.” United States v. Chen,\n820 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (N.D. Cal. 1992). To the extent that Ms. Maxwell’s ties to France and\nthe United Kingdom—where she has not lived for nearly 30 years—create a flight risk, her\nextradition waivers along with the substantial bail package proposed reasonably cure it.®\n\nE. The Recent COVID Surge at MDC Further Justifies Bail\n\nThe government suggests that the Court ignore COVID concerns because Ms. Maxwell,\nthough quarantined because of contact with an officer who tested positive, did not become\ninfected. This ignores the daily (sometimes multiple) inspections of Ms. Maxwell’s mouth,\nwhich heightens her risk of contracting the deadly virus, which has now surged to 113 positive\ncases in the MDC. Further, Deputy Captain B. Houtz recently issued a memo stating that “[1]t\nhas not been determined whether legal calls and legal visits will continue.” As the Court is well\naware, legal visits with Ms. Maxwell already have been suspended. Should legal calls also be\ndiscontinued, her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel will be further eroded.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell respectfully requests that the Court order her\n\nrelease on bail pursuant to the strict conditions she has proposed.\n\n* Any incentive Ms. Maxwell might have to flee \n... [truncated, 2390 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/57 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=57]", "char_count": 2390}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "CaGede20t er WD FZ0cAahen DiibGmehH01020 2A iled G2A28)26aceageol 5 Ob 15\n\nDated: December 18, 2020\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Mark §. Cohen\n\nMark S. Cohen\n\nChristian R. Everdell\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\nPhone: 212-957-7600\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nPhone: 303-831-7364\n\nBobbi C. Sternheim\n\nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim\n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor\nNew York, NY 10011\n\nPhone: 212-243-1100\n\nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\n11\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001200\n\n", "char_count": 574}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "CaSese Z0-ef 00 220s Aste (hide OB nte0 102921, RGB 520 5729 eGtage T66f 4\n\nExhibit A\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001201\n\n", "char_count": 105}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "CaSesk 20-6f 00 220sAdTe nich ne 10321 , ARAB L2DS?AaQePage Hof 4\n\nWILLIAM JULIE\nAVOCAT A LA COUR\n\nDecember 18, 2020, Paris.\n\nResponse to the government’s memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s renewed\nmotion for release.\n\nI was asked to review the United States government’s memorandum and notably pages 15 to\n17 alongside the French Minister of Justice’s letter dated 11 December 2020 produced as\nExhibit B to this memorandum.\n\n1 The French Minister of Justice’s letter (Exhibit B)\n\nThe letter of the French Minister of Justice, on which the US government relies to argue that\nthe French government does not extradite its citizens outside the European Union and thus to\nthe United States, quotes Article 696-2 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, which\nprovides that France can extradite \"any person not having French nationality”.\n\nIt remains unclear whether the author of such letter had actually access to my opinion which is\nnot even quoted, and more generally it seems the letter responds to a question which\nunexpectedly was not disclosed.\n\nThe letter fails to mention, however, that Article 696 of the same Code provides that provisions\nof the French Code of Criminal Procedure on the conditions of extradition apply in the absence\nof an international agreement providing otherwise (Article 696 of the French Code of\nCriminal Procedure: “Jn the absence of an international agreement stipulating otherwise, the\nconditions, procedure and effects of extradition shall be determined by the provisions of this\nchapter'. These provisions shall also apply to matters which would not have been regulated by\ninternational conventions’). The provisions of Article 696 of the French Code of Criminal\nProcedure are a reminder that under Article 55 of the French Constitution, international\nagreements prevail over national legislation (Article 55 of the French Constitution: “Treaties\nor agreements that have been duly ratified or approved have, upon their publication, an\nauthority superior t\n... [truncated, 3058 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/60 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=60]", "char_count": 3058}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "CaSesk 20-6 (00 220sAdTeniDcd ne 1021 , ARAB L2bS72Q9eRAgE HOF 4\n\nWILLIAM JULIE\nAVOCAT A LA COUR\n\nsubsidiarity of domestic law in relation to international instruments as stated by the\naforementioned law of 10 March 1927: the legislative provisions on extradition are applicable\n\nonly in the silence or in the absence of international conventions.”\n\nIt follows from the provisions of Article 696 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure that the\nkey question is whether France may extradite a French national under the Extradition Treaty\nbetween the USA and France and/or under the Extradition Treaty between the European Union\nand the USA, not whether France may extradite its citizens under French legislation.\n\nAs previously outlined, the Extradition Treaty between the USA and France does not preclude\nthe French government from extraditing a French national and must therefore be distinguished\nfrom a number of other international agreements signed by France which contain a clear\nprohibition to that extent. The Treaty between the USA and France gives the French\ngovernment discretion as to whether or not to extradite its own citizens to the USA.\n\nIt is noted that the letter of the French Minister does not provide any answer on this issue.\n2 The DOJ Memorandum and the Peterson Case\n\nIn support of its argument that the French government would not extradite Ms Ghislaine\nMaxwell to the USA, the government relies on the case of Mr Hans Peterson, a dual French\nAmerican citizen whose extradition to the US was denied by France in 2007.\n\nThe Peterson precedent should only be cited with great caution. First, | am not aware that this\ncase has given rise to a published judicial decision, therefore it should not be interpreted as the\nsupport of any legal rule or principle. In addition, in regards to the documents that the DOJ has\nreferred to in its memorandum, | doubt that a judicial decision has ever occurred in this case:\nas mentioned by the 2007 letter of US Senators Richard J. Durbin \n... [truncated, 3287 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/61 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=61]", "char_count": 3287}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "CaSesk 20-6f (00 220sAdTe nich ne 10321 , ARAB LAD S7AaQeRageé WF 4\n\nWILLIAM JULIE\nAVOCAT A LA COUR\n\nchallenge the refusal before French courts, while such challenge could have led to a judicial\nreview of the request, in accordance with the ordinary extradition procedure.\n\nSecondly, in the absence of a published judicial decision, it is impossible to determine what the\noutcome of this case would have been if it had come before the courts.\n\nThird, as was rightly pointed out by US Senators Richard J. Durbin and Barack Obama in their\naforementioned letter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which the government cites in\nits memorandum:\n\n“Article 3 of the Extradition Treaty between the United States and France provides in\n\npertinent part that “There is no obligation upon the Requested State to grant the\nextradition of a person who is a national of the Requested State”. While this Article\ndoes not require the extradition of a national to a requesting state, it also does not\nappear to preclude extradition. To the extent there is discretion available in such\nextradition decisions, we urge the French government to exercise that discretion in\nfavor of extradition ”.\n\nI am satisfied that this is the right interpretation of Article 3, as this is exactly the conclusion I\ncame to in my first report. To the extent that there is a discretion, there can be no absolute rule\nagainst the extradition of nationals under French law. A discretionary power 1s not a legal rule.\nIndeed, there is no constitutional principle against the extradition of nationals. For these\nreasons, the Peterson case does not alter my view that under the specific and unique facts of\nthis case, it is highly unlikely that the French government would refuse to issue and execute an\nextradition decree against Ms. Maxwell, particularly if Ms. Maxwell has signed an irrevocable\nwaiver in the USA.\n\nFinally, if an extradition request were to be issued against a French citizen today, the obligations\nof the French go\n... [truncated, 3028 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/62 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=62]", "char_count": 3028}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "CaSese Z0-ef U0 220s Aste (hide A nteh0 102921 , RGB 5205729 ePhgeé T66f 4\n\nExhibit B\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001205\n\n", "char_count": 105}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "CaSese 20 6f ADD SB0s Aste nie nH 1021 , ARABI2Y S72aQeRage Of 4\n\nIN THE MATTER OF AN OPINION\nON THE EXTRADITION LAW OF ENGLAND AND WALES\n\nRE GHISLAINE MAXWELL\n\nADDENDUM OPINION\n\n1. | This Addendum Opinion is provided in response to the Government’s Memorandum\nin Opposition to the Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Release dated 16 December\n\n2020, insofar as it pertains to matters of English extradition law and practice.\n\n2. The primary conclusions of the Opinion dated 8 October 2020 (‘the Opinion’)\nremain unchanged, namely: (a) in the majority of cases, proceedings in England and\nWales in relation to US extradition requests are concluded in under two years; (b) it\nis virtually certain that bail would be refused in an extradition case in circumstances\nwhere the requested person had absconded from criminal proceedings in the United\nStates prior to trial and in breach of bail; and (c) on the basis of the information\ncurrently known, it is highly unlikely’ that Ghislaine Maxwell would be able\nsuccessfully to resist extradition to the United States in relation to the charges in the\nsuperseding indictment dated 7 July 2020. In addition to those conclusions, the\n\nfollowing three points may be made.\n\n3. First, as noted in the Opinion’, Ms Maxwell’s waiver of extradition would be\nadmissible in any extradition proceedings in England and Wales. While such a\ndocument cannot compel a requested person to consent to their extradition once in\nthe United Kingdom, the document would be a highly relevant factor in any\n\ncontested extradition proceedings. In particular:\n\n(a) If Ms Maxwell were to rely on such a waiver to secure bail in the United\n\nStates and then, having absconded, renege on the undertakings in that\n\n' The Government observes, at p.16 of the Motion, that this leaves open a “possibility” that extradition could be\nresisted. Absolute certainty in any legal context is rare but the practical effect of the conclusion in the Opinion is\nthat, at this stage and on the basis of the i\n... [truncated, 2233 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/64 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=64]", "char_count": 2233}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "CaSese 20 6f AMD SB0s Aste nie nH 1021 , ARABI2Y S72aQe Rage HOf 4\n\ndocument to seek to resist her extradition, bail would almost certainly be\n\nrefused for the duration of the extradition proceedings.\n\n(b) The majority of the bars that might be relied upon by Ms Maxwell? require\nthe extradition judge to make a finding that extradition would be\noppressive. Quite apart from the other factors rendering those bars\nunavailable to Ms Maxwell, as set out in the Opinion, it is difficult to\nconceive of circumstances in which a finding of oppression could be made\nin relation to the serious charges faced by Ms Maxwell in circumstances\nwhere she had absconded from the United States and was contesting her\nextradition in breach of good faith undertakings relied upon to secure her\nbail. Similar considerations apply to the balancing exercise required in\nassessing whether extradition would breach the right to family life under\nArticle 8 of the ECHR. The remaining bars to extradition and human rights\nbars are unlikely to be available to Ms Maxwell for the reasons given in\n\nthe Opinion’.\n\n(c) A breach of the undertakings in the waiver of extradition would be highly\nlikely to be viewed as a sign of bad faith and cause the extradition judge to\n\ntreat any evidence given by Ms Maxwell with scepticism.\n\n4. Second, it is not correct that section 93 of the Extradition Act 2003 (‘the 2003 Act’)\nconfers a general discretion on the Secretary of State to refuse extradition if a case is\nsent to her by the extradition judge. The ambit of the power in section 93 is\ndescribed at paragraph 8 of the Opinion. The Secretary of State may only refuse\nextradition on the grounds provided for in that section, namely: (a) if an applicable\nbar to extradition® is found to exist; (b) the Secretary of State is informed that the\n\nrequest has been withdrawn’; (c) there is a competing claim for extradition from\n\n> Opinion, para. 26. Those bars are passage of time; forum; and mental and physical condition.\n\n* Opinion\n... [truncated, 2461 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/65 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=65]", "char_count": 2461}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "CaSese 20 of AD SB0s Aste nie nH 1021 , ARABIA S72QePage HOF 4\n\nanother state®; (d) the person has been granted asylum or humanitarian protection in\nthe United Kingdom’; or (e) extradition would be against the interests of UK\nnational security'’. On the information currently known, none of these bars or\n\nexceptions would arise in the case of Ms Maxwell.\n\n5. | The exceptional nature of the Secretary of State’s power is illustrated by the fact that\nit has been exercised in the favour of a requested person on only one occasion since\nthe enactment of the 2003 Act, and that that single exercise of the power was based\n\non grounds on which reliance may not now be placed. \"\n\n6. Third, as to the timescales of extradition proceedings arising from requests for\nextradition made by the Government of the United States, it is to be noted that the\npurpose of the 2003 Act to streamline extradition procedures’* and, in practice, the\nlegislation works to facilitate extradition. As noted in the Opinion’ the majority of\nextradition cases conclude within two years, or three months in cases where consent\n\nto extradition is given.\n\nDavid Perry QC\n6KBW College Hill\n17 December 2020\n\n* Extradition Act 2003, ss. 93(4)(b), 126(2) and 179(2).\n” Extradition Act 2003, s. 93(4)(c) and (6A).\n\n'° Extradition Act 2003, s. 208.\n\n'' viz. in the case of Gary McKinnon, whose extradition was refused by the Secretary of State in 2012 on the\nbasis that he was seriously mentally ill and that there was a high risk of suicide were he to be extradited; since\nthat decision, the Secretary of State has been barred from refusing extradition on the basis of human rights\ngrounds: Extradition Act 2003, s. 70(11) (as inserted by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 with effect from 29 July\n2013).\n\n? Welsh v United States [2007] 1 WLR 156 (Admin) para. 26.\n\n'? Opinion, para. 13.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00001208\n\n", "char_count": 1870}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 20-3, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page68 of 165\n\nExhibit H\n\nDoc. 106\nOpinion & Order\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001209\n\n", "char_count": 119}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "Casese: 20-100 BaGAUnt Bbcimdrt 1/26 2 Filee6Ba30/PagPege ; _\nUSDC SDNY\n\nDOCUMENT\n\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\n\nDOC #:\n\nDATE FILED: 12/28/20\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUnited States of America,\n\nVv\n20-CR-330 (AJN)\nGhislaine Maxwell,\nOPINION AND ORDER\nDefendant.\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:\n\nDetendant Ghislaine Maxwell has been indicted by a grand jury on charges of conspiracy\nto entice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; enticing a\nminor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2; conspiracy\nto transport minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; transporting\nminors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423 and 2; and two charges\nof perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The Court held a lengthy bail hearing on July 14,\n2020. After extensive briefing and argument at the hearing, the Court concluded that the\nDefendant was a clear risk of flight and that no conditions or combination of conditions would\nensure her appearance. Bail was therefore denied.\n\nThe Defendant has now filed a renewed motion for release on bail pending trial, which\nthe Government opposes. In her renewed motion, the Defendant attempts to respond to the\nreasons that the Court provided in denying bail and proposes a substantially larger bail package.\nBut by and large, the arguments presented either were made at the initial bail hearing or could\nhave been made then. In any event, the new information provided in the renewed application\n\nonly solidifies the Court’s view that the Defendant plainly poses a risk of flight and that no\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001210\n\n", "char_count": 1720}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "Casest:20-c1/00 BBG AUNt D6EiinNe rt 1/26 2 Fileehh2aS0/PagPagehGa22\n\ncombination of conditions can ensure her appearance. This is so because: the charges, which\ncarry a presumption of detention, are serious and carry lengthy terms of imprisonment if\nconvicted; the evidence proffered by the Government, including multiple corroborating and\ncorroborated witnesses, is strong; the Defendant has substantial resources and foreign ties\n(including citizenship in a country that does not extradite its citizens); and the Defendant, who\nlived in hiding and apart from the family to whom she now asserts important ties, has not been\nfully candid about her financial situation. Thus, for substantially the same reasons that the Court\ndenied the Defendant’s first motion for release on July 14, 2020, the Court DENIES the\nDefendant’s renewed motion for release on bail.’\ni Background\n\nOn June 29, 2020, a grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned a six-count\nIndictment against the Defendant, charging her with facilitating Jeffrey Epstein’s sexual abuse of\nmultiple minor victims between approximately 1994 and 1997. See Dkt. No. 1. On July 2, 2020,\nthe Indictment was unsealed, and that same day, the Defendant was arrested in New Hampshire.\nOn July 8, 2020, the Government filed a Superseding Indictment, which contained only small\nministerial corrections. Dkt. No. 17.\n\nOn July 14, 2020, this Court held a hearing regarding the Defendant’s request for bail.\nAfter a thorough consideration of all of the Defendant’s arguments and of the factors set forth in\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the Court concluded that no conditions or combination of conditions could\nreasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance, determining as a result that the Defendant was a\n\nflight risk and that detention without bail was warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The\n\n! This Opinion & Order will be temporarily sealed in order to allow the parties to propose\nredactions to sensitive or confidential information.\nZ\n\nDO\n... [truncated, 2016 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/69 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=69]", "char_count": 2016}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "Casest:20-c1/00 BBG AUN B6Etine rf 1/262 FileehRa30/PagPéageB1Ga22\n\nDefendant did not appeal the Court’s determination that detention was required, and she has been\nincarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center since that time.\nII. Legal Standard\n\nPretrial detainees have a right to bail under the Eighth Amendment to the United States\nConstitution, which prohibits the imposition of “|e|xcessive bail,” and under the Bail Reform\nAct, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seg. The Bail Reform Act requires the Court to release a defendant\n“subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that | it]\ndetermines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any\nother person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). Only if, after considering the\nfactors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the Court concludes that “no condition or combination\nof conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of\nany other person and the community,” may the Court order that the defendant be held without\nbail. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).\n\nIf there is probable cause to find that the defendant committed an offense specifically\nenumerated in § 3142(e)(3), a rebuttable presumption arises “that no condition or combination of\nconditions will reasonably assure” the defendant's appearance or the safety of the community or\nothers. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). In such circumstances, “the defendant ‘bears a limited burden of\nproduction .. . to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that he does not pose\na danger to the community or a risk of flight.’” United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d\nCir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also\nUnited States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (“|A] defendant must introduce some\nevidence contrary to the presumed fact in order to rebut the presumption.”). Nonetheless, “‘the\n\ngovernment retains the\n... [truncated, 2092 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/70 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=70]", "char_count": 2092}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "Casest:20-c1/00BR@AUNnt B6Etine rf 1/06 2 FileehhaS0/PagPagek1Ga22\n\ndefendant presents a danger to the community,’ and ‘by the lesser standard of a preponderance of\nthe evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight.’”” English, 629 F.3d at 319 (quoting\nMercedes, 254 F.3d at 436); see also United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986)\n(“The government retains the burden of persuasion |in a presumption case}.”). Even when “a\ndefendant has met his burden of production,” however, “the presumption favoring detention does\nnot disappear entirely, but remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district\ncourt.” United States v. Mattis, 963 F.3d 285, 290 91 (2d Cir. 2020).\n\nAfter a court has made an initial determination that no conditions of release can\nreasonably assure the appearance of the Defendant as required, the Court may reopen the bail\nhearing if “information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and\nthat has a material bearing on the issue” of whether pretrial detention is warranted. 18 U.S.C. §\n3142(f). But the Court is not required to reopen the hearing or to conduct another hearing if it\ndetermines that any new information would not have a material bearing on the issue. See United\nStates v. Raniere, No. 18-CR-2041 (NGG) (VMS), 2018 WL 6344202, at *2 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.\n5, 2018) (noting that “|a]s the court has already held one detention hearing, it need not hold\nanother” the standards set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) are met); United States v. Havens, 487\nF. Supp. 2d 335, 339 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (electing not to reopen a detention hearing because the\nnew information would not have changed the court’s decision to detain the defendant until trial).\n\nII. Discussion\n\nThe Defendant bases her renewed motion for bail on both 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) and the\nCourt’s inherent powers to review its own bail decisions. See Def. Mot. at 7 9. As already\nnoted, § 3142(f) provides that a bail hearing “may be reopened\n... [truncated, 2158 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/71 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=71]", "char_count": 2158}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "Casest:20-c1/00BR@AUNnt B6Etine rf 1/26 2 Fileehha30/PagPageb1Ga22\n\nhearing and that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release that\nwill reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other\nperson and the community.” A court may also revisit its own decision pursuant to its inherent\nauthority, even where the circumstances do not match § 3142(f)’s statutory text. See, e.g.,\nUnited States v. Rowe, No. 02-CR-756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21,\n2003) (noting that “‘a release order may be reconsidered even where the evidence proffered on\nreconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the original hearing.”’); United States v.\nPetrov, No. 15-CR-66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (noting the\n“Court’s inherent authority for reconsideration of the Court’s previous bail decision”).\n\nIn line with this, the Defendant’s new motion aims to address the reasons that the Court\nprovided when it originally determined that no conditions could reasonably assure her\nappearance and that pretrial detention was warranted. First, the Defendant proposes a more\nexpansive set of bail conditions that she claims addresses any concerns regarding risk of flight.\nThe newly proposed conditions include a $28.5 million bail package, which consists of a $22.5\nmillion personal recognizance bond co-signed by the Defendant and her spouse and secured by\napproximately $8 million in property and $500,000 in cash, along with six additional bonds—\nfive co-signed by the Defendant’s friends and family members and the sixth posted by the\nsecurity company that would provide security services to the Defendant if she were granted bail\nand transferred to home confinement. See Def. Mot. at 2. The proposed conditions also provide\nthat the Defendant would be released to the custody of a family member, who would serve as her\nthird-party custodian under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i); that she would be placed\n... [truncated, 2211 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/72 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=72]", "char_count": 2211}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "Casest:20-c1/00 BBG AUN B6Etine rf 1/262 FileehRaS0/PagPageb1Ga22\n\ncounsel, medical visits, and upon approval by the Court or Pretrial Services. Jd. at 2 3.\nFurthermore, the Defendant would have on-premises security guards that she would pay for who\nwould prevent her from leaving the residence at any time without prior approval by the Court or\nPretrial Services and who would escort her when she is authorized to leave. Jd. at 3.\n\nThe motion also presents new information that, according to the Defendant, addresses the\nconcerns that the Court articulated when it determined that detention was warranted. This newly\npresented information, most of which was available to the Defendant at the time of the initial bail\nhearing, includes evidence of the Defendant’s family ties in the United States, see Def. Mot. at\n10 14; a detailed financial report that provides a more comprehensive outlook on the\nDefendant’s financial conditions and assets, see id. at 15—18; evidence that according to her\nrebuts the Government’s original contention that she attempted to evade law enforcement prior\nto her arrest, see id. at 18-25; waivers of her right to contest extradition from the United\nKingdom and France, along with expert opinions claiming that the Defendant would not be able\nto resist extradition if she were to execute the waivers, see id. at 25-29; and evidence that she\nargues lays bare the weakness of the Government’s case against her, see id. at 30-34.\n\nFinally, the Defendant argues that the conditions of her confinement, including as a result\nof the COVID-19 pandemic, present an additional factor favoring release. She claims that the\nconditions imposed are punitive and that those conditions interfere with her ability to participate\nin her defense, and she asserts that these factors further militate in favor of release. See id. at 34\n38.\n\nHaving carefully considered all of the Defendant’s arguments, the Court again concludes\n\nthat no conditions or combination of conditions could reaso\n... [truncated, 2056 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/73 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=73]", "char_count": 2056}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "Casest:20-c1/00 BBG AUN B6Etine rf 1/26 2 FileehB2aS0/PRagP aget71G522\n\ndetention without bail is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The Court accordingly denies\nDefendant’s request to reopen the original bail hearing and denies her renewed motion for bail.\nA. The presumption in favor of detention applies\n\nThe Court is required to presume that no condition or combination of conditions of\npretrial release will reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance. The Bail Reform Act\nprovides that if a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim\nunder 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, “it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of\nconditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the\ncommunity if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person\ncommitted.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). The Defendant’s indictment by a grand jury suffices to\nestablish that there is probable cause to believe that she committed the offenses charged in the\nindictment. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that\nthat an indictment returned by a properly constituted grand jury “conclusively determines the\nexistence of probable cause” and that “the return of an indictment eliminates the need for a\npreliminary examination at which a probable cause finding is made by a judicial officer pursuant\nto Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” (citations omitted)). In light of the\ncrimes charged in the indictment, the Court begins with the presumption that no condition or\ncombination of conditions of pretrial release will reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance.\n\nWhen the presumption applies, the Defendant bears a limited burden of production\n“tending to counter the § 3142(e) presumption of flight,” Contreras, 776 F.2d at 53 n.1. The\nDefendant’s burden of production only requires that she “introduce a certain amount of evidence\n\ncontrary \n... [truncated, 2102 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/74 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=74]", "char_count": 2102}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "Casest:20-c1/00BRG@ AUN D6Eiine rf 1/26 2 FileehB230/PagPageb1Gn22\n\nabrogated on other grounds by United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990). That\nburden is “limited.” United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). The\nDefendant’s proffer of evidence and information including information relating to her financial\nconditions and her family ties to the United States, among other things—-satisfies this limited\nburden. As the Court discussed at the July 14, 2020 hearing, these factors bear on the question\nof whether the Defendant poses a flight risk. And the evidence she advances in her renewed\nmotion for bail reasonably disputes the presumption that she poses a flight risk. In that sense,\nthis evidence is relevant to the ultimate determination and satisfies the relatively low threshold\nimposed by the burden of production.\n\nThe presumption of flight does not disappear entirely, however, and it “remains a factor\nto be considered among those weighed by the district court.” United States v. Mercedes, 254\nF.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, “|a| judicial officer\nconducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal\nevidence, continue to give the presumption of flight some weight by keeping in mind that\nCongress has found that these offenders pose special risks of flight, and that ‘a strong probability\narises’ that no form of conditional release will be adequate to secure their appearance.” Martir,\n782 F.2d at 1144 (citation omitted).\n\nB. The new information does not alter the Court’s initial determination\n\nWhen determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the\nappearance of the person as required, courts are required to consider the factors outlined in 18\nU.S.C. § 3142(g). Thus, the Court considers (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense\ncharged, including whether the offense involves a minor victim, (2) the weight of the evide\n... [truncated, 2126 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/75 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=75]", "char_count": 2126}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "Casest:20-c1/00BR@ AUN B6Etine rf 1/06 2 FileehkaS0/PagPageb1Ga22\n\nany person or the community posed by pre-trial release. See Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436; see also\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).\n\nAt the July 14, 2020 bail hearing, the Court considered these factors before concluding\nthat no conditions of release could reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.\nAnd the first and fourth factors remain unchanged. As already noted, the Defendant is charged\nwith offenses involving minor victims, and it is undisputed that the nature and circumstances of\nthe offenses charged in the Superseding Indictment weighs in favor of continued detention. On\nthe other hand, the Government has not advanced any evidence that the Defendant poses a\ndanger to any person or to the community, a factor that weighs against detention. The\nDefendant’s arguments therefore focus on the second and third factors.\n\nAs explained below, neither the arguments put forth in the Defendant’s renewed motion\nfor bail nor the evidence she submitted in conjunction with her motion rebut the Court’s\nconclusions, and the Court continues to find, after again applying these factors, that no\nconditions of release will reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance at future proceedings.\n\n1. The Weight of the Evidence\n\nThe Court will address the strength of the Government’s case first. The Defendant\nargues that the Government lacks any meaningful documentary corroboration of the witness\ntestimony and that the discovery produced to date has included only a “small number of\ndocuments from the time period of the conspiracy.” Def. Mot. at 5. And she claims, as a result,\nthat the Government overstated the strength of its case in advance of the July 14, 2020 bail\nhearing. See id. at30 33. So she argues that the second § 3142(g) factor supports release.\n\nThe Court disagrees. Arguing that the case against her “is based almost exclusively on\n\nthe recollections of the three accusers, who remain unidentified,” the Defendant \n... [truncated, 2037 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/76 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=76]", "char_count": 2037}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "CaGade2bter WD IZ0caohen (Dehe Gineh101 O40 2h | @@ 6.2730) 26a Gea gGeol d Gb 22\n\nweight of the evidence is weak. Def. Reply at 2. But she too easily discredits the witness\ntestimony. According to the Government, and as reflected in the indictment, it is anticipated that\nthe three witnesses will provide detailed and corroborating accounts of the Defendant’s alleged\nrole in enticing minors to engage in sex acts. See Gov’t Opp’n at 10; see also Dkt. No. 17, S1\nSuperseding Indictment, §§f 7, 11, 13, 17. Moreover, the Government proffers that additional\nevidence, including flight records and other witnesses’ corroborating testimony, will further\nsupport the main witnesses’ testimony and link the Defendant to Epstein’s conduct. Gov’t\nOpp’n at 10-11. And while the Defendant contends that much of this evidence focuses on\nEpstein, not the Defendant, the nature of the conspiracy charge (along with the evidence linking\nthe Defendant to Epstein) renders this evidence relevant to the Government’s charges against\nher. As the Court stated in the July 14, 2020 hearing, although the Court does not prejudge the\nmerits of the Government’s case or of the Defendant’s defenses, for purposes of the bail\ndetermination stage, the Government’s proffered case against the Defendant remains strong. See\nDkt. No. 93 (“Tr.”) at 83:4-83:10. The Court again concludes that the Defendant’s awareness of\nthe potential strength of the government’s case against her creates a risk of flight, and none of the\nDefendant’s new arguments meaningfully alter that conclusion. As a result, the second factor\nsupports detention.\n2. The Defendant’s History and Characteristics\n\nAt the July 14, 2020 bail hearing, the Court determined that the Defendant was a flight\nrisk in part because of her substantial international ties, including multiple foreign citizenships\nand familial and personal connections abroad and her ownership of at least one foreign property\nof significant value. See Tr. at 83:13—83:18. And the Court f\n... [truncated, 2153 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/77 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=77]", "char_count": 2153}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "CaGade2ter WD IZ0caOhen Dehe Gireh101 O40 2h || @@ 6.2730) 26a GeaGeol 1 Ob 22\n\nCOVID-19 related travel restrictions. Jd. at 83:21 83:25. The Court also observed that the\nDefendant had family and personal connections to the United States but concluded that the\nabsence of any dependents, significant family ties, or employment in the United States also\nsupported the conclusion that flight would not pose an insurmountable burden for her. Jd. at\n84:4 84:9. While the Defendant’s renewed motion for bail addresses some of these factors, it\ndoes not alter the Court’s conclusion.\n\nThe first few considerations remain relatively unchanged. The Defendant continues to\nhave substantial international ties and multiple foreign citizenships, and she continues to have\nfamilial and personal connections abroad. None of the evidence presented in support of the\npresent motion fundamentally alters those conclusions. To address the Court’s concern that the\nDefendant’s French citizenship presented the opportunity that she could flee to France and that\nshe would be able to resist extradition on that basis, see Tr. at 83:18—83:20, the Defendant now\noffers to waive her right to extradition from both the United Kingdom and France, along with\nexpert opinions reports claiming that such waivers would likely make it possible to resist an\nextradition request from the United States to either country. See Def. Mot., Exs. T, U, V. As the\nGovernment points out in its brief, however, the legal weight of the waivers is, at best, contested.\nThe French Ministry of Justice, for instance, indicated in a letter submitted in conjunction to the\nGovernment’s opposition that the French Code of Criminal Procedure “absolutely prohibits” the\nextradition of a French national. See Gov’t Opp’n, Ex. B. And while the Defendant’s own\nexpert attempts to rebut the Ministry of Justice’s letter, see Def. Reply, Ex. A, even the\nDefendant’s own experts use probabilistic, rather than absolute, language, leaving open the\npossibili\n... [truncated, 2205 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/78 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=78]", "char_count": 2205}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "CaGade2ter WD IZ0cdOhen Dhe Gimeh101 O40 2h | @@ 6.2730) 26a Geageot A Ob 22\n\nsuccessfully to resist extradition to the United States in relation to the charges in the superseding\nindictment dated 7 July 2020.”); Def. Mot., Ex. V § 76 (“It would . . . become a matter for the\nFrench government to decide on whether or not to issue an extradition decree against Ms.\nGhislaine Maxwell.”); id. § 77 (“|I|t is highly unlikely that the French government would refuse\nto issue and execute an extradition decree against Ms Maxwell. . . .”). Nor has the Defendant\npresented any cases where courts addressed the question of whether an anticipatory waiver of\nextradition is enforceable; while she cites cases where defendants offered to waive extradition,\nthe reasoning in those cases turned on other factors and the courts did not dwell on the\nenforceability of such waivers. See, e.g., United States v. Cirillo, No. 99-1514, 1999 WL\n1456536, at *2 (3d Cir. July 13, 1999); United States v. Salvagno, 314 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119\n(N.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132 33 (D.D.C. 2004); United\nStates v. Chen, 820 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1992). In those cases, the courts included\nsuch waivers as one among several conditions of release, but they did not make any express\ndetermination that such waivers are enforceable. On the other hand, some courts have expressly\nopined that such waivers are unenforceable. See, e.g., United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d\n306, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (describing the “Defense proposal to give advance consent to\nextradition and waiver of extradition rights” as “an empty gesture.”); United States v. Morrison,\nNo. 16-MR-118, 2016 WL 7421924, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2016) (“Although the defendants\nhave signed a waiver of extradition, such a waiver may not become valid until an extradition\nrequest is pending in Canada and may be subject to withdrawal.”’); United States v. Stroh, No.\n396-CR-139 (AHN), 2000 WL 1832956, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov\n... [truncated, 2245 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/79 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=79]", "char_count": 2245}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "CaGade2ter WD IZ0caohen Dehe Gireh101 O20 2h |e 6.2730) 26a Geatgeol 3 Ob 22\n\nextradition from Israel (or any other country) would be, at best, a difficult and lengthy process\nand, at worst, impossible.’’).\n\nHaving carefully reviewed the experts’ reports and the cases cited by the Defendant,” the\nCourt’s analysis of the relationship between the Defendant’s French citizenship and the risk of\nflight remains fundamentally unchanged. Its reasoning is guided in part by the substantial legal\nquestions regarding the legal weight of anticipatory extradition waivers and the likelihood that\nany extradition would be a difficult and lengthy process (including, for instance, the likelihood\nthat the Defendant would contest the validity of those waivers and the duration it would take to\nresolve those legal disputes). The likelihood that the Defendant would be able to frustrate any\nextradition requests—even if she were correct that she would be unable to stop extradition\nentirely weighs strongly in favor of detention.\n\nIn addition, the Defendant’s extraordinary financial resources also continue to provide\nher the means to flee the country and to do so undetected. To be sure, this factor alone does not\nby itself justify continued detention. But as the Court noted at the initial bail hearing, the\nDetendant’s financial resources, in combination with her substantial international ties and\nforeign connections and her experience avoiding detection (whether from the government, the\npress, or otherwise), do bear significantly on the flight risk analysis. See Tr. at 88:6 88:23\n\n(distinguishing this case from United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018),\n\n* The Defendant also argues that “a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal an extradition order\nhas been recognized as an indication of the defendant’s intent not to flee.” Def. Mot. at 27\n(citing United States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). The Court places\nlittle weight on this argument. Under \n... [truncated, 2217 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/80 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=80]", "char_count": 2217}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "CaGade2ter WD IZ0cdOhen Dehe Gineh101 O40 2h |e 6.2730) 26a Geageol 4 Ob 22\n\nUnited States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), and United States v. Madoff, 586\nF. Supp. 2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).\n\nThe Court’s concerns regarding the absence of any dependents, significant family ties, or\nemployment in the United States, meanwhile, apply with somewhat less force in light of the\nevidence submitted in support of this motion. See id. at 84:4 84:9. The Defendant has\nsubmitted a litany of letters of support written by friends and family members. See Def. Mot.,\nExs. A N, W X. These letters, according to the Defendant, support her claim that she has\nsignificant ties to the United States and attest to the Defendant’s character. The Defendant\nplaces particular emphasis on the letter written by her spouse, whose identity and connection to\nthe Defendant was withheld from the Court at the initial bail hearing. See Def. Mot. at 11-13.\n\nIn that letter, her spouse expounds on the lives they led before her arrest, noting in particular that\nthe Government’s characterization of the Defendant’s “transient” lifestyle, Dkt. No. 4 at 9, was\nbelied by the “quiet family life” that they had enjoyed. Def. Mot. at 11; see also Def. Mot, Ex. A\n§§ 4-5. Other letters similarly highlight that the Defendant’s family and affective ties in the\nUnited States are stronger than was originally presented to the Court in the initial bail hearing.\n\nThese letters substantiate the Defendant’s claim that she has important ties to people in\nthe United States, but they leave unaltered the Court’s conclusion that flight would not pose an\ninsurmountable burden for the Defendant. Among other things, the Defendant now argues that\nher newly revealed relationship with her spouse signals her deep affective ties in the country, but\nat the time she was arrested, she was not living with him and claimed to be getting divorced. See\nPretrial Services Report at 3. Indeed, she does not propose to live with him were she\n... [truncated, 2227 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/81 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=81]", "char_count": 2227}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "CaGade2ter WD IZ0caohen Dhe Gineh101 O20 2A |e 4.2730) 26a Geafeol 5 Ob 22\n\ndoes not mean that those people would be unable to visit her were she to flee to another country.\nIn addition, the Defendant continues to lack any employment ties to the United States—another\nfactor weighing in favor of detention. Furthermore, it is apparent from the letters that the\nDefendant has significant ties to family and friends abroad. In light of this, nothing in the\nrenewed motion for bail alters the Court’s fundamental conclusion that flight would not pose an\ninsurmountable burden to the Defendant.\n\nOther factors that similarly speak to the Defendant’s history and characteristics weigh in\nfavor of detention. Most notably, the Defendant’s pattern of providing incomplete or erroneous\ninformation to the Court or to Pretrial Services bears significantly on the Court’s application of\nthe third factor to the present case. Among other things, in July 2020 the Defendant represented\nto Pretrial Services that she possessed around $3.5 million worth of assets (while leaving out her\nspouse’s assets and assets that had been transferred to trust accounts) and the representation that\nthe New Hampshire property was owned by a corporation and that she was “just able to stay\nthere.” See Pretrial Services Report at 2. The Defendant now claims that she “was detained at\nthe time and had no access to her financial records and was trying to piece together these\nnumbers from memory. According to the Macalvins report, |the financial figures| are a close\napproximation of the value of the assets that Ms. Maxwell held in her own name at the time of\nher arrest. . .. For the reasons already discussed, Ms. Maxwell was reluctant to discuss anything\nabout her |spouse| and expressed that to Pretrial Services.” Def. Mot. at 16 n.5. Even if the\nDefendant was unable to provide an exact number, however, the difference between the number\nshe originally reported to Pretrial Services and the number now presented to the C\n... [truncated, 2227 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/82 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=82]", "char_count": 2227}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "CaGade2ter TD IZ0cdohen Dehe Gineh101 O20 2h |e 6.2730) 26a Geageot 6 Ob 22\n\nwas the result of the Defendant’s misestimation rather than misdirection. And while the\nDefendant’s concerns regarding her spouse’s privacy are not insignificant, she fails to furnish\nany explanation as to why those concerns led her to misrepresent key facts to Pretrial Services\nand, by extension, the Court. In sum, the evidence of a lack of candor is, if anything, stronger\nnow than in July 2020, as it is clear to the Court that the Defendant’s representations to Pretrial\nServices were woefully incomplete. That lack of candor raises significant concerns as to\nwhether the Court has now been provided a full and accurate picture of her finances and as to the\nDefendant’s willingness to abide by any set of conditions of release.\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the third factor continues to weigh\nin favor of detention.\n\nC. Pretrial detention continues to be warranted\n\nIn light of the reasons stated above, the Government has again met its burden of\npersuasion by “a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight.”\nEnglish, 629 F.3d at 319 (quoting Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436). Taking the § 3142(g) factors into\naccount, the Court concludes that the presumption in favor of detention, the nature and\ncharacteristics of the charged offenses, the weight of the evidence, and the history and\ncharacteristics of the Defendant all weigh in favor of detention. Along similar lines, the\nGovernment has also shown, and the Court concludes for the reasons outlined below, that the\nDefendant’s proposed bail package cannot reasonably assure her appearance. Thus, the Court’s\noriginal conclusion that the Defendant poses a flight risk and that no set of conditions can\nreasonably assure her future appearance remains unaltered.\n\nAs already noted, the Defendant now proposes a $28.5 million bail package, which\n\nincludes a $22.5 million personal recognizance bond co-signed by \n... [truncated, 2052 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/83 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=83]", "char_count": 2052}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "CaGade2ter WD IZ0cdohen Dehe Gineh101 O20 2h || GO 6.2730) 26a Geaigpeot 11 Ob 22\n\nand secured by approximately $8 million in property and $500,000 in cash, along with six\nadditional bonds—five co-signed by the Defendant’s friends and family members and the sixth\nposted by the security company that would provide security services to the Defendant if she were\ngranted bail and transferred to home confinement. See Def. Mot. at 2. At the initial hearing, the\nCourt noted that the opaqueness of the Defendant’s finances rendered it difficult to set financial\nbail conditions that could reasonably assure her appearance in court. The financial information\nthat the Defendant presented to the Court at the initial bail hearing was undisputedly incomplete,\nand as the Court noted, the Court lacked “a clear picture of Ms. Maxwell’s finances and the\nresources available to her.” Tr. at 86 87.\n\nThe Defendant has now presented to the Court what is perhaps a more thorough report on\nher finances prepared by Macalvins, an accounting firm in the United Kingdom. Macalvins\nanalyzed the Defendant’s assets and finances for the past five years, basing its analysis on,\namong other things, bank statements, tax returns, and FBAR filings, providing a summary of\nthe assets held by the Defendant and her spouse as well as the assets held in trust for the\nbenefit of the Defendant for the period stemming from 2015 to 2020. See Def. Mot., Ex. O.\nIn addition, the Defendant retained a Certified Fraud Examiner and a former IRS Special\nAgent, who reviewed the Macalvins report and the underlying documents and determined that\nreport accurately represents the assets held by the Defendant and her spouse. See Def. Mot., Ex.\nP. The Defendant’s new bail proposal is based on the numbers derived from the Macalvins\nreport.\n\nBut even assuming that the financial report provides an accurate analysis of the\nDefendant’s finances, the Court is unpersuaded by her argument that the bail package reasonably\n\nassures her appeara\n... [truncated, 2096 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/84 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=84]", "char_count": 2096}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "CaGade2terWI30caohen Dehe Gimeh01 O20 2h |e 6.2730) 26a Geagect d Ob 22\n\nmillions of dollars and other assets that she could sell in order to support herself. See Gov’t\nOpp’n at 23. Furthermore, the proposed bond is only partially secured. Taking into account the\nvast amounts of wealth left relatively unrestrained by the bail package, that amount, standing\nalone, cannot reasonably assure that she would appear before the Court. Nor is the Court’s\nconclusion altered by the fact that a number of third parties have pledged to support her bond;\nthe amount of wealth that she would retain were she to flee, in addition to contingent assets and\nfuture income streams that are not accounted for in the bail package, would plausibly enable her\nto compensate them, in part or in full, for their losses. And while the Defendant argues that she\nhas procured “significant loans on the basis of a negative pledge” over a property and that $4\nmillion is invested in an “illiquid hedge fund that could only be liquidated with considerable\ndifficulty,” see Def. Reply at 6, these arguments do not alter the Court’s ultimate conclusion\nthat the financial package does not meaningfully mitigate the possibility of flight.\n\nThe proposed conditions also provide that the Defendant would be released to the\ncustody of a family member, who would serve as the Defendant’s third-party custodian under 18\nU.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(1); that the Defendant would be placed in home confinement with GPS\nmonitoring and that her travel would be restricted to the Southern and Eastern Districts of New\nYork and would be limited to appearances in Court, meetings with counsel, medical visits, and\nupon approval by the Court or Pretrial Services; that she would be under the strict supervision of\nPretrial Services; and that she would surrender all travel documents. Jd. at 2-3. Furthermore,\nthe Defendant would have on-premises security guards who would prevent her from leaving the\nresidence at any time without prior approval by \n... [truncated, 2123 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/85 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=85]", "char_count": 2123}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "CaGade2ter WD IZ0caohen Dehe Gineh101 O40 2h |e 6.2730) 26a Geatgeol J Ob 22\n\nNone of these conditions would reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance. Here,\ntoo, the Court’s original determination applies with equal force. As the Court noted at the\noriginal hearing, the Defendant has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to evade detection,\n“le|ven in the face of what the Defense has acknowledged to be extreme and unusual efforts to\nlocate her.” Tr. at 87:4 87:19. Indeed, regardless of whether the Defendant sought to evade the\npress, rather than law enforcement, in the months leading up to her arrest, her sophistication in\nevading detection reveals the futility of relying on any conditions, including GPS monitoring,\nrestrictive home confinement, and private security guards, to secure her appearance. See Tr. at\n87:4 88:2. As other courts have observed, “home detention with electronic monitoring does not\nprevent flight; at best, it limits a fleeing defendant’s head start.” United States v. Zarger, No. 00-\nCR-773-S-1 (JG), 2000 WL 1134364, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000). Furthermore, while the\nDefendant now represents that she would be released to the custody of a family member, who\nwould serve as the Defendant’s third-party custodian under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(4), and\nthat she secured a residence in the Eastern District of New York, see Def. Mot. at 3, that does not\noutweigh the other significant factors weighing in favor of detention. And finally, the\nDefendant’s argument that private security guards could ensure her appearance at future\nproceedings runs afoul of the Bail Reform Act, which the Second Circuit has held “does not\npermit a two-tiered bail system in which defendants of lesser means are detained pending trial\nwhile wealthy defendants are released to self-funded private jails.” United States v. Boustani,\n932 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019). As in Boustani, the Defendant in the present case would be\ndetained regardless of her wealth, and “if a similarly \n... [truncated, 2189 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/86 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=86]", "char_count": 2189}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "CaSedeD ef LD TOcMINeN LA GirH101 CRD 21 OGIO) 2Ba GedGeok d Ob 22\n\nIn light of the above, the Court again concludes that the Government has shown by a\npreponderance of the evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight and that the\nDefendant’s proposed conditions are insufficient to reasonably assure her appearance. The\npresumption in favor of detention, the weight of the evidence, and the history and characteristics\nof the Defendant all support that conclusion, and none of Defendant’s new arguments change the\nCourt’s original determination.\n\nD. The Defendant’s conditions of confinement do not justify release\n\nLastly, the Court is unpersuaded by the Defendant’s argument that the conditions of her\nconfinement are uniquely onerous, interfere with her ability to participate in her defense, and\nthus justify release. See Def. Mot. at 35-38. Indeed, the Defendant does not meaningfully\ndispute that she has received “more time than any other inmate at the MDC to review her\ndiscovery and as much, if not more, time to communicate with her attorneys.” Gov’t Opp’n at\n29. To the extent that the Defendant has concerns regarding some of the measures taken by\nBOP, including a recent lockdown due to COVID-19 that curtailed in-person legal visitations,\nthe Defendant provides no authority to conclude that this, standing alone, violates her\nconstitutional right to participate in her defense. And while the Court acknowledges the\nDefendant’s concerns regarding the conditions of her confinement, the Defendant has failed to\nprovide any basis to conclude that release is warranted on those grounds—even after the Court\n\nhas determined that she continues to pose a flight risk.*\n\n3 The Court will continue to ensure that the Defendant has the ability to speak and meet regularly\nwith her attorneys and to review all necessary discovery materials to prepare for her defense.\nDefense counsel shall confer with the Government on any specific requests. To the extent they\nare not reasonably accom\n... [truncated, 2073 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/87 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=87]", "char_count": 2073}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "CaSedeD ef 2D TOcMINeN LA GirH101 CRD 21 GOG273O/2Ba GedGeo! 11 O5 22\n\nFinally, as the Court expressed at the initial bail hearing, it has deep concerns about the\nspread of COVID-19 at BOP facilities, including at the MDC. Indeed, in recent weeks, the\nincidence of COVID-19 among the inmate population where the Defendant is housed is truly\nalarming. See COVID-19: Coronavirus, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/\ncoronavirus/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2020) (noting that the MDC currently has 99 inmates and 11\nstaff members who have tested positive for COVID-19). It could be argued that in the face of\nthis, only those defendants who pose a danger to the community ought to be detained pending\ntrial. If that were the law and in light of the increasing positivity rate, the Court would not\nhesitate to reopen the detention hearing and release the Defendant on bail since the Government\nrests none of its arguments on dangerousness. But that is not the law. Moreover, as the Court\nfound at the initial bail hearing, the Defendant has no underlying health conditions that put her at\nheightened risk of health impacts were she to contract COVID. The pandemic, including\nincreasing positivity numbers in the MDC, is not a basis for release in this case where the Court\nfinds that the Defendant poses a substantial and actual risk of flight and that no combination of\nconditions could reasonably assure her appearance.\n\nE. A hearing is unnecessary\n\nHaving carefully reviewed the parties’ arguments, the Court determines that a hearing is\nunnecessary and that it can resolve the motion on the papers. The briefing from both sides\ncomprehensively lays out the parties’ respective arguments For the reasons stated above, none\nof the new information has a material bearing on the Court’s determination that the Defendant\nposes a flight risk. Indeed, many of the reasons that the Court provided at the July 14, 2020\n\nhearing continue to apply with equal, if not greater, force. The Court need not hold\n... [truncated, 2032 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/88 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=88]", "char_count": 2032}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "CaSedeD ef LD TOcMINeN LA GirH101 CRD 21 GOG2FRO/2Ba GedGeck A Ob 22\n\nhearing to evaluate Maxwell’s motion, and it declines to do so. See United States v. Raniere, No.\n18-CR-2041 (NGG) (VMS), 2018 WL 6344202, at *2 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2018).\nIV. Conclusion\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell’s renewed motion for release on bail, Dkt. No. 97, is\n\nDENIED.\n\nsO ORDERED A 0, isto\n\nDated: December 28, 2020\nNew York, New York ALISON J. NATHAN\nUnited States District Judge\n\n22\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001231\n\n", "char_count": 486}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 20-3, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page91 of 165\n\nExhibit I\n\nDoc. 160\nMemorandum in Support of Ghislaine Maxwell’s Third Motion for Release\non Bail\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00001232\n\n", "char_count": 182}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "Cased 20-€FO03304AGNit DieCu trent 1602 1F ited 2226 /2ag ages 1 Ob 9\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nV.\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\n\nDefendant.\n\nMEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL’S\nTHIRD MOTION FOR RELEASE ON BAIL\n\nBobbi C. Sternheim\n\nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim\n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor\nNew York, NY 10011\n\nPhone: 212-243-1100\n\nChristian R. Everdell\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\nPhone: 212-957-7600\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, Colorado 80203\n\nPhone: 303-831-7364\n\nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001233\n\n", "char_count": 705}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rO03304ATNit DioCu trent 1602 1F ited 2226 /24g Pagel J Ob 9\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nGhislaine Maxwell respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of her Third\nMotion for Release on Bail.\n\nAs Ms. Maxwell has stated on numerous occasions and reaffirms here: she has no\nintention or desire to leave this country. She is an American citizen, has lived in United States\nfor 30 years, has strong family ties and the support of friends and family residing in this country.\nShe wants nothing more than to remain in the United States under whatever conditions the Court\ndeems necessary so that she can effectively prepare for trial and vigorously defend against the\n25-year-old charges in the Indictment. Ms. Maxwell has already proposed an expansive and, to\nour knowledge, unprecedented set of bail conditions that would reasonably assure her\nappearance. (See Dkt. 97.) In light of the Court’s denial of that application (see Dkt. 106), Ms.\nMaxwell now proposes two additional bail conditions to supplement the extraordinarily\nrestrictive bail package she has already offered.\n\ne First, Ms. Maxwell will renounce her French and British citizenship to eliminate\nany opportunity for her to seek refuge in those countries, if the Court so requires.\n\ne Second, Ms. Maxwell will have her and her spouse’s assets—excluding funds\nearmarked for living expenses, for legal fees and other expenses necessary to\ndefend her against the criminal charges in this case and related civil lawsuits and\nfor taxes—placed in a new account that will be monitored by a retired federal\nDistrict Court judge and former United States Attorney who will function as asset\nmonitor and will have co-signing authority over the account.\n\nThe former condition goes well beyond the extradition waivers that the Court deemed\ninsufficient and should satisfy any concerns the Court may have that Ms. Maxwell may try to\n\nseek a safe haven in France or the United Kingdom. (See id. at 11-13). As a non-citizen, Ms.\n\nMaxwell will not be abl\n... [truncated, 2095 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/92 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=92]", "char_count": 2095}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 93, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rO0330uAGNt DioCu trent 1602 1F ied 2226/2 49 Padget 3 Ob 9\n\ncitizens of those countries. The latter condition will restrain Ms. Maxwell’s assets so they\ncannot be used for flight or harboring her outside of the jurisdiction of this Court. This should\nsatisfy the Court’s concern that the proposed bond was not fully secured and left assets\nunrestrained that could be used for such purposes. (See id. at 17-18).\n\nIn addition, since the last bail application, Ms. Maxwell has submitted twelve pretrial\nmotions that raise substantial legal and factual issues that may result in the dismissal of some or\nall of the charges against her. Ms. Maxwell referenced some of these motions in her initial bail\napplication (see Dkt. 18 at 19) but was not in a position to fully articulate them until she had the\nchance to review the discovery and research the legal issues in advance of the motion deadline of\nJanuary 25. These motions significantly call into question the strength of the government’s case\nagainst Ms. Maxwell and the underlying justification for continued detention.\n\nMs. Maxwell has already been denied a fair chance in the court of public opinion. She\nhas been maligned by the media, which has perpetuated a false narrative about her that has\npoisoned any open-mindedness and impartiality of a potential jury. She has been relentlessly\nattacked with vicious slurs, persistent lies, and blatant inaccuracies by spokespeople who have\nneither met nor spoken to her. She has been depicted as a cartoon-character villain in an attempt\nto turn her into a substitute replacement for Jeffrey Epstein. Yet, Ms. Maxwell is determined —\nand welcomes the opportunity — to face her accusers at trial and clear her name. The additional\nproposed bail conditions should quell any concerns that she would try to flee. The Court should\ntherefore grant bail under the proposed conditions so that Ms. Maxwell can adequately prepare\n\nfor trial.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001235\n\n", "char_count": 1961}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 94, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rO03304AGNt DieCu trent 1602 1F ited 82226 /24g ages 4 Ob 9\n\nI. The Proposed Additional Bail Conditions Will Reasonably Assure Ms. Maxwell’s\nAppearance in Court\n\nAs set forth above, Ms. Maxwell now proposes two additional restrictions that eliminate\nany means or opportunity that she may have to leave the country. The Court should therefore\nreconsider its earlier ruling and grant bail under the proposed conditions. See United States v.\nRowe, No. 02 CR. 756 LMM, 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003) (“[A] release\norder may be reconsidered even where the evidence proffered on reconsideration was known to\nthe movant at the time of the original hearing.”); see also United States v. Petrov, No. 15-CR-66-\nLTS, 2015 WL 11022886, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (noting “Court’s inherent authority for\nreconsideration of the Court’s previous bail decision”).\n\nA. Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship\n\nTo demonstrate her commitment to abide by her conditions of release and to provide\nfurther assurance to the Court that she will not attempt to leave the country, Ms. Maxwell is\nwilling to formally renounce her foreign citizenships in France and the United Kingdom. Should\nthe Court feel this drastic condition is necessary, the required documents will be submitted to the\nappropriate authorities. Moreover, as a standard condition of bail, all of Ms. Maxwell’s\npassports will be surrendered to the government and no further application will be made.\n\nIf the Court deems it a necessary condition of release, Ms. Maxwell will formally\ncommence the procedure to renounce her foreign citizenship. The requisite paperwork is in the\nprocess of being completed. Renunciation of UK citizenship can be accomplished immediately\nupon granting of bail. The process of renouncing her French citizenship, while not immediate,\nmay be expedited.\n\nCitizenship is a precious and priceless asset. Ms. Maxwell’s decision to give up\n\ncitizenship from the county of her birth and the country of her up\n... [truncated, 2045 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/94 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=94]", "char_count": 2045}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 95, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rO03304AGNt Docu trent 1602 1F ited 82226 /249 age 5 Ob 9\n\nearnestness to abide by the conditions of her release and underscores that she has no intention to\nflee and reflects her deep need to communicate freely with counsel to prepare for her defense.\nHer renunciation of foreign citizenship obviates the Court’s concerns about the validity of\nwaivers of extradition. (See Dkt. 106 at 13). Ms. Maxwell will have no ability to contest\nextradition from France or the United Kingdom on the basis of citizenship, which removes any\n\nincentive the Court and government believe she may have to seek refuge in those countries.\n\nB. Restraint and Monitoring of Assets\n\nIn denying bail, the Court noted that the bond was not fully secured, and that Ms.\nMaxwell and her spouse would still have several million dollars in unrestrained assets that could\nbe used to facilitate her flight from the country. (See id. at 17-18). To assuage any concerns that\nthose assets would be available to finance flight to and shelter in a foreign country, Ms. Maxwell\nhas taken steps to create a monitorship that will place meaningful restraints on the assets that are\nnot used to secure the bond, while still allowing Ms. Maxwell to pay for her legal defense, for\nher spouse to pay for daily living expenditures and for payment of taxes.\n\n1. New Account\n\nAll assets of Ms. Maxwell and her spouse, with the exception of money currently held in\nescrow for legal fees and related defense expenses and the funds contained in the bank account in\nthe name of Ms. Maxwell’s spouse (“the Personal Account’”’)!, will be deposited in a newly\ncreated account (“the New Account”) to be overseen by an asset monitor appointed pursuant to\norder of the Court. The New Account will contain all of Ms. Maxwell’s and her spouse’s\n\nremaining cash and other liquid assets, including any proceeds that result from the pending sale\n\n1 The Personal Account is identified as Account I on page 9 of the Financial Report annexed to Ms. Maxwel\n... [truncated, 2075 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/95 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=95]", "char_count": 2075}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 96, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rO03304ATNt DioCu trent 1602 1F ited 62226 /249 Pagel 6 Ob 9\n\nof Ms. Maxwell’s London house and any other assets, excluding salary, hereinafter acquired.\nThe asset manager will approve the financial institution at which the New Account is created and\nmust approve and co-sign any expenditure from the New Account, with the exception of\ndisbursements for Ms. Maxwell’s legal fees in connection with the ongoing criminal and civil\nlitigation and for payment of taxes, which will not require authorization. No illiquid assets may\nbe sold, conveyed or transferred without approval of the asset monitor.\n\nDs Other Assets\n\nThe only funds that will not be included in the New Account are (1) the money currently\nheld in escrow by Ms. Maxwell’s attorneys, which will be used exclusively for her defense; and\n(2) the roughly $450,000 in the Personal Account which her spouse will use only for living\nexpenses. The asset monitor shall regularly receive information regarding activity of the Personal\nAccount, including the account balance, on a weekly basis. The asset monitor must also receive\nfive-day advance notice of any check, on-line payment, or transfer of funds in any amount\nexceeding $5,000, and the reason for such payment. Ms. Maxwell’s spouse agrees to be bound\nby these restrictions and reporting requirements.\n\nThe asset monitor shall report to Pretrial Services any possible non-compliance or\ndisbursement in violation of the terms and conditions specified above.\n\n3. Selected Asset Monitor\n\nThe Honorable William S. Duffey, Jr., a retired federal District Court judge and the\nformer United States Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, has agreed to undertake the\nposition of asset monitor. (Judge Duffey’s bio is attached as Exhibit A.) Judge Duffey has\n\nextensive experience evaluating and monitoring funds held in and disbursed from financial\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001238\n\n", "char_count": 1892}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 97, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rO03304AGNt DioCu trent 1602 1F ited 2226/2 49 ages 71 Ob 9\n\naccounts and will be entrusted with the authority to oversee the assets of Ms. Maxwell and her\nspouse, as described above.\n\nRestraining Ms. Maxwell’s assets that are not used to secure the bond and placing them under\nthe supervision of a former federal District Court judge eliminates any concern that such funds\n\ncould be used to violate the terms of release.\n\nII. Ms. Maxwell’s Pretrial Motions Raise Substantial Legal and Factual Issues\nThat Could Result in Dismissal of Some or All of the Charges Against Her\n\nIn addition to the new conditions proposed above, the numerous substantive pretrial\nmotions now before the Court amply challenge the purported strength of the government’s case.\nMs. Maxwell’s pretrial motions raise serious legal issues that could result in dismissal of\ncharges, if not the entire indictment. Among the dozen submissions are motions to dismiss the\nsuperseding indictment for breach of the non-prosecution agreement, for pre-indictment delay,\nand for being based on improperly obtained evidence in violation of Ms. Maxwell’s\nconstitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth the Amendments. Other motions seek dismissal of\nthe Mann Act charges as being time-barred and the perjury charges as based on non-perjurious\nstatements. These motions are substantial with a likelihood of success on the merits. These\nmotions cast substantial doubt on the alleged strength of the government’s case and warrant\ngranting bail on the conditions proposed.\n\nIii. The Court Should Grant Bail\n\nUnder the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a defendant must be released on personal\nrecognizance or unsecured personal bond unless the judicial officer determines “that such release\nwill not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of\nany other person or the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). The enhanced bail package proposed\n\nby Ms. Maxwell contains financial burdens and a combinatio\n... [truncated, 2053 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/97 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=97]", "char_count": 2053}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 98, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rO03304AGNt DioCu trent 1602 1F ited 2226 /24g ages 8 Ob 9\n\nassure her appearance as required. Before preventive detention may be ordered under § 3142(e),\nthe Court is obliged to determine both whether the defendant is likely to flee the jurisdiction if\nreleased, and whether any conditions of release will be reasonably certain to guard against this\npropensity to flee. The Court expressed concerns and denied bail without indicating what\nconditions would be reasonably certain to assure Ms. Maxwell’s appearance. Ms. Maxwell is no\ndanger to the community and not alleged to have been involved in ongoing criminal activity. To\nsay that there are absolutely no conditions flies in the face of cases where non-United States\ncitizens with no ties to the district, let alone the country, were released on lesser conditions for\nalleged criminality ongoing up to or within hours of the time of arrest, in contrast to 26-year-old\nclaims alleged against Ms. Maxwell.”\n\nThe additional conditions set forth above, which supplement the exceptional bail package\npreviously proposed, are sufficient to address the hypothetical risk of flight and secure Ms.\nMaxwell’s presence at trial. The financial magnitude of the proposed bonds, the collateral\npledged to secure the bonds, the stringent requirements of home detention, the renunciation of\nforeign citizenship and monitoring of assets contained in a special account from which no funds\ncan be withdrawn without the approval and signature of a retired federal District Court judge and\nformer United States Attorney are conditions that amply satisfy the concerns expressed by the\n\ngovernment and the Court. These cnditions are unique and unprecedented. They profoundly\n\n2 See Dkt. 97 at 34 (case-comparison chart in the Renewed Motion for Bail); cf People v. Dominique Strauss-Kahn,\n02526/2011(S.Ct. N.Y. County). Strauss-Kahn, a French citizen with no ties to the United States, was arrested on a\nParis-bound flight at JFK minutes before takeoff and\n... [truncated, 2765 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/98 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=98]", "char_count": 2765}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 99, "text_content": "Casee1240/FO00RR0HASN Ads uPAEht /LO 1 FIeCkA223724g9 ePag eb 1G(9\n\naffirm Ms. Maxwell’s earnestness in seeking bail to properly prepare her defense, not to flee.\n\nThe Court should grant bail to Ghislaine Maxwell.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nThe proposed additional conditions of release—renunciation of foreign citizenship and\nrestraint and monitoring of assets by a retired District Court judge—enhance the already\nextraordinarily restrictive bail conditions proposed in Ms. Maxwell’s Renewed Motion for Bail.\nIn combination, these conditions satisfy the Bail Reform Act and reasonably assure Ms.\nMaxwell’s appearance at trial. To deny Ms. Maxwell bail when such extraordinary and\nrestrictive conditions are available would be a miscarriage of justice.\nDated: February 23, 2021\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nBobbi C. Sternheim\n\nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim\n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor\nNew York, NY 10011\n\nPhone: 212-243-1100\n\nChristian R. Everdell\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\nPhone: 212-957-7600\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C.\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, Colorado 80203\n\nPhone: 303-831-7364\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001241\n\n", "char_count": 1174}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 100, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 20-3, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page101 of 165\n\nExhibit J\n\nDoe. 165\nThe Government’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Third Motion for\nRelease on Bail\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001242\n\n", "char_count": 192}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 101, "text_content": "Caseel240/cR008B0HAEN 2ADeduMMént /L6S 1 Filecsas/OoF2AgePag etl 169\nU.S. Department of Justice\n\nUnited States Attorney\nSouthern District of New York\n\nThe Silvio J. Mollo Building\nOne Saint Andrew’s Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nMarch 9, 2021\nBY ECF & ELECTRONIC MAIL\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nSouther District of New York\nUnited States Courthouse\n\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nRe: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell, 20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nDear Judge Nathan:\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this letter in opposition to the defendant’s third\nmotion for release on bail, dated February 23, 2021 (the “Third Bail Motion” or the “Motion’”).\n(Dkt. No. 160). On July 14, 2020, after extensive briefing and a lengthy hearing, this Court\nconcluded that the defendant posed a serious flight risk and that no condition or combination of\nconditions could ensure her appearance in court. On December 28, 2020, after the defendant\nrenewed her motion for release on bail (the “Second Bail Motion”) by essentially restating her\nprior arguments and presenting a more significant and specific bail package, this Court issued a\nthorough opinion and again concluded that the defendant “plainly poses a risk of flight” and denied\nthe motion for “substantially the same reasons that the Court denied” her first motion for release.\n(Dkt. No. 106 at 1-2 (“Dec. Op.”)). The defendant appealed this Court’s December 2020 decision\nto the Second Circuit, and that appeal remains pending. Now, the defendant asks the Court yet\nagain to reconsider its decision, and proposes two additional bail conditions to supplement the bail\npackage the Court previously considered and rejected. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion\nshould be denied. First, the Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the Third Bail Motion—in\nwhich she asks this Court to reconsider its December opinion—because the defendant has appealed\nthat December opinion to the Second Circuit. Second, even \n... [truncated, 2736 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/101 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=101]", "char_count": 2736}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 102, "text_content": "Casee1240/FR00RR0HASN Ads uPAEnt /LOZ 1 FileceasO972ig ePag e216\n\nPage 2\n\nbail in July 2020, the defendant filed a renewed motion for release in December 2020 in which the\ndefendant proposed a “substantially larger bail package” and presented arguments that “either were\nmade at the initial bail hearing or could have been made then.” (Dec. Op. at 1). In denying that\nsecond application, the Court found that the information provided in the Second Bail Motion “only\nsolidifies the Court’s view that the Defendant plainly poses a risk of flight and that no combination\nof conditions can ensure her appearance.” (/d. at 1-2).\n\nOn January 11, 2021, the defendant filed a notice of appeal to the Second Circuit appealing\nthe Court’s December 2020 opinion denying the Second Bail Motion. (Dkt. No. 113). That appeal\nis pending; the defendant has not yet filed her brief in support of the appeal.\n\nOn February 23, 2021, the defendant submitted the Third Bail Motion, in which she\nproposed two additional bail conditions to “supplement the . . . bail package she has already\noffered” in the Second Bail Motion (Mot. at 2): (1) renunciation of the defendant’s French and\nBritish citizenship; and (2) placement of a portion of her and her spouse’s assets in a new account\nto be overseen by an asset monitor.\n\nII. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Grant the Third Bail Motion Because of\nthe Defendant’s Pending Bail Appeal\n\nThe defendant asks this Court to “reconsider its earlier ruling and grant bail under the\nproposed conditions.” (Mot. at 4). More specifically, the defendant asks the Court to consider the\nexact same package previously considered and rejected in the December opinion, as now\n“supplement[ed]” by two additional conditions. (/d. at 2,8). However, the Court lacks jurisdiction\nto grant the Motion by virtue of the defendant’s appeal of the Court’s prior ruling to the Second\nCircuit.\n\n“As a general matter, ‘the filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional\nsignificance—\n... [truncated, 3485 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/102 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=102]", "char_count": 3485}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 103, "text_content": "Casee1240/FR00RR0HASN Ads uPAEht /LOZ 1 FIeCeasO 972g ePageB 1G\n\nPage 3\n\ndefendant cannot simultaneously pursue bail in both the Second Circuit and the district court. To\nallow her to seek relief in both venues runs counter to the principles of judicial economy\nunderpinning the divestiture of jurisdiction upon the filing of a notice of appeal. See Rodgers, 101\nF.3d at 251.!\n\nThe Court’s lack of jurisdiction to grant the Third Bail Motion does not leave the defendant\nwithout a remedy. The defendant can withdraw her pending bail appeal to restore jurisdiction to\nthis Court. Alternatively, the Court can follow the procedure set forth in Rule 37(a) of the Federal\nRules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that if the defendant makes a timely motion for relief\n“that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending,\nthe court may: (1) defer considering the motion; (2) deny the motion; or (3) state either that it\nwould grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a\nsubstantial issue.” However, the defendant should not be permitted to simultaneously pursue bail\nin both this Court and the Second Circuit.\n\nWil. The Court Should Not Reverse Its Prior Well-Reasoned and Thorough Bail\nDecisions\n\nEven if this Court had jurisdiction to grant the Third Bail Motion, the motion should be\ndenied. This Court has already twice made the determination that the defendant poses a risk of\nflight. In particular, the Court has found, “the charges, which carry a presumption of detention,\n\n' While the Government has not identified a case addressing the precise issue with which the Court\nis confronted, several considerations support the Government’s position that the Court does not\npresently have jurisdiction to grant the Third Bail Motion. In addition to the rule articulated by\nthe Supreme Court in Griggs, in Ching v. United States, the Second Circuit found that while an\nappeal from the denial of a Sectio\n... [truncated, 3768 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/103 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=103]", "char_count": 3768}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 104, "text_content": "Casee1240/fR00RR0HASN Ads uPAEht /LOZ 1 FileceasO 972g ePage 416i\n\nPage 4\n\nare serious and carry lengthy terms of imprisonment if convicted; the evidence proffered by the\nGovernment, including multiple corroborating and corroborated witnesses, is strong; the\nDefendant has substantial resources and foreign ties (including citizenship in a country that does\nnot extradite its citizens); and the Defendant, who lived in hiding and apart from the family to\nwhom she now asserts important ties, has not been fully candid about her financial situation.”\n(Dec. Op. at 2). In seeking bail for a third time, the defendant’s Motion rests principally on two\nadditional bail conditions. Neither of these conditions will reasonably assure the defendant’s\nappearance in court, and neither outweighs all of the other factors that make this defendant an\nextreme flight risk. Moreover, the Court should reject as premature the defendant’s assertion that\nher pretrial motions have somehow weakened the Government’s case; those motions have not been\nadjudicated, and, for the reasons set forth in the Government’s opposition memorandum, the\ndefendant’s motions have no merit.\n\nIn short, all three of the relevant Bail Reform Act factors—the nature and circumstances\nof the offense, the strength of the evidence, and the history and characteristics of the defendant—\ncontinue to weigh heavily in favor of detention, and the defendant’s Motion does not present any\ninformation that warrants revisiting this Court’s well-reasoned and detailed prior decisions.\n\nA. Applicable Law\n\n“After a court has made an initial determination that no conditions of release can reasonably\nassure the appearance of the Defendant as required, the Court may reopen the bail hearing if\n‘information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a\nmaterial bearing on the issue’ of whether pretrial detention is warranted.” (Dec. Op. at 4 (quoting\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). “A court may also revisit its own de\n... [truncated, 3392 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/104 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=104]", "char_count": 3392}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 105, "text_content": "Casee1240/FR00RR0HASN Ads uUPAEnt /LOZ 1 FileCeas/O 972g ePag eb 1Gf9\n\nPage 5\n\n1. The Defendant’s Alleged Willingness to Renounce Her Foreign Citizenship\nShould Not Alter the Court’s Prior Bail Determinations\n\nThe defendant contends that she has materially strengthened her proposed bail package by\noffering to renounce her foreign citizenship “if the Court so requires.” (Mot. at 2). She claims\nthat such a renunciation will “eliminate any opportunity for her to seek refuge” in France and the\nUnited Kingdom or “remove[] any incentive the Court and government believe she may have to\nseek refuge in those countries.” (/d. at 2, 5). The defendant is wrong. That she is “willing” to\nrenounce her foreign citizenship would do nothing to prevent the defendant from fleeing and then\nfighting extradition once abroad, and it does nothing to diminish the risk that the defendant could\nchoose to flee to another jurisdiction altogether, including one with which the United States does\nnot have an extradition treaty and from which extradition is impossible. The Court previously\nfound that the likelihood that the defendant “would be able to frustrate any extradition requests . .\n. weighs strongly in favor of detention” (Dec. Op. at 13); the defendant’s Motion provides no basis\nto disturb this finding. Indeed, just as the defendant’s offer to execute anticipatory extradition\nwaivers failed to provide the Court with any assurance that she would not frustrate any potential\nextradition, so too should her offer to renounce her foreign citizenship.\n\nFirst, the defendant’s willingness to renounce her citizenship is an offer of unclear validity.\nAs an initial matter, the defendant’s offer is itself of little value, as she would at bare minimum\nhave to follow the legal requirements attendant to each country in order to formally renounce her\ncitizenship. Moreover, she provides no assurances—nor could she—that she will not contest the\nvalidity and/or voluntariness of such a renunciation once she is \n... [truncated, 4033 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/105 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=105]", "char_count": 4033}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 106, "text_content": "Casee1240/FR00RR0HASN Ads uPAEht /LOZ 1 FIeCeas/O 972g ePageb 1G\n\nPage 6\n\nher intent not to flee. (Dec. Op. at 13 n.2). The Court recognized that “a defendant could\nstrategically offer to waive the right to extradition while intending to resist any subsequent\nextradition that might result.” (/d.). So too here. An offer to renounce her foreign citizenship\n“Ts|hould the Court feel this drastic condition is necessary,” (Mot. at 4) is another strategic, but\nhollow offer given that the defendant would be free to fight extradition once in the United Kingdom\nor France, or any other jurisdiction of her choosing (i.e., the one to which she chooses to flee).\n\nAs such, the defendant’s claimed “willing[ness]” to renounce her citizenship in both the\nUnited Kingdom and France is little more than window dressing. After receiving the defendant’s\nThird Bail Motion, the Government, through the Department of Justice’s Office of International\nAffairs (“OIA”), contacted the French Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”) to understand the impact of the\ndefendant’s offer to renounce her French citizenship on France’s categorical unwillingness to\ndeport its own citizens for crimes they have committed. In response, the MOJ provided the\nGovernment with a letter setting forth the relevant law and conclusively indicating that the\ndefendant’s offer to waive her French citizenship will not make her eligible to be extradited from\nFrance because, for purposes of extradition, nationality is assessed as of the time the charged\noffense was committed. That letter in its original French, as well as an English translation of the\nletter, are attached hereto as Exhibit A. See Ex. A (“[A]ny loss of nationality subsequent to said\noffense has no bearing upon the removal proceedings and shall not supersede said assessment of\nnationality.”); see also Dkt. No. 100, Ex. B at 3 (MOJ letter stating that the French Code of\nCriminal Procedure “absolutely prohibits the extradition of a person who had French nationality\nat the ti\n... [truncated, 4129 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/106 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=106]", "char_count": 4129}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 107, "text_content": "Casee1240/FR00RR0HASN Ads uPAEht /LOZ 1 FileceasO9F2Ag Pag @f7 16f59\n\nPage 7\n\nwould be forced to wait years for the defendant’s return.\n\nAs the Government has repeatedly emphasized, the strong possibility that the defendant\ncould successfully resist extradition only heightens the defendant’s incentive to flee. (Dkt. No.\n100 at 19-20). Indeed, in rejecting the defendant’s offer in the Second Bail Motion to execute\nanticipatory extradition waivers, the Court noted, among other things, “the likelihood that any\nextradition would be a difficult and lengthy process.” (Dec. Op. at 13). The Court further noted\nthat the “likelihood that the Defendant would be able to frustrate any extradition requests—even\nif she were correct that she would be unable to stop extradition entirely—weighs strongly in favor\nof detention.” (/d.). That statement remains true even if the face of the defendant’s newest offer\nto renounce her foreign citizenship.\n\nAs this Court previously found, the defendant has substantial international ties, familial\nand personal connections abroad, and owns at least one foreign property of significant value. (Dec.\nOp. at 10-11). The defendant’s alleged willingness to renounce her foreign citizenship should not\nfundamentally alter the Court’s conclusions.\n\n2. The Court Should Reject the Defendant’s Proposed Monitorship Condition\n\nNext, the defendant has offered to place a portion of her and her spouse’s assets into a new\naccount that “will be monitored by a retired federal District Court judge and former United States\nAttorney who will function as asset monitor and will have co-signing authority over the account.”\n(Mot. at 2). This proposed condition—the details of which are vague—is insufficient to ensure\nthat the defendant appears in Court.\n\nIt first bears noting that the defendant’s finances—and her candor with the Court about\nthose finances— is not an issue of first impression. Significantly absent from the defendant’s\nMotion is any attempt to address the Court\n... [truncated, 3527 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/107 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=107]", "char_count": 3527}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 108, "text_content": "Casee1240/FR00RR0HASN Ads uPAEht /LOZ 1 Fileceas/O9F2g ePageB 1G\n\nPage 8\n\nleast $2 million. In addition, the defendant proposes that she retain an additional half a million\ndollars in liquid assets in an unrestrained account, as well as any future income.” That figure\nappears to be in addition to the approximately $1 million in “chattels” the defendant has disclosed\namong her various assets. See Dkt. 97, Ex. O at 9. In short, the defendant’s proposal would leave\nher with ample resources to fund her flight from prosecution.\n\nFurther still, the defendant’s Motion provides only cursory details of the monitorship\nprogram she proposes, and it offers no legal precedent to explain what, if any, authority this Court\nhas to establish and oversee such a monitorship. Aside from defense counsel’s assertions, the\nMotion offers nothing that would enable the Court to meaningfully consider the details of such a\nmonitorship. Among other things, it is unclear from the defendant’s Motion whether such a\nprogram would require the defendant’s voluntary compliance with the monitorship, or whether the\nfunds would be placed in a bank account that the defendant could not access. Given that the\ndefendant’s Motion suggests that attorney’s fees could be disbursed without approval, it appears\nthat the defendant’s proposal would provide her latitude to engage in financial transactions, subject\nonly to a review that would require her voluntary compliance.\n\nFinally, although the defendant does not provide any detail about the amount of money she\nwould pay the monitor, presumably the monitor would not undertake this responsibility for free.\nAs a result, the tension between the monitor’s obligation to review the defendant’s finances and\nthe monitor’s employment relationship with the defendant creates a conflict of interest. But at\nbottom, if the Court determines that the only way to keep the defendant from using her assets to\nflee is to take away control of her assets, then she is too great a flight \n... [truncated, 3632 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/108 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=108]", "char_count": 3632}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 109, "text_content": "Casee1240/fR00RR0HASN Ads uPAEht /LOZ 1 FileceasO972g ePag eb 1G\n\nPage 9\n\ndetermination that the Government’s case is strong.\nIV. Conclusion\nThe defendant continues to represent a “plain[]” risk of flight. (Dec. Op. at 1). Even\nassuming the Court has jurisdiction to grant this third bail motion, the two new bail conditions\noffer insufficient protection against the “substantial and actual risk of flight” this Court has already\nfound that the defendant poses. (/d. at 21). The defendant’s Third Bail Motion should be denied.\nRespectfully submitted,\nAUDREY STRAUSS\nUnited States Attorney\n\nBy: __s/\nMaurene Comey / Alison Moe / Lara Pomerantz\nAssistant United States Attorneys\nSouthern District of New York\n\nCe: All Counsel of Record (By email)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001251\n\n", "char_count": 764}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 110, "text_content": "CAs54@:20-¢700B30AUENt DOcuhdi 18621 , FIEADBOPAde 1Pagd 1&7 2\n\ncE\nMINISTERE a a :\nDE LA JUSTICE Direction des affaires criminelies et des graces\n\nLiberté\nEgatité\nFraternité\n\nSous-direction de la justice pénale spécialisée\n\nBureau de l’entraide pénale internationale Patis, le 9 mars 2021\n\nMonsieur le garde des Sceaux, ministre de la Justice\na\nDepartment of Justice (D.O,J)\n\nPar lintermédiaire d’ Andrew FINKELMAN, magistrat de haison\nAlmbassade des Etats-Unis d “Amérique a Paris\n\nJ'ai Thonneur de porter 4 votre connaissance que la procédure et les conditions\nd@’extradition sont régies en France par les articles 696 et suivants du code de procedure pénale.\n\nLarticle 696-2 de ce code prévoit ainsi que « /e gouvernement francais peut remettre, sur leur\ndemande, aux fouverncments ttrangers, toute personne n'ayant pas la nationalité francaise qui, étant l'objet d'une\npoursuite intentée au nom de I'Etat requérant ou d'une condamnation prononcée par ses tribunaux, est trouvée sur\nke territoire de la République. »\n\nL’article 694-4 ptécise expressément que :\n« L'extradition n'est pas accordée :\n\n1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité Jrangaise, cette detniére étant appréciée a\nI'époque de I'infraction pour laquelle l'extradition est requise ».\n\n“\\ins1, le fait que la personne recherchée ait la nationalité frangaise constitue un obstacle\ninsurmontable 4 son extradition. Dés lors que cette nationalité s’apprécie au moment de la\ncommission de linfraction, la perte de la nationalité, postérieurement 4 la commission de cette\nderniére, est sans incidence sur la procédure d’extradition, et ne permet pas de lever cet obstacle.\n\néyfale Internationale\n\n13, place Vendéme - 75042 Paris Cedex 01\n\nTéléphone : 01 44 77 60 60\nwww justice. gouv. fr\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001252\n\n", "char_count": 1780}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 111, "text_content": "Ee yen Docume RWB620 , FIGADBOPAde 1hage 265 2\n\nMINISTRY OF JUSTICE\n\nLiberty Directorate of Criminal Affairs & Pardons\nEquality\nFraternity\n\nSpecialized Criminal Justice Sub-Directorate\nInternational Criminal Assistance Bureau\n\nParis, March 9, 2021\n\nHis Honor the Keeper of Seals, Minister of Justice\n\nTo the\n\nDepartment of Justice (D.O.J)\n\nThrough Andrew FINKELMAN, Liaison Magistrate on behalf of the\nEmbassy of the United States of America located in Paris, France\n\nThereby inform you that in France, all removal proceedings and conditions are\ngoverned by Articles 696 et sq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nArticle 696-2 of said Code provides that: “The French government is able to remit to\nforeign governments upon their request any individual who is not a French citizen and who is subject to a\nlawsuit brought on behalf of the requesting State, or who is subject to a sentence passed by the Court of said\nrequesting State, and who is located on the territory of the French Republic.”\n\nArticle 694-4 expressly specifies as follows:\n\n“Removal is not granted:\n\n1- When the individual claimed to have French citizenship, said citizenship having been\n\nassessed at the time of the offense on the basis of which removal is being\nrequested.”\n\nWHEREBY, the fact that the wanted individual is a French national constitutes an\ninsuperable obstacle to his/her removal. As long as said nationality is assessed at the time the\noffense was committed, any loss of nationality subsequent to said offense has no bearing upon\nthe removal proceedings and shall not supersede said assessment of nationality.\n\nHead of the International Criminal Assistance Bureau\n\nPhilippe JAE( Ve\n\n13, place Vendéme - 75042 Paris Cedex 01 - France\nTelephone: (011) 33.1.44.77.60.60\nwww.justice.gouv. fr\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001253\n", "char_count": 1794}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 112, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 20-3, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page113 of 165\n\nExhibit K\n\nDoe. 171\nReply Memorandum of Ghislaine Maxwell in Support of Her Third Motion\nfor Bail\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001254\n\n", "char_count": 182}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 113, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQ0360uAGNit DioCutrentl1702 1FikeG OSe/2agPlddecl o618\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\neen enn enn ee ee neem x\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nv.\n\n20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\n\nDefendant.\n\nREPLY MEMORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL\nI PPORT OF HER THIRD MOTI FOR BAIL\n\nBobbi C. Sternheim\n\nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim\n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor\nNew York, NY 10011\n\nPhone: 212-243-1100\n\nChristian R. Everdell\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\nPhone: 212-957-7600\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nPhone: 303-831-7364\n\nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001255\n\n", "char_count": 714}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 114, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQ0360uAGNt Diecutrentl1702 1Fikeb OSMe/2agPldgedt O618\n\nPreliminary Statement\n\nThe issue before the Court, as it has been since Ms. Maxwell’s first bail application,\nis whether conditions exist that can reasonably assure Ms. Maxwell's appearance at trial.\nOn her third application (the “Third Bail Motion”) (Dkt.160), Ms. Maxwell has put before\nthe Court significant enhancements to the already extraordinary bail package previously\npresented to the Court in her renewed application for bail (the “Second Bail Motion’’)\n(Dkt. 97).! Together, these two motions present a unique and comprehensive bail package\nwith the strictest of conditions known in any bail application:\n\n= $28.5 million in bonds (including a $1M bond co-signed by a security\ncompany);\n\n= $9.5 million in real property;\n\n= $550,000 in cash;\n\n= Asset Monitoring by a retired federal district court judge;\n\n=\" Renunciation of British and French citizenship;\n\n= Irrevocable written waivers of the right to contest extradition;\n=\" Surrender of all travel documents;\n\n= Home confinement in New York City;\n\n= Electronic GPS monitoring;\n\n= Jn-residence third-party custodian;7\n\n1 Ms. Maxwell’s present motion (the “Third Bail Motion”) (Dkt.160) incorporates her Memorandum in Support of\nHer Renewed Motion for Bail and accompanying exhibits (Dkt. 97, including Attachments 1-24) and her Reply\nMemorandum in Support of Her Renewed Motion for Bail (Dkt. 103, including Attachments 1-2) (collectively, the\n“Second Bail Motion’).\n\n2 To assist Ms. Maxwell in making up for lost time preparing for her upcoming trial, one of her lawyers (not trial\ncounsel) has agreed to reside with her and serve as an additional residential custodian.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001256\n\n", "char_count": 1722}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 115, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQ0360uAGNt Dibcutrentl1702 1FikeGb OSB /2agPldged’ 618\n\n= On-premises 24/7 private security to prevent Ms. Maxwell from leaving the\nresidence without pre-approval by the Court or Pretrial Services and to\nescort her when authorized to leave the residence;\n\n= Visitors to be pre-approved by Pretrial Services;\n\n= Strict supervision by Pretrial Services;\n\n= Such other terms as the Court deems appropriate.\n\nThe government goes to great lengths to oppose bail arguing technicalities and\noffering unfounded innuendo ripped from the tabloid headlines to avoid addressing the\nmerits of Ms. Maxwell’s exceptional bail package, which puts at risk everything she has,\nincluding the assets of her spouse and the financial security of her family and closest\nfriends.\n\nThe Court Retains Jurisdiction to Decide Matters Related to Bail\n\nThe government asserts that the Court should not consider the present bail motion\nbecause appeal of denial of the Second Bail Motion, not yet briefed, is pending before the\nSecond Circuit. (Dkt. 165 at 2-3). It is ironic that the government takes this position given that it\ncreated this problem by opposing Ms. Maxwell’s request for an enlargement of time to file a\nnotice of appeal to the Court’s denial of her Second Bail Motion. Indeed, Ms. Maxwell sought\nthe extension to avoid this very issue. (Dkt. 109). The government should not now be allowed to\nturn that procedural sword into a jurisdictional shield to prevent the Court from considering the\ninstant motion.\n\nDivestiture of jurisdiction in the district court while an appeal is pending is not a per se\nrule. Rather, it is a judicially crafted rule rooted in the interest of judicial economy that is\ndesigned to avoid confusion or waste of time resulting from having the same issues before two\n\ncourts at the same time. Divestiture of jurisdiction, therefore, should not be automatic, but\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001257\n\n", "char_count": 1903}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 116, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQ0360uAGNit Dibcutrentl1702 1Fikeé 8SieB/24gPlagect O618\n\ninstead guided by concerns of efficiency. Here, it is unclear whether interlocutory appeal of a\ndistrict court’s decision regarding bail “divests the court of its control over aspects of the case\ninvolved in the appeal.” United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1996). Were it so, a\ndistrict court would have no authority to remand or modify bail conditions of a defendant\nreleased while the government appeals the grant of bail. Such a rule would detract from, rather\nthan promote, judicial economy and would be unworkable in practice.\n\nShould the Court believe it does not have jurisdiction to decide the present bail\nmotion, Ms. Maxwell will move the Circuit to withdraw her notice of appeal without\nprejudice and thereby remove any theoretical bar to this Court’s jurisdiction over the\npresent bail motion. Should the Court summarily deny the present motion on the merits,\n\nMs. Maxwell will file a notice of appeal and request consolidation of both appeals.\nRenunciation of Foreign Citizenship is a Valid and Significant Condition of Release\n\nRelying on a letter from the French Ministry of Justice, the government urges the\nCourt to give no weight to Ms. Maxwell’s agreement to renounce her foreign citizenship.\nBut the letter is wrong on the law and should be disregarded. The letter asserts that the loss of\nFrench nationality subsequent to the criminal act which the person is alleged to have committed\ndoes not affect the rule against the extradition of nationals, as nationality must be assessed at the\ntime of commission of the offense and not at the time of the extradition request. As discussed in\nthe opinion from William Julié, French legal counsel (attached as Exhibit A), the\ngovernment’s assertion is entirely incorrect for the following reasons:\n\n= The government’s argument goes against the letter of the law.\n= The government’s argument goes against the spirit of the law.\n= The government’s argume\n... [truncated, 2092 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/116 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=116]", "char_count": 2092}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 117, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQ0330uAGNt Dibcutrentl1702 1FikeG OSMeB/2agPidged O618\n\nThe language of the extradition treaty between the United States and France and the\napplicable French statues are clear that anyone seeking to contest extradition on the basis of\nFrench citizenship must be a French national at the time of the extradition request. Ud. § 11).\nThe provisions on which the government relies were not intended to apply in cases where the\nperson whose extradition is sought had lost French citizenship. To the contrary, it was\ndesigned to apply to individuals who had acquired French citizenship subsequent to the\ncommission of the alleged crime “in order to avoid fraudulent nationality applications of\noffenders seeking to escape extradition.” (/d. 4¥ 15-16). Ifthe person is no longer a French\nnational at the time of the request, the provision does not apply. The government cites no case\nwhere the relevant statute was applied to protect a formerly French national from extradition,\nand we have found none ourselves. (/d. {] 19-21). By contrast, there are numerous examples\nof French courts deporting individuals who have lost French nationality following the\ncommission of an offense. (/d. § 21). Accordingly, Mr. Julié concludes: “[I]t cannot have been\nthe intention of French lawmakers that Article 696-4 be construed as meaning that a person\nwho has lost French nationality would still be entitled to be protected from extradition.” (/d.\n\n4] 26).\n\nMs. Maxwell’s agreement to give up both British and French citizenship and waive\nany and all right to contest extradition is a formidable challenge to the assertion that Ms.\nMaxwell would likely flee if released from custody and goes above and beyond the\n“reasonable assurances” that the Bail Reform Act requires to grant bail. While we\nmaintain that Ms. Maxwell’s written waivers of the right to challenge extradition should\nsuffice, her willingness to forfeit citizenship birthrights exceeds what is necessary and\nprofoundly demonstrates her comm\n... [truncated, 2082 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/117 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=117]", "char_count": 2082}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 118, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQ0360uAGNt DieCutrenti1702 1FikeGb OSB /2agPldged O618\n\nMonitoring of Assets is a Valid and Significant Condition of Release\n\nTo address the Court’s concern about Ms. Maxwell’s access to assets, the bail\nmotion proposed another extremely significant and restrictive bail condition — the\nimposition of a monitor to supervise the assets of Ms. Maxwell and her spouse and\napprove expenditures. Rather than suggest conditions to satisfy its concerns, the\ngovernment urges the Court to summarily reject the proposed monitorship.\n\nWilliam S. Duffey, Jr., a retired federal district court judge and the former United\nStates Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, has agreed to undertake appointment by\nthe Court as asset monitor. Judge Duffey has extensive experience evaluating and monitoring\nfunds held in and disbursed from financial accounts. He has agreed to serve by appointment of\nthe Court in a capacity similar to other trustees and receivers who serve as officers of the Court\nand are entrusted, pursuant to court order, with oversight authority to restrain, monitor, and\napprove disbursement of assets requiring his signature. Similar to others who have been\nappointed by courts to oversee financial matters, Judge Duffey will be compensated at the same\nhourly rate billed for his services as an ADR panelist for Federal Arbitration (FedArb).\n\nThe proceeds from the sale of Ms. Maxwell’s London home will be restrained and\nmonitored by Judge Duffey. As required by court order, documentation concerning the\nproceeds of the sale will be provided to Judge Duffey and the funds will be deposited in the\nfinancial account approved by Judge Duffey.\n\nThe government tries to steer the Court’s attention to allegations of Ms. Maxwell’s lack\nof candor to dissuade the Court from considering the proposed monitorship as a meaningful\nrestraint on the assets of Ms. Maxwell and her spouse. As previously stated, despite being\n\nquestioned by Pretrial Services following a period of solitar\n... [truncated, 2055 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/118 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=118]", "char_count": 2055}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 119, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQ0360uAGNit DibCutrentl1702 1FikeG OSMe/2agPlagec? O618\n\ndeprivation, and other conditions adverse to her physical health and mental well-being, Ms.\nMaxwell responded appropriately and accurately to questions posed by Pretrial Services which\nwere restricted to her personal assets. Since then, financial documents - collected and\nprofessionally vetted by a highly respected accounting firm — have been submitted to the\ngovernment and the Court and provide full details and supporting documentation concerning\nMs. Maxwell’s personal assets and those jointly held with the spouse. Further, no valid\nchallenge has been made to those submissions.\n\nThe government challenges the Court by inanely stating that if “the only way to keep\nthe defendant from using her assets to flee is to take away control of her assets, then she is too\ngreat a risk to release.” (Dkt.165 at 8.) This statement is fundamentally illogical as it\nundermines most conditions of release. For example, the same could be said of electronic\nmonitoring — 1.e., if the only way to keep a defendant from fleeing the jurisdiction is to place\nhim on home confinement with electronic monitoring, then he is too great a flight risk to\nrelease.* The Court should readily dismiss this frivolous argument. Under the Bail Reform Act,\nif there are appropriate conditions for release, bail should be granted. The conditions\ncollectively proposed in the previous and present bail applications provide ample assurance that\n\nMs. Maxwell will be present at trial.\n\n3 Moreover, in an effort to further obfuscate the merits of Ms. Maxwell’s bail application, the government\ndesperately argues that funds for legal services, presently held in attorney escrow accounts, would be\nreleased and made available to support Ms. Maxwell as a fugitive. To suggest that defense counsel would\nbecome accomplices to a violation of a court order shows utter disrespect for Ms. Maxwell’s defense team.\nIn particular, New York counsel, who have spent the ent\n... [truncated, 2197 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/119 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=119]", "char_count": 2197}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 120, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQ0360uAGNt DibCutrentl1702 1FikeG OSB /2agPlagecs O618\n\nConceded Problems Undermine the Strength of the Government’s Case\n\nAs Ms. Maxwell’s period of detention passes the nine-month mark, the government has\ncontinuously upgraded Ms. Maxwell from a “plain [ ] risk of flight” to a “substantial and\nactual risk of flight” to a “serious flight of risk” and now to an “extreme risk of flight.” (Dkt.\n165 at 1.) Ironically, her level of flight risk increases as the strength of government’s case\nagainst her diminishes. Ms. Maxwell has challenged the strength of the government’s case\nin pretrial motions pending before the Court. Among other things, Ms. Maxwell has\npersuasively argued that the Non-Prosecution Agreement entered into by Jeffrey Epstein in\n2007, which immunizes “any potential co-conspirators of Epstein,” bars Ms. Maxwell’s\nprosecution in this case, and that the counts charging her with alleged sexual abuse are\ntime-barred.\n\nThe government’s response to Ms. Maxwell’s pretrial motions shines further light\nof the weaknesses of its case. For example, the government concedes it cannot establish that\neither Ms. Maxwell or Epstein ever caused, or sought to cause, Accuser-3* to travel while she\nwas a minor or that she was underage when she allegedly engaged in sex acts with Epstein.\n(See Opp.162-65 & fn. 57-58.)° Hence, her allegations cannot support the conspiracies charged\nin the Indictment, leaving the government with only two witnesses to prove the charges against\nMs. Maxwell. More importantly, in connection with the government’s response, it\nproduced documents indicating that government prosecutors misled a federal judge to\nobtain evidence against Ms. Maxwell (see, e.g.,. Opp. Ex. 4-7) - a shocking revelation that\n\nundermines the viability of the perjury counts, not to mention the integrity of the entire\n\n+ Accuser-3 is identified in the Indictment as “Minor Victim-3.”\n\n5 “Opp.” references are to page numbers of the Government’s Omnibus Memorandum in Oppos\n... [truncated, 2111 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/120 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=120]", "char_count": 2111}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 121, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQd360uAGNt Dibcutrentl1702 1FikeG OSB /2agPlageds O618\n\nprosecution.\n\nThe ongoing review of discovery confirms the lack of evidence in support of the\nstale allegations in the indictment. Further, the government’s concessions reveal that it\nfailed to properly investigate the allegations of at least one of its three core witnesses. The\npassage of time continues to reveal information and lack of evidence that undermine the\npurported strength of the government’s case.\n\nBail Must Be Granted\n\nThe detention of Ms. Maxwell on 25-year-old allegations — based on the lowest grade\nmisdemeanor under New York Penal Law 130.55° — presented in a sensationalized\nindictment containing pictures to inflame the public and entice and feed the media frenzy’ —\nis unwarranted in the face of the unique bail package before the Court. Relentless media\ncoverage of Ms. Maxwell, which preceded and impacted the bringing of this prosecution,\nhas increased significantly since her arrest and detention. Ms. Maxwell’s continued\ndetention — providing daily fodder for media for the past nine months—continues to severely\nundermine her presumption of innocence.\n\nIn the face of this enhanced bail package, the government’s claim that Ms. Maxwell\nposes “an extreme risk of flight” rings hollow. The government urges the Court to apply a\nstandard that defies the law - an absolute guarantee against all risks. See United States v.\nOrta, 760, F.2d 887, 888 n.4 (8th Cir. 1985) (\"The legal standard required by the [Bail\n\nReform] Act is one of reasonable assurances, not absolute guarantees.\"). Under the Bail\n\n® Counts Two and Four allege violations of New York Penal Law § 130.55 - sexual abuse in the third degree - a\nclass B misdemeanor punishable by maximum penalties of three months in jail or one year probation.\n\n7 What other purpose could be served by the inclusion of a picture of Ms. Maxwell and Jeffrey Epstein taken over a\ndozen years after the period of the conspiracy alleged and pictures of three hig\n... [truncated, 2039 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/121 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=121]", "char_count": 2039}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 122, "text_content": "CaéSesb:20-7Z00BRGUUNNt DEctiMdrt 1/202 FiladedS/2B/PagPage a016618\n\nReform Act, Ms. Maxwell must be released unless there are \"no conditions\" that would\nreasonably assure her presence. Here, the proposed bail package - uniquely strengthened\nby Ms. Maxwell’s agreement to renunciate her foreign citizenship and have assets\nmonitored by a retired federal district court judge - satisfies the actual governing standard.\nTo find there are absolutely no conditions to satisfy flight risk of a 59-year-old\nwoman with no criminal history, who poses no danger to the community, who has made\nAmerica her home for the past 30 years, and who has established strong roots and forged\nimportant connections with family and friends who reside here, is incredulous. The\nconcerns regarding foreign citizenship and restraint of assets have been addressed. To say\nthat renunciation of foreign citizenship and strict monitoring of assets by a retired federal\ndistrict court judge does not suffice when combined with an eight-figure bond secured by\nreal property and cash and the strictest terms of home confinement and electronic\nmonitoring strains credulity. The government gains a strategic advantage each day Ms.\nMaxwell remains in custody — her case is tried daily in the court of public opinion based\non allegations that are inadmissible in a court of law; the likelihood of seating jurors who\nare not implicitly biased against her is being severely jeopardized; her physical strength\nand concentration are becoming increasingly impaired by the conditions of her\nconfinement; and she is being denied a full and fair opportunity to prepare her case for\ntrial.§\n8 Ms. Maxwell continues to experience difficulty reviewing electronic discovery, including discs that can only be\nreviewed on the MDC computer but are not readable on that computer, and thousands of pages still not readable on\neither the MDC computer or the laptop. Her receipt of legal mail — including pretrial motions, responses and replies\n—are const\n... [truncated, 2677 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/122 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=122]", "char_count": 2677}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 123, "text_content": "CéSesb:20-7Z00BRG UMN DEcBiidrit 1/202 Filed 2B/Pag Page atl 16618\n\nConclusion\nThe Court should grant bail for Ms. Maxwell on the extraordinary conditions\nproposed. Should the Court determine that additional conditions are necessary, Ms.\n\nMaxwell is willing to satisfy and abide by those terms as well.\n\nDated: March 16, 2021\nRespectfully submitted:\nBobbi C. Sternheim\nLaw Offices of Bobbi C. Sternheim\n33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor\n\nNew York, NY 10011\nPhone: 212-243-1100\n\nChristian R. Everdell\nCOHEN & GRESSER LLP\n800 Third Avenue\n\nNew York, NY 10022\nPhone: 212-957-7600\n\nJeffrey S. Pagliuca\n\nLaura A. Menninger\n\nHADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C\n150 East 10th Avenue\n\nDenver, CO 80203\n\nPhone: 303-831-7364\n\nAttorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nMaxwell’s guards and a hand-held camera focused on both Ms. Maxwell and counsel. Further, confidential\nattorney-client communications conducted during video teleconferencing (VTC) are now further compromised by\nthe repositioning of a camera with sensitive audio recording, putting a chill on privileged communication. During\nVTC conferences, counsel can hear conversation among the guards, so it is likely that the guards, who seem to be\nwriting during those sessions, are able to hear discussions between Ms. Maxwell and counsel. Last night, prior to the\nfiling of defense replies to Ms. Maxwell’s pretrial motions, the MDC refused her request to speak with her lawyers\nto provide information bearing on those filings,. Such denial violates the BOP’s Program Statement pertaining to\nproviding legal calls upon request of pretrial inmates. See https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/7331_ 004.pdf at\npar. 24(c). The chronic difficulties related to Ms. Maxwell’s review of the millions of documents of electronic\ndiscovery are continuing to negatively impact her ability to prepare for a trial that is only a few months away.\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001265\n\n", "char_count": 1885}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 124, "text_content": "CéSesb:20-7Z00 BROAN DEcBiMdrt 1/202 FilededS/2B/Prag Page ab 16618\n\nEXHIBIT A\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001266\n\n", "char_count": 98}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 125, "text_content": "Casest:20-cr/0088GAU Ant AdewmMent 1/202 Filedees/23/PagPage 46161518\n\nWILLIAM JULIE\nAVOCAT A LA COUR — ATTORNEY AT LAW\n\nMarch 14\" 2021\n\nRe: Additional opinion on the extradition of nationals by the French government\n\n1. This memorandum was written pursuant to a request from Olivier Laude, a partner at\nthe French firm Laude Esquier Champey acting on behalf of Cohen & Gresser LLP as\ncounsel for Ms Ghislaine Maxwell. The request was made in the context of ongoing bail\nproceedings involving Ms Maxwell in the United States of America (hereafter “USA”),\nwhere Ms Maxwell is being detained pre-trial on charges relating to her alleged role in\n\nsexual activities involving Jeffrey Epstein from 1994 to 1997.\n\n2. Ina previous opinion, I have outlined why French authorities could decide to execute\nan extradition request against a French citizen under the Extradition Treaty between the\n\nUSA and France, without violating any superior norm of French and international law.\n\n3. AsTunderstand the defendant’s French nationality continues to be regarded by the Court\nas a bar to her release pending trial, I am informed that the defendant is prepared to\nrenounce French nationality under Article 23-4 of the French Civil Code, if the Court\n\nso requires.\n\n4. Ina letter to the Department of Justice dated 9 March 2021, the Head of the International\nCriminal Assistance Bureau of the French Ministry of Justice, Mr Philippe Jaeglé,\nasserts that the loss of French nationality after the criminal act which the person is\nalleged to have committed does not affect the rule against the extradition of nationals,\nas nationality must be assessed at the time of commission of the offence and not at the\n\ntime of the extradition request.\n\n5. This report was written to provide a counter opinion on this issue, in support of the\nproposition that the French government would be legally entitled to execute an\n\nextradition request against an individual who is no longer a French national.\n\n6. The Ministry of Justice’s\n... [truncated, 2256 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/125 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=125]", "char_count": 2256}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 126, "text_content": "CaSest:20-cr/008aGAU At AdewmMent 1/202 Filedees/23/PagPagé 41416518\n\nWILLIAM JULIE\nAVOCAT A LA COUR — ATTORNEY AT LAW\n\n(ii) Nor is it supported by the spirit of the law;\n\n(iii) Case law and precedents in fact suggest the opposite.\n\n7. First, the Ministry’s interpretation goes against the letter of the law.\n\n8. American extradition requests are principally governed by the Extradition Treaty\nbetween the USA and France of 23 April 1996 (“the Treaty”) and the French Code of\n\nCriminal Procedure for matters not dealt with under the Treaty. !\n\n9. Article 3(1) of the Treaty provides:\n\n“There is no obligation upon the Requested State to grant the extradition of a person\nwho is a national of the Requested State, but the executive authority of the United\nStates shall have the power to surrender a national of the United States if, in its\ndiscretion, it deems it proper to do so. The nationality of the person sought shall be\n\nthe nationality of that person at the time the offense was committed”.\n\n10. Article 696-4 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the same rule,\n\nunder similar wording:\n\n“Extradition shall not be granted:\n1° When the person claimed has French nationality, the latter being assessed at the time\n\nof the offense for which extradition is requested”\n\n11. Under a literal reading of these provisions, the nationality protection only applies where\nFrench authorities are faced with an extradition request against a person who is a French\n\nnational at the time of the extradition request. Both the Treaty and the French Code of\n\n1 Other relevant international treaties include: the Agreement on Extradition between the United States of\nAmerica and the European Union signed in Washington on 25 June 2003, and the Instrument Amending the\nTreaty of 23 April 1996 between the United States of America and France signed in the Hague on 30 September\n\n2004.\n\n51, RUE AMPERE - 75017 PARIS ~ TEL. O1 88 33 S51 8O- FAX. O1 88 33 5i 81\nwj@wjavocats.com - www.wjavocats.com - P\n... [truncated, 2032 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/126 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=126]", "char_count": 2032}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 127, "text_content": "Casest:20-cr/008aGAU Ant AdewmMént 1/202 Filedees/23/PagPage 46161518\n\nWILLIAM JULIE\nAVOCAT A LA COUR — ATTORNEY AT LAW\n\nCriminal Procedure use the present tense (“a person who is a national of the Requested\nState’”/”the person claimed Aas French nationality”), which can only mean that the\nextradition of a person is denied when that person is in fact a French national. If the\n\nperson is no longer a French national at the time of the request, the provision does not\n\napply.\n\n12. Had these provisions been intended to apply in cases where the person has lost French\nnationality subsequent to the commission of the alleged crime, the texts would have\nexpressly stated so or would at least have used both the present and the past tense to\n\nqualify the national affiliation of the requested person.\n\n13. Furthermore, it is a well-known principle of legal interpretation across all jurisdictions\nthat exceptions to rules must be construed strictly. The nationality ban being an\nexception to extradition, it must be interpreted in a restrictive manner and its application\n\nto a person who is no longer a French national must be rejected.\n\n14. Second, the Ministry’s interpretation goes against the spirit of the law\n\n15. The literal reading of Article 3 of the Treaty and Article 696-4 of the French Code of\nCriminal Procedure is further supported by the fact that these provisions were in fact\nnot intended to apply in cases where the person sought has lost French citizenship, but\nonly in cases where that person has acquired French citizenship subsequent to the\n\ncommission of the alleged crime.\n\n16. In other words, the rule that “nationality shall be assessed at the time of the offence for\nwhich extradition is requested” seeks to deny the extension of the benefit of French\nnationality to persons who have acquired French nationality after committing an\noffence, in order to avoid fraudulent nationality applications of offenders seeking to\n\nescape extradition.\n\n51, RUE AMPERE - 75017 PARIS ~ TE\n... [truncated, 2111 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/127 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=127]", "char_count": 2111}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 128, "text_content": "17.\n\n18.\n\n19,\n\n20\n\nAls\n\nDoon\n\nCasest:20-cr/008 BGAN Ant AdewmMent 1/202 Filedees/23/PagPage 46161518\n\nWILLIAM JULIE\nAVOCAT A LA COUR — ATTORNEY AT LAW\n\nThis concern over opportunistic nationality applications is precisely the justification of\nthe rule mentioned in academic literature (see for example Répertoire de droit pénal et\nde procédure pénale Extradition Pén. — Conditions de fond de l'extradition —\n\nDelphine Brach-Thiel-October 2018, §59).\n\nThird, the French Ministry of Justice’s interpretation is contradicted by precedents\n\nand case law\n\nThe French Ministry of Justice’s interpretation finds no support in case law, as no case\ncan be found where Article 696-4 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure was applied\n\nto protect a formerly French national from extradition.\n\nInstead, precedents exist in which Article 696-4,1° of the French Code of Criminal\nProcedure was relied on by French authorities to execute an extradition request against\nan individual who had acquired French nationality after committing an offence, which\nis the natural use of this provision (for example, a ruling issued by the Criminal Chamber\n\nof the French Cour de cassation on 4 January 2006, n°05-86.258).\n\nAlthough we have found no precedent where French authorities were faced with the\nextradition of a person who had lost French nationality, we have found cases where\nFrench authorities were faced with the deportation of a person who had lost French\nnationality. Both extradition and deportation allow for the removal of a person from\nFrench territory by the police and its surrender to the authorities of a third State, with\n\nthe consent and cooperation of the authorities of that State.\n\nThe European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”’) treats extradition and deportation\nanalogously. More specifically, the ECtHR considers that the same human rights bars\napply to all types of removal of a person from the territory of a State party (“the Court\nconsiders that the question whether there is a real risk\n... [truncated, 2354 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/128 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=128]", "char_count": 2354}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 129, "text_content": "Casest:20-cr/008aGAU Ant AGewmMent 1/202 Filedees/23/PagPage 17161518\n\nWILLIAM JULIE\nAVOCAT A LA COUR — ATTORNEY AT LAW\n\nextradition and other removals”, ECtHR 12 April 2012, Babar Ahmad and Others v.\nthe United Kingdom, no. 24027/07, §168).\n\n23. France has no difficulty with deporting individuals who have lost French nationality by\napplication of Article 25 of the Civil Code, which enumerates the list of crimes that may\ngive rise to a deprivation of citizenship. For example, a dual French-Algerian citizen\nnamed Djamel Beghal was recently deported to Algeria after he was convicted of\n\nterrorist offences and subsequently deprived of his French nationality’.\n\n24. While in custody in France, Djamel Beghal was also convicted in absentia to a term of\nprison in Algeria, but his extradition initially seemed impossible, not because he used\nto be a French citizen, but because the case law of the ECtHR specifically prohibits\nState parties from deporting persons deprived of their nationality to the State of which\nthey remain a national, when there is a risk of torture or degrading treatment’. Beghal\nwas eventually deported to Algeria where he was arrested upon landing for the purpose\nof standing trial. In this case, the French government’s decision to deprive Djamel\nBeghal of his French nationality was clearly intended to allow for his removal from\nFrance, whether through extradition or deportation, as both means of removal were\nconceivable at the time. Had there not been a risk of violation of the ECHR at the time\nof the Algerian extradition request, he may well have been extradited as opposed to\n\ndeported a few years later, when that risk was eliminated.\n\n25. In any case, the deportation of formerly French citizens shows that the loss of French\nnationality prevents any retroactive application of domestic provisions which are\n\nintended to protect French nationals, be it from deportation or extradition.\n\n* https://www.lemonde. fr/societe/article/2018/07/1 6/incertitude-sur-le-\n... [truncated, 2558 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/129 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=129]", "char_count": 2558}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 130, "text_content": "Casest:20-cr/008aGAU At AdewmMént 1/202 Filed6es/23/PagPage 48161518\n\nWILLIAM JULIE\nAVOCAT A LA COUR — ATTORNEY AT LAW\n\n26. In these circumstances, it cannot have been the intention of French lawmakers that\nArticle 696-4 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure be construed as meaning that\na person who has lost French nationality would still be entitled to be protected from\nextradition since the French government has on several occasions deported to third\ncountries individuals who had been deprived of their French nationality following the\n\ncommission of criminal offences.\n\nWilliam JULIE\n\nAvocat a la Cour\n\n————SS=—=\n\n51, RUE AMPERE - 75017 PARIS ~- TEL. O1 88 33 Si 8O- FAX. Oi 88 33 5i BI\nwj@wjavocats.com - www.wjavocats.com - PALAIS C1652\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001272\n\n", "char_count": 769}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 131, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 20-3, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page132 of 165\n\nExhibit L\n\nDoc 169\nOrder\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001273\n\n", "char_count": 109}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 132, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rQ0360uAGNt DibCumentl 1682 1FikeGOSR2/2agPlagecl 642\n\nUsSbe SDNY\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CEE\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED\n\npoc#\nDATE FILED: 3/22/21\n\nUnited States of America,\n\n_y_\n20-CR-330 (AJN)\nGhislaine Maxwell,\nORDER\nDefendant.\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell has been indicted by a grand jury on charges of conspiracy\nto entice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; enticing a\nminor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2; conspiracy\nto transport minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; transporting\nminors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423 and 2; and two charges\nof perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.\n\nOn July 14, 2020, the Court held a lengthy bail hearing and concluded that the Defendant\nwas a Clear risk of flight and that no conditions or combination of conditions would ensure her\nappearance. It therefore denied bail. On December 8, 2020, the Defendant filed a renewed\nmotion for release on bail pending trial, which was entered into the public docket on December\n14, 2020. Dkt. No. 96. On December 28, 2020, the Court denied that motion, concluding that\nthe Defendant posed a risk of flight and that no combination of conditions could ensure her\nappearance. Dkt. Nos. 104, 106.\n\nThe Defendant then filed a third motion for release on bail on February 23, 2021. Dkt.\n\nNo. 160. In this motion, the Defendant attempts to respond to the reasons that the Court\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001274\n\n", "char_count": 1626}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 133, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQ0360uAGNt DibCutrentl 1682 1FikeG OSR2/2agPlagec? 0642\n\nprovided in denying bail, proposing two additional conditions to the ones she proposed in her\nsecond motion for bail. Specifically, she offers to renounce her French and British citizenship,\nand she also proposes to have her and her spouse’s assets placed in a new account that will be\nmonitored by a retired federal judge. See Dkt. No. 160 at 2.\n\nAs set forth below, the Court concludes that none of the Defendant’s new arguments and\nproposals disturb its conclusion that the Defendant poses a risk of flight and that there are no\ncombination of conditions that can reasonably assure her appearance. Thus, for substantially the\nsame reasons that the Court denied the Defendant’s first and second motions for release, the\nCourt DENIES the Defendant’s third motion for release on bail.\n\n1. Background\n\nOn July 14, 2020, this Court held a hearing regarding the Defendant’s request for bail.\nAfter a thorough consideration of all of the Defendant’s arguments and of the factors set forth in\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the Court concluded that no conditions or combination of conditions could\nreasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance, determining as a result that the Defendant was a\nflight risk and that detention without bail was warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The\nDefendant has been incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center since that time.\n\nThe Defendant renewed her motion for release on bail on December 8, 2020. The Court\nagain denied the Defendant’s motion. In doing so, the Court explained that none of the\nDefendant’s new arguments materially impacted its conclusion that the Defendant posed a risk of\nflight. It noted that the charges, which carry a presumption of detention, are serious and carry\nlengthy terms of imprisonment if convicted; the evidence proffered by the Government,\nincluding multiple corroborating and corroborated witnesses, remained strong; the Defendant’s\n\nsubstantial resources and fore\n... [truncated, 2083 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/133 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=133]", "char_count": 2083}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 134, "text_content": "Cased 20-€FQ03604AGNt Document 1682 1FikeG OSA2/2agPlagecds’ 642\n\nescape; and that the Defendant’s lack of candor regarding her family ties and financial situations\nraised serious doubts as to her willingness to comply with any conditions imposed by the Court.\nSee Dkt. No. 106.\n\nOn February 23, 2021, the Defendant filed a third motion for release on bail. Dkt. No.\n160 (“Def. Mot.”). The Government opposed the Defendant’s motion on March 9, 2021. Dkt.\nNo. 165 (“Gov’t Opp’n’”). The Defendant filed her reply under temporary seal on March 16,\n2021.\n\nI. Legal Standard\n\nThe parties dispute whether the divestiture of jurisdiction rule precludes this Court from\ngranting the Defendant’s third bail motion while Defendant’s bail appeal is pending. See Gov’t\nOpp’n at 2-3; Reply at 2-3; see also United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1996)\n(“As a general matter, ‘the filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—\nit confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over\nthose aspects of the case involved in the appeal.’”) (citation omitted). Under Rule 37(a) of the\nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, the Court unquestionably has authority to defer\nconsidering the motion, deny the motion, or state either that it would grant the motion if the court\nof appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue. Fed. R. Crim. P.\n37(a). Because the Court denies the Defendant’s motion, it does not resolve the question of\nwhether it would have jurisdiction to grant it.\n\nPretrial detainees have a right to bail under the Eighth Amendment to the United States\nConstitution and under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seg. The Bail Reform Act\nrequires that a court release a defendant “subject to the least restrictive further condition, or\n\ncombination of conditions, that [it] determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001276\n\n", "char_count": 1975}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 135, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrO0330uATNt DibCumentl 1682 1FikeG OSA2/2agPlagect 642\n\nperson as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. §\n3142(c)(1)(B). The Court may order that the defendant be held without bail only if, after\nconsidering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the Court concludes that “no condition\nor combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and\nthe safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).\n\nAfter a court has made an initial determination that no conditions of release can\nreasonably assure the appearance of the Defendant as required, the Bail Reform Act allows the\nCourt to reopen the bail hearing if “information exists that was not known to the movant at the\ntime of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue” of whether pretrial detention is\nwarranted. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The Court is not required to do so if it determines that any new\ninformation would not have a material bearing on the issue. See United States v. Raniere, No.\n18-CR-2041 (NGG) (VMS), 2018 WL 6344202, at *2 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2018) (noting that\n“(a]s the court has already held one detention hearing, it need not hold another”); United States v.\nHavens, 487 F. Supp. 2d 335, 339 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (electing not to reopen a detention hearing\nbecause the new information would not have changed the court’s decision to detain the defendant\nuntil trial). In addition, the Court may also revisit its own decision pursuant to its inherent\nauthority, even when the circumstances do not match § 3142(f)’s statutory text. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Rowe, No. 02-CR-756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003)\n(noting that “‘a release order may be reconsidered even where the evidence proffered on\nreconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the original hearing.”); United States v.\nPetrov, No. 15-CR-66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (noting\n... [truncated, 2115 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/135 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=135]", "char_count": 2115}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 136, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rO0330uAGNt DibCumentl 1682 1FikeGOS2/(2agPlages& 0642\n\nIf, as here, there is probable cause to find that the defendant committed an offense\nspecifically enumerated in § 3142(e)(3), a rebuttable presumption arises “that no condition or\ncombination of conditions will reasonably assure” the defendant’s appearance or the safety of the\ncommunity or others. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). In such circumstances, “the defendant ‘bears a\nlimited burden of production . . . to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that\nhe does not pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight.”” United States v. English, 629\nF.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir.\n2001)); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] defendant must\nintroduce some evidence contrary to the presumed fact in order to rebut the presumption.”).\nNonetheless, “‘the government retains the ultimate burden of persuasion by clear and convincing\nevidence that the defendant presents a danger to the community,’ and ‘by the lesser standard of a\npreponderance of the evidence that the defendant presents a risk of flight.’” English, 629 F.3d at\n319 (quoting Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436); see also United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144\n(2d Cir. 1986) (“The government retains the burden of persuasion [in a presumption case].”’).\nEven when “a defendant has met his burden of production,” however, “the presumption favoring\ndetention does not disappear entirely, but remains a factor to be considered among those weighed\nby the district court.” United States v. Mattis, 963 F.3d 285, 290-91 (2d Cir. 2020).\n\nIl. Discussion\n\nThe Defendant bases her third motion for bail on the Court’s inherent powers to review\nits own bail decisions, arguing that the new conditions she proposes warrant reconsideration of\nthe Court’s earlier rulings. See Def. Mot. at 4. She also argues that the strength of the\nGovernment’s case is diminished in light\n... [truncated, 2172 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/136 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=136]", "char_count": 2172}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 137, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rQ0330uATNt DibCumentl 1682 1FikeG OSA2/2agPlages o612\n\nCourt’s view has not changed. The Court again concludes that the Government has shown by a\npreponderance of the evidence that the Defendant presents a risk of flight and that there are no\nset of conditions, including the Defendant’s third set of proposed conditions, that are sufficient to\nreasonably assure her appearance. The presumption in favor of detention, the weight of the\nevidence, and the history and characteristics of the Defendant all continue to support that\nconclusion. The Defendant’s proposed conditions do not alter the Court’s determination.\n\nA. The Court’s assessment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) factors has not changed\n\nTo begin with, the presumption in favor of detention continues to apply with equal force.\nSee Dkt. No. 106 (“Dec. Op.”) at 7-8. And though the Court again concludes that the Defendant\nhas met her burden of production, the presumption “remains a factor to be considered among\nthose weighed by the district court.” Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436 (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at\n1144). The Court is mindful “that Congress has found that these offenders pose special risks of\nflight, and that ‘a strong probability arises’ that no form of conditional release will be adequate\nto secure their appearance.” Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144 (citation omitted).\n\nThe Court’s analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) factors also remains unchanged.\nBecause the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged include crimes involving a minor\nvictim, the first 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) factor continues to weigh strongly in favor of detention.\nAnd the Court remains of the opinion that the Defendant does not pose a danger to any person or\nto the community. The fourth § 3142(g) factor thus weighs against detention.\n\nWith respect to the second § 3142(g) factor, none of the Defendant’s new arguments alter\nthe Court’s conclusion as to the weight of the evidence. The Defendant argues that the pre-trial\nmotions “raise serious l\n... [truncated, 2192 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/137 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=137]", "char_count": 2192}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 138, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrQ0360uAGNt DibCutentl 1682 1FikeGOSR2/(2agPlageo? o642\n\nof the government’s case and warrant granting bail on the conditions proposed.” Def. Mot. at 7.\nThose motions became fully briefed one week ago and are now pending before this Court. The\nGovernment strenuously contests each of the motions and the Court has not yet adjudicated\nthem. Without prejudging the merits of any of those pending motions and mindful of the\npresumption of innocence, the Court remains of the view that in light of the proffered strength\nand nature of the Government’s case, the weight of the evidence supports detention. See Dec.\nOp. at 9-10.\n\nThe Court’s assessment of the Defendant’s history and characteristics has not changed.\nSee Dec. Op. at 10-16. The Defendant continues to have substantial international ties, familial\nand personal connections abroad, substantial financial resources, and experience evading\ndetection. /d. at 10-11. And the Court’s concerns regarding the Defendant’s lack of candor\nregarding her assets when she was first arrested have also stayed the same. As the Court\nemphasized in its denial of the second motion for release on bail, the discrepancies between the\ninformation presented to the Court and to Pretrial Services in July 2020 and the information\npresented to the Court in December 2020 raised significant concerns about candor. See Dec. Op.\nat 16. There remains considerable doubt as to the Defendant’s willingness to abide by any set of\nconditions of release. /d. While there continue to be certain mitigating circumstances cutting in\nthe opposite direction, including the Defendant’s family ties in the United States, these do not\novercome the weight of the considerations that lean in favor of continued detention.\n\nAs aresult, none of the evidence or arguments presented in this third motion for bail alter\nthe Court’s assessment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) factors. While the fourth factor continues to\n\nfavor release, the first three factors and the presumption of \n... [truncated, 2056 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/138 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=138]", "char_count": 2056}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 139, "text_content": "Cased 20-C€rQ0360uAGNt DibCumentl 1682 1FikeGOS2/2agPldged’ 612\n\nthat the Defendant poses a significant risk of flight. Thus, the Court again concludes that there\nare no conditions of release that will reasonably assure her appearance in future proceedings.\n\nB. Pretrial detention continues to be warranted\n\nThe thrust of the Defendant’s argument in her third motion for bail is that the two new\nproposed conditions vitiate the Court’s concerns regarding the risk of flight. The Defendant first\noffers to renounce her French and British citizenship. Def. Mot. at 2. And she also proposes to\nhave most of her and her spouse’s assets placed in a new account that will be monitored by a\nretired federal judge, who would function as an asset monitor and will have co-signing authority\nover the account. Jd. Those conditions are offered in addition to the bail package she proposed\nin December. See Dec. Op. at 16-17; see also Def. Mot. at 2. The new bail package does not\ndisturb the Court’s conclusion that the Government has carried its burden of showing that these\nconditions are insufficient to mitigate the flight risks, and the Court again determines that no set\nof conditions—including the two new ones—can reasonably assure her future appearance.\n\nThe Court begins with the Defendant’s offer to renounce her French and United Kingdom\ncitizenship. She notes that she can renounce her UK citizenship “immediately upon granting of\nbail,” and she informs the Court that “[t]he process of renouncing her French citizenship, while\nnot immediate, may be expedited.” Def. Mot. at 4. As the Government notes, the offer is of\nunclear validity, and the relevance and practical impact of the renunciations is, at best, unclear.\nSee Gov’t Opp’n at 5. With respect to her offer to renounce her French citizenship, the Court is\nagain confronted with dueling opinions on the correct interpretation of French law. The\nGovernment relies on the position of the head of the International Criminal Assistance Bureau o\n... [truncated, 2213 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/139 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=139]", "char_count": 2213}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 140, "text_content": "Cased 20-CrO0360uAGNt DibCumentl 1682 1FikeGOSR2/2agPldges 0642\n\nnationality is assessed at the time the offense was committed, any loss of nationality subsequent\nto said offense has no bearing upon the removal proceedings and shall not supersede said\nassessment of nationality.”! Gov’t Opp’n, Ex. A at 2. The Defendant, meanwhile, relies on the\nopinion of a French legal expert who argues that nationality is assessed at the time of the\nextradition request. See Reply, Ex. A411. The Defendant’s expert concedes that there is no\ncase law addressing this precise issue. /d. § 21.\n\nExacerbating the uncertainty is the fact that the relevant legal materials also lend\nthemselves to multiple interpretations. For instance, Article 3(1) the Extradition Treaty between\nthe United States and France of April 23, 1996 provides that “[t]here is no obligation upon the\nRequested State to grant the extradition of a person who is a national of the Requested State, but\nthe executive authority of the United States shall have the power to surrender a national of the\nUnited States if, in its discretion, it deems it proper to do so. The nationality of the person\nsought shall be the nationality of that person at the time the offense was committed.” See Reply,\nEx. A ¥ 9 (emphasis added)). Article 694-4 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure similarly\nprovides that “Extradition shall not be granted . . . [w]hen the person claimed has French\nnationality, the latter being assessed at the time of the offense for which extradition is\nrequested.” Jd. | 10; see also Gov’t Opp’n, Ex. A at 2. Thus, there is considerable uncertainty\nas to the relevance of the Defendant’s offer of renunciation of her French citizenship to her\n\nability to frustrate, if not entirely bar, extradition. The Court’s assessment of the risks largely\n\n' The Court cites the translated version of the letter, though the original letter is in French.\n* Here, there are minor discrepancies between the two sides’ respective translations. \n... [truncated, 2303 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/140 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=140]", "char_count": 2303}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 141, "text_content": "CéSesb:20-CZ00 BRAUN DEcBidrt 1892 FiledeNs/22/Prag Page 4016612\n\nparallel those that the Court articulated when the Defendant proposed signing an extradition\nwaiver. See Dec. Op. at 12-13.\n\nSimilar doubts exist as to the Defendant’s offer to renounce her UK citizenship. The\nCourt is persuaded by the Government’s arguments that even if the Defendant were to renounce\nher UK citizenship, she would still likely be able to delay or resist extradition from the UK. See\nGov’t Opp’n at 6-7. And for largely similar reasons, the Court again concludes that the\nproposed conditions do not meaningfully diminish the Court’s concerns regarding the\nDefendant’s ability to flee and to frustrate or impair any subsequent extradition attempts. The\npossibility that the Defendant could successfully resist or forestall extradition heightens the\nDefendant’s incentive to flee.\n\nTo summarize, the Defendant’s willingness to renounce her French and UK citizenship\ndoes not sufficiently assuage the Court’s concerns regarding the risk of flight that the Defendant\nposes. Considerable uncertainty regarding the enforceability and practical impact of the\nrenunciations cloud whatever relevance they might otherwise have to the Court’s assessment of\nwhether the Defendant poses a risk of flight. See United States v. Cohen, No. C 10-00547 (SD,\n2010 WL 5387757, at *9 n.11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010). And that same uncertainty—and the\npossibility that she will be able to successfully resist, or at least delay, extradition—incentivizes\nflight, particularly because of the Defendant’s substantial international ties.\n\nNor does the second proposed condition materially alter the Court’s determination that no\ncondition or combination of conditions can reasonably assure the Defendant’s appearance. The\nDefendant proposes to have a retired federal judge provide oversight authority over her financial\naffairs, and, if granted, he would have the authority to restrain, monitor, and approve\n\ndisbursement of assets requiring h\n... [truncated, 2081 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/141 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=141]", "char_count": 2081}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 142, "text_content": "CaéSesb:20-CZ00BRO UMN DEcBiNdrt 1692 FiledOdS/20/Prag Page 41116612\n\nconcerns about whether the full extent of the Defendant’s assets have been disclosed in light of\nthe lack of transparency when she was first arrested. But the Court assumes, for purposes of\nresolving this motion, that the financial report that it reviewed in December is accurate and that it\naccounts for all of the Defendant’s and her spouse’s assets. See Dec. Op. at 16-17.\n\nThe monitorship condition does not reasonably assure the Defendant’s future appearance,\neven when viewed in combination with the rest of the Defendant’s bail package. The Defendant\nwould continue to have access to substantial assets—certainly enough to enable her flight and to\nevade prosecution. These include the $450,000 that the Defendant would retain for living\nexpenses and any future salaries for her or her spouse, along with other assets, including jewelry\nand other chattels, that are potentially worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. See Def. Mot. at\n5-6; see also Dkt. 97, Ex. O at 9. While those amounts may be a small percentage of the\nDefendant’s total assets, they represent a still-substantial amount that could easily facilitate\nflight. When combined with the Court’s weighing of the § 3142(g) factors and the presumption\nof detention, the Court concludes that the proposed restraints are insufficient to alter its\nconclusion that no combination of conditions can reasonably assure her appearance.\n\nIf the Court could conclude that any set of conditions could reasonably assure the\nDefendant’s future appearance, it would order her release. Yet while her proposed bail package\nis substantial, it cannot provide such reasonable assurances. As a result, the Court again\ndetermines that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the\nappearance of” the Defendant, and it denies her motion for bail on this basis. 18 U.S.C. §\n\n3142(c)(1).\n\n1]\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001284\n\n", "char_count": 1948}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 143, "text_content": "cl\n\naspne JOLNSIC soje1g poyuy\nNVHIVN ‘f NOSTTV YIOX MON YOK MON\n1707 “77 Yue :pored\n\nABN 6 “\"Y ‘CHeadduoO OS\n\n“TZOZ “PZ\n\nyoreyy Aq Jolg oY} JO UOISIOA po}oepolUN 9y} J2yDOp 0} CHUMACUO SI! Juepusjeq oy} ‘Aressooouun\n\nale SUOTJOBpal Jey} apnyjouos AsyI JT “[ZOT ‘PZ Youre Aq Joliq Ajda1 s,yUepuayaq] ay} 0}\n\nsuoloepes Aue Ajysnf pue asodoid pure Jayuos pure j90W 0} CAMACUO we sonsed sy, ‘GCAINAG\nSI ‘Q9OT ‘ON ‘TIC ‘[leq Uo asva[al JO} UOTJOU PITY} S JJOMXBIA[ SUTLISIYH JUepudjaq\n\nuOIsn[IUO,) = “AT\n\nCIGOLAD OBE a Oa /DEoooel!4 Z G/L DUPOUIAIOT IUNDWHONEOOZ4D-NZ Fsaseo\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001285\n\n", "char_count": 590}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 144, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 20-3, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page145 of 165\n\nExhibit M\n\nDoe. 159\nGhislaine Maxwell’s Letter Regarding MDC Conditions\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001286\n\n", "char_count": 156}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 145, "text_content": "Casee1240/TR00BBOHAEN Add uMént /LSe 1 Fiedsaa 672g ePag ef 163\n\nLAW OFFICES OF BOBBI C. STERNHEIAA\n\n212-243-1100 © Main 33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor\n917-306-6666 ° Cell New York, New York 10011\n888-587-4737 ° Fax bc@sternheimlaw.com\n\nFebruary 16, 2021\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nUnited States District Court\nUnited States Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\nNew York, NY 10007\n\nRe: United States v. Ghislaine Maxwell\n20 Cr. 330 (AJN)\n\nDear Judge Nathan:\n\nThe government’s recent letter regarding MDC conditions (Dkt.158) essentially repeats\nthe same points it made in defense of the MDC’s request that the Court vacate its order directing\nthe MDC to permit Ms. Maxwell to use a laptop on weekends and holidays. We appreciate the\nCourt’s concern regarding Ms. Maxwell’s opportunity to review discovery and the extent to\nwhich she is required to undergo searches. The government’s letter, however, does not include\nthe concerns defense counsel has reported to MDC Legal during the past couple of months. In\naddition, the letter incorrectly states that legal calls are available on Saturdays. Such requests by\ncounsel have been denied.\n\nBy ignoring the myriad other issues reported by counsel, the government’s letter\nmisrepresents Ms. Maxwell’s conditions of confinement. Ms. Maxwell does not have access to\ndaily discovery review for the entirety of the 13 hours. The vagaries and delays of moving her\nthe 50 feet or so from the isolation cell to the day room are a large part of the challenge.\n\nThe number of searches is also not correct. Ms. Maxwell is searched on every move,\nincluding to the empty concrete space, adjacent to the day room, used for recreation. Currently,\nshe is subject to a minimum of four pat down searches a day if she goes to rec, and five pat down\nsearches on the day of her weekly body scan. Since July 6\", Ms. Maxwell has been physically\nsearched approximately 1400 times, including pat down searches, metal wand searches, mouth,\nhair and ear searches (posing additional health \n... [truncated, 2743 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/145 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=145]", "char_count": 2743}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 146, "text_content": "Casee1240/fR00BBOHAEN Add uMént /LSP 1 Fiedsaa 672g ePage? 163\nLAW OFFICES OF BOBBI C. STERNHEIA\\\n\nAs the government states, a flashlight is pointed at the ceiling of her isolation cell every\n15 minutes, from approximately 9:30 pm to 6:30 am. It is hard to verbally convey the power of a\nlight that bounces off a concrete ceiling in a six-by-nine-foot concrete box into Ms. Maxwell’s\neyes, disrupting her sleep and ability to have any restful night. The attenuating effects of sleep\ndeprivation are well documented.\n\nMs. Maxwell continues to be at the mercy of a revolving group of security officers who\nare used to guarding hundreds of inmates but now focus their undivided attention exclusively on\none respectful, middle-aged female pretrial detainee. Recently, out of view of the security\ncamera, Ms. Maxwell was placed in her isolation cell and physically abused during a pat down\nsearch. When she asked that the camera be used to capture the occurrence, a guard replied “no.”\nWhen Ms. Maxwell recoiled in pain and when she said she would report the mistreatment, she\nwas threatened with disciplinary action. Within a week and while the same team was in charge,\nMs. Maxwell was the subject of further retaliation for reporting the abuse: a guard ordered Ms.\nMaxwell into a shower to clean, sanitize, and scrub the walls with a broom. Ms. Maxwell’s\nrequest to have the camera record the guard alone with her in the confined space was again\ndenied.\n\nMs. Maxwell spends an increasing amount of time in her isolation cell because her daily\nremoval is delayed. Her movement within that cell is restricted. Despite claims by MDC Legal\nto the contrary, guards forbid Ms. Maxwell from standing in certain areas of her six-by-nine-foot\ncell: she is not allowed to stand to the left or right of the toilet, in either corner of the isolation\ncell, and within two feet from the door. This directive encroaches on an already restricted and\nconfined area and limits her movement and use to the little space tha\n... [truncated, 3568 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/146 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=146]", "char_count": 3568}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 147, "text_content": "Casee1240/TR00BBOHAEN Add uUMEnt /LSP 1 Fiedsaa 672g ePageB1Gh3\nLAW OFFICES OF BOBBI C. STERNHEIA\\\n\nIt is impossible to overstate the deleterious effect of the conditions under which Ms.\nMaxwell is detained. Upon arrival at the MDC seven months ago, she was placed on suicide\nwatch though no competent medical professional deemed her in any manner suicidal, nor has any\npsychologist or medical staffer ever found her to be suicidal at any time during her detention.\n\nFor weeks she was deprived of legal material, the ability to use a telephone to make personal\ncalls, and the opportunity to exercise and shower. Clearly, this was an effort to avoid a\nrecurrence of the BOP’s negligence regarding Jeffrey Epstein’s death. Contrary to the way she is\nhyper-monitored, Ms. Maxwell is classified with the standard CC1-Mh designation: inmate with\nno significant mental health care.\n\nThe overall conditions of detention have had a detrimental impact on Ms. Maxwell’s\nhealth and overall well-being; and she is withering to a shell of her former self — losing weight,\nlosing hair, and losing her ability to concentrate. In addition to the many difficulties impacting\nher review of electronic discovery materials, the over-management and stress are impacting her\nstamina and effectiveness in preparing her defense and conferring with counsel.\n\nHaving been incarcerated in de facto solitary confinement for 225 days and monitored by\ntwo to six guards 24 hours a day with a handheld camera dedicated to capturing her every move,\nexcept when it would record improper conduct on the part of the guards, it is not surprising that\n\nMs. Maxwell feels she is detained under the control of the Bureau of “Pretrial Punishment.’\n\nVery truly yours,\n\nBobki C. Sternheim\n\nBOBBI C. STERNHEIM\n\ncc: All counsel\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001289\n\n", "char_count": 1803}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 148, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 20-3, 04/01/2021, 3068530, Page149 of 165\n\nExhibit N\n\nDoe. 306\nUnited States v. Dashawn Robertson,\nCase Number 17-cr-02949-MV1, District of New Mexico\nMemorandum Opinion and Order\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001290\n\n", "char_count": 221}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 149, "text_content": "Caseel217 /ot00 2extauent Body Md BAG62 Filst66206/Phg Paye df d6bd6\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nFOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nPlaintiff,\nNo. 17-CR-02949-MV-1\nVv.\nDASHAWN ROBERTSON,\nDefendant.\n\nMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER\n\nTHIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendant Dashawn Robertson’s Motion to\nReconsider Motion for Review of Detention Order and Immediate Release. Doc. 274. The\ngovernment filed a response in opposition [Doc. 282] and Mr. Robertson filed a reply [Doc. 284].\nThe United States Probation Office (USPO) also filed two memorandums addressing Mr.\nRobertson’s release. Docs. 277 and 287. The Court then discussed the motion at length with the\nparties and the USPO at the February 4, 2021 pretrial conference in this case. Doc. 297 at 4-6.\nAfter carefully considering the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged, the weight of the\nevidence against Mr. Robertson, his history and characteristics, and the potential danger to the\ncommunity posed by his release, the Court found that a combination of extremely strict conditions\ncould reasonably assure Mr. Robertson’s appearance in court and the safety of the community, as\nrequired by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Jd. The Court also found that Mr. Robertson’s release was\nnecessary to allow him to effectively prepare for his upcoming trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(4)\nbecause the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has significantly hampered his ability to meet or\ncommunicate with his attorneys. /d. The Court accordingly ordered Mr. Robertson to be released\n\nunder strict conditions to La Pasada Halfway House on February 5, 2021. See Docs. 300 and 301.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001291\n\n", "char_count": 1673}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 150, "text_content": "Caseel217 /ot00 2extauent Body Mdil BAG2 Filkt66206/PhgPaye A 6HD6\n\nIn this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court explains its release analysis under the\nBail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142. It also explains its decision to deny the government’s\nAmended Emergency Motion for Reconsideration and Stay of Release Order. Doc. 298.\n\nBACKGROUND\n\nMr. Robertson is charged in a three-count superseding indictment with Obstruction of\nJustice by Retaliating Against a Witness, Victim, or Informant, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1513(a)(1)(B); Possessing and Discharging a Firearm in Furtherance of a Crime of Violence, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition, in violation\nof 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. Doc. 86. The charges arise from his alleged act of shooting\nan individual named D.S. eight times in the early morning hours of September 12, 2017 in\nretaliation for D.S.’s cooperation with the federal government in a criminal case two years earlier.\nSee Doc. 38 at 2. Mr. Robertson pled not guilty to the charges at an arraignment held on December\n11, 2017 [Doc. 9] and a trial in the case will be set for April 5, 2021, about two months from today.\n\nAlthough presumed innocent of all charges, Mr. Robertson has been in pretrial detention\nin this case for over three years. He was arrested on December 11, 2017 and was ordered detained\nthe same day by Magistrate Judge B. Paul Briones after the Magistrate Judge found that no\ncondition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably assure the safety of the\ncommunity or his appearance in court. Doc. 12. Extensive pretrial litigation followed until the\ncase was eventually ready and set for trial on March 23, 2020. Doc. 63. The Court held a pretrial\nconference on March 10, 2020 and testimonial writs were issued. Docs. 127 and 143. Just days\nlater, however, the devastating extent of the global COVID-19 pandemic became clear and the\nChief Judge of the United States District Court for the D\n... [truncated, 2158 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/150 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=150]", "char_count": 2158}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 151, "text_content": "Caseel217 /ot00 2extauent Body Mdil BAG62 Filkt66206/Phg Pye F 6HD6\n\nLight of the Coronavirus Outbreak, 20-MC-00004-9 (D.N.M. Mar. 13, 2020) (Johnson, C.J.).\nAlmost a full year later, jury trials remain suspended in the District of New Mexico. See Jn the\nMatter of: Superseding Administrative Order 20-MC-00004-49, 21-MC-00004-04 (D.N.M. Jan.\n15, 2021) (Johnson, C.J.) (continuing the suspension of all civil and criminal jury trials through at\nleast February 28, 2021).\n\nIn the intervening 11 months, Mr. Robertson has remained in custody. During that time\nperiod, the Court set and then continued several trial dates due to the pandemic, including dates in\nDecember 2020 and February 2021. See, e.g, Doc. 271. Mr. Robertson’s trial will now be reset\nfor April 5, 2021, and the Court is hopeful that he will finally get his day in court after the extreme\nand unprecedented delay he has endured. Complicating matters, however, is the fact that the\npandemic and the resulting passage of time has led to a recent and significant change in Mr.\nRobertson’s defense team: both of his original attorneys withdrew from the case in January of this\nyear. Doc. 295. As a result, the attorneys with which he will be going to trial in two months were\nappointed in September 2020 and January 2021. Docs. 197 and 293. Although the Court would\nnot have granted the appointments if it were not sure that Mr. Robertson’s new attorneys would be\nready for trial this April, they nevertheless face the daunting task of earning their client’s trust,\npreparing for trial, and reviewing three years’ worth of litigation in a matter of months.\n\nMr. Robertson first asked the Court to consider his release in July of last year. Doc. 181.\nHe argued that his continued pretrial detention posed a risk to his health because his compromised\nimmune system makes him especially vulnerable to serious illness or death from COVID-19. /d.\nat 5. He also argued that there were conditions of release that would satisfy the requirements \n... [truncated, 2219 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/151 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=151]", "char_count": 2219}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 152, "text_content": "Caseel217 /ot00 2extauMent Body Mdil BAG62 Filkt66206/Phg Page af 66D6\n\nthat it was “very concerned” about the amount of time Mr. Robertson had been in custody up to\nthat point, especially given that the already-minimal rehabilitative and mental health services in\njail had been further reduced by the pandemic. Transcript of September 11, 2020 Status\nConference at 43-44.! The Court nevertheless found that it did not have any conditions available\nthat could reasonably assure Mr. Robertson’s appearance or the safety of the community given his\nfailure to comply with conditions of release in the past. Jd. at 44-45. The Court also noted that\nwhile it was concerned about Mr. Robertson’s ability to meet with his attorneys to prepare for trial\nduring the pandemic, it had been informed that the defense team would be able to meet in\nconference rooms in the federal courthouse in Albuquerque. Jd. at 45.\n\nMr. Robertson now asks the Court to reconsider its earlier decision denying him pretrial\nrelease. Doc. 274. As grounds for reconsideration, he points to the additional unforeseen trial\ncontinuances following the September status conference as well as new placement options,\nincluding the grandmother of his children and La Pasada Halfway House. /d.; see also Doc. 284\nat 2-3. The government opposes the requested reconsideration. Doc. 282.\n\nDISCUSSION\n1. Reconsideration is Proper on the Basis of New Evidence Previously Unavailable.\n\nAs an initial matter, Mr. Robertson has raised legitimate reasons for the Court to reconsider\nits earlier release decision. As the Court has previously explained, it is well-established in this\nCircuit that although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly authorize a motion\nfor reconsideration, such motions are proper in criminal cases. See United States v. Christy, 739\nF.3d 534, 539 (10th Cir. 2014). A district court thus may amend its interlocutory orders prior to\n\nentry of final judgment. See, e.g., Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.\n... [truncated, 2106 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/152 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=152]", "char_count": 2106}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 153, "text_content": "Caseel217 /ot00 2etauent Body Mdil BAG62 Filkt66206/Phg Paye & 6HD6\n\n1991) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a ‘motion to reconsider.’ Instead,\nthe rules allow a litigant subject to an adverse judgment to file either a motion to alter or amend\nthe judgment... or a motion seeking relief from the judgment.”); Trujillo v. Bd. of Educ. of\nAlbuquerque Pub. Sch., 212 F. App’x 760, 765 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“A district court\nhas discretion to revise interlocutory orders prior to entry of final judgment.”). Hence, “[w]hen a\nparty seeks to obtain reconsideration of a non-final order, the motion is considered ‘an\ninterlocutory motion invoking the district court’s general discretionary authority to review and\nrevise interlocutory rulings prior to entry of final judgment.’” Wagner Equip. Co. v. Wood, 289\nF.R.D. 347, 349 (D.N.M. 2013) (quoting Wagoner v. Wagoner, 938 F.2d 1120, 1122 n.1 (10th Cir.\n1991)). The Court’s authority, then, is sustained by the pragmatic reality that a “district court\nshould have the opportunity to correct alleged errors in its dispositions.” Christy, 739 F.3d at 539.\nConsequently, the district court enjoys “considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to\nreconsider.” Federated Towing & Recovery, LLC v. Praetorian Ins. Co., 283 F.R.D. 644, 651\n(D.N.M. 2012) (citing Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997)).\n\nThe scope of reconsideration, however, is narrowly cabined and far more limited than in\nan ordinary appeal. That is, a motion to reconsider is an “inappropriate vehicle[] to reargue an\nissue previously addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new arguments, or\nsupporting facts which were available at the time of the original motion.” Servants of Paraclete\nv. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Rather, “[g]rounds warranting\na motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence\npreviously unavailable, and (3) the need t\n... [truncated, 2250 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/153 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=153]", "char_count": 2250}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 154, "text_content": "Casee1217 /ot00 2etauent Body mdl BAG62 Filkt66206/Phg Paye & 6656\n\nRobertson release in September of last year, it believed that he would only remain in pretrial\ndetention for three additional months until a December 7, 2020 trial date. Doc. 194. As bad as\nthe pandemic had been to that point, the Court did not expect the federal judiciary to remain in a\nstate of near total suspension for another six months, requiring the trial to be continued twice more\nto the current April 5, 2021 trial date. Second, when the Court denied Mr. Robertson release last\nSeptember, it was under the impression that he would be able to meet with his attorneys in person\nin conference rooms at the Albuquerque courthouse, mitigating the Court’s concerns about the\ndefense team’s ability to effectively prepare for trial. See supra at 4. The Court’s impression on\nthat point turned out to be incorrect: due to concerns about inmates meeting with attorneys and\nthen bringing COVID-19 back into the jails, the idea of unrestricted attorney-client meetings at\nthe Albuquerque courthouse was ultimately rejected. Third, the Court is now able to impose\nsignificantly stricter conditions of release because of its ability to release Mr. Robertson to La\nPasada Halfway House, an option with which it was not presented last September.\nIl. Mr. Robertson’s Release to La Pasada Halfway House Under Extremely Strict\nand Carefully Tailored Conditions Will Reasonably Assure His Appearance and\nthe Safety of the Community Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).\n\nOn the merits, the Court has thoroughly considered the parties’ arguments, the UPSO’s\nrecommendations, Mr. Robertson’s Form 13 Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) and the\ninformation contained therein about his criminal history and prior performance on release, and the\napplicable law. Although the government’s concerns are understandable, the Court ultimately\nbelieves that it can reasonably assure Mr. Robertson’s appearance and the safety of the community\nby releasing him \n... [truncated, 2203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/154 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=154]", "char_count": 2203}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 155, "text_content": "Caseel217 /ot00 2extauent Body Md BAG62 Filkt66206/Phg Pye of 66D6\n\nhearing, a judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably\nassure the defendant’s appearance as required and the safety of any other person and the\ncommunity. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The government bears the burden of proving flight risk by\na preponderance of the evidence and dangerousness to any other person or the community by clear\nand convincing evidence. United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 2003). A district\ncourt’s review of a Magistrate Judge’s order of detention is de novo. See Cisneros, 328 F.3d at\n616.\n\nSection 3142(e)(2) creates a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combinations of\nconditions exist to reasonably assure a defendant’s appearance or the safety of the community\nwhere there is probable cause to believe the defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3142(e)(3)(B). As the Tenth Circuit has held:\n\nOnce the presumption is invoked, the burden of production shifts to the defendant.\n\nHowever, the burden of persuasion regarding risk-of-flight and danger to the\n\ncommunity always remains with the government. The defendant’s burden of\n\nproduction is not heavy, but some evidence must be produced. Even if a\n\ndefendant’s burden of production is met, the presumption remains a factor for\n\nconsideration by the district court in determining whether to release or detain.\nUnited States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 1991).\n\nHere, although Mr. Robertson is subject to a presumption of detention due to his § 924(c)\ncharge, see Doc. 86 at 1—2, the Court finds that he has successfully rebutted the presumption. He\nhas produced evidence, for example, that he is not a danger to the community nor a flight risk\nbecause he voluntarily turned himself in on the instant offense, despite consistently maintaining\nhis innocence and knowing the extremely long prison sentence he faced if convicted. Doc. 274 at\n5. He has al\n... [truncated, 2298 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/155 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=155]", "char_count": 2298}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 156, "text_content": "Caseel217 /ot00 2extauent Docu Mdl BAG62 Filet66206/Phg Pye & 6HD6\n\nDoc. 284 at 2—3. Mr. Robertson has met his burden of production and has rebutted the presumption\nin § 3142(e)(3)(B) that no condition or combination of conditions could meet the requirements for\nhis release.\n\nSection 3142(g) then lays out the following factors for courts to consider: (1) the nature\nand circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, a\nviolation of § 1591, a Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled\nsubstance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device; (2) the weight of the evidence against the\ndefendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (4) the nature and seriousness\nof the danger to any person or community that would be posed by the defendant’s release. 18\nU.S.C. § 3142(g).\n\nThe Court finds that although some of these factors weigh against Mr. Robertson’s release,\nthey do not foreclose relief under the strict conditions the Court has imposed. With regard to the\nnature and circumstances of the offenses charged, they are extremely serious and involve Mr.\nRobertson allegedly shooting a victim, D.S., in retaliation for his cooperation with the government\nin an earlier criminal case. As the Court stated at the November 4, 2021 pretrial conference, it\ntakes Mr. Robertson’s charges extremely seriously because the ability of witnesses to come\nforward and safely provide information to the government, and to the Court, is at the core of our\ncriminal justice system.\n\nWith regard to the weight of the evidence against Mr. Robertson, it is mixed. On the one\nhand, D.S. positively identified Mr. Robertson as the person who shot him and at least one other\nwitness, N.F., has testified that Mr. Robertson made incriminating statements in the weeks prior\nto the shooting. On the other hand, it appears that there were many people present at the time and\n\nplace of the shooting and there is evidence that D.S.’\n... [truncated, 2065 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/156 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=156]", "char_count": 2065}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 157, "text_content": "Caseel217 /ot00 2extauent Body Mdil BAG62 Filkt66206/Phg aye OF 6HD6\n\nbeen influenced by the suggestion of others, including his girlfriend at the time and the police who\ncame to question him in the hospital.\n\nWith regard to Mr. Robertson’s history and characteristics, his history of violating past\nconditions of release is a source of concern, as the Court noted when denying him release last\nSeptember. See supra at 4. More specifically, Mr. Robertson’s Form 13 PSR notes several\ninstances in which his probation was revoked for failure to comply with conditions of release.\nDoc. 188 at 8-10. Mr. Robertson also has several prior convictions. /d. However, as the defense\nhas pointed out, none of Mr. Robertson’s probation revocations appear to have involved him\nabsconding; although he has convictions for illegal firearm possession, he does not have any\nconvictions for violent offenses; and he turned himself after being charged in the instant case. /d.;\nsee also Doc. 274 at 4-5.\n\nFinally, with regard to the nature and seriousness of the danger that would be posed to any\nperson or the community by Mr. Robertson’s release, the Court understands the government’s\nconcerns given the frightening allegations in this case. Mr. Robertson is presumed innocent on all\ncharges until proven guilty, however. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142() (“Nothing in this section shall be\nconstrued as modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence.”). Presuming Mr. Robertson’s\ninnocence in this case, while he is someone who has been convicted of gun and drug offenses and\nhas failed to comply with conditions of release in the past, he is not someone with a proven history\nof violent behavior.” Nor is the Court persuaded by the government’s vague suggestions that Mr.\nRobertson might have tried to contact or intimidate witnesses in this case because it has provided\nno concrete or specific evidence to substantiate any such claims. For example, the government’s\ncryptic report that witness N.F. was allegedly contac\n... [truncated, 2232 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/157 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=157]", "char_count": 2232}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 158, "text_content": "Case4:27-€Y-O204eumién thichneh0300 2 Filed O2106/Atagedge 00 1616\n\nis not a valid reason to deny Mr. Robertson release because the government has not come forward\nwith any details to corroborate N.F.’s account or to link Mr. Robertson to the alleged contact.\n\nMore importantly, the Court has imposed a number of extremely strict and carefully\ntailored conditions of release that it believes will be more than sufficient to reasonably assure Mr.\nRobertson’s appearance and the safety of the community. Mr. Robertson will be placed at La\nPasada Halfway House, where he will be on home incarceration with active GPS tracking, the\nstrictest form of location monitoring available to the Court. Doc. 301 at 2. He will not be allowed\nto leave La Pasada for any reason other than to meet with his attorneys, and he will not be allowed\nto transport himself to those meetings; his attorneys will have to transport him. /d. He will not be\nallowed any visitors at La Pasada except for his attorneys. /d. He will not be allowed to use or\npossess a cellphone, nor to borrow anyone else’s cellphone. /d. He will not be allowed to use the\nlandline at La Pasada, except to speak to his attorneys. /d. He will not be allowed to have contact\nwith anyone other than his Pretrial Services officer and his attorneys. /d. That includes no contact\nwith his family members until he shows the Court that he is fully compliant with all of his\nconditions of release. /d. He will not be allowed to use or possess drugs or alcohol. /d. He will\nbe allowed to participate in counseling at La Pasada to help him cope with the stress of his looming\ntrial. Jd. He will be required to abide by all rules and regulations of the halfway house, however\nsmall. Jd.\n\nThe Court believes that with all of these conditions, and under the close supervision of the\nstaff at La Pasada and his Pretrial Services officer, Mr. Robertson will not pose a danger to the\ncommunity or a risk of flight. The Court also cautioned Mr. Robertson at the Febru\n... [truncated, 2234 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/158 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=158]", "char_count": 2234}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 159, "text_content": "Cass4:27-€Y-O204eumién tDhtcinehd3O0 2 Filed O2106/Atagedge of T6216\n\ncombination of conditions, that will reasonably assure Mr. Robertson’s appearance and the safety\nof any person and the community. His pretrial release is therefore required by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).\n\nlil. Mr. Robertson’s Release is Necessary for the Preparation of His Trial Defense\nUnder 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i).\n\nThe Court additionally finds that Mr. Robertson’s release is necessary for the preparation\nof his trial defense under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). That section allows a judicial officer who issued an\norder of detention to, by subsequent order, “permit the temporary release of the person, in the\ncustody of a United States marshal or another appropriate person, to the extent that the judicial\nofficer determines such release to be necessary for preparation of the person’s defense or for\nanother compelling reason.” § 3142(i).2 The defendant bears the burden of establishing their\nentitlement to temporary release under § 3142(i). United States v. Clark, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1152,\n1155 (D. Kan. 2020) (citation omitted). Courts considering whether pretrial release is necessary\nfor the preparation of the person’s defense have considered: “(1) [the] time and opportunity the\ndefendant has to prepare for the trial and to participate in his defense; (2) the complexity of the\ncase and volume of information; and (3) expense and inconvenience associated with preparing\nwhile incarcerated.” United States v. Boatwright, ---F. Supp. 3d---, No. 2:19-CR-00301-GMN-\nDJA, 2020 WL 1639855, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 2, 2020) (unreported) (citations omitted).\n\nHere, all of those factors weigh in favor of release. Because Mr. Robertson’s trial will be\n\nreset for April 5, 2021, he and his defense team have only two months left to prepare.\n\n> While the Court recognizes that Magistrate Judge Briones is the judicial officer that issued Mr.\nRobertson’s initial order of detention, this matter is before the Court on Mr. Robertson’s request that the\n... [truncated, 2606 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/159 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=159]", "char_count": 2606}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 160, "text_content": "Cased :27-Cr-O204eumién thtcinehd3O0 2 Filed O2106/Atagedgé D2 T6216\n\nComplicating matters further is the fact that both of Mr. Robertson’s initial defense attorneys have\nrecently withdrawn from the case, and both of his current attorneys have been appointed within\nthe past six months (one in the last three weeks). The defense team therefore has a considerable\namount of catching up to do in a very short amount of time, and defense counsel need to\nimmediately begin meeting with Mr. Robertson on a regular basis. The case is also complex and\nexceedingly serious. The government has named 24 witnesses on its most recent witness list [Doc.\n104] and the Court has issued upwards of 30 written orders over the past three years of contentious\npretrial litigation in this case. And if Mr. Robertson is convicted on all charges, he will be facing\ndecades in prison: according to his Form 13 PSR, Mr. Robertson’s effective guidelines range\nwould be a staggering 412 to 485 months of imprisonment, or approximately 34 to 40 years. See\nDoc. 188 at 15.\n\nFinally, defense counsel explained at the recent pretrial conference that it will be\nimpossible for them to effectively prepare the case for trial with Mr. Robertson in custody under\nthe current lockdown conditions due to COVID-19. In normal times, defense counsel can meet\nwith their clients face to face in meeting rooms at the jails, where they can review discovery and\ndo other critical trial preparation. Now, however, if the jails are allowing in-person client meetings\nat all, itis with the defendants separated from their counsel by a screen, making it nearly impossible\nto effectively review documentary evidence. And while defense counsel represented that the Santa\nFe County Detention Center is allowing video meetings by Zoom, it is hard to schedule Zoom time\ndue to the limited number of computer facilities at the jail and the number of parties vying for them\n(including this Court). Defense counsel also represented that while the Zoom me\n... [truncated, 2234 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/160 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=160]", "char_count": 2234}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 161, "text_content": "Case4:27-€r-O204eumién thtcinehd300 2 Filed G2106/Atagedge 08 1616\n\nhopes that Mr. Robertson can see them that way.\n\nThis is no way to prepare for a trial. The defense team needs to be able to meet with Mr.\nRobertson in person, unobstructed by metal bars or a plexiglass barrier, to do the critical and time-\nconsuming work of reviewing discovery, evidence, and exhibits; discussing trial strategy; and\nmaking the countless decisions which individually and collectively can make the difference\nbetween a verdict of guilty and not guilty. Mr. Robertson’s attorneys also need unobstructed\naccess to him to build the trust and confidence they need to effectively defend him at trial. They\nneed to meet with him for as long as they need to, as frequently as they need to, every day if\nnecessary. They cannot be at the mercy of the jail and its fluctuating visitation policies due to\nCOVID-19. As the past twelve months have taught us, our prisons and jails are at constant risk of\nsevere outbreaks, which at times have required multi-week lockdowns to ensure the safety of the\nstaff and inmates. The defense also cannot be at the mercy of the Court or the United States\nMarshals Service because our policies have been in constant flux as well. None of this will provide\nMr. Robertson the opportunity at a fair trial that he deserves and to which he is constitutionally\nentitled. Nor can he be made to sit in jail indefinitely, awaiting trial as a legally innocent man,\nuntil it is safe and practically possible for his attorneys to meet with him there. The status quo is\nno longer acceptable, and Mr. Robertson’s release is necessary for the preparation of his defense.\n§ 3142(4).\n\nIV. The Government Has Not Demonstrated Its Entitlement to Reconsideration or a\nStay.\n\nFinally, the Court is not persuaded by the government’s request for reconsideration or a\nstay pending appeal. See Doc. 298. In asking the Court to reconsider its order granting Mr.\nRobertson pretrial release, the government represents \n... [truncated, 2164 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/161 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=161]", "char_count": 2164}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 162, "text_content": "Cased :27-€r-O204eumién thicOmehd300 2 Filed G2106/Atagedge 4 616\n\ndecision. First, the government represents that, per the United States Marshal’s Service, “the\ninterview room at the courthouse can be made available for [Mr. Robertson] to meet with his\nattorneys to prepare for trial, for unlimited meetings and unlimited durations of meetings during\nbusiness hours, excepting only times when the Aspen courtroom is in use.” Doc. 298 at 2. There\nis a catch, however: “There is a screen in the interview room, which will allow for appropriate\nsocial distancing between [Mr. Robertson] and his lawyers.” Jd. Second, the government\nrepresents that “the Santa Fe jail is willing to provide an exception to the policy barring in-person\nattorney visits, and will work to accommodate in-person visits between Robertson and his\nattorneys.” Id.\n\nWhile the Court appreciates the government’s effort in gathering information on these\nalternatives, they do not change its decision on release. First, the Court notes that the government\ncould have, and should have, presented this information earlier if it wanted the Court to rely on\nthese alternatives to deny release. Mr. Robertson filed his motion for reconsideration on December\n21, 2020. Doc. 274. The government had a month and a half to investigate alternatives and make\nits argument against release. It cannot wait until an unfavorable ruling to present additional\nevidence that it was capable of presenting in the first instance. A motion for reconsideration is\nfor presenting new evidence that was “previously unavailable.” Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d\nat 1012.\n\nSecond, the proposed alternatives are inadequate to address the trial preparation concerns\nthe Court has articulated. The proposal to use the interview room at the Santa Fe courthouse is\ninadequate because the room, by the government’s own description, will still contain a “screen”\nbetween Mr. Robertson and his attorneys. For all of the reasons set forth above, the defense team\n\ncan\n... [truncated, 2120 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/162 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=162]", "char_count": 2120}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 163, "text_content": "Cased :27-CrO204eumién thitcinehd300 2 Filed O2106/Atagedgé 05 616\n\nline by line in a way that is not possible through a screen. The fact that the interview room will be\nunavailable when the Aspen courtroom is in use is also unacceptable because the courtroom has\nbeen, and will be, in frequent use, just as it was when the parties in this case met all day for the\nDaubert hearing and pretrial conference on February 4. The Court’s calendar is also constantly\nshifting, meaning that the defense team will have little to no ability to confidently predict when\nthey will be able to meet with Mr. Robertson. The proposal involving the Santa Fe County\nDetention Center fares no better. The government’s language is tellingly equivocal. First, it states\nthat “the Santa Fe jail is potentially willing to amend their policy that currently bars in-person\nattorney visits in response to this Court’s concerns.” Doc. 298 at 1 (emphasis added). Later, the\ngovernment writes that the jail is willing to allow in-person meetings, but that it will “work to\naccommodate in-person visits between Robertson and his attorneys.” /d. at 2 (emphasis added).\nRather than inspire confidence, the language of government’s motion reflects the high level of\nuncertainty that our jails have operated with over the last year. The truth remains that the Santa\nFe County Detention Center, like all jails, can still go into a full and indefinite lockdown at any\ntime due to the continued spread of COVID-19 (and potentially the virus’s recent and more\ninfectious variants). The Court also does not want to put the jail or the defense team at risk of\nCOVID-19 because the jail feels compelled to deviate from what it believes are its best safety\npractices. Neither of the government’s proposals are adequate to provide Mr. Robertson the\nconsistent and predictable in-person contact with his defense attorneys that he needs.\n\nFinally, the Court will not grant the requested stay pending appeal, as it noted in its earlier\nrelease or\n... [truncated, 2305 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/163 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=163]", "char_count": 2305}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 164, "text_content": "91\n\nAOdNf LORLLSIC SALVLS CALINN .\n\n\"TZOz ‘Areniqo, Jo Aep 9 sty. CALVG\n\n‘CAINAG S! [867 90] 19PiO eseapoy Jo Avig pue Jo UOT}VIOPIsUOdayY IO}\n\nUoTJO[ ADUDSIOWY POPUSWTY S,JUSWIUIZAOS SY, “TOE 90 “TZOT ‘¢ Aleniqoy UO polly ‘asvopoyy\n\nJO SUOTIPUOD BUINIS JOpIO 9Y} UI PUNO} 9q URd dSBaTAI S ,UOS}IOQOY “IJ JO SUOTIIPUOD dt} Jo [TV\n\n‘O0E 90q OS]P aay ‘CALNVUYD Aqoeioy st [plz ‘90q] ssea]oy s1eIpouMWUT] pue JopiO UOTUD}OCq JO\nMOTADY JOJ UOTOJ] JOPISUOIIYT 0} UOTJOP[ S$ ,UOSLagoY “JAY ‘QAOge YO} 19s suUOseaI OY} 1OJ\n\nNOISNTONOOD\n\n“‘QOUDIOJUOD [eLOId 9y} ye pojsossns sem sv ‘epeseg kT Je SUIALUe UOdn syoom OM}\n\nJoy suTjURIeNb 0} posmbss 9q [[IM oy JI Aqyeroodsa ‘wiry yyM oredaid 07 398 ues yt Aep AIOA9 spoou\n\nWD} BSUSJOP SY} ‘SYJUOU OA} UT [RL 0} SUIPeaY UOs}IoqoY “IAL YIM ‘poureydxa sey yNOD sy sV\n\n‘pie 867 90q__,, Apo} [Uos}Ioqoy IPI] 2Se9]OI 0} PooU o}eIPOWWUUT OU st dI9U[}],, }eU} 9oISe JINOD\n\ndU} S9OP JON “9AOQR pdj}e}s SUOSBAI dU} JO T][e OJ (TTP E § Aq poytuuoed pure (9)z7pT¢ § Aq posnba\n\nSI OSBOIOI S UOSLaqgoOY “IJ JeY} SOADI[9q I Osnevdaq [eadde s}I Jo s}IOW dy} UO psdd9Ons 0} ATOYI] ST\n\nOGM 9¢ SHPeHeEZ/OOLED DSIIYZ QUECUAWNITUAMAEHECOAI-LE: PSSBO\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001306\n\n", "char_count": 1187}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 165, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 22, 04/01/2021, 3068583, Page‘ of 2\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\nDate: April 01, 2021 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 21-58 DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-\n1\nDC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nCITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nNOTICE OF DEFECTIVE FILING\n\nOn April 01, 2021 the Notice of Appearance as Additional Counsel, on behalf of the Appellee\nUnited States of America, was submitted in the above referenced case. The document does not\ncomply with the FRAP or the Court's Local Rules for the following reason:\n\n____ Failure to submit acknowledgment and notice of appearance (Local Rule 12.3)\n___ Failure to file the Record on Appeal (FRAP 10, FRAP 11)\n_ Missing motion information statement (7-/080 - Local Rule 27.1)\n_ Missing supporting papers for motion (e.g, affidavit/affirmation/declaration) (FRAP 27)\n______ Insufficient number of copies (Local Rules: 21.1, 27.1, 30.1, 31.1)\n____ Improper proof of service (FRAP 25)\n___ Missing proof of service\n____ Served to an incorrect address\n____ Incomplete service (Anders v. California 386 U.S. 738 (1967))\n_ Failure to submit document in digital format (Local Rule 25.1)\n____ Not Text-Searchable (Local Rule 25.1, Local Rules 25.2), click here\nfor instructions on how to make PDFs text searchable\n____ Failure to file appendix on CD-ROM (Local Rule 25.1, Local Rules 25.2)\n____ Failure to file special appendix (Local Rule 32.1)\n____ Defective cover (FRAP 32)\n___ Incorrect caption (FRAP 32)\n__ Wrong color cover (FRAP 32)\n_______ Docket number font too small (Local Rule 32.1)\n____ Incorrect pagination, click here for instructions on how to paginate PDFs\n(Local Rule 32.1)\n___ Incorrect font (FRAP 32)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001307\n\n", "char_count": 1925}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 166, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 22, 04/01/2021, 3068583, Page2 of 2\n\n___ Oversized filing (FRAP 27 (motion), FRAP 32 (brief)\n______ Missing Amicus Curiae filing or motion (Local Rule 29.1)\n___ Untimely filing\n\n____ Incorrect Filing Event\n\n__X__ Other: MUST INCLUDE BOTH DOCKET NUMBERS 21-58 (L) and 21-770\n\ncon).\n\nPlease cure the defect and resubmit the document, with the required copies if necessary,\nno later than April 05, 2021. The resubmitted documents, if compliant with FRAP and the Local\nRules, will be deemed timely filed.\n\nFailure to cure the defect by the date set forth above will result in the document being\nstricken. An appellant's failure to cure a defective filing may result in the dismissal of the appeal.\n\nInquiries regarding this case may be directed to 212-857-8577.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001308\n\n", "char_count": 799}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 167, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 23, 04/01/2021, 3068597, Page‘ of 1\nNOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR SUBSTITUTE, ADDITIONAL, OR AMICUS COUNSEL\n\nShort Title: United States v. Maxwell Docket No.: 21-58(L), 21-770(CON)\n\nSubstitute, Additional, or Amicus Counsel’s Contact Information is as follows:\n\nName: Thomas McKay\n\nFirm: United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York\n\nAddress: One St. Andrew's Plaza\n\nTelephone: (212) 637-2268 Fax: (212) 637-0128\n\nE-mail. thomas.mckay@usdoj.gov\n\nAppearance for; United States of America/Appellee\n\n(party/designation)\nSelect One;\n[Substitute counsel (replacing lead counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[_]Substicute counsel (replacing other counsel: )\n(name/firm)\n[Vv] Additional counsel (co-counsel with: Won Shin/U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York )\n(name/firm)\n[ ]Amicus (in support of : )\n(party/ designation)\nCERTIFICATION\nI certify that:\n[vl am admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by Interim Local Rule 46.1(a)(2), have renewed\nOR\n\nmy admission on\n\n[It applied for admission on\n\nSignature of Counsel: Is/\n\nType or Print Name: [homas McKay\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001309\n\n", "char_count": 1134}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 168, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 31, 04/05/2021, 3070287, Page‘ of 2\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\nDate: April 05, 2021 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 21-58 DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-\n1\nDC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nCITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nNOTICE OF DEFECTIVE FILING\n\nOn April 05, 2021 the Notice of Appearance as Additional Counsel, on behalf of the Appellee\nUnited States of America, was submitted in the above referenced case. The document does not\ncomply with the FRAP or the Court's Local Rules for the following reason(s):\n\n____ Failure to submit acknowledgment and notice of appearance (Local Rule 12.3)\n____ Failure to file the Record on Appeal (FRAP 10, FRAP 11)\n\n___ Missing motion information statement (7-/080 - Local Rule 27.1)\n______ Missing supporting papers for motion (e.g, affidavit/affirmation/declaration) (FRAP 27)\n_____ Insufficient number of copies (Local Rules: 21.1, 27.1, 30.1, 31.1)\n\n______ Improper proof of service (FRAP 25)\n__ Missing proof of service\n____ Served to an incorrect address\n____ Incomplete service (Anders v. California 386 U.S. 738 (1967))\n____ Failure to submit document in digital format (Local Rule 25.1)\n____ Not Text-Searchable (Local Rule 25.1, Local Rules 25.2), click here\nfor instructions on how to make PDFs text searchable\n____ Failure to file appendix on CD-ROM (Local Rule 25.1, Local Rules 25.2)\n____ Failure to file special appendix (Local Rule 32.1)\n____ Defective cover (FRAP 32)\n___ Incorrect caption (FRAP 32)\n__ Wrong color cover (FRAP 32)\n_______ Docket number font too small (Local Rule 32.1)\n____ Incorrect pagination, click here for instructions on how to paginate PDFs\n(Local Rule 32.1)\n___ Incorrect font (FRAP 32)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001310\n\n", "char_count": 1941}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 169, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 31, 04/05/2021, 3070287, Page2 of 2\n\n_____ Oversized filing (FRAP 27 (motion), FRAP 32 (brief))\n______ Missing Amicus Curiae filing or motion (Local Rule 29.1)\n___ Untimely filing\n____ Incorrect Filing Event\nx Other: IF COUNSEL WISHES TO BE ADDED TO BOTH CASES, YOU MUST\n\nLIST BOTH DOCKET NUMBERS ON THE FORM 21-58 — L AND 21-770 CON.\n\nPlease cure the defect and resubmit the document, with the required copies if necessary,\nno later than April 07, 2021. The resubmitted documents, if compliant with FRAP and the Local\nRules, will be deemed timely filed.\n\nFailure to cure the defect by the date set forth above will result in the document being\nstricken. An appellant's failure to cure a defective filing may result in the dismissal of the appeal.\n\nInquiries regarding this case may be directed to 212-857-8577.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001311\n\n", "char_count": 853}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 170, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 33, 04/05/2021, 3070417, Page‘ of 2\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse\n40 Foley Square\n\nNew York, NY 10007\nDEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE\nCHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT\nDate: April 05, 2021 DC Docket #: 1:20-cr-330-1\nDocket #: 21-770 DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell CITY)\n\nDC Judge: Nathan\n\nNOTICE OF DEFECTIVE FILING\n\nOn April 05, 2021the Acknowledgment and Notice of Appearance, was submitted in the above\nreferenced case. The document does not comply with the FRAP or the Court's Local Rules for\nthe following reason:\n\n____ Failure to submit acknowledgment and notice of appearance (Local Rule 12.3)\n____ Failure to file the Record on Appeal (FRAP 10, FRAP 11)\n___ Missing motion information statement (7-/080 - Local Rule 27.1)\n____ Missing supporting papers for motion (e.g, affidavit/affirmation/declaration) (FRAP 27)\n____ Insufficient number of copies (Local Rules: 21.1, 27.1, 30.1, 31.1)\n\n______ Improper proof of service (FRAP 25)\n\nX___ Missing proof of service\n_____ Served to an incorrect address\n\n____ Incomplete service (Anders v. California 386 U.S. 738 (1967))\n\n____ Failure to submit document in digital format (Local Rule 25.1)\n\n____ Not Text-Searchable (Local Rule 25.1, Local Rules 25.2), click here\n\nfor instructions on how to make PDFs text searchable\n____ Failure to file appendix on CD-ROM (Local Rule 25.1, Local Rules 25.2)\n____ Failure to file special appendix (Local Rule 32.1)\n____ Defective cover (FRAP 32)\n____ Incorrect caption (FRAP 32)\n______ Wrong color cover (FRAP 32)\n_______ Docket number font too small (Local Rule 32.1)\n_____ Incorrect pagination, click here for instructions on how to paginate PDFs\n(Local Rule 32.1)\n\n___ Incorrect font (FRAP 32)\n___ Oversized filing (FRAP 27 (motion), FRAP 32 (brief))\n____ Missing Amicus Curiae filing or motion (Local Rule 29.1)\n____ Untimely filing\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001312\n\n", "char_count": 1976}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 171, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 33, 04/05/2021, 3070417, Page2 of 2\n\n___ Incorrect Filing Event\nX__ Other: PLEASE RE-FILE UNDER BOTH DOCKET NUMBERS 21-58 — L AND\n\n21-770 (con). THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT FOR MUST ALSO LIST THE LEAD\nDOCKET NUMBER.\n\nPlease cure the defect and resubmit the document, with the required copies if necessary,\nno later than April 07, 2021 resubmitted documents, if compliant with FRAP and the Local\nRules, will be deemed timely filed.\n\nFailure to cure the defect by the date set forth above will result in the document being\nstricken. An appellant's failure to cure a defective filing may result in the dismissal of the appeal.\n\nInquiries regarding this case may be directed to 212-857-8577.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001313\n\n", "char_count": 720}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 172, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 34, 04/05/2021, 3070625, Page’ of 1\n\nACKNOWLEDGMENT AND NOTICE OF APPEARANCE\n\nCel\n\nShort Title: United States of America v. Maxwell Docket No.: 21-770/21-58\n\nLead Counsel of Record (name/firm) or Pro se Party (name): David Oscar Markus, Markus/Moss PLLC\n\nAppearance for (party/designation): Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nDOCKET SHEET ACKNOWLEDGMENT/AMENDMENTS\n\nCaption as indicated is:\n\n(v }) Correct\n\n(im) Incorrect. See attached caption page with corrections.\n\nAppellate Designation is:\nCorrect\nC) Incorrect. The following parties do not wish to participate in this appeal:\nParties:\n(im) Incorrect. Please change the following parties’ designations:\nParty Correct Designation\n\nContact Information tor Lead Counsel/Pro Se Party is:\nCorrect\n\nC) Incorrect or Incomplete. As an e-filer, I have updated my contact information in the PACER “Manage My Account” screen.\n\nName: David Oscar Markus\n\nFirm: Markus/Moss PLLC\n\nAddress: 40 NW Third Street, PH 1, Miami, Florida 33128\n\nTelephone: (305)379-6667————“—‘“—;*C™S™S~™~CSCCé ax (308)379-OOSB\n\nEmail: dmarkus@markuslaw.com\n\nRELATED CASES\n\nC) This case has not been betore this Court previously.\nO This case has been before this Court previously. The short title, docket number, and citation are:\n\n(v}) Matters related to this appeal or involving the same issue have been or presently are betore this Court. The short titles,\ndocket numbers, and citations are: United States of America v. Maxwell, Case Number 21-58.\n\nCERTIFICATION\n\nI certify that I am admitted to practice in this Court and, if required by LR 46.1(a)(2), have renewed my admission on\nOR that C) 1 applied tor admission on or renewal on\nIf the Court has not yet admitted me or approved my renewal, I have completed Addendum A.\nSignature ot Lead Counsel ot Record: /s/ David Oscar Markus\nType or Print Name: David Oscar Markus\nOR\nSignature of pro se litigant:\nType or Print Name:\n(im) Iama pro se litigant who is not an attorney.\nO Iam an incarcerated pro se litigant.\n\nDOJ-OGR-0\n... [truncated, 2009 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00001142/172 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00001142&page=172]", "char_count": 2009}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 173, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 38, 04/12/2021, 3075291, Page1 of 3\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\nThurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500\n\nMOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT\n\nLeave to file exhibit under seal\n\nMotion for:\n\nee __Caption[use short tile]\n\nSet forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:\n\nThe Government seeks leave to file exhibit under seal\n\nUnited States v. Maxwell\n\nMOVING PARTY: United States of America\n\nDefendant\n|Appellant/Petitioner 4 |Appellee/Respondent\n\nAudrey Strauss, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York\nMOVING ATTORNEY: %\n\nOPPOSING PARTY: Ghislaine Maxwell\n\nOPPOSING ATTORNEY: David Markus\n\n[name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]\n\nBy: Lara Pomerantz, Assistant U.S. Attorney\n\nOne Saint Andrew's Plaza, New York, NY 10007\n\nCourt- Judge/ Agency appealed from:\n\nMarkus/Moss PLLC\n\n40 NW Third Street, PH 1, Miami, FL 33128\n\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan, United States District Judge, Southern District of New York\n\nPlease check appropriate boxes:\n\nHas movant notified_opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1):\n|v [Yes | __|No (explain):\n\nOpposing counsel’s position_on motion:__\nlv {Unopposed | |Opposed| _| Don’t Know\nDoes opposing counsel intend to file a response:\n[Yes |No lv Don’t Know\n\nIs oral argument on motion requested?\n\nHas argument date of appeal been set?\n\nSignature of Moving Attorney:\ns/ Lara Pomerantz\n\nDate: 04/12/21\n\nForm T-1080 (rev. 12-13)\n\nFOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND\nINJUCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:\n\nHas this request for relief been made below?\nHas this relief been previously sought in this court?\nRequested return date and explanation of emergency:\n\nINo\n|No\n\nYes |\nYes |\n\nlYes lv INo (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)\n\nlV] ves] |No Ifyes, enter date: April 26, 2021\n\nService by: lv iCM/ECF | Other [Attach proof of service]\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001315\n\n", "char_count": 1947}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 174, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 38, 04/12/2021, 3075291, Page2 of 3\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\nwee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee x\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : AFFIRMATION\nAppellee, :\n-V.- : Docket Nos. 21-58, 21-\n: 770\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant-Appellant,\n-- eee ee eee eee eee eee eee eee ee x\nSTATE OF NEW YORK )\nCOUNTY OF NEW YORK : SS.\n\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK )\n\nLARA POMERANTZ, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby affirms under penalty of\nperjury:\n\n1. I am an Assistant United States Attorney in the Office of Audrey Strauss, United\nStates Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and I represent the Government in this\nappeal. I submit this affirmation in support of the Government’s motion to file an unredacted copy\nof Exhibit F, the Government’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant’s Renewed Motion\nfor Release, under seal.\n\n2. Counsel for the Defendant-Appellant filed publicly a redacted version of Exhibit F,\nwhich was the version publicly filed on the docket in this case. (Dkt. No. 100). The redactions to\nthat document are narrowly tailored to cover (1) information implicating the privacy interests of\nthird parties previously articulated by the defense (Dkt. No. 86), and (2) Confidential Material\nproduced by the Government in discovery and governed by the protective order in this case (Dkt.\nNo. 36). The Government believes that some of the redacted information is pertinent to this appeal\n\nand therefore seeks leave to file an unredacted copy of Exhibit F under seal.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001316\n\n", "char_count": 1557}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00001142", "page_number": 175, "text_content": "Case 21-770, Document 38, 04/12/2021, 3075291, Page3 of 3\n\n3. The Government has communicated with counsel for the Defendant-Appellant,\n\nwho does not object to this request.\n\n4, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.\n\nDated: New York, New York\nApril 12, 2021\n\n/s/ Lara Pomerantz\n\nLara Pomerantz\n\nAssistant United States Attorney\nTelephone: (212) 637-2343\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001317\n", "char_count": 409}]}