{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_count": 159, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00000034", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/DOJ-OGR-00000034.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "No. 24-\n\nIN THE\n\nSupreme Court of the Anited States\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 1,\n\nPetitioner,\nVv.\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nRespondent.\n\nOn Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nfor the Second Circuit\n\nPETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI\n\nDAVID OSCAR MARKUS\n\nCounsel of Record\nMARKUS/Moss PLLC\n40 N.W. Third Street\nPenthouse One\nMiami, FL 33128\n(305) 379-6667\n\ndmarkus@markuslaw.com\nCounsel for Petitioner\nApril 10, 2025\n\nWILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000034\n", "char_count": 558}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "QUESTION PRESENTED\n\nThis Court long has recognized that “when a plea\nrests in any significant degree on a promise or\nagreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to\nbe part of the inducement or consideration, such\npromise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404\nUS. 257 (1971). And, of course, it is well settled that\nplea agreements and non-prosecution agreements are\ninterpreted using ordinary principles of contract\nconstruction, requiring that the plain language of the\nagreement must govern interpretation and _ that\nambiguities must be resolved against the Government.\nNevertheless, Circuits are split on whether promises\nin a plea agreement in one district on behalf of the\n“United States” or the “Government” binds the\nGovernment in other districts.\n\nThe question presented here is:\n\nUnder Santobello and common principles of contract\ninterpretation, does a promise on behalf of the\n“United States” or the “Government” that is made by a\nUnited States Attorney in one district bind federal\nprosecutors in other districts?\n\n(i)\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000035\n", "char_count": 1067}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "i\nPARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING\n\nPetitioner Ghislaine Maxwell was the Defendant in\nthe district court and the Appellant in the Second\nCircuit. Respondent is the United States.\n\nRELATED PROCEEDINGS\n\nThis case arises from the following proceedings:\n\ne United States v. Maxwell, 118 F.4th 256 (2d\nCir. 2024), reh’g denied, November 25, 2024.\nJudgment entered September 17, 2024.\n\ne United States v. Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d 299\n(S.D.N.Y. 2021).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000036\n", "char_count": 456}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nQUESTION PRESENTED...0 ee eeeeeeee\nPARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS...\nRELATED PROCEEDINGS ..0.. eects\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1.00. eeeeeee\nOPINIONS BELOW |... eeeeeeeeesneeeesneeeeenees\nJURISDICTION ooo. eeceeesseeeeeseeeesseeeeeees\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL AND\nSTATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED......\n\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE oo eee\nPROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ..... ee\n\nA.\n\nB.\n\nC.\n\nEntry of the Non-Prosecution Agree-\n\nREASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION..\n\nI.\n\nThe circuits are split as to whether a\npromise on behalf of the “United States”\nor the “Government” by a United States\nAttorney’s office in one district is binding\nupon United States Attorney’s offices in\nOther districts ................cccssssssssessssssesssseeees\n\n(iii)\n\nPage\n\ni\ni\n\nal\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000037\n", "char_count": 759}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "II.\n\nlv\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued\n\nA. The Third, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth\nCircuits have faithfully applied\nSantobello’s instruction that promises\nin plea agreements must be binding\non the government, applying basic\nprinciples of contract law to find that\nobligations entered into on behalf of\nthe “United States” or the\n“Government” apply to the federal\ngovernment throughout the nation ....\n\nB. The Second and the Seventh Circuits\napply the opposite presumption. They\nrefuse to enforce a promise made on\nbehalf of the “United States” or “the\nGovernment” except against the\nparticular United States Attorney’s\noffice which entered into the\nagreement, unless the agreement\nexpressly reiterates that the term\n“United States” does in fact mean the\nentire country as a whole................066\n\nThe Second Circuit's decision below is\nwrong and violates the principles set\nforth in this Court’s prior opinions ..........\n\nA. Both Annabi and the opinion below\nwere wrongly decided under\nSantobello and Giglio ...........cccccccceeeeeee\n\nB. Ordinary principles of contract\ninterpretation compel Annabi and\nMaxwell to be reversed.............:::0000008\n\nPage\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000038\n", "char_count": 1189}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Vv\nTABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued\n\nC. The available evidence suggests that\nthe NPA was meant to bind the\nSouthern District of New York ...........\n\nIII. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving\nthe split over this important and\nYECULTING QUESTION ...........ccccceeeseeceeeeeeeeeeees\n\nCONCLUSION ooo. eeeeeeeeeeneeeeeseeeeesneeeeaees\nAPPENDIX\n\nPage\n\n16\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000039\n", "char_count": 371}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "al\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\n\nCASES Page(s)\nGiglio v. United States,\n405 U.S. 150 (1972)... cc ccccceeeeeeeeees 8, 13, 14\nCommonwealth v. Cosby,\n666 Pa. 416, 252 A.3d 1092 (Pa. 2021)..... 14\nIn re Altro,\n180 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1999)... eee 16\n\nMargalli-Olvera v. Immigration and\nNaturalization Service,\n\n43 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 1994)... 10, 15\nSantobello v. New York,\n404 U.S. 257 (1971)... ccccccccceceeeeeeeeeees 7, 8,13\n\nThomas v. Immigration and\nNaturalization Service,\n\n35 F.3d 13832 (9th Cir. 1994)... 10, 11\nThompson v. United States,\n431 F. App’x 491 (7th Cir. 2011) .............. 12,16\n\nUnited States v. Annabi,\n771 F.2d. 670 (2d Cir. 1985).....6, 11, 12, 16, 18\n\nUnited States v. Carmichael,\n\n216 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2000)........... eee 16\nUnited States v. Carter,\n\n454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972)... 9, 10\nUnited States v. Gebbie,\n\n294 F.3d 540 (8d Cir. 2002)... 9\nUnited States v. Johnston,\n\n199 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1999)... 11\nUnited States v. Jordan,\n\n509 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2007)................0000 14\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000040\n", "char_count": 1026}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Vil\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued\nPage(s)\n\nUnited States v. Maxwell,\n118 F.4th 256 (2d Cir. 2024).... 1, 6, 8, 12, 16-18\n\nUnited States v. Maxwell,\n534 F. Supp. 3d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)........ 1\n\nUnited States v. McDowell,\nNo. 94-CR-787-1, 2006 WL 1896074\n\n(N.D. Tl]. 2006) ......... eee eeeeeeeessseeeseeeeees 12\nUnited States v. O’Doherty,\n64 F.3d 209 (7th Cir. 2011)... eee 16\nUnited States v. Rubbo,\n396 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2005)................. 15\nUnited States v. Transfiguracion,\n442 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2006)................... 16\nUnited States v. Van Thournout,\n100 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 1996)... 10, 14\nUnited States v. Warner,\n820 F.3d 678 (4th Cir. 2016).................000 14\nUnited States v. Williams,\n102 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 1996)... 14, 15\nSTATUTES\n18 U.S.C. § 2255 oo... cccecccccscccccceessssssneeeeeeees 2,15\n28 U.S.C. § 12541)... cccccessssseeeeeeeeeeeeees 1\nRULES\nFed. R. Civ. P. 35(D)..... cc cccccceeeessseseteeeeeees 12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000041\n", "char_count": 961}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "vill\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued\nOTHER AUTHORITIES Page(s)\n\nAntonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,\nReading Law: The Interpretation of\nLegal Texts (2012) ......eeeccccccccceeeeeeeeeeees 15,17\n\nU.S. Dept. of Justice, Justice Manual\n(updated Feb. 2018), https:/AWwww.just\nice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-\nPYOSCCULION ...........ceeeccccceeseececeeeseeceeeeeseeeeees 18\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000042\n", "char_count": 392}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI\n\nGhislaine Maxwell respectfully petitions for a writ\nof certiorari to review the judgment of the United\nStates Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.\n\nOPINIONS BELOW\n\nThe opinion of the Second Circuit (App.1) is reported\nat United States v. Maxwell, 118 F.4th 256 (2d Cir.\n2024). The Second Circuit’s order denying Maxwell’s\npetition for rehearing en banc (App.92) is not pub-\nlished in the Federal Reporter. The district court’s\norder denying Maxwell’s motion to dismiss (App.52) is\navailable at United States v. Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d\n299 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).\n\nJURISDICTION\n\nThe Second Circuit issued its opinion on September\n17, 2024. Maxwell’s motion for en banc review was\ndenied on November 25, 2024. This Court has\njurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254.\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY\nPROVISIONS INVOLVED\n\nThere are no pertinent constitutional or statutory\nprovisions involved in the matter at issue in this case.\n\nSTATEMENT OF THE CASE\n\nDespite the existence of a non-prosecution agree-\nment promising in plain language that the United\nStates would not prosecute any co-conspirator of\nJeffrey Epstein, the United States in fact prosecuted\nGhislaine Maxwell as a co-conspirator of Jeffrey\nEpstein.\n\nOnly because the United States did so in the Second\nCircuit and not elsewhere, her motion to dismiss the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000043\n", "char_count": 1358}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "2\n\nindictment was denied, her trial proceeded, and she\nis now serving a 20 year sentence. In light of\nthe disparity in how the circuit courts interpret the\nenforceability of a promise made by the “United\nStates,” Maxwell’s motion to dismiss would have\nbeen granted if she had been charged in at least four\nother circuits (plus the Eleventh, where Epstein’s\nagreement was entered into). This inconsistency in the\nlaw by which the same promise by the United States\nmeans different things in different places should be\naddressed by this Court.\n\nPROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n\nA. Entry of the Non-Prosecution Agreement.\n\nIn September 2007, after an extended period of\nnegotiation with high-level representatives of the\nUnited States that included Main Justice, Jeffrey\nEpstein entered into a non-prosecution and plea\nagreement (“NPA”) with the United States Attorney’s\nOffice for the Southern District of Florida. (App.24-\n38). In return for pleading guilty to state charges in\nFlorida, receiving and serving an eighteen-month\nsentence, and consenting to jurisdiction and liability\nfor civil suits under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, the United\nStates agreed not to prosecute Epstein in the Southern\nDistrict of Florida for the offenses from 2001-2007\nthen under investigation. In addition, after lengthy\nnegotiations, the United States agreed that “[iJn\nconsideration of Epstein’s agreement to plead guilty\nand provide compensation in the manner described\nabove, if Epstein successfully fulfills all of the terms of\nthis agreement, the United States also agrees that it\nwill not institute any criminal charges against any\npotential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not\nlimited to [four named individuals].” (App.30-31).\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000044\n", "char_count": 1725}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "3\n\nThis co-conspirator clause, containing no geographic\nlimitation on where in the United States it could be\nenforced, was actively negotiated at the same time as\nthe terms of Epstein’s protection for his own criminal\nprosecution, which was expressly limited to a bar on\nprosecutions in the Southern District of Florida only\n(App.26). A previous version of the co-conspirator\nlanguage limited it to the Southern District of Florida\nbefore it was amended to refer more broadly to the\n“United States,” and the co-conspirator clause was\nrelocated in the document. (App.95, 108-126). The\nNPA also contained an express recitation that it was\nnot binding on the State Attorney’s office in Florida\n(App.30), but it contained no such recitation setting\nforth that it was not binding on other United States\nAttorney’s offices.\n\nRelying on the NPA, Epstein pleaded guilty in\nFlorida state court on June 30, 2008, and fulfilled all\nhis obligations under the NPA.\n\nB. Criminal Proceedings in the District Court.\n\nIn July 2019, Epstein was indicted in the Southern\nDistrict of New York on charges of sex trafficking and\nconspiracy related to conduct in Florida and New York\nbetween 2003 and 2005. The NPA did not pose an\nimpediment to this indictment because Epstein’s\nprotection therein had been limited to charges brought\nin the Southern District of Florida. Epstein died while\nincarcerated on August 10, 2019.\n\nOne year later, after Epstein died in jail, Ghislaine\nMaxwell was indicted in the Southern District of\nNew York for her alleged actions as a co-conspirator\nof Epstein, on charges that were the same as had\nbeen brought against Epstein. Initially, Maxwell was\ncharged with crimes in the 1994 to 1997 timeframe,\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000045\n", "char_count": 1728}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "4\n\npresumably in an effort to circumvent the time frame\ncovered by the NPA.\n\nOn March 29, 2021, the government added in its\nsuperseding indictment an alleged sex trafficking\noffense (Count Six) related to conduct and offenses\nwholly within the timeframe and subject matter cov-\nered by the NPA. The sole complainant to the allega-\ntions in Count Six had been presented to the Grand\nJury in the Southern District of Florida and her\nevidence formed the basis of a conspiracy charge and\na sex trafficking charge in a proposed indictment of\nEpstein that was dropped pursuant to the terms of\nthe NPA. Thus, the complainant’s allegations were\npart of those for which Epstein pleaded guilty and\npaid restitution, in exchange (in part) for his co-\nconspirators to be immune from prosecution.\n\nMaxwell moved to dismiss based on the express\nplain language of the NPA which precluded charges by\nthe United States against any co-conspirator of\nEpstein:\n\nIn consideration of Epstein’s agreement to\nplead guilty and to provide compensation\nin the manner described above, if Epstein\nsuccessfully fulfills all the terms and condi-\ntions of this agreement, the United States also\nagrees that it will not institute any criminal\ncharges against any potential co-conspirators\nof Epstein, including but not limited to\n[four named individuals]...\n\n(App.30-31) (emphasis added). Alternatively, Maxwell\nsought discovery and a hearing to establish affirma-\ntive evidence of intent to bind the United States as a\nwhole.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000046\n", "char_count": 1512}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "5\n\nMaxwell’s motion was denied without a hearing.\nAlthough the district court did not order discovery, it\ndid order the government to disclose to Maxwell\n“any evidence supporting a defense under the NPA.”\nThe government responded that its review “did not\ninclude search terms relevant to the NPA, and the\nGovernment has not searched [the SDFL prosecutor’s]\ninbox for communications relating to the NPA.” It also\nstated that it did not intend to request or review\nemails for any other USAO-SDFL or Department of\nJustice attorney or otherwise perform a comprehen-\nsive review of the internal e-mails of that prosecutor’s\noffice from its wholly separate investigation, including\nby asking for any other material gathered by OPR as\npart of its investigation.\n\nThe District Court found that Maxwell was a\nbeneficiary of the NPA and had standing to enforce its\nterms, but concluded that the NPA did not grant\nimmunity to Maxwell in the Southern District of\nNew York. The case proceeded to trial and the jury\nfound Maxwell guilty on, inter alia, Count Six.\n(App.39). She was sentenced to a 240 month (20 year)\nterm of incarceration. (App.41).\n\nIn 2019, the Department of Justice Office of Profes-\nsional Responsibility (“OPR”) issued a lengthy report\non its extensive investigation into whether the federal\ngovernment’s 2007-08 resolution of the federal inves-\ntigation of Epstein through the NPA was improper.\nSee Appendix F, Excerpts of the Department of Justice\nOffice of Professional Responsibility Report (App.93).\nOPR’s investigation overlapped the prosecutions\nof Epstein and Maxwell in the Southern District of\nNew York. The OPR report did not contain a finding\nas to whether the co-conspirator clause of the NPA\nbound districts other than the Southern District of\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000047\n", "char_count": 1784}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "6\n\nFlorida, but it reported that “witnesses” (none of whom\nwere on the defense side) stated that the clause\nprovided transactional immunity and that it “found\nno policy prohibiting a U.S. Attorney from declining\nto prosecute third parties or providing transactional\nimmunity.” (App.128-129).\n\nC. The Second Circuit’s Decision.\n\nOn appeal, Maxwell argued that the NPA barred her\nprosecution in the Southern District of New York by\nits express language. The Second Circuit disagreed,\naffirming the district court’s opinion that under United\nStates v. Annabi, 771 F.2d. 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985), the\nco-conspirator clause in the NPA did not preclude\nMaxwell’s prosecution in the Southern District of\nNew York notwithstanding that the clause expressly\nstated that the “United States” is barred from such a\nprosecution. United States v. Maxwell, 118 F.4th 256\n(2d. Cir. 2024). The court applied Annabi even though\nthe NPA had been negotiated in the Eleventh Circuit\nwhere no similar precedent exists or applies. The\nparties certainly expected that the law of the Eleventh\nCircuit, where the NPA was entered into, would apply.\n\nNevertheless, quoting Annabi, the Second Circuit\nheld that “[a] plea agreement binds only the office of\nthe United States Attorney for the district in which the\nplea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that\nthe agreement contemplates a broader restriction.” Id.\nat 263. The court found that neither the text of the\nNPA nor the “negotiation history” showed that the\nco-conspirator clause was “meant to” bind other dis-\ntricts, even though the clause contains no limiting\nlanguage and even though government witnesses told\nOPR that the clause was, in fact, meant to provide\ntransactional immunity. (App.128).\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000048\n", "char_count": 1754}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "7\n\nMaxwell moved for rehearing en banc, which was\ndenied. (App.92).\n\nREASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION\n\nThis case is the perfect vehicle for resolving an\nacknowledged circuit split over the proper application\nof this Court’s precedent regarding an important issue\nof federal criminal law. Despite the fact that the term\n“United States” has a widely accepted meaning in\nperhaps every other context, when this term is used in\na plea agreement, it means something different in\nNew Jersey than it does across the river in New York\nCity. A criminal defendant who, after receiving a\npromise that he will not be prosecuted again by the\nUnited States, pleads guilty to resolve all criminal\nliability, is not in fact resolving all criminal liability\nbecause the United States remains free to prosecute\nhim anew so long as it does so in the Second or Seventh\nCircuits.\n\nThis Court should resolve this conflict, ensuring that\nplea agreements are enforced consistently throughout\nthe United States so that when the United States\nmakes a promise in a plea agreement, it is held to that\npromise.\n\nI. The circuits are split as to whether a promise\non behalf of the “United States” or the\n“Government” by a United States Attorney’s\noffice in one district is binding upon United\nStates Attorney’s offices in other districts.\n\nIn Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), this\nCourt held that a prosecutor’s promise in a plea\nagreement binds other prosecutors, even those who\nmight have been unaware of the promise. 404 U.S.\nat 262. “Th[e] circumstances will vary, but a constant\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000049\n", "char_count": 1583}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "8\n\nfactor is that, when a plea rests in any significant\ndegree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so\nthat it can be said to be part of the inducement or\nconsideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Jd. And\nin Giglio v. United States, this Court found that “the\nprosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is the\nspokesman for the Government. A promise made by\none attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to\nthe Government.” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.\n150, 154 (1972).\n\nYet despite this binding precedent, the Second\nCircuit refuses to hold its United States prosecutors to\nthe promises that other United States prosecutors\nhave made on behalf of the United States, instead\nclinging to the position that a plea agreement binds\nonly the district in which it was entered unless it\nexpressly states otherwise, even if the promise is made\non behalf of the “United States.” (App.8-12). The\nSeventh Circuit similarly applies a narrow interpreta-\ntion of who is bound by a pledge on behalf of the\n“United States” or the “Government.” This policy jeop-\nardizes the integrity of the plea negotiation process\nnationwide, which is “an essential component of the\nadministration of justice” that “presupposels] fairness\nin securing agreement between an accused and a\nprosecutor.” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.\n\nThe Second and Seventh Circuit’s policy is squarely\nin conflict with that of the Third, Fourth, Eighth and\nNinth Circuits, creating a circuit split with nationwide\nramifications pursuant to which the same plea agree-\nment can receive a different interpretation throughout\nthe country on one of its most fundamental aspects\n(a defendant’s potential future criminal liability). This\ncase provides an ideal opportunity to resolve this\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000050\n", "char_count": 1779}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "9\n\ncircuit split regarding an important issue of federal\ncriminal law.\n\nA. The Third, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Cir-\ncuits have faithfully applied Santobello’s\ninstruction that promises in plea agree-\nments must be binding on the government,\napplying basic principles of contract law to\nfind that obligations entered into on behalf\nof the “United States” or the “Government”\napply to the federal government through-\nout the nation.\n\nThird Circuit. In United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d\n540 (8d Cir. 2002), the Third Circuit squarely\naddressed the question of “whether promises made on\nbehalf of ‘the Government’ or ‘the United States’ by\na United States Attorney to a defendant bind other\nUnited States Attorneys with respect to the same\ndefendant.” Id. at 546-47. After recognizing that the\nSecond and Fourth Circuits “employ opposite default\nrules” from one another, id. at 547, the Third Circuit\nagreed with the Fourth Circuit and held that “when a\nUnited States Attorney negotiates and contracts on\nbehalf of ‘the United States’ or ‘the Government’ in\na plea agreement for specific crimes, that attorney\nspeaks for and binds all of his or her fellow United\nStates Attorneys with respect to those same crimes\nand those same defendants.” Jd. at 550. It went on\nto note that “United States Attorneys should not be\nviewed as sovereigns of autonomous fiefdoms. They\nrepresent the United States, and their promises on\nbehalf of the Government must bind each other absent\nexpress contractual limitations or disavowals to the\ncontrary.” Id.\n\nFourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit, in United\nStates v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), was the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000051\n", "char_count": 1656}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "10\n\nfirst to hold that a promise on behalf of the United\nStates in one district not to prosecute a defendant is\nbinding upon U.S. Attorney’s offices in other districts.\nId. at 428. As that court noted, “[t]he United States\ngovernment is the United States government through-\nout all of the states and districts. ... A contrary result\nwould constitute a strong deterrent to the willingness\nof defendants accused of multistate crimes to cooperat-\ning in speedy disposition of their cases and in appre-\nhending and processing codefendants” Jd. The Fourth\nCircuit concluded, “[a]t stake is the honor of the\ngovernment|,] public confidence in the fair admin-\nistration of justice, and the efficient administration of\njustice in a federal scheme of government.” Jd.\n\nEighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit similarly found\nin United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590\n(8th Cir. 1996), that “absent an express limitation,\nany promises made by an Assistant United States\nAttorney in one district will bind an Assistant United\nStates Attorney in another district.” Id. at 594. Inter-\npreting a plea agreement which provided that the\n“United States” would make certain recommendations\nregarding the defendant’s sentence, the court held\nthat this provision was binding on the U.S. Attorney’s\noffice in another district and that the terms of the\nagreement should be enforced. See also Margalli-\nOlvera v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,\n43 F.3d 345, 352 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that “the term\n‘United States’ is a reference to the entire United\nStates government and all the agencies hereof” in the\ncontext of determining that the INS is bound by\npromises made by the U.S. Attorney’s office).\n\nNinth Circuit. In Thomas v. Immigration and\nNaturalization Service, 35 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1994),\n\nthe Ninth Circuit held that a promise made by the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000052\n", "char_count": 1856}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "11\n\nU.S. Attorney’s Office on behalf of the “Government”\n(defined in that agreement to include its “depart-\nments, officers, agents, and agencies”) binds not\njust the office of the U.S. Attorney but also the\nImmigration and Naturalization Service. 35 F.3d at\n1337-38. Although the plea agreement in that case\ndefined broadly that all governmental agencies would\nbe bound, the Ninth Circuit cited approvingly to the\nbroader proposition that “the United States govern-\nment as a whole uses United States Attorneys as\nits authorized agents to negotiate plea bargains in\ncriminal cases, so their authorized agreements bind\nthe government as a whole.” Id. at 1340. See also\nUnited States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 1015, 1020-21\n(9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that although a plea\nagreement which specifically and expressly limits a\nnon-prosecution promise to a particular U.S. attor-\nney’s office is enforceable only against that office, this\nis an exception to the general principle that a plea\nagreement is binding upon all districts).\n\nB. The Second and the Seventh Circuits apply\nthe opposite presumption. They refuse\nto enforce a promise made on behalf of\nthe “United States” or “the Government”\nexcept against the particular United States\nAttorney’s office which entered into the\nagreement, unless the agreement expressly\nreiterates that the term “United States”\ndoes in fact mean the entire country as a\nwhole.\n\nSecond Circuit. In the decision below, in reliance\non Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, the Second Circuit held\nthat the government’s promise that the “United\nStates” would not prosecute any of the defendant’s\nco-conspirators was only enforceable in the Southern\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000053\n", "char_count": 1677}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "12\n\nDistrict of Florida, and not in the Southern District of\nNew York. United States v. Maxwell, 118 F.4th 256,\n261 (2d Cir. 2024). The Maxwell court found that\nit must “affirmatively appear[] that the agreement\ncontemplates a broader restriction” in order for the\n“United States” to mean the country as a whole, even\nif entered into in a district in which the term “United\nStates” does, in fact, mean the country as a whole.\nId. at 263.\n\nSeventh Circuit. Although the Seventh Circuit\nhas not considered the question presented in the\nspecific context of the enforceability of a promise\nmade in a plea agreement against a different U.S.\nAttorney’s office, it has held in a related context that\n“[a] prosecutor’s agreement will not bind more than\nthe office of the United States Attorney unless the\npromise explicitly contemplates ‘a broader restriction.”\nThompson v. United States, 431 F. App’x 491, 493\n(7th Cir. 2011) (finding that a promise on behalf of the\ngovernment by a prosecutor would not bind the INS).\nSee also United States v. McDowell, No. 94-CR-787-1,\n2006 WL 1896074 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (finding in the\ncontext of Rule 35(b) motions that “a United States\nAttorney has sole authority to bind his own office” only\nand lacks authority to compel a U.S. Attorney in\nanother district to file a Rule 35(b) motion).\n\nII. The Second Circuit’s decision below is wrong\nand violates the principles set forth in this\nCourt’s prior opinions.\n\nThe opinion below, which is based on the Second\nCircuit’s prior holding in Annabi, is wrongly decided\nand should not stand. Rather than the Second\nCircuit’s default rule that a promise made on behalf of\nthe United States does not bind the United States as\na whole, the default rule should be that a promise\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000054\n", "char_count": 1765}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "13\n\nmade on behalf of the United States binds the entire\nUnited States unless it says so affirmatively (as, in\nfact, the agreement at issue here did for Epstein\nhimself, but not for his co-conspirators). As set forth\nabove, this is consistent with Santobello and Giglio,\nand with ordinary principles of contract interpreta-\ntion. And it is the only principled way to interpret the\nplain language of this agreement, as well as the\navailable information on the parties’ intent.\n\nA. Both Annabi and the opinion below were\nwrongly decided under Santobello and\nGiglio.\n\nIt is impossible to square the Second and Seventh\nCircuit’s policies on plea agreement interpretation\nwith this Court’s holdings in Santobello. As this Court\ncorrectly determined in that case, “when a plea rests\nin any significant degree on a promise or agreement of\nthe prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the\n\ninducement or consideration, such promise must be\nfulfilled.” 404 U.S. at 262.\n\nThere is perhaps no promise the government makes\nwithin a plea agreement that is more fundamental\nthan the promise that by pleading guilty, the defend-\nant is resolving his or her legal culpability for the\nconduct at issue, and that after accepting and serving\nthe penalty contemplated in the agreement, he or she\ncan move forward without fear of additional prosecu-\ntion for that conduct. A defendant should be able to\nrely on a promise that the United States will not\nprosecute again, without being subject to a gotcha in\nsome other jurisdiction that chooses to interpret that\nplain language promise in some other way. Only in\nthis way can the pronouncement of Giglio be upheld,\nfor “the prosecutor’s office is an entity and as such it is\nthe spokesman for the Government. A promise made\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000055\n", "char_count": 1778}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "14\n\nby one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes,\nto the Government.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. See also\nCommonwealth v. Cosby, 666 Pa. 416, 481-82, 252\nA.3d 1092, 1131 (Pa. 2021) (finding by the Pennsylva-\nnia Supreme Court that a promise made by a prior\nprosecutor was binding on a subsequent one because\n“Tals prosecutors are vested with such ‘tremendous’\ndiscretion and authority, our law has long recognized\nthe special weight that must be accorded to their\nassurances.”).\n\nB. Ordinary principles of contract interpre-\ntation compel Annabi and Maxwell to be\nreversed.\n\nA plea agreement is a contract and is to be inter-\npreted according to ordinary contract principles. See,\ne.g., United States v. Williams, 102 F.3d 923, 927\n(7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Warner, 820 F.3d 678,\n683 (4th Cir. 2016); Van Thournout, 100 F.3d at 594.\nIn fact, in interpreting plea agreements, these ordi-\nnary contract principles are to be employed even more\nstrongly in favor of the defendant because they “are\nsupplemented with a concern that the bargaining\nprocess not violate the defendant’s right to fundamen-\ntal fairness under the Due Process Clause.” Williams,\n102 F.3d at 927 Gnternal quotation omitted). See also\nUnited States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 195-96 (4th Cir.\n2007); Van Thournout, 100 F.3d at 594. Pursuant\nto these standards of interpretation, words within a\ncontract are to be afforded their ordinary meaning.\nAnd to the extent that there is an ambiguity, such an\nambiguity is to be construed against the government.'\n\n' In addition, as discussed below as to the particular plea\nagreement at issue in this case, the contract interpretation\nprinciple known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius compels a\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000056\n", "char_count": 1745}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "15\n\nAs to the first and most basic of these principles,\nterms within a plea agreement are to be given their\nordinary meaning. See, e.g., Williams, 102 F.3d at 927;\nMargalli-Olvera, 43 F.3d at 352; United States v.\nRubbo, 396 F.3d 13830, 13834 (11th Cir. 2005). See\nAntonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:\nThe Interpretation of Legal Texts at 69 (2012) (“The\nordinary meaning rule is the most fundamental\nsemantic rule of interpretation.”) It should be beyond\nreasonable dispute that the ordinary meaning of the\nterm “the United States” is the country as a whole.\nThis leads to the presumption that if a plea agreement\nstates that the “United States” cannot further prose-\ncute an individual, this means that the United States\ncannot do so anywhere in the United States. If that is\nnot what is intended, and the intent is to bind only a\nparticular district, this can easily be achieved by using\nthe ordinary descriptors for that district.\n\nSecond, the placement of language informs the in-\ntent of the parties. During the course of the NPA\nnegotiations, the co-conspirator immunity clause was\nsevered from Epstein’s immunity clause and moved\ngeographically to the end of the NPA after the 2255\nsection. This is significant because the 2255 sections\n“were not limited to any district.” The 2255 section\nand the co-conspirator clause were negotiated in\ntandem and the 2255 language was accepted in return\nfor the global immunity provided to the co-conspira-\ntors. The co-conspirator clause was subsequently\nsevered from Epstein’s restrictive language and moved\ngeographically below the 2255 as a consequence. The\nNPA was identified as a hybrid agreement where one\nsection referred to the district-specific language and\n\nfinding that the NPA precludes Maxwell’s prosecution in this\ncase.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000057\n", "char_count": 1809}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "16\n\nthe other was the more expansive global federal part\nof the NPA.\n\nThird, as every circuit recognizes (including the\nSecond and Seventh), it is a well- settled proposition\nthat ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be resolved\nagainst the government. See, e.g., In re Altro, 180 F.3d\n372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Carmichael,\n216 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[Wle ‘construe plea\nagreements strictly against the Government.”) (inter-\nnal citation omitted); United States v. O'Doherty, 64\nF.3d 209, 217 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v.\nTransfiguracion, 442 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2006).\nAnnabi, Thompson, and the opinion below flip this\nguidepost on its head, holding that a promise of\nimmunity from prosecution by “the United States” is\nto be construed against the defendant. 771 F.2d at 672;\n431 Fed. Appx. 492 (App.8).\n\nIf it is not in fact clear on its face that the United\nStates means the United States as a whole, at most\nthe intent in using this term is ambiguous. Because\nsuch ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the\ndefendant and against the government, 180 F.3d at\n375, the majority interpretation that the United\nStates refers to the country as a whole is correct and\nthe opinion below must be reversed.\n\nC. The available evidence suggests that the\nNPA was meant to bind the Southern\nDistrict of New York.\n\nDespite the Second Circuit’s conclusion below that\nthe text and the negotiating history of this NPA\nsuggest an intent to bind only the Southern District of\nFlorida, (App.10), the opposite is true.\n\nFirst, the contractual interpretation principle known\nas expressio unius est exclusio alterius compels the\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000058\n", "char_count": 1662}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "17\n\ndetermination that the NPA precludes Maxwell’s\nprosecution in New York. As the Second Circuit itself\nnoted, although the co-conspirator clause at issue\nhere is “silent” as to whether it intended to preclude\nco-conspirator prosecution outside the Southern\nDistrict of Florida, it is not silent as to whether\nEpstein’s future prosecution is limited to the Southern\nDistrict of Florida. Instead, “the NPA makes clear that\nif Epstein fulfilled his obligations, he would no longer\nface charges in that district.” (App.9, emphasis in\noriginal). The use of narrowing terms as to Epstein’s\nprotections, not but not as to co-conspirator protec-\ntions, demonstrates that the difference was inten-\ntional. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The\nInterpretation of Legal Texts at 167 (“The whole of a\ncontract is to be taken together, so as to give effect\nto every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause\nhelping to interpret the other.”); Id. at 170 ((“[A]\nmaterial variation in terms suggests a variation in\nmeaning.”). This intent should have been recognized.\n\nSecond, the NPA was entered into after extensive\nnegotiation. The language was hotly contested and\nsubject to much revision back and forth, including\nspecifically on the relevant language of the coconspira-\ntor clause. (App.95, 108-126). In one of the earlier\ndrafts, the government proposed language that the\nco-conspirator protection would be limited to the\nSouthern District of Florida. (App.117). Yet the final\ndraft eliminated the limitation to the Southern\nDistrict of Florida and referred only to the United\nStates. (App.122-24). The OPR report found that gov-\nernment witnesses (who were the only witnesses OPR\nspoke to) believed the co-conspirator clause was in-\ntended to provide transactional immunity. (App.128-\n129). This understanding, supported by the NPA itself\nand the negotiation history contained in the one-sided\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000059\n", "char_count": 1910}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "18\n\nOPR report, precludes application of Annabi in this\ncase because the intent to bind the United States as a\nwhole, and not just the Southern District of Florida, is\nclear.\n\nThird, the Second Circuit misplaced its reliance on\na selective reading of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the\nUnited States Attorneys’ Manual to conclude that\nUnited States Attorneys are “cabined to their specific\ndistrict unless otherwise directed.” 118 F.4th at 265.\nYet the Second Circuit ignored the Manual’s admoni-\ntion that United States Attorneys who do not wish to\nbind other districts should explicitly limit the scope of\na non-prosecution agreement to their districts. U.S.\nDept. of Justice, Justice Manual (updated Feb. 2018),\nhttps://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-fede\nral-prosecution. The existence of this provision reveals\nthat AUSAs can bind other districts and that it is the\nobligation of the government to make explicit any\nlimitation in the scope of immunity, and not the other\nway around.\n\nFourth, the recitals of the NPA reveal that the\nintent was for a broad, complete resolution of the\nmatters addressed by the agreement. The NPA states\nthat “Epstein seeks to resolve globally his state and\nfederal criminal liability.” (App.25). It also states that\n“the interests of the United States, the State of Florida,\nand the Defendant will be served” by the agreement.\n(App.25-26, emphasis added). The recitals do not refer\nto the specific interests of the Southern District of\nFlorida at all.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000060\n", "char_count": 1515}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 27, "text_content": "19\n\nIII. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the\nsplit over this important and recurring\nquestion.\n\nThis case is especially worthy of review because it\ncleanly presents the issue at hand, which is ripe for\nthis Court’s attention. In this case, the government\nmade a written promise that Epstein’s co-conspirators\nwould not be prosecuted by the United States, and\nMaxwell was in fact prosecuted as a co-conspirator of\nEpstein by the United States. The only question is\nwhether the government’s promise that the “United\nStates” would not prosecute her was enforceable\nagainst the U.S. Attorney’s office in New York, or only\nagainst the Southern District of Florida. The circuit\nsplit on this issue is well developed and ripe for the\nCourt’s review.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant\nthe petition for certiorari.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDAVID OSCAR MARKUS\n\nCounsel of Record\nMARKUS/Moss PLLC\n40 N.W. Third Street\nPenthouse One\nMiami, FL 33128\n(305) 379-6667\n\ndmarkus@markuslaw.com\n\nCounsel for Petitioner\nApril 10, 2025\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000061\n", "char_count": 1076}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 28, "text_content": "[VISION] | PEOPLE: None visible. | TEXT: None visible. | OBJECTS: None visible. | SETTING: The image is blank with no visible objects or text. | ACTIVITY: No activity present. | NOTABLE: The image is completely blank and does not contain any information or details.", "char_count": 265}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 29, "text_content": "APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nAPPENDIX A: OPINION, U.S. Court of\nAppeals for the Second Circuit (September 17,\n\nAPPENDIX B: NON-PROSECUTION AGREE-\nMENT, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the\nSouthern District of Florida (October 30, 2007).\n\nAPPENDIX C: JUDGMENT, U.S. District\nCourt for the Southern District of New York\n(June 29, 2022) oiccccccccccccccceeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees\n\nAPPENDIX D: OPINION AND ORDER, U.S.\nDistrict Court for the Southern District of New\nYork (April 16, 2021)... cccceeescscccceeeeeesessaees\n\nAPPENDIX E: ORDER, U.S. Court of Appeals\nfor the Second Circuit (November 25, 2024) ......\n\nAPPENDIX F: Excerpts of the Department of\nJustice Office of Professional Responsibility\nReport (November 2020) .............cccccccccssssseeeeeeeees\n\nPage\n\nla\n\n24a\n\n39a\n\n52a\n\n92a\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000063\n", "char_count": 803}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 30, "text_content": "la\nAPPENDIX A\n\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\nAUGUST TERM 2023\nNo. 22-1426-cr\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nAppellee,\nVv.\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, also known as\nSealed Defendant 1,\n\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court\nfor the Southern District of New York\n\nARGUED: MARCH 12, 2024\nDECIDED: SEPTEMBER 17, 2024\n\nBefore: CABRANES, WESLEY, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell appeals her June 29,\n2022, judgment of conviction in the United States\nDistrict Court for the Southern District of New York\n(Alison J. Nathan, Judge). Maxwell was convicted of\nconspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage\nin criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 371; transportation of a minor with intent to engage\nin criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000064\n", "char_count": 861}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 31, "text_content": "2a\n\n§ 2423(a); and sex trafficking of a minor in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and (b)(2). She was principally\nsentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 60\nmonths, 120 months, and 240 months, respectively, to\nbe followed by concurrent terms of supervised release.\n\nOn appeal, the questions presented are whether\n(1) Jeffrey Epstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement with\nthe United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of Florida barred Maxwell’s prosecution by\nthe United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of New York; (2) a second superseding indict-\nment of March 29, 2021, complied with the statute of\nlimitations; (3) the District Court abused its discretion\nin denying Maxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial\nbased on the claimed violation of her Sixth Amend-\nment right to a fair and impartial jury; (4) the District\nCourt’s response to a jury note resulted in a construc-\ntive amendment of, or prejudicial variance from, the\nallegations in the second superseding indictment; and\n(5) Maxwell’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.\n\nIdentifying no errors in the District Court’s conduct\nof this complex case, we AFFIRM the District Court’s\nJune 29, 2022, judgment of conviction.\n\nANDREW ROHRBACH, Assistant United States Attorney\n(Maurene Comey, Alison Moe, Lara Pomerantz, Won S.\nShin, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief),\nfor Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the\nSouthern District of New York, New York, NY, for\nAppellee.\n\nDIANA FABI SAMSON (Arthur L. Aidala, John M.\nLeventhal, on the brief), Aidala Bertuna & Kamins PC,\nNew York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000065\n", "char_count": 1648}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 32, "text_content": "3a\nJOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell appeals her June 29,\n2022, judgment of conviction in the United States\nDistrict Court for the Southern District of New York\n(Alison J. Nathan, Judge). Maxwell was convicted of\nconspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage\nin criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 371; transportation of a minor with intent to engage\nin criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 2423(a); and sex trafficking of a minor in violation\nof 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and (b)(2). The District Court\nimposed concurrent terms of imprisonment of 60\nmonths, 120 months, and 240 months, respectively, to\nbe followed by concurrent terms of supervised release\nof three years, three years, and five years, respectively.\nThe District Court also imposed a fine of $250,000 on\neach count for a total of $750,000.\n\nOn appeal, the questions presented are (1) whether\nJeffrey Epstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement (“NPA”)\nwith the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of Florida (““USAO-SDFL’) barred Maxwell’s\nprosecution by the United States Attorney’s Office for\nthe Southern District of New York (““USAO-SDNY”);\n(2) whether Maxwell’s second superseding indictment\nof March 29, 2021 (the “Indictment”) complied with the\nstatute of limitations; (3) whether the District Court\nabused its discretion in denying Maxwell’s Rule 33\nmotion for a new trial based on the claimed violation\nof her Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial\njury; (4) whether the District Court’s response to a jury\nnote resulted in a constructive amendment of, or\nprejudicial variance from, the allegations in the\nIndictment; and (5) whether Maxwell’s sentence was\nprocedurally reasonable.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000066\n", "char_count": 1760}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 33, "text_content": "4a\n\nWe hold that Epstein’s NPA did not bar Maxwell’s\nprosecution by USAO-SDNY as the NPA does not\nbind USAO-SDNY. We hold that Maxwell’s Indictment\ncomplied with the statute of limitations as 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3283 extended the time to bring charges of sexual\nabuse for offenses committed before the date of\nthe statute’s enactment. We further hold that the\nDistrict Court did not abuse its discretion in denying\nMaxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial based on one\njuror’s erroneous answers during voir dire. We also\nhold that the District Court’s response to a jury note\ndid not result in a constructive amendment of, or\nprejudicial variance from, the allegations in the Indict-\nment. Lastly, we hold that Maxwell’s sentence is pro-\ncedurally reasonable.\n\nAccordingly, we AFFIRM the District Court’s June\n29, 2022, judgment of conviction.\n\nI. BACKGROUND!\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell coordinated, facilitated,\nand contributed to Jeffrey Epstein’s sexual abuse of\nwomen and underage girls. Starting in 1994, Maxwell\ngroomed numerous young women to engage in sexual\nactivity with Epstein by building friendships with\nthese young women, gradually normalizing discussions\nof sexual topics and sexual abuse. Until about 2004,\nthis pattern of sexual abuse continued as Maxwell\nprovided Epstein access to underage girls in various\nlocations in the United States.\n\n' Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from\nthe evidence presented at trial and described in the light most\nfavorable to the Government. See United States v. Litwok, 678\nF.3d 208, 210-11 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Because this is an appeal from a\njudgment of conviction entered after a jury trial, the [ ] facts are\ndrawn from the trial evidence and described in the light most\nfavorable to the Government.”).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000067\n", "char_count": 1789}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 34, "text_content": "5a\n1. Epstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement\n\nIn September 2007, following state and federal\ninvestigations into allegations of Epstein’s unlawful\nsexual activity, Epstein entered into an NPA with\nUSAO-SDFL. In the NPA, Epstein agreed to plead\nguilty to one count of solicitation of prostitution, in\nviolation of Florida Statutes § 796.07,? and to one\ncount of solicitation of minors to engage in prostitu-\ntion, in violation of Florida Statutes § 796.03.? He\nagreed to receive a sentence of eighteen months’\nimprisonment on the two charges. In consideration of\nEpstein’s agreement, the NPA states that “the United\nStates also agrees that it will not institute any\ncriminal charges against any potential co-conspirators\nof Epstein, including but not limited to Sarah Kellen,\nAdriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova.”\n\n2. Maxwell’s Indictment and Trial-Related\nProceedings\n\nThe Indictment filed against Maxwell contained\neight counts, six of which proceeded to trial.® Prior to\n\n? Florida Statutes § 796.07 provides in relevant part:\n(2) It is unlawful:\n\n(f) To solicit, induce, entice, or procure another to\ncommit prostitution, lewdness, or assignation.\n\n° Florida Statutes § 796.03, which has since been repealed,\nprovided in relevant part: “A person who procures for prostitution,\nor causes to be prostituted, any person who is under the age of 18\nyears commits a felony of the second degree.”\n\n*A-178.\n\n> Count One charged Maxwell with conspiracy to entice minors\nto travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§ 371. Count Two charged Maxwell with enticement of a minor to\ntravel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422\nand 2. Count Three charged Maxwell with conspiracy to transport\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000068\n", "char_count": 1758}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 35, "text_content": "6a\n\nthe commencement of trial, prospective jurors completed\na lengthy questionnaire, with several questions rais-\ning issues relevant to the trial. Based on the completed\nquestionnaires, the parties selected prospective jurors to\nproceed to in-person voir dire. The District Court\nultimately empaneled a jury.\n\nDuring the four-and-a-half-week jury trial, the\nGovernment presented evidence of the repeated sexual\nabuse of six girls. At the conclusion of trial, on\nDecember 29, 2021, the jury found Maxwell guilty on\nall but one count.®\n\nFollowing the verdict, Juror 50 gave press interviews\nduring which he stated that he was a survivor of child\nsexual abuse.’ In his answers to the written jury\nquestionnaire, however, Juror 50 answered “no” to\nthree questions asking whether he or a friend or\nfamily member had ever been the victim of a crime;\nwhether he or a friend or family member had ever been\nthe victim of sexual harassment, sexual abuse, or\nsexual assault; and whether he or a friend or family\nmember had ever been accused of sexual harassment,\n\nminors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Four charged Maxwell with\ntransportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual\nactivity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(a) and 2. Count Five\ncharged Maxwell with sex trafficking conspiracy, in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Six charged Maxwell with sex trafficking\nof a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a), (b)(2), and 2.\nCounts Seven and Eight charged Maxwell with perjury, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The perjury charges were severed\nfrom the remaining charges and ultimately dismissed at sentencing.\n\n6 The jury found Maxwell guilty on Counts One, Three, Four,\nFive, and Six. Maxwell was acquitted on Count Two.\n\n* Consistent with a juror anonymity order entered for trial, the\nparties and the District Court referred to the jurors by pseudonym.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000069\n", "char_count": 1954}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 36, "text_content": "7a\n\nsexual abuse, or sexual assault. Upon learning of the\ninterviews, the Government filed a letter on January\n5, 2022, requesting a hearing; Maxwell then moved for\na new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\n33. On March 8, 2022, the District Court held a hearing\nand Juror 50 testified—under grant of immunity—\nthat his answers to three questions related to sexual\nabuse in the jury questionnaire were not accurate but\nthat the answers were an inadvertent mistake and\nthat his experiences did not affect his ability to be fair\nand impartial. Finding Juror 50’s testimony to be\ncredible, the District Court denied Maxwell’s motion\nfor a new trial in a written order.\n\nMaxwell was subsequently sentenced to a term of\n240 months’ imprisonment to be followed by five years’\nsupervised release, and the District Court imposed a\n$750,000 fine and a $300 mandatory special assessment.\nThis appeal followed.\n\n° Question 2 asked “[hlave you, or any of your relatives or close\nfriends, ever been a victim of a crime?” Question 48 asked “[hlave\nyou or a friend or family member ever been the victim of sexual\nharassment, sexual abuse, or sexual assault? (This includes\nactual or attempted sexual assault or other unwanted sexual\nadvance, including by a stranger, acquaintance, supervisor,\nteacher, or family member.)” Finally, Question 49 asked\n\n[hlave you or a friend or family member ever been\naccused of sexual harassment, sexual abuse, or sexual\nassault? (This includes both formal accusations in a\ncourt of law or informal accusations in a social or work\nsetting of actual or attempted sexual assault or other\nunwanted sexual advance, including by a stranger,\nacquaintance, supervisor, teacher, or family member.\n\nSee A-299, A-310.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000070\n", "char_count": 1755}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 37, "text_content": "8a\nIl. DISCUSSION\n\n1. The NPA Between Epstein and USAO-SDFL\nDid Not Bar Maxwell’s Prosecution by\nUSAO-SDNY\n\nMaxwell sought dismissal of the charges in the\nIndictment on the grounds that the NPA made between\nEpstein and USAO-SDFL immunized her from prose-\ncution on all counts as a third-party beneficiary of the\nNPA. The District Court denied the motion, rejecting\nMaxwell’s arguments. We agree. We review de novo the\ndenial of a motion to dismiss an indictment.®\n\nIn arguing that the NPA barred her prosecution by\nUSAO-SDNY, Maxwell cites the portion of the NPA in\nwhich “the United States [] agree[d] that it w[ould] not\ninstitute any criminal charges against any potential co-\nconspirators of Epstein.” We hold that the NPA with\nUSAO-SDFL does not bind USAO-SDNY.\n\nIt is well established in our Circuit that “[a] plea\nagreement binds only the office of the United States\nAttorney for the district in which the plea is entered\nunless it affirmatively appears that the agreement\ncontemplates a broader restriction.”!! And while Maxwell\ncontends that we cannot apply Annabi to an agreement\nnegotiated and executed outside of this Circuit, we\nhave previously done just that.!? Applying Annabi, we\n\n° See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 910 F.3d 11, 22 (2d Cir.\n2018).\n\n10 A-178.\n\nUnited States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985). We\nrecognize that circuits have been split on this issue for decades.\n\nSee United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986);\nUnited States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 550 (3d Cir. 2002).\n\nSee, e.g., United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App’x 920, 921 (2d Cir.\n2010) (summary order) (applying Annabi to plea agreement\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000071\n", "char_count": 1676}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 38, "text_content": "9a\n\nconclude that the NPA did not bar Maxwell’s prosecu-\ntion by USAO-SDNY. There is nothing in the NPA that\naffirmatively shows that the NPA was intended to bind\nmultiple districts. Instead, where the NPA is not\nsilent, the agreement’s scope is expressly limited to the\nSouthern District of Florida. The NPA makes clear\nthat if Epstein fulfilled his obligations, he would no\nlonger face charges in that district:\n\nAfter timely fulfilling all the terms and\nconditions of the Agreement, no prosecution\nfor the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this\nAgreement, nor any other offenses that have\nbeen the subject of the joint investigation by\nthe Federal Bureau of Investigation and the\nUnited States Attorney’s Office, nor any\noffenses that arose from the Federal Grand\nJury investigation will be instituted in this\nDistrict, and the charges against Epstein if\nany, will be dismissed.\"\n\nentered into in the District of New Jersey); United States v.\nGonzalez, 93 F. App’x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order)\n(same, to agreement entered into in the District of New Mexico).\nNor does Annabi, as Maxwell contends, apply only where subsequent\ncharges are \"sufficiently distinct\" from charges covered by an\nearlier agreement. In Annabi, this Court rejected an interpreta-\ntion of a prior plea agreement that rested on the Double Jeopardy\nClause, reasoning that even if the Double Jeopardy Clause\napplied, the subsequent charges were \"sufficiently distinct\" and\ntherefore fell outside the Clause’s protections. Annabi, 771 F.2d\nat 672. This Court did not, however, conclude that the rule of\nconstruction it announced depended on the similarities between\nearlier and subsequent charges.\n\n13 A-175 (emphasis added). The agreement’s scope is also\nlimited in an additional section:\n\nTHEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta,\nUnited States Attorney for the Southern District of\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000072\n", "char_count": 1899}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 39, "text_content": "10a\n\nThe only language in the NPA that speaks to the\nagreement’s scope is limiting language.\n\nThe negotiation history of the NPA, just as the text,\nfails to show that the agreement was intended to bind\nother districts. Under our Court’s precedent, the\nnegotiation history of an NPA can support an inference\nthat an NPA “affirmatively” binds other districts.'* Yet,\nthe actions of USAO-SDFL do not indicate that the\nNPA was intended to bind other districts.\n\nThe United States Attorney's Manual that was\noperable during the negotiations of the NPA required\nthat:\n\nNo district or division shall make any\nagreement, including any agreement not to\nprosecute, which purports to bind any other\ndistrict(s) or division without the express written\napproval of the United States Attorney(s) in\neach affected district and/or the Assistant\nAttorney General of the Criminal Division.’\n\nNothing before us indicates that USAO-SDNY had\nbeen notified or had approved of Epstein’s NPA with\nUSAO-SDFL and intended to be bound by it. And the\nAssistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division\nstated in an interview with the Office of Professional\nResponsibility that she “played no role” in the NPA,\neither by reviewing or approving the agreement.\n\nFlorida, prosecution in this District for these offenses\nshall be deferred in favor of prosecution by the State of\nFlorida, provided that Epstein abides by the following\nconditions and the requirements of this Agreement set\nforth below.\n\nId. (emphasis added).\n“4 See United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1986).\n% United States Attorney’s Manual § 9-27.641 (2007).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000073\n", "char_count": 1629}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 40, "text_content": "lla\n\nThe history of the Office of the United States\nAttorney is instructive as to the scope of their actions\nand duties. The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the\nOffice of the United States Attorney, along with the\noffice of the Attorney General. More specifically, the\nJudiciary Act provided for the appointment, in each\ndistrict, of a “person learned in the law to act as\nattorney for the United States in such district, who\nshall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful execution of\nhis office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such\ndistrict all delinquents for crimes and offences,\ncognizable under the authority of the United States,\nand all civil actions in which the United States shall\nbe concerned.”!® The Judiciary Act thus emphasized\nthat U.S. Attorneys would enforce the law of the\nUnited States but did not determine that the actions\nof one U.S. Attorney could bind other districts, let alone\nthe entire nation. In fact, the phrase “in such district,”\nrepeated twice, implies that the scope of the actions\nand the duties of the U.S. Attorneys would be limited\nto their own districts, absent any express exceptions.\n\nSince 1789, while the number of federal districts has\ngrown significantly, the duties of a U.S. Attorney and\ntheir scope remain largely unchanged. By statute, U.S.\nAttorneys, “within [their] district, shall (1) prosecute\nfor all offenses against the United States; (2) prosecute\nor defend, for the Government, all civil actions, suits or\nproceedings in which the United States is concerned.””\nAgain, the scope of the duties of a U.S. Attorney is\n\n16 An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,\nch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789) (emphasis added).\n\n7 28 U.S.C. § 547.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000074\n", "char_count": 1737}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 41, "text_content": "12a\n\ncabined to their specific district unless otherwise\ndirected.'®\n\nIn short, Annabi controls the result here. Nothing in\nthe text of the NPA or its negotiation history suggests\nthat the NPA precluded USAO-SDNY from prosecut-\ning Maxwell for the charges in the Indictment. The\nDistrict Court therefore correctly denied Maxwell’s\nmotion without an evidentiary hearing.\n\n2. The Indictment Is Timely\n\nMaxwell argues that Counts Three and Four of the\nIndictment are untimely because they do not fall\nwithin the scope of offenses involving the sexual or\nphysical abuse or kidnapping of a minor and thereby\ndo not fall within the extended statute of limitations\nprovided by § 3283.\" Separately, Maxwell contends\nthat the Government cannot apply the 2003 amendment\nto § 3283 that extended the statute of limitations to\n\n1 This does not suggest that there are no instances in which a\nUS. Attorney's powers do not extend beyond their districts. For\ninstance, under 28 U.S.C. § 515 a U.S. Attorney can represent the\nGovernment or participate in proceedings in other districts, but\nonly when specifically directed by the Attorney General:\n\nThe Attorney General or any other officer of the\nDepartment of Justice, or any attorney specially\nappointed by the Attorney General under law, may,\nwhen specifically directed by the Attorney General,\nconduct any kind of legal proceeding ... which United\nStates attorneys are authorized by law to conduct,\nwhether or not he is a resident of the district in which\nthe proceeding is brought.\n\n® 18 U.S.C. § 3283 provides: “[nJo statute of limitations that\nwould otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the\nsexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of\n18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the\nchild, or for ten years after the offense, whichever is longer.”\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000075\n", "char_count": 1865}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 42, "text_content": "13a\n\nthose offenses that were committed before the\nenactment into law of the provision. On both points,\nwe disagree and hold that the District Court correctly\ndenied Maxwell’s motions to dismiss the charges as\nuntimely. We review de novo the denial of a motion to\ndismiss an indictment and the application of a statute\nof limitations.”°\n\nFirst, Counts Three and Four of the Indictment are\noffenses involving the sexual abuse of minors. The\nDistrict Court properly applied Weingarten v. United\nStates.?! In Weingarten, we explained that Congress\nintended courts to apply § 3283 using a case-specific\napproach as opposed to a “categorical approach.”\nWe see no reason to depart from our reasoning in\nWeingarten. Accordingly, the question presented here\nis whether the charged offenses involved the sexual\nabuse of a minor for the purposes of § 3283 based on\nthe facts of the case. Jane, one of the women who\n\n20 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 276, 278 (2d Cir.\n2018).\n\n21 865 F.3d 48, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2017); see also United States v.\nMaxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d 299, 313 14 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).\n\n2 The “categorical approach” is a method of statutory inter-\npretation that requires courts to look \"only to the statutory\ndefinitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts\nunderlying those convictions” for sentencing and immigration\npurposes. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). We\nproperly reasoned in Weingarten that § 3283 met none of the\nconditions listed by Taylor that might require application of the\ncategorical approach. See Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. First,\n“[tlhe language of § 3283[] ... reaches beyond the offense and its\nlegal elements to the conduct ‘involv[ed]’ in the offense.” Id. at 59-\n60. Second, legislative history suggests that Congress intended\n§ 3283 to be applied broadly. Id. at 60. Third, a case-specific\napproach would not produce practical difficulties or potential\nunfairness. Id.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000076\n", "char_count": 1962}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 43, "text_content": "14a\n\ntestified at trial, gave evidence that she had been\nsexually abused when transported across state lines\nas a minor. Counts Three and Four thus qualify as\noffenses, and § 3283 applies to those offenses.\n\nSecond, Maxwell argues that Counts Three, Four,\nand Six of the Indictment are barred by the statute of\nlimitations because the extended statute of limitations\nprovided by the 2003 amendment to § 3283 does not\napply to pre-enactment conduct. In Landgraf v. USI\nFilm Products, the Supreme Court held that a court,\nin deciding whether a statute applies retroactively,\nmust first “determine whether Congress has expressly\nprescribed the statute’s proper reach.” If Congress\nhas done so, “the inquiry ends, and the court enforces\nthe statute as it is written.” If the statute “is\nambiguous or contains no express command regarding\nretroactivity, a reviewing court must determine whether\napplying the statute to antecedent conduct would\ncreate presumptively impermissible retroactive effects.”\n\nHere, the inquiry is straightforward. In 20038, Con-\ngress amended § 3283 to provide: “No statute of\nlimitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution\nfor an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse,\nor kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years\nshall preclude such prosecution during the life of\nthe child.”*° The text of § 3283—that no statute of\n\n73 511 US. 244, 280 (1994); see also Weingarten, 865 F.3d at\n54-55.\n\n#4 In re Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d\n401, 406 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).\n\n* Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 55 (citation and internal quotation\nmarks omitted).\n\n°° PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 202, 117 Stat. 650, 660\n(2003).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000077\n", "char_count": 1725}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 44, "text_content": "15a\n\nlimitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution\nof these offenses will apply—plainly requires that it\nprevent the application of any statute of limitations\nthat would otherwise apply to past conduct.\n\nThe statutory text makes clear that Congress\nintended to extend the time to bring charges of sexual\nabuse for pre-enactment conduct as the prior statute\nof limitations was inadequate. This is enough to\nconclude that the PROTECT Act’s amendment to\n§ 3283 applies to Maxwell’s conduct as charged in the\nIndictment.\n\n3. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its\nDiscretion in Denying Maxwell’s Motion for\na New Trial\n\nMaxwell contends that she was deprived of her\nconstitutional right to a fair and impartial jury\nbecause Juror 50 failed to accurately respond to\nseveral questions related to his history of sexual abuse\nas part of the jury questionnaire during jury selection.\nFollowing a special evidentiary hearing, the District\nCourt denied Maxwell’s motion for a new trial.\n\nWe review a District Court’s denial of a motion for a\nnew trial for abuse of discretion.2’ We have been\nextremely reluctant to “haul jurors in after they have\n\n27 See Rivas v. Brattesani, 94 F.3d 802, 807 (2d Cir. 1996). “[Wle\nare mindful that a judge has not abused her discretion simply\nbecause she has made a different decision than we would have\nmade in the first instance.\" United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d\n129, 183 (2d Cir. 2001). We have repeatedly explained that the\nterm of art “abuse of discretion” includes errors of law, a clearly\nerroneous assessment of the evidence, or “a decision that cannot\nbe located within the range of permissible decisions.” In re Sims,\n534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation\nmarks omitted).\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000078\n", "char_count": 1762}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 45, "text_content": "16a\n\nreached a verdict in order to probe for potential\ninstances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences.””°\nWhile courts can “vacate any judgment and grant a\nnew trial if the interest of justice so requires,” Fed. R.\nCrim. P. 33(a), they should do so “sparingly” and only\nin “the most extraordinary circumstances.””’ A district\ncourt “has broad discretion to decide Rule 33 motions\nbased upon its evaluation of the proof produced” and is\nshown deference on appeal.*°\n\nA Rule 33 motion based on a juror’s alleged\nerroneous response during voir dire is governed by\nMcDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood.*!\nUnder McDonough, a party seeking a new trial “must\nfirst demonstrate that a juror failed to answer\nhonestly a material question on voir dire, and then\nfurther show that a correct response would have\nprovided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”*”\n\nThe District Court applied the McDonough stand-\nard, found Juror 50’s testimony credible, and deter-\nmined that Juror 50’s erroneous responses during voir\ndire were “not deliberately incorrect” and that “he\nwould not have been struck for cause if he had pro-\nvided accurate responses to the questionnaire.”*? In\n\n28 United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983).\n29 Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 134.\n\n30 United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir. 1995)\n(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n31 464 U.S. 548 (1984).\n\n32 Td. at 556.\n3 A-340 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court reminds us that\n“Itlo invalidate the result of a [ ] trial because of a juror’s\n\nmistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist on\nsomething closer to perfection than our judicial system can be\nexpected to give.” McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000079\n", "char_count": 1744}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 46, "text_content": "17a\n\nfact, as the District Court noted, Maxwell did not\nchallenge the inclusion of other jurors who disclosed\npast experience with sexual abuse, assault, or harass-\nment. This is enough; the District Court did not abuse\nits discretion in denying Maxwell’s motion for a new\ntrial.**\n\n4. The District Court's Response to a Jury\nNote Did Not Result in a Constructive\nAmendment of, or Prejudicial Variance from,\nthe Allegations in the Indictment\n\nDuring jury deliberations, the jury sent the\nfollowing jury note regarding Count Four of the\nIndictment:\n\nUnder Count Four (4), if the defendant aided\nin the transportation of Jane’s return flight,\nbut not the flight to New Mexico where/if the\nintent was for Jane to engage in sexual\nactivity, can she be found guilty under the\nsecond element?*\n\nThe District Court determined that it would not\nrespond to the note directly because it was difficult to\n“parse factually and legally” and instead referred the\n\n34 Nor did the District Court err in questioning Juror 50 rather\nthan allowing the parties to do so. In conducting a hearing on\npotential juror misconduct, “[wle leave it to the district court’s\ndiscretion to decide the extent to which the parties may\nparticipate in questioning the witnesses, and whether to hold the\nhearing in camera.” United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 544\n(2d Cir. 1989). And while Maxwell contends that the District\nCourt improperly limited questioning about Juror 50’s role in\ndeliberations, she both waived that argument below and fails to\nshow here how any such questioning would not be foreclosed by\nFederal Rule of Evidence 606(b).\n\n3 A-238.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000080\n", "char_count": 1644}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 47, "text_content": "18a\n\njury to the second element of Count Four.*® Maxwell\nsubsequently filed a letter seeking reconsideration of\nthe District Court's response, claiming that this\nresponse resulted in a constructive amendment or\nprejudicial variance. The District Court declined to\nreconsider its response and denied Maxwell’s motion.\n\nMaxwell appeals the District Court’s denial and\nargues that the alleged constructive amendment is a\nper se violation of the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth\nAmendment. Specifically, Maxwell argues that testimony\nabout a witness’s sexual abuse in New Mexico presented\nthe jury with another basis for conviction, which is\ndistinct from the charges in the Indictment. Similarly,\nMaxwell argues that this testimony resulted in a\nprejudicial variance from the Indictment. We disagree\nand affirm the District Court’s denial.\n\nWe review the denial of a motion claiming constructive\namendment or prejudicial variance de novo.*\" To\nsatisfy the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause, “an\nindictment must contain the elements of the offense\ncharged and fairly inform the defendant of the charge\nagainst which he must defend.”** We have explained\nthat to prevail on a constructive amendment claim, a\ndefendant must demonstrate that “the terms of the\nindictment are in effect altered by the presentation\nof evidence and jury instructions which so modify\n\n36 A-207-221. The District Court’s instruction on the second\nelement of Count Four required the jury to find that “Maxwell\nknowingly transported Jane in interstate commerce with the\nintent that Jane engage in sexual activity for which any person\ncan be charged with a criminal offense in violation of New York\nlaw.” A-205.\n\n37 See United States v. Dove, 884 F.3d 138, 146, 149 (2d Cir.\n2018).\n\n38 United States v. Khalupsky, 5 F.4th 279, 293 (2d Cir. 2021).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000081\n", "char_count": 1832}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 48, "text_content": "19a\n\nessential elements of the offense charged that there is\na substantial likelihood that the defendant may have\nbeen convicted of an offense other than that charged\nin the indictment.” A constructive amendment re-\nquires reversal.”\n\nWe cannot conclude that a constructive amend-\nment resulted from the evidence presented by the\nGovernment—namely, Jane’s testimony—or that it\ncan be implied from the jury note. We have permitted\nsignificant flexibility in proof as long as a defendant\nwas “given notice of the core of criminality to be\nproven at trial.”*! In turn, “[t]he core of criminality of\nan offense involves the essence of a crime, in general\nterms; the particulars of how a defendant effected the\ncrime falls outside that purview.’”\n\nWe agree with the District Court that the jury\ninstructions, the evidence presented at trial, and the\nGovernment's summation captured the core of\ncriminality. As the District Court noted, while the jury\nnote was ambiguous in one sense, it was clear that it\nreferred to the second element of Count Four of the\nIndictment. Therefore, the District Court correctly\ndirected the jury to that instruction, which “accurately\ninstructed that Count Four had to be predicated on\nfinding a violation of New York law.”* It is therefore\n\n°° United States v. Mollica, 849 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir. 1988).\n\n40 See United States v. D’Amelio, 683 F.3d 412, 417 (2d Cir.\n2012).\n\n41 United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 308, 310 (2d Cir.\n2009) (per curiam) (emphasis omitted).\n\n“2 D’Amelio, 683 F.3d at 418 (internal quotation marks\nomitted).\n\n43 A-387; see United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 101 (2d Cir.\n1990) (“The trial judge is in the best position to sense whether the\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000082\n", "char_count": 1725}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 49, "text_content": "20a\n\nnot “uncertain whether [Maxwell] was convicted of\nconduct that was the subject of the grand jury’s\nindictment.”**\n\nWe also cannot conclude that the evidence at\ntrial prejudicially varied from the Indictment. To\nallege a variance, a defendant “must establish that the\nevidence offered at trial differs materially from the\nevidence alleged in the indictment.”* To prevail and\nwin reversal, the defendant must further show “that\nsubstantial prejudice occurred at trial as a result” of\nthe variance.**© “A defendant cannot demonstrate\nthat he has been prejudiced by a variance where\nthe pleading and the proof substantially correspond,\nwhere the variance is not of a character that could\nhave misled the defendant at the trial, and where the\nvariance is not such as to deprive the accused of his\nright to be protected against another prosecution for\nthe same offense.”*”\n\nFor reasons similar to the ones noted above in the\ncontext of the constructive amendment, the evidence\nat trial did not prove facts “materially different”\nfrom the allegations in the Indictment.** The evidence\nindicated that Maxwell transported Jane to New York\nfor sexual abuse and conspired to do the same.\nMaxwell knew that the evidence also included conduct\n\njury is able to proceed properly with its deliberations, and [ ] has\nconsiderable discretion in determining how to respond to commu-\nnications indicating that the jury is experiencing confusion.”)\n\n44 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 20038).\n*® Dove, 884 F.3d at 149\n46 Td. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n47 Salmonese, 352 F.3d at 621-22 (citation and internal quota-\ntion marks omitted); see also Khalupsky, 5 F.4th at 294.\n\n* Dove, 884 F.3d at 149.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000083\n", "char_count": 1746}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 50, "text_content": "2la\n\nin New Mexico.*? Furthermore, Maxwell cannot demon-\nstrate “substantial prejudice.” Maxwell received—over\nthree weeks before trial—notes of Jane’s interview\nrecording the abuse she suffered in New Mexico. This\nis enough to conclude that Maxwell was not “unfairly\nand substantially” prejudiced.”\n\n5. Maxwell’s Sentence Was _ Procedurally\nReasonable\n\nLastly, Maxwell argues that her sentence was\nprocedurally unreasonable because the District Court\nerred in applying a leadership sentencing enhancement\nunder the Sentencing Guidelines and inadequately\nexplained its above-Guidelines sentence.*! We disagree.\n\nWe review a sentence for both procedural and\nsubstantive reasonableness, which “amounts to review\nfor abuse of discretion.”*? We have explained that\n\n4 As the District Court found, “[t]he Indictment charged a\nscheme to sexually abuse underage girls in New York. In service\nof this scheme, the Indictment alleged that Epstein and the\nDefendant groomed the victims for abuse at various properties\n\nand in various states, including Epstein’s ranch in New Mexico.”\nA-393.\n\n50 See United States v. Lebedev, 932 F.3d 40, 54 (2d Cir. 2019)\n(concluding that a defendant was not “unfairly and substantially”\nprejudiced because “[tlhe government disclosed the evidence and\nexhibits ... four weeks prior to trial”).\n\n51 At sentencing, the District Court calculated a Guidelines\nrange of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment and sentenced\nMaxwell to a slightly above-Guidelines term of 240 months’\nimprisonment.\n\n52 United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 2008) (en\nbanc). “Regardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or\noutside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the\n\nsentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000084\n", "char_count": 1819}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 51, "text_content": "22a\n\nprocedural error is found when a district court “fails to\ncalculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing\nGuidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as\nmandatory, fails to consider the [Section] 3553(a) factors,\nselects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or\nfails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.”\nThe District Court did none of that. It is important\nto emphasize that the Sentencing Guidelines “are\nguidelines—that is, they are truly advisory.”* A\nDistrict Court is “generally free to impose sentences\noutside the recommended range” based on its own\n“informed and individualized judgment.”\n\nWith respect to the four-level leadership enhancement,\nthe District Court found that Maxwell “supervised”\nSarah Kellen in part because of testimony from two\nof Epstein’s pilots who testified that Kellen was\nMaxwell’s assistant. The District Court found that\ntestimony credible, in part because it was corroborated\nby other testimony that Maxwell was Epstein’s\n“number two and the lady of the house” in Palm Beach,\nwhere much of the abuse occurred and where Kellen\nworked.** We therefore hold that the District Court did\nnot err in applying the leadership enhancement.\n\nWith respect to the length of the sentence, the\nDistrict Court properly discussed the sentencing\nfactors when imposing the sentence, and described, at\nlength, Maxwell’s “pivotal role in facilitating the abuse\nof the underaged girls through a series of deceptive\n\n53 United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 38 (2d Cir. 2012).\n54 Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189.\n\n55 Td.\n\n56 A417,\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000085\n", "char_count": 1587}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 52, "text_content": "23a\n\ntactics.”°’ The District Court recognized that the\nsentence “must reflect the gravity of Ms. Maxwell’s\nconduct, of Ms. Maxwell’s offense, the pivotal role she\nplayed in facilitating the offense, and the significant\nand lasting harm it inflicted.”** And the District Court\nexplained that “a very serious, a very significant\nsentence is necessary to achieve the purposes of\npunishment” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In sum, the\nDistrict Court did not err by failing to adequately\nexplain its sentence.\n\nCONCLUSION\nTo summarize, we hold as follows:\n\n1. The District Court did not err in holding\nthat Epstein’s NPA with USAO-SDFL did not bar\nMaxwell’s prosecution by USAOSDNY.\n\n2. The District Court did not err in holding that the\nIndictment was filed within the statute of limitations.\n\n3. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in\ndenying Maxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial.\n\n4. The District Court’s response to a jury note did\nnot result in a constructive amendment of, or prejudi-\ncial variance from, the allegations in the Indictment.\n\n5. The District Court’s sentence was procedurally\nreasonable.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the District\nCourt’s June 29, 2022, judgment of conviction.\n\n57 SA-459.\n°8 SA-461.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000086\n", "char_count": 1256}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 53, "text_content": "24a\nAPPENDIX B\n\nIN RE: INVESTIGATION OF JEFFREY EPSTEIN\nNON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT\n\nIT APPEARING that the City of Palm Beach Police\nDepartment and the State Attorney’s Office for the\n15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County\n(hereinafter, the “State Attorney’s Office”) have\nconducted an investigation into the conduct of Jeffrey\nEpstein (hereinafter “Epstein”);\n\nIT APPEARING that the State Attorney’s Office has\ncharged Epstein by indictment with solicitation of\n\nprostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes Section\n796.07;\n\nIT APPEARING that the United States Attorney’s\nOffice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have\nconducted their own investigation into Epstein’s\nbackground and any offenses that may have been\ncommitted by Epstein against the United States from\nin or around 2001 through in or around September\n2007, including:\n\n(1) knowingly and willfully conspiring with others\nknown and unknown to commit an offense\nagainst the United States, that is, to use a\nfacility or means of interstate or foreign com-\nmerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or entice\nminor females to engage in prostitution, in\nviolation of Title 18, United States Code, Section\n2422(b); all in violation of Title 18, United\nStates Code, Section 371;\n\n(2) knowingly and willfully conspiring with others\nknown and unknown to travel in interstate\ncommerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit\nsexual conduct, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2423(f),\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000087\n", "char_count": 1460}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 54, "text_content": "25a\n\nwith minor females, in violation of Title 18,\nUnited States Code, Section 2423(b); all in\nviolation of Title 18, United States Code, Section\n2423(e);\n\n(3) using a facility or means of interstate or foreign\ncommerce to knowingly persuade, induce, or\nentice minor females to engage in prostitution;\nin violation of Title 18, United States Code,\nSections 2422(b) and 2;\n\n(4) traveling in interstate commerce for the pur-\npose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as\ndefined in 18 US.C. § 2423(f), with minor\nfemales; in violation of Title 18, United States\nCode, Section 2423(b); and\n\n(5) knowingly, in and affecting interstate and\nforeign commerce, recruiting, enticing, and\nobtaining by any means a person, knowing that\nthe person had not attained the age of 18 years\nand would be caused to engage in a commercial\nsex act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(1); in\nviolation of Title 18, United States Code,\nSections 1591(a)(1) and 2; and\n\nIT APPEARING that Epstein seeks to resolve globally\nhis state and federal criminal liability and Epstein\nunderstands and acknowledges that, in exchange for\nthe benefits provided by this agreement, he agrees to\ncomply with its terms, including undertaking certain\nactions with the State Attorney’s Office;\n\nIT APPEARING, after an investigation of the\noffenses and Epstein’s background by both State and\nFederal law enforcement agencies, and after due\nconsultation with the State Attorney’s Office, that the\ninterests of the United States, the State of Florida, and\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000088\n", "char_count": 1527}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 55, "text_content": "26a\n\nthe Defendant will be served by the following\nprocedure;\n\nTHEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander\nAcosta, United States Attorney for the Southern\nDistrict of Florida, prosecution in this District for\nthese offenses shall be deferred in favor of prosecution\nby the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides\nby the following conditions and the requirements of\nthis Agreement set forth below.\n\nIf the United States Attorney should determine,\nbased on reliable evidence, that, during the period of\nthe Agreement, Epstein willfully violated any of the\nconditions of this Agreement, then the United States\nAttorney may, within ninety (90) days following the\nexpiration of the term of home confinement discussed\nbelow, provide Epstein with timely notice specifying\nthe condition(s) of the Agreement that he has violated,\nand shall initiate its prosecution on any offense within\nsixty (60) days’ of giving notice of the violation. Any\nnotice provided to Epstein pursuant to this paragraph\nshall be provided within 60 days of the United States\nlearning of facts which may provide a basis for a\ndetermination of a breach of the Agreement.\n\nAfter timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of\nthe Agreement, no prosecution for the offenses set out\non pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any other\noffenses that have been the subject of the joint\ninvestigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation\nand the United States Attorney’s Office, nor any\noffenses that arose from the Federal Grand Jury\ninvestigation will be instituted in this District, and the\ncharges against Epstein if any, will be dismissed.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000089\n", "char_count": 1632}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 56, "text_content": "27a\n\nTerms of the Agreement:\n\n1.\n\n3.\n\nEpstein shall plead guilty (not nolo contendere)\nto the Indictment as currently pending\nagainst him in the 15th Judicial Circuit in and\nfor Palm Beach County (Case No. 2006-cf-\n009495AXXXMB) charging one (1) count of\nsolicitation of prostitution, in violation of FI. Stat.\n§ 796.07. In addition, Epstein shall plead guilty\nto an Information filed by the State Attorney’s\nOffice charging Epstein with an offense that\nrequires him to register as a sex offender, that\nis, the solicitation of minors to engage in\nprostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes\nSection 796.03;\n\nEpstein shall make a binding recommendation\nthat the Court impose a thirty (30) month\nsentence to be divided as follows:\n\n(a) Epstein shall be sentenced to consecutive\nterms of twelve (12) months and six (6)\nmonths in county jail for all charges, without\nany opportunity for withholding adjudi-\ncation or sentencing, and without probation\nor community control in lieu of imprison-\nment; and\n\n(b) Epstein shall be sentenced to a term of\ntwelve (12) months of community control\nconsecutive to his two terms in county jail as\ndescribed in Term 2(a), supra.\n\nThis agreement is contingent upon a Judge\nof the 15th Judicial Circuit accepting and\nexecuting the sentence agreed upon between\nthe State Attorney’s Office and Epstein, the\ndetails of which are set forth in this agreement.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000090\n", "char_count": 1407}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 57, "text_content": "28a\n\n. The terms contained in paragraphs 1 and 2,\nsupra, do not foreclose Epstein and the State\nAttorney’s Office from agreeing to recommend\nany additional charge(s) or any additional\nterm(s) of probation and/or incarceration.\n\n. Epstein shall waive all challenges to the\nInformation filed by the State Attorney’s Office\nand shall waive the right to appeal his con-\nviction and sentence, except a sentence that\nexceeds what is set forth in paragraph (2),\nsupra.\n\n. Epstein shall provide to the U.S. Attorney’s\nOffice copies of all proposed agreements with\nthe State Attorney’s Office prior to entering into\nthose agreements.\n\n. The United States shall provide Epstein’s\nattorneys with a list of individuals whom it has\nidentified as victims, as defined in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 2255, after Epstein has signed this agreement\nand been sentenced. Upon the execution of this\nagreement, the United States, in consultation\nwith and subject to the good faith approval\nof Epstein’s counsel, shall select an attorney\nrepresentative for these persons, who shall be\npaid for by Epstein. Epstein’s counsel may\ncontact the identified individuals through that\nrepresentative.\n\n. If any of the individuals referred to in para-\ngraph (7), supra, elects to file suit pursuant to\n18 U.S.C. § 2255, Epstein will not contest the\njurisdiction of the United States District Court\nfor the Southern District of Florida over his\nperson and/or the subject matter, and Epstein\nwaives his right to contest liability and also\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000091\n", "char_count": 1505}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 58, "text_content": "10.\n\n11.\n\n29a\n\nwaives his right to contest damages up to an\namount as agreed to between the identified\nindividual and Epstein, so long as the identified\nindividual elects to proceed exclusively under\n18 U.S.C. § 2255, and agrees to waive any other\nclaim for damages, whether pursuant to state,\nfederal, or common law. Notwithstanding this\nwaiver, as to those individuals whose names\nappear on the list provided by the United\nStates, Epstein’s signature on this agreement,\nhis waivers and failures to contest liability and\nsuch damages in any suit are not to be\nconstrued as an admission of any criminal or\ncivil liability.\n\nEpstein’s signature on this agreement also is\nnot to be construed as an admission of civil or\ncriminal liability or a waiver of any jurisdic-\ntional or other defense as to any person whose\nname does not appear on the list provided by the\nUnited States.\n\nExcept as to those individuals who elect to\nproceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, as\nset forth in paragraph (8), supra, neither\nEpstein’s signature on this agreement, nor its\nterms, nor any resulting waivers or settlements\nby Epstein are to be construed as admissions or\nevidence of civil or criminal liability or a waiver\nof any jurisdictional or other defense as to any\nperson, whether or not her name appears on the\nlist provided by the United States.\n\nEpstein shall use his best efforts to enter his\nguilty plea and be sentenced not later than\nOctober 26, 2007. The United States has no\nobjection to Epstein self-reporting to begin\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000092\n", "char_count": 1539}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 59, "text_content": "30a\n\nserving his sentence not later than January 4,\n2008.\n\n12. Epstein agrees that he will not be afforded any\nbenefits with respect to gain time, other than\nthe rights, opportunities, and benefits as any\nother inmate, including but not limited to,\neligibility for gain time credit based on standard\nrules and regulations that apply in the State of\nFlorida. At the United States’ request, Epstein\nagrees to provide an accounting of the gain time\nhe earned during his period of incarceration.\n\n13. The parties anticipate that this agreement will\nnot be made part of any public record. If the\nUnited States receives a Freedom of Information\nAct request or any compulsory process com-\nmanding the disclosure of the agreement, it will\nprovide notice to Epstein before making that\ndisclosure.\n\nEpstein understands that the United States Attorney\nhas no authority to require the State Attorney’s Office\nto abide by any terms of this agreement. Epstein\nunderstands that it is his obligation to undertake\ndiscussions with the State Attorney’s Office and to\nuse his best efforts to ensure compliance with these\nprocedures, which compliance will be necessary to\nsatisfy the United States’ interest. Epstein also\nunderstands that it is his obligation to use his best\nefforts to convince the Judge of the 15th Judicial\nCircuit to accept Epstein’s binding recommendation\nregarding the sentence to be imposed, and understands\nthat the failure to do so will be a breach of the\nagreement.\n\nIn consideration of Epstein’s agreement to plead\nguilty and to provide compensation in the manner\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000093\n", "char_count": 1590}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 60, "text_content": "3la\n\ndescribed above, if Epstein successfully fulfills all\nof the terms and conditions of this agreement, the\nUnited States also agrees that it will not institute any\ncriminal char es against any potential co-conspirators\nof Epstein, including but not limited to\n\n. Further, upon execution\nof this agreement and a plea agreement with the State\nAttorney’s Office, the federal Grand Jury investigation\nwill be suspended, and all pending federal Grand Jury\nsubpoenas will be held in abeyance unless and until\nthe defendant violates any term of this agreement. The\ndefendant likewise agrees to withdraw his pending\nmotion to intervene and to quash certain grand jury\nsubpoenas. Both parties agree to maintain their\nevidence, specifically evidence requested by or directly\nrelated to the grand jury subpoenas that have been\nissued, and including certain computer equipment,\ninviolate until all of the terms of this agreement have\nbeen satisfied. Upon the successful completion of the\nterms of this agreement, all outstanding grand jury\nsubpoenas shall be deemed withdrawn.\n\nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and\ncertifies that each of these terms is material to this\nagreement and is supported by independent consideration\nand that a breach of any one of these conditions allows\nthe United States to elect to terminate the agreement\nand to investigate and prosecute Epstein and any other\nindividual or entity for any and all federal offenses.\n\nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and\ncertifies that he is aware of the fact that the Sixth\nAmendment to the Constitution of the United States\nprovides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused\nshall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.\nEpstein further is aware that Rule 4 8(b) of the Federal\nRules of Criminal Procedure provides that the Court\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000094\n", "char_count": 1835}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 61, "text_content": "32a\n\nmay dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint\nfor unnecessary delay in presenting a charge to the\nGrand Jury, filing an information, or in bringing a\ndefendant to trial. Epstein hereby requests that the\nUnited States Attorney for the Southern District of\nFlorida defer such prosecution. Epstein agrees and\nconsents that any delay from the date of this Agreement\nto the date of initiation of prosecution, as provided for\nin the terms expressed herein, shall be deemed to be a\nnecessary delay at his own request, and he hereby\nwaives any defense to such prosecution on the ground\nthat such delay operated to deny him rights under\nRule 4 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure\nand the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of\nthe United States to a speedy trial or to bar the\nprosecution by reason of the running of the statute of\nlimitations for a period of months equal to the period\nbetween the signing of this agreement and the breach\nof this agreement as to those offenses that were the\nsubject of the grand jury’s investigation. Epstein\nfurther asserts and certifies that he understands that\nthe Fifth Amendment and Rule 7(a) of the Federal\nRules of Criminal Procedure provide that all felonies\nmust be charged in an indictment presented to a grand\njury. Epstein hereby agrees and consents that, if a\nprosecution against him is instituted for any offense\nthat was the subject of the grand jury’s investigation,\nit may be by way of an Information signed and filed by\nthe United States Attorney, and hereby waives his\nright to be indicted by a grand jury as to any such offense.\n\nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and\ncertifies that the above has been read and explained to\nhim. Epstein hereby states that he understands the\nconditions of this Non-Prosecution Agreement and\nagrees to comply with them.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000095\n", "char_count": 1849}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 62, "text_content": "Dated:\n\n33a\n\nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY\n\nBy:\n\nA. MARIE VILLAFANA\nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY\n\nDated: 9/24/07\n\nDated:\n\nDated:\n\n/s/ Jeffrey Epstein\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nGERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ.\nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ.\nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and\ncertifies that the above has been read and explained to\nhim. Epstein hereby states that he understands the\nconditions of this Non-Prosecution Agreement and\nagrees to comply with them.\n\nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY\n\nDated: 9/27/07\n\nBy: /s/ A. Marie Villafania\nA. MARIE VILLAFANA\nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000096\n", "char_count": 661}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 63, "text_content": "34a\n\nDated:\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN\nDated: 9/24/07\n/s/ Gerald Lefcourt\nGERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ.\nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN\nDated:\n\nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ.\nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nBy signing this agreement, Epstein asserts and\ncertifies that the above has been read and explained to\nhim. Epstein hereby states that he understands the\nconditions of this Non-Prosecution Agreement and\nagrees to comply with them.\n\nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA\n\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY\nDated:\n\nBy: _\n\nA. MARIE VILLAFANA\n\nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY\nDated:\n\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN\nDated:\n\nGERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ.\nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nDated: 9-24-07\n\n/s/ Lilly Ann Sanchez\nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ.\nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000097\n", "char_count": 701}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 64, "text_content": "35a\nIN RE: INVESTIGATION OF JEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nADDENDUM TO THE\nNON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT\n\nIT APPEARING that the parties seek to clarify\ncertain provisions of page 4, paragraph 7 of the Non-\nProsecution Agreement (hereinafter “paragraph 7”),\nthat agreement is modified as follows:\n\n7A. The United States has the right to assign to an\n\n7B.\n\n7C,\n\nindependent third-party the responsibility for\nconsulting with and, subject to the good faith\napproval of Epstein’s counsel, selecting the\nattorney representative for the individuals\nidentified underthe Agreement. If the United\nStates elects to assign this responsibility to an\nindependent third-patty, both the United States\nand Epstein retain the right to make good faith\nobjections to the attorney representative sug-\ngested by the independent third-party prior to\nthe final designation of the attorney representa-\ntive.\n\nThe parties will jointly prepare a short written\nsubmission to the independent third-party\nregarding the role of the attorney representa-\ntive and regarding Epstein’s Agreement to pay\nsuch attorney representative his or her regular\ncustomary hourly rate for representing such\nvictims subject to the provisions of paragraph C,\ninfra.\n\nPursuant to additional paragraph 7A, Epstein\nhas agreed to pay the fees of the attorney\nrepresentative selected by the independent\nthird party. This provision, however, shall not\nobligate Epstein to pay the fees and costs of\ncontested litigation filed against him. Thus, if\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000098\n", "char_count": 1494}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 65, "text_content": "36a\n\nafter consideration of potential settlements, an\nattorney representative elects to file a contested\nlawsuit pursuant to 18 U,S.C. s 2255 or elects to\npursue any other contested remedy, the para-\ngraph 7 obligation of the Agreement to pay the\ncosts of the attorney representative, as opposed\nto any statutory or other obligations to pay\nreasonable attorneys fees and costs such as\nthose contained in s 2255 to bear the costs of the\nattorney representative, shall cease.\n\nBy signing this Addendum, Epstein asserts and\ncertifies that the above has been read and explained to\nhim. Epstein hereby, states that he understands the\nclarifications to the Non-Prosecution Agreement and\nagrees to comply with them.\n\nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY\n\nDated: 10/30/07\n\nBy: /s/ [Illegible] _\nfor A. MARIE VILLAFANA\nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY\n\nDated: 10/29/07\n\n/s/ Jeffrey Epstein\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN\nDated:\nGERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ.\nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN\nDated:\n\nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ.\nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000099\n", "char_count": 1029}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 66, "text_content": "37a\n\nBy signing this Addendum, Epstein asserts and\ncertifies that the above has been read and explained to\nhim. Epstein hereby states that he understands the\nclarifications to the Non-Prosecution Agreement and\nagrees to comply with them.\n\nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY\n\nDated: 10/30/07\n\nBy: /s/ [legible] _\nfor A. MARIE VILLAFANA\nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY\n\nDated:\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN\nDated: 10/29/07\n/s/ Gerald Lefeourt\nGERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ.\nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN\nDated:\n\nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ.\nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nBy signing this Addendum, Epstein asserts and\ncertifies that the above has been read and explained to\nhim. Epstein hereby states that he understands the\nclarifications to the Non-Prosecution Agreement and\nagrees to comply with them.\n\nR. ALEXANDER ACOSTA\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY\n\nDated: 10/30/07\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000100\n", "char_count": 850}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 67, "text_content": "38a\nBy: /s/ [Illegible]\n\nfor A. MARIE VILLAFANA\nASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY\n\nDated:\n\nJEFFREY EPSTEIN\nDated:\n\nGERALD LEFCOURT, ESQ.\nCOUNSEL TO JEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nDated: 10-29-07\n/s/ Lilly Ann Sanchez\n\nLILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ.\nATTORNEY FOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000101\n", "char_count": 265}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 68, "text_content": "39a\nAPPENDIX C\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nCase Number: S2 20 CR 330 (AJN)\nUSM Number: 02879-509\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nVv.\n\nGHISAINE MAXWELL\n\nBOBBI C. STERNHEIM\nDefendant’s Attorney\n\nJUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE\n\nTHE DEFENDANT:\nLI pleaded guilty to count(s)\n\nLC) pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was\naccepted by the court.\n\nVI was found guilty on count(s) after a plea of not\n\nguilty. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 Gudgment not entered on 1 & 5 as\nmultiplicitous, Dkt. No. 657)\n\nThe defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:\n\nOffense Count\nEnded\n\n18 USC 371.F Conspiracy to transport 7/30/2004 3\nminors with intent to\nengage in criminal sexual\nactivity\n\nTitle & Section Nature of Offense\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000102\n", "char_count": 744}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 69, "text_content": "40a\n\nThe defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2\nthrough 8 _ of this judgment. The sentence is imposed\npursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.\n\n™ The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) 2_\n\nVI Count(s) 7,8 and underlying indictments LJ is M are\ndismissed on the motion of the United States.\n\nIt is ordered that the defendant must notify the\nUnited States attorney for this district within 30 days\nof any change of name, residence, or mailing address\nuntil all fines, restitution, costs, and special assess-\nments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If\nordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify\nthe court and United States attorney of material\nchanges in economic circumstances.\n\n6/29/2022\n\nDate of Imposition of Judgment\n/s/ Alison J. Nathan\n\nSignature of Judge\n\nALISON J. NATHAN, US Circuit\nJudge sitting by designation\nName and Title of Judge\n6/29/2022\n\nDate\n\nADDITIONAL COUNTS OF CONVICTION\n\nTitle & Nature of Offense Offense Count\nSection Ended\n\n18 USC Transportation of a minor 12/31/1997 4\n2423.F with intent to engage in\n\ncriminal sexual activity\n18 USC Sex trafficking of an 7/30/2004 6\n\n1591.F individual under the age\nof eighteen\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000103\n", "char_count": 1200}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 70, "text_content": "Ala\nIMPRISONMENT\nThe defendant is hereby committed to the custody of\n\nthe Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a\ntotal term of:\n\nThe Defendant is sentenced to a term of 240 Months.\n\nCount 3 a sentence of 60 Months. Count 4 a sentence\nof 120 Months. Count 6 a sentence of 240 Months. All\nCounts to run concurrently.\n\nDefendant was notified of her right to Appeal.\n\nI The court makes the following recommendations\nto the Bureau of Prisons:\nDefendant to be considered for designation to FCI\nDanbury.\n\nDefendant to be considered for enrollment in FIT\nprogram.\n\nL] The defendant is remanded to the custody of the\nUnited States Marshal.\n\nL) The defendant shall surrender to the United\nStates Marshal for this district:\n\nLI at LJ a.m. L] p.m. on\nLC as notified by the United States Marshal.\n\n(1 The defendant shall surrender for service of\nsentence at the institution designated by the\nBureau of Prisons:\n\nLO before 2 p.m. on .\nLC as notified by the United States Marshal.\n\nLO as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services\nOffice.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000104\n", "char_count": 1056}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 71, "text_content": "42a\nRETURN\n\nI have executed this judgment as follows:\n\nDefendant delivered on to at\n, with a certified copy of this judgment.\n\nUnited States Marshal\n\nBy\nDeputy United States Marshal\n\nSUPERVISED RELEASE\n\nUpon release from imprisonment, you will be on\nsupervised release for a term of:\n\n3 Years on Counts 3 and 4. 5 Years on Count 6 to run\nconcurrently.\n\nMANDATORY CONDITIONS\n\n1. You must not commit another federal, state or local\ncrime.\n\n2. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled\nsubstance.\n\n3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a\ncontrolled substance. You must submit to one drug\ntest within 15 days of release from imprisonment\nand at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as\ndetermined by the court.\n\nL] The above drug testing condition is suspended,\nbased on the court's determination that you\npose a low risk of future substance abuse.\n(check if applicable)\n\n4. M You must make restitution in accordance with 18\nUS.C. §§ 3663 and 36638A or any other statute\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000105\n", "char_count": 999}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 72, "text_content": "43a\n\nauthorizing a sentence of restitution. (check if\napplicable)\n\n5. M You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as\ndirected by the probation officer. (check if applicable)\n\n6. @ You must comply with the requirements of the\nSex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34\nU.S.C. § 20901, et seq.) as directed by the probation\nofficer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex\noffender registration agency in the location where\nyou reside, work, are a student, or were convicted\nof a qualifying offense. (check if applicable)\n\n7. UO You must participate in an approved program for\ndomestic violence. (check if applicable)\n\nYou must comply with the standard conditions that\nhave been adopted by this court as well as with any\nother conditions on the attached page.\n\nSTANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION\n\nAs part of your supervised release, you must comply\nwith the following standard conditions of supervision.\nThese conditions are imposed because they establish\nthe basic expectations for your behavior while on\nsupervision and identify the minimum tools needed by\nprobation officers to keep informed, report to the court\nabout, and bring about improvements in your conduct\nand condition.\n\n1. You must report to the probation office in the\nfederal judicial district where you are authorized to\nreside within 72 hours of your release from impris-\nonment, unless the probation officer instructs you\nto report to a different probation office or within a\ndifferent time frame.\n\n2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you\nwill receive instructions from the court or the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000106\n", "char_count": 1600}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 73, "text_content": "44a\n\nprobation officer about how and when you must\nreport to the probation officer, and you must report\nto the probation officer as instructed.\n\n. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial\ndistrict where you are authorized to reside without\nfirst getting permission from the court or the\nprobation officer.\n\n. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by\nyour probation officer.\n\n. You must live at a place approved by the probation\nofficer. If you plan to change where you live or\nanything about your living arrangements (such as\nthe people you live with), you must notify the\nprobation officer at least 10 days before the change.\nIf notifying the probation officer in advance is not\npossible due to unanticipated circumstances, you\nmust notify the probation officer within 72 hours of\nbecoming aware of a change or expected change.\n\n. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at\nany time at your home or elsewhere, and you must\npermit the probation officer to take any items\nprohibited by the conditions of your supervision\nthat he or she observes in plain view.\n\n. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per\nweek) at a lawful type of employment, unless the\nprobation officer excuses you from doing so. If you\ndo not have full-time employment you must try to\nfind full-time employment, unless the probation\nofficer excuses you from doing so. If you plan to\nchange where you work or anything about your\nwork (such as your position or your job responsibili-\nties), you must notify the probation officer at\nleast 10 days before the change. If notifying the\nprobation officer at least 10 days in advance is not\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000107\n", "char_count": 1653}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 74, "text_content": "8.\n\n45a\n\npossible due to unanticipated circumstances, you\nmust notify the probation officer within 72 hours of\nbecoming aware of a change or expected change.\n\nYou must not communicate or interact with some-\none you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you\nknow someone has been convicted of a felony, you\nmust not knowingly communicate or interact with\nthat person without first getting the permission of the\nprobation officer.\n\nIf you are arrested or questioned by a law\nenforcement officer, you must notify the probation\nofficer within 72 hours.\n\n10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a\n\nfirearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dan-\ngerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed,\nor was modified for, the specific purpose of causing\nbodily injury or death to another person such as\nnunchakus or tasers).\n\n11. You must not act or make any agreement with a\n\nlaw enforcement agency to act as a confidential\nhuman source or informant without first getting\nthe permission of the court.\n\n12. You must follow the instructions of the probation\n\nofficer related to the conditions of supervision.\n\nU.S. Probation Office Use Only\n\nA US. probation officer has instructed me on the\nconditions specified by the court and has provided me\nwith a written copy of this judgment containing these\nconditions. For further information regarding these\nconditions, see Overview of Probation and Supervised\nRelease Conditions, available at: www.uscourts.gov.\n\nDefendant’s Signature Date\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000108\n", "char_count": 1504}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 75, "text_content": "46a\nSPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION\n\nYou shall submit your person, and any property,\nresidence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic\ncommunication, data storage devices, cloud storage or\nmedia, and effects to a search by any United States\nProbation Officer, and if needed, with the assistance of\nany law enforcement. The search is to be conducted\nwhen there is reasonable suspicion concerning vio-\nlation of a condition of supervision or unlawful conduct\nby the person being supervised. Failure to submit to a\nsearch may be grounds for revocation of release. You\nshall warn any other occupants that the premises may\nbe subject to searches pursuant to this condition. Any\nsearch shall be conducted at a reasonable time and in\na reasonable manner.\n\nYou shall undergo a sex-offense-specific evaluation and\nparticipate in an outpatient sex offender treatment\nand/or outpatient mental health treatment program\napproved by the U.S. Probation Office. You shall abide\nby all rules, requirements, and conditions of the sex\noffender treatment program(s), including submission\nto polygraph testing and refraining from accessing\nwebsites, chatrooms, instant messaging, or social\nnetworking sites to the extent that the sex offender\ntreatment and/or mental health treatment program\ndetermines that such access would be detrimental to\nyour ongoing treatment. You will not view, access,\npossess, and/or download any pornography involving\nadults unless approved by the sex-offender specific\ntreatment provider. You must waive your right of\nconfidentiality in any records for mental health assess-\nment and treatment imposed as a consequence of\nthis judgment to allow the U.S. Probation Office to\nreview the course of treatment and progress with the\ntreatment provider. You must contribute to the cost of\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000109\n", "char_count": 1815}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 76, "text_content": "Ava\n\nservices rendered based on your ability to pay and the\navailability of third-party payments. The Court author-\nizes the release of available psychological and psychi-\natric evaluations and reports, including the presentence\ninvestigation report, to the sex offender treatment\nprovider and/or mental health treatment provider.\n\nYou must not have contact with the victim(s) in this\ncase. This includes any physical, visual, written, or\ntelephonic contact with such persons. Additionally, you\nmust not directly cause or encourage anyone else to\nhave such contact with the victim (s).\n\nYou must not have deliberate contact with any child\nunder 18 years of age, unless approved by the U.S.\nProbation Office. You must not loiter within 100 feet of\nplaces regularly frequented by children under the age\nof 18, such as schoolyards, playgrounds, and arcades.\nYou must not view and/or access any web profile of\nusers under the age of 18. This includes, but is not\nlimited to, social networking websites, community\nportals, chat rooms or other online environment\n(audio/visual/messaging), etc. which allows for real\ntime interaction with other users, without prior\napproval from your probation officer.\n\nYou must provide the probation officer with access to\nany requested financial information.\n\nYou must not incur new credit charges or open\nadditional lines of credit without the approval of the\nprobation officer unless you are in compliance with the\ninstallment payment schedule.\n\nIf you are sentenced to any period of supervision, it is\nrecommended that you be supervised by the district of\nresidence.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000110\n", "char_count": 1618}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 77, "text_content": "48a\nCRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES\n\nThe defendant must pay the total criminal monetary\npenalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.\n\nTOTALS:\n\nAssessment Restitution Fine\n$300.00 $ $750,000.00\nAVAA Assessment* JVTA Assessment**\n$ $\n\nL] The determination of restitution is deferred until\n\n. An Amended Judgment in a Criminal\n\nCase (AO 245C) will be entered after such\ndetermination.\n\n[| The defendant must make restitution (including\ncommunity restitution) to the following payees in\nthe amount listed below.\n\nIf the defendant makes a partial payment, each\npayee shall receive an approximately proportioned\npayment, unless specified otherwise in the priority\norder or percentage payment column below. How-\never, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664G), all nonfederal\nvictims must be paid before the United States is\npaid.\n\nRestitution Priority or\nName of Payee Total Loss*** Ordered Percentage\nTOTALS $ 0.00 $ 0.00\n\nL| Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea\nagreement $\n\nL] The defendant must pay interest on restitution and\na fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or\nfine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000111\n", "char_count": 1149}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 78, "text_content": "49a\n\nthe date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may\n\nbe subject to penalties for delinquency and default,\npursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).\n\nC1 The court determined that the defendant does not\nhave the ability to pay interest and it is ordered\nthat:\n\nC1 the interest requirement is waived for the\nOO fine UO restitution.\n\n[1 the interest requirement for the L fine\nCJ restitution is modified as follows:\n\n* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim\nAssistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.\n\n** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub.\nL. No. 114-22.\n\n*** Findings for the total amount of losses are\nrequired under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of\nTitle 18 for offenses committed on or after September\n13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.\n\nSCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS\n\nHaving assessed the defendant’s ability to pay,\npayment of the total criminal monetary penalties is\ndue as follows:\n\nA MLump sum payment of $ 300.00 due immediately,\nbalance due\n\nC1 not later than , or\n(C1 in accordance with LD) C, 0 D, U E, or UF below;\nor\n\nB OU Payment to begin immediately (may be combined\nwith UD) C, 0 D, or UO F below); or\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000112\n", "char_count": 1203}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 79, "text_content": "C\n\nF\n\n50a\n\n[| Payment in equal ____ (e.g., weekly, monthly,\nquarterly) installments of $ over a period of\n(e.g., months or years), to commence\n(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment;\n\nor\n\nL| Payment in equal (e.g., weekly, monthly,\nquarterly) installments of $ __ over a period of\n(e.g., months or years), to commence\n(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprison-\n\nment to a term of supervision; or\n\nJ] Payment during the term of supervised release\nwill commence within 30 (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after\nrelease from imprisonment. The court will set the\npayment plan based on an assessment of the\ndefendant’s ability to pay at that time; or\n\nLC] Special instructions regarding the payment of\ncriminal monetary penalties:\n\nUnless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if\nthis judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of\ncriminal monetary penalties is due during the period\nof imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties,\nexcept those payments made through the Federal\nBureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility\nProgram, are made to the clerk of the court.\n\nThe defendant shall receive credit for all payments\npreviously made toward any criminal monetary\npenalties imposed.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000113\n", "char_count": 1220}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 80, "text_content": "5la\nC1 Joint and Several\n\nCase Number\nDefendant and Co-Defendant Names\n(including defendant number)\n\nTotal Amount\nJoint and Several Amount\nCorresponding Payee, if appropriate\n(1 The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.\nL] The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):\n\nC1 The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest\nin the following property to the United States:\n\nPayments shall be applied in the following order:\n(1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution\ninterest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal,\n(6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA\nassessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost\nof prosecution and court costs.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000114\n", "char_count": 712}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 81, "text_content": "52a\nAPPENDIX D\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n20-cr-330 (AJN)\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n_y—\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL,\nDefendant.\n\nOPINION & ORDER\nALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:\n\nIn June 2020, a grand jury returned a six-count\nindictment charging Ghislaine Maxwell with facilitating\nthe late financier Jeffrey Epstein’s sexual abuse of\nminor victims from around 1994 to 1997. The Govern-\nment filed a first (S1) superseding indictment shortly\nthereafter, which contained only small, ministerial\ncorrections. The S1 superseding indictment included\ntwo counts of enticement or transportation of minors\nto engage in illegal sex acts in violation of the Mann\nAct and two counts of conspiracy to commit those\noffenses. It also included two counts of perjury in\nconnection with Maxwell’s testimony in a civil deposi-\ntion. Trial is set to begin on July 12, 2021.\n\nMaxwell filed twelve pretrial motions seeking to\ndismiss portions of the S1 superseding indictment,\nsuppress evidence, and compel discovery. After the\nparties fully briefed those motions, a grand jury\nreturned a second (S2) superseding indictment adding\n\nDOJ-OGR-O0000115\n", "char_count": 1156}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 82, "text_content": "53a\n\na sex trafficking count and another related conspiracy\ncount.\n\nThis Opinion resolves all of Maxwell’s currently\npending pretrial motions other than those seeking to\nsuppress evidence, which the Court will resolve in due\ncourse. The motions, and this Opinion, deal exclusively\nwith the $1 superseding indictment and do not resolve\nany issues related to the newly added sex trafficking\ncharges. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies\nMaxwell’s motions to dismiss the S1 superseding\nindictment in whole or in part. It grants her motion to\nsever the perjury charges for a separate trial. It denies\nher motion to further expedite discovery.\n\nThe Court provides a brief summary of its con-\nclusions here and its reasoning on the pages that\nfollow:\n\ne Maxwell moves to dismiss all counts based on a\nnon-prosecution agreement between Jeffrey\nEpstein and the U.S. Attorney for the Southern\nDistrict of Florida. The Court concludes that the\nagreement does not apply in this District or to\nthe charged offenses.\n\ne Maxwell moves to dismiss all counts as un-\ntimely. The Court concludes that the Govern-\nment brought the charges within the statute\nof limitations and did not unfairly delay in\nbringing them.\n\ne Maxwell moves to dismiss the Mann Act counts\nbecause they are too vague, or in the alternative\nto require the Government to describe the\ncharges in greater detail. The Court concludes\nthat the charges are specific enough.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000116\n", "char_count": 1451}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 83, "text_content": "54a\n\ne Maxwell moves to dismiss the perjury counts\nbecause, in her view, her testimony responded to\nambiguous questioning and was not material.\nThe Court concludes that these issues are best\nleft for the jury.\n\ne Maxwell moves to sever the perjury counts from\nthe Mann Act counts so that they can proceed\nin a separate trial. The Court concludes that\nseverance is appropriate and will try the\nperjury counts separately.\n\ne Maxwell moves to strike language from the\nindictment that she believes is superfluous and\nto dismiss conspiracy counts she believes are\nredundant. The Court concludes that these\nmotions are premature before trial.\n\ne Maxwell moves to compel the Government to\nimmediately disclose certain categories of\nevidence. The Court concludes that she is not\nentitled to do so, but the Court will order\nMaxwell and the Government to confer on a\ndiscovery schedule.\n\ne Maxwell moves to dismiss all counts because\na grand jury in White Plains, rather than\nManhattan, returned the S1_ superseding\nindictment. Because a jury in Manhattan\nreturned the S2 superseding indictment, the\nmotion appears moot.\n\nI. Jeffrey Epstein’s non-prosecution agreement\ndoes not bar this prosecution\n\nIn September 2007, under investigation by both\nfederal and state authorities, Jeffrey Epstein entered\ninto a non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”) with the\nOffice of the United States Attorney for the Southern\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000117\n", "char_count": 1414}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 84, "text_content": "55a\n\nDistrict of Florida. Dkt. No. 142 at 1-2. Epstein agreed\nin the NPA to plead guilty in Florida state court to\nsoliciting minors for prostitution and to serve eighteen\nmonths in a county jail. Id. In exchange, the U.S.\nAttorney’s Office agreed not to charge him with federal\ncrimes in the Southern District of Florida stemming\nfrom its investigation of his conduct between 2001 and\n2007. Id. It also agreed not to bring criminal charges\nagainst any of his “potential co-conspirators.” Id.\n\nAs a recent report from the Department of Justice’s\nOffice of Professional Responsibility observed, the\nNPA was unusual in many respects, including its\nbreadth, leniency, and secrecy. OPR Report, Gov. Ex. 3,\nDkt. No. 204-3, at x, 80, 175, 179, 260-61. The U.S.\nAttorney’s promise not to prosecute unidentified co-\nconspirators marks a stark departure from normal\npractice for federal plea agreements. This provision\nappears to have been added “with little discussion or\nconsideration by the prosecutors.” Id. at 169, 185. The\nreport concluded that the U.S. Attorney’s negotiation\nand approval of the NPA did not amount to\nprofessional misconduct, but nonetheless reflected\n“poor judgment.” Id. at 169.\n\nOnly the NPA’s effect, and not its wisdom, is\npresently before the Court. Maxwell contends that the\nNPA bars this prosecution, because she is charged as\na co-conspirator of Jeffrey Epstein and the NPA’s\nco-conspirator provision lacks any geographical or\ntemporal limitations. The Court disagrees for two\nindependent reasons. First, under controlling Second\nCircuit precedent, the NPA does not bind the U.S.\nAttorney for the Southern District of New York.\nSecond, it does not cover the offenses charged in the S1\nsuperseding indictment.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000118\n", "char_count": 1751}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 85, "text_content": "56a\n\nA. The non-prosecution agreement does not\nbind the U.S. Attorney for the Southern\nDistrict of New York\n\nUnited States Attorneys speak for the United\nStates. When a U.S. Attorney makes a promise as part\nof a plea bargain, both contract principles and due\nprocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See\nSantobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971);\nUnited States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996).\nThe question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for\nthe Southern District of Florida had the power to\nbind the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of\nNew York. The question is whether the terms of the\nNPA did so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and\nprinciples of contract interpretation, the Court\nconcludes that they did not.\n\nIn United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held:\n“A plea agreement binds only the office of the United\nStates Attorney for the district in which the plea is\nentered unless it affirmatively appears that the\nagreement contemplates a broader restriction.” 771\nF.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam). This is\nsomething akin to a clear statement rule. Single-\ndistrict plea agreements are the norm. Nationwide,\nunlimited agreements are the rare exception. Applying\nAnnabi, panels of the Second Circuit have stated that\ncourts cannot infer intent to depart from this ordinary\npractice from an agreement’s use of phrases like “the\ngovernment” or “the United States.” United States v.\nSalameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam);\nUnited States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App’x 268, 270 (2d Cir.\n2004). Those are common shorthand. A plea agreement\nneed not painstakingly spell out “the Office of the\nUnited States Attorney for Such-and-Such District” in\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000119\n", "char_count": 1733}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 86, "text_content": "57a\n\nevery instance to make clear that it applies only in the\ndistrict where signed.\n\nMaxwell asks this Court to draw the opposite\nconclusion. The provision of the NPA dealing with\nco-conspirators does not expressly state that it binds\nUS. Attorneys in other districts. It does not expressly\nstate that it applies in other districts. The relevant\nlanguage, in its entirety, reads as follows: “the United\nStates also agrees that it will not institute any crimi-\nnal charges against any potential co-conspirators of\nEpstein.” Dkt. No. 142-1 at 5. Under Annabi, Salameh,\nand Gonzalez, a statement that “the United States”\nagrees not to prosecute implies no restriction on\nprosecutions in other districts.\n\nTwo provisions of the NPA refer specifically to\nprosecution in the Southern District of Florida. The\nfirst states that the U.S. Attorney for the Southern\nDistrict of Florida will defer “prosecution in this\nDistrict” if Epstein complies with the agreement. Dkt.\nNo. 142-1 at 2. The second states that no prosecution\n“will be instituted in this District, and the charges\nagainst Epstein if any, will be dismissed” after he\nfulfills the agreement’s conditions. Maxwell contends\nthat the lack of similar language in the co-conspirator\nprovision must mean that it lacks any geographical\nlimitation. If anything, that language reflects that the\nNPA’s scope was expressly limited to the Southern\nDistrict of Florida. It is not plausible—let alone\n“affirmatively apparent”, Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672,—\nthat the parties intended to drastically expand the\nagreement’s geographic scope in the single sentence on\nthe prosecution of co-conspirators without clearly so\nsaying.\n\nWithout an affirmative statement in the NPA’s text,\nMaxwell turns to its negotiation history. Under Second\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000120\n", "char_count": 1790}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 87, "text_content": "58a\n\nCircuit precedent she may offer evidence that negotia-\ntions of the NPA between the defendant and the\nprosecutors included a promise to bind other districts.\nSee United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir.\n1986). She alleges that officials in the U.S. Attorney’s\nOffice for the Southern District of Florida sought and\nobtained approval for the NPA from the Office of the\nDeputy Attorney General and communicated with\nattorneys in other districts. Any involvement of attorneys\noutside the Southern District of Florida appears\nto have been minimal. Maxwell has already received\naccess to an unusually large amount of information\nabout the NPA’s negotiation history in the form of the\nOPR report and yet identifies no evidence that the\nDepartment of Justice made any promises not contained\nin the NPA. The OPR report reflects that the Office of\nthe Deputy Attorney General reviewed the NPA, but\nonly after it was signed when Epstein tried to get out\nof it. OPR Report at 103. Other documents show that\nattorneys in the Southern District of Florida reached\nout to other districts for investigatory assistance but\nnot for help negotiating the NPA. Dkt. No. 204-2. Nor\nwould direct approval of the NPA by the Office of the\nDeputy Attorney General change the meaning of its\nterms. No evidence suggests anyone promised Epstein\nthat the NPA would bar the prosecution of his co-\nconspirators in other districts. Absent such a promise,\nit does not matter who did or did not approve it.\n\nSecond Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption\nthat a plea agreement binds only the U.S. Attorney’s\noffice for the district where it was signed. Maxwell\nidentifies nothing in the NPA’s text or negotiation\nhistory to disturb this presumption. The Court thus\nconcludes that the NPA does not bind the US.\nAttorney for the Southern District of New York.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000121\n", "char_count": 1863}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 88, "text_content": "59a\n\nB. The non-prosecution agreement does not\ncover the charged offenses\n\nThe NPA would provide Maxwell no defense to the\ncharges in the $1 superseding indictment even against\nan office bound to follow it. The NPA bars prosecution,\nfollowing Epstein’s fulfillment of its conditions, only\nfor three specific categories of offenses:\n\n(1) “the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2” of\nthe NPA; namely, “any offenses that may\nhave been committed by Epstein against\nthe United States from in or around 2001\nthrough in or around September 2007”\nincluding five enumerated offenses;\n\n(2) “any other offenses that have been the\nsubject of the joint investigation by the\nFederal Bureau of Investigation and the\nUnited States Attorney’s Office”; and\n\n(3) “any offenses that arose from the Federal\nGrand Jury investigation.” 6\n\nDkt. No. 142-1 at 2. The NPA makes clear that the\ncovered charges are those relating to and deriving\nfrom a specific investigation of conduct that occurred\nbetween 2001 and 2007.\n\nMaxwell contends that the NPA’s co-conspirator\nprovision lacks any limitation on the offenses covered.\nThe Court disagrees with this improbable interpretation.\nThe phrase “potential co-conspirator” means nothing\nwithout answering the question “co-conspirator in\nwhat?” The most natural reading of the co-conspirator\nprovision is that it covers those who conspired with\nEpstein in the offenses covered by the NPA for their\ninvolvement in those offenses. Thus, it would cover any\ninvolvement of Maxwell in offenses committed by\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000122\n", "char_count": 1538}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 89, "text_content": "60a\n\nEpstein from 2001 to 2007, other offenses that were\nthe subject of the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office\ninvestigation, and any offenses that arose from the\nrelated grand jury investigation.\n\nThe Court has no trouble concluding that the\nperjury counts are not covered by the NPA. Those\ncharges do not relate to conduct in which Maxwell\nconspired with Epstein and stem from depositions in\n2016, more than eight years after Epstein signed the\nNPA. Maxwell now concedes as much, though her\nmotion sought to dismiss the $1 superseding indictment\nin its entirety, perjury counts and all.\n\nThe Mann Act counts, too, fall comfortably outside\nthe NPA’s scope. The S1 superseding indictment\ncharges conduct occurring exclusively between 1994\nand 1997, some four years before the period covered by\nthe Southern District of Florida investigation and the\nNPA. The NPA does not purport to immunize Epstein\nfrom liability for crimes committed before the period\nthat was the subject of the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s\nOffice investigation. Maxwell’s protection is no\nbroader. The Court thus concludes that the NPA does\nnot cover the offenses charged in the $1 superseding\nindictment.\n\nC. Maxwell is not entitled to an evidentiary\nhearing\n\nIn the alternative to dismissing the indictment,\nMaxwell requests that the Court conduct an eviden-\ntiary hearing as to the parties’ intent in the NPA. The\nCourt finds no basis to do so.\n\nThe cases Maxwell cites where courts held hearings\non the scope of a plea agreement mostly involved oral\nagreements where there was no written record of the\nfull set of terms reached by the parties. All of them\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000123\n", "char_count": 1639}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 90, "text_content": "6la\n\ninvolved defendants with first-hand knowledge of\nnegotiations who claimed prosecutors breached an\noral promise. “An oral agreement greatly increases the\npotential for disputes such as ... a failure to agree on\nthe existence, let alone the terms, of the deal.” United\nStates v. Aleman, 286 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus,\nan evidentiary hearing may be necessary to determine\nthe terms of an agreement never committed to writing.\nThis is no such case. The NPA’s terms are clear. Beyond\nthe NPA itself, an extensive OPR report details its\nnegotiation history. No record evidence suggests that\nprosecutors promised Epstein anything beyond what\nwas spelled out in writing. The Court agrees with the\nGovernment that Maxwell’s request for a hearing rests\non mere conjecture.\n\nFor the same reason, the Court will not order the\ndiscovery on the NPA. In any case, it appears that\nthe Government has already produced two of the\ndocuments Maxwell seeks in her motion—the OPR\nreport and notes mentioned in a privilege log. Of\ncourse, the Government’s disclosure obligations would\nrequire it to disclose to Maxwell any exculpatory evi-\ndence or evidence material to preparing the defense,\nincluding any evidence supporting a defense under the\nNPA. The Government shall confirm in writing within\none week whether it views any evidence supporting\nMaxwell’s interpretation of the NPA as material it is\nrequired to disclose, and, if so, whether it has disclosed\nany and all such evidence in its possession.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000124\n", "char_count": 1514}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 91, "text_content": "62a\nII. The indictment is timely\n\nA. The indictment complies with the statute of\nlimitations\n\nFederal law imposes a five-year limitations period\nfor most non-capital offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).\nRecognizing the difficulty of promptly prosecuting\ncrimes against children, Congress has provided a\nlonger limitations period for “offense[s] involving the\nsexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping” of a minor. 18\nUS.C. § 3283. Until 2003, the operative version of\n§ 3283 allowed prosecution of these offenses until the\nvictim reached the age of twenty-five. Congress further\nextended the limitations period in the PROTECT Act\nof 2003, Pub. L. No. 108 21, 117 Stat. 650, to allow\nprosecution any time during the life of the victim.\n\nThe parties agree that the Mann Act charges are\ntimely if subject to the PROTECT Act, but untimely\nunder the general statute of limitations for non-capital\noffenses or the pre-2003 version of § 3283. Maxwell\ncontends that the charged offenses do not qualify as\noffenses involving the sexual or physical abuse or\nkidnapping of a minor and are thus governed by the\ngeneral statute of limitations. Alternatively, she\ncontends that the pre-20038 version of § 3283 applies\nbecause the charged conduct occurred prior to 2003.\nThe Court concludes that statute of limitations in the\nPROTECT Act applies and that the charges are timely.\n\n1. The Mann Act charges are offenses\ninvolving the sexual abuse of minors\n\nMaxwell does not dispute that the facts alleged in\nthe Sl superseding indictment involve the sexual\nabuse of minors. The indictment charges that Epstein\nsexually abused each of the alleged minor victims and\nthat Maxwell allegedly enticed them to travel or\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000125\n", "char_count": 1705}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 92, "text_content": "63a\n\ntransported them for that purpose. Instead, Maxwell\ncontends that charged offenses do not qualify as\noffenses involving the sexual abuse of minors because\nsexual abuse is not an essential ingredient of each\nstatutory offense. See Bridges v. United States, 346\nUS. 209, 221 (1953). In Maxwell’s view, for example, it\nis possible to transport a minor with intent to engage\nin criminal sexual activity and not follow through with\nthe planned sexual abuse, and so sexual abuse is not\nan essential ingredient of the offense. Maxwell makes\nthe same argument for the enticement and related\nconspiracy charges.\n\nThis approach is analogous to the “categorical\napproach” employed by courts to evaluate prior con-\nvictions for immigration and sentencing purposes. See\nTaylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).\nGenerally speaking, the “categorical approach” requires\nthat courts “look only to the statutory definitions—i.e.,\nthe elements” of the relevant offense to determine if\nthe provision applies “and not to the particular facts\nunderlying those convictions.” Descamps v. United\nStates, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) Gnternal quotation\nmarks omitted). Whether a statute requires a categori-\ncal or case-specific approach is a question of statutory\ninterpretation. To determine whether Congress used\nthe word “offense” in a statute to refer to an offense in\nthe abstract or to the facts of each individual case, the\nCourt must examine the statute’s “text, context, and\nhistory.” United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2819, 2327\n(2019).\n\nThough it has not authoritatively settled the ques-\ntion, the Second Circuit has strongly suggested that\nMaxwell’s approach is the wrong one. In Weingarten v.\nUnited States, 865 F.3d 48, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2017), the\n\nSecond Circuit discussed at length how the text,\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000126\n", "char_count": 1816}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 93, "text_content": "64a\n\ncontext, and history of § 3283 show that Congress\nintended courts to apply the statute using a case-\nspecific approach. The Third Circuit reached the same\nconclusion in United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186,\n196 (3d Cir. 2015).\n\nThe Court sees no reason to depart from the\nreasoning in Weingarten. First, “[t]he Supreme Court's\nmodern categorical approach jurisprudence is confined\nto the post-conviction contexts of criminal sentencing\nand immigration deportation cases.” Weingarten, 865\nF.3d at 58. To the extent that the categorical approach\nis ever appropriate in other contexts, it is in-\nappropriate here.\n\nThe Court begins with the statute’s text. Statutes\nthat call for application of the categorical approach\ntypically deal with the elements of an offense in a prior\ncriminal conviction. Id. at 59. “The language of § 3283,\nby contrast, reaches beyond the offense and its legal\nelements to the conduct ‘involv[ed]’ in the offense. That\nlinguistic expansion indicates Congress intended courts to\nlook beyond the bare legal charges in deciding whether\n§ 3283 applied.” Jd. at 59-60 (alteration in original)\n(quoting § 3283). Maxwell cites one case holding\notherwise, but that case involved a venue statute\npresenting significantly different concerns. See United\nStates v. Morgan, 393 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2004).\nThe Supreme Court has likewise held that a statute\nwhich uses the language “an offense that. . . involves\nfraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or\nvictims exceeds $10,000” is “consistent with a\ncircumstance-specific approach.” Nijhawan v. Holder,\n557 U.S. 29, 32, 38 (2009) (emphasis added). Thus, the\nword “involves” generally means that courts should\nlook to the circumstances of an offense as committed\nin each case. This reading accords with a robust\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000127\n", "char_count": 1814}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 94, "text_content": "65a\n\nlegislative history indicating that Congress intended\nto apply § 3283 to a wide range of crimes against\nchildren. See Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 60; Schneider,\n801 F.3d at 196.\n\nThe purposes underlying the categorical approach\ndo not apply here either. For statutes dealing with\nprior convictions, “[t]he categorical approach serves\n‘practical’ purposes: It promotes judicial and adminis-\ntrative efficiency by precluding the relitigation of past\nconvictions in minitrials conducted long after the fact.”\nMoncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200-01 (2013). In\nthe context of § 3283, there is no prior conviction to\nassess, and the jury will determine in the first instance\nwhether “the defendant engaged in the applicable\nabusive conduct.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 60. Maxwell\nnonetheless contends that using a _ case-specific\napproach for § 3283 would be impractical because the\nGovernment would need to prove conduct beyond the\nelements of the offense. It may be true that this\napproach requires the Government to prove some\nadditional facts, but any statute-of-limitations defense\npresents factual issues (including, at least, when the\nalleged conduct took place). This is not a serious\npractical problem and does not justify setting aside the\nstatute’s language and apparent purpose.\n\nMaxwell relies primarily on Bridges v. United States,\n346 U.S. 209 (1953), to urge this Court to cast\nWeingarten aside. The Supreme Court in Bridges\naddressed a statute that extended the limitations\nperiod for defrauding the United States during the\nSecond World War. In that case, the Supreme Court\nfirst concluded that making false statements at an\nimmigration hearing was not subject to the extended\nlimitations period because it lacked any pecuniary\nelement as required by the statute. Id. at 221.Then, as\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000128\n", "char_count": 1817}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 95, "text_content": "66a\n\nan alternative basis for its holding, it explained that\nthe offense did not require fraud as an “essential\ningredient.” Jd. at 222. It reached that conclusion in\nlarge part because the statute’s legislative history\nmade clear that Congress intended it to apply only to\na narrow class of war frauds causing pecuniary loss.\nId. at 216.\n\nAs the Second Circuit explained in Weingarten,\nCongress had the opposite intent in the enacting in the\nPROTECT Act. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 & n. 10. “In\npassing recent statutes related to child sex abuse,\nincluding extensions of the § 3283 limitations period,\nCongress ‘evinced a general intention to “cast a wide\nnet to ensnare as many offenses against children as\npossible.”” Id. at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at\n196 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347,\n1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). The primary basis for\nBridges’ holding— legislative history supporting a\nnarrow interpretation—does not exist here. Instead,\nboth the statute’s plan meaning and its legislative\nhistory suggest it should apply more broadly.\n\nBased on the statute’s text, context, and history,\nthe Court follows Weingarten and concludes that the\nappropriate inquiry is whether the charged offenses\ninvolved the sexual abuse of a minor on the facts\nalleged in this case. There is no question that they did.\nThe Court thus concludes that § 3283 governs the\nlimitations period for the charges here.\n\n2. The 2003 amendment to the statute of\nlimitations applies to these offenses\n\nMaxwell next contends that because the charged\nconduct took place before the PROTECT Act’s enactment,\nthat statute did not lengthen the statute of limitations\napplicable to her alleged offenses. Here too, the Second\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000129\n", "char_count": 1741}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 96, "text_content": "67a\n\nCircuit has provided guidance in its decision in\nWeingarten. Although the court did not provide a\ndefinitive answer there, it explained that the view\nMaxwell now takes conflicts with established principles of\nretroactivity and the decisions of at least two other\ncircuit courts. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58 & n.8; see\nCruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014);\nUnited States v. Leo Sure Chief, 488 F.3d 920, 924 (9th\nCir. 2006).\n\nThe Supreme Court has set out a_ two-step\nframework to determine whether a federal statute\napplies to past conduct. See Landgraf v. USI Film\nProducts, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). Courts look first to\nthe language of the statute. If the statute states that\nit applies to past conduct, courts must so apply it.\nWeingarten, 865 F.3d at 54. Otherwise, the statute\napplies to past conduct unless doing so would create\nimpermissible retroactive effects. Id.\n\nThe Court begins with Landgraf’s first step. To\nassess a statute’s meaning here, courts must consider\nthe text of the statute along with other indicia of\ncongressional intent, including the statute’s history\nand structure. See Enter. Morig. Acceptance Co., LLC,\nSec. Litig. v. Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401,\n406 (2d Cir. 2004).\n\nSection 3283, as amended by the PROTECT Act,\nbroadly states that “[nlo statute of limitations that\nwould otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense\ninvolving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping,\nof a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such\nprosecution during the life of the child.” The statute\nlacks an express retroactivity clause, but courts have\nheld that no such clause is necessary, including for this\nparticular statute. See Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d at 923.\nThe statute’s plain language unambiguously requires\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000130\n", "char_count": 1791}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 97, "text_content": "68a\n\nthat it apply to prosecutions for offenses committed\nbefore the date of enactment. Instead of simply\nproviding a new limitations period for future conduct,\nCongress stated that no statute of limitations that\nwould otherwise preclude prosecution of these offenses\nwill apply. That is, it prevents the application of any\nstatute of limitations that would otherwise apply to\npast conduct.\n\nCourts have reached the same conclusion for other\nstatutes employing similar language. The Eighth\nCircuit has held that the 1994 amendments to § 3283,\nwhich allowed prosecution of sex crimes against\nchildren until the victim reached age twenty-five,\napplied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries,\n405 F.3d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second\nCircuit has observed that the Higher Education\nTechnical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26,\n105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a\nstatute’s application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg.\nAcceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d at 407. That\nstatute eliminated the statute of limitations for claims\non defaulted student loans by stating that “no\nlimitation shall terminate the period within which suit\nmay be filed.” Jd. The PROTECT Act’s language is\nquite similar.\n\nThe history of § 3283 confirms Congress’s intent to\napply the extended limitations period as broadly as the\nConstitution allows. With each successive amendment\nto the statute, Congress further extended the limitations\nperiod, recognizing that sex crimes against children\n“may be difficult to detect quickly” because children\noften delay or decline to report sexual abuse.\nWeingarten, 865 F.3d at 54. Congress enacted the\nlimitations provision of the PROTECT Act because it\nfound the prior statute of limitations was “inadequate\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000131\n", "char_count": 1780}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 98, "text_content": "69a\n\nin many cases.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-63, at 54\n(2003). For example, a person who abducted and raped\na child could not be prosecuted beyond this extended\nlimit—even if DNA matching conclusively identified\n\nhim as the perpetrator one day after the victim turned\n25.” Id.\n\nMaxwell makes no argument based on the statute’s\ntext. Instead, she contends that because the House\nversion of the bill included an express retroactivity\nprovision absent from its final form, the Court should\ninfer that Congress did not intend the statute to apply\nto past conduct. However, the legislative history makes\nclear that Congress abandoned the retroactivity\nprovision in the House bill only because it would have\nproduced unconstitutional results. The Supreme Court\nhas explained that a law that revives a time-barred\nprosecution violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the\nConstitution, but a law that extends an un-expired\nstatute of limitations does not. Stogner v. California,\n539 U.S. 607, 6382-33 (2003). Senator Leahy, who\ncosponsored the PROTECT Act, expressed concerns in\na committee report that the proposed retroactivity\nprovision was “of doubtful constitutionality” because it\n“would have revived the government’s authority to\nprosecute crimes that were previously time-barred.”\n149 Cong. Rec. $5187, S5147 (Apr. 10, 2003)\n(statement of Sen. Leahy). Congress removed the\nprovision shortly thereafter for this reason. The\nremoval of the express retroactivity provision shows\nonly that Congress intended to limit the PROTECT\nAct to its constitutional applications, including past\nconduct—like Maxwell’s—on which the statute of\nlimitations had not yet expired.\n\nBoth the text and history of the PROTECT Act’s\namendment to § 3283 reflect that it applies Maxwell’s\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000132\n", "char_count": 1777}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 99, "text_content": "70a\n\nconduct charged in the $1 superseding indictment.\nThe Court could stop here. However, it also concludes\nthat even if the statute were ambiguous, it would\nproperly apply to these charges.\n\nAt Lanfgraf’s second step, the Court asks whether\napplication of the statute to past conduct would have\nimpermissible retroactive effects. “[A] statute has\npresumptively impermissible retroactive effects when\nit ‘takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under\nexisting laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a\nnew duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to\ntransactions or considerations already past.” Weingarten,\n865 F.3d at 56 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 290).\nThus, applying a new statute of limitations to pre-\nviously time-barred claims has an impermissible\nretroactive effect. Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC,\nSec. Litig., 391 F.3d at 407. Applying it to conduct for\nwhich the statute of limitations has not yet expired\ndoes not. Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.,\n49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995).\n\nMaxwell concedes that these offenses were within\nthe statute of limitations when Congress enacted the\nPROTECT Act. Thus, the Act did not deprive her of any\nvested rights. Maxwell contends that it is unfair to\nallow the Government to prosecute her now for\nconduct that occurred more than twenty years ago, but\nthere is no dispute that Congress has the power to set\na lengthy limitations period or no limitations period at\nall. It has done so here, judging that the difficulty of\nprosecuting these offenses and the harm they work on\nchildren outweighs a defendant’s interest in repose.\nMaxwell’s fairness argument is a gripe with Congress’s\npolicy judgment, not an impermissibly retroactive\napplication of the statute. The Court concludes that\n§ 3283 allows her prosecution now.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000133\n", "char_count": 1824}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 100, "text_content": "71a\n\nB. The Government’s delay in bringing charges\ndid not violate due process\n\n“As the Supreme Court stated in United States v.\nMarion, the statute of limitations is ‘the primary\nguarantee against bringing overly stale criminal\ncharges.” United States v. Cornielle, 171 F.3d 748, 751\n(2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v.\nMarion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971)). There is a strong\npresumption that an indictment filed within the\nstatute of limitations is valid. To prevail on a claim\nthat pre-indictment delay violates due process, a\ndefendant must show both that the Government inten-\ntionally delayed bringing charges for an improper\npurpose and that the delay seriously damaged the\ndefendant’s ability defend against the charges. See id.\nThis is a stringent standard. “Thus, while the\n[Supreme] Court may not have shut the door firmly on\na contention that at some point the Due Process\nClause forecloses prosecution of a claim because it is\ntoo old, at most the door is barely ajar.” DeMichele v.\nGreenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 167 F.3d 784, 790—\n91 (2d Cir. 1999).\n\nThe Court sees no evidence that the Government’s\ndelay in bringing these charges was designed to thwart\nMaxwell’s ability to prepare a defense. However, it is\nenough to say that Maxwell does not make the strong\nshowing of prejudice required to support this sort of\nclaim. Maxwell contends that the Government’s delay\nin bringing charges has prejudiced her interests\nbecause potential witnesses have died, others have\nforgotten, and records have been lost or destroyed. It\nis highly speculative that any of these factors would\nmake a substantial difference in her case.\n\nMaxwell first points to several potential witnesses\nwho have passed away. These include Jeffrey Epstein\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000134\n", "char_count": 1778}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 101, "text_content": "72a\n\nand his mother, one individual Maxwell believes\nworked with one of the alleged victims in this case, and\na police detective who investigated Epstein in Florida.\nShe contends they all would have provided exculpatory\ntestimony were they alive today. Courts have generally\nfound that vague assertions that a deceased witness\nmight have provided favorable testimony do not justify\ndismissing an indictment for delay. See, e.g., United\nStates v. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y.\n2005). The Court agrees with this approach. Maxwell\nprovides no indication of what many of these potential\nwitnesses might have testified to. The testimony she\nsuggests the detective might have offered—that\nwitnesses in the Palm Beach investigation did not\nidentify Maxwell by name—is propensity evidence\nthat does nothing to establish her innocence of the\ncharged offenses. There are also serious doubts under\nall of the relevant circumstances that a jury would\nhave found testimony from Epstein credible even if he\nhad waived his right against self-incrimination and\ntestified on her behalf. See United States v. Spears, 159\nF.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1999).\n\nMaxwell’s arguments that the indictment should be\ndismissed because of the possibility of missing witnesses,\nfailing memories, or lost records fail for similar reasons.\nThese are difficulties that arise in any case where\nthere is extended delay in bringing a prosecution, and\nthey do not justify dismissing an indictment. United\nStates v. Marion, 404 US. 307, 325-26 (1971); see United\nStates v. Elsbery, 602 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1979).\n\nFinally, the Court finds no substantial prejudice\nfrom the pretrial publicity this case has garnered.\nMaxwell contends that lengthy public interest in this\ncase has transformed her reputation from that of\nEpstein’s friend to a co-conspirator. And she also\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000135\n", "char_count": 1869}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 102, "text_content": "73a\n\nalleges—without evidence—that her accusers fabricated\ntheir stories based on media allegations. The Court\nwill not dismiss the indictment on Maxwell’s bare\nassertion that numerous witnesses are engaged in a\nperjurious conspiracy against her. And the Court will\ntake all appropriate steps to ensure that the pretrial\npublicity in this case does not compromise Maxwell’s\nright to a fair and impartial jury.\n\nThe Court thus concludes that Maxwell has failed to\nestablish actual prejudice from the Government’s\ndelay in bringing charges. She may renew her motion\nif the factual record at trial shows otherwise. On the\npresent record, neither the applicable statute of\nlimitations nor due process bars the charges here.\n\nIII. The indictment describes the charged offenses\nwith specificity\n\nMaxwell seeks to dismiss the Mann Act counts for\nlack of specificity or in the alternative to compel the\nGovernment to submit a bill of particulars providing\ngreater detail of the charges. The Court concludes that\nthe charges in the S1 superseding indictment are clear\nenough.\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7, an\nindictment must contain “a plain, concise, and definite\nwritten statement of the essential facts constituting\nthe offense charged.” The indictment must be specific\nenough to inform the defendant of the charges and\nallow the defendant to plead double jeopardy in a later\nprosecution based on the same events. United States v.\nStavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1992). “Under\nthis test, an indictment need do little more than to\ntrack the language of the statute charged and state the\ntime and place (in approximate terms) of the alleged\ncrime.” United States. v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1113\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000136\n", "char_count": 1731}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 103, "text_content": "74a\n\n(2d Cir. 1975). In addition to dismissal, “Rule 7(f) of\nthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a\ndefendant to seek a bill of particulars in order to\nidentify with sufficient particularity the nature of\nthe charge pending against him, thereby enabling\ndefendant to prepare for trial, to prevent surprise, and\nto interpose a plea of double jeopardy should he be\nprosecuted a second time for the same offense.” United\nStates v. Bortnovusky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987).\n\nThe S1 superseding indictment sets out the elements of\neach charged crime and the facts supporting each\nelement. Nonetheless, Maxwell contends that the\nindictment is too vague because it refers to open-ended\ntime periods, describes conduct like “grooming” and\n“befriending” that is not inherently criminal, and does\nnot identify the alleged victims by name.\n\nMaxwell’s first argument fails because the\nGovernment need only describe the time and place of\ncharged conduct “in approximate terms.” Tramuntti,\n513 F.2d at 11138. The details are subject to proof at\ntrial. “[T]he Second Circuit routinely upholds the ‘on\nor about’ language used to describe the window of\nwhen a violation occurred.” United States v. Kidd, 386\nF. Supp. 3d 364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting United\nStates v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987)).\n“This is especially true in cases of sexual abuse of\nchildren: allegations of sexual abuse of underage\nvictims often proceed without specific dates of the\noffenses.” United States v. Young, No. 08-cr-285 (KMK),\n2008 WL 4178190, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2008)\n(collecting cases). As here, these cases frequently\ninvolve alleged abuse spanning a lengthy period of\ntime, and witnesses who were victimized as children\nmay struggle to recall the precise dates when abuse\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000137\n", "char_count": 1802}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 104, "text_content": "75a\n\noccurred. The indictment adequately describes the\ntime and place of the charged conduct.\n\nMaxwell next contends that allegations of noncriminal\nconduct render the charges impermissibly vague. The\nCourt disagrees. Rule 7 requires only that the language of\nthe indictment track the language of the statute and\nprovide a rough account of the time and place of the\ncrime. Tramunti, 513 F.2d at 1113. The language of the\nS1 superseding indictment does so. The Government’s\ndecision to provide more details than those strictly\nrequired does not hamper Maxwell’s ability to prepare\na defense. Maxwell’s argument that some of the con-\nduct alleged is not inherently criminal goes to the\nmerits of the Government’s case, not the specificity of\nthe charges.\n\nFinally, Maxwell argues that the indictment is\nvague because the government does not provide the\nnames of the alleged victims. The Court sees no basis\nto require that the alleged victims’ names be included\nthe indictment. The names of victims, even if important,\ngenerally need not appear there unless their omission\nwould seriously prejudice the defendant. See United\nStates v. Stringer, 730 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2013);\nUnited States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp. 3d 364, 369\n(S.D.N.Y. 2019). Maxwell likely knows the identity of\nthe alleged victims described in the indictment at this\npoint because the Government has provided extensive\ndiscovery on them. Moreover, the Government has\nagreed to disclose their names in advance of trial.\nThere is thus no unfairness here. See Stringer, 730\nF.3d at 126. As discussed below, the Court will require\nthe parties to negotiate and propose a full schedule for\nall remaining pretrial disclosures.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000138\n", "char_count": 1706}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 105, "text_content": "76a\nIV. The perjury charges are legally tenable\n\nThe Court turns next to Maxwell’s motion to dismiss\nthe perjury counts stemming from her answers to\nquestions in a deposition in a civil case. She contends\nthat these charges are legally deficient because the\nquestions posed were fundamentally ambiguous and\nthe questions were not material to the subject of the\ndeposition. The Court concludes that the charges are\nlegally tenable and Maxwell’s defenses are appropriately\nleft to the jury.\n\nThe applicable perjury statute imposes criminal\npenalties on anyone who “in any proceeding before or\nancillary to any court ... knowingly makes any false\nmaterial declaration.” 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). Testimony\nis perjurious only if it is knowingly false and is\nmaterial to the proceeding in which the defendant\noffered it.\n\nA. The questions posed were not too ambiguous\nto support a perjury charge\n\nThe requirement of knowing falsity requires that a\nwitness believe that their testimony is false. United\nStates v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 372 (2d Cir. 1986). As a\ngeneral matter, “[a] jury is best equipped to determine\nthe meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific\nquestion.” Id. Courts have acknowledged a narrow\nexception for questions that are so fundamentally\nambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them\ncannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United\nStates v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A\nquestion is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable\npeople could not agree on its meaning in context.\nLighte,'782 F.2d at 375. The existence of some arguable\nambiguity does not foreclose a perjury charge against\na witness who understood the question.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000139\n", "char_count": 1687}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 106, "text_content": "77a\n\nAt a minimum, Maxwell’s motion is premature.\nCourts typically evaluate whether a question was\nfundamentally ambiguous only after the development\nof a full factual record at trial. See, e.g., United States\nv. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992). The\nevidence at trial may shed further light on whether the\nquestions posed were objectively ambiguous in context\nor whether Maxwell subjectively understood them.\nIn any event, the Court has closely considered each of\nthe categories of questions that Maxwell argues are\nambiguous. None of the alleged ambiguities Maxwell\nidentifies rise to the level supporting dismissal of the\ncharges. The context of the questions and answers, in\nconjunction with the Government’s evidence, could\nlead a reasonable juror to conclude that the statements\nwere perjurious. Truth and falsity are questions for the\njury in all but the most extreme cases. The Court\ndeclines to usurp the jury’s role on the limited pretrial\nrecord.\n\nB. A reasonable juror could conclude that\nMaxwell’s statements were material\n\nMaxwell also argues that the perjury counts should\nbe dismissed because none of the allegedly false\nstatements were material to the defamation action. In\na civil deposition, a statement is material if it has a\nnatural tendency to influence the court or if a truthful\nanswer might reasonably lead to the discovery of\nadmissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.\n506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751,\n753-654 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is\nan element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be\n“decided by the jury, not the court.” Johnson v. United\nStates, 520 US. 461, 465 (1997). Only the most\nextraordinary circumstances justify departure from\nthis general rule. United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000140\n", "char_count": 1817}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 107, "text_content": "78a\n\n2d 406, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Gaudin, 515 US. at\n522-23).\n\nThe charged statements do not fall within this\nnarrow exception. Maxwell contends that the questions\ndid not relate to the sex trafficking and sexual abuse\nallegations at the center of the civil case, but that is\nnot the legal standard. The Government may prevail if\nit proves that Maxwell’s answers could have led to\nthe discovery of other evidence or could influence the\nfactfinder in the civil case. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509;\nKross, 14 F.3d at 753-54. At trial, a reasonable juror\ncould conclude that truthful answers to the questions\nmay have permitted the plaintiff to locate other\nvictims or witnesses who could have corroborated the\nplaintiff’s testimony. The factual disputes relating to\nmateriality are at least enough to preclude pretrial\nresolution. In criminal cases, courts must guard\nagainst “invading the ‘inviolable function of the jury’\nin our criminal justice system,” and if the “defense\nraises a factual dispute that is inextricably intertwined\nwith a defendant’s potential culpability, a judge cannot\nresolve that dispute on a Rule 12(b) motion.” United\nStates v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 281 (2d Cir. 2018).\n\nThe Court concludes that the perjury charges are\nlegally tenable and appropriately presented to the jury.\n\nV. The perjury charges must be severed and tried\nseparately\n\nAlthough the perjury charges are legally tenable, the\nCourt concludes that the interests of justice require\nsevering those counts and trying them separately.\nTrying the perjury counts together with the Mann Act\ncounts would require admitting evidence of other\nacts likely to be unduly prejudicial. It would also risk\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000141\n", "char_count": 1705}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 108, "text_content": "79a\n\ndisqualifying Maxwell’s chosen counsel based on their\ninvolvement in the earlier civil case.\n\nRule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure\nallows a court to order separate trials if joining\nall offenses in a single trial would prejudice the\ndefendant. A defendant seeking severance must show\nsignificant unfairness to outweigh the burden on the\ncourt of conducting multiple trials. United States v.\nWalker, 142 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1998). The harm to\nthe defendant must be more than “solely the adverse\neffect of being tried for two crimes rather than one.”\nUnited States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 929 (2d Cir.\n1980). Though this standard is demanding, the Court\nconcludes that, due to unique features of the perjury\ncounts, Maxwell meets it here. Trying all counts\ntogether would compromise Maxwell’s right to the\ncounsel of her choice and risk an unfair trial.\n\nTrying the perjury counts together with the Mann\nAct counts would risk an unfair trial on each set of\ncounts. First, it would introduce unrelated allegations\nof sexual abuse, which would potentially expose the\njury to evidence that might otherwise not be admissible.\nIn particular, a joint trial would potentially expose the\njury to a wider swath of information regarding civil\nlitigation against Epstein that is remote from Maxwell’s\ncharged conduct. This presents a significant risk that\nthe jury will cumulate the evidence of the various\ncrimes charged and find guilt when, if considered\nseparately, it would not do so. See United States v.\nHalper, 590 F.2d 422, 430 (2d Cir. 1978). Second, the\nevidence presented on the Mann Act counts may\nprejudice the jury’s ability to fairly evaluate Maxwell’s\ntruthfulness in her deposition, a critical element of the\nperjury counts. The Court has concerns that a limiting\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000142\n", "char_count": 1812}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 109, "text_content": "80a\n\ninstruction may be inadequate to mitigate these risks\ngiven the nature of the allegations involved.\n\nImportantly, a joint trial is also likely to require\ndisqualification of at least one of Maxwell’s attorneys\nfrom participating as an advocate on her behalf. The\nperjury counts likely implicate the performance and\ncredibility of her lawyers in the civil action—two of\nwhom represent her in this case. The New York Rules\nof Professional Conduct generally forbid a lawyer from\nrepresenting a client in a proceeding in which the\nlawyer is likely also to be a witness. N.Y. R. Prof’l\nConduct § 3.7(a). Maxwell’s counsel in the civil action\nand the deposition may be important fact witnesses on\nthe perjury counts. Even if counsel were not required\nto testify, trying all counts together could force Maxwell\nto choose between having her counsel testify on her\nbehalf on the perjury charges and having them assist\nher in defending the Mann Act charges.\n\nThe Second Circuit has recognized that witness\ntestimony offered by a party’s attorney presents\nserious risks to the fairness of a trial. See Murray v.\nMetro. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 2009).\nThe lawyer might appear to vouch for their own\ncredibility, jurors might perceive the lawyer as dis-\ntorting the truth to benefit their client, and blurred\nlines between argument and evidence might confuse\nthe jury. Id. Disqualification of counsel also implicates\nMaxwell’s Sixth Amendment right to be represented\nby the counsel of her choice. See, e.g., United States v.\nKincade, No. 15-cr-00071 (JAD) (GWF), 2016 WL\n6154901, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 21, 2016). The prejudice to\nMaxwell is especially pronounced because the attorneys\nwho represented her in the civil case have worked with\nher for years and are particularly familiar with the\nfacts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000143\n", "char_count": 1873}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 110, "text_content": "8la\n\nStates v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir.\n1982).\n\nThe Court is of course cognizant of the burden\nseparate trials may impose on all trial participants.\nBut much of the proof relevant to the perjury counts\nand the Mann Act counts does not overlap. In\nparticular, materiality for statements made in a civil\ndeposition is broad, and evidence on that question is\nunlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross,\n14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although\nsome allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both\nsets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will\nexpand the scope of the trial far beyond the narrower\nissues presented. And while the Court agrees with the\nGovernment that at least some of Maxwell’s concerns\nare overstated, there is little question that the jury’s\nconsideration of the nature of the defamation action\nwill require a significant investment of time and\nresources to provide the requisite context.\n\nThe balance of these considerations favors severance.\n“Motions to sever are committed to the sound discretion of\nthe trial judge.” United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d\n1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989). In its discretion, the Court\nconcludes that trying the perjury counts separately\nwill best ensure a fair and expeditious resolution of all\ncharges in this case.\n\nVI. Maxwell’s motion to strike surplusage is\npremature\n\nMaxwell moves to strike allegations related to\none of the alleged victims from the $1 superseding\nindictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so\nat this juncture.\n\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a\ncourt to strike surplusage from an indictment on a\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000144\n", "char_count": 1659}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 111, "text_content": "82a\n\ndefendant’s motion. “Motions to strike surplusage\nfrom an indictment will be granted only where the\nchallenged allegations are not relevant to the crime\ncharged and are inflammatory and_ prejudicial.”\nUnited States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir.\n1996) (cleaned up). Courts in this District generally\ndelay ruling on any motion to strike until after the\npresentation of the Government’s evidence at trial,\nbecause that evidence may affect how specific allega-\ntions relate to the overall charges. See, eg., United\nStates v. Nejad, No. 18-cr-224 (AJN), 2019 WL\n67023861, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019); United States\nv. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).\n\nMaxwell contends that the allegations related to\n“Minor Victim-3” are surplusage because the indictment\ndoes not charge that Minor Victim-3 traveled in\ninterstate commerce or was below the age of consent\nin England where the alleged activities took place.\nThus, she argues, these allegations do not relate to the\ncharged conspiracy and instead reflect an attempt to\nintroduce Minor Victim-3’s testimony for impermissible\npurposes.\n\nThe Court will not strike any language from the $1\nsuperseding indictment at this juncture. The standard\nunder Rule 7(d) is “exacting” and requires the\ndefendant to demonstrate clearly that the allegations\nare irrelevant to the crimes charged. United States v.\nNapolitano, 552 F. Supp. 465, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The\nindictment does not allege that the alleged victim\ntraveled in interstate commerce or was underage\nduring sexual encounters with Epstein. But the\nCourt cannot rule out that the allegations may reflect\nconduct undertaken in furtherance of the charged\nconspiracy or be relevant to prove facts such as\nMaxwell’s state of mind. See United States uv.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000145\n", "char_count": 1798}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 112, "text_content": "83a\n\nConcepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992). The Court\nwill follow the well-worn path of others in this District\nand reserve the issue for trial. Maxwell may renew her\nmotion then.\n\nVII. Maxwell’s motion to dismiss multiplicitous\ncharges is premature\n\nMaxwell’s motion to dismiss either the first or third\ncount of the $1 superseding indictment as multiplicitous\nis also premature. Maxwell contends that the Government\nhas alleged the same conspiracy twice in the indictment.\n“An indictment is multiplicitous when it charges a\nsingle offense as an offense multiple times, in separate\ncounts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been\ncommitted.” United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145\n(2d Cir. 1999). “The multiplicity doctrine is based upon\nthe double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment,\nwhich assures that the court does not exceed its\nlegislative authorization by imposing multiple punish-\nments for the same offense.” United States v. Nakashian,\n820 F.2d 549, 552 (2d Cir. 1987) (cleaned up).\n\n“Where there has been no prior conviction or acquittal,\nthe Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against\nsimultaneous prosecutions for the same offense, so\nlong as no more than one punishment is eventually\nimposed.” United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350,\n355 (2d Cir. 2006). “Since Josephberg, courts in this\nCircuit have routinely denied pre-trial motions to\ndismiss potentially multiplicitous counts as premature.”\nUnited States v. Medina, No. 13-cr-272 (PGG), 2014\nWL 3057917, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2014) (collecting\ncases). The Court therefore denies Maxwell’s motion to\ndismiss multiplicitous counts without prejudice.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000146\n", "char_count": 1668}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 113, "text_content": "84a\n\nVIII. The parties shall negotiate all remaining\ndisclosures\n\nMaxwell moves to compel the Government to\nproduce certain documents she believes it has in its\npossession and has failed to produce. She also seeks\naccelerated disclosure of the Government’s witness\nlist, Jencks Act material, Brady and Giglio material,\nco-conspirator statements, and Rule 404(b) material.\nBased on the Government’s response in briefing and\nletters the parties have since submitted to the Court,\nit appears that most of these requests have been\novertaken by events. Accordingly, although the Court\nconcludes that Maxwell is not entitled to expedite this\ndiscovery based on the arguments in her motion\npapers, the Court will require the parties to confer on\nan overall schedule for all remaining pretrial disclosures.\n\nA. The Court accepts the Government’s repre-\nsentations that it has disclosed all Brady\nand Giglio Material\n\nThe Supreme Court’s decisions in Brady v. Maryland,\n373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.\n150 (1972) require the Government to disclose to\ndefendants certain evidence that will aid their defense.\nBrady requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence.\nUnder Giglio, the Government has a duty to produce\n“not only exculpatory material, but also information\nthat could be used to impeach a key government\nwitness.” United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d\nCir. 2001) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154). As a general\nrule, “Brady and its progeny do not require immediate\ndisclosure of all exculpatory and impeachment mate-\nrial upon request by a defendant.” Jd. at 146. “[A]s long\nas a defendant possesses Brady evidence in time for its\neffective use, the government has not deprived the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000147\n", "char_count": 1729}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 114, "text_content": "85a\n\ndefendant of due process of law simply because it did\nnot produce the evidence sooner.” Id. at 144.\n\nMaxwell requests an order directing immediate\ndisclosure of all Brady and Giglio material and also\nrequests a few specific documents she contends the\nGovernment has failed to disclose. The Court begins\nwith the specific requests. The requested materials\ninclude (1) records of witness interviews in connection\nwith an ex parte declaration in support of a response\nto a motion to quash subpoenas; (2) an unredacted\ncopy of two FBI reports; (3) pages from a personal\ndiary that is in the custody of a civilian third party;\nand (4) copies of all subpoenas the Government has\nissued for Maxwell’s records as part of its investigation\nin this case.\n\nThe Government represents that it is cognizant of\nits Brady obligations, that is has reviewed the witness\ninterviews and one of the FBI reports, and that neither\nset of documents includes exculpatory information not\npreviously disclosed. The Court has no reason to doubt\nthe Government’s representation in this case that it is\naware of its Brady obligations and that it has complied\nand will continue to comply with them. And because\nthe witness statements are covered by the Jencks Act,\nthe Court cannot compel production of such statements\nunder the terms of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500;\nCoppa, 267 F.3d at 145. Next, the Government\nrepresents that it has already produced an unredacted\ncopy of the other requested FBI report, and so that\nrequest is moot. The diary pages she requests are\nwithin the control of a civilian third party, not the\nGovernment, and so the Government need not (and\nperhaps cannot) produce them. See United States v.\nCollins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).\nFinally, Maxwell’s request for copies of all subpoenas\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000148\n", "char_count": 1825}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 115, "text_content": "86a\n\nthe Government has issued is overly broad and lacks\na legal basis. Maxwell is not entitled to compel pro-\nduction of these documents.\n\nThe Court also will not issue an order requiring the\nimmediate disclosure of Brady and Giglio material.\nThe Government has represented that it recognizes its\nobligations under Brady and that it has complied, and\nwill continue to comply, with such obligations. The\nCourt has no reason to doubt these representations\ngiven its expansive approach to document production\nthus far in this case. The Government has agreed in its\nrecent letter to produce Giglio material six weeks\nin advance of trial. The parties shall negotiate the\nspecific timing, but assuming a schedule along those\nlines is met, the Court concludes that Maxwell will be\nable to effectively prepare for trial. See Coppa, 267 F.3d\nat 144.\n\nB. Jencks Act material and co-conspirator\nstatements\n\nMaxwell also seeks to expedite discovery of Jencks\nAct material and non-exculpatory statements of co-\nconspirators that the government may offer at trial.\nThe Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, “provides that no\nprior statement made by a government witness shall\nbe the subject of discovery until that witness has\ntestified on direct examination.” Coppa, 267 F.3d at\n145. The statute therefore prohibits a district court\nin most cases from ordering the pretrial disclosure\nof witness statements unless those statements are\nexculpatory. “A coconspirator who testifies on behalf of\nthe government is a witness under the Act.” In re\nUnited States, 834 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1987). The\nCourt therefore lacks the inherent power to expedite\nthese disclosures. In any case, the Government has\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000149\n", "char_count": 1697}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 116, "text_content": "87a\n\nagreed to produce all Jencks Act material at least six\nweeks in advance of trial.\n\nThe Court also rejects Maxwell’s alternative request\nfor a hearing to determine the admissibility of co-\nconspirator declarations. Co-conspirator statements\nmay often be admitted at trial on a conditional basis.\nIf the Court determines that the Government has not\nmet its burden to show that the conditionally admitted\nstatements were made in furtherance of the charged\nconspiracy, the Court should provide a limiting in-\nstruction or, in extreme cases declare a mistrial.\nUnited States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir.\n1993). Although conditional admissions can pose a\nproblem, a pretrial hearing is unnecessary here be-\ncause the Government has committed to producing co-\nconspirator statements at least six weeks in advance\nof trial to allow Maxwell to raise any objections.\nMaxwell will have adequate time to object to any\nproffered co-conspirator testimony following the\nGovernment’s Jencks Act disclosures.\n\nC. Witness list\n\nAs a general matter, “district courts have authority\nto compel pretrial disclosure of the identity of\ngovernment witnesses.” United States v. Cannone, 528\nF.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 1975). In deciding whether to\norder accelerated disclosure of a witness list, courts\nconsider whether a defendant has made a specific\nshowing that disclosure is “both material to the\npreparation of the defense and reasonable in light of\nthe circumstances surrounding the case.” United\nStates v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 189-140 (2d Cir. 1990)\n(cleaned up).\n\nMaxwell has made a particularized showing that the\nGovernment must produce a witness list reasonably in\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000150\n", "char_count": 1679}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 117, "text_content": "88a\n\nadvance of trial. The nature of the allegations in\nthis case—decades-old allegations spanning multiple\nlocations—present considerable challenges for the\npreparation of the defense. However, the Government’s\nproposed disclosure schedule—which will afford Maxwell\nat least six weeks to investigate testifying witness\nstatements—allows Maxwell significantly more time\nto review disclosures than schedules adopted in most\ncases in this District. See, e.g., United States v. Rueb,\nNo. 00-CR-91 (RWS), 2001 WL 96177, at *9 (S.D.NLY.\nFeb. 5, 2001) (thirty days before trial); United States v.\nNachamie, 91 F. Supp. 2d 565, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)\n(fourteen days before trial). In addition, on April 18,\n2021, the Government produced over 20,000 pages of\ninterview notes, reports and other materials related to\nnon-testifying witnesses. After considering the circum-\nstances, including the complexity of the issues in this\ncase and what the defense has already received and\nlikely learned in the course of discovery, the Court\nconcludes that the Government’s proposal is generally\nreasonable.\n\nD. Rule 404(b) material\n\nMaxwell’s final discovery request is for early\ndisclosure of evidence the Government seeks to offer\nunder Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Under Rule\n404(b), if the prosecutor in a criminal case intends to\nuse “evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act” against a\ndefendant, the prosecutor must “provide reasonable\nnotice of the general nature of any such evidence that\nthe prosecutor intends to offer at trial” and must “do\nso in writing before trial—or in any form during trial\nif the court, for good cause, excuses lack of pretrial\nnotice.” The Government represents that it will notify\nthe defense of its intent to use 404(b) evidence at least\n45 days in advance of trial to allow Maxwell to file any\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000151\n", "char_count": 1834}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 118, "text_content": "89a\n\nmotions in limine to be considered at the final pretrial\nconference. The Government’s proposal will give\nMaxwell an opportunity to challenge admission of that\nevidence and to bring to the Court’s attention any\nissues that require resolution before trial. “This is all\nthat Rule 404(b) requires.” United States v. Thompson,\nNo. 13-cr-378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.\nDec. 3, 2013). The Court concludes this schedule is\ngenerally reasonable, although additional time to\nenable briefing and resolution in advance of trial is\nstrongly encouraged.\n\nThe Court’s denial of Maxwell’s requests to compel\npretrial disclosures does not preclude the parties from\nnegotiating in good faith for an expedited discovery\ntimeline that will account for Maxwell’s specific\nconcerns. “[I]n most criminal cases, pretrial disclosure\nwill redound to the benefit of all parties, counsel, and\nthe court.” United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126,\n132 (2d Cir. 1974). In general, the Court will require\nthe parties to negotiate a final, omnibus schedule to\npropose to the Court. The Court concludes that the\ndisclosure of all of the above materials approximately\nsix to eight weeks in advance of trial is appropriate\nand sufficient.\n\nGiven the complexities of the case and the addition\nof two counts via the $2 indictment, the Court\nencourages the parties to agree to approximately eight\nweeks.\n\nIX. The S2 superseding indictment moots Maxwell’s\ngrand jury challenge\n\nThe Court has not received supplemental briefing on\nthe motions in light of the return of the S2 superseding\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000152\n", "char_count": 1586}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 119, "text_content": "90a\n\nindictment and so does resolve any such issues here.'\nHowever, Maxwell’s motion seeking to dismiss the $1\nsuperseding indictment because it was returned by a\ngrand jury sitting at the White Plains courthouse\nappears moot. Maxwell argued that the use of a grand\njury drawn from the White Plains Division in this\nDistrict did not represent a fair cross-section of the\ncommunity, because her trial would proceed in the\nManhattan Division. A grand jury sitting in Manhattan\nreturned the S2 superseding indictment. By April 21,\n2021, Maxwell shall show cause why her grand jury\nmotion should not be dismissed on that basis.\n\nConclusion\n\nThe Court DENIES Maxwell’s motions to dismiss\nthe indictment as barred by Epstein’s non-prosecution\nagreement (Dkt. No. 141), to dismiss the Mann Act\ncounts as barred by the statute of limitations (Dkt. No.\n143), to dismiss the indictment for pre-indictment\ndelay (Dkt. No. 187), to dismiss the Mann Act counts\nfor lack of specificity (Dkt. No. 123), to dismiss the\nperjury counts as legally untenable (Dkt. No. 135), to\nstrike surplusage (Dkt. No. 145), to dismiss count one\nor count three as multiplicitous (Dkt. No. 121), and to\nexpedite pretrial disclosures (Dkt. No. 147). The Court\nGRANTS Maxwell’s motion to sever the perjury counts\nfor a separate trial (Dkt. No. 119).\n\nThe Court ORDERS the Government to confirm\nwithin one week whether it considers any evidence\nrelated to negotiation of the non-prosecution agreement\nto constitute Brady or Rule 16 material and, if so, to\nconfirm that it has or will disclose such evidence.\n\n' The parties shall negotiate and propose a schedule for any\navailable additional or supplement rulings in light of the filing of\nthe 82 indictment.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000153\n", "char_count": 1739}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 120, "text_content": "9la\n\nThe Court further ORDERS the parties to negotiate\na final schedule for all pretrial disclosures that remain\noutstanding, including: Brady, Giglio, and Jenks Act\nmaterials, including co-conspirator statements; non-\ntestifying witness statements; testifying witness state-\nments; the identity of victims alleged in the indictment;\n404(b) material; and the Government’s witness list.\nThe Court also requires the parties to negotiate a\nschedule for any additional or supplemental motions\nbriefing in light of the S2 indictment. The Court\nORDERS a joint proposal to be submitted by April 21,\n2021. If agreement is not reached, the parties shall\nsubmit their respective proposals.\n\nThe Court further ORDERS Maxwell to show cause\nby April 21, 2021 why her motion to dismiss the $1\nsuperseding indictment under the Sixth Amendment\n(Dkt. No. 125) should not be denied as moot.\n\nSO ORDERED.\nDated: April 16, 2021\nNew York, New York\n\n/s/ Alison J. Nathan\nALISON J. NATHAN\nUnited States District Judge\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000154\n", "char_count": 1013}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 121, "text_content": "92a\nAPPENDIX E\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\nDocket No: 22-1426\n\nAt a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals\nfor the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall\nUnited States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the\nCity of New York, on the 25th day of November, two\nthousand twenty-four.\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nAppellee,\nVv.\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 1,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nORDER\n\nAppellant, Ghislaine Maxwell, filed a petition for\npanel rehearing, or, in the alternative, for rehearing\nen banc. The panel that determined the appeal has\nconsidered the request for panel rehearing, and the\nactive members of the Court have considered the\nrequest for rehearing en banc.\n\nIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is\ndenied.\nFOR THE COURT:\n\nCatherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk\n[United States Second Circuit\nCourt of Appeals\n\nCatherine O’Hagan Wolfe Seal]\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000155\n", "char_count": 919}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 122, "text_content": "93a\nAPPENDIX F\n\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE\n[LOGO]\n\nEXCERPTS OF THE OFFICE OF\nPROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT\n\nInvestigation into the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the\nSouthern District of Florida’s Resolution of Its 2006—\n2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of\nJeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with\nVictims during the Investigation\n\nNovember 2020\n\nNOTE: THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE,\nPRIVILEGED, AND PRIVACY ACT PROTECTED\nINFORMATION. DO NOT DISTRIBUTE THE REPORT\nOR ITS CONTENTS WITHOUT THE PRIOR\nAPPROVAL OF THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL\nRESPONSIBILITY.\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY\n\nThe Department of Justice (Department) Office of\nProfessional Responsibility (OPR) investigated allega-\ntions that in 2007-2008, prosecutors in the U.S.\nAttorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida\n(USAO) improperly resolved a federal investigation\ninto the criminal conduct of Jeffrey Epstein by\nnegotiating and executing a federal non-prosecution\nagreement (NPA). The NPA was intended to end a\nfederal investigation into allegations that Epstein\nengaged in illegal sexual activity with girls.t OPR also\n\n' As used in this Report, including in quoted documents and\nstatements, the word “girls” refers to females who were under the\nage of 18 at the time of the alleged conduct. Under Florida law, a\nminor is a person under the age of 18.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000156\n", "char_count": 1340}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 123, "text_content": "94a\n\ninvestigated whether USAO prosecutors committed\nprofessional misconduct by failing to consult with\nvictims of Epstein’s crimes before the NPA was signed\nor by misleading victims regarding the status of the\nfederal investigation after the signing.\n\nI, OVERVIEW OF FACTUAL BACKGROUND\n\nThe Palm Beach (Florida) Police Department (PBPD)\nbegan investigating Jeffrey Epstein in 2005, after the\nparents of a 14-year-old girl complained that Epstein\nhad paid her for a massage. Epstein was a multi-\nmillionaire financier with residences in Palm Beach,\nNew York City, and other United States and foreign\nlocations. The investigation led to the discovery that\nEpstein used personal assistants to recruit girls to\nprovide massages to him, and in many instances, those\nmassages led to sexual activity. After the PBPD\nbrought the case to the State Attorney’s Office, a Palm\nBeach County grand jury indicted Epstein, on July 19,\n2006, for felony solicitation of prostitution in violation\nof Florida Statute § 796.07. However, because the\nPBPD Chief and the lead Detective were dissatisfied\nwith the State Attorney’s handling of the case and\nbelieved that the state grand jury’s charge did not\naddress the totality of Epstein’s conduct, they referred\nthe matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation\n(FBI) in West Palm Beach for a possible federal\ninvestigation.\n\nThe FBI brought the matter to an Assistant U.S.\nAttorney (AUSA), who opened a file with her supervisor’s\napproval and with the knowledge of then U.S. Attorney\nR. Alexander Acosta. She worked with two FBI case\nagents to develop a federal case against Epstein and,\nin the course of the investigation, they discovered\nadditional victims. In May 2007, the AUSA submitted\nto her supervisors a draft 60-count indictment outlining\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000157\n", "char_count": 1797}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 124, "text_content": "95a\n\ncharges against Epstein. She also provided a lengthy\nmemorandum summarizing the evidence she had\nassembled in support of the charges and addressing\nthe legal issues related to the proposed charges.\n\nFor several weeks following submission of the\nprosecution memorandum and proposed indictment,\nthe AUSA’s supervisors reviewed the case to determine\nhow to proceed. At a July 31, 2007 meeting with\nEpstein’s attorneys, the USAO offered to end its\ninvestigation if Epstein pled guilty to state charges,\nagreed to serve a minimum of two years’ incarceration,\nregistered as a sexual offender, and agreed to a mecha-\nnism through which victims could obtain monetary\ndamages. The USAO subsequently engaged in additional\nmeetings and communications with Epstein’s team of\nattorneys, ultimately negotiating the terms of a state-\nbased resolution of the federal investigation, which\nculminated in the signing of the NPA on September 24,\n2007. The NPA required Epstein to plead guilty in\nstate court to the then-pending state indictment\nagainst him and to an additional criminal information\ncharging him with a state offense that would require\nhim to register as a sexual offender—specifically,\nprocurement of minors to engage in prostitution, in\nviolation of Florida Statute § 796.03. The NPA\nrequired Epstein to make a binding recommendation\nthat the state court sentence him to serve 18 months\nin the county jail followed by 12 months of community\ncontrol (home detention or “house arrest”). The NPA\nalso included provisions designed to facilitate the\nvictims’ recovery of monetary damages from Epstein.\nIn exchange, the USAO agreed to end its investigation\nof Epstein and to forgo federal prosecution in the\nSouthern District of Florida of him, four named\nco-conspirators, and “any potential co-conspirators.”\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000158\n", "char_count": 1825}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 125, "text_content": "96a\n\nVictims were not informed of, or consulted about, a\npotential state resolution or the NPA prior to its signing.\n\nThe signing of the NPA did not immediately lead to\nEpstein’s guilty plea and incarceration, however. For\nthe next nine months, Epstein deployed his extensive\nteam of prominent attorneys to try to change the terms\nthat his team had negotiated and he had approved,\nwhile simultaneously seeking to invalidate the entire\nNPA by persuading senior Department officials that\nthere was no federal interest at issue and the matter\nshould be left to the discretion of state law enforce-\nment officials. Through repeated communications with\nthe USAO and senior Department officials, defense\ncounsel fought the government’s interpretation of the\nNPA’ss terms. They also sought and obtained review by\nthe Department’s Criminal Division and then the\nOffice of the Deputy Attorney General, primarily on\nthe issue of federal jurisdiction over what the defense\ninsisted was “a quintessentially state matter.” After\nreviewing submissions by the defense and the USAO,\non June 23, 2008, the Office of the Deputy Attorney\nGeneral informed defense counsel that the Deputy\nAttorney General would not intervene in the matter.\nOnly then did Epstein agree to fulfill his obligation\nunder the NPA, and on June 30, 2008, he appeared in\nstate court and pled guilty to the pending state\nindictment charging felony solicitation of prostitution\nand, pursuant to the NPA, to a criminal information\ncharging him with procurement of minors to engage in\nprostitution. Upon the joint request of the defendant\nand the state prosecutor, and consistent with the NPA,\nthe court immediately sentenced Epstein to consecu-\ntive terms of 12 months’ incarceration on the solicitation\ncharge and 6 months’ incarceration on the procurement\ncharge, followed by 12 months of community control.\nEpstein began serving the sentence that day, in a\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000159\n", "char_count": 1930}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 126, "text_content": "97a\n\nminimum-security Palm Beach County facility. A copy\nof the NPA was filed under seal with the state court.\n\nOn July 7, 2008, a victim, identified as “Jane Doe,”\nfiled in federal court in the Southern District of Florida\nan emergency petition alleging that the government\nviolated the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), 18\nU.S.C. § 3771, when it resolved the federal investiga-\ntion of Epstein without consulting with victims, and\nseeking enforcement of her CVRA rights.” In responding\nto the petition, the government, represented by the\nUSAO, revealed the existence of the NPA, but did not\nproduce it to the petitioners until the court directed it\nto be turned over subject to a protective order; the NPA\nitself remained under seal in the federal district court.\nAfter the initial filings and hearings, the CVRA case\nwas dormant for almost two years while the\npetitioners pursued civil cases against Epstein.\n\nSoon after he was incarcerated, Epstein applied for\nthe Palm Beach County Sheriff’s work release\nprogram, and the Sheriff approved his application. In\nOctober 2008, Epstein began spending 12 hours a day\npurportedly working at the “Florida Science Foundation,”\nan entity Epstein had recently incorporated that was\nco-located at the West Palm Beach office of one of\nEpstein’s attorneys. Although the NPA specified a\nterm of incarceration of 18 months, Epstein received\n“gain time,” that is, time off for good behavior, and he\nactually served less than 13 months of incarceration.\nOn July 22, 2009, Epstein was released from custody\nto a one-year term of home detention as a condition of\n\n? Emergency Victim’s Petition for Enforcement of Crime\nVictim’s [sic] Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771, Doe v. United\nStates, Case No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM (8.D. Fla. July 7, 2008).\nAnother victim subsequently joined the litigation as “Jane Doe 2.”\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000160\n", "char_count": 1865}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 127, "text_content": "98a\n\ncommunity control, and he registered as a sexual\noffender with the Florida Department of Law\nEnforcement. After victims and news media filed suit\nin Florida courts for release of the copy of the NPA that\nhad been filed under seal in the state court file, a state\njudge in September 2009 ordered it to be made public.\n\nBy mid-2010, Epstein reportedly settled multiple\ncivil lawsuits brought against him by victims seeking\nmonetary damages, including the two petitioners in\nthe CVRA litigation. During the CVRA litigation, the\npetitioners sought discovery from the USAOQO, which\nmade substantial document productions, filed lengthy\nprivilege logs in support of its withholding of documents,\nand submitted declarations from the AUSA and the\nFBI case agents who conducted the federal investiga-\ntion. The USAO opposed efforts to unseal various\nrecords, as did Epstein, who was permitted to intervene in\nthe litigation with respect to certain issues. Nevertheless,\nthe court ultimately ordered that substantial records\nrelating to the USAO’s resolution of the Epstein case\nbe made public. During the course of the litigation, the\ncourt made numerous rulings interpreting the CVRA.\nAfter failed efforts to settle the case, the parties’ cross\nmotions for summary judgment remained pending for\nmore than a year.\n\nIn 2017, President Donald Trump nominated Acosta\nto be Secretary of Labor. At his March 2017 confirmation\nhearing, Acosta was questioned only briefly about the\nEpstein case. On April 17, 2017, the Senate confirmed\nAcosta’s appointment as Labor Secretary.\n\nIn the decade following his release from incarceration,\nEpstein reportedly continued to settle multiple civil\nsuits brought by many, but not all, of his victims.\nEpstein was otherwise able to resume his lavish\nlifestyle, largely avoiding the interest of the press. On\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000161\n", "char_count": 1852}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 128, "text_content": "99a\n\nNovember 28, 2018, however, the Miami Herald\npublished an extensive investigative report about\nstate and federal criminal investigations initiated\nmore than 12 years earlier into allegations that\nEpstein had coerced girls into engaging in sexual\nactivity with him at his Palm Beach estate.? The\nMiami Herald reported that in 2007, Acosta entered\ninto an “extraordinary” deal with Epstein in the form\nof the NPA, which permitted Epstein to avoid federal\nprosecution and a potentially lengthy prison sentence\nby pleading guilty in state court to “two prostitution\ncharges.” According to the Miami Herald, the govern-\nment also immunized from prosecution Epstein’s co-\nconspirators and concealed from Epstein’s victims the\nterms of the NPA. Through its reporting, which\nincluded interviews of eight victims and information\nfrom publicly available documents, the newspaper\npainted a portrait of federal and state prosecutors who\nhad ignored serious criminal conduct by a wealthy\nman with powerful and politically connected friends by\ngranting him a “deal of a lifetime” that allowed him\nboth to escape significant punishment for his past\nconduct and to continue his abuse of minors. The\nMiami Herald report led to public outrage and media\nscrutiny of the government’s actions.’\n\n3 Julie K. Brown, “Perversion of Justice,” Miami Herald, Nov.\n28, 2018. https:/;www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article220097\n825. html.\n\n‘ See, e.g., Ashley Collman, “Stunning new report details\nTrump’s labor secretary’s role in plea deal for billionaire sex\nabuser,” The Business Insider, Nov. 29, 2018; Cynthia McFadden,\n“New Focus on Trump Labor Secretary’s role in unusual plea deal\nfor billionaire accused of sexual abuse,” NBC Nightly News, Nov.\n29, 2018; Anita Kumar, “Trump labor secretary out of running for\nattorney general after Miami Herald report,” McClatchy Washington\nBureau, Nov. 29, 2018; Emily Peck, “How Trump’s Labor Secretary\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000162\n", "char_count": 1946}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 129, "text_content": "100a\n\nOn February 21, 2019, the district court granted the\nCVRA case petitioners’ Motion for Partial Summary\nJudgment, ruling that the government violated the\nCVRA in failing to advise the victims about its\nintention to enter into the NPA.°® The court also found\nthat letters the government sent to victims after\nthe NPA was signed, describing the investigation as\nongoing, “mislead [sic] the victims to believe that\nfederal prosecution was still a possibility.” The court\nalso highlighted the inequity of the USAO’s failure to\ncommunicate with the victims while at the same time\nengaging in “lengthy negotiations” with Epstein’s\ncounsel and assuring the defense that the NPA would\nnot be “made public or filed with the court.” The court\nordered the parties to submit additional briefs\nregarding the appropriate remedies. After the court’s\norder, the Department recused the USAO from the\nCVRA litigation and assigned the U.S. Attorney’s\nOffice for the Northern District of Georgia to handle\nthe case for the government. Among the remedies\nsought by the petitioners, and opposed by the govern-\nment, was rescission of the NPA and federal prosecution\nof Epstein.\n\nOn July 2, 2019, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the\nSouthern District of New York obtained a federal\ngrand jury indictment charging Epstein with one\ncount of sex trafficking of minors and one count of\nconspiracy to commit sex trafficking of minors. The\nindictment alleged that from 2002 until 2005, Epstein\n\nCovered For A Millionaire Sex Abuser,” Huffington Post, Nov. 29,\n2018; Julie K. Brown, et al., “Lawmakers issue call for investiga-\ntion of serial sex abuser Jeffrey Epstein’s plea deal,” Miami\nHerald, Dec. 6, 2018.\n\n5 Doe v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (S.D. Fla., Feb. 21,\n2019) (Opinion and Order, 9:08-80736-CIV-Marra).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000163\n", "char_count": 1820}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 130, "text_content": "10la\n\ncreated a vast network of underage victims in both\nNew York and Florida whom he sexually abused and\nexploited. Epstein was arrested on the charges on July\n6, 2019. In arguing for Epstein’s pretrial detention,\nprosecutors asserted that agents searching Epstein’s\nManhattan residence found thousands of photos of\nnude and half-nude females, including at least one\nbelieved to be a minor. The court ordered Epstein\ndetained pending trial, and he was remanded to the\ncustody of the Bureau of Prisons and held at the\nMetropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan.\n\nMeanwhile, after publication of the November 2018\nMiami Herald report, the media and Congress increas-\ningly focused attention on Acosta as the government\nofficial responsible for the NPA. On July 10, 2019,\nAcosta held a televised press conference to defend his\nand the USAO’s actions. Acosta stated that the Palm\nBeach State Attorney’s Office “was ready to allow\nEpstein to walk free with no jail time, nothing.”\nAccording to Acosta, because USAO prosecutors con-\nsidered this outcome unacceptable, his office pursued\na difficult and challenging case and obtained a\nresolution that put Epstein in jail, forced him to\nregister as a sexual offender, and provided victims\nwith the means to obtain monetary damages. Acosta’s\npress conference did not end the controversy, however,\nand on July 12, 2019, Acosta submitted to the\nPresident his resignation as Secretary of Labor. In a\nbrief oral statement, Acosta explained that continued\nmedia attention on his handling of the Epstein\ninvestigation rather than on the economy was unfair\nto the Labor Department.\n\nOn August 10, 2019, Epstein was found hanging in\nhis cell and was later pronounced dead. The New York\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000164\n", "char_count": 1742}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 131, "text_content": "102a\n\nCity Chief Medical Examiner concluded that Epstein\nhad committed suicide.\n\nAs a result of Epstein’s death, the U.S. Attorney’s\nOffice for the Southern District of New York filed a\nnolle prosequi to dismiss the pending indictment\nagainst Epstein. On August 27, 2019, the district court\nheld a hearing at which more than a dozen of Epstein’s\nvictims—including victims of the conduct in Florida\nthat was addressed through the NPA—spoke about\nthe impact of Epstein’s crimes. The court dismissed the\nEpstein indictment on August 29, 2019.\n\nAfter Epstein’s death, the federal district court in\nFlorida overseeing the CVRA litigation denied the\npetitioners their requested remedies and closed the\ncase as moot. Among its findings, the court concluded\nthat although the government had violated the CVRA,\nthe government had asserted “legitimate and legally\nsupportable positions throughout this litigation,” and\ntherefore had not litigated in bad faith. The court also\nnoted it expected the government to “honor its\nrepresentation that it will provide training to its\nemployees about the CVRA and the proper treatment\nof crime victims,” as well as honoring its promise to\nmeet with the victims.\n\nOn September 30, 2019, CVRA petitioner “Jane\nDoe 1” filed in her true name a petition for a writ of\nmandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for\nthe Eleventh Circuit, seeking review of the district\ncourt’s order denying all of her requested remedies. In\nits responsive brief, the government argued that “as a\nmatter of law, the legal obligations under the CVRA do\nnot attach prior to the government charging a case”\nand thus, “the CVRA was not triggered in [the\nSouthern District of Florida] because no criminal\ncharges were brought.” Nevertheless, during oral\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000165\n", "char_count": 1778}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 132, "text_content": "103a\n\nargument, the government conceded that the USAO\nhad not been “fully transparent” with the petitioner\nand had “made a mistake in causing her to believe that\nthe case was ongoing when in fact the NPA had been\nsigned.” On April 14, 2020, a divided panel of the Court\nof Appeals denied the petition, ruling that CVRA\nrights do not attach until a defendant has been\ncriminally charged. On August 7, 2020, the court\ngranted the petition for rehearing en banc and vacated\nthe panel’s opinion; as of the date of this Report, a\nbriefing schedule has been issued, and oral argument\nis set for December 3, 2020.\n\nIl. THE INITIATION AND SCOPE OF OPR’S\nINVESTIGATION\n\nAfter the Miami Herald published its investigative\nreport on November 28, 2018, U.S. Senator Ben Sasse,\nChairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on\nOversight, Agency Action, Federal Rights and Federal\nCourts, sent a December 3, 2018 letter to OPR, citing\nthe Miami Herald’s report and requesting that OPR\n“open an investigation into the instances identified in\nthis reporting of possible misconduct by Department\nof Justice attorneys.” On February 6, 2019, the\nDepartment of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs\nadvised Senator Sasse that OPR had opened an\ninvestigation into the matter and would review the\nUSAO?’s decision to resolve the federal investigation of\nEpstein through the NPA.®\n\nAfter the district court issued its ruling in the CVRA\nlitigation, on February 21, 2019, OPR included within\n\n° The federal government was closed from December 22, 2018,\nto January 25, 2019. After initiating its investigation, OPR\nalso subsequently received other letters from U.S. Senators and\nRepresentatives inquiring into the status of the OPR investigation.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000166\n", "char_count": 1740}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 133, "text_content": "104a\n\nthe scope of its investigation an examination of the\ngovernment’s conduct that formed the basis for the\ncourt’s findings that the USAO violated the CVRA in\nfailing to afford victims a reasonable right to confer\nwith the government about the NPA before the\nagreement was signed and that the government\naffirmatively misled victims about the status of the\nfederal investigation.\n\nDuring the course of its investigation, OPR obtained\nand reviewed hundreds of thousands of records from\nthe USAO, the FBI, and other Department components,\nincluding the Office of the Deputy Attorney General,\nthe Criminal Division, and the Executive Office for\nU.S. Attorneys. The records included emails, letters,\nmemoranda, and investigative materials. OPR also\ncollected and reviewed materials relating to the state\ninvestigation and prosecution of Epstein. OPR also\nexamined extensive publicly available information,\nincluding depositions, pleadings, orders, and other\ncourt records, and reviewed media reports and\ninterviews, articles, podcasts, and books relating to the\nEpstein case.\n\nIn addition to this extensive documentary review,\nOPR conducted more than 60 interviews of witnesses,\nincluding the FBI case agents, their supervisors, and\nFBI administrative personnel; current and former\nUSAO staff and attorneys; current and former\nDepartment attorneys and senior managers, including\na former Deputy Attorney General and a former\nAssistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division;\nand the former State Attorney and former Assistant\nState Attorney in charge of the state investigation of\nEpstein. OPR also interviewed several victims and\nattorneys representing victims, and reviewed written\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000167\n", "char_count": 1705}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 134, "text_content": "105a\n\nsubmissions from victims, concerning victim contacts\nwith the USAO and the FBI.\n\nOPR identified former U.S. Attorney Acosta, three\nformer USAO supervisors, and the AUSA as subjects\nof its investigation based on preliminary information\nindicating that each of them was involved in the\ndecision to resolve the case through the NPA or in the\nnegotiations leading to the agreement. OPR deems a\ncurrent or former Department attorney to be a subject\nof its investigation when the individual’s conduct is\nwithin the scope of OPR’s review and may result in a\nfinding of professional misconduct. OPR reviewed\nprior public statements made by Acosta and another\nsubject. All five subjects cooperated fully with OPR’s\ninvestigation. OPR requested that all of the subjects\nprovide written responses detailing their involvement\nin the federal investigation of Epstein, the drafting\nand execution of the NPA, and decisions relating to\nvictim notification and consultation. OPR received and\nreviewed written responses from all of the subjects,\nand subsequently conducted extensive interviews of\neach subject under oath and before a court reporter.\nEach subject was represented by counsel and had\naccess to relevant contemporaneous documents before\nthe subject’s OPR interview. The subjects reviewed and\nprovided comments on their respective interview\ntranscripts and on OPR’s draft report. OPR carefully\nconsidered the comments and made changes, or noted\ncomments, as OPR deemed appropriate; OPR did not,\nhowever, alter its findings and conclusions.\n\nFinally, OPR reviewed relevant case law, statutes,\nregulations, Department policy, and attorney profes-\nsional responsibility rules as necessary to resolve the\nissues presented in this case and to determine whether\nthe subjects committed professional misconduct.\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000168\n", "char_count": 1823}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 135, "text_content": "106a\n\nAs part of its investigation, OPR examined the\ninteractions between state officials and the federal\ninvestigators and prosecutors, but because OPR does\nnot have jurisdiction over state officials, OPR did not\ninvestigate, or reach conclusions about, their conduct\nregarding the state investigation.’ Because OPR’s\nmission is to ensure that Department attorneys adhere\nto the standards of professional conduct, OPR’s inves-\ntigation focused on the actions of the subject attorneys\nrather than on determining the full scope of Epstein’s\nand his assistants’ criminal behavior. Accordingly,\nOPR considered the evidence and information regard-\ning Epstein’s and his assistants’ conduct as it was\nknown to the subjects at the time they performed their\nduties as Department attorneys. Additional evidence\nand information that came to light after June 30, 2008,\nwhen Epstein entered his guilty plea under the NPA,\ndid not affect the subjects’ actions prior to that date,\nand OPR did not evaluate the subjects’ conduct on the\nbasis of that subsequent information.\n\nOPR’s investigation occurred approximately 12\nyears after most of the significant events relating to\nthe USAO’s investigation of Epstein, the NPA, and\nEpstein’s guilty plea. As a result, many of the subjects\nand witnesses were unable to recall the details of\nevents or their own or others’ actions occurring in\n2006-2008, such as conversations, meetings, or documents\n\n7 In August 2019, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis announced\nthat he had directed the Florida Department of Law Enforcement\nto open an investigation into the conduct of state authorities\nrelating to Epstein. As reported, the investigation focuses on\nEpstein’s state plea agreement and the Palm Beach County work\nrelease program.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000169\n", "char_count": 1774}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 136, "text_content": "107a\n\nthey reviewed at the time.* However, OPR’s evaluation\nof the subjects’ conduct was aided significantly by\nextensive, contemporaneous emails among the prose-\ncutors and communications between the government\nand defense counsel. These records often referred to\nthe interactions among the participants and described\nimportant decisions and, in some instances, the bases\nfor them.\n\nIII. OVERVIEW OF OPR’S ANALYTICAL FRAME-\nWORK\n\nOPR’s primary mission is to ensure that Department\nattorneys perform their duties in accordance with the\nhighest professional standards, as would be expected\nof the nation’s principal law enforcement agency.\nAccordingly, OPR investigates allegations of professional\nmisconduct against current or former Department\nattorneys related to the exercise of their authority to\n\n* Ok Ok\n\n[69] to the assault charge” and suggesting a different\nfactual scenario to support a federal charge.'” At this\n\n8 OPR was cognizant that Acosta and the three managers all\nleft the USAO during, or not long after resolution of, the Epstein\ncase, while the AUSA remained with the USAO until mid-2019.\nMoreover, as the line prosecutor in the Epstein investigation\nand also as co-counsel in the CVRA litigation until the USAO\nwas recused from that litigation in early 2019, the AUSA had\ncontinuous access to the USAO documentary record and numerous\noccasions to review these materials in the course of her official\nduties. Additionally, in responding to OPR’s request for a written\nresponse, and in preparing to be interviewed by OPR, the AUSA\nwas able to refresh her recollection with these materials to an\nextent not possible for the other subjects, who were provided with\nrelevant documents by OPR in preparation for their interviews.\n\n\"2 Villafafia told OPR that she sometimes used her home email\naccount because “[nlegotiations were occurring at nights, on\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000170\n", "char_count": 1886}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 137, "text_content": "108a\n\npoint, Sloman left on vacation, and he informed Acosta\nand Villafafia that in his absence Lourie had agreed\n“to help finalize this.” Lourie spent the following\nwork week at his new post at the Department in\nWashington, D.C., but communicated with his USAO\ncolleagues by phone and email.\n\nIn a Sunday, September 16, 2007 email, Villafania\ninformed Lefkowitz that she had drafted a factual\nproffer to accompany a revised “hybrid” federal plea\nproposal. In that email, Villafafia also noted that she\nwas considering filing charges in the federal district\ncourt in Miami, “which will hopefully cut the press\ncoverage significantly.” This email received considerable\nattention 12 years later when it was made public\nduring the CVRA litigation and was viewed as evidence\nof the USAO’s efforts to conceal the NPA from the\nvictims. Villafafia, however, explained to OPR that she\nwas concerned that news media coverage would\nviolate the victims’ privacy. She told OPR, “(If [the\nvictims] wanted to attend [the plea hearing], I wanted\nthem to be able to go into the courthouse without their\nfaces being splashed all over the newspaper,” and that\nsuch publicity was less likely to happen in Miami,\nwhere the press “in general does not care about what\nhappens in Palm Beach.”\n\nLefkowitz responded to Villafafia with a revised\nversion of her latest proposed “hybrid” plea agreement,\nin a document entitled “Agreement.” Significantly,\nthis defense proposal introduced two new provisions.\nThe first related to four female assistants who had\n\nweekend|[s], and while I was [away from the office for personal\nreasons], ... and this occurred during a time when out of office\naccess to email was very limited.” Records show her supervisors\nwere aware that at times she used her personal email account in\ncommunicating with defense counsel in this case.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000171\n", "char_count": 1857}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 138, "text_content": "109a\n\nallegedly facilitated Epstein in his criminal scheme.\nThe defense sought a government promise not to\nprosecute them, as well as certain other unnamed\nEpstein employees, and a promise to forego immigration\nproceedings against two of the female assistants:\n\nEpstein’s fulfilling the terms and conditions\nof the Agreement also precludes the initiation\nof any and all criminal charges which might\notherwise in the future be brought against\n[four named female assistants] or any employee\nof [a specific Epstein-owned corporate entity]\nfor any criminal charge that arises out of the\nongoing federal investigation .... Further, no\nimmigration proceeding will be instituted\nagainst [two named female assistants] as a\nresult of the ongoing investigation.\n\nThe second new provision related to the USAO’s\nefforts to obtain Epstein’s computers:\n\nEpstein’s fulfilling the terms and conditions\nof the Agreement resolves any and all out-\nstanding [legal process] that have requested\nwitness testimony and/or the production of\ndocuments and/or computers in relation to\nthe investigation that is the subject of the\nAgreement. Each [legal process] will be\nwithdrawn upon the execution of the\nAgreement and will not be re-issued absent\nreliable evidence of a violation of the agree-\nment. Epstein and his counsel agree that the\ncomputers that are currently under [legal\nprocess] will be safeguarded in their current\ncondition by Epstein’s counsel or their agents\nuntil the terms and conditions of the Agree-\nment are fulfilled.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000172\n", "char_count": 1533}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 139, "text_content": "110a\n\nLater that day, Villafafia sent Lefkowitz a lengthy\nemail to convey two options Lourie had suggested: “the\noriginal proposal” for a state plea but with an\nagreement for an 18-month sentence, or pleas to state\ncharges and two federal obstruction-of-justice charges.\nVillafana also told Lefkowitz she was willing to ask\nAcosta again to approve a federal plea to a five-year\nconspiracy with a Rule 11(c) binding recommendation\nfor a 20-month sentence. Villafafa explained:\n\nAs to timing, it is my understanding that Mr.\nEpstein needs to be sentenced in the state after he is\nsentenced in the federal case, but not that he needs to\nplead guilty and be sentenced after serving his federal\ntime. Andy recommended that some of the timing\nissues be addressed only in the state agreement, so\nthat it isn’t obvious to the judge that we are trying to\ncreate federal jurisdiction for prison purposes.\n\nWith regard to prosecution of individuals other than\nEpstein, Villafafia suggested standard federal plea\nagreement language regarding the resolution of all\ncriminal liability, “and I will mention ‘co-conspirators,\nbut I would prefer not to highlight for the judge all of\nthe other crimes and all of the other persons that we\ncould charge.” Villafafia told OPR that she was willing\nto include a non-prosecution provision for Epstein’s co-\nconspirators, who at the time she understood to be the\nfour women named in the proposed agreement,\nbecause the USAO was not interested in prosecuting\nthose individuals if Epstein entered a plea. Villafafia\ntold OPR, “[W]e considered Epstein to be the top of the\nfood chain, and we wouldn’t have been interested in\nprosecuting anyone else.” She did not consider the\npossibility that Epstein might be trying to protect\nother, unnamed individuals, and no one, including the\nFBI case agents, raised that concern. Villafafia also\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000173\n", "char_count": 1877}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 140, "text_content": "lila\n\ntold OPR that her reference to “all of the other crimes\nand all of the other persons that we could charge”\nrelated to her concern that if the plea agreement\ncontained information about uncharged conduct, the\ncourt might ask for more information about that\nconduct and inquire why it had not been charged, and\nif the government provided such information, Epstein’s\nattorneys might claim the agreement was breached.”\n\nWith regard to immigration, Villafafia told OPR that\nthe USAO generally did not take any position in plea\nagreements on immigration issues, and that in this\ncase, there was no evidence that either of the two\nassistants who were foreign nationals had committed\nfraud in connection with their immigration paperwork,\n“and I think that they were both in status. So there\nwasn’t any reason for them to be deported.”!* As to\nwhether the foreign nationals would be removable by\nvirtue of having committed crimes, Villafafia told OPR\nshe did not consider her role as seeking removal apart\nfrom actual prosecution.\n\nVillafafia concluded her email to Lefkowitz by\nexpressing disappointment that they were not “closer\nto resolving this than it appears that we are,” and\n\n48 OPR understood Villafaria’s concern to be that if the govern-\nment were required to respond to a court’s inquiry into additional\nfacts, Epstein would object that the government was trying to cast\nhim in a negative light in order to influence the court to impose a\nsentence greater than the agreed-upon term.\n\n4 According to the case agents, the West Palm Beach FBI office\nhad an ICE agent working with them at the beginning of the\nfederal investigation, and the ICE agent normally would have\nlooked into the immigration status of any foreign national, but\nneither case agent recalled any immigration issue regarding any\nof the Epstein employees.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000174\n", "char_count": 1849}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 141, "text_content": "1l12a\n\noffering to meet the next day to work on the\nagreement:\n\nCan I suggest that tomorrow we either meet\nlive or via teleconference, either with your\nclient or having him within a quick phone\ncall, to hash out these items? I was hoping to\nwork only a half day tomorrow to save my\nvoice for Tuesday’s hearing ... , if necessary,\nbut maybe we can set a time to meet. If you\nwant to meet “off campus” somewhere, that is\nfine. I will make sure that I have all the\nnecessary decision makers present or “on\ncall,” as well.1%\n\nVillafafia told OPR that she offered to meet\nLefkowitz away from the USAO because conducting\nnegotiations via email was inefficient, and Villafafia\nwanted “to have a meeting where we sat down and just\nfinalized things. And what I meant by off campus is,\nsometimes people feel better if you go to a neutral\nlocation” for a face-to-face meeting.\n\nOn the morning of Monday, September 17, 2007, the\nUSAO supervisor who was taking over Lourie’s duties\nas manager of the West Palm Beach office asked\nVillafana for an update on the plea negotiations, and\nshe forwarded to him the email she had sent to\nLefkowitz the previous afternoon. Villafafa told the\nmanager, “As you can see ... there are a number of\nthings in their last draft that were unacceptable. All of\nthe loopholes that I sewed up they tried to open.”\n\nShortly thereafter, Villafafia alerted the new manager,\nAcosta, and Lourie that she had just spoken with\n\n5 Lefkowitz was based in New York City but traveled to Miami\nin connection with the case.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000175\n", "char_count": 1545}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 142, "text_content": "118a\n\nLefkowitz, who advised that Epstein was leaning\ntowards a plea to state charges under a non-prosecu-\ntion agreement, and she would be forwarding to\nLefkowitz “our last version of the Non-Prosecution\nAgreement.” Acosta asked that Villafafia “make\nsure they know it[’]s only a draft” and reminded her\nthat “[t]he form and language may need polishing.”\nVillafana responded, “Absolutely. There were a lot of\nproblems with their last attempt. They tried to re-open\nall the loopholes that I had sewn shut.” Villafafia sent\nto Lefkowitz the draft NPA that she had provided to\nLefcourt on September 11, 2007, noting that it was the\n“last version” and would “avoid [him] having to\nreinvent the wheel.” She also updated the FBI case\nagents on the status of negotiations, noting that she\nhad told her “chain of command... that we are still on\nfor the [September] 25th [to bring charges] ... , no\nmatter what.”\n\nAfter receiving the draft NPA, Lefkowitz asked\nVillafafia to provide for his review a factual proffer for\na federal obstruction of justice charge, and, with\nrespect to the NPA option, asked, “[I]f we go that route,\nwould you intend to make the deferred [sic] prosecu-\ntion agreement public?” Villafafia replied that while a\nfederal plea agreement would be part of the court file\nand publicly accessible, the NPA “would not be made\npublic or filed with the Court, but it would remain part\nof our case file. It probably would be subject to a FOIA\n[Freedom of Information Act] request, but it is not\nsomething that we would distribute without compulsory\nprocess.” Villafaia told OPR that she believed\nEpstein did not want the NPA to be made public\n\nNé6 FOIA requires disclosure of government records upon\nrequest unless an exemption applies permitting the government\nto withhold the requested records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000176\n", "char_count": 1843}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 143, "text_content": "11l4a\n\nbecause he “did not want people to believe him to have\ncommitted a variety of crimes.” As she explained to\nOPR, Villafafia believed the NPA did not need to be\ndisclosed in its entirety, but she anticipated notifying\nthe victims about the NPA provisions relating to their\nability to recover damages.\n\nE. The Parties Appear to Reach Agreement on\na Plea to Federal Charges\n\nNegotiations continued the next day, Tuesday,\nSeptember 18, 2007. Responding to Villafafia’s revised\ndraft of the NPA, Lefkowitz suggested that Epstein\nplead to one federal charge with a 12-month sentence,\nfollowed by one year of supervised release with a\nrequirement for home detention and two years of\nstate probation, with the first six months of the state\nsentence to be served under community control.\nVillafana replied, “I know that the U.S. Attorney will\nnot go below 18 months of prison/jail time (and I would\nstrongly oppose the suggestion).” Shortly thereafter,\nVillafafiia emailed Acosta, Lourie, and the incoming\nWest Palm Beach manager:\n\nHi all — I think that we may be near the end\nof our negotiations with Mr. Epstein, and not\nbecause we have reached a resolution. As I\nmentioned yesterday, I spent about 12 hours\nover the weekend drafting Informations,\nchanging plea agreements, and writing\nfactual proffers. I was supposed to receive a\ndraft agreement from them yesterday, which\nnever arrived. At that time, they were leaning\ntowards pleading only to state charges and\ndoing all of the time in state custody.\n\nLate last night I talked to Jay Lefkowitz who\nasked about Epstein pleading to two twelve-\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000177\n", "char_count": 1613}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 144, "text_content": "115a\n\nmonth federal charges with half of his jail\ntime being spent in home confinement\npursuant to the guidelines. I told him that I\nhad no objection to that approach but, in the\ninterest of full disclosure, I did not believe\nthat Mr. Epstein would be eligible because he\nwill not be in Zone A or B.\"\"\" This morning Jay\nLefkowitz called and said that I was correct\nbut, if we could get Mr. Epstein down to 14\nmonths, then he thought he would be eligible.\n\nMy response: have him plead to two separate\nInformations. On the first one he gets 12\nmonths’ imprisonment and on the second he\ngets twelve months, with six served in home\nconfinement, to run consecutively.\n\nI just received an e-mail asking if Mr. Epstein\ncould just do 12 months imprisonment instead.\n\nAs you can see, Mr. Epstein is having second\nthoughts about doing jail time. I would like to\nsend Jay Lefkowitz an e-mail stating that if\nwe do not have a signed agreement by\ntomorrow at 5:00, negotiations will end. I\nhave selected tomorrow at 5:00 because it\ngives them enough time to really negotiate an\nagreement if they are serious about it, and if\nnot, it gives me one day before the Jewish\nholiday to get [prepared] for Tuesday .. .\n[September 25] , when I plan to [file charges],\nand it gives the office sufficient time to review\nthe indictment package.\n\nDo you concur?\n\n\"7 Sentences falling within Zones A or B of the U.S. Sentencing\nGuidelines permit probation or confinement alternatives to\nimprisonment.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000178\n", "char_count": 1492}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 145, "text_content": "116a\n\nA few minutes later, the incoming West Palm Beach\nmanager emailed Lourie, suggesting that Lourie “talk\nto Epstein and close the deal.”!\"®\n\nWithin moments, Lourie replied to the manager,\nwith a copy to Villafafia, reporting that he had just\nspoken with Lefkowitz and agreed “to two fed[eral]\nobstruction[] charges (24 month cap) with nonbinding\nrecommendation for 18 months. When [Epstein] gets\nout, he has to plead to state offenses, including against\nminor, registrable, and then take one year house\narrest/community confinement.” By reply email,\nVillafana asked Lourie to call her, but there is no\nrecord of whether they spoke.\n\nF. Defense Counsel Offers New Proposals\nSubstantially Changing the Terms of the\nFederal Plea Agreement, which the USAO\n\nRejects\n\nApproximately an hour after Lourie’s email reporting\nthe deal he had reached with Lefkowitz, Lefkowitz\nsent Villafafia a revised draft plea agreement. Despite\nthe agreement Lourie believed he and Lefkowitz had\nreached that morning, Lefkowitz’s proposal would\nhave resulted in a 16-month federal sentence followed\nby 8 months of supervised release served in the form\nof home detention. Lefkowitz also inserted a statement\nin his proposal explicitly prohibiting the USAO from\nrequesting, initiating, or encouraging immigration\nauthorities to institute immigration proceedings against\ntwo of Epstein’s female assistants.\n\n48 The manager told OPR that he probably meant this as a joke\nbecause in his view the continued back-and-forth communications\nwith defense counsel “was ridiculous,” and the only way to “get\nthis deal done” might be to have a direct conversation with Epstein.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000179\n", "char_count": 1662}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 146, "text_content": "117a\n\nVillafana circulated the defense’s proposed plea\nagreement to Lourie and two other supervisors, and\nexpressed frustration that the new defense version\nincorporated terms that were “completely different\nfrom what Jay just told Andy they would agree to.”\nVillafana also pointed out that the defense “wants us\nto recommend an improper calculation” of the sentencing\nguidelines and had added language waiving the\npreparation of a presentence investigation (PSI) “so he\ncan keep all of his information confidential. I have\nalready told Jay that the PSI language ... was\nunacceptable to our office.” Of even greater significance, in\na follow-up email, Villafafia noted that the defense had\nremoved both the requirement that Epstein plead to a\nregistrable offense and the entire provision relating to\nmonetary damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255.\n\nIn the afternoon, Villafafa circulated her own\nproposed “hybrid” plea agreement, first internally to\nthe management team with a note stating that it\n“contains the 18/12 split that Jay and Andy agreed to,”\nand then to Lefkowitz. Regarding the prosecution of\nother individuals, she included the following provision:\n“This agreement resolves the federal criminal liability\nof the defendant and any co-conspirators in the\nSouthern District of Florida growing out of any\ncriminal conduct by those persons known to the\n[USAO] as of the date of this plea agreement,”\nincluding but not limited to the conspiracy to solicit\nminors to engage in prostitution.\n\nIn her email to Lefkowitz, transmitting the plea\nagreement, Villafatia wrote:\n\nCould you share the attached draft with your\ncolleagues. It is in keeping with what Andy\ncommunicated to me was the operative “deal.”\nThe U.S. Attorney hasn’t had a chance to\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000180\n", "char_count": 1764}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 147, "text_content": "118a\n\nreview all of the language, but he agrees with\nit in principle.\n\n[The West Palm Beach manager] and I will\nboth be available at 2:00. ... One of my\nsuggestions is going to be (again) that we all\nsit down together in the same room, including\nBarry [Krischer] and/or Lanna [Belohlavek],\nso we can hash out the still existing issues\nand get a signed document.\n\nVillafaiia also emailed Acosta directly, telling him\nshe planned to meet with Epstein’s attorneys to work\non the plea agreement, and asking if Acosta would be\navailable to provide final approval. Acosta replied, “I\ndon’t think I should be part of negotiations. I’d rather\nleave it to you if that’s ok.” Acosta told OPR that\n“absent truly exceptional circumstances,” he believed\nit was important for him “to not get involved” in\nnegotiations, and added, “You can meet, like I did in\nSeptember, [to] reaffirm the position of the office, [and]\nback your AUSA, but ultimately, I think your trial\nlawyer needs discretion to do their job.” Villafana told\nOPR, however, that she did not understand Acosta to\nbe giving her discretion to conduct the negotiations as\nshe saw fit; rather, she believed Acosta did not want to\nengage in face-to-face negotiations because “he wanted\nto have an appearance of having sort of an arm’s\nlength from the deal.”!” Villafafia replied to Acosta’s\n\n49 As noted throughout the Report, Villafafia’s interpretation\nof her supervisors’ motivations for their actions often differed\nfrom the supervisors’ explanations for their actions. Because it\ninvolved subjective interpretations of individuals’ motivations,\nOPR does not reach conclusions regarding the subjects’ differing\nviews but includes them as an indication of the communication\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000181\n", "char_count": 1741}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 148, "text_content": "119a\n\nmessage, “That is fine. [The West Palm Beach manager]\nand I will nail everything down, we just want to get a\nfinal blessing.”\n\nNegotiations continued throughout the day on\nWednesday, September 19, 2007, with Villafana and\nLefkowitz exchanging emails regarding the factual\nproffer for a plea and the scheduling of a meeting to\nfinalize the plea agreement’s terms. During that\nexchange, Villafafia made clear to Lefkowitz that the\ntime for negotiating was reaching an end:\n\nI hate to have to be firm about this, but we\nneed to wrap this up by Monday. I will not\nmiss my [September 25 charging] date when\nthis has dragged on for several weeks already\nand then, if things fall apart, be left in a less\nadvantageous position than before the nego-\ntiations. I have had an 82-page pros memo\nand 53-page indictment sitting on the shelf\nsince May to engage in these negotiations.\nThere has to be an ending date, and that date\nis Monday.\n\nEarly that afternoon, Lourie—who was participating\nin the week’s negotiations from his new post at the\nDepartment in Washington, D.C.—asked Villafafia to\nfurnish him with the last draft of the plea agreement\nshe had sent to defense counsel, and she provided him\nwith the “18/12 split” draft she had sent to Lefkowitz\nthe prior afternoon. After reviewing that draft, Lourie\ntold Villafafia it was a “[glood job” but he questioned\ncertain provisions, including whether the USAO’s\nagreement to suspend the investigation and hold\nall legal process in abeyance should be in the plea\n\nissues that hindered the prosecution team. See Chapter Two, Part\nThree, Section V.E.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000182\n", "char_count": 1617}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 149, "text_content": "120a\n\nagreement. Villafafia told Lourie that she had added\nthat paragraph at the “insistence” of the defense, and\nopined, “I don’t think it hurts us.” Villafafia explained\nto OPR that she held this view because “Alex and\npeople above me had already made the decision that if\nthe case was resolved we weren’t going to get the\ncomputer equipment.”\n\nAt 3:44 p.m. that afternoon, Lefkowitz emailed a\n“redline” version of the federal plea agreement\nshowing his new revisions, and noted that he was “also\nworking on a deferred [sic] prosecution agreement\nbecause it may well be that we cannot reach agree-\nment here.” The defense redline version required\nEpstein to plead guilty to a federal information\ncharging two misdemeanor counts of attempt to\nintentionally harass a person to prevent testimony, the\npending state indictment charging solicitation of\nprostitution, and a state information charging one\ncount of coercing a person to become a prostitute, in\nviolation of Florida Statute § 796.04 (without regard\nto age). Neither of the proposed state offenses required\nsexual offender registration. Epstein would serve an\n18-month sentence and a concurrent 60 months on\nprobation on the state charges. The redline version\nagain deleted the provisions relating to damages\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and replaced it with the\nprovision requiring creation of a trust administered by\nthe state court. It retained language proposed by\nVillafafia, providing that the plea agreement “resolves\nthe federal criminal liability of the defendant and any\nco-conspirators in the Southern District of Florida\ngrowing out of any criminal conduct by those persons\nknown to the [USAO] as of the date of this plea\nagreement,” but also re-inserted the provision\npromising not to prosecute Epstein’s assistants and\nthe statement prohibiting the USAO from requesting,\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000183\n", "char_count": 1856}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 150, "text_content": "12la\n\ninitiating, or encouraging immigration proceedings. It\nalso included a provision stating the government’s\nagreement to forgo a presentence investigation and a\npromise by the government to suspend the investiga-\ntion and withdraw all pending legal process.\n\n* Ok Ok\n\n[79] I think Jay [Lefkowitz] will try to talk you out\nof a registrable offense. Regardless of the\nmerits of his argument, in order to get us\ndown in time they made us an offer that\nincluded pleading to an offense against a\nminor (encouraging a minor into prostitution)\nand touted that we should be happy because\nit was registrable. For that reason alone, I\ndon’t think we should consider allowing them\nto come down from their own offer, either on\nthis issue or on time of incarceration.\n\nLefkowitz attempted to reach Acosta that night, but\nAcosta directed Villafafia to return the call, and told\nLourie that he did not want to open “a backchannel”\nwith defense counsel. Lourie instructed Villafafa,\n“U can tell [JJay that [A]lex will not agree to a\nnonregistration offense.”\n\nOn the morning of Friday, September 21, 2007,\nVillafana emailed Acosta informing him that “it looks\nlike we will be [filing charges against] Mr. Epstein on\nTuesday,” reporting that the charging package was\nbeing reviewed by the West Palm Beach manager, and\nasking if anyone in the Miami office needed to review\nit. Villafafia also alerted Lourie that she had spoken\nthat morning to Lefkowitz, who “was waffling” about\nEpstein pleading to a state charge that required\nsexual offender registration, and she noted that she\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000184\n", "char_count": 1586}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 151, "text_content": "122a\n\nwould confer with Krischer and Belohlavek “to make\nsure the defense doesn’t try to do an end run.”\n\nThat same morning, Epstein attorney Sanchez, who\nhad not been involved in negotiations for several\nweeks, emailed Sloman, advising, “[I] want to finalize\nthe plea deal and there is only one issue outstanding\nand [I] do not believe that [A]Jlex has read all the\ndefense submissions that would assist in his deter-\nmination on this point... [U]pon resolution, we will be\nprepared to sign as soon as today.” From his out-of-\ntown vacation, Sloman forwarded the email to Acosta,\nwho replied, “Enjoly] vacation. Working with [Mlarie\non this.” Sloman also forwarded Sanchez’s email to\nLourie and asked, “Do you know what she’s talking\nabout?” Lourie responded that Sanchez “has not been\nin any negotiations. Don’t even engage with yet\nanother cook.”\n\nJ. The USAO Agrees Not to Criminally Charge\n“Potential Co-Conspirators”\n\nLefkowitz, in the meantime, sent Villafafia a revised\ndraft NPA that proposed an 18-month sentence in the\ncounty jail, followed by 12 months of community\ncontrol, and restored the provision for a trust fund for\ndisbursement to an agreed-upon list of individuals\n“who seek reimbursement by filing suit pursuant to\n18 US.C. § 2255.” This defense draft retained the\nprovision promising not to criminally charge Epstein’s\nfour female assistants and unnamed employees of the\nspecific Epstein-owned corporate entity, but also extended\nthe provision to “any potential co-conspirators” for any\ncriminal charge arising from the ongoing federal\ninvestigation. This language had evolved from similar\nlanguage that Villafafia had included in the USAO’s\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000185\n", "char_count": 1683}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 152, "text_content": "123a\n\nearlier proposed draft federal plea agreement.!”?\nLefkowitz also again included the sentence precluding\nthe government from requesting, initiating, or recom-\nmending immigration proceedings against the two\nassistants who were foreign nationals.\n\nAt this point, Lefkowitz again sought to speak to\nAcosta, who replied by email: “I am happy to talk. My\ncaveat is that in the middle of negotiations, u try to\navoid[] undermining my staff by allowing ‘interlocutor[y\nappeals so to speak so ’'d want [Mlarie on the call[.] Pl\nhave her set something up.”\n\nVillafafa sent to Lefkowitz her own revised NPA,\ntelling him it was her “attempt at combining our\nthoughts,” but it had not “been approved by the office\nyet.” She inserted solicitation of minors to engage in\nprostitution, a registrable offense, as the charge to\nwhich Epstein would plead guilty; proposed a joint\nrecommendation for a 30-month sentence, divided\ninto 18 months in the county jail and 12 months\nof community control; and amended the § 2255\nprovision.”* Villafafia’s revision retained the provision\nsuspending the investigation and holding all legal\nprocess in abeyance, and she incorporated the non-\nprosecution provision while slightly altering it to apply\n\n12 The language in the USAO’s draft federal plea agreement\nstated, “This agreement resolves the federal criminal liability of\nthe defendant and any co-conspirators in the Southern District of\nFlorida growing out of any criminal conduct by those persons\nknown to the [USAO]....”\n\n8 Villafafia noted that she had consulted with a USAO\nemployee who was a “former corporate counsel from a hospital”\nabout the § 2255 language, and thought that the revised language\n“addresses the concern about having an unlimited number of\nclaimed victims, without me trying to bind girls who I do not\nrepresent.”\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000186\n", "char_count": 1839}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 153, "text_content": "124a\n\nto “any potential co-conspirator of Epstein, including’\nthe four named assistants, and deleting mention of the\ncorporate entity employees. Finally, Villafafia deleted\nmention of immigration proceedings, but advised in\nher transmittal email that “we have not and don’t plan\nto ask immigration” proceedings to be initiated.'™*\n\nLater that day, Villafafa alerted Lourie (who had\narrived in Florida from Washington, D.C. early that\nafternoon) and the new West Palm Beach manager\n(copying her first-line supervisor and co-counsel) that\nshe had included language that defense counsel had\nrequested “regarding promises not to prosecute other\npeople,” and commented, “I don’t think it hurts us.”\nThere is no documentation that Lourie, the West Palm\nBeach manager, or anyone else expressed disagreement\nwith Villafafia’s assessment. Rather, within a few\nminutes, Villafafia re-sent her email, adding that\ndefense counsel was persisting in including an\nimmigration waiver in the agreement, to which Lourie\nresponded, “No way. We don’t put that sort of thing\nin a plea agreement.” Villafafa replied to Lourie,\nindicating she would pass that along to defense\ncounsel and adding, “Any other thoughts?” When\nLourie gave no further response, Villafafia informed\ndefense counsel that Lourie had rejected the proposed\nimmigration language.\n\nOPR questioned the subjects about the USAO’s\nagreement not to prosecute “any potential co-\n\n9\n\n124 Villafafia gave OPR an explanation similar to that given by\nthe case agents—that an ICE Special Agent had been involved\nin the early stages of the federal investigation of Epstein, and\nVillafafia believed the agent knew two of Epstein’s female\nassistants were foreign nationals and would have acted appropri-\nately on that information. Villafafia also said that the USAO\ngenerally did not get involved in immigration issues.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000187\n", "char_count": 1872}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 154, "text_content": "125a\n\nconspirators.” Lourie did not recall why the USAO\nagreed to it, but he speculated that he left that\nprovision in the NPA because he believed at the time\nthat it benefited the government in some way. In\nparticular, Lourie conjectured that the promise not to\nprosecute “any potential co-conspirators” protected\nvictims who had recruited others and thus potentially\nwere co-conspirators in Epstein’s scheme. Lourie also\ntold OPR, “I bet the answer was that we weren’t going\nto charge” Epstein’s accomplices, because Acosta\n“didn’t really want to charge Epstein” in federal court.\nSloman similarly said that he had the impression that\nthe non-prosecution provision was meant to protect\nnamed co-conspirators who were also victims, “in a\nsense,” of Epstein’s conduct. Although later press\ncoverage of the Epstein case focused on Epstein’s\nconnection to prominent figures and suggested that\nthe non-prosecution provision protected these individuals,\nSloman told OPR that it never occurred to him that\nthe reference to potential co-conspirators was directed\ntoward any of the high-profile individuals who were at\nthe time or subsequently linked with Epstein.'!%\nAcosta did not recall the provision or any discussions\nabout it. He speculated that if he read the non-\nprosecution provision, he likely assumed that Villafatia\nand Lourie had “thought this through” and “addressed\nit for a reason.” The West Palm Beach manager, who\nhad only limited involvement at this stage, told OPR\nthat the provision was “highly unusual,” and he had\n“no clue” why the USAO agreed to it.\n\nVillafatia told OPR that, apart from the women\nnamed in the NPA, the investigation had not developed\n\n% Sloman also pointed out that the NPA was not a “global\nresolution” and other co-conspirators could have been prosecuted\n“by any other [U.S. Attorney’s] office in the country.”\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000188\n", "char_count": 1867}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 155, "text_content": "126a\n\nevidence of “any other potential co-conspirators. So, . .\n. we wouldn’t be prosecuting anybody else, so why not\ninclude it? . . . I just didn’t think that there was\nanybody that it would cover.” She conceded, however,\nthat she “did not catch the fact that it could be read as\nbroadly as people have since read it.”\n\nK. The USAO Rejects Defense Efforts to\nEliminate the Sexual Offender Registration\nRequirement\n\nOn the afternoon of Friday, September 21, 2007,\nState Attorney Krischer informed Villafafia that\nEpstein’s counsel had contacted him and Epstein was\nready to agree “to all the terms” of the NPA—except\nfor sexual offender registration. According to Krischer,\ndefense counsel had proposed that registration be\ndeferred, and that Epstein register only if state or\nfederal law enforcement felt, at any point during his\nservice of the sentence, that he needed to do so.\nKrischer noted that he had “reached out” to Acosta\nabout this proposal but had not heard back from him.\nVillafafiia responded, “I think Alex is calling you now.”\nVillafana told OPR that, to her knowledge, Acosta\ncalled Krischer to tell him that registration was not a\nnegotiable term.!”°\n\nLater that afternoon, Villafafia emailed Krischer for\ninformation about the amount of “gain time” Epstein\nwould earn in state prison. Villafafia explained in her\nemail that she wanted to include a provision in the\nNPA specifying that Epstein “will actually be in jail at\nleast a certain number of days to make sure he doesn’t\ntry to ‘convince’ someone with the Florida prison\n\n6 Krischer told OPR that he did not recall meeting or having\ninteractions with Acosta regarding the Epstein case or any other\nmatter.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000189\n", "char_count": 1700}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 156, "text_content": "127a\n\nauthorities to let him out early.” Krischer responded\nthat under the proposal as it then stood, Epstein would\nserve 15 months. He also told Villafafa that a plea to\na registrable offense would not prevent Epstein from\nserving his time “at the stockade” the local minimum\nsecurity detention facility.’\n\n* Ok Ok\n\n[139] authority to deviate from the Ashcroft Memo’s\n“most serious readily provable offense” requirement.\n\nAlthough Acosta could not recall specifically how or\nby whom the decision was made to allow Epstein to\nplead to only one of the three charges identified on the\noriginal term sheet, or how or by whom the decision\nwas made to reduce the sentencing requirement from\ntwo years to 18 months, Acosta was aware of these\nchanges. He reviewed and approved the final NPA\nbefore it was signed. Department policy gave him the\ndiscretion to approve the agreement, notwithstanding\nany arguable failure to comply with the “most serious\nreadily provable offense” requirement. Furthermore,\nthe Ashcroft Memo does not appear to preclude a U.S.\nAttorney from deferring to a state prosecution, so it is\nnot clear that the Memo’s terms apply to a situation\ninvolving state charges. Accordingly, OPR concludes\nthat the negotiation of an agreement that allowed\nEpstein to resolve the federal investigation in return\nfor the imposition of an 18-month state sentence did\n\n\"7 The State Attorney concluded his email: “Glad we could get\nthis worked out for reasons I won't put in writing. After this is\nresolved I would love to buy you a cup at Starbucks and have a\nconversation.” Villafaria responded, “Sounds great.” When asked\nabout this exchange during her OPR interview, Villafaria said:\n“Everybody\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000190\n", "char_count": 1717}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 157, "text_content": "128a\n\nnot violate a clear and unambiguous standard and\ntherefore does not constitute professional misconduct.\n\n2. The USAO’s Agreement Not to Prosecute\nUnidentified “Potential Co-Conspirators”\nDid Not Violate a Clear and Unambiguous\nDepartment Policy\n\nSeveral witnesses told OPR that they believed the\ngovernment’s agreement not to prosecute unidentified\n“potential co-conspirators” amounted to “transactional\nimmunity,” which the witnesses asserted is prohibited\nby Department policy. Although “use immunity” pro-\ntects a witness only against the government’s use of\nhis or her immunized testimony in a prosecution of\nthe witness, and is frequently used by prosecutors,\ntransactional immunity protects a witness from\nprosecution altogether and is relatively rare.\n\nOPR found no policy prohibiting a U.S. Attorney\nfrom declining to prosecute third parties or providing\ntransactional immunity. One section of the USAM\nrelated to immunity but applied only to the exchange\nof “use immunity” for the testimony of a witness who\nhas asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege. See USAM\n§ 9-23.100 et seg. Statutory provisions relating to\nimmunity also address the same context. See 18\nU.S.C. § 6002; 21 U.S.C. § 884. Moreover, apart from\nvoluntariness or enforceability concerns, courts have\nnot suggested that a prosecutor’s promise not to\nprosecute a third party amounts to an inappropriate\nexercise of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Marquez,\n909 F.2d at 741-43; Kemp, 760 F.2d at 1248; Stinson,\n839 So. 2d at 909; Frazier, 697 So. 2d 945. OPR found\nno clear and unambiguous standard that was violated\nby the USAO’s agreement not to prosecute “potential\nco-conspirators,” and therefore cannot conclude that\nnegotiating or approving this provision violated a clear\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000191\n", "char_count": 1778}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000034", "page_number": 158, "text_content": "129a\n\nand unambiguous standard or constituted professional\nmisconduct.\n\nNotwithstanding this finding, in Section IV of this\nPart, OPR includes in its criticism of Acosta’s decision\nto approve the NPA his approval of this provision\nwithout considering its potential consequences, includ-\ning to whom it would apply.\n\n* Ok Ok\n\n[140]\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000192\n", "char_count": 350}]}