{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_count": 27, "url": "https://epstein-data.com/DOJ-OGR-00000002", "pdf_url": "https://epstein-data.com/pdf/DOJ-OGR-00000002.pdf", "pages": [{"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 0, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page of 26\n\n22-1426-cr\nUnited States v. Maxwell\n\nIn the\nGnuited States Court of Appeals\n\nfor the Second Circuit\n\nAUGUST TERM 2023\nNo. 22-1426-cr\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nAppellee,\n\nGHISLAINE MAXWELL, also known as Sealed Defendant 1,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nOn Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern\nDistrict of New York\n\nARGUED: MARCH 12, 2024\nDECIDED: SEPTEMBER 17, 2024\n\nBefore: CABRANES, WESLEY, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000002\n\n", "char_count": 521}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 1, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page2 of 26\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell appeals her June 29, 2022,\njudgment of conviction in the United States District Court for the\nSouthern District of New York (Alison J. Nathan, Judge). Maxwell was\nconvicted of conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in\ncriminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; transportation\nof a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity in violation\nof 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); and sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 18\nU.S.C. §1591(a) and (b)(2). She was principally sentenced to\nconcurrent terms of imprisonment of 60 months, 120 months, and 240\nmonths, respectively, to be followed by concurrent terms of\n\nsupervised release.\n\nOn appeal, the questions presented are whether (1) Jeffrey\nEpstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement with the United States\nAttorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida barred Maxwell’s\nprosecution by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of New York; (2) a second superseding indictment of March\n29, 2021, complied with the statute of limitations; (3) the District Court\nabused its discretion in denying Maxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new\ntrial based on the claimed violation of her Sixth Amendment right to a\nfair and impartial jury; (4) the District Court’s response to a jury note\nresulted in a constructive amendment of, or prejudicial variance from,\nthe allegations in the second superseding indictment; and (5)\n\nMaxwell’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.\n\nIdentifying no errors in the District Court’s conduct of this\ncomplex case, we AFFIRM the District Court’s June 29, 2022, judgment\n\nof conviction.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000003\n\n", "char_count": 1717}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 2, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page3 of 26\n\nANDREW ROHRBACH, Assistant United States\nAttorney (Maurene Comey, Alison Moe,\nLara Pomerantz, Won S. Shin, Assistant\nUnited States Attorneys, on the brief), for\nDamian Williams, United States Attorney\nfor the Southern District of New York, New\nYork, NY, for Appellee.\n\nDIANA FABI SAMSON (Arthur L. Aidala, John\nM. Leventhal, on the brief), Aidala Bertuna &\nKamins PC, New York, NY, for Defendant-\nAppellant.\n\nJOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell appeals her June 29, 2022,\njudgment of conviction in the United States District Court for the\nSouthern District of New York (Alison J. Nathan, Judge). Maxwell was\nconvicted of conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in\ncriminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; transportation\nof a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity in violation\nof 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); and sex trafficking of a minor in violation of 18\nU.S.C. § 1591(a) and (b)(2). The District Court imposed concurrent\nterms of imprisonment of 60 months, 120 months, and 240 months,\n\nrespectively, to be followed by concurrent terms of supervised release\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000004\n\n", "char_count": 1210}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 3, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page4 of 26\n\nof three years, three years, and five years, respectively. The District\nCourt also imposed a fine of $250,000 on each count for a total of\n$750,000.\n\nOn appeal, the questions presented are (1) whether Jeffrey\nEpstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement (“NPA”) with the United States\nAttorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida (“USAO-SDFL”)\nbarred Maxwell’s prosecution by the United States Attorney’s Office\nfor the Southern District of New York (““USAO-SDNY”); (2) whether\nMaxwell’s second superseding indictment of March 29, 2021 (the\n“Indictment”) complied with the statute of limitations; (3) whether the\nDistrict Court abused its discretion in denying Maxwell’s Rule 33\nmotion for a new trial based on the claimed violation of her Sixth\nAmendment right to a fair and impartial jury; (4) whether the District\nCourt’s response to a jury note resulted in a constructive amendment\nof, or prejudicial variance from, the allegations in the Indictment; and\n\n(5) whether Maxwell’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.\n\nWe hold that Epstein’s NPA did not bar Maxwell’s prosecution\nby USAO-SDNY as the NPA does not bind USAO-SDNY. We hold\nthat Maxwell’s Indictment complied with the statute of limitations as\n18 U.S.C. § 3283 extended the time to bring charges of sexual abuse for\noffenses committed before the date of the statute’s enactment. We\nfurther hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in\ndenying Maxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial based on one juror’s\nerroneous answers during voir dire. We also hold that the District\nCourt’s response to a jury note did not result in a constructive\n\namendment of, or prejudicial variance from, the allegations in the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000005\n\n", "char_count": 1770}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 4, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Paged of 26\n\nIndictment. Lastly, we hold that Maxwell’s sentence is procedurally\n\nreasonable.\n\nAccordingly, we AFFIRM the District Court’s June 29, 2022,\n\njudgment of conviction.\nI. BACKGROUND !\n\nDefendant Ghislaine Maxwell coordinated, facilitated, and\ncontributed to Jeffrey Epstein’s sexual abuse of women and underage\ngirls. Starting in 1994, Maxwell groomed numerous young women to\nengage in sexual activity with Epstein by building friendships with\nthese young women, gradually normalizing discussions of sexual\ntopics and sexual abuse. Until about 2004, this pattern of sexual abuse\ncontinued as Maxwell provided Epstein access to underage girls in\n\nvarious locations in the United States.\n1. Epstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement\n\nIn September 2007, following state and federal investigations\ninto allegations of Epstein’s unlawful sexual activity, Epstein entered\ninto an NPA with USAO-SDEL. In the NPA, Epstein agreed to plead\n\nguilty to one count of solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Florida\n\n' Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the evidence presented at trial\nand described in the light most favorable to the Government. See United States v. Litwok, 678\nF.3d 208, 210-11 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Because this is an appeal from a judgment of conviction\nentered after a jury trial, the | ] facts are drawn from the trial evidence and described in the\n\nlight most favorable to the Government.”).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000006\n\n", "char_count": 1502}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 5, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page6 of 26\n\nStatutes § 796.07,7 and to one count of solicitation of minors to engage\nin prostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes § 796.03.° He agreed to\nreceive a sentence of eighteen months’ imprisonment on the two\ncharges. In consideration of Epstein’s agreement, the NPA states that\n“the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal\ncharges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but\nnot limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia\n\nMarcinkova.”4\n2. Maxwell’s Indictment and Trial-Related Proceedings\n\nThe Indictment filed against Maxwell contained eight counts,\n\nsix of which proceeded to trial.° Prior to the commencement of trial,\n\n2 Florida Statutes § 796.07 provides in relevant part:\n(2) It is unlawful:\n\n(f) To solicit, induce, entice, or procure another to commit prostitution,\n\nlewdness, or assignation.\n\n5 Florida Statutes § 796.03, which has since been repealed, provided in relevant part: “A\nperson who procures for prostitution, or causes to be prostituted, any person who is under\n\nthe age of 18 years commits a felony of the second degree.”\n4 A-178.\n\n> Count One charged Maxwell with conspiracy to entice minors to travel to engage in illegal\nsex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Two charged Maxwell with enticement of a\nminor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 and 2. Count\nThree charged Maxwell with conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in\ncriminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Four charged Maxwell with\ntransportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18\n\nU.S.C. §§ 2423(a) and 2. Count Five charged Maxwell with sex trafficking conspiracy, in\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000007\n\n", "char_count": 1841}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 6, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page? of 26\n\nprospective jurors completed a lengthy questionnaire, with several\nquestions raising issues relevant to the trial. Based on the completed\nquestionnaires, the parties selected prospective jurors to proceed to in-\n\nperson voir dire. The District Court ultimately empaneled a jury.\n\nDuring the four-and-a-half-week jury trial, the Government\npresented evidence of the repeated sexual abuse of six girls. At the\nconclusion of trial, on December 29, 2021, the jury found Maxwell\n\nguilty on all but one count.°®\n\nFollowing the verdict, Juror 50 gave press interviews during\nwhich he stated that he was a survivor of child sexual abuse.’ In his\nanswers to the written jury questionnaire, however, Juror 50 answered\n“no” to three questions asking whether he or a friend or family\nmember had ever been the victim of a crime; whether he or a friend or\nfamily member had ever been the victim of sexual harassment, sexual\nabuse, or sexual assault; and whether he or a friend or family member\n\nhad ever been accused of sexual harassment, sexual abuse, or sexual\n\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count Six charged Maxwell with sex trafficking of a minor, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591{a), (b)(2), and 2. Counts Seven and Eight charged Maxwell\nwith perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The perjury charges were severed from the\n\nremaining charges and ultimately dismissed at sentencing.\n\n6 The jury found Maxwell guilty on Counts One, Three, Four, Five, and Six. Maxwell was\n\nacquitted on Count Two.\n\n7 Consistent with a juror anonymity order entered for trial, the parties and the District Court\n\nreferred to the jurors by pseudonym.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000008\n\n", "char_count": 1711}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 7, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Pages of 26\n\nassault.’ Upon learning of the interviews, the Government filed a letter\non January 5, 2022, requesting a hearing; Maxwell then moved for a\nnew trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. On March 8,\n2022, the District Court held a hearing and Juror 50 testified —under\ngrant of immunity—that his answers to three questions related to\nsexual abuse in the jury questionnaire were not accurate but that the\nanswers were an inadvertent mistake and that his experiences did not\naffect his ability to be fair and impartial. Finding Juror 50’s testimony\nto be credible, the District Court denied Maxwell’s motion for a new\n\ntrial in a written order.\n\nMaxwell was subsequently sentenced to a term of 240 months’\n\nimprisonment to be followed by five years’ supervised release, and the\n\n8 Question 2 asked “[h]ave you, or any of your relatives or close friends, ever been a victim\nof a crime?” Question 48 asked “[h]ave you or a friend or family member ever been the\nvictim of sexual harassment, sexual abuse, or sexual assault? (This includes actual or\nattempted sexual assault or other unwanted sexual advance, including by a stranger,\n\nacquaintance, supervisor, teacher, or family member.)” Finally, Question 49 asked\n\n[hJave you or a friend or family member ever been accused of sexual harassment,\nsexual abuse, or sexual assault? (This includes both formal accusations in a court of\nlaw or informal accusations in a social or work setting of actual or attempted sexual\nassault or other unwanted sexual advance, including by a stranger, acquaintance,\n\nsupervisor, teacher, or family member.\n\nSee A-299, A-310.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000009\n\n", "char_count": 1695}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 8, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page9 of 26\n\nDistrict Court imposed a $750,000 fine and a $300 mandatory special\n\nassessment. This appeal followed.\nII. DISCUSSION\n\n1. The NPA Between Epstein and USAO-SDFL Did Not Bar\nMaxwell’s Prosecution by USAO-SDNY\n\nMaxwell sought dismissal of the charges in the Indictment on the\ngrounds that the NPA made between Epstein and USAO-SDFL\nimmunized her from prosecution on all counts as a third-party\nbeneficiary of the NPA. The District Court denied the motion, rejecting\nMaxwell’s arguments. We agree. We review de novo the denial of a\n\nmotion to dismiss an indictment.?\n\nIn arguing that the NPA barred her prosecution by USAO-SDNY,\nMaxwell cites the portion of the NPA in which “the United States [ ]\nagree[d] that it w[ould] not institute any criminal charges against any\npotential co-conspirators of Epstein.”!° We hold that the NPA with\nUSAO-SDFL does not bind USAO-SDNY.\n\nIt is well established in our Circuit that “[a] plea agreement binds\nonly the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which\n\nthe plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement\n\n9 See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 910 F.3d 11, 22 (2d Cir. 2018).\n\n10 A-178.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000010\n\n", "char_count": 1248}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 9, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page10 of 26\n\ncontemplates a broader restriction.”\" And while Maxwell contends\nthat we cannot apply Annabi to an agreement negotiated and executed\noutside of this Circuit, we have previously done just that.!* Applying\nAnnabi, we conclude that the NPA did not bar Maxwell’s prosecution\nby USAO-SDNY. There is nothing in the NPA that affirmatively shows\nthat the NPA was intended to bind multiple districts. Instead, where\nthe NPA is not silent, the agreement’s scope is expressly limited to the\nSouthern District of Florida. The NPA makes clear that if Epstein\n\nfulfilled his obligations, he would no longer face charges in that district:\n\nAfter timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the\nAgreement, no prosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1\nand 2 of this Agreement, nor any other offenses that have been\nthe subject of the joint investigation by the Federal Bureau of\n\nInvestigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any\n\n\" United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985). We recognize that circuits have\nbeen split on this issue for decades. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir.\n1986); United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 550 (3d Cir. 2002).\n\n2 See, e.g., United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App’x 920, 921 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order)\n(applying Annabi to plea agreement entered into in the District of New Jersey); United States\nv. Gonzalez, 93 F. App’x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order) (same, to agreement entered\ninto in the District of New Mexico). Nor does Annabi, as Maxwell contends, apply only\nwhere subsequent charges are “sufficiently distinct” from charges covered by an earlier\nagreement. In Annabi, this Court rejected an interpretation of a prior plea agreement that\nrested on the Double Jeopardy Clause, reasoning that even if the Double Jeopardy Clause\napplied, the subsequent charges were “sufficiently distinct” and therefore fell outside the\nClause’s protectio\n... [truncated, 2203 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00000002/9 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00000002&page=9]", "char_count": 2203}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 10, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page11 of 26\n\noffenses that arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation\nwill be instituted in this District, and the charges against Epstein\n\nif any, will be dismissed.\"\n\nThe only language in the NPA that speaks to the agreement’s scope is\n\nlimiting language.\n\nThe negotiation history of the NPA, just as the text, fails to show\nthat the agreement was intended to bind other districts. Under our\nCourt’s precedent, the negotiation history of an NPA can support an\ninference that an NPA “affirmatively” binds other districts.'* Yet, the\nactions of USAO-SDFL do not indicate that the NPA was intended to\nbind other districts.\n\nThe United States Attorney’s Manual that was operable during\nthe negotiations of the NPA required that:\n\nNo district or division shall make any agreement, including any\nagreement not to prosecute, which purports to bind any other\n\ndistrict(s) or division without the express written approval of\n\n38 A-175 (emphasis added). The agreement's scope is also limited in an additional section:\n\nTHEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for\nthe Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be\ndeferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein\nabides by the following conditions and the requirements of this Agreement set forth\n\nbelow.\nId. (emphasis added).\n\n14 See United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1986).\n\n11\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000012\n\n", "char_count": 1521}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 11, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page12 of 26\n\nthe United States Attorney(s) in each affected district and/or the\n\nAssistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division.\n\nNothing before us indicates that USAO-SDNY had been notified or\nhad approved of Epstein’s NPA with USAO-SDFL and intended to be\nbound by it. And the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal\nDivision stated in an interview with the Office of Professional\nResponsibility that she “played no role” in the NPA, either by\n\nreviewing or approving the agreement.\n\nThe history of the Office of the United States Attorney is instructive\nas to the scope of their actions and duties. The Judiciary Act of 1789\ncreated the Office of the United States Attorney, along with the office\nof the Attorney General. More specifically, the Judiciary Act provided\nfor the appointment, in each district, of a “person learned in the law to\nact as attorney for the United States in such district, who shall be sworn\nor affirmed to the faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall\nbe to prosecute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences,\ncognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil\nactions in which the United States shall be concerned.” ° The Judiciary\nAct thus emphasized that U.S. Attorneys would enforce the law of the\nUnited States but did not determine that the actions of one U.S.\nAttorney could bind other districts, let alone the entire nation. In fact,\n\nthe phrase “in such district,” repeated twice, implies that the scope of\n\n‘5 United States Attorney’s Manual § 9-27.641 (2007).\n\n16 An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93\n(1789) (emphasis added).\n\n12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000013\n\n", "char_count": 1751}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 12, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page13 of 26\n\nthe actions and the duties of the U.S. Attorneys would be limited to\n\ntheir own districts, absent any express exceptions.\n\nSince 1789, while the number of federal districts has grown\nsignificantly, the duties of a U.S. Attorney and their scope remain\nlargely unchanged. By statute, U.S. Attorneys, “within [their] district,\nshall (1) prosecute for all offenses against the United States; (2)\nprosecute or defend, for the Government, all civil actions, suits or\nproceedings in which the United States is concerned.” Again, the\nscope of the duties of a U.S. Attorney is cabined to their specific district\n\nunless otherwise directed.1®\n\nIn short, Annabi controls the result here. Nothing in the text of\nthe NPA or its negotiation history suggests that the NPA precluded\nUSAO-SDNY from prosecuting Maxwell for the charges in the\n\n7 28 U.S.C. § 547.\n\n'8 This does not suggest that there are no instances in which a U.S. Attorney’s powers do not\nextend beyond their districts. For instance, under 28 U.S.C. §515 a U.S. Attorney can\nrepresent the Government or participate in proceedings in other districts, but only when\n\nspecifically directed by the Attorney General:\n\nThe Attorney General or any other officer of the Department of Justice, or any\nattorney specially appointed by the Attorney General under law, may, when\nspecifically directed by the Attorney General, conduct any kind of legal proceeding\n... which United States attorneys are authorized by law to conduct, whether or not\n\nhe is a resident of the district in which the proceeding is brought.\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000014\n\n", "char_count": 1642}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 13, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page14 of 26\n\nIndictment. The District Court therefore correctly denied Maxwell’s\n\nmotion without an evidentiary hearing.\n2. The Indictment Is Timely\n\nMaxwell argues that Counts Three and Four of the Indictment\nare untimely because they do not fall within the scope of offenses\ninvolving the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a minor and\nthereby do not fall within the extended statute of limitations provided\nby § 3283.19 Separately, Maxwell contends that the Government cannot\napply the 2003 amendment to § 3283 that extended the statute of\nlimitations to those offenses that were committed before the enactment\ninto law of the provision. On both points, we disagree and hold that\nthe District Court correctly denied Maxwell’s motions to dismiss the\ncharges as untimely. We review de novo the denial of a motion to\n\ndismiss an indictment and the application of a statute of limitations.”°\n\nFirst, Counts Three and Four of the Indictment are offenses\ninvolving the sexual abuse of minors. The District Court properly\napplied Weingarten v. United States.*1 In Weingarten, we explained that\n\nCongress intended courts to apply § 3283 using a case-specific\n\n© 18 U.S.C. § 3283 provides: “[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude\nprosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child\nunder the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child, or for\n\nten years after the offense, whichever is longer.”\n20 United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 276, 278 (2d Cir. 2018).\n\n21 865 F.3d 48, 58-60 (2d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d 299, 313-\n14 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR-O00000015\n\n", "char_count": 1753}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 14, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page15 of 26\n\napproach as opposed to a “categorical approach.”*? We see no reason\nto depart from our reasoning in Weingarten. Accordingly, the question\npresented here is whether the charged offenses involved the sexual\nabuse of a minor for the purposes of § 3283 based on the facts of the\ncase. Jane, one of the women who testified at trial, gave evidence that\nshe had been sexually abused when transported across state lines as a\nminor. Counts Three and Four thus qualify as offenses, and § 3283\n\napplies to those offenses.\n\nSecond, Maxwell argues that Counts Three, Four, and Six of the\nIndictment are barred by the statute of limitations because the\nextended statute of limitations provided by the 2003 amendment to\n§ 3283 does not apply to pre-enactment conduct. In Landgraf v. USI\nFilm Products, the Supreme Court held that a court, in deciding\nwhether a statute applies retroactively, must first “determine whether\nCongress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.” If\n\nCongress has done so, “the inquiry ends, and the court enforces the\n\n2 The “categorical approach” is a method of statutory interpretation that requires courts to\nlook “only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts\nunderlying those convictions” for sentencing and immigration purposes. Taylor v. United\nStates, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). We properly reasoned in Weingarten that § 3283 met none of\nthe conditions listed by Taylor that might require application of the categorical approach.\nSee Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. First, “[t]he language of § 3283[] .. . reaches beyond the\noffense and its legal elements to the conduct ‘involv[ed]’ in the offense.” Id. at 59-60. Second,\nlegislative history suggests that Congress intended § 3283 to be applied broadly. Id. at 60.\nThird, a case-specific approach would not produce practical difficulties or potential\n\nunfairness. Id.\n\n3 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994); see also Weing\n... [truncated, 2049 chars — for the full page use /api/corpus/document/DOJ-OGR-00000002/14 or ?id=DOJ-OGR-00000002&page=14]", "char_count": 2049}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 15, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page16 of 26\n\nstatute as it is written.”*4 If the statute “is ambiguous or contains no\nexpress command regarding retroactivity, a reviewing court must\ndetermine whether applying the statute to antecedent conduct would\n\ncreate presumptively impermissible retroactive effects.”\n\nHere, the inquiry is straightforward. In 2003, Congress\namended § 3283 to provide: “No statute of limitations that would\notherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or\nphysical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall\npreclude such prosecution during the life of the child.”*¢ The text of\n§ 3283—that no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude\nprosecution of these offenses will apply—plainly requires that it\nprevent the application of any statute of limitations that would\n\notherwise apply to past conduct.\n\nThe statutory text makes clear that Congress intended to extend\nthe time to bring charges of sexual abuse for pre-enactment conduct as\nthe prior statute of limitations was inadequate. This is enough to\nconclude that the PROTECT Act’s amendment to § 3283 applies to\n\nMaxwell’s conduct as charged in the Indictment.\n\n24 In re Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing\nLandgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).\n\n2 Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 55 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n26 PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 202, 117 Stat. 650, 660 (2003).\n\n16\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000017\n\n", "char_count": 1511}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 16, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page17 of 26\n\n3. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying\n\nMaxwell’s Motion for a New Trial\n\nMaxwell contends that she was deprived of her constitutional right\nto a fair and impartial jury because Juror 50 failed to accurately\nrespond to several questions related to his history of sexual abuse as\npart of the jury questionnaire during jury selection. Following a special\nevidentiary hearing, the District Court denied Maxwell’s motion for a\n\nnew trial.\n\nWe review a District Court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for\nabuse of discretion.”” We have been extremely reluctant to “haul jurors\nin after they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential\ninstances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences.” 28 While courts\ncan “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice\nso requires,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a), they should do so “sparingly” and\n\nonly in “the most extraordinary circumstances.” A district court “has\n\n27 See Rivas v. Brattesani, 94 F.3d 802, 807 (2d Cir. 1996). “[W]e are mindful that a judge has\nnot abused her discretion simply because she has made a different decision than we would\nhave made in the first instance.” United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2001).\nWe have repeatedly explained that the term of art “abuse of discretion” includes errors of\nlaw, a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or “a decision that cannot be located\nwithin the range of permissible decisions.” In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008)\n\n(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n28 United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983).\n\n2 Ferguson, 246 F.3d at 134.\n\n17\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000018\n\n", "char_count": 1740}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 17, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page18 of 26\n\nbroad discretion to decide Rule 33 motions based upon its evaluation\n\nof the proof produced” and is shown deference on appeal.*°\n\nA Rule 33 motion based on a juror’s alleged erroneous response\nduring voir dire is governed by McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v.\nGreenwood.*! Under McDonough, a party seeking a new trial “must first\ndemonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question\non voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have\n\nprovided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” *\n\nThe District Court applied the McDonough standard, found Juror\n50’s testimony credible, and determined that Juror 50’s erroneous\nresponses during voir dire were “not deliberately incorrect” and that\n“he would not have been struck for cause if he had provided accurate\nresponses to the questionnaire.”* In fact, as the District Court noted,\nMaxwell did not challenge the inclusion of other jurors who disclosed\n\npast experience with sexual abuse, assault, or harassment. This is\n\n3° United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation\n\nmarks omitted).\n31 464 U.S. 548 (1984).\n32 Td. at 556.\n\n38 A-340 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court reminds us that “[t]o invalidate the result\nof a | ] trial because of a juror’s mistaken, though honest response to a question, is to insist\non something closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give.”\nMcDonough, 464 U.S. at 555.\n\n18\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000019\n\n", "char_count": 1544}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 18, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page19 of 26\n\nenough; the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying\n\nMaxwell’s motion for a new trial.*4\n\n4. The District Court’s Response to a Jury Note Did Not Result\nin a Constructive Amendment of, or Prejudicial Variance\n\nfrom, the Allegations in the Indictment\n\nDuring jury deliberations, the jury sent the following jury note\n\nregarding Count Four of the Indictment:\n\nUnder Count Four (4), if the defendant aided in the\ntransportation of Jane’s return flight, but not the flight to\nNew Mexico where/if the intent was for Jane to engage in\nsexual activity, can she be found guilty under the second\n\nelement?5\n\nThe District Court determined that it would not respond to the note\ndirectly because it was difficult to “parse factually and legally” and\n\ninstead referred the jury to the second element of Count Four.*6\n\n% Nor did the District Court err in questioning Juror 50 rather than allowing the parties to\ndo so. In conducting a hearing on potential juror misconduct, “[w]e leave it to the district\ncourt’s discretion to decide the extent to which the parties may participate in questioning\nthe witnesses, and whether to hold the hearing in camera.” United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d\n540, 544 (2d Cir. 1989). And while Maxwell contends that the District Court improperly\nlimited questioning about Juror 50’s role in deliberations, she both waived that argument\nbelow and fails to show here how any such questioning would not be foreclosed by Federal\nRule of Evidence 606(b).\n\n35 A-238.\n\n36 A-207-221. The District Court’s instruction on the second element of Count Four required\n\nthe jury to find that “Maxwell knowingly transported Jane in interstate commerce with the\n\n19\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000020\n\n", "char_count": 1768}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 19, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page20 of 26\n\nMaxwell subsequently filed a letter seeking reconsideration of the\nDistrict Court’s response, claiming that this response resulted in a\nconstructive amendment or prejudicial variance. The District Court\n\ndeclined to reconsider its response and denied Maxwell’s motion.\n\nMaxwell appeals the District Court’s denial and argues that the\nalleged constructive amendment is a per se violation of the Grand Jury\nClause of the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, Maxwell argues that\ntestimony about a witness’s sexual abuse in New Mexico presented the\njury with another basis for conviction, which is distinct from the\ncharges in the Indictment. Similarly, Maxwell argues that this\ntestimony resulted in a prejudicial variance from the Indictment. We\n\ndisagree and affirm the District Court’s denial.\n\nWe review the denial of a motion claiming constructive\namendment or prejudicial variance de novo.” To satisfy the Fifth\nAmendment’s Grand Jury Clause, “an indictment must contain the\nelements of the offense charged and fairly inform the defendant of the\ncharge against which he must defend.”** We have explained that to\nprevail on a constructive amendment claim, a defendant must\ndemonstrate that “the terms of the indictment are in effect altered by\nthe presentation of evidence and jury instructions which so modify\n\nessential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial\n\nintent that Jane engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a\n\ncriminal offense in violation of New York law.” A-205.\n37 See United States v. Dove, 884 F.3d 138, 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2018).\n\n8 United States v. Khalupsky, 5 F.4th 279, 293 (2d Cir. 2021).\n\n20\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000021\n\n", "char_count": 1742}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 20, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page21 of 26\n\nlikelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense\nother than that charged in the indictment.”*° A constructive\n\namendment requires reversal.*°\n\nWe cannot conclude that a constructive amendment resulted\nfrom the evidence presented by the Government—namely, Jane’s\ntestimony—or that it can be implied from the jury note. We have\npermitted significant flexibility in proof as long as a defendant was\n“given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial.”*! In turn,\n“Tt]he core of criminality of an offense involves the essence of a crime,\nin general terms; the particulars of how a defendant effected the crime\n\nfalls outside that purview.”\n\nWe agree with the District Court that the jury instructions, the\nevidence presented at trial, and the Government's summation\ncaptured the core of criminality. As the District Court noted, while the\njury note was ambiguous in one sense, it was clear that it referred to\nthe second element of Count Four of the Indictment. Therefore, the\nDistrict Court correctly directed the jury to that instruction, which\n\n“accurately instructed that Count Four had to be predicated on finding\n\n39 United States v. Mollica, 849 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir. 1988).\n40 See United States v. D’Amelio, 683 F.3d 412, 417 (2d Cir. 2012).\n\n“| United States v. lonia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (emphasis\nomitted).\n\n2 D’Amelio, 683 F.3d at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n21\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000022\n\n", "char_count": 1536}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 21, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page22 of 26\n\na violation of New York law.”* It is therefore not “uncertain whether\n[Maxwell] was convicted of conduct that was the subject of the grand\n\njury’s indictment.” #\n\nWe also cannot conclude that the evidence at trial prejudicially\nvaried from the Indictment. To allege a variance, a defendant “must\nestablish that the evidence offered at trial differs materially from the\nevidence alleged in the indictment.” To prevail and win reversal, the\ndefendant must further show “that substantial prejudice occurred at\ntrial as a result” of the variance.* “A defendant cannot demonstrate\nthat he has been prejudiced by a variance where the pleading and the\nproof substantially correspond, where the variance is not of a character\nthat could have misled the defendant at the trial, and where the\nvariance is not such as to deprive the accused of his right to be\n\nprotected against another prosecution for the same offense.” ”\n\nFor reasons similar to the ones noted above in the context of the\n\nconstructive amendment, the evidence at trial did not prove facts\n\n4 A-387; see United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The trial judge is in the\nbest position to sense whether the jury is able to proceed properly with its deliberations,\nand [] has considerable discretion in determining how to respond to communications\n\nindicating that the jury is experiencing confusion.”)\n\n“ United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 2003).\nDove, 884 F.3d at 149\n\n46 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n4“ Salmonese, 352 F.3d at 621-22 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also\nKhalupsky, 5 F.4th at 294.\n\n22\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000023\n\n", "char_count": 1727}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 22, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page23 of 26\n\n“materially different” from the allegations in the Indictment. The\nevidence indicated that Maxwell transported Jane to New York for\nsexual abuse and conspired to do the same. Maxwell knew that the\nevidence also included conduct in New Mexico.*? Furthermore,\nMaxwell cannot demonstrate “substantial prejudice.” Maxwell\nreceived—over three weeks before trial—notes of Jane’s interview\nrecording the abuse she suffered in New Mexico. This is enough to\nconclude that Maxwell was not “unfairly and substantially”\n\nprejudiced.*°\n5. Maxwell’s Sentence Was Procedurally Reasonable\n\nLastly, Maxwell argues that her sentence was procedurally\nunreasonable because the District Court erred in applying a leadership\nsentencing enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines and\n\ninadequately explained its above-Guidelines sentence.*! We disagree.\n\n48 Dove, 884 F.3d at 149.\n\n*” As the District Court found, “[t]he Indictment charged a scheme to sexually abuse\nunderage girls in New York. In service of this scheme, the Indictment alleged that Epstein\nand the Defendant groomed the victims for abuse at various properties and in various\n\nstates, including Epstein’s ranch in New Mexico.” A-393.\n\n50 See United States v. Lebedev, 932 F.3d 40, 54 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding that a defendant was\nnot “unfairly and substantially” prejudiced because “[t]he government disclosed the\n\nevidence and exhibits . . . four weeks prior to trial”).\n\n5! At sentencing, the District Court calculated a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months’\nimprisonment and sentenced Maxwell to a slightly above-Guidelines term of 240 months’\n\nimprisonment.\n\n23\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000024\n\n", "char_count": 1698}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 23, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page24 of 26\n\nWe review a sentence for both procedural and substantive\nreasonableness, which “amounts to review for abuse of discretion.”\nWe have explained that procedural error is found when a district court\n“fails to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines\nrange, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider\nthe [Section] 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly\nerroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.”\nThe District Court did none of that. It is important to emphasize that\nthe Sentencing Guidelines “are guidelines—that is, they are truly\nadvisory.”*+ A District Court is “generally free to impose sentences\noutside the recommended range” based on its own “informed and\n\nindividualized judgment.”*>\n\nWith respect to the four-level leadership enhancement, the District\nCourt found that Maxwell “supervised” Sarah Kellen in part because\nof testimony from two of Epstein’s pilots who testified that Kellen was\nMaxwell’s assistant. The District Court found that testimony credible,\nin part because it was corroborated by other testimony that Maxwell\n\nwas Epstein’s “number two and the lady of the house” in Palm Beach,\n\n5% LInited States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). “Regardless of whether\nthe sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must\nreview the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.\n38, 51 (2007).\n\n33 United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 38 (2d Cir. 2012).\n54 Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189.\n\n53 Id.\n\n24\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000025\n\n", "char_count": 1670}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 24, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page25 of 26\n\nwhere much of the abuse occurred and where Kellen worked.**° We\ntherefore hold that the District Court did not err in applying the\n\nleadership enhancement.\n\nWith respect to the length of the sentence, the District Court\nproperly discussed the sentencing factors when imposing the\nsentence, and described, at length, Maxwell’s “pivotal role in\nfacilitating the abuse of the underaged girls through a series of\ndeceptive tactics.”°” The District Court recognized that the sentence\n“must reflect the gravity of Ms. Maxwell’s conduct, of Ms. Maxwell’s\noffense, the pivotal role she played in facilitating the offense, and the\nsignificant and lasting harm it inflicted.”°* And the District Court\nexplained that “a very serious, a very significant sentence is necessary\nto achieve the purposes of punishment” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In\nsum, the District Court did not err by failing to adequately explain its\n\nsentence.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nTo summarize, we hold as follows:\n\n56 A-417,.\n57 SA-459.\n\n58 SA-461.\n\n25\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000026\n\n", "char_count": 1087}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 25, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page26 of 26\n\n1. The District Court did not err in holding that Epstein’s NPA\nwith USAO-SDFL did not bar Maxwell’s prosecution by USAO-\nSDNY.\n\n2. The District Court did not err in holding that the Indictment\n\nwas filed within the statute of limitations.\n\n3. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying\n\nMaxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial.\n\n4. The District Court’s response to a jury note did not result ina\nconstructive amendment of, or prejudicial variance from, the\n\nallegations in the Indictment.\n5. The District Court’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the District Court’s June\n\n29, 2022, judgment of conviction.\n\n26\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000027\n\n", "char_count": 756}, {"efta_number": "DOJ-OGR-00000002", "page_number": 26, "text_content": "Case 22-1426, Document 120, 11/25/2024, 3637560, Page’ of 1\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\nFOR THE\nSECOND CIRCUIT\n\nAt a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the\nThurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the\n25\" day of November, two thousand twenty-four.\n\nUnited States of America,\n\nAppellee,\nORDER\n\nVv. Docket No: 22-1426\nGhislaine Maxwell, AKA Sealed Defendant 1,\n\nDefendant - Appellant.\n\nAppellant, Ghislaine Maxwell, filed a petition for panel rehearing, or, in the alternative,\nfor rehearing en banc. The panel that determined the appeal has considered the request for panel\nrehearing, and the active members of the Court have considered the request for rehearing en banc.\n\nIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied.\n\nFOR THE COURT:\nCatherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk\n\nDOJ-OGR- 00000028\n\n", "char_count": 888}]}