[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: The text in the image reads as follows: "top priority, Obama should have realized that Netanyahu would resist, and that much would depend on who was seen to win this initial test of wills. If Obama were seen to back down on this first issue of contestation, that would damage his reputation for being a strong leader. And back down he did. Second, Obama did not seem to fully appreciate the importance of having a strong alter ego to serve as his primary diplomat on Arab-Israeli affairs. All prior U.S. successes in Arab-Israeli diplomacy had involved a strong president working closely with an empowered secretary of state, both backed by an experienced team of advisors. This was the model that worked for Nixon-Kissinger, Carter-Vance, and Bush I-Baker. But Obama chose to work with George Mitchell, a low-key technocrat—a man of undoubted ability, but not someone known to be especially close to the president. Hillary Clinton, who might have also played a significant role, seemed stand-offish toward Arab-Israeli issues, at least during her first year as secretary of state. Recent presidents have allowed a certain amount of chaos to reign among their Arab-Israeli policy group. This was definitely the case for Clinton and Bush II, and it also has been true of Obama. While Mitchell was supposed to be his primary advisor, others were also in the game, often sending rather different signals. There was his first chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, with close personal ties to Israel; there was his outspoken vice president, Joe Biden, a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; there was his national security advisor, James Jones; and, on at least one occasion, there was General David Petraeus, then head of the U.S. Central Command, on the importance of Arab-Israeli peace to the U.S.'s strategic interests in the Middle East. And then there was Dennis. In Middle East circles, if you mention the name Denn