1 expensive. However, there is a huge discrepancy in the financial capacities of the two camps. The secular camp can not even dream of matching the financial resources of the Muslim Brotherhood and the remnants of the NDP. Finally, much will depend on the ability of the rivals to win public support by means of clear and succinct electoral platforms that truly address people's hopes and aspirations. On the basis of the foregoing criteria and circumstances as they currently stand, the "critical mass" is likely to swing towards the religious camp, with its better organisational, mobilisational and financial capacities. In addition, even if that camp truly relinquished the slogan, "Islam is the solution," it still possesses a remarkable talent for swaying public opinion through emotive and misleading oversimplifications and attacks on the opposing viewpoint. For example, during the referendum on the constitutional amendments, it centred its propaganda around Article 2, claiming that a "No" vote would negate the Islamic character of the state. Although the proposed constitutional amendments in the referendum came nowhere near this article, the tactic worked marvellously, and helped yield this camp's desired result. The secularists, therefore, have their work cut out for them. They will need to expand their base of support considerably and to try to use the proportional list system to their best advantage. They will also have to enlist the moral and financial support of the business community. Finally, they must couch their liberal secularist message in a simpler and graspable language that will capture the public's attention. Their ability to rise to this challenge will determine the future of Egypt, the Egyptian constitution and the nature of its government. The more effective they are the lower is the probability that the country's first free and fair parliamentary elections will be its last. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030278