[VISION] | PEOPLE: There are no people visible in the image. | TEXT: situation calms down (a big "if"), then Damascus may be interested in energising its own peace negotiations, as suggested recently by former US government adviser Bill Quant. Indeed, this possibility partially explains the gentler US treatment of Bashar Al-Assad in the face of a popular uprising. But there remains obscurity over how to deal with Binyamin Netanyahu's obstructionism, recently described by Thomas Friedman as the "Mubarak of the peace process". Meanwhile, non-Arab states of the Middle East have created a brand of diplomacy where ideas are energetically pursued with a variety of hard and soft power strategies. Both Turkey and Iran, in different ways, have increased the level of their interaction and influence in the region. The former established visa free travel zones with several Arab countries, expanded its Middle East trade relations and interceded on issues ranging from Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations, to mediating on Iran's nuclear programme and the Libyan situation. The stars of Turkish soap operas are household names in the region. Iran, albeit under a cloud due to internal repression and the refusal of Arab uprisings of Tehran's patronage, still has huge influence in Iraq, an alliance with Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas, and a nuclear programme that attracts popular admiration to the extent it appears to respond to Israel's atomic monopoly. A more dynamic Egyptian diplomacy will be measured against these standards. IT'S THE ECONOMY: Beyond this challenging landscape, Egypt's reaction to the new regional dynamics will be heavily conditioned by two critical factors: the economy and internal politics. Facing a serious downturn of revenues from tourism, a slackening of investment inflows and disrupted industrial production, IMF experts estimate that Egypt will need up to $12 billion over the next financial year in external assistance. The critical partners that have the capacity to r