HOUSE OVERSIGHT 028739 international pressure to make Hamas agree to those conditions. But Hamas is afraid to fall into the same trap that others, like Fatah, have fallen into without getting anything in return except loss of popular support, as was demonstrated in the elections seven years ago. In light of the demands that the movement should recognize the two-state solution and make political commitments, some influential circles within the Hamas leadership think that the movement is being drawn into going beyond its rational political discourse and how it deals with the reality on the ground, and into recognizing Israel and exchanging messages with it. However, the siege has made the Palestinian territories miserable. So decision-makers in Hamas are forced to issue hints and signals that do not affect the movement's general principles. Those signals, however, may be misunderstood. And this is where the problem lies. No one thinks that Hamas supporters will make a big deal of those signals, but any concrete steps toward recognizing Israel will cost Hamas dearly, something which I don't think Hamas wants during this dangerous phase. At the external level, Hamas's enemies and opponents may think that the siege has finally paid off, albeit a little late, and that Hamas's current declarations are signals that, if the siege and the Palestinian suffering continue, the movement may explicitly recognize Israel, which would open the "appetite" of Hamas' opponents for more breakthroughs in its ideology and principles. Not an existential conflict, but a border dispute. Although Hamas is aware of all that, it should be noted that in a few months it is facing elections during which the movement's signals that it may accept a two-state solution will be used in a fierce anti-Hamas campaign. Even though the movement has provided a different administrative performance than before, the fundamental change in the movement's political program may be a deci