16 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. BREYER, J., dissenting Were we to interpret the statute statically, then, the default rule would be immunity in suits arising from an organization’s commercial activities. But the Executive Branch would have the power to withdraw immunity where immunity is not warranted, as the Act itself pro- vides. And in making that determination, it could con- sider whether allowing the lawsuit would jeopardize the organization’s ability to carry out its public interest tasks. In a word, the Executive Branch, under a static interpre- tation, would have the authority needed to separate law- suit sheep from lawsuit goats. Under the majority’s interpretation, by contrast, there is no such flexibility. The Executive does not have the power to tailor immunity by taking into account the risk of a lawsuit’s unjustified interference with institutional objec- tives or other institutional needs. Rather, the majority’s holding takes away an international organization’s im- munity (in cases arising from “commercial” activities) across the board. And without a new statute, there is no way to restore it, in whole or in part. Nothing in the present statute gives the Executive, the courts, or the organization the power to restore immunity, or to tailor any resulting potential liability, where a lawsuit threatens seriously to interfere with an organization’s legitimate needs and goals. Thus, the static interpretation comes equipped with flexibility. It comes equipped with a means to withdraw immunity where justified. But the dynamic interpretation freezes potential liability into law. It withdraws immunity automatically and irretrievably, irrespective of institu- tional harm. It seems highly unlikely that Congress would have wanted this result. * * * At the end of World War II, many in this Nation saw international cooperation through international organiza- HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028574