4 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. BREYER, J., dissenting ... as,” provide no greater help. The majority finds sup- port for its dynamic interpretation in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which gives all citizens the “same right” to make and enforce contracts and to buy and sell property “as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. §§1981(a), 1982 (emphasis added). But it is purpose, not words, that read- ily resolves any temporal linguistic ambiguity in that statute. The Act’s objective, like that of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, was a Nation that treated its citizens equally. Its purpose—revealed by its title, historical context, and other language in the statute—was “to guar- antee the then newly freed slaves the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy.” CBOCS West, Inc. v. Hum- phries, 553 U.S. 442, 448 (2008). Given this purpose, its dynamic nature is obvious. Similarly, judges interpreting the words “same ... as” have long resolved ambiguity not by looking at the words alone, but by examining the statute’s purpose as well. Compare, e.g., Kugler’s Appeal, 55 Pa. 128, 128-125 (1867) (adopting a dynamic interpretation of “same as” statute in light of “plain” and “manifest” statutory purpose); and Gaston v. Lamkin, 115 Mo. 20, 34, 21 S.W. 1100, 1104 (1898) (adopting a dynamic interpretation of “same as” election statute given the legislature’s intent to achieve “simplicity and uniformity in the conduct of elections”), with O'Flynn v. East Rochester, 292 N.Y. 156, 162, 54 N. E. 2d 348, 346 (1944) (adopting a static interpretation of “same as” statute given that the legislature “did not contemplate” that subsequent changes to a referenced statute would apply (interpreting N. Y. Gen. Mun. Law Ann. §860(5) (West 1984))). There is no hard-and-fast rule that the statutory words “as is” or the statutory words “same as’ require applying the law as it stands today. The majority wrongly believes that it can solve the temporal problem by bringing statutory canons in