Cite as: 586 U.S. (2019) 13 Opinion of the Court view further bolsters our understanding of the IOIA’s immunity provision. D The IFC argues that interpreting the IOTA’s immunity provision to grant anything less than absolute immunity would lead to a number of undesirable results. The IFC first contends that affording international organizations only restrictive immunity would defeat the purpose of granting them immunity in the first place. Allowing international organizations to be sued in one member country’s courts would in effect allow that mem- ber to second-guess the collective decisions of the others. It would also expose international organizations to money damages, which would in turn make it more difficult and expensive for them to fulfill their missions. The IFC argues that this problem is especially acute for interna- tional development banks. Because those banks use the tools of commerce to achieve their objectives, they may be subject to suit under the FSIA’s commercial activity excep- tion for most or all of their core activities, unlike foreign sovereigns. According to the IFC, allowing such suits would bring a flood of foreign-plaintiff litigation into U.S. courts, raising many of the same foreign-relations con- 918 (1980) “By virtue of the FSIA, and unless otherwise specified in their constitutive agreements, international organizations are now subject to the jurisdiction of our courts in respect of their commercial activities, while retaining immunity for their acts of a public charac- ter.”); Letter from Arnold Kanter, Acting Secretary of State, to Presi- dent George H. W. Bush Gept. 12, 1992) in Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1016-1017 (S. Cummins & D. Stewart eds. 2005) (explaining that the Headquarters Agreement of the Organi- zation of American States affords the OAS “full immunity from judicial process, thus going beyond the usual United States practice of affording restrictive immunity,” in exchange for assurances th