8 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. Opinion of the Court to the rights in question. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 892 U.S. 409, 427-480 (1968). Similarly, the Federal Tort Claims Act states that the “United States shall be liable” in tort “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S. C. §2674. That provision is most naturally under- stood to make the United States liable in the same way as a private individual at any given time. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-7 1962). Such “same as” provisions dot the statute books, and federal and state courts commonly read them to mandate ongoing equal treatment of two groups or objects. See, e.g., Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F. 2d 668, 671-672 (CA10 1988) (statute mak- ing United States liable for fees and expenses “to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute” interpreted to continuously tie liability of United States to that of any other party); Kugler’s Appeal, 55 Pa. 128, 124-125 (1867) (statute making the procedure for dividing election districts “the same as” the procedure for dividing town- ships interpreted to continuously tie the former procedure to the latter). The IFC objects that the IOIA is different because the purpose of international organization immunity is entirely distinct from the purpose of foreign sovereign immunity. Foreign sovereign immunity, the IFC argues, is grounded in the mutual respect. of sovereigns and serves the ends of international comity and reciprocity. The purpose of international organization immunity, on the other hand, is to allow such organizations to freely pursue the collective goals of member countries without undue interference from the courts of any one member country. The IFC therefore urges that the IOIA should not be read to tether international organization immunity to changing foreign sovereign immunity. But that gets the inquiry backward. We