/ BARAK / 142 US. No matter how we might explain our attack, with the joint exercises soon to begin, it would come over as a deliberate attempt to implicate our most important ally in a potential conflict with Iran, against the explicit wishes of President Obama. I felt this even more strongly when, a few weeks later, I was contacted by one of Bibi’s close political allies. He sounded me out on the possibility of launching our strike against Iran after the joint exercise: barely two weeks before the 2012 US election. Politically, he argued, Obama would then feel compelled to support Israel’s action, or at the very least to refrain from criticizing it. In other words, we would be setting a political trap for the President of the United States. I couldn’t quite believe he was suggesting it. But my reply to this last-gasp suggestion of a way for us to attack the Iranian sites required no hesitation, and only two words: “No way.” Bibi would have known I would oppose such a ploy. But as with so much else in the years I spent in his government, I think it was the politics of the scheme, more than the substance, that enticed him. Almost everything he did seemed increasingly about creating a kind of grand narrative to secure his position on the right, solidifying a base which he figured would sustain him in office. At its core, the narrative presented a picture of vulnerability and victimhood: a kind of “fortress Israel” threatened by terror, missiles on its northern and southern borders, and now potential nuclear annihilation from Iran, while our main ally, the United States, was under the sway of a President who neither understood nor fundamentally supported us. In day-to-day policy terms, this allowed Bibi to insist we couldn’t risk serious engagement with the Palestinians. On domestic issues as well, like the widening gap between those at the top of our high-tech economy and a painfully squeezed middle class, the sense of crisis he encouraged gave him license to hunker