/ BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration — first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense —our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they, nor indeed President Obama, wavered from their commitment to the principle that Israel needed to retain our “qualitative military advantage” over any combination of threats we might face, nor to the $3 billion package of annual US aid that underpinned it. We were even able to agree on additional US backing for our increasingly effective range of anti-missile systems: the Arrow, against long-range ballistic missiles, developed in coordination with the US defense contractor Raytheon; “David’s Sling,” to target enemy forces’ mid-range missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft; and our new Iron Dome system, integrating sophisticated Israeli radar and guidance technology and designed to deal with the missile threat from Hizbollah on our northern border and Hamas in Gaza. It had not yet been used in battle. But from test firings, we were confident it could destroy incoming rockets with nearly 90-per-cent success. By late 2011, the issue of Iran had taken on much greater urgency. There was still no sign the American-led diplomatic efforts were succeeding in removing the nuclear threat. As for an American military strike, though the President intermittently declared that “all options” remained on the table, I knew from senior administration members that it was extremely unlikely to happen. Iran, meanwhile, had been acquiring thousands more centrifuges, more uranium, and heavier protection around its key sites. And the “window of vulnerability” was now only about a year away. Operationally and politically, at least now a majority of the key players in Israel agreed that we had to be prepared to take military action if there was no alternative way to rein in the Iranians. Ashkenazi’s successor