/ BARAK / 127 neutralize any recidivist claims to all of Palestine, especially since we had around 1.5 million Arab citizens living inside our pre-1967 borders. But as I told Bibi, that was ared herring. There was a more straightforward, legally binding answer: a peace treaty which, as with Egypt and Jordan, declared an end to our conflict and to any further claims on either side. My main concern was more fundamental. Bibi’s new approach contradicted the central thrust of Zionism: that after centuries of powerlessness and persecution, Jews would finally take control of their own destiny. We now had our state. It was more than six decades old. “Why do we need the Palestinians, or anyone, to validate us as a Jewish state? Why propose something that implies the Palestinians somehow have a say in what kind of state we choose to be?” Yet the more I pressed him, the clearer it became that the substance didn’t much matter to Bibi. His move was political, and tactical, aimed at staking out a position of power in the diplomatic process. Besides, he didn’t expect any new negotiations to make real progress anyway. As Defense Minister, I had scope for taking steps with the Palestinians on my own. With Bibi’s knowledge and tacit acceptance, I established a particularly strong relationship with Abu Mazen’s Prime Minister, Salaam Fayyad. A respected economist, he operated on the assumption that neither violence nor negotiations seemed likely to lead the Palestinians to statehood as things now stood. He saw his role as doing an end-run. He would put in place the institutions, the infrastructure, the economy, the internal security and the stability needed for an eventual state to succeed. He was trying to do for the Palestinians what Ben-Gurion had done before 1948. He and I met and talked often but discreetly — sometimes in his office in Ramallah, sometimes in mine, sometimes over dinner in the 31*-floor flat I was renting in central Tel Aviv. I remember one dinner in particular.