/ BARAK / 91 the diplomatic equivalent of the battlefield, triumphant against the odds. It was the role he liked and played best. His next move was to take the show on the road: to Arab, European and world capitals, pleading that he had been the “victim” of summit chicanery in which President Clinton and I had presented him with a deal no self-respecting Palestinian could accept. He was also campaigning for international support for a move, in contravention of the final Camp David communiqué, to “declare” a Palestinian state unilaterally in mid-September. I spoke personally to Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, and also dispatched Shlomo-Ben Ami, Amnon Lipkin, Yossi Beilin and Shimon Peres, who was Minister of Regional Cooperation in the coalition, on a series of diplomatic visits to make sure the true story of what had happened at the summit was understood. As a result, the globetrotting Arafat received an almost unanimous rebuff for the idea of a unilateral declaration of stateheood. He was told that if he really wanted a state, he should return to the negotiating table with Israel. By the time I went to New York in early September — joining the largest collection of world leaders ever assembled, for the UN’s Millennium Summit — there seemed little chance of that happening. I met privately with a number of world leaders before delivering a brief address to the more than 150 presidents and prime ministers. I was at pains to take the high road. None of the foreign leaders I met had expressed any doubt that we’d gone much further than they had expected at Camp David, and that the onus for putting diplomacy back on track rested firmly with the Palestinians. Looking straight at Arafat from the UN podium, I said: “We are at the Rubicon, and neither of us can cross it alone.” Jerusalem, “the eternal capital of Israel,” was calling out for a “peace of honor, of courage and of brotherhood” — a peace recognizing that the city was also sacred to Muslims and Ch