/ BARAK/ 71 they were willing to consider full Palestinian sovereignty over two Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, and even some form of Palestinian authority and control in the Christian and Muslim quarters inside the walls of the Old City. They had dropped our insistence on Israeli control over the Jordan Valley, suggesting that we hold on to only a small segment of the border with Jordan. They had gone beyond the share of the West Bank allocated to a Palestinian state on the map that Abu Ala’a wouldn’t even look at. Now, they suggested around 90 percent. But when I asked what the Palestinian negotiators, Saeb Erekat and Mohammed Dahlan, had proposed in return, the answer was almost nothing. They had taken notes. They had asked questions. The one Palestinian proposal, from Saeb Erekat, was on Jerusalem: Palestinian sovereignty over a// the city’s predominantly Arab areas, and Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods. In other words, a division of the city. Even though I was concerned that Gili and Shlomo had gone so far, especially on Jerusalem, I’d reached the point where I doubted that even that would matter. We were now in day-six of the summit, barely 48 hours from President Clinton’s departure for the G-8 summit, and we were negotiating only with ourselves. Knowing that the President planned to go see Arafat, I sat down and wrote him a note — emotional not just because I did it quickly, but because of how deeply let down I felt by the Palestinians’ deliberate avoidance of a peace deal which, with genuine reciprocity, should have been within reach. “I took the report of Shlomo Ben-Ami and Gilead Sher of last night’s discussion very badly...” it began. “This is not a negotiation. This is a manipulative attempt to pull us to a position we will never be able to accept, without the Palestinians moving one inch.” I reminded President Clinton that just as he was taking political risks, I was too. “Even the positions presented by our people last night, thoug