/ BARAK / 46 viewed Hafez al-Assad as a natural partner for peace. For years, he’d been a constant, sneering presence on our northern border, denouncing not only Sadat but any Arab leader who’d shown willingness to engage or negotiate with Israel. Amos Oz, one of our finest writers and a cultural icon for Labor Zionists, probably put it best. He said the Syrians seemed to think that “we will give them the Golan, and they’ ll send us a receipt by fax.” The consensus was: forget Assad. Keep the Golan. In fact, before I left for the US, the Knesset voted on whether it supported my attempt to negotiate an agreement with Syria. We could muster only 47 votes, 14 short of a majority. An opinion poll found only 13 percent of Israelis favored a full withdrawal from the Golan. The message I drew from this was not that we should give up on the chances of a peace agreement. After all, before Begin and Sadat went to Camp David in 1978, an almost equally tiny minority of Israelos had been in favor of withdrawing from the Sinai. Yet once they had seen the other side of the equation — full, formal peace with our most powerful neighbor — the opposition all but evaporated. The problem I saw was that if we and the Syrians couldn’t find a way to insulate our negotiations from leaks, speculation and a swirl of opposition to our efforts at home, we’d never ge? to the key issues of substance. I’d been making that point to the Americans for weeks. At first, I tried to persuade them to hold the talks at Camp David, ensuring the same, media-free isolation that had yielded the historic Israeli-Egypt agreement. But Dennis Ross replied that the very association of Camp David with that breakthrough meant it would be a non-starter for President Assad. I then suggested we consider sites outside of the US: NATO’s Incerlik air base in Turkey, for instance, a British base in Cyprus, an American naval ship in the Mediterranean. Even, half-jokingly, an abandoned missile silo in South Dakota. Yet the