/ BARAK / 38 redeployments — on only the /and part of a land-for-peace deal — meant we risked ignoring the core issues that would determine whether a full peace agreement was achievable. More urgently, I knew from our diplomats in the US that the Americans would not necessarily be receptive to a further delay in moving ahead with Oslo, even if it meant focusing on trying to make peace with Syria. That made my first visit to see President Clinton as Prime Minister especially important. * * * It was billed as a “working visit” and work we did. After a gala dinner for Nava and me in the White House, we helicoptered to the presidential retreat at Camp David. President Clinton and I spent more than 10 hours discussing shared security challenges in the Middle East, especially terrorist groups and states like Iran that were backing them, and, of course, how best to move forward our efforts to negotiate peace. These face-to-face meetings set a pattern that would last throughout the time he and I were in office. On almost all key issues, my preference was to deal directly with the President, something I know sometimes frustrated other senior US negotiators like Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Mideast envoy Dennis Ross. This was not out of any disrespect for them. It was because the decisions on which negotiations would succeed or fail would have to be made at the top, just as President Clinton and I would ultimately carry the responsibility, or the blame, for errors, missteps or missed opportunities. Our first meeting ran until three in the morning. When the President asked me how I saw the peace process going forward, he smiled, in obviously relief, at my answer: I wanted to move quickly. He had only a limited time left in office, and I was determined that we not waste it. Much is often made about the personal “chemistry” in political relationships. Too much, I think, because the core issues, and the trade-offs of substance, are what truly matter when negotiat