I suspect Amnon would have said much the same thing. But that wasn’t the question he’d been asked. As the proceedings wound down, Peres looked glum. Maybe he was anticipating the potential leaks of army concerns about a Golan withdrawal if we did get closer to a deal, and the venomous political attacks he could expect from the right. Bibi’s stated view on a deal with Syria at the time was that we could get peace and keep the Golan. It was classic Bibi, spoken with verve and conviction as if simply saying it would make it true. When the presentation was over, Peres called us into a small room in the bunker reserved for use by the Defense Minister. As Foreign Minister, I was the only cabinet member with him — along with Uri Savir, Peres’s senior deputy for peace negotiations and several other Peres aides. If there had been a discussion, I would have told him that as long as he felt the talks were progressing, he could ignore Amnon’s presentation. If we didn’t get a deal, it would be irrelevant. If we did, the military could find ways to deal with the security issues. But he just looked at us and said” “We’re going for elections.” A few days later, the date was set for May 29, 1996. Yet that would turn out not to be the end of Peres’s doubts or difficulties. It was only the beginning. 285 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028133