difficult. Genuine peace, and trust, would inevitably take years to reach fruition. That was no mere academic problem in a conflict where, for decades, our enemies had defined Israel’s mere existence as illegitimate. The reason for Rabin’s reluctance to have his “deposit” presented as a set negotiating position was that it meant dealing away our only card — territory — before the hard questions about peace had been answered. When he phoned Christopher, I don’t think I’ve ever heard him as angry. That was not what we agreed, he insisted. He said it had spoiled any prospect of serious negotiations on the peace side of the balance. Christopher didn’t agree there had been any real damage, nor that Assad had failed to understand the context. It might not have changed things anyway, since by this stage, the Oslo talks had almost completed a draft agreement. In mid-August, Rabin gave Peres the go-ahead to initial this “Declaration of Principles.” It provided for a period of interim Palestinian self-government; the start of a phased Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank with the creation of a Palestinian police force to deal with internal security; and a commitment to reach a full peace agreement within five years. In early September, ahead of the formal signing of the Oslo declaration, there was an exchange of “letters of recognition” between Arafat and Rabin. Arafat’s letter also renounced “terrorism and other acts of violence” and declared invalid “those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel’s right to exist.” A few days later, the signing ceremony was hosted by President Clinton in Washington. Thus emerged the famous photo of Rabin and Arafat shaking hands, on either side of Clinton, who was beaming, arms outstretched in conciliation. They say a picture is worth a thousand words. In this case, you needed barely a dozen. Rabin’s demeanor, his posture, the look on his face, all seemed to say: “I would rather be shaking the hand of anyone on eart