fully detailed picture of the progress of the SAS action, skeptics and hawks in the cabinet were inclined to see a glass half-empty. They continued to press for Israeli military action. In arare public statement, I tried to reassure the country we did have a military option, but also to urge restraint. I pointed out that the number of Scuds had begun decreasing. Though the threat had not been eliminated altogether, we had “very good operational plans” that would be “carried out when and if the Israeli government instructs us to implement them.” Yet I added a caveat. “On the political level, fingers are itching to carry out operations which, in our opinion, can remove the threat. But in the complex situation created by this war, neither anger, hurt, nor itchy fingers can replace rational thinking.” The American ground invasion did turn out to be swift and decisive. In Israel, Scud attacks continued for a few more days. But the last two missiles fell in the Negev before dawn on February 25, among the very few to cause neither casualties nor damage. We turned out to have been right in our pre-war assessment about the number of missiles: around 40. Fortunately, the casualties were far fewer than we’d anticipated. Not 120 dead, but fifteen, only one of whom died directly because of a missile blast. The other deaths were the result of understandable panic: the misuse of gas masks or the gas antidote drug atropine, or from respiratory and cardiac failure. The physical damage, however, was far greater than I’d anticipated. Buildings were destroyed. Cars were crushed. Glass and debris flew everywhere. In financial terms, the cost ran to hundreds of millions of dollars. The true impact was greater: on families who saw the destruction not only their homes, but a lifetime of prized possessions. For Holocaust survivors in particular, there was the almost unimaginable terror of having to huddle in sealed rooms for fear of gas. And all Israelis had experienced a new sense of vul