in the Sinai. Dan Shomron was now head of the southern command and had told me, before we headed back from California, that he’d recommended me for the post. It was an especially exciting prospect because the US-backed negotiations with Egypt did finally appear to be nearing an agreement. As commander of Division 252, I’d be coordinating and implementing Israel’s Sinai withdrawal. But I didn’t get the job, at least not on my return. Raful Eitan had indeed succeeded Motta as chief of staff, and he had the final say. I'd evidently been right to assume I would figure no higher in his estimation than I had as sayeret commander. To be fair, however, he did agree to my becoming commander of Dan’s reserve division in the south: the same 611" that Arik Sharon had led across the canal in 1973. When I took up that post in April 1979 — just days after the formal Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was indeed signed — I was also promoted. I became a one-star general. And eighteen months later, when the regular division post came open again, I did get the nod to command the 252™". Even then, it was a close-run thing. Raful called me in to see him and said he wanted me to return to the kirya instead, in the one-star general’s post inside military intelligence. He said he had more than enough candidates for division commander, but that my previous experience meant I was the best choice for the intelligence post. I was determined to remain in the field, especially with signs that Begin, and certainly his more right-wing supports in the Likud, were already having second thoughts about the peace deal we’d struck with Egypt. In part, they feared that a withdrawal from any of the land taken in the 1967 war might create a precedent, and invite pressure, for more withdrawals. But the real buyers’ remorse centered on the fact that, as part of the initial agreement at Camp David, Begin had needed to accept a parallel framework for negotiations toward a broader peace that would include the West