I could see why Dan had said it. Working with Mookie and the rest of my team, I’d been in charge of all the initial planning. I was in command of the Sabena assault, the only remotely similar operation Israel had attempted. Though an attempt to rescue dozens of terrified hostages in Entebbe, with both the terrorists and possibly Ugandan soldiers armed and ready, would be much harder. As Sayeret Matkal commander, I’d conceived and commanded other missions that requiring us to break new ground. But — and it was a huge but — I knew from the moment I left Kuti’s office that I would have to find a way to avoid undermining the current sayeret commander, Yoni. Dan had clearly been aware of that as well. He’d stressed to Kuti that he meant no disrespect to Yon1. “But I know Ehud,” he said. “I’ve worked with him. I want him to lead it.” Yoni was still in the Sinai. ’'d phoned him before our first overnight planning session to tell him I was bringing in Mookie and Amiram. Mookie had been giving him daily updates. But the clock was ticking. Under the initial deadline, the hijackers had threatened to begin “executions” on Thursday. Today. The deadline had now been pushed back, but only until Sunday morning —and only after Rabin felt he had no option but to drop our public refusal to consider negotiating with them. When Dan called our first operational briefing for Thursday night, Mookie sent a plane to bring Yoni back. Dan set out the plan with his customary confidence. The four Hercules would take off on Saturday evening from Sharm el-Sheikh at the southernmost tip of the Sinai, to cut the flying distance at least slightly. The first plane would land on the runway near the new terminal. Inside would be a small unit of paratroopers, the sayeret strike force, a pair of Jeeps and the Mercedes. The next Hercules wouldn’t arrive for another seven minutes: the most critical minutes of the whole operation. That was when our “Ugandan motorcade” would make its way to the old terminal