system was given the mandate to contest, assert, and where possible to lead in the various councils of the world. And this was new. Furthermore, anyone who continues to entertain the fanciful idea, which I still sometimes seen in Western commentary, that these changes are not the product of a well-considered Chinese grand strategy, is simply choosing to ignore the clear evidence of clearly defined policy purpose systematically at work in the field. Our Chinese friends think things through carefully. They observe carefully. Not just what is happening in the headlines, which is the permanent obsession of the Western political establishment. But what is happening, in what Xi Jinping would describe as “the underlying historical trends” in international relations. And then, after a period of detailed internal reflection, consideration, and where necessary consensus building within the system, a new direction is set. That indeed is what these Central Foreign Policy Work Conferences are all about. They sum up where the system has got to in its analysis. And then what the system intends to do about it. It’s part of the rolling system of policy analysis, implementation and review that characterises the entire Chinese public policy system, both foreign and domestic. It is both one of the great strengths of the Chinese system. But also one of its great weaknesses if the conclusions reached prove it be analytically flawed, or unsustainable in practice. It takes a lot to turn the Chinese ship of state around once that course has been set at the top. So what changes with the 2018 Central Conference? Is it more of the same? Or simply an intensification of the trajectory? Or a change in content and tone. The answer is all of the above—a blend of continuity and change. A NEW ROLE FOR PARTY IDEOLOGY IN FOREIGN POLICY First, the press reporting of the conference asserts the absolute centrality of the party to the country’s foreign policy mission. This is not entirely new. But the emph