“When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” However, if policies based on conviction or consistency over time are signals that a candidate does not look at the benefits of cooperation, this is an indication that the candidate can be trusted in situations where making the decision that is right for his or her constituency comes at a large political cost. Consistent with this, opponents take every opportunity to paint candidates as flip-floppers who cannot be trusted [21]. This argument generalizes outside of politics to why we respect people who are “principled” over those who are “strategic”. People intuitively cooperate. That is, when people make decisions rapidly, they are more likely to cooperate than if they have time to deliberate. Additionally, people who cooperate make quicker decisions than those who defect [22]. The Social Heuristics Hy- pothesis offers one explanation for this phenomena: we adopt heuristics to avoid incurring cognitive costs associated with deliberation [23, 24, 25]. In a world with repeated inter- actions, it is usually worthwhile to cooperate, so individuals may adopt heuristics such as “always cooperate” or “cooperate as long a situation is not a business interaction.” These same individuals, when serving as laboratory subjects, may apply these heuristics and cooperate even when it is not worthwhile to do so [22, 26]. Our model offers the following alternative explanation for intuitive cooperation. Intu- itive cooperation may serve to reduce responsiveness to realized costs. Thus, others should trust intuitive cooperators more than deliberate cooperators. Since intuitive cooperators are more trustworthy, this may lead people to evolve or learn to become intuitive cooper- ators. Note that this explanation suggests that intuitive cooperation may be an optimal response to others’ ability to detect deliberation, and not, as a heuristic is, an attempt to avoid cognitive costs. For this explanation to be sensible, it mus