15 First, and not surprisingly, ElBaradei is well aware of the atomic energy agency’s handicaps. For one, its inspections are generally restricted to Non-Proliferation Treaty members and only to those sites declared by those members. Extending this limited mandate to other sites requires a strong push from the United Nations Security Council. The agency has only some 2,300 employees, a very tight budget of about $450 million and limited intelligence-gathering resources. Of course, ElBaradei wants to buttress inspection authority and capabilities. He wants more intelligence-sharing from the big powers. He is particularly angry at Washington for not disclosing its intelligence that Syria was building a nuclear facility, and then for doing nothing to stop Israel from bombing that facility in 2007. He also pushes for tougher safeguards for nuclear material and for moving control of the developmental stages of the “fuel cycle” from national to international hands. This is all sensible but probably not attainable. While the United Nations does a number of things quite well, it is not very adept or courageous when it comes to sensitive political matters and national prerogatives. Take, for example, the curious fact that the members of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights elected Libya to its chairmanship in 2003, despite its appalling record, because it was “Africa’s turn.” If this is how business is done, it is unlikely that the [.A.E.A.’s board of governors and the Security Council will ever endow the agency with the common-sense powers and capabilities E|Baradei wants. Beyond this, ElBaradei insistently describes the United States and other great powers as more the problem than the solution. In a “new era, one characterized by clandestine activity and the willingness of some countries to blatantly deceive,” the Iraq experience showed “that this deliberate deception was not limited to small countries ruled by ruthless dictators.” ElBaradei goes on to fault the U