12 to his religious base. In fact, the relationship between Hamas and al Qaeda, and between Hamas and al Qaeda-like jihadists in Gaza, is far more contentious. Zawahiri has blasted Hamas for adhering to ceasefires with Israel, not immediately implementing Islamic law in Gaza, and otherwise deviating from the pure faith of jihadism. To prevent these ideas from eroding its support, Hamas has harshly repressed al Qaeda-inspired jihadists in Gaza, arresting and even torturing some of the individuals linked to these groups, according to Israeli sources. In 2009, one Salafi-jihadist preacher declared Gaza to be an Islamic state; Hamas stormed the mosque that was his base, killing him and over 20 others. But the biggest difference is that Hamas is a success while al Qaeda is a failure. Hamas has gone from a small group overshadowed by Yasir Arafat's Fatah to a large and powerful organization. Whether we like it or not, Hamas is the government of Gaza -- and terrorism helped them get there. And with the fall of Mubarak and the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as an important political actor there, Hamas may gain influence. Al Qaeda, in contrast, is if anything farther from its goals of ending U.S. regional influence and establishing a caliphate than it was 15 years ago. Despite Netanyahu's rhetoric, Hamas cannot simply be wished away when it comes to the peace process. It represents a large portion of Palestinian opinion, and it has repeatedly demonstrated that it can use suicide bombers, rocket attacks, or other forms of terrorism to disrupt any talks. But the group's occasional pragmatism suggests that under the right conditions it can be convinced not to play the spoiler. Such an effort may fail and involves many sticks as well as carrots, but a similar effort with al Qaeda would be a fool's errand. Netanyahu's government may be dead-set against talking with Hamas, but treating it like al Qaeda and using this as a reason to not negotiate with moderates like A