22 can be achieved only through “jihad and resistance until the Islamic regime rises.” The chaos and disappointment that follow revolutions will inevitably provide many opportunities for Al Qaeda to spread its influence. Demographic pressures, economic woes and corruption will continue to bedevil even the best-run governments in the region. Divisions will beset the protest movements, and vestiges of the old regimes may re- emerge. Al Qaeda and its allies don’t need to win the allegiance of every protester to exert their influence; they have a patient view of history. Although Washington must avoid tainting organic movements or being perceived as a central protagonist, the United States and its Western allies should not be shy about working with reformers and democrats to shape the region’s trajectory — and ensuring Al Qaeda’s irrelevance in the Sunni Arab world, the heart of its supposed constituency. In countries where autocrats have been toppled (as in Egypt and Tunisia), we must help shape the new political and social environment; in nondemocratic, allied states (like the region’s monarchies), we need to accelerate internal reform; and in repressive states (like Iran, Libya and Syria), we should challenge the legitimacy of autocratic regimes and openly assist dissidents and democrats. This is not about military intervention or the imposition of American- style democracy. It is about using American power and influence to support organic reform movements. The United States Agency for International Development and advocacy organizations can help civil society groups grow; human rights groups can organize and assist networks of dissidents; and Western women’s groups and trade unions could support their counterparts throughout the Middle East. Wealthy philanthropists and entrepreneurs who are part of the Middle Eastern diaspora could HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023508