8 In addition to “setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons,” the 2007 statement argued for a number of practical measures to diminish the likelihood that nuclear weapons would fall into “dangerous hands,” or that they would be launched by accident, or that countries interested in, but not now possessing, such weapons would succeed in acquiring them. A number of these measures are doable and desirable, but some are dubious. Altering the posture of nuclear weapons now deployed so that they need not be launched urgently, thereby increasing warning time and diminishing the danger of an accidental or unauthorized launch, would be a useful thing to do—although there is room for debate about how best to accomplish this. The end of the Cold War should have brought an end to deterrent forces poised for instantaneous launch (which in the extreme case could mean launching missiles on the strength of radar warnings) but, unfortunately and dangerously, old habits die hard. Reducing or eliminating the number of short-range nuclear weapons that are designed to be forward deployed would also be useful, since these are the small, highly mobile weapons that could fall into the wrong hands far more readily than large, central strategic systems that are carefully controlled. Most of the short-range weapons deployed today are Russian, however, and the Russians have resisted American proposals to adopt limits on their number. (Given Russia’s strong interest in limiting strategic weapons, it is difficult to understand why the Obama administration did not insist on some limits on short- range nuclear weapons as a condition for the New START Treaty. Unused leverage is a squandered opportunity.) “Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-useable plutonium and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world,” another of the 2007 statement’s recommendations, is an obvious thing to do. But there is an HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023494